Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch
Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch
Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch
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Congress included the deposition requirement in the material witness law because “it<br />
puts much greater emphasis on release.” 253 As one court stated in a non-post-September<br />
11 material witness case, depositions provide the “keys <strong>to</strong> the jailhouse door.” 254<br />
In the post-September 11 counterterrorism context, the deposition option has not been<br />
a key <strong>to</strong> opening the jailhouse door. The Justice Department has consistently opposed<br />
depositions or stalled in taking them. This evasion of the basic requirements of the<br />
material witness law is further evidence that the government’s primary goal has not been<br />
<strong>to</strong> secure the witness’s testimony, but <strong>to</strong> ensure the witness remained incarcerated while<br />
the government continued its investigations. When courts threatened <strong>to</strong> order a<br />
deposition, the government has typically relied again on the sensitive nature of the case<br />
and unspecified national security concerns <strong>to</strong> persuade the courts <strong>to</strong> keep the witness<br />
detained. And when courts have ordered depositions, the government has sometimes<br />
evaded the order (and the attendant obligation <strong>to</strong> release the witnesses) by transferring<br />
the witnesses from one jurisdiction <strong>to</strong> another or by criminally charging them, which it<br />
should have done in the first place if it had the requisite evidence.<br />
When Daniel Sears, at<strong>to</strong>rney for material witness James Ujaama, requested <strong>to</strong> have his<br />
client deposed in Colorado he hit a wall both in court and with the Justice Department.<br />
Sears, a former prosecu<strong>to</strong>r who had represented a number of material witnesses before<br />
September 11, described <strong>to</strong> HRW/ACLU the response of the government and court <strong>to</strong><br />
his request <strong>to</strong> have his client deposed:<br />
The requirement that a material witness is only permitted <strong>to</strong> be detained<br />
only when the government can’t get his testimony by deposition was<br />
unavailable in this case. The court would barely hear my argument—it<br />
[was] waived on the ground of national security. And when we offered<br />
253<br />
In enacting the current version of the material witness law, Congress made clear that “whenever possible, the<br />
depositions of witnesses should be obtained so that they may be released from cus<strong>to</strong>dy.” As one Congressman<br />
explained when the deposition requirement was explicitly added <strong>to</strong> the material witness statute:<br />
This, in effect, would say that the Congress feels that you should ordinarily not detain<br />
material witnesses. They have committed no crime, except <strong>to</strong> have been at the wrong place<br />
at the wrong time, and we have had some recent instances … where apparently material<br />
witnesses were unhappily detained for several months <strong>to</strong> testify in connection with the<br />
crime that [they] felt that [they] had any connection with except knowledge. … And the idea<br />
here is that the Congress would feel that it should be the exceptional case where a material<br />
witness should be detained, and that unless for some reason the testimony cannot be<br />
adequately secured by deposition, the individual should be released.<br />
Federal Bail Reform, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 89th<br />
Congress, Second Session, p. 29 (March 9-16, 1966).<br />
254<br />
United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578 (N.D. Cal. 2003).<br />
79 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO. 2(G)