human security in an uufinished state - Helsinki Committee for ...
human security in an uufinished state - Helsinki Committee for ...
human security in an uufinished state - Helsinki Committee for ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
HUMAN SECURITY IN AN UNFINISHED STATE<br />
Serbia 2005<br />
0 1
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
HUMAN SECURITY IN AN UNFINISHED STATE<br />
Serbia 2005<br />
PUBLISHER:<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
FOR PUBLISHER:<br />
Sonja Biserko<br />
* * *<br />
TRANSLATED BY:<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Novaković<br />
Iv<strong>an</strong>a Damj<strong>an</strong>ović<br />
Spomenka Grujičić<br />
LAY-OUT:<br />
Nebojša Tasić<br />
COVER PAGE:<br />
Iv<strong>an</strong> Hrašovec<br />
HUMAN SECURITY IN AN<br />
UNFINISHED STATE<br />
- Serbia 2005 -<br />
PRINTED BY:<br />
"Zagorac", Belgrade 2006<br />
CIRCULATION: 500<br />
ISBN - 86-7208-122-6<br />
This report came out of pr<strong>in</strong>t th<strong>an</strong>ks to the assist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of the Swedish Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
Belgrade, 2006<br />
2<br />
3
Contents:<br />
• Introduction ............................................................................................. 7<br />
I<br />
SHADOW OF THE PAST<br />
• Extremism Escalates .............................................................................. 23<br />
• Memory Remodeled ............................................................................... 37<br />
• Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the Hague Tribunal: A Halfway Cooperation ................ 61<br />
• Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a Takes Serbia-Montenegro Be<strong>for</strong>e the ICJ ....... 76<br />
• Campaign<strong>in</strong>g Aga<strong>in</strong>st Non-Governmental Org<strong>an</strong>izations .............. 90<br />
II<br />
LEGAL SYSTEM<br />
• Institutions <strong>in</strong> the Clutches of the Executive Br<strong>an</strong>ch ......................... 101<br />
• Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d Legislation ............................................................. 107<br />
• Conscientious Objection ........................................................................ 122<br />
• Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Trials ......................................................................... 133<br />
• War Crime Trials ................................................................................... 147<br />
• Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs Be<strong>for</strong>e Domestic Courts .................................................. 155<br />
• Police Torture .......................................................................................... 164<br />
• Prison Monitor<strong>in</strong>g ................................................................................... 171<br />
III<br />
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRANSITION<br />
• Contradictory Economic Trends: The Imposed Re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Inflationary Spiral ..................................................................................<br />
189<br />
• A Burden of Poverty ............................................................................... 206<br />
• Cultural Rights <strong>an</strong>d Cultural Policy .................................................... 224<br />
4 5
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
IV<br />
INSTITUTIONS IN AN UNFINISHED STATE<br />
• Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro: Poor Rat<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d Delayed<br />
Re<strong>for</strong>ms .................................................................................................... 235<br />
• The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, State <strong>an</strong>d Society .............................. 261<br />
• The Media: An Unregulated Sphere .................................................... 290<br />
• Education: Another Wasted Year ......................................................... 301<br />
V<br />
MINORITIES IN SERBIA<br />
• Unch<strong>an</strong>ged Matrix .................................................................................. 321<br />
VI<br />
SERBIAN AND DECENTRALIZATION<br />
• Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a: Europe<strong>an</strong> Initiatives <strong>an</strong>d Their Opponents .................... 353<br />
• S<strong>an</strong>džak: At the Crossroads of Political Developments .................... 374<br />
VII<br />
SERBIA IN THE REGION<br />
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY<br />
• International Relations: Mov<strong>in</strong>g Towards Europe ............................ 389<br />
• Slovenia: Putt<strong>in</strong>g Forth Solutions To Regional Problems ................. 401<br />
• Croatia: Fac<strong>in</strong>g the Challenge of Europe ............................................ 407<br />
• Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a: The Burden of the Past ..................................... 424<br />
• Macedonia: Cooperation <strong>an</strong>d Veiled Confrontation ......................... 437<br />
VIII<br />
KEY CHALLENGES: KOSOVO AND MONTENEGRO<br />
• Kosovo: Consensus on Two Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples ................................................ 451<br />
• Montenegro: On the Eve of the Referendum ...................................... 468<br />
ANNEX<br />
HELSINKI COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITY IN 2005<br />
• Projects <strong>in</strong> 2005 ........................................................................................ 495<br />
• The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>'s Youth Groups ........................................... 506<br />
• Documentary Serial ................................................................................ 508<br />
• Publish<strong>in</strong>g ................................................................................................ 512<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Political, social <strong>an</strong>d economic problems characteristic of the societies<br />
with strong national feel<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d plagued by xenophobia <strong>an</strong>d unsolved<br />
problems of the past kept weight<strong>in</strong>g the overall situation of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia <strong>in</strong> 2005. The restoration of basic tenets of Milosevic’s policy<br />
(nationalism, populism, fundamental misconception of the <strong>in</strong>ternational order<br />
<strong>an</strong>d reality, resist<strong>an</strong>ce to ch<strong>an</strong>ge, marg<strong>in</strong>alization of political opponents <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their stigmatization, etc.) <strong>an</strong>d the silent rehabilitation of the Socialists’ cadres<br />
(to be ascribed to the Socialist Party of Serbia’s support to the m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
government, but shared ideological <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>terests as well) called <strong>in</strong>to<br />
question, i.e. brought to a st<strong>an</strong>dstill re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d the process of fac<strong>in</strong>g up the<br />
past. Besides, Serbia is burdened with the defeated national policy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
pend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong> issues. Serbia is still left without a new constitution that would<br />
def<strong>in</strong>e her as a modern <strong>state</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d, consequently, without <strong>state</strong> symbols such as<br />
national <strong>an</strong>them, b<strong>an</strong>ner, etc.<br />
Major problems weight<strong>in</strong>g the situation of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights are as<br />
follows: marg<strong>in</strong>alization of m<strong>in</strong>ority communities <strong>an</strong>d the absence of the<br />
policy <strong>for</strong> their <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to the economic <strong>an</strong>d political ma<strong>in</strong>stream;<br />
<strong>in</strong>operative <strong>an</strong>d politicized judiciary; <strong>in</strong>strumentalization of the media <strong>for</strong> the<br />
purpose of block<strong>in</strong>g re<strong>for</strong>ms; political one-sidedness <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce; the<br />
absence of civil (<strong>an</strong>d legislative) control over <strong>in</strong>telligence services plagu<strong>in</strong>g<br />
political <strong>an</strong>d public life; <strong>an</strong>d, the lack of political will <strong>for</strong> cooperation with The<br />
Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d accept<strong>an</strong>ce of responsibility <strong>for</strong> the war <strong>an</strong>d war crimes.<br />
Actually, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society’s one-sidedness c<strong>an</strong> be ascribed to <strong>in</strong>adequate<br />
collective consciousness <strong>an</strong>d nationalism as a last<strong>in</strong>g outcome of the failure to<br />
shape <strong>an</strong> alternative to the national program.<br />
Formally, Serbia has had a multiparty system <strong>for</strong> 15 years now, but<br />
actually she is not pluralistic. For, she is still unable to strike <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner bal<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
by establish<strong>in</strong>g a modern <strong>state</strong> recogniz<strong>in</strong>g citizens’ <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights. Serbia has<br />
not yet launched the process of democratic tr<strong>an</strong>sition that implies<br />
reconstruction of all social structures <strong>an</strong>d radical tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of political,<br />
economic <strong>an</strong>d cultural spheres.<br />
6<br />
7
Two Years of Kostunica's Cab<strong>in</strong>et<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
It took the Vojislav Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et two years to realize that Serbia<br />
has no choice but to pursue the re<strong>for</strong>ms launched by the Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic cab<strong>in</strong>et.<br />
The first year of its m<strong>an</strong>date was a wasted year. In early 2005 the government<br />
begun to cooperate with The Hague Tribunal, made two steps towards<br />
the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union, <strong>an</strong>d successfully f<strong>in</strong>alized negotiations with the IMF on<br />
dept <strong>an</strong>nulment. However, <strong>in</strong> late 2005 the government’s <strong>in</strong>ternational credibility<br />
backslid aga<strong>in</strong>, jeopardiz<strong>in</strong>g re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d Serbia’s mov<strong>in</strong>g towards the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Union. True, the government stabilized its position (with<strong>in</strong> the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
coalition <strong>an</strong>d th<strong>an</strong>ks to the support of the Socialist Party of Serbia) <strong>an</strong>d skillfully<br />
m<strong>an</strong>euvered <strong>in</strong> the parliament, but did not stabilize Serbia’s political scene<br />
or def<strong>in</strong>ed its st<strong>an</strong>d about key issues. Actually, it stuck to its old pattern <strong>for</strong> Kosovo,<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d The Hague Tribunal, especially after the death of<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic.<br />
The Vojislav Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et’s en<strong>for</strong>ced cooperation with The Hague<br />
followed the recipe <strong>for</strong> "voluntary surrender." As this "recipe" turned <strong>in</strong>efficient<br />
<strong>in</strong> the case of Ratko Mladic <strong>an</strong>d other six <strong>in</strong>dictees The Hague Tribunal<br />
w<strong>an</strong>ts extradited, the government hesitates to arrest them. Its hesitation c<strong>an</strong> be<br />
ascribed to the remn<strong>an</strong>ts of the staunch resist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d delusion that now<br />
gradually melt down under the <strong>in</strong>ternational pressure. For the frustrated<br />
"patriotic block" <strong>an</strong>d the old regime’s still powerful structures, this is all about<br />
a global conspiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia. There<strong>for</strong>e, they more <strong>an</strong>d more look up to<br />
the Radicals as the only genu<strong>in</strong>e protectors of the Serbia’s <strong>in</strong>terests. Cherish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
hope that the Radicals would come to power, they produce the argumentation<br />
such as, "We haven’t witnessed yet the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party’s might. It would<br />
be only proper to let them have their say." Torn between the disappo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
patriotic block the goals of which turned null <strong>an</strong>d void on the one h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the grow<strong>in</strong>gly impoverished population on the other, the <strong>in</strong>cumbent<br />
government – or <strong>an</strong>y other <strong>for</strong> that matter – will slowly <strong>an</strong>d pa<strong>in</strong>fully follow<br />
the re<strong>for</strong>mist course. Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic’s death <strong>in</strong> the Scheven<strong>in</strong>gen<br />
