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2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

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<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />

like the move from geometric to algebraic representation, and the hesitant<br />

acceptance <strong>of</strong> Newton’s metaphysical concept <strong>of</strong> force.<br />

Kristen Intemann University <strong>of</strong> Washington<br />

<strong>Science</strong> and Values: Are Value Judgements Always Irrelevant to the<br />

Justification <strong>of</strong> Scientific Claims?<br />

Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence<br />

theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative<br />

claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for<br />

descriptive claims. I argue against one <strong>of</strong> the premises <strong>of</strong> Haack’s argument.<br />

Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense <strong>of</strong> this premise<br />

would cast doubt on a second premise <strong>of</strong> Haack’s argument. My aim is to open<br />

up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice.<br />

Tetsuji Iseda Nagoya University<br />

Bridging a Gap Between Naturalistic and Traditional Approaches in the<br />

Philosophy <strong>of</strong> <strong>Science</strong><br />

There seems to be a lack <strong>of</strong> mutual understanding between naturalistically<br />

oriented philosophers and more traditional philosophers in the philosophy <strong>of</strong><br />

science. This paper attempts to bridge the gap between these two orientations<br />

by introducing a conceptual framework: a distinction between action-guiding<br />

rules and evaluative principles. To make the argument concrete, I examine<br />

exchanges between Frederick Suppe and Bayesians over Suppe’s interpretation<br />

<strong>of</strong> W.J. Morgan’s plate tectonics paper. Through a re-analysis <strong>of</strong> the Morgan<br />

paper, I conclude that Suppe’s account through the special reasons requirement<br />

can be made compatible with a Bayesian account, though not quite in the way<br />

Bayesians themselves argue.<br />

222<br />

Jonathan␣ Michael Kaplan University <strong>of</strong> Tennessee<br />

Historical Evidence and Human Adaptations<br />

Phylogenetic information is <strong>of</strong>ten necessary to distinguish between competing<br />

evolutionary scenarios. Recently, evolutionary psychology has acknowledged<br />

this, and has claimed that such evidence can be and has been brought to bear on<br />

adaptive hypotheses involving complex human traits. If this were possible, it<br />

would be a valuable source <strong>of</strong> possible tests for hypothesized adaptive traits in<br />

humans, especially given that such hypotheses generally cannot be tested by the

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