2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

PSA Abstracts
on the principle that explanation-based revisions should preserve certain Bayes
factors. A plausible alternative principle dicatates that observation- and
explanation-based revisions should commute. One formulation of the latter
principle is equivalent to the uniformity of Bayes factors, but another is not.
This paper initiates a study of these competing revision principles.
Marcel Weber University of Hannover
Determinism, Realism, and Probability in Evolutionary Theory: The
Pitfalls, and How to Avoid Them
Recent discussion of the statistical character of evolutionary theory has centered
around two positions: (1) Determinism combined with the claim that the
statistical character is eliminable, a subjective interpretation of probability,
and instrumentalism; (2) Indeterminism combined with the claim that the
statistical character is ineliminable, a propensity interpretation of probability,
and realism. I point out some internal problems in these positions and show
that the relationship between determinism, eliminability, realism, and the
interpretation of probability is more complex than previously assumed in this
debate. Furthermore, I take some initial steps towards a more adequate account
of the statistical character of evolutionary theory.
Steve Weinstein Princeton University
Remarks on the Conventionality of Simultaneity
A recent paper of Sarkar & Stachel (1999) argues that Malament’s (1977)
proof, that there is only one simultaneity convention for special relativity that
can be defined in terms of the causal structure, rests on a dubious assumption,
namely that time has no intrinsic direction. Relaxing this assumption, Sarkar
and Stachel use Malament’s framework to construct alternative simultaneity
conventions. In this paper, I argue that although the Sarkar and Stachel
conventions satisfy their criteria, the conventions are deeply flawed, and suggest
that the original criteria with which Malament works should be augmented.
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Robert␣ A. Wilson University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Group-Level Cognition
David Sloan Wilson has recently revived the idea of a group mind as an
application of group selectionist thinking to cognition. Central to my discussion
of this idea is the distinction between the claim that groups have a psychology