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Return to hostilities The resumption of major military operations in April 2006 started a new phase of the conflict. Government forces, which had shelled the Sampur area in the eastern district of Trincomalee after a suicide bomb assassination attempt on Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka in Colombo on April 25, bombed the area around Mavil Aru in the east on July 26, after the LTTE turned off water from a sluice gate. The LTTE responded with a counterattack on the government-controlled, mostly Muslim town of Mutur. On August 11, 2006, the LTTE launched an attack on the Jaffna peninsula leading to a closure of the A9 highway, the main north-south arterial road. LTTE artillery attacked Palaly airbase causing a suspension of flights to Jaffna. The closure of the A9 and air flights, combined with LTTE threats to attack shipping to Jaffna, led to a severe worsening of the humanitarian situation on the peninsula. Only the eventual resumption of food and essential supplies by ship spared the 600,000 Jaffna residents further hardship. A government offensive to take over the Sampur area led to waves of displacement from April 2006. The number of displaced from Sampur increased as fighting intensified in August. Many sought shelter in the LTTE-controlled area of Vaharai, on the coastal road between Trincomalee and Batticaloa, but later fled that area when the government defeated LTTE forces there in January 2007. Government troops succeeded in cutting off the LTTE supply route to the strategic port of Trincomalee and thereby struck a major blow to the rebels’ hold over the east, which was already considerably weakened following the Karuna split in 2004. The LTTE tried but failed to block the departure of civilians from LTTE areas. During the fighting, LTTE forces fired heavy weapons from populated areas, including near displaced persons camps, placing civilians at unnecessary risk. The army often responded with or initiated indiscriminate shelling. On November 8, 2006, this dynamic resulted in the deaths of more than 40 displaced civilians and injuries to nearly 100 others who had sought refuge outside a school. Fearful of continued shelling, more than 20,000 people fled LTTE-territory by walking for days through jungle or risking their lives on overcrowded boats. Several drowned at sea. Many families continue to live in uncertain circumstances in areas under the influence of the Karuna group. In February 2007 the government began using threats and 21 Human Rights Watch August 2007
intimidation to force civilians who fled fighting in the east to return home. Government and military officials threatened to cut aid and withdraw security for displaced persons who refused to return, causing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to seek assurances from the government (see Chapter III, “Internal Displacement”). Since March 2007 a string of firefights and mortar duels accompanied by aerial bombing by the Sri Lankan military in the districts of Mannar and Vavuniya in the north has been inflicting heavy casualties on both sides. The onslaught on the north marks a decisive shift in the theater of fighting, which until then had largely been concentrated in the east. Future fighting seems likely. In his November 2006 annual “Heroes Day” speech, LTTE leader Prabhakaran declared that the CFA was effectively “defunct.” Following a May 7, 2007 attack on the LTTE stronghold of Killinochchi, government defense spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella said the government would breach the terms of the 2002 CFA if necessary to safeguard national security. In March 2007 the LTTE launched its first air strike, using a single-propeller plane to drop bombs on an air force base next to the international airport in Colombo, killing three soldiers. On April 29 the LTTE struck two oil facilities near Colombo, causing minor damage and tripping air defenses that plunged the city into darkness. Officially the CFA remains in place, as neither side wants to be blamed for its demise. But the military realities on the ground reveal that it exists in name alone. Its formal existence allows for the continued presence of monitors of the SLMM, although the monitors have largely withdrawn to a base outside Colombo, from which they undertake short missions to the field. Return to War 22
Page 1 and 2: Sri Lanka Return to War Human Right
Page 3 and 4: Karuna group ......................
Page 5 and 6: I. Summary What I am saying is, if
Page 7 and 8: extrajudicial killings to unlawful
Page 9 and 10: 2002. Since January 2006 more than
Page 11 and 12: against them, and list the location
Page 13 and 14: Emergency Regulations (372 Tamils,
Page 15 and 16: The mother of an abducted boy from
Page 17 and 18: disappearances. The police released
Page 19 and 20: commission, highlighting examples o
Page 21 and 22: Methodology This report is based pr
Page 23: discriminating against Tamils in th
Page 27 and 28: International humanitarian law proh
Page 29 and 30: in which an LTTE cadre shot and kil
Page 31 and 32: the Savukady camp in Batticaloa to
Page 33 and 34: they would no longer be responsible
Page 35 and 36: In mid-May the government began a n
Page 37 and 38: On May 29, UNHCR commented on the g
Page 39 and 40: Grama Niladari Divisions (the small
Page 41 and 42: The salvos landed in and around the
Page 43 and 44: didn’t take him to the hospital b
Page 45 and 46: While describing the loss of civili
Page 47 and 48: saw no weapons, no bunkers or artil
Page 49 and 50: V. Enforced Disappearances and Abdu
Page 51 and 52: months of 2007. 84 A government com
Page 53 and 54: In one illustrative case documented
Page 55 and 56: The Valvettiturai police registered
Page 57 and 58: would send him by bus or train to T
Page 59 and 60: wife tried his cell phone several t
Page 61 and 62: then that his brother had paid, alt
Page 63 and 64: as the disseminators of “LTTE pro
Page 65 and 66: It is evident that many of the [dis
Page 67 and 68: The government’s lack of commitme
Page 69 and 70: A lodge-owner who had 29 out of 36
Page 71 and 72: arguing that evicting Tamils from C
Page 73 and 74: VII. Emergency Regulations In Augus
Page 75 and 76:
Given the wide ranging powers provi
Page 77 and 78:
Large-scale arrests of Tamil youth
Page 79 and 80:
held, how many had been charged wit
Page 81 and 82:
Various United Nations principles i
Page 83 and 84:
In addition, the regulations establ
Page 85 and 86:
individuals and groups working to r
Page 87 and 88:
At a public meeting on April 6, 200
Page 89 and 90:
On April 30, 2007, unidentified gun
Page 91 and 92:
“We have blocked it as per a gove
Page 93 and 94:
conference said they had already ca
Page 95 and 96:
astards with the law we need to use
Page 97 and 98:
humanitarian worker with direct kno
Page 99 and 100:
The government dismissed the allega
Page 101 and 102:
With the change of administration i
Page 103 and 104:
IX. Karuna Group and State Complici
Page 105 and 106:
stating that it “has no complicit
Page 107 and 108:
of the government commission lookin
Page 109 and 110:
Over the past 18 months, the govern
Page 111 and 112:
Lack of witness protection A key pr
Page 113 and 114:
president cannot appoint any commis
Page 115 and 116:
Watch asked the Sri Lankan governme
Page 117 and 118:
persons and refugees, and SLMM in r
Page 119 and 120:
7. Death of 51 persons in Naddalamo
Page 121 and 122:
Members of the IIGEP have also expr
Page 123 and 124:
In the current context, in particul
Page 125 and 126:
domestic and international criticis
Page 127 and 128:
To the Liberation Tigers of Tamil E
Page 129 and 130:
• Urge the Sri Lankan government
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H UMAN R I GHTS WATCH 350 Fifth Ave
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