2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
<strong>PSA</strong> Abstracts<br />
logical independence <strong>of</strong> causal facts. Mellor in particular argues that argues<br />
on the basis <strong>of</strong> the logical independence <strong>of</strong> causal facts together with ‘laws <strong>of</strong><br />
large numbers’, that causal loops are impossible because they produce<br />
inconsistent sets <strong>of</strong> frequencies. In this paper I <strong>of</strong>fer an improved version <strong>of</strong><br />
his argument, clarifying the relevant independence assumption, but argue<br />
nevertheless that it would be preferable to abandon the improved independence<br />
assumption in the case <strong>of</strong> causal loops. I <strong>of</strong>fer three arguments for this view.<br />
Armond Duwell University <strong>of</strong> Pittsburgh<br />
Explaining Information Transfer in Quantum Teleportation<br />
Quantum teleportation is a recently discovered phenomenon whereby quantum<br />
information can be transferred from some location A to another location B<br />
without physically moving quantum information from A to B. Several<br />
explanations <strong>of</strong> information transfer in quantum teleportation have surfaced. I<br />
examine four <strong>of</strong> them. After reviewing some elementary results about<br />
teleportation I argue that only one <strong>of</strong> the four could be acceptable. I also argue<br />
that there are several different concepts <strong>of</strong> information employed in these<br />
explanations and as such they have differing explanandums.<br />
P<br />
S<br />
A<br />
Adam Elga Massachusetts Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology<br />
Statistical mechanics and the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> counterfactual dependence<br />
In “Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow”, D. Lewis defends an analysis<br />
<strong>of</strong> counterfactuals intended to yield the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> counterfactual<br />
dependence: that later affairs depend counterfactually on earlier ones, and not<br />
the other way around. I argue that careful attention to the dynamical properties<br />
<strong>of</strong> thermodynamically irreversible processes shows that in many ordinary cases,<br />
Lewis’s analysis fails to yield this asymmetry. Furthermore, the analysis fails<br />
in an instructive way: one that teaches us something about the connection<br />
between the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> overdetermination and the asymmetry <strong>of</strong> entropy.<br />
Christopher Eliot University <strong>of</strong> Minnesota<br />
A Field Guide to Reduction in Ecology<br />
Philosophical accounts <strong>of</strong> reductionism have not clearly illustrated cases <strong>of</strong><br />
reduction in biology, and, if at all, certainly not in ecology. Philosophers and<br />
biologists have moreover <strong>of</strong>fered a number <strong>of</strong> arguments aimed at<br />
demonstrating that ecology is not reductive. Both reductionists with respect<br />
215