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2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

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<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />

and what I call the social manifestation thesis—a thesis about the psychology<br />

<strong>of</strong> individuals. Contemporary work on this topic has confused these two theses.<br />

My discussion also points to research questions and issues that Wilson’s work<br />

raises, as well as their connection to externalist conceptions <strong>of</strong> the mind familiar<br />

since the work <strong>of</strong> Putnam and Burge.<br />

Eric Winsberg Northwestern University<br />

Simulations, Models, and Theories: Complex Physical Systmes and their<br />

Representations<br />

Using an example <strong>of</strong> the computer simulation <strong>of</strong> the convective structure <strong>of</strong> a<br />

red giant star, this paper argues that simulation is a rich inferential process,<br />

and not simply a “number-crunching” technique. The scientific practice <strong>of</strong><br />

simulation, moreover, poses some interesting and challenging epistemological<br />

and methodological issues for the philosophy <strong>of</strong> science. I will also argue that<br />

these challenges would be best addressed by a philosophy <strong>of</strong> science that places<br />

less emphasis on the representational capacity <strong>of</strong> theories (and ascribes that<br />

capacity instead to models) and more emphasis on the role <strong>of</strong> theory in guiding<br />

(rather than determining) the construction <strong>of</strong> models.<br />

P<br />

S<br />

A<br />

K.␣ Brad Wray University <strong>of</strong> British Columbia<br />

<strong>Science</strong>, Biases, and the Threat <strong>of</strong> Global Pessimism<br />

Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists view that the conclusions reached<br />

in inquiry are determined by the interests <strong>of</strong> some segment <strong>of</strong> the population,<br />

arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender,<br />

are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes<br />

effect such inquiries are operative in all domians, but the prevalence <strong>of</strong> such<br />

biases does not support global pessimism. I argue that in order to address the<br />

global pessimists’ concerns, the scientific community needs criticism from<br />

people with diverse interests and background assumptions. Kitcher fails to<br />

see this because he fails to recognize the social nature <strong>of</strong> scientific inquiry and<br />

the constructive epistemic role that our differences can play.<br />

245

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