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Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ All in all the change process to the internal organisation structure took roughly eleven years, with frustratingly long learning and adaptation phases, and is still in progress (see ANNEX 4). Slovakia The establishing of JAVYS is connected with the generally complicated and not always transparent privatization process in the Slovak Republic that was started in the late nineties. Slovenské elektrárne company (SE), a state enterprise company, was originally responsible for the operation. Part of the company was privatized by the ENEL Company - a multinational group based in Italy (ENEL 2013). Selected nuclear assets of SE in which ENEL was not interested were detached. For this reason, SE formed the subsidiary GovCo company (GovCo a.s.) in 2005. GovCo was owned by the government that was represented by the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. Subsequently, SE assured as much as possible smooth transfer of administration and operation of these assets towards GovCo. Based on a decision by the government of the Slovak Republic the resolution on the privatization of Slovak Power Plants went into power in April 2006. At that time it was assumed that GovCo will be stock company. It would have been responsible for the operation of the V1 Nuclear Power Plant, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the treatment of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel as well as for the decommissioning of the A1 NPP 22 . The shareholder Ministry of Economy of Slovak Republic later initiated changing of the company’s name to JAVYS (Jadrová a vyraďovacia spoločnosť, JAVYS - Nuclear and Decommissioning Company). The first organisational structure of the decommissioning company was introduced within the framework agreement between the Slovak Republic and the EBRD that was signed in 2001 – before GovCo was established. The activities of the Bohunice International Decommissioning Support Fund (BIDSF) were fixed in the agreement. In this context the Project Management Unit (PMU) was established which was responsible for preparation and implementation of decommissioning projects. The PMU was composed of JAVYS experts and international consultant staff (see ANNEX 5). The Decommissioning License was issued in July, 2011 (NRA SR Resolution No. 400/2011) by UJD SR (Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic - Úrad jadrového dozoru Slovenskej republiky). The license issuing was based on the application of JAVYS in December 2010. Organisational requirements to obtain the license included the change of the organisational structure, reduction of personnel responsible for operation, change of personnel portfolio and mix of operational staff with new project-oriented personnel and personnel trainings. In January 2012, JAVYS had 897 employees; 382 people of them were employed by the V1 Decommissioning Division and the Project Management Unit division (CPD 2012). 22 Bohunice A1 is situated on the Jaslovské Bohunice site and was shut-downed after an accident in 1977. It is currently is undergoing a decommissioning and cleanup process. The Federal Government of the CSSR resolution No. 135/1979 put a definitive end to the operation of the A1 nuclear power plant in 1979 at that time, ordering it to be prepared for gradual decommissioning. [Link] 108
Nuclear Decommissioning: Management of Costs and Risks ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 4.4.2. Comparison and evaluation of the national organisations with best practice The change processes in the two best practice examples EWN and EDF were very different. The organisation and processes at EWN were changed rapidly because it was already clear at an early stage that decommissioning was the only option and that this requires a completely different approach (project management). The setup process at EDF only started after the basic decision for decommissioning was taken, but then was consistent and complete. Compared to these two examples, the change processes in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia were considerably slower, required more interim steps and in some aspects are still not sufficiently effective. Several reasons played a role in the past: The decision to shut the plants down was seen as possibly reversible. That kept responsible management and workforce from adopting the task early and with the necessary rigor. Decommissioning was not seen as an ambitious task but much less demanding than operation of the facility. The complexity of this undertaking was generally underestimated. In the first phase the management of the reactors had no experiences at all with the new situation and tried to manage the changed situation with some additions or 'add-ons' to their organisation until this, years later, proved to be inadequate. In this phase nearly no exchange between the three countries was established so that learning from more advanced countries (e.g. Slovakia) or a systematic, planned and well-organized experience exchange with the other affected countries and/or with countries having advanced experiences in decommissioning did not occur. Organisational issues were in general underestimated so that continuity in the established structures was chosen and kept as long as possible. These aspects do not play a role any more. From our interviews, site visits and from the answers to our questionnaire we evaluate today’s internal structures, the self-confidence of the management and the awareness about the necessary changes are well-established in all three countries. Another aspect that was over long periods very different from EWN and EDF’s principal practices was that the main managing and planning instrument, the PMU, was constructed outside the managing organisation. The PMU unit consisted of two different member categories: Experts as employed by, nominated by, reporting to and under full control of the managing organisation; External consultants, as selected, controlled and fully administered by EBRD. This construction was not in line with the framework agreement between the countries and EBRD, which defined the task to establish PMUs as part of the managing organisation and under national control (see the respective text of such an agreement on page 103). Decision-making, not only on operational but also in strategic issues (see chapter 2.4.3), previously a task between the internal PMU and its controlling ministry, was shifted towards the external PMU and EBRD. This PMU design is shown in Figure 36. 109
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