2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

PSA Abstracts
circumstances solely the known data can fix praise or blame within a theoretical
context. This result is contrary to what has long been accepted.
Bradley Monton University of Kentucky
On Dualistic Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
Dualistic interpretations attempt to solve the measurement problem of quantum
mechanics by postulating the existence of non-physical minds, and by giving
a suitable dynamical equation for how these minds evolve. I consider the
relative merits of three extant dualistic interpretations (Albert and Loewer s
single-mind and many-minds interpretations, and Squires interpretation), and
I defend Squires interpretation as preferable to the Albert/Loewer
interpretations. I also argue that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds
evolve independently of the physical universe, and hence render the physical
universe otiose; the interpretations are better viewed as supporting not dualism,
but mental monism.
Thomas Mormann University of the Basque Country (EHU/UPV)
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A Quasianalytical Constitution of Physical Space
One of the most incisive criticism of Carnap’s Aufbau is Quine’s who conten-ded
that the Aufbau account of the constitution of the physical world is
fatally flawed. According to him, statements of the form “Quality q is at pointinstant
x;y;z;t” cannot be reconstructed in terms of Carnap’s initial language
of sense data and logic. According to Quine, the connective “is at” remains an
added undefined connective. In this paper it is proved that this contention is
wrong. The proof makes use of the conceptual machinery of incidence
geometry.
Wayne␣ C. Myrvold University of Western Ontario
Einstein’s Untimely Burial
There seems to be a growing consensus that any interpretation of quantum
mechanics other than an instrumentalist interpretation will have to abandon
the requirement of Lorentz invariance, at least at the fundamental level,
preserving at best Lorentz invariance of phenomena. In particular, it is often
said that the collapse postulate is incompatible with the demands of relativity.
It is the purpose of this paper to argue that such a conclusion is premature, and
that a covariant account of collapse can be given according to which the state
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