2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

Otavio Bueno California State University, Fresno
Application of Mathematics and Underdetermination
PSA Abstracts
Recent work in the philosophy of mathematics has focused on the
indispensability argument. According to this argument, we should believe in
the existence of mathematical entities, since they are indispensable to our best
scientific theories. Empiricists have often tried to resist the commitment to
unobservable entities in science by using the underdetermination argument.
Given that scientific theories are typically underdetermined by the data, we
are not forced to believe in the unobservable entities that such theories posit.
In this paper, I extend the underdetermination argument to the application of
mathematics, arguing that, similarly to its counterpart in science, the argument
provides an empiricist alternative to avoid ontological commitment to
mathematical objects. In this way, a strategy is presented to resist the conclusion
advanced by the indispensability theorist.
Craig Callender London School of Economics
Nick Huggett University of Illinois, Chicago
Why Quantize Gravity (or Any Other Field For That Matter)?
P
S
A
The quantum gravity program seeks a theory that handles quantum matter
fields and gravity consistently. But is such a theory is really required and must
it involve quantizing the gravitational field? We give reasons for a positive
answer to the first question, but dispute a widespread contention that it is
inconsistent for the gravitational field to be classical while matter is quantum.
In particular, we show how a popular argument (Eppley and Hannah 1977)
falls short of a no-go theorem, and discuss possible counter-examples.
Important issues in the foundations of physics are shown to bear crucially on
all these considerations.
Xiang Chen California Lutheran University
Perceptual Symbols and Taxonomy Comparison
Many recent cognitive studies reveal that human cognition is inherently
perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the conceptual and the neural
levels. This paper introduces Barsalou’s theory of perceptual symbols and
explores its implications for philosophy of science. If perceptual symbols lie in
the heart of conceptual processing, the process of attribute selection during
concept representation, which is critical for defining similarity and thus for
comparing taxonomies, can no longer be determined solely by background
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