Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch
Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch
Witness to Abuse - Human Rights Watch
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While Congress emphasized a preference for deposing and then releasing material<br />
witnesses, it set no limit on the length of time a witness can be kept incarcerated. Due<br />
process requires the duration of the detention <strong>to</strong> be rationally related <strong>to</strong> its purpose. 27<br />
Arrest of Material <strong>Witness</strong>es before September 11<br />
Before September 11, the vast majority of persons arrested as material witnesses were<br />
non-U.S. citizens arrested by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 28<br />
In 2000, for example, 94 percent of the 4,168 federal material witness arrests were made<br />
by the INS, and less than 2 percent were citizens. 29 Most of the material witnesses<br />
arrested by the INS were immigrants who were smuggled in<strong>to</strong> the country, and the INS<br />
sought <strong>to</strong> ensure their testimony in trials against the smugglers before the witnesses left<br />
the country. 30<br />
Courts generally issued material witness warrants only when the witness had<br />
demonstrated through his conduct that securing his testimony absent an arrest would be<br />
unlikely, e.g., in cases of “a witness moving without leaving a forwarding address, a<br />
witness not appearing when requested or subpoenaed <strong>to</strong> appear, or the inability <strong>to</strong> serve<br />
a subpoena upon a witness.” 31 The government had <strong>to</strong> meet a high threshold of proof<br />
that a witness would flee if he or she was subpoenaed because, as one court explained,<br />
“Police have less authority <strong>to</strong> detain those who have witnessed a crime than <strong>to</strong> detain<br />
27<br />
See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that "a person charged by a State with a<br />
criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity <strong>to</strong> proceed <strong>to</strong> trial cannot be held more<br />
than the reasonable period of time necessary <strong>to</strong> determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will<br />
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future"). Furthermore, under Jackson, “[E]ven if it is determined that the<br />
defendant probably soon will be able <strong>to</strong> stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress<br />
<strong>to</strong>ward that goal." Ibid. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (finding that, under statute permitting<br />
detention for purpose of carrying out removal, detention is no longer authorized once removal is no longer<br />
reasonably foreseeable).<br />
28<br />
Until March 1, 2003, immigration was handled by the INS, a division of the Department of Justice. Now, the<br />
Department of Homeland Security is charged with many immigration matters. The Bureau of Immigrations and<br />
Cus<strong>to</strong>ms Enforcement (ICE) handles immigration enforcement within the U.S. borders.<br />
29<br />
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics 2000,<br />
available online at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cfjs00.htm, accessed on Sept. 1, 2004 (Compendium<br />
of Federal Justice Statistics 2000).<br />
30<br />
See, e.g., Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, (5th Cir. 1992), 973 F.2d 411; United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578<br />
(N.D.Cal. 2003); United States v. Nai, 949 F.Supp. 42 (D.Mass. 1996); United States v. Huang, 827 F.Supp.<br />
945 (S.D.N.Y.1993); In re Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus on Behalf of All Material <strong>Witness</strong>es in<br />
Western Dist. of Texas, 612 F.Supp. 940 (W.D.Tex.1985). Even in these cases, courts frequently ordered the<br />
government <strong>to</strong> depose the witness or approved detention for a limited time. Detention was considered<br />
necessary in some cases <strong>to</strong> preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right <strong>to</strong> cross-examine his accusers.<br />
See, e.g., United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578 (N.D.Cal. 2003).<br />
31<br />
Stacey M. Studnicki and John P. Apol, “<strong>Witness</strong> Detention and Intimidation: The His<strong>to</strong>ry and Future of Material<br />
<strong>Witness</strong> Law,” 76 St. John’s Law Review, p. 483, 499.<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17, NO. 2(G) 14