Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch

More documents

Recommendations

Info

the government to provide deposition testimony, the government moved him to Eastern District of Virginia … The post September 11 context is drastically different. Before, the government takes an individual’s deposition, and releases him or her, unless required by trial. The government, in non-September 11 cases, had no reticence in taking a deposition. 255 Material witness Ali Ahmed languished in jail for months while the government refused to take his deposition. His lawyer, Steve Swift, who had also represented several material witnesses before September 11, contrasted the government’s treatment of Ahmed with his other non-terrorism-related material witness clients: Ahmed dragged out more. No one wanted to take his deposition. There were rumors, thoughts, and suspicions about his involvement in terrorism. He never got a deposition—it was just dragged out. But before September 11 the government was quick to let go of those witnesses. Some of those were released real quick. They would appear at the courthouse for a deposition within two weeks of their arrest. 256 Susan Otto, who represented material witness Mujahid Menepta, also told HRW/ACLU the deposition alternative was not even on the table. A few days after Menepta was arrested, Otto raised the possibility of a deposition to the Oklahoma-based federal prosecutors. But the “government made clear that it was not an option in this case.” According to Otto, the U.S. attorneys in New York called the shots and flatly refused to depose Menepta. 257 255 HRW/ACLU telephone interview with Dan Sears, attorney for material witness James Ujaama, Denver, Colorado, December 2003. 256 HRW/ACLU telephone interview with Stephen Swift, Attorney for Ali Ahmed, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, August 2, 2004. 257 Interview with Susan Otto. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO. 2(G) 80
X. Haste, Incompetence, Prejudice: The Arrest of Witnesses Who Have No Information The number of men arrested and incarcerated as material witnesses who had no connection to, much less knowledge about, terrorists or terrorist activities is significant. Based on government admissions of mistaken arrests, Congressional inquiries, and our review of material witness cases, as many as one-third of the witnesses had no relevant information regarding any criminal activity. 258 In these cases, the information suggesting that the witness had any information relating to an investigation was erroneous. The number may be substantially greater, but cannot be ascertained until more records are made public. Forty-two witnesses never faced any charges, and only seven faced any terrorism-related charges. In a significant proportion of cases, witnesses have had information, but it was far too minimal, tangential, or circumstantial to provide the basis for arrest and incarceration. There may have been good reasons for the Justice Department to want to talk to some of these men, such as those who had prior contacts with hijackers, but absent any evidence of wrongdoing, there was no good reason for arresting them and forcing them to languish in jail. If the government had been willing to proceed more carefully, if it had taken more seriously the liberty interests of the men, few of the seventy would have been considered genuine material witnesses, and even fewer would have been deemed flight risks. What has accounted for the appalling record of arresting utterly innocent people and locking them up for months? The federal government understandably felt great urgency after the September 11 attacks, particularly in light of the limited information the FBI had about al-Qaeda at the time, and this apparently induced federal investigators and attorneys to lower their professional standards. Yet months and years after September 11, when federal agents have assessed how to proceed with Muslim men of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent who had attracted their notice for one reason or another, they have rushed to judgment, and failed to acquire and develop solid evidence. In case after case, federal investigators and attorneys have given undue weight to unverified tips, made poor inferences from the information they had, and leapt to dubious conclusions. 258 In addition to the public apologies for wrongful arrests and admissions in Congress, Justice Department officials have acknowledged that some material witnesses held in the September 11 investigations may have no relevant information. See also Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice, Reynolds Aff. 36, No. 01-2500 (D.D.C. 2002), Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, James Reynolds (noting that “it may turn out that [material witnesses held in connection to September 11] have no information useful to the investigation or that they are innocent people who are able to assist the government in its investigations”). 81 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO. 2(G)
Page 1 and 2:
Human Rights Watch June 2005 Vol. 1
Page 3 and 4:
Summary After I got in the cell I w
Page 5 and 6:
were almost all the witnesses Musli
Page 7 and 8:
combination with having worked in t
Page 9 and 10:
Recommendations The recommendations
Page 11 and 12:
o requiring the government to infor
Page 13 and 14:
eflects a compromise between an ind
Page 15 and 16:
the witness for immigration or prob
Page 17 and 18:
those suspected of committing a cri
Page 19 and 20:
Arizona, and Florida, where the nin
Page 21 and 22:
testimony—you get fingerprints, y
Page 23 and 24:
The FBI appeared to believe that Ma
Page 25 and 26:
interrogating him, without counsel,
Page 27 and 28:
Jose Padilla On May 8, 2002, the Ju
Page 29 and 30:
The Justice Department has often st
Page 31 and 32: criticism on the conduct of Assista
Page 33 and 34: government failed to take Diab’s
Page 35 and 36: Eric Sears, a former federal prosec
Page 37 and 38: sentencing. The judge finally got a
Page 39 and 40: accompanied by extensive searches c
Page 41 and 42: and young children. 121 He was deta
Page 43 and 44: High Security Conditions of Detenti
Page 45 and 46: Harassment and Abuse in Jail Many m
Page 47 and 48: uised. See id. In the elevator, the
Page 49 and 50: In practice, then, court approval o
Page 51 and 52: I kept asking what am I being charg
Page 53 and 54: As Mark Foster, the lawyer for one
Page 55 and 56: Federal marshals transferred the ei
Page 57 and 58: [T]he government filed all their pa
Page 59 and 60: Federal agents have also refused to
Page 61 and 62: In many cases, the trauma of forcef
Page 63 and 64: In January 2002, another hotel gues
Page 65 and 66: abuse, international human rights 2
Page 67 and 68: It is not clear why the courts have
Page 69 and 70: Things go on behind those doors tha
Page 71 and 72: providing interviews, submitting to
Page 73 and 74: Detaining Witnesses Who Cooperate w
Page 75 and 76: stayed with the FBI agents for eigh
Page 77 and 78: government, “I’m not coming.”
Page 79 and 80: armed forces for several years and
Page 81: Congress included the deposition re
Page 85 and 86: government’s basis was weak. Thes
Page 87 and 88: target, 272 the state police ordere
Page 89 and 90: Khan and Azmath were deported in Ja
Page 91 and 92: told them I told them I had no idea
Page 93 and 94: y subletting their apartment. Altho
Page 95 and 96: The post-scripts to the stories of
Page 97 and 98: I could not ask questions. What’s
Page 99 and 100: Ayub Ali Khan and Mohammad Azmath A
Page 101 and 102: get all these kinds of questions—
Page 103: Human Rights Watch and the American
show all

Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?