2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

PSA Abstracts
alternatives as well-confirmed by merely all actual evidence, so long as this
transient predicament recurs for each theory and body of evidence we consider.
The historical record supports the claim that this recurrent, transient
underdetermination predicament is our own.
Daniel Steel University of Pittsburgh
Bayesian Statistics in Radiocarbon Calibration
Critics of Bayesianism often assert that scientists are not Bayesians. The
widespread use of Bayesian statistics in the field of radiocarbon calibration is
discussed in relation to this charge. This case study illustrates the willingness
of scientists to use Bayesian statistics when the approach offers some advantage,
while continuing to use orthodox methods in other contexts. Such an eclectic
and pragmatic use of statistical methods casts doubt on inferences from the
use of a method to a strong commitment to principles underlying the method.
Alex Viskovatoff University of Pittsburgh
Economics and Kant’s Philosophy of Science
P
S
A
According to Kant’s philosophy of science, there are three methodological
components to scientific theory appraisal: those of probability, possibility, and
unity. Common views of scientific method, influenced by empiricism, usually
only recognize the first. Because physical phenomena are governed by
mathematical laws, this is not too harmful in the case of physics. Because
social phenomena do not exhibit laws comparable to the ones in physics
however—so that inductive methods are only of limited effectiveness for theory
appraisal—this oversight is devastating in the case of economics: it is left
with no adequate criteria for theory selection. The two other methodological
components, in addition to clarifying the reservations of many regarding
economics’ scientific status, can prove useful as a guide to the construction of
valid economic (and social) theory.
Carl␣ G. Wagner The University of Tennessee
Old Evidence and New Explanation III
Jeffrey (1991, 1995) has devised a probability revision method that increases
the probability of hypothesis H when is it discovered that H implies previously
known evidence E. Wagner (1997, 1999) has generalized Jeffrey’s method to
the case of uncertain old evidence and probabilistic new explanation, based
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