detention unit laid bare the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political scene – it revealed the actual <strong>state</strong><br />
of affairs <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society: deficient potential <strong>for</strong> radical ch<strong>an</strong>ges,<br />
characteristic of Serbia’s post-communism. The <strong>in</strong>cumbent government <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
Premier are logical outputs of such social constellation. No wonder, there<strong>for</strong>e,<br />
that the Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et is "stable" <strong>in</strong> unstable circumst<strong>an</strong>ces.<br />
Two years of the Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et are marked by perm<strong>an</strong>ent campaign<strong>in</strong>g<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st a part of the civil sector, <strong>in</strong>tolerably coarse l<strong>an</strong>guage used <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament, tabloidization of the media <strong>an</strong>d their <strong>in</strong>strumentalization<br />
<strong>in</strong> the showdown with the society’s liberal option, <strong>an</strong>d overall clericalization of<br />
the society. All this just mirrors Serbia’s poor liberal potential. Instead of<br />
look<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a new paradigm capable of mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g all citizens, regardless of<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
their ethnic, religious or political backgrounds, the Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et lent a<br />
help<strong>in</strong>g h<strong>an</strong>d to the most conservative social structures.<br />
Throughout 2005 the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political scene was <strong>in</strong> turmoil. Solution<br />
of key <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d social problems was postponed s<strong>in</strong>ce the political elite was<br />
unready to commit itself to larger <strong>in</strong>terests of the society. In the absence of true<br />
political pluralism <strong>an</strong>d clear-cut vision, Serbi<strong>an</strong> political parties were more <strong>an</strong>d<br />
more act<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>in</strong>terest groups. This negatively affected citizens’ spirits <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> politics. Citizens were less <strong>an</strong>d less captured by mushroom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
sc<strong>an</strong>dals. For, as it turned out, none of them ended up <strong>in</strong> a court of law. The<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party is still most popular among Serbia’s citizens, primarily<br />
because of accumulated social problems <strong>an</strong>d the democratic block’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>capability to offer a worthwhile alternative. The parties from the so-called<br />
democratic block missed the opportunity to impose tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>herent<br />
problems as someth<strong>in</strong>g the society had to come to grips with <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> this<br />
context, awaken every <strong>in</strong>dividual’s responsibility.<br />
Just several bigger parties, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Democratic Party <strong>in</strong> the first place, that have become clearly recognizable so<br />
far reflect, at the same time, the political scene’s fundamental division <strong>in</strong>to<br />
populists <strong>an</strong>d democrats. Other parties c<strong>an</strong> be grouped along this l<strong>in</strong>e. The<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Renewal Movement, the Force of Serbia Movement (Bogoljub Karic)<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the New Serbia (Velimir Ilic) are populist parties. The Democratic Party of<br />
Serbia is somewhere <strong>in</strong> between, though by its conservativeness about the<br />
West <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>es more to populists. Moreover, the Democratic Party of Serbia has<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>ed the International Populist Association. What predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>tly marked<br />
Serbia’s partis<strong>an</strong> politics <strong>in</strong> 2005 were numerous <strong>in</strong>ter-party schisms,<br />
parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s’ tr<strong>an</strong>sfers, <strong>an</strong>d electoral <strong>an</strong>d post-electoral coalitions that<br />
brought about new caucuses.<br />
F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d economic magnates whose <strong>in</strong>fluence practically shapes<br />
the political scene also determ<strong>in</strong>e its dynamism. Hav<strong>in</strong>g accumulated their f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
power th<strong>an</strong>ks to their hookup with the Milosevic regime, they now develop<br />
partis<strong>an</strong> logistics of their own. Bogoljub Karic <strong>an</strong>d the like are try<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> politics <strong>an</strong>d promote themselves as party leaders. Such political<br />
"pluralization" mirrors partis<strong>an</strong>-ideological pragmatism, rather th<strong>an</strong> different<br />
political concepts. Bogoljub Karic’s team<strong>in</strong>g up with Nebojsa Covic’s Social-<br />
Democratic Party is the latest illustrative <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce testify<strong>in</strong>g of Serbia’s immature<br />
partis<strong>an</strong> politics guided by one-off <strong>in</strong>terests rather th<strong>an</strong> by social priorities.<br />
The democratic block acts along re<strong>for</strong>mist l<strong>in</strong>es only under the<br />
pressure from the West. Its poor re<strong>for</strong>mist potential has deprived Serbia’s<br />
voters of <strong>an</strong> authentic vision, like the one the late Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic had<br />
offered them. By fail<strong>in</strong>g to take a clear-cut oppositionist st<strong>an</strong>ce, the Democratic<br />
Party <strong>an</strong>d its blurred policy have made it possible <strong>for</strong> the Radicals to behave as<br />
the only opposition. Besides, the Radicals have monopolized corruption – the<br />
8<br />
9
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
issue sensitiz<strong>in</strong>g citizens – <strong>an</strong>d thus made room <strong>for</strong> their own election<br />
campaign. However, regardless of the fact that with their 79 seats they figure<br />
as the strongest party <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament, at this stage they are only after<br />
coalition partnerships at various levels, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g occasional partnerships with<br />
the Democratic Party as well.<br />
Th<strong>an</strong>ks to the support of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Vojislav Kostunica’s<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority government m<strong>an</strong>ages to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> stability. The Socialists’ support<br />
is conditioned by certa<strong>in</strong> concessions related to the cooperation with The<br />
Hague Tribunal. The president of their Ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, Ivica Dacic, has already<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced the party’s priorities <strong>in</strong> 2006 – one of them be<strong>in</strong>g a stronger partnership<br />
with the Democratic Party of Serbia. The Socialists keep condition<strong>in</strong>g<br />
their support on strict observ<strong>an</strong>ce of a mutual agreement that mostly provides<br />
the cooperation with the ITCY. Ivica Dacic made no bones about the Socialists’<br />
help<strong>in</strong>g h<strong>an</strong>d to the government lent "on the grounds of a strategic agreement<br />
with the Democratic Party of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Kostunica," which, as he put it, "not<br />
only brought to <strong>an</strong> end the political isolation of the Socialist Party of Serbia,<br />
but also division of Serbia’s parties <strong>in</strong>to the so-called blocks." The bottom l<strong>in</strong>e<br />
here is that, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Dacic, "there are no conceptual differences between<br />
the two parties <strong>in</strong> the matter of national <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests."<br />
Serbia’s political scene <strong>in</strong> 2005 was marked by political violence. The<br />
same pattern has actually characterized Serbia’s tr<strong>an</strong>sition from one-party<br />
system to parliamentari<strong>an</strong>ism. The national program def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> late 1880s<br />
secured Milosevic’s political monopoly. Almost the entire Serbi<strong>an</strong> opposition<br />
has been constituted under the same concept, which practically plagues it to<br />
this very day even though it is <strong>in</strong> power. Except <strong>for</strong> Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic, no one has<br />
ever questioned this concept.<br />
Several war generations have been raised on the model of violence<br />
exempt from punishment. This is how the new cultural model grew from<br />
radical ethno-nationalism <strong>an</strong>d ethnic, religious <strong>an</strong>d even political <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
This is how extreme rightist youth org<strong>an</strong>izations such as Obraz, Dveri <strong>an</strong>d Novi<br />
Stroj begun to mushroom <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stigate ever more radical <strong>in</strong>cidents. They act<br />
under the auspices of <strong>in</strong>fluential Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions such as the Belgrade<br />
University, the Svetozar Miletic Association <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church. At a<br />
larger scale, such m<strong>in</strong>dset is mirrored <strong>in</strong> the predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t value system<br />
where<strong>in</strong> Ark<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Legija are models of social prestige, while Ratko Mladic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadzic of war heroism.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority Policy<br />
The policy of <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d discrim<strong>in</strong>ation dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> Serbia ever<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce early 1990s was still <strong>in</strong> place <strong>in</strong> 2005. At political, social <strong>an</strong>d cultural<br />
scenes it is pursued by a number of <strong>for</strong>mal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal rightist groups aflame<br />
with the warr<strong>in</strong>g ideology of the last decade of the 20 th century <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
tradition of a part of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church – adherents of Nikolaj<br />
Velimirovic <strong>an</strong>d Just<strong>in</strong> Popovic, <strong>an</strong>d of generalized St. Sava’s teach<strong>in</strong>gs. Their<br />
ideological pattern <strong>in</strong>dicates "the idea of populism <strong>in</strong>fluenced neither by the<br />
West or Europe." The majority of such groups have overt or at least silent<br />
support from certa<strong>in</strong> circles <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Academy of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Sciences <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church. Some have adjusted their programs to the<br />
Church, while the rest such as Obraz, Sa<strong>in</strong>t Just<strong>in</strong> Popovic, Dveri Srpske or<br />
Nomok<strong>an</strong>on operate with the Church’s bless<strong>in</strong>g. More often th<strong>an</strong> not, their<br />
activities militate aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
The m<strong>in</strong>ority issue is a major <strong>in</strong>dicator of ethno-nationalism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ethnic <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce. A <strong>state</strong> based on ethnicity is <strong>in</strong>capable of address<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority question <strong>in</strong> a democratic m<strong>an</strong>ner, s<strong>in</strong>ce, as a rule, it perceives<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities as evildoers. Aga<strong>in</strong>st a backdrop as such, m<strong>in</strong>orities try to f<strong>in</strong>d a<br />
way out <strong>in</strong> various <strong>for</strong>ms of autonomy <strong>an</strong>d special status. Their dem<strong>an</strong>ds fuel<br />
the majority’s suspicion about their loyalty, the same as its conviction that<br />
ethnic pluralism is a burden one should get rid of. Aggressiveness spirals not<br />
only when it comes to m<strong>in</strong>orities, but also to <strong>an</strong>y differ<strong>in</strong>g, alternative thought.<br />
Never be<strong>for</strong>e have non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations, particularly those<br />
concerned with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, been so much targeted as they are today. The<br />
political alternative, choked by the current social ambience, is also heavily<br />
barraged. More th<strong>an</strong> ever be<strong>for</strong>e is the freedom of expression end<strong>an</strong>gered as<br />
the elite that used to back up Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic’s warr<strong>in</strong>g project fears the<br />
