PT Jan-67 - Herbert W. Armstrong Library and Archives
PT Jan-67 - Herbert W. Armstrong Library and Archives
PT Jan-67 - Herbert W. Armstrong Library and Archives
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<strong>Jan</strong>uary, 19<strong>67</strong><br />
The PLAIN TRUTH<br />
27<br />
the new coalition government has taken<br />
over.<br />
Instead of De Gaulle's influence in<br />
Europe diminishing, it has been steadi·<br />
ly gainillg. His low regard fo r NATO<br />
is not unique to him. It is shared by<br />
image of himself as an honest brokera<br />
trustworthy neutral- an iJldepell~<br />
dent arbiter between East <strong>and</strong> West.<br />
De Gaulle the realist, however, kno\vs<br />
that France is too weak to st<strong>and</strong> alone<br />
<strong>and</strong> too weak to become a partner of<br />
Ambassador College Photo<br />
Eve n the vigorous French President tired from inte nsi ve activity <strong>and</strong> ceremony<br />
on Pacific tour.<br />
other European leaders. The U. S. must<br />
admit that Europe has lost confidence<br />
in American leadership - NATO is<br />
finished. An era has drawn to a close.<br />
Why have Adenauer <strong>and</strong> Strauss <br />
Germany's strongest <strong>and</strong> most deter ~<br />
mined politicians thus far - steadfastly<br />
supported De Gaulle'<br />
West Germany is a political midget.<br />
Germany desperately seeks reunification.<br />
But reunification is ent.irely in the<br />
h<strong>and</strong>s of Russi a. The USSR <strong>and</strong> much<br />
of Europe fear a strong, uncontrolled,<br />
unified Germany. Especially a Germany<br />
possessing 1l11cle(11' llIeapons.<br />
But Germany Ul(lIlts both.'<br />
She craves atomic weapons for the<br />
same reasons De Gaulle does. There is<br />
no guarantee, say Germans, that an<br />
alliance partner will use his arlTIS to<br />
defend Germany if the risks are too<br />
great.<br />
Smart Germans can see the possib ili ~<br />
ty of attaining all their aims through<br />
De Gaulle. Through his patronizing<br />
nelltralist pose, <strong>and</strong> his ever.increaslOg<br />
contact with Russia, he is building an<br />
the U. S. But he thinks (or hopes)<br />
that he just might be able to restrain<br />
German ambitions long enough to be~<br />
come a sen ior partner to Bonn on<br />
a 55-45 basis. This is his price to<br />
Bonn for gOIng all~out for German<br />
reuni{jcation.<br />
BLlt wi ll De Gaulle's plan for Ellropeanizing<br />
the Germans become, in r ea l~<br />
ity, the Germanization of Em'ope?<br />
Just as W cst Germany neecisF rance<br />
now, /7l'fluce also needs Ge,.man)' - <strong>and</strong><br />
De Gau lle knows it, all illusions of<br />
g r<strong>and</strong>eur notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing. De Gaulle<br />
can afford to push NATO out of France,<br />
but he can't afford to puJJ out of the<br />
Common Market! This would be economic<br />
slficide for France_<br />
France by herself cannot compete<br />
with the U. S. or the USSR. But France<br />
<strong>and</strong> Germany closely all ied, working<br />
side-by~sj d c in bringing the rest of<br />
Europe in tow - that is another matter.<br />
Even Russia would begin to respect such<br />
a union - a combined population of<br />
over 100 million <strong>and</strong> total industrial<br />
capacity twice that of Britain.<br />
Eu ropean Atom Force<br />
Inevitable<br />
If a united Europe (however loosely<br />
confederated) is to become a realityfree,<br />
as De Gaulle would have it, from<br />
American pressure - it mlfst have its<br />
own independent military [mce. De<br />
Gaulle would have this be his atomic<br />
Force de Frappe - entirely under<br />
French control. But the hard facts for<br />
President de Gaulle are these: The<br />
force he is building even when com~<br />
pleted by 1970 will by no means be<br />
Ambassador College Photo<br />
De Gaulle, with glasses, at review of military parade on New Caledonia.