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2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

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<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />

logical independence <strong>of</strong> causal facts. Mellor in particular argues that argues<br />

on the basis <strong>of</strong> the logical independence <strong>of</strong> causal facts together with ‘laws <strong>of</strong><br />

large numbers’, that causal loops are impossible because they produce<br />

inconsistent sets <strong>of</strong> frequencies. In this paper I <strong>of</strong>fer an improved version <strong>of</strong><br />

his argument, clarifying the relevant independence assumption, but argue<br />

nevertheless that it would be preferable to abandon the improved independence<br />

assumption in the case <strong>of</strong> causal loops. I <strong>of</strong>fer three arguments for this view.<br />

Armond Duwell University <strong>of</strong> Pittsburgh<br />

Explaining Information Transfer in Quantum Teleportation<br />

Quantum teleportation is a recently discovered phenomenon whereby quantum<br />

information can be transferred from some location A to another location B<br />

without physically moving quantum information from A to B. Several<br />

explanations <strong>of</strong> information transfer in quantum teleportation have surfaced. I<br />

examine four <strong>of</strong> them. After reviewing some elementary results about<br />

teleportation I argue that only one <strong>of</strong> the four could be acceptable. I also argue<br />

that there are several different concepts <strong>of</strong> information employed in these<br />

explanations and as such they have differing explanandums.<br />

P<br />

S<br />

A<br />

Adam Elga Massachusetts Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology<br />

Statistical mechanics and the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> counterfactual dependence<br />

In “Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow”, D. Lewis defends an analysis<br />

<strong>of</strong> counterfactuals intended to yield the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> counterfactual<br />

dependence: that later affairs depend counterfactually on earlier ones, and not<br />

the other way around. I argue that careful attention to the dynamical properties<br />

<strong>of</strong> thermodynamically irreversible processes shows that in many ordinary cases,<br />

Lewis’s analysis fails to yield this asymmetry. Furthermore, the analysis fails<br />

in an instructive way: one that teaches us something about the connection<br />

between the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> overdetermination and the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> entropy.<br />

Christopher Eliot University <strong>of</strong> Minnesota<br />

A Field Guide to Reduction in Ecology<br />

Philosophical accounts <strong>of</strong> reductionism have not clearly illustrated cases <strong>of</strong><br />

reduction in biology, and, if at all, certainly not in ecology. Philosophers and<br />

biologists have moreover <strong>of</strong>fered a number <strong>of</strong> arguments aimed at<br />

demonstrating that ecology is not reductive. Both reductionists with respect<br />

215

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