disclosure of its role. Actually, that’s the last defense of that project not only<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e The Hague Tribunal, but also be<strong>for</strong>e domestic public.<br />
Political opponents are outcast from public life <strong>an</strong>d marg<strong>in</strong>alized. This<br />
refers to Cedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ovic <strong>an</strong>d other close associates of late Premier Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Dj<strong>in</strong>djic, to Natasa Micic <strong>an</strong>d Zarko Korac, as well as to certa<strong>in</strong> representatives<br />
of the NGOs, particularly those concerned with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d fac<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
past. The <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s presence considerably hampers Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
nationalists’ potential <strong>for</strong> stick<strong>in</strong>g to the ethnic model of the <strong>state</strong>. However,<br />
their capacity <strong>for</strong> generat<strong>in</strong>g national homogenization, chauv<strong>in</strong>istic campaigns,<br />
ethnically motivated violence <strong>an</strong>d isolationism is still great <strong>an</strong>d scars<br />
<strong>in</strong>terethnic relations.<br />
Overcom<strong>in</strong>g the Past<br />
Some conditions must be established be<strong>for</strong>e Serbia opens the debate<br />
on the recent past, i.e. the wars <strong>in</strong> the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. This primarily<br />
refers to a clear break with the Greater Serbia project, i.e. the policy of crime.<br />
So far Serbia has not given a h<strong>in</strong>t of such a break. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> their evaluation<br />
of the past, some circles attempt to discredit <strong>an</strong>d blame certa<strong>in</strong> periods (the<br />
period of communism <strong>in</strong> the first place) <strong>for</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d thus relativize the<br />
process of overcom<strong>in</strong>g the crim<strong>in</strong>al past born out of radical nationalism.<br />
10<br />
11
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Overcom<strong>in</strong>g the past implies several premises. Firstly, the truth<br />
should be sought – either by a society itself or by <strong>in</strong>ternational circles. The<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> society as a whole does not search <strong>for</strong> the truth – <strong>for</strong>, the Serbs<br />
generally perceive themselves as the biggest victims, while the crimes are<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreted as justified as they were committed <strong>in</strong> their name. Secondly, there<br />
should be a strong political will. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, supporters of the current set<br />
off by Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic were <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>ority, <strong>an</strong>d the current itself was<br />
defeated after his murder. Vojislav Kostunica upheld the cont<strong>in</strong>uity of the old<br />
structures not only by re<strong>in</strong>stat<strong>in</strong>g "old" cadres but also by restor<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
function<strong>in</strong>g. Thirdly, political elites should be up to fac<strong>in</strong>g the past – <strong>in</strong> other<br />
words, this premise depends on the distribution of power <strong>in</strong> a society. The<br />
actual <strong>state</strong> of affairs <strong>in</strong> Serbia is probably best illustrated by the p<strong>an</strong>el held at<br />
the Belgrade Law School <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>an</strong>nounced as "The Liberation of<br />
Srebrenica." The very title crucially determ<strong>in</strong>es the Serbi<strong>an</strong> national strategy as<br />
it reflects territorial aspirations that have not been given up. Fourthly, the very<br />
character of ch<strong>an</strong>ges should be def<strong>in</strong>ed – <strong>in</strong> other words, def<strong>in</strong>ition of October<br />
5, 2000 must be a start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>for</strong> underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Serbia after Milosevic’s<br />
ouster.<br />
Institutions <strong>in</strong> the Clutches of the Executive Br<strong>an</strong>ch<br />
The establishment of a legal system that would br<strong>in</strong>g Serbia closer to<br />
developed democracies is still underway. As it turned out, a genu<strong>in</strong>e political<br />
will to have newly adopted laws <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards implemented did not follow <strong>in</strong><br />
the footsteps of legislative activism. This is about a slow-paced process that<br />
almost stalled <strong>in</strong> 2005. Though the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament passed scores of laws,<br />
what marked 2005 was that those laws were not implemented. For a<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sitional <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its functional re<strong>for</strong>ms the legislation that lacks<br />
en<strong>for</strong>ceable mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>an</strong>d a new methodology is more of a regress th<strong>an</strong><br />
progress.<br />
The government failed to adopt bylaws that would secure<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement of a number of laws, the same as it failed to establish necessary<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms of control. The much delayed Serbi<strong>an</strong> constitution<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates a chronic absence of political will to f<strong>in</strong>alize the necessary re<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
<strong>an</strong>d safeguard them by <strong>an</strong> adequate legal system. All this only moves Serbia<br />
away from Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
Serbia has not been constituted yet as a <strong>state</strong>. There<strong>for</strong>e, all <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
supposed to uphold a functional society, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g key ones, are <strong>in</strong>capable of<br />
secur<strong>in</strong>g the rule of law. In other words, the postulates guar<strong>an</strong>tee<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
exercise <strong>an</strong>d protection of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, as well as legal <strong>security</strong> of both<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ority communities are non-existent. Though a number of<br />
newly passed laws are <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, Serbia still lacks<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>isms that would put them <strong>in</strong>to effect – relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions have been<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
deva<strong>state</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d subjected to unprofessionalism <strong>for</strong> years. It is only natural,<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e, that citizens’ trust <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> on the downward curve, the<br />
same as their perception of general <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>security</strong>.<br />
Radical re<strong>for</strong>ms of the judiciary have not been launched. Moreover,<br />
politics once aga<strong>in</strong> stepped <strong>in</strong>to all judicial <strong>in</strong>stitutions. By barrag<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Special Trial Chamber <strong>for</strong> Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime <strong>an</strong>d War Crimes - that has<br />
processed several complex cases – with criticism, politics <strong>in</strong>fluences its overall<br />
efficiency. In all cases brought be<strong>for</strong>e the Chamber the Prosecution still<br />
attempts to neutralize the <strong>state</strong>, the YPA troops <strong>an</strong>d the police’s <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong><br />
war crimes. It labels war crimes "<strong>in</strong>cidents" committed by "isolated" g<strong>an</strong>gs.<br />
This is how the <strong>state</strong> is be<strong>in</strong>g protected from accusations <strong>for</strong> aggression <strong>an</strong>d<br />
genocide, <strong>an</strong>d, as m<strong>an</strong>y put it, possible war compensation.<br />
The Army of Serbia-Montenegro is fall<strong>in</strong>g apart – a process triggered<br />
off by general demoralization <strong>an</strong>d numerous affairs <strong>an</strong>d sc<strong>an</strong>dals. The affairs<br />
that cont<strong>in</strong>ued mushroom<strong>in</strong>g throughout 2005 laid bare the crises of the<br />
Army’s morale. The affairs disclosed the hookup between military structures<br />
<strong>an</strong>d war crim<strong>in</strong>als, Ratko Mladic <strong>in</strong>cluded. For over a decade, this hookup has<br />
provided a safe haven to The Hague fugitives. Liable to disrepute, the Army<br />
itself shattered the myth of its "impeccability," which was evidenced <strong>in</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />
polls. Once a traditional number one, the Army now takes the third place after<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d the education system, <strong>an</strong>d will most<br />
probably further spiral down.<br />
The re<strong>for</strong>m of the defense system hardly made <strong>an</strong>y progress at all –<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> authorities are still excluded from it, while a strategic project <strong>for</strong> its<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation has not been def<strong>in</strong>ed. The re<strong>for</strong>m mostly boils down to<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izational arr<strong>an</strong>gements <strong>an</strong>d the drafts compensat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> demobilized<br />
professionals. The Army still counts on the Serbi<strong>an</strong> military tradition, rather<br />
th<strong>an</strong> on re<strong>for</strong>ms that would qualify it <strong>for</strong> Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, primarily<br />
<strong>for</strong> the Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace.<br />
It its attitude towards Montenegro the Army still <strong>in</strong>sists on the State<br />
Union’s susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Given that the Army used to be the strongest l<strong>in</strong>k<br />
between the two member-<strong>state</strong>s (with the General Staff <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Defense overtly sid<strong>in</strong>g with Serbia), <strong>in</strong> 2005 Montenegro agreed to subsidize<br />
some ten percent of its <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d material resources – a part that is <strong>an</strong>yway<br />
located <strong>in</strong> its territory. This de facto divided the Army of Serbia-Montenegro<br />
<strong>in</strong>to two armies.<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> side (<strong>in</strong> t<strong>an</strong>dem with the General Staff <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Defense) still attempts to <strong>in</strong>fluence the "Montenegr<strong>in</strong> part" of the armed <strong>for</strong>ces<br />
through keep<strong>in</strong>g all key positions. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g elite exclusively<br />
perceives the Army as a decisive factor of "the safeguard of p<strong>an</strong>-Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
territory."<br />
12<br />
13
The Church <strong>an</strong>d Politics<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The longst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g crisis, destroyed value system, resist<strong>an</strong>ce to<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>an</strong>d re<strong>for</strong>ms, <strong>an</strong>d massive war crimes opened the door to the <strong>for</strong>ces<br />
that <strong>in</strong>herently oppose <strong>an</strong>y ch<strong>an</strong>ge. As Serbia’s traditional <strong>in</strong>stitution, the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church m<strong>an</strong>aged to conquer the public scene. It imposed<br />
itself as <strong>an</strong> arch arbiter <strong>in</strong> all social <strong>an</strong>d political issues, particularly after<br />
October 5, 2000. However, with its conservative position on the character of the<br />
society, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church st<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>in</strong> the way of a clearly shaped<br />
pro-Europe<strong>an</strong> policy. This particularly affects younger generations prone to<br />
quick <strong>an</strong>d simple solutions. The Church opposes Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Western<br />
values, free market <strong>an</strong>d the concept of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>in</strong>dividual rights <strong>in</strong><br />
particular.<br />
The Church’s attitude towards the recent past is also problematic – not<br />
only because of its ample support to Milosevic’s warr<strong>in</strong>g policy, but also<br />
because of the fact that it still actively sides with <strong>an</strong>ti-Hague lobby <strong>an</strong>d thus<br />
with war crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>in</strong>dicted by the Tribunal.<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church hugely <strong>in</strong>fluences the shap<strong>in</strong>g of a new<br />
