2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society

PSA Abstracts
Douglas Allchin University of Minnesota
The Epistemology of Error
How do we know and justify that a scientist has erred? Through several case
studies, including the recently contested case of bacterial mesosomes (Rasmussen
1993, Culp 1994, and Hudson 1999), I examine the epistemic work in ascertaining
error, and the role of this reasoning in establishing reliable claims in each
respective field. By focusing on the justification of error claims, one finds that
an ‘artifact’ (a result attributable to an experimental procedure only) is a type of
‘fact’. Thus, the characterization of experiment as separating fact from artifact
(as highlighted by Hacking and Galison) is incomplete. As a remedy, I suggest
strategies for achieving what I call ‘deep reliability’. Historical occurrences of
error (illustrated in these cases) show the importance of actively probing for
error, beyond merely confirming theoretical maps through positive instances or
evidence. When combined with Mayo’s framework for error statistics, this
suggests a broader philosophical research programme for developing Error
Analytics as a branch of experimental reasoning.
204
Hanne Andersen Dahum Institute
Reference and Resemblance
Many discussions between realists and non-realists have centered on the issue of
reference, especially whether there is referential stability during theory change. In
this paper, I shall summarize the debate, sketching the problems which remain
within the two opposing positions and show that both have ended on their own
slippery slope, sliding away from their original position towards that of their
opponents. Thus, in the search for a viable intermediate position, I shall suggest an
account of reference which may follow the causal theory in explaining reference
as carving the world at its joints but contrary to the causal theory this world is a
phenomenal world whose variable joints exist only in a historical process in which
they are transmitted gradually from one generation to the next. According to this
account, the joints of a phenomenal world are constituted by family resemblance.
I shall argue that on this account, bundles of features that span bounded areas in
perceptual space underlie the joints of a phenomenal world. Further, the integrity
of the cognitive process by which the cognitive process by which these joints are
recognized recognizes these joints depends on a transmission process by which
new generations are presented with given joints and bundles by the preceding
generation. However, contrary to a traditional realist account, this heritage from
the preceding generation may be transformed into new joints and bundles before
transmission to new generations. This permits a continuous process of referential
change in which the joints and bundles at different stages in the development of a
theory can be connected by chains-of-reasoning.