2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
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<strong>HSS</strong> Abstracts<br />
Rebecca␣ P. Schwartz, Princeton University<br />
Writing the Authorized Biography <strong>of</strong> the Manhattan Project:<br />
Henry DeWolf Smyth and the Smyth Report<br />
The increased authority <strong>of</strong> physicists as a result <strong>of</strong> their successful work on<br />
the Manhattan Project is a standard theme in the history <strong>of</strong> American physics.<br />
But how did Americans come to know about physicists’ work on the atomic<br />
bomb, which after all remained entirely classified after World War II, so that<br />
the physicists could benefit thereby? An important piece <strong>of</strong> the answer is the<br />
Smyth Report, the <strong>of</strong>ficial governmental report on the Manhattan Project, which<br />
was released days after the atomic bombs were dropped. Coming as it did into<br />
a security-imposed vacuum, the Smyth Report served as the sole resource to a<br />
nation seeking to learn about this new and fearsome weapon. In this paper, I<br />
examine how Henry DeWolf Smyth, a Princeton University physicist, crafted<br />
his report to convey to the American people a carefully controlled picture <strong>of</strong><br />
the Manhattan Project. Using drafts <strong>of</strong> the report and Smyth’s correspondence<br />
from the archives <strong>of</strong> the American Philosophical <strong>Society</strong>, I show that besides<br />
for considerations <strong>of</strong> national security, Smyth also edited his report to reflect<br />
well on the Army and British scientists, to minimize the dangers <strong>of</strong> radioactive<br />
fallout, and, most importantly, to emphasize the roles <strong>of</strong> physicists on the<br />
Manhattan Project while downplaying the vital contributions <strong>of</strong> chemists and<br />
engineers. In doing so, Smyth was guided by his own predispositions as to<br />
what constituted interesting science, and what was merely technical problem<br />
solving. Although the Smyth Report is not well remembered today, its impact<br />
is apparent in the way that so much scholarship about the Manhattan Project<br />
continues its emphasis on physicists, implicitly dismissing the others without<br />
whom success could not have been realized. This is not necessarily reflective<br />
<strong>of</strong> the reality <strong>of</strong> the Manhattan Project, but rather <strong>of</strong> how it was portrayed in<br />
this early and important work.<br />
154<br />
Silvan␣ S. Schweber Brandeis University<br />
Interdisciplinarity, Theory, the Computer and the Physical <strong>Science</strong>s<br />
Teams <strong>of</strong> physical scientists—metallurgists, physical chemists, physicists,<br />
engineers—had <strong>of</strong>ten been organized at the Bell Laboratories and at the General<br />
Electric Research Laboratory to solve pressing problems in the development<br />
and improvement <strong>of</strong> particular devices. During World War II research teams in<br />
which members <strong>of</strong> sufficiently different background to cover all aspects <strong>of</strong> a<br />
given situation were assembled to address the problems <strong>of</strong> designing radar sets,<br />
nuclear piles, proximity fuses, atomic bombs, ..., <strong>of</strong> implementing operational<br />
research, and formulating answers to numerous other problems that waging a<br />
total war entails. After the war the value <strong>of</strong> such teams and the contribution <strong>of</strong>