2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
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<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />
alternative presuppositions and connect them to the specific case <strong>of</strong> the<br />
foundations <strong>of</strong> geometry. This will show that we can distinguish mathematically<br />
fundamental features <strong>of</strong> a geometry from the traditional foundations <strong>of</strong> that<br />
geometry. We will then argue that the same can be done for category theory,<br />
since the latter exhibits the fundamentals <strong>of</strong> mathematics and that from there,<br />
a philosophically appealing program, currently being developed by many<br />
logicians and mathematicians, can be envisaged.<br />
Glenn Parsons University <strong>of</strong> Alberta<br />
Patrick McGivern University <strong>of</strong> Alberta<br />
Can the Bundle Theory save Substantivalism from the Hole Argument?<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the most serious theoretical obstacles to contemporary space-time<br />
substantivalism is the dilemma produced by the hole argument. We argue that<br />
adopting the bundle <strong>of</strong> universals theory <strong>of</strong> substance allows space-time<br />
substantivalists to escape from this dilemma. Several philosophers, however,<br />
have claimed that the bundle <strong>of</strong> universals theory and substantivalism are<br />
actually incompatible. We argue that these claims are unfounded. However,<br />
we find that although the positions are not logically incompatible, combining<br />
substantivalism with the bundle <strong>of</strong> universals theory can lead to a commitment<br />
to various problematic theses about the nature <strong>of</strong> space-time.<br />
P<br />
S<br />
A<br />
Massimo Pigliucci University <strong>of</strong> Tennessee<br />
Genotype-environment interactions and our understanding <strong>of</strong> the biological<br />
bases <strong>of</strong> human cognitive abilities<br />
The debate on the biological bases <strong>of</strong> human characteristics, and especially <strong>of</strong><br />
cognitive abilities, has been raging in philosophy and biology essentially<br />
forever. The two extreme positions maintain that either a) the genes <strong>of</strong> an<br />
individual causally explain most <strong>of</strong> her characteristics, with the environment<br />
playing a modifier role, or b) the environments (physical but especially cultural)<br />
to which an individual is exposed during her life are the major determinants <strong>of</strong><br />
her behavior, with the genes playing a secondary role. There is indeed<br />
convincing evidence to support both positions, but that does not mean that the<br />
truth lies somewhere in the middle . Where would this middle be? Surely<br />
nobody think it possible to Solomonically divide an individual’s intelligence<br />
or creativity in percentages due to the environment experienced by or to the<br />
genetic makeup <strong>of</strong> that individual. I will submit that the conceptual solution<br />
to the conundrum has already been provided by the study <strong>of</strong> genotypeenvironment<br />
interactions as understood in the context <strong>of</strong> the modern theory <strong>of</strong><br />
reaction norms and phenotypic plasticity. However, no relevant data <strong>of</strong> this<br />
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