2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />
like the move from geometric to algebraic representation, and the hesitant<br />
acceptance <strong>of</strong> Newton’s metaphysical concept <strong>of</strong> force.<br />
Kristen Intemann University <strong>of</strong> Washington<br />
<strong>Science</strong> and Values: Are Value Judgements Always Irrelevant to the<br />
Justification <strong>of</strong> Scientific Claims?<br />
Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence<br />
theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative<br />
claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for<br />
descriptive claims. I argue against one <strong>of</strong> the premises <strong>of</strong> Haack’s argument.<br />
Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense <strong>of</strong> this premise<br />
would cast doubt on a second premise <strong>of</strong> Haack’s argument. My aim is to open<br />
up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice.<br />
Tetsuji Iseda Nagoya University<br />
Bridging a Gap Between Naturalistic and Traditional Approaches in the<br />
Philosophy <strong>of</strong> <strong>Science</strong><br />
There seems to be a lack <strong>of</strong> mutual understanding between naturalistically<br />
oriented philosophers and more traditional philosophers in the philosophy <strong>of</strong><br />
science. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between these two orientations<br />
by introducing a conceptual framework: a distinction between action-guiding<br />
rules and evaluative principles. To make the argument concrete, I examine<br />
exchanges between Frederick Suppe and Bayesians over Suppe’s interpretation<br />
<strong>of</strong> W.J. Morgan’s plate tectonics paper. Through a re-analysis <strong>of</strong> the Morgan<br />
paper, I conclude that Suppe’s account through the special reasons requirement<br />
can be made compatible with a Bayesian account, though not quite in the way<br />
Bayesians themselves argue.<br />
222<br />
Jonathan␣ Michael Kaplan University <strong>of</strong> Tennessee<br />
Historical Evidence and Human Adaptations<br />
Phylogenetic information is <strong>of</strong>ten necessary to distinguish between competing<br />
evolutionary scenarios. Recently, evolutionary psychology has acknowledged<br />
this, and has claimed that such evidence can be and has been brought to bear on<br />
adaptive hypotheses involving complex human traits. If this were possible, it<br />
would be a valuable source <strong>of</strong> possible tests for hypothesized adaptive traits in<br />
humans, especially given that such hypotheses generally cannot be tested by the