2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
2000 HSS/PSA Program 1 - History of Science Society
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Bruce␣ T. Moran University <strong>of</strong> Nevada, Reno<br />
<strong>HSS</strong> Abstracts<br />
Libavius, Polemics & Alchemy:<br />
The Transmutation <strong>of</strong> Emotions and Rationality<br />
One can’t read far in Libavius’s polemical writings without confronting<br />
amazing mixtures <strong>of</strong> emotional, moral, and cognitive reasoning. Despite the<br />
practical and analytical works for which he is best known, and his sometime<br />
image as a stern German gymnasiarch, Libavius was a passionate man and a<br />
passionate writer. His emotions, like most emotions, were based in beliefs,<br />
that is, they contained a cognitive underpinning. Aristotle can be used to show<br />
how emotions were thought to be rooted not only in individual psychology,<br />
but also in social interaction. Libavius is an angry writer when it comes to<br />
condemning Paracelsian secrecy and mysticism, and anger is an intensely social<br />
emotion—all the more so since the social emotions reflected in Libavius’s<br />
diatribes were played out not within strictly dyadic relationships but included<br />
an audience, a reading public. Anger (an emotion prompted by a belief about<br />
another’s actions) clearly turns to hate (a response to a belief about another’s<br />
character) the latter, I will argue, becomes a durable passion consistent with<br />
rational choice and action. In this regard, Libavius wished his adversaries to<br />
feel shame while taking pride in his ability to endure abuse and thus being<br />
immune from the same emotion. As Aristotle notes, it is for voluntary actions<br />
that shame is felt, and a good man will never voluntarily do bad things. In this<br />
sense an emotion itself becomes the object <strong>of</strong> cognition. On a wider level my<br />
claim will be that paying attention to emotional responses such as contained<br />
in Libavius’s polemical writings should be part <strong>of</strong> the work <strong>of</strong> the historian <strong>of</strong><br />
science. Emotional constructions should be accorded relevance not just as<br />
rhetoric but as elements in the cognitive constitution <strong>of</strong> ideas, arguments, as<br />
well as social norms. Only in this way, I would argue, can we find in the use <strong>of</strong><br />
language and in the interplay <strong>of</strong> ideas a way to relate emotional being (including<br />
behaviors, moral judgements, as well as feelings <strong>of</strong> shame, guilt, anger and<br />
the rest) to culturally influenced rational choices and decisions.<br />
H<br />
S<br />
S<br />
Mary␣ S. Morgan London School <strong>of</strong> Economics and University <strong>of</strong><br />
Amsterdam<br />
Thought Experiments and the Generation <strong>of</strong> Economic “Evidence”<br />
Verbal reasoning from thought experiments is a traditional form <strong>of</strong> argument<br />
in economics. From the 1930s, economists began to abandon verbal versions<br />
<strong>of</strong> these experiments in favour <strong>of</strong> a more structured form which relied on the<br />
use <strong>of</strong> mathematical and statistical models as a technology to extend the powers<br />
<strong>of</strong> the mind. In one type <strong>of</strong> practise, these experiments used models to explore<br />
the implications, limitations and range <strong>of</strong> applicability <strong>of</strong> economic theories.<br />
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