Listing of Sessions and Abstracts of Papers - History of Science ...
Listing of Sessions and Abstracts of Papers - History of Science ...
Listing of Sessions and Abstracts of Papers - History of Science ...
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1931) faith <strong>and</strong> his Jesuit philosophical training intersected to reconcile evolution <strong>and</strong> Catholicism by<br />
delineating the philosophical limits <strong>of</strong> science: Wasmann demarcated a material <strong>and</strong> historical world,<br />
which science can describe, <strong>and</strong> the realm <strong>of</strong> subjective experience <strong>and</strong> the soul, which it cannot.<br />
Wasmann’s evolution contrasted (<strong>and</strong> conflicted) strongly with contemporary German atheistic <strong>and</strong><br />
anticlerical monistic evolutionary biology, <strong>and</strong> I will discuss Wasmann’s very public debates with<br />
monism’s prophet, Ernst Haeckel. Finally, I will briefly contrast Wasmann’s Catholic evolutionism with<br />
Teilhard de Chardin’s, <strong>and</strong> conclude with some remarks on the diverse influences <strong>of</strong> religious faith in<br />
evolutionary biology.<br />
Lynch, William<br />
E-mail Address: ae8917@wayne.edu<br />
Seeing, Doing, <strong>and</strong> Uncovering: Interpreting Bacon's Method in the Early Royal Society <strong>of</strong> London<br />
Rejecting the view that methodology acts more as window dressing than a program that can help<br />
direct research practice, I argue that Francis Bacon's program for methodological reform shaped the<br />
Royal Society's earliest work in important, if <strong>of</strong>ten contradictory, ways. The Royal Society developed<br />
Bacon's programs in different directions, building upon a richer underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> Bacon's methodological<br />
program than the undirected empiricism <strong>of</strong>ten associated with his name. Bacon's call for a focus on<br />
"things themselves" built upon three distinct images <strong>of</strong> objects <strong>of</strong> knowledge. Identifying a threefold<br />
metaphorical ontology <strong>of</strong> objects <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>and</strong> corresponding objectivities at the core <strong>of</strong> Bacon's<br />
method, I argue that the Royal Society was more sophisticated <strong>and</strong> unified in their methodological<br />
approach than is commonly accepted. At the same time, development <strong>of</strong> their interpretations <strong>of</strong> Bacon's<br />
legacy ultimately pulled in different directions. Specular objects <strong>of</strong> knowledge privileged passive<br />
observation <strong>and</strong> justified an empiricist objectivity. Pulling in a different direction, manipulated objects <strong>of</strong><br />
art or manual objects emphasized an engaged, constructivist objectivity, where knowing is doing. Finally,<br />
a vision <strong>of</strong> underlying forms as generative objects <strong>of</strong> knowledge, combinable like letters <strong>of</strong> the<br />
alphabet to produce phenomena at will, defined a theoretical concept <strong>of</strong> objectivity. These components<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bacon's method inform in different ways the early publications <strong>of</strong> the Royal Society by John Evelyn,<br />
Robert Hooke, John Wilkins, Thomas Sprat, <strong>and</strong> John Graunt. The Royal Society developed an ambitious<br />
inductive program employing hypotheses, active powers, <strong>and</strong> the disciplined use <strong>of</strong> analogy.<br />
Maas, Harro<br />
E-mail Address: harro@fee.uva.nl<br />
Mimetic Experiments: Stanley Jevons's Construction <strong>of</strong> Evidence for Theories<br />
William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) is commonly considered one <strong>of</strong> the great 19th century innovators<br />
in economics. Until to date, however, his empirical work in economics is considered quite apart from his<br />
theoretical innovations. My argument in this paper is that Jevons’s empirical <strong>and</strong> theoretical work are<br />
much more interwoven than such an account suggests. Jevons’s experimental practices in meteorology<br />
(on cloud formation) are illuminating here. As many experimental scientists, Jevons was fully aware that<br />
empirical data do not speak for themselves: the experimental scientist is not a passive observer, perceiving<br />
reality <strong>and</strong> only then arriving at an explanation. Rather, he uses experimental practices to reveal the<br />
phenomena from the data, the actual observations are loaded with error. One might think <strong>of</strong> these phenomena<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> essential characteristics or mean values. Phenomena could then be further analysed<br />
to reveal the natural laws they obeyed. For Jevons, these laws were stable functional relationships. The<br />
step from phenomena to laws depended critically upon the role <strong>of</strong> analogy, given the many possible<br />
mathematical relations consistent with the phenomena. In a nutshell, this procedure can be seen in<br />
Jevons' experiments on cloud formation, in his Principles <strong>of</strong> <strong>Science</strong>, <strong>and</strong> also in his statistical studies in