cultural model. Its strong politicization <strong>an</strong>d meddl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> affairs seriously<br />
questioned the secular character of the <strong>state</strong>. Vojislav Kostunica’s cab<strong>in</strong>et<br />
promotes the Church <strong>in</strong> all social spheres <strong>an</strong>d enables its arbitrage <strong>in</strong> all key<br />
issues. His Democratic Party of Serbia has even set up <strong>an</strong> advisory committee –<br />
the Council <strong>for</strong> Religion.<br />
The Media: Lagg<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d the Ch<strong>an</strong>ges<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> media are not up to the task of promot<strong>in</strong>g overall social<br />
re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d democratic tr<strong>an</strong>sition. They rather mirror a part of the society<br />
try<strong>in</strong>g to obstruct <strong>an</strong>y ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>d thus safeguard the adv<strong>an</strong>tages ga<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Milosevic era. Though the media legislation was rounded off <strong>in</strong> the period<br />
October 5, 2000 – 2005, some provisions are still not en<strong>for</strong>ced. This not only<br />
affects the media <strong>in</strong>dustry, but also fuels <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>mist policies of the majority<br />
of the outlets. The <strong>in</strong>effective provisions primarily relate to <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
broadcast<strong>in</strong>g laws – i.e. to media privatization, distribution of frequencies <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of the Radio & Television of Serbia <strong>in</strong>to a public<br />
broadcast<strong>in</strong>g service. All deadl<strong>in</strong>es set <strong>for</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>alization of these processes<br />
have been postponed <strong>for</strong> several months or even several years. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the comparative survey the Open Society Institute, Budapest, conducted <strong>in</strong> 20<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> countries, Serbia’s media regulation is almost at the bottom – not<br />
only have the media been destroyed <strong>for</strong> decades, but also "the re<strong>for</strong>ms after the<br />
democratic ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> 2000 have been slow-paced." Properly regulated<br />
broadcast<strong>in</strong>g is among the preconditions <strong>for</strong> jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Relations with Neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Countries<br />
Serbia’s attitude towards Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, Montenegro,<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia clearly <strong>in</strong>dicates that Serbi<strong>an</strong> nationalism const<strong>an</strong>tly<br />
replenishes <strong>an</strong>d sticks to the same premises. Developments over the past<br />
several months, the same as the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political elite’s rhetoric <strong>in</strong> all key<br />
matters, show that national goals have not been given up. Incapable <strong>an</strong>d<br />
unready to deal with crucial problems that have been plagu<strong>in</strong>g her, <strong>in</strong> 2005<br />
Serbia raised all unresolved <strong>state</strong> questions <strong>an</strong>d proved that she was relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
<strong>for</strong> the region just because she held the keys to Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a’s,<br />
Montenegro’s, Kosovo’s <strong>an</strong>d even Macedonia’s issues.<br />
In Macedonia, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church (SPC) tried to establish<br />
its own org<strong>an</strong>ization, regardless of the existence of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church. Appo<strong>in</strong>tment of Bishop Jov<strong>an</strong> as the SPC’s<br />
autonomous representative <strong>in</strong> Macedonia faced the Macedoni<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>for</strong> the first<br />
time, with the fact that Serbia goes aga<strong>in</strong>st her sovereignty.<br />
In Montenegro, Serbi<strong>an</strong> nationalists, amply backed by the official<br />
Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Premier Kostunica himself, <strong>in</strong>cite conflicts because of the<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced referendum on <strong>in</strong>dependence. Almost the entire Serbi<strong>an</strong> elite’s<br />
paternalistic attitude towards Montenegro reflects overt territorial aspirations.<br />
The official Belgrade is actively campaign<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st Montenegro’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence. Even the Democratic Party – now fully cle<strong>an</strong>sed from the socalled<br />
Dj<strong>in</strong>djic adherents – takes the same st<strong>an</strong>ces. This is probably best<br />
illustrated by Ljubomir Tadic’s letter to Nenad Bogd<strong>an</strong>ovic reproach<strong>in</strong>g him<br />
<strong>for</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g attended the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g party’s convention. "Advocat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the <strong>state</strong> union while support<strong>in</strong>g the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> regime makes no sense,"<br />
wrote Tadic. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, the Democratic Party that st<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> the <strong>state</strong><br />
union c<strong>an</strong>not possibly cherish friendly relations with the <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> regime <strong>an</strong>d its policy of open enmity. 1 Moreover, philosopher<br />
Ljubomir Tadic advised President Boris Tadic to actively jo<strong>in</strong> the preparations<br />
<strong>for</strong> Montenegro’s referendum.<br />
When it comes to Kosovo, faced with st<strong>an</strong>dards’ assessment <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced negotiations on Kosovo’s status, Serbia ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s tension. The<br />
media propag<strong>an</strong>da aga<strong>in</strong>st the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s is still at full sw<strong>in</strong>g – the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s<br />
are const<strong>an</strong>tly presented as terrorists, s<strong>in</strong>ce combat<strong>in</strong>g terrorism is among the<br />
West’s priorities.<br />
Bosnia’s charge aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia-Montenegro <strong>for</strong> genocide <strong>an</strong>d<br />
aggression has also become Serbia’s major concern engag<strong>in</strong>g almost all social<br />
structures, some NGOs <strong>in</strong>cluded. Some Western countries, too, have set<br />
themselves at hav<strong>in</strong>g the problem solved through extra-judicial arbitration.<br />
However, it is imperative <strong>for</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the region that the Court verifies the<br />
1 Vecernje Novosti, May 29, 2005.<br />
14<br />
15
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
charge <strong>an</strong>d thus provide evidence <strong>for</strong> Serbia’s aggression <strong>an</strong>d her genocidal<br />
policy aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslims. Only deconstruction <strong>an</strong>d demystification of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> project <strong>in</strong> Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a c<strong>an</strong> truly pacify the entire region.<br />
Mark<strong>in</strong>g of the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of the "Storm" operation once aga<strong>in</strong><br />
revived the polemic on the event’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation. He Serbi<strong>an</strong> side’s claim that<br />
was the biggest ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g ever aims at negat<strong>in</strong>g legitimacy of the<br />
"Storm" military operation <strong>an</strong>d, consequently, equaliz<strong>in</strong>g the war<br />
responsibility. Crucial signific<strong>an</strong>ce of Serb-Croati<strong>an</strong> relations is once aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
the close-up, the same as their fragility.<br />
The Region <strong>an</strong>d the International Community<br />
The Balk<strong>an</strong> region, slowly but surely, enters under the aegis of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Union. By giv<strong>in</strong>g the green light to negotiations on Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Association Agreement with Serbia-Montenegro, the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union has<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ally rounded off its Western Balk<strong>an</strong>s policy. At the same time, it has started<br />
to negotiate accession with Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Turkey, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>nounced the SAA with<br />
Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. With this package the EU has effectuated conclusions of<br />
the 2003 Salonika Summit that had decided that all Balk<strong>an</strong> countries, under<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, may run <strong>for</strong> the EU membership. However, the tim<strong>in</strong>g<br />
itself demonstrates that the EU has somewhat matured, given that it had been<br />
w<strong>an</strong>der<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its search <strong>for</strong> a solution <strong>for</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>for</strong> over a decade. The EU<br />
has overcome the region’s deficiency <strong>in</strong> liberal elites capable of support<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> values <strong>an</strong>d promot<strong>in</strong>g democratic processes by lend<strong>in</strong>g it a help<strong>in</strong>g<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d – <strong>an</strong>d, with this package, it has become a factor of the region’s<br />
mobilization. The EU has thus solved the issue of regional stability <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>security</strong>, which is of strategic signific<strong>an</strong>ce to Europe as a whole. As <strong>for</strong> Serbia,<br />
that’s practically the only alternative.<br />
All countries <strong>in</strong> the region have welcomed the EU’s decision with one<br />
voice, though their perceptions of a shared Europe<strong>an</strong> future differ. In this<br />
context, Serbia faces the biggest challenge. The obstacles on her way result, <strong>in</strong><br />
the first place, from her economic, political <strong>an</strong>d social limitations. After the<br />
<strong>in</strong>itial breakthrough of October 2005, everyth<strong>in</strong>g has been mov<strong>in</strong>g backward<br />
ever s<strong>in</strong>ce Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic had been gunned down – a <strong>state</strong> without<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed borders <strong>an</strong>d without a constitution, centralized govern<strong>an</strong>ce, broken<br />
cooperation with The Hague, stalled economic re<strong>for</strong>ms, etc.<br />
The commitment "to Europe" – verbally undisputed neither by the<br />
political elite nor the majority of citizens – lacks the support of a clear-cut<br />
consensus that would guar<strong>an</strong>tee its validity. On the contrary, as if some<br />
taciturn <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> consensus has been reached <strong>in</strong> some segments crucial<br />
to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> particular, to her relations with her neighbors. However,<br />
plagued by accumulated economic, political <strong>an</strong>d social problems, the m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
government has little choice. Namely, over the past two years, the EU, the IMF<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the World B<strong>an</strong>k have made the Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et resume the path cleared<br />
by the Dj<strong>in</strong>djic government. So, Vojislav Kostunica radically ch<strong>an</strong>ged his<br />
attitude towards The Hague Tribunal ("The Hague is the number one issue," he<br />
said), though, <strong>in</strong> the name of national <strong>in</strong>terests, he used to extradite all<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictees to the Tribunal as "volunteers." In the doma<strong>in</strong> of economy, the<br />
Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et, though sluggishly, follows <strong>in</strong> the footsteps of its<br />
predecessor, primarily when it comes to monetary <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial discipl<strong>in</strong>e that<br />
preconditions the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial assist<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
After Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic’s assass<strong>in</strong>ation, the West has adjusted its<br />
policy to the reality that hugely differed from the overrated perception of the<br />
post-October 5 Serbia. It took the West three years to realize that Milosevic’s<br />
legacy was a by far more serious <strong>an</strong>d deeper problem then his ouster.<br />
Corruption, poverty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>competence to govern the <strong>state</strong> turned out to be<br />
