2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
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<strong>HSS</strong> Abstracts<br />
out the distribution <strong>of</strong> fluctuations and looked to its graphical form for insight<br />
into the character <strong>of</strong> the process. In studies <strong>of</strong> color perception these same<br />
Viennese physicists insisted on the irreducible variability between observers.<br />
In rejecting the significance <strong>of</strong> averages and problematizing the notion<br />
experimental error, Schrödinger and his colleagues took an approach that might<br />
be termed “morphological.” The premise <strong>of</strong> their method seems to have<br />
mirrored Goethe’s axiom that there is no such thing as a “normal” member <strong>of</strong><br />
a species, or an “error <strong>of</strong> nature.”<br />
H<br />
S<br />
S<br />
Jamie␣ N. Cohen-Cole Princeton University<br />
The Cognitive Revolution<br />
and the Culture <strong>of</strong> Interdisciplinarity in Cold War America<br />
In the two decades following World War Two experimental psychology<br />
experienced the Cognitive Revolution. Early adherents <strong>of</strong> the cognitive<br />
perspective saw their work as a fundamentally interdisciplinary project. In<br />
fact, it was this interdisciplinarity which helped cognitively oriented<br />
psychologists overcome objections raised by behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner<br />
to the scientific study <strong>of</strong> mind. But, the advantage the cognitive perspective<br />
drew from its interdisciplinary stance did not rely only upon the specific ideas<br />
that psychologists could import from neighboring disciplines. Instead, a<br />
significant part <strong>of</strong> the benefit cognitive psychology derived from being<br />
interdisciplinary rested on the two features <strong>of</strong> the Cold War’s cultural climate.<br />
First, many attributed America’s technical success in WWII to the<br />
interdisciplinary nature <strong>of</strong> the war-related research programs—most notably<br />
that <strong>of</strong> the Manhattan Project. They further believed that this war-time<br />
experience demonstrated that the best way to conduct research would be on a<br />
similar interdisciplinary basis. Second, from the late 1940s through the 1960s,<br />
thought carried political and moral significance. For many in this period rational<br />
thinking and freedom <strong>of</strong> thought were seen as intimately related and as the<br />
foundations <strong>of</strong> democracy. At the same time, irrational, ideological, and<br />
totalitarian thinking (which were commonly equated one to the other) were<br />
seen as anti-democratic. If types <strong>of</strong> thinking could be characterized with<br />
political labels, the converse was also true—political positions were given<br />
mental characteristics. Within this understanding, a primary feature <strong>of</strong><br />
rationality was broad, synthetic thought. In the case <strong>of</strong> scientific research this<br />
meant the ability to escape methodologies bound by a single discipline. Within<br />
this charged context government <strong>of</strong>ficials, public intellectuals, science<br />
administrators, foundation <strong>of</strong>ficials, and cultural commentators would come<br />
to favor interdisciplinary research. And, as a consequence, research programs<br />
with a cognitive emphasis were able to garner external funding, despite the<br />
fact that a behaviorism opposed to cognitive perspectives held sway within<br />
the academy.<br />
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