2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

PSA Abstracts
Hans Radder Vrije University
Primitive Rays And Aetherial Air: On the Impossibility of Theory-Free
Experiments
In this paper, I offer a differentiated philosophical interpretation of the
relationship between experiment and theory. The claims that all scientific
experiments are theory guided or that all experiments are explicit tests of
existing theories about the objects in question, prove to be implausible. Yet
theories are important for experimental practice for two reasons. The
(immediate or later) significance of experiments is affected by the theoretical
context in which they are situated. Moreover, performing and understanding
experiments depends on a theoretical interpretation of what happens in realizing
the experimental process. Through an examination of Newton’s prism and
Boyle’s air-pump experiments, the last point is argued here in detail. It goes
both against explicit claims made by some philosophers of experiment and
against possible empiricist conclusions that might be drawn from such claims.
Athanasios Raftopoulos University of Cyprus
Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception
In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by
undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce
psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) the early
vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and
events and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the earlyvision
processing modules to participate in higher -level visual or cognitive
functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call perception,
is bottom-up and theory neutral, and can play the role of ground in which a
naturalized epistemology could be built and relativism be avoided.
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Robert␣ C. Richardson University of Cincinnati
Chance and Indeterminism in Evolutionary Explanation
Explanations in evolutionary biology are probabilistic. Some philosophers such
as Rosenberg (1988, 1994) and Horan (1994) argue that this indeterminism in
evolutionary explanation is not fundamental. Appeals to chance in evolutionary
explanation are merely epistemological, and can be dispensed with in favor of
more fundamental deterministic explanations. Others such as Brandon and
Carson (1996) press that the appeal to chance in evolutionary explanation is
fundamental to evolutionary biology. These discussions fail to recognize the