2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
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<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />
type can be obtained for humans because <strong>of</strong> ethical considerations as well as<br />
technical difficulties. While interesting conclusions can be derived for other<br />
mammals, and possibly even for some primates, the study <strong>of</strong> nature vs. nurture<br />
in humans is indeed very limited, and it is about time that the scientific<br />
community refrains itself from making grand statements that cannot be<br />
reasonably substantiated by the available evidence. This especially in light <strong>of</strong><br />
the obvious implications <strong>of</strong> such studies for social and educational policies.<br />
Cassandra␣ L. Pinnick Western Kentucky University<br />
Error and Underdetermination: The Status <strong>of</strong> Metamethodology<br />
In her book, Error and the Growth <strong>of</strong> Experimental Knowledge, Deborah Mayo<br />
maintains that her new use <strong>of</strong> error statistics can resolve the abiding Duhem<br />
Problem that some philosophers and sociologists <strong>of</strong> science believe to plague<br />
scientific evidence and knowledge. My paper considers, first, Mayo’s response<br />
to certain <strong>of</strong> Larry Laudan’s cautions to the scientific methodologist regarding<br />
experimental design and normativity. Next, I take up the question <strong>of</strong> how well<br />
Mayo’s methods fare in rendering the Duhem Problem toothless. I examine<br />
possible criticisms that center on Mayo’s method <strong>of</strong> severe test; these criticisms<br />
focus on the methodological—rather than the logical—gaps possibly remaining<br />
as between evidence and theory and how any such gaps might risk loss <strong>of</strong><br />
normative power for Mayo’s overall methodology.<br />
234<br />
Itamar Pitowsky The Hebrew University<br />
Quantum Speedup <strong>of</strong> Computations<br />
Physicists <strong>of</strong>ten interpret the Church-Turing Thesis as saying something about<br />
the scope and limitations <strong>of</strong> physical computing machines. Although this was<br />
not the intention <strong>of</strong> Church or Turing, the Physical Church-Turing Thesis is<br />
interesting in its own right. Consider, for example, Wolfram’s formulation: “One<br />
can expect in fact that universal computers are as powerful in their computational<br />
capabilities as any physically realizable system can be... No physically<br />
implementable procedure could then shortcut a computationally irreducible<br />
process.” Wolfram’s claim is not just that any physically computable function<br />
(from natural numbers to natural numbers) is recursive. He maintains,<br />
furthermore, that any theoretical bound on Turing machine (TM) computation<br />
reflects a physical limitation. For example, suppose that we can prove that the<br />
fastest TM computation <strong>of</strong> a given function runs in exponential number <strong>of</strong> steps<br />
(in the size <strong>of</strong> the input). This, says Wolfram, constrains the actual time <strong>of</strong><br />
computation <strong>of</strong> that function on any real physical machine. An even more extreme<br />
formulation can be found in Aharonov’s excellent review <strong>of</strong> quantum