bigger problems th<strong>an</strong> thought, while it became obvious that "the democratic<br />
revolution" just lead to the reshuffle of Milosevic’s clique. Basically, the failure<br />
is to be ascribed to old social <strong>an</strong>d cultural weaknesses, only aggravated by the<br />
absence of stable economic <strong>an</strong>d political <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>an</strong>d educated, politically<br />
motivated, economically dynamic <strong>an</strong>d law-abid<strong>in</strong>g middle class. Besides, a<br />
political party capable of mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g citizens to endure the p<strong>an</strong>gs of tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
is still nowhere to be seen.<br />
The Balk<strong>an</strong> package co<strong>in</strong>cided with the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s<br />
decision to start resolv<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo status. It is obvious that speed<strong>in</strong>g up<br />
Serbia’s movement towards Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>nulment of her debts<br />
are supposed to compensate her <strong>for</strong> Kosovo. Serbia has not publicly accepted<br />
the offer, as she lacks political courage to acknowledge – through the<br />
resolution of Kosovo’s status – the developments that have led to its loss.<br />
Apart from unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to face the recent past, Serbi<strong>an</strong> political elites<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ifest <strong>in</strong>credible rigidity when it comes to accept<strong>in</strong>g the new reality.<br />
Though the unty<strong>in</strong>g of the Kosovo knot dramatically draws <strong>in</strong>, Serbia has not<br />
yet def<strong>in</strong>ed her negotiat<strong>in</strong>g strategy (except <strong>for</strong> the empty-worded slog<strong>an</strong><br />
"more th<strong>an</strong> autonomy, less th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence").<br />
Th<strong>an</strong>ks to the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s presence, Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
nationalists no longer have either potential or opportunity <strong>for</strong> stick<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
ethnic model of the <strong>state</strong>. However, their capacity <strong>for</strong> generat<strong>in</strong>g national<br />
homogenization, chauv<strong>in</strong>istic campaigns, ethnically motivated violence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
isolationism is still great <strong>an</strong>d scars <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations.<br />
The official Belgrade’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of globalization <strong>in</strong>dicates not only<br />
its misunderst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g but also denial of the new world order that reflects<br />
new <strong>in</strong>ternational constellation <strong>an</strong>d economic-technological progress, i.e. spirit<br />
of the times. The lament over a nation-<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its exclusive sovereignty is noth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
but a denial of em<strong>an</strong>cipation <strong>an</strong>d the st<strong>an</strong>dards guar<strong>an</strong>tee<strong>in</strong>g freedom to<br />
all communities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals. At the same time, such lament is supposed to<br />
prevent square recognition <strong>an</strong>d punishment of war crimes, i.e. accountability.<br />
16<br />
17
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Judg<strong>in</strong>g by public discourse, the grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d even<br />
repression might spiral <strong>in</strong> 2006 when Serbia will have to cope with two major<br />
<strong>an</strong>d potentially frustrat<strong>in</strong>g challenges: negotiations on the f<strong>in</strong>al status of<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro’s referendum. While refus<strong>in</strong>g to acknowledge defeat<br />
<strong>an</strong>d thus uncha<strong>in</strong> itself, the political elite <strong>in</strong>sists on the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people’s<br />
sacrifice – even Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic’s death is used to susta<strong>in</strong> this loss – <strong>an</strong>d<br />
fuels the society’s resist<strong>an</strong>ce to ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>d reserve <strong>for</strong> the West.<br />
Serbia is a closed society with poor capacity <strong>for</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition. She has not<br />
been yet constituted as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d lacks a new paradigm capable<br />
of mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g all citizens regardless of their ethnic, religious or political<br />
affiliations.<br />
Const<strong>an</strong>t campaign<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st a part of the civil society, the absence of<br />
alternative thought, <strong>in</strong>tolerably coarse l<strong>an</strong>guage used <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
parliament, tabloidization of the media <strong>an</strong>d their <strong>in</strong>strumentalization <strong>in</strong><br />
curb<strong>in</strong>g liberal social tendencies, <strong>an</strong>d clericalization of the society noth<strong>in</strong>g but<br />
testify of Serbia’s meager liberal potential.<br />
Under the weight of her recent past, Serbia is still ambivalent to her<br />
future. Serbia is eager to jo<strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration processes as soon as<br />
possible, but <strong>in</strong> real life m<strong>an</strong>ifests <strong>in</strong>sufficient political will <strong>an</strong>d capacity.<br />
The fact that Serbia is <strong>an</strong> unf<strong>in</strong>ished <strong>state</strong> without clear borders<br />
seriously threatens her re<strong>for</strong>mist potential <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> this context, ability to<br />
promote <strong>an</strong>d protect <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights.<br />
Recommendations to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government:<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia puts <strong>for</strong>th the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>an</strong>ds:<br />
• The government should prepare the public <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> realistic<br />
solutions to Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> issues <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community so as avoid additional frustration<br />
among citizens <strong>an</strong>d all political factors. This is the only way to prevent<br />
destabilization of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society <strong>an</strong>d create conditions <strong>for</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
crucial questions of tr<strong>an</strong>sition;<br />
• The government should cooperate with The Hague Tribunal<br />
seriously <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> full s<strong>in</strong>cerity. This implies immediate arrests of Ratko Mladic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>dictees;<br />
• The government should pursue system re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> the first<br />
place, round off the legal framework necessary <strong>for</strong> the society’s normal<br />
function<strong>in</strong>g;<br />
• The government should clearly m<strong>an</strong>ifest its political will <strong>for</strong> the<br />
implementation of the enacted legislation;<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
• The government should resume the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of a secular <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> this context, dist<strong>an</strong>ce itself from the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church’s<br />
political activity;<br />
• The government should engage itself <strong>in</strong> the promotion of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> value system <strong>an</strong>d thus prepare younger generations <strong>for</strong> Serbia’s<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> future;<br />
• The government should guar<strong>an</strong>tee the freedom of the media<br />
under the exist<strong>in</strong>g provisions <strong>an</strong>d their freedom from the <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal<br />
circles;<br />
• The government should warr<strong>an</strong>t the atmosphere of toler<strong>an</strong>ce so as<br />
to enable a free social debate lead<strong>in</strong>g to the consensus on Serbia’s option <strong>for</strong><br />
Europe;<br />
• The government should be <strong>an</strong> active factor <strong>in</strong> curb<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>for</strong>ms of<br />
nationalism so as to pave the road <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>terethnic harmonization <strong>an</strong>d open the<br />
door to alternative options;<br />
• State <strong>in</strong>stitutions should adopt the programs <strong>for</strong> fac<strong>in</strong>g the past, a<br />
process that preconditions the renewal of trust <strong>an</strong>d cooperation with the<br />
countries <strong>in</strong> the region.<br />
Recommendations to the International Community:<br />
• In its attempt to have Serbia jo<strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration processes<br />
as soon as possible, the <strong>in</strong>ternational community should strike a proper<br />
bal<strong>an</strong>ce between pressure <strong>an</strong>d motivation. This is the more so import<strong>an</strong>t s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
Serbia needs to trigger off her <strong>in</strong>ner potential;<br />
• The <strong>in</strong>ternational community should actively partake <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>for</strong> the implementation of the enacted<br />
"Europe<strong>an</strong>" laws;<br />
• To speed up the <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>for</strong> regional cooperation, the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community should be more perceptive <strong>in</strong> discern<strong>in</strong>g the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
radical nationalism. In this context, it should more resolutely engage itself <strong>in</strong><br />
the resolution of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> issues, as well as <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
Serbia’s borders <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal arr<strong>an</strong>gements;<br />
• In its contacts with Serbia’s government <strong>an</strong>d other relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
authorities, the <strong>in</strong>ternational community should more firmly call <strong>for</strong> toler<strong>an</strong>t<br />
attitudes towards <strong>an</strong>y alternative thought <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>d guar<strong>an</strong>tees <strong>for</strong> safe<br />
activity of the civil sector, particularly the non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
concerned with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights;<br />
• Apart from assist<strong>in</strong>g governmental agencies, the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community should show more underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> Serbia’s still blurred liberal<br />
option embedded <strong>in</strong> some smaller political parties <strong>an</strong>d a part of the civil sector;<br />
18<br />
19
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
• The <strong>in</strong>ternational community should actively partake <strong>in</strong> education<br />
of young professionals <strong>an</strong>d facilitate their contacts with Europe<strong>an</strong> educational<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions (visa regime).<br />
I<br />
SHADOW<br />
OF THE PAST<br />
20<br />
21
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The rise of extremism <strong>in</strong> Europe <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> other parts of the world, as<br />
evidenced by racism, chauv<strong>in</strong>ism, xenophobia, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism, religious,<br />
national, ethnic <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, <strong>an</strong>d hate speech <strong>in</strong><br />
the doma<strong>in</strong>s of social <strong>an</strong>d political life, is looked upon by <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions as a subst<strong>an</strong>tial challenge to the<br />
culture of democracy <strong>an</strong>d respect <strong>for</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights. M<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
summits <strong>an</strong>d conferences – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the World Conference Aga<strong>in</strong>st Racism,<br />
Racial Discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, Xenophobia <strong>an</strong>d Related Intoler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> Durb<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2001<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Stockholm International Forum, the Vienna Summit of the Council of<br />
Europe, the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism held <strong>in</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong>, Paris <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Brussels <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Cordoba <strong>in</strong> 2005 – have discussed these phenomena,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g hate crimes, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mulated a framework of measures <strong>in</strong> their f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
documents with which to fight them.<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Young Serb Right<br />
The policy of <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, which had<br />
predom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> Serbia s<strong>in</strong>ce the early 1990s, cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong> 2005. In politics,<br />
social affairs <strong>an</strong>d cultural life it was dist<strong>in</strong>guished by the existence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
activities of m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>for</strong>mal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal right-w<strong>in</strong>g groups draw<strong>in</strong>g on the<br />
warlike ideology 1 dat<strong>in</strong>g back to the early 1990s <strong>an</strong>d on some of the traditions<br />
of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church (SPC), notably the lore surround<strong>in</strong>g Nikolaj<br />
Velimirović <strong>an</strong>d St Just<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the cult of St Sava <strong>in</strong> general. In the ideological<br />
model of these groups one detects <strong>an</strong> ‘advocacy of populism or commonalty<br />
devoid of <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>fluence whatever...of the West <strong>an</strong>d Europe’, 2 whose belated<br />
reflex is ‘m<strong>an</strong>ifested as a collectivistic m<strong>in</strong>dset <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ization of life <strong>in</strong><br />
society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> po<strong>in</strong>tedly repudiat<strong>in</strong>g...<strong>an</strong>y <strong>for</strong>m of modern<br />
parliamentari<strong>an</strong>ism <strong>an</strong>d democracy.’ 3 M<strong>an</strong>y of the young radical right-w<strong>in</strong>g<br />
groups <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izations enjoy ‘if not open, then at least tacit support from<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> SANU (Serbi<strong>an</strong> Academy of Sciences <strong>an</strong>d Arts) <strong>an</strong>d SPC circles –<br />
1 The idea of a Greater Serbia <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g Serb ethnic space <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia.<br />
2 Mirko Đorđević, ‘O izvorima ideja nove srpske desnice’, discourse at the<br />
‘New Serb Right <strong>an</strong>d Anti-Semitism’ round table org<strong>an</strong>ized by the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, Belgrade, 3 November 2005.<br />
3 Ibid.<br />
22<br />
23
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> bishops, the semi-monthly Pravoslavlje, the SPC In<strong>for</strong>mation Service –<br />
or universities.’ 4 While some base their programmes on the SPC, 5 others such<br />
as ‘Obraz [Dignity], Sveti [St] Just<strong>in</strong> Popović, Dveri srpske [Serbi<strong>an</strong> Doorway],<br />
Nomok<strong>an</strong>on [Nomoc<strong>an</strong>on], etc. operate publicly with the bless<strong>in</strong>g of the SPC<br />
<strong>an</strong>d often <strong>in</strong> close collaboration with it.’ 6<br />
The majority of the right-w<strong>in</strong>g groups are youth org<strong>an</strong>izations such as<br />
sk<strong>in</strong>heads, Nacionalni stroj (National Echelons), Krv i čast (Blood <strong>an</strong>d Honour),<br />
Rasni nacionalisti - rasonalisti (Racial Nationalists), Obraz, Dveri srpske, Sveti<br />
Just<strong>in</strong> Filozof (St Just<strong>in</strong> the Philosopher), Svetozar Miletić, Nomok<strong>an</strong>on. They are<br />
characterized by extreme <strong>an</strong>ti-Westernism, nationalism, ideological bigotry,<br />
<strong>an</strong>imosity towards liberal values, homophobia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism, as well as by<br />
open support <strong>for</strong> the Hague Tribunal <strong>in</strong>dictees Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić 7 <strong>an</strong>d Ratko<br />
Mladić.<br />
The ‘ideological’ bigotry of these org<strong>an</strong>izations, comb<strong>in</strong>ed with their<br />
repugn<strong>an</strong>ce towards <strong>an</strong>d even negation of all th<strong>in</strong>gs not ‘authentically Serb’,<br />
reflects a wider social frustration borne of the unread<strong>in</strong>ess of Serbi<strong>an</strong> society to<br />
deal with its recent history <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> that context, to accept the Western<br />
democratic values be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ced on the present government from outside with a<br />
view to Serbia’s Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration. The right-w<strong>in</strong>g youth org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
equate the SPC with the theology of Orthodoxy <strong>an</strong>d support the SPC, its<br />
grow<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>state</strong> religion’ status through a proactive engagement <strong>in</strong> official<br />
policy, <strong>an</strong>d its chief moral arbiter role <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y relev<strong>an</strong>t socio-political issues –<br />
all of which has been criticized by numerous civil society org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
few liberal <strong>an</strong>d social democratic political parties. This support is subst<strong>an</strong>tiated<br />
both explicitly <strong>an</strong>d implicitly by m<strong>an</strong>y. Thus, at the southeast Serbia Orthodox<br />
Youth Assembly, Professor Slobod<strong>an</strong> Kostić said: ‘We need the Orthodox<br />
4 Mirko Đorđević, Vreme, 7 April 2005.<br />
5 In its Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Draft Serb Youth National Programme <strong>for</strong> the 21sth<br />
century, the Serb Youth Assembly, which has the support of the SPC, writes that ‘the<br />
future of the Serb <strong>state</strong> ought to be based on the cult of St Sava, the Kosovo Oath, a<br />
reappraisal of Serb culture, education <strong>an</strong>d history <strong>an</strong>d of relations with others, the<br />
creation of <strong>an</strong> elite, the preservation of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d the Cyrillic, the<br />
restoration of the Serb village, the good husb<strong>an</strong>d’s family, parochial community,<br />
church-popular assemblies, democracy <strong>an</strong>d monarchy.’ Dr Mil<strong>an</strong> Vukom<strong>an</strong>ović, ‘O<br />
čemu crkva (ne)može da se pita. SPC, država i društvo u Srbiji (2000-2005),<br />
www.hels<strong>in</strong>ki.org 2005.<br />
6 Radov<strong>an</strong> Kupres, ‘Srpska pravoslavna crkva i novi srpski identitet’,<br />
www.hels<strong>in</strong>ki.org 2005.<br />
7 Obraz conducts a campaign called ‘Every Serb Is a Radov<strong>an</strong>’ <strong>in</strong> order to w<strong>in</strong><br />
recognition of the ‘truth’ about Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d the just struggle of the Serb<br />
people. Start, 20 December 2005. On 17 May 2005 members of the movement wear<strong>in</strong>g T-<br />
shirts with Special Operations Unit (JSO) emblems <strong>an</strong>d portraits of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić<br />
disrupted the ‘Liberation of Srebrenica’ p<strong>an</strong>el discussion at the Faculty of Law <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade. NIN, 29 December 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
culture <strong>an</strong>d art of the olden times, not <strong>an</strong>y upstarts who subscribe to Western<br />
culture.’ 8 Vladimir Nešić of Dveri srpske said that ‘the road of Serb youth must<br />
revert to the foundations of the cult of St Sava.’ 9 Even more <strong>in</strong>dicative was the<br />
<strong>an</strong>nouncement of the Dveri srpske Assembly, which br<strong>in</strong>gs together over 50<br />
Orthodox Serb youth org<strong>an</strong>izations, on the occasion of the ‘Proclamation of 33<br />
Public Figures’: ‘We do not accept the position of the new ideologues that the<br />
Serbs are the only ones to blame <strong>for</strong> the war of 1991-95...we do not accept the<br />
new ideologues’ death penalty <strong>for</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church...After all that<br />
has befallen the Serb Church <strong>an</strong>d people <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, Macedonia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, not to speak of the other territories where Serbs used to<br />
live, only a very impudent person will accuse none other th<strong>an</strong> the Serb Church<br />
of m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g conflict <strong>in</strong> these regions...We do not accept the <strong>in</strong>correct<br />
allegation of the new ideologues that the SPC has taken over the role of the<br />
<strong>state</strong>...’ 10<br />
In a broader sense, the right-w<strong>in</strong>g youth org<strong>an</strong>izations’ support <strong>for</strong> the<br />
SPC c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>in</strong>terpreted not only as support <strong>for</strong> the st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d status of the<br />
SPC as the head of the largest religious community <strong>in</strong> Serbia, but also<br />
<strong>in</strong>directly as <strong>an</strong> encouragement to cont<strong>in</strong>ue the policy of exp<strong>an</strong>sion from the<br />
early 1990s, a policy the SPC cont<strong>in</strong>ues to serve today. 11 The ‘Serb’ territories,<br />
some of which the Serb army tried to capture dur<strong>in</strong>g the wars <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia, are today referred to by the SPC as the Serb spiritual space<br />
rightfully belong<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the ‘spiritual’ as well as political boundaries of the<br />
Serb <strong>state</strong>, especially with regard to Republika Srpska <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro.<br />
In view of the controversy triggered by the pl<strong>an</strong>s of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Orthodox churches to build places of worship <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a,<br />
the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g arguments become underst<strong>an</strong>dable. The SPC, government <strong>an</strong>d<br />
right-w<strong>in</strong>g youth regard the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Orthodox Church as unrecognized churches, sects <strong>an</strong>d even<br />
political creations 12 which, accord<strong>in</strong>g to M<strong>in</strong>ister Radulović, abuse ‘the rights<br />
of the national m<strong>in</strong>orities to break up the religious structure <strong>in</strong> Serbia’, as well<br />
8 D<strong>an</strong>as, 24-25 September 2005.<br />
9 Ibid.<br />
10 Večernje novosti, 15 October 2005.<br />
11 The <strong>for</strong>mer US ambassador <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, William Montgomery, said that he<br />
had noticed a disturb<strong>in</strong>g trend <strong>in</strong> the last two or three years, with high Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodox dignitaries tak<strong>in</strong>g the lead <strong>in</strong> religious/nationalistic <strong>an</strong>d political activities <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong> aggressive m<strong>an</strong>ner. He said that the Orthodox Church had not yet m<strong>an</strong>aged to make<br />
peace with the political developments over the past decades <strong>an</strong>d po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the<br />
SPC had used a military helicopter to place a chapel atop a mounta<strong>in</strong> peak <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro. D<strong>an</strong>as, 23-24 September 2005.<br />
12 Mil<strong>an</strong> Radulović, Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of Religion. Večernje novosti, 14 August<br />
2005.<br />
24<br />
25
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
alleg<strong>in</strong>g that the m<strong>in</strong>orities are search<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> their identity <strong>in</strong> a ‘nonexistent<br />
church. That is a fully atheized rather th<strong>an</strong> religious consciousness.’ 13<br />
In sid<strong>in</strong>g with the SPC <strong>in</strong> this controversy, the government is help<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to establish the supremacy of the SPC <strong>in</strong> multi-confessional Serbia, its narrowm<strong>in</strong>ded<br />
policy aimed at impos<strong>in</strong>g a new Serb Orthodox identity<br />
wholeheartedly backed by the numerous org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d right-w<strong>in</strong>g Serb<br />
youth groups. Radulović also said that ‘Our <strong>state</strong> recognizes the Church <strong>in</strong><br />
law. Thereby it recognizes the <strong>in</strong>ternal org<strong>an</strong>ization of the churches <strong>an</strong>d<br />
religious communities <strong>an</strong>d their law; the <strong>state</strong> recognizes this law as <strong>state</strong> law<br />
<strong>an</strong>d has a duty to make sure that they are respected. This me<strong>an</strong>s that Orthodox<br />
places of worship c<strong>an</strong>not be built without the permission of the eparchial<br />
govern<strong>in</strong>g board <strong>an</strong>d the bless<strong>in</strong>g of the competent bishop.’ 14<br />
The writer <strong>an</strong>d publicist Momir Lazić said that there were several<br />
boards <strong>in</strong> Serbia ready at a moment’s notice to ‘tear down those blasphemous<br />
build<strong>in</strong>gs’ <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> a characteristic outburst of hate speech, charged that<br />
‘Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Ustashe such as Jevrem Brković’ 15 were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the project to<br />
build a temple of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Orthodox Church. He also denounced the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Churches as sects <strong>an</strong>d urged the<br />
government to ‘pass a law [as soon as possible] prohibit<strong>in</strong>g these sects to carry<br />
on <strong>an</strong>y activity <strong>in</strong> Serbia.’ 16 Otačastveni pokret Obraz too threatened to react<br />
violently <strong>in</strong> the event of the two ‘quasi-churches’ attempt<strong>in</strong>g to build their<br />
temples: ‘If it were up to Obraz to decide, there’d be no build<strong>in</strong>g at all; but if<br />
the sectari<strong>an</strong>s stick to their pl<strong>an</strong>s, Obraz is certa<strong>in</strong>ly not go<strong>in</strong>g to st<strong>an</strong>d idly by,’<br />
said Obraz president Mladen Obradović. 17<br />
Serbia’s government has long refused to face the fact of the existence<br />
of extreme, org<strong>an</strong>ized radicalism m<strong>an</strong>ifested <strong>in</strong> the activities of these<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>for</strong> several years past. Its reaction to the numerous <strong>in</strong>cidents<br />
<strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g physical assault, the writ<strong>in</strong>g of graffiti, <strong>an</strong>d publish<strong>in</strong>g by these<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations has on the whole been <strong>in</strong>adequate, most of these <strong>in</strong>cidents be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
treated as isolated occurrences. This was condemned by, among others, the<br />
nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>ization Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Watch, which noted <strong>in</strong> its report<br />
that ‘Violence aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>orities has <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly become a problem <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
today’, 18 also warn<strong>in</strong>g that ‘the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government’s response to these attacks<br />
has been <strong>in</strong>adequate’, that the <strong>in</strong>cidents had been m<strong>in</strong>imized, <strong>an</strong>d that ‘the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> government’s weak reaction to ethnic <strong>an</strong>d religious violence has<br />
served to encourage Serb extremists.’ 19<br />
13 Ibid.<br />
14 D<strong>an</strong>as, 10 August 2005.<br />
15 Nacional, 12 August 2005.<br />
16 Ibid.<br />
17 Ibid.<br />
18 Includ<strong>in</strong>g the writ<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Muslim graffiti.<br />
19 Politika, 11 October 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The appear<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic graffiti <strong>an</strong>d posters <strong>in</strong> Belgrade at the<br />
end of March 2005 prompted the first determ<strong>in</strong>ed response on the part of the<br />
authorities <strong>an</strong>d public condemnation on a wider scale. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> president,<br />
Boris Tadić, denounced the <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d asked the authorities to carry out a<br />
prompt <strong>in</strong>vestigation. He was jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this dem<strong>an</strong>d by the Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs <strong>an</strong>d the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition (the<br />
Democratic Party of Serbia, G17 + <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> Renewal Movement) as well as<br />
by opposition parties <strong>an</strong>d nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations. Whereas the<br />
members of the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition effectively identified the problem as pressure<br />
on the media <strong>an</strong>d advocacy of <strong>an</strong> unfree press, 20 the <strong>an</strong>nouncements of the<br />
opposition parties, notably the Social Democratic Union <strong>an</strong>d the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of Serbia, placed the <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> the proper political context. They said that the<br />
<strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>an</strong>d pro-Nazi posters were redolent of the ‘ideological preparation<br />
<strong>for</strong> war <strong>an</strong>d violence from the Milošević rule era’ 21 as well as saw the labell<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of dissentients <strong>an</strong>d public calls <strong>for</strong> lynch<strong>in</strong>g ‘proof of the impotence of the<br />
present government resolutely to oppose the retrograde <strong>for</strong>ces on our political<br />
stage.’ 22<br />
In their response to these <strong>in</strong>cidents, nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
asked the authorities to b<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d strike off the register of citizens’ associations<br />
all org<strong>an</strong>izations spread<strong>in</strong>g racial, religious <strong>an</strong>d national hatred. However, it<br />
was only after Nacionalni stroj disrupted the round table at the Novi Sad<br />
Faculty of Philosophy on 9 November 2005 that the government took adequate<br />
action to punish activities of this <strong>an</strong>d like org<strong>an</strong>izations. In act<strong>in</strong>g as it did the<br />
government was largely <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the reaction of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community, which had begun to pay ever closer attention to the radicalization<br />
of society <strong>in</strong> Serbia. In the event both the government <strong>an</strong>d the general public<br />
had to confront the fact that the existence of neo-Nazi <strong>an</strong>d clerofascist<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d right-w<strong>in</strong>g Christi<strong>an</strong> youth coalesced around Dveri srpske<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Obraz 23 <strong>in</strong> Serbia was not a marg<strong>in</strong>al problem but evidence of a radicalized<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> society.<br />
The Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a government reacted to the Faculty of Philosophy<br />
<strong>in</strong>cident by <strong>an</strong>nounc<strong>in</strong>g that it would call <strong>for</strong> a b<strong>an</strong> on the neo-Nazi groups.<br />
After that the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly received from the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly<br />
Security <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Internal Affairs (MUP) a<br />
communication list<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal social groups with neo-Nazi characteristics on<br />
the territory of Serbia’. 24 The <strong>an</strong>nouncement by the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly<br />
president, Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostreš, that a b<strong>an</strong> on the Obraz movement would be<br />
20 http://www.b92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo/vesti/<strong>in</strong>dex.php?yyy=2005&mm=03&dd= 22&<br />
nav_id?16483...<br />
21 Announcement of the Social Democratic Union. Ibid.<br />
22 Announcement of the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia. Ibid.<br />
23 Start, 11 December 2005.<br />
24 Start, 20 December 2005.<br />
26<br />
27
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
proposed drew a sharp response from its members. Thus, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview with<br />
Start, Mladen Obradović said: ‘No b<strong>an</strong> c<strong>an</strong> prevent the spiritual <strong>an</strong>d nationbuild<strong>in</strong>g<br />
rebirth of Serbdom which Obraz advocates!...With God’s help, we will<br />
free ourselves from these modern tyr<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the same way as we freed<br />
ourselves from the Ottom<strong>an</strong> Turks!’ 25 For Otačastveni pokret Obraz, the nationbuild<strong>in</strong>g<br />
rebirth of Serbdom is a struggle to establish a ‘Serb nation <strong>state</strong> which<br />
will liberate <strong>an</strong>d unite all the stolen <strong>an</strong>d occupied Serb homel<strong>an</strong>ds – not only<br />
present-day Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, but also<br />
Republika Srpska, the Serb Kraj<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Southern Serbia (Serb Macedonia), 26 <strong>for</strong><br />
only such a ‘free <strong>an</strong>d unified Serb nation <strong>state</strong>...is the prerequisite of the<br />
survival of the Serb people <strong>in</strong> the w<strong>in</strong>d-swept Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d world’. 27<br />
At its meet<strong>in</strong>g on 20 December 2005 the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly adopted<br />
the motion of the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition, consist<strong>in</strong>g of the Democratic Party, Alli<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, Strength of Serbia movement <strong>an</strong>d League of Social<br />
Democrats of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, to b<strong>an</strong> the neo-Nazi, racist <strong>an</strong>d clerofascist<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d groups <strong>in</strong> Serbia, as well as to b<strong>an</strong> the rallies of all World<br />
War Two military <strong>for</strong>mations which collaborated with or were part of the<br />
fascist occupy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d which disturb the public <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>cite national<br />
tensions. 28<br />
The proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st the members of Nacionalni stroj who<br />
disrupted the ‘Fascist Threat’ round table <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad on 9 November were<br />
conducted by Miroslav Alimpić, a judge of the Novi Sad District Court. He<br />
said that the confiscated Nacionalni stroj statute ‘glorifies racism’ <strong>an</strong>d advocates<br />
the ‘rebirth <strong>an</strong>d preservation of the sound values of the Serb nation as a<br />
component part of the white race’. 29 The culprits were charged with ‘<strong>in</strong>cit<strong>in</strong>g<br />
national <strong>an</strong>d racial hatred by physically abus<strong>in</strong>g those present <strong>an</strong>d<br />
end<strong>an</strong>ger<strong>in</strong>g their safety’. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP, Nacionalni stroj is a<br />
‘cl<strong>an</strong>dest<strong>in</strong>e, racist, chauv<strong>in</strong>ist <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic org<strong>an</strong>ization’ 30 which recruits<br />
members by ‘advocat<strong>in</strong>g the preservation of centuries-old Serb territories, the<br />
unification of all Serb l<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>in</strong> a Serb <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the preservation of<br />
Orthodoxy’. 31 The MUP also listed the follow<strong>in</strong>g racist, (clero)fascist<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a/Serbia:<br />
The sk<strong>in</strong>heads fight ‘crime, drugs, sexual perversion <strong>an</strong>d other k<strong>in</strong>ds of<br />
destructive cults <strong>an</strong>d all k<strong>in</strong>ds of religious sects, freemasonry. They are aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Roma, Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, Muslims, Jews, blacks, <strong>for</strong>eigners. They strive <strong>for</strong> a centralist<br />
25 Ibid.<br />
26 Ibid.<br />
27 Ibid.<br />
28 Politika, 21 December 2005.<br />
29 D<strong>an</strong>as, 29 November 2005.<br />
30 NIN, 29 December 2005..<br />
31 Ibid.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Serb <strong>state</strong> rest<strong>in</strong>g on monarchy <strong>an</strong>d Orthodoxy...’ 32 On 13 November a group<br />
of some 15 sk<strong>in</strong>heads attacked the residents of the Roma settlement <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Staro sajmište district of Belgrade. The <strong>in</strong>cident passed almost unnoticed by the<br />
media <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> appeal to the authorities to do all <strong>in</strong> their power to stop the<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uous terror campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st Roma did not attract much attention. 33<br />
Furthermore, a project to construct a publicly-funded settlement <strong>in</strong> New<br />
Belgrade <strong>for</strong> Roma was fiercely opposed by local residents (Start, 19<br />
November).<br />
Krv i čast uses emblems which resemble those of National Socialism,<br />
its flag display<strong>in</strong>g modified swastikas, a two-headed eagle <strong>an</strong>d four t<strong>in</strong>der-box<br />
steels. It fights <strong>for</strong> the exp<strong>an</strong>sion of ‘National Socialism by <strong>in</strong>spir<strong>in</strong>g followers<br />
with radical activism’. 34<br />
Rasni nacionalisti - rasonalisti w<strong>an</strong>t ‘...the Serbs to have the most rights<br />
<strong>in</strong> their <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d to decide on their own <strong>state</strong> themselves. They advocate a<br />
struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st Roma, <strong>for</strong> a <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> which there are no drug addicts,<br />
homosexuality, sectari<strong>an</strong>s, thieves, degenerates <strong>an</strong>d other mental patients’. 35<br />
Obraz campaigns <strong>for</strong> the rehabilitation of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović,<br />
Mil<strong>an</strong> Nedić, Dimitrije Ljotić, Draža Mihailović <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> a <strong>state</strong> ‘blessed by God,<br />
<strong>for</strong> honest politics, <strong>for</strong> a patriotic army, <strong>for</strong> schools with faith, <strong>for</strong> Serbdom<br />
with Obraz’. 36 On 17 May 2005 they <strong>for</strong>ced their way <strong>in</strong>to the ‘Liberation of<br />
Srebrenica’ p<strong>an</strong>el discussion at the Belgrade Faculty of Law, wear<strong>in</strong>g T-shirts<br />
with the JSO emblem <strong>an</strong>d portraits of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić. NIN, 29 December.<br />
The MUP also mentioned Sveti Just<strong>in</strong> Filozof <strong>an</strong>d the Svetozar Miletić<br />
Serb national movement.<br />
The MUP’s reaction to the Novi Sad <strong>in</strong>cident bore out a discrim<strong>in</strong>atory<br />
attitude on the part of Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions: <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>onymous Novi Sad police<br />
source told Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list that along with lists of sk<strong>in</strong>heads, drug addicts,<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>an</strong>d prostitutes, the police kept lists of homosexuals which, although<br />
legally irrelev<strong>an</strong>t, greatly facilitated their work. 37<br />
Even if the neo-Nazi, racist <strong>an</strong>d clerofascist org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d groups<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia are b<strong>an</strong>ned accord<strong>in</strong>g to the dem<strong>an</strong>d of the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, there rema<strong>in</strong>s the problem of its implementation by the current<br />
government <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>stitutions, particularly the m<strong>in</strong>istries of justice <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal affairs. Nacionalni stroj, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal, unregistered<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization with no org<strong>an</strong>izational structure <strong>an</strong>d hierarchy. Jov<strong>an</strong> By<strong>for</strong>d<br />
argues that one c<strong>an</strong>not arrest the leaders or seize the materials of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal<br />
‘org<strong>an</strong>ization’ consist<strong>in</strong>g of a website registered abroad <strong>an</strong>d of <strong>in</strong>dividuals. He<br />
32 Ibid.<br />
33 Start, 19 November 2005.<br />
34 NIN, 29 December 2005.<br />
35 Ibid.<br />
36 Ibid.<br />
37 Blic, 20 November 2005.<br />
28<br />
29
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that even if there is a b<strong>an</strong>, the results <strong>in</strong> terms of a decrease of racist<br />
violence would be m<strong>in</strong>imal. 38 As regards registered org<strong>an</strong>izations such as<br />
Obraz, the situation is quite different <strong>an</strong>d this expla<strong>in</strong>s its members’ resist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
to the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly b<strong>an</strong> motion. If the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly upholds the<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly’s resolution, Obraz <strong>an</strong>d other org<strong>an</strong>izations propagat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
like ideas may be officially b<strong>an</strong>ned.<br />
Anti-Semitism<br />
The endur<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism is <strong>in</strong> direct disproportion to the very<br />
small number 39 of Jews <strong>an</strong>d their political <strong>an</strong>d economic <strong>in</strong>fluence. Its pr<strong>in</strong>cipal<br />
sources may be found <strong>in</strong> numerous literary works with a marked <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic<br />
content as well as <strong>in</strong> the activities of a number of dignitaries of the SPC which<br />
figures as the ‘spiritual sponsor of extreme <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic associations such as<br />
Obraz, Sv. Just<strong>in</strong>, Svetozar Miletić, <strong>an</strong>d of certa<strong>in</strong> theological periodicals on<br />
whose editorial staffs young people preponderate, as they do <strong>in</strong> the<br />
a<strong>for</strong>ementioned org<strong>an</strong>izations’. 40 Anti-Semitism is also <strong>in</strong> evidence <strong>in</strong> the<br />
public utter<strong>an</strong>ces of quite a large number of politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d public figures who<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ue to uphold the thesis about a world (Jewish) conspiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Serbia. 41<br />
Aca S<strong>in</strong>ger, president of the Union of Jewish Municipalities <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro (SCG), believes that ‘there is less [<strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism <strong>in</strong> Serbia]<br />
th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> other Eastern or Western countries, though more th<strong>an</strong> be<strong>for</strong>e,<br />
especially s<strong>in</strong>ce the October events...Prejudices from earlier times apparently<br />
survive <strong>an</strong>d are fed by certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic websites or occasional books of <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic nature such as the edition by Ratomir Đurđević...’ 42 That <strong>an</strong>ti-<br />
Semitism was only part of the general <strong>state</strong> of affairs <strong>in</strong> society was confirmed<br />
38 Jov<strong>an</strong> By<strong>for</strong>d, ‘“Clerical fascism” between the ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>an</strong>d the extreme’,<br />
a discourse at the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia round table entitled<br />
‘Racism, fascism, xenophobia...’, Novi Sad, 21 December 2005.<br />
39 The latest census puts the number of Jews <strong>in</strong> Serbia at 1,500 to 2,000, Filip<br />
David, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16-17 April 2005.<br />
40 Filip David, ‘O <strong>an</strong>tisemitizmu u Srbiji’, a discourse at the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia round table entitled ‘Nova srpska desnica i<br />
<strong>an</strong>tisemitizam’, Belgrade, 3 November 2005.<br />
41 A characteristic of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> br<strong>an</strong>d of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism is its use by political<br />
parties <strong>in</strong> attacks on each other. ‘The use of <strong>an</strong>ti-Jewish stereotypes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terparty fight<strong>in</strong>g<br />
is a characteristic of Serbia. One strives to deme<strong>an</strong> one’s opponent by say<strong>in</strong>g that he or<br />
she is a Jew (‘Labus is a Jew’, ‘Koštunica’s mother is Jewish’, etc.) or is close to the Jews,<br />
or else.’ Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Lebl, ‘Savremeni <strong>an</strong>tisemitizam u Srbiji i svetu’, a discourse at the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia round table entitled ‘Nova srpska<br />
desnica i <strong>an</strong>tisemitizam’, Belgrade, 3 November 2005.<br />
42 Večernje novosti, 23 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
by Filip David who said that the ‘<strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism isn’t the problem, it’s the<br />
xenophobia, racism, f<strong>an</strong>aticism...the development of the ideology of hatred, the<br />
negation of difference’. 43<br />
Other th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the scrawl<strong>in</strong>g of graffiti, desecration<br />
of graveyards <strong>an</strong>d verbal abuse, all of which con<strong>for</strong>m to a pattern of<br />
<strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d hatred of other m<strong>in</strong>ority groups, a major characteristic of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> br<strong>an</strong>d of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism is ‘<strong>in</strong> evidence to <strong>an</strong> exceptional degree <strong>in</strong><br />
publish<strong>in</strong>g’. 44 Among the numerous titles are The Jewish Conspiracy Aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
Serbs, The Serb People <strong>in</strong> the Clutches of the Jews, Under the Six-po<strong>in</strong>ted Star, Why I<br />
Admire Adolf Hitler, Dead Cows vs. Six Million Dead Jews, Why Racism Is Correct,<br />
The Protocol of the Learned Elders of Zion, Bishop Nikolaj on the Judaites, the Enemies<br />
of Christi<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Christi<strong>an</strong>ity, Wicked <strong>an</strong>d Damned, The Conspiracy of Conspiracies,<br />
The Evildoers of M<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>d, The Judaite Conspiracy Aga<strong>in</strong>st God <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>an</strong>, etc. The<br />
number of websites propag<strong>an</strong>diz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism was on the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
list of some 20 members of the Jewish community <strong>in</strong> Serbia appeared on the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong>-l<strong>an</strong>guage open <strong>for</strong>um on www.stormfront.org <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sult<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
threaten<strong>in</strong>g messages.<br />
Isak Aisel, the Rabi of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, told Večernje novosti<br />
that he was ‘astonished at the number of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic books <strong>in</strong> Belgrade. I<br />
personally counted over one hundred titles. And I will not mention how<br />
surprised I was at the mass editions of the Protocol of the Learned Elders of Zion,<br />
the tales of a conspiracy theory, that the Jews are to blame <strong>for</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>g.’ 45<br />
Towards the end of February 2005 a number of <strong>in</strong>cidents occurred first<br />
<strong>in</strong> Novi Sad then <strong>in</strong> Niš. In Novi Sad, copies were distributed of Milorad<br />
Mojić’s <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic brochure Srpski narod u k<strong>an</strong>džama Jevreja (The Serb People<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Clutches of the Jews) published by the Krv i čast Srbije (The Blood <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Honour of Serbia) publish<strong>in</strong>g house from Žabalj. A few days later, sk<strong>in</strong>heads<br />
attacked two young Roma <strong>in</strong> Niš caus<strong>in</strong>g numerous <strong>in</strong>juries to one of them. 46<br />
Neither of the <strong>in</strong>cidents prompted <strong>an</strong>y response worthy of note <strong>an</strong>d it was not<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e a spate of coord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong>cidents took place <strong>in</strong> Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d other towns<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia at the end of March that the authorities <strong>an</strong>d civil society reacted. In<br />
Belgrade graffiti appeared at the Jewish cemetery <strong>an</strong>d outside the Reks c<strong>in</strong>ema<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the offices of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law Centre, the messages read<strong>in</strong>g ‘Resist the 5th of October<br />
Zionist occupation’, ‘B92 is Jewish television’, ‘Jewish parasites get out of<br />
Serbia’, ‘We w<strong>an</strong>t freedom, not a Jewish yoke’, ‘Sonja Biserko – Jewish pawn –<br />
43 D<strong>an</strong>as, 16-17 April 2005.<br />
44 Filip David, ‘O <strong>an</strong>tisemitizmu u Srbiji’, a discourse at the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia round table entitled ‘Nova srpska desnica i<br />
<strong>an</strong>tisemitizam’, Belgrade, 3 November 2005.<br />
45 Večernje novosti, 27 November 2005.<br />
46 http://www.kontra-punkt.<strong>in</strong>fo/modules.php?op=modload &name=News<br />
&file=article&sid=...<br />
30<br />
31
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
humble serv<strong>an</strong>t of the Jew world order’, etc. Also, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic posters were<br />
pasted <strong>in</strong> the centre of Belgrade urg<strong>in</strong>g a boycott of B92: ‘Boycott [them over<br />
their] <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb activities, pernicious <strong>in</strong>fluence on Serb youth, support <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo, support <strong>for</strong> the spread<strong>in</strong>g of drug abuse, homosexuality<br />
<strong>an</strong>d other diseases from the West <strong>an</strong>d support <strong>for</strong> a multi-racial new world<br />
order’. 47 The graffiti <strong>an</strong>d posters were signed by Nacionalni stroj.<br />
Soon afterwards <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>an</strong>d racist graffiti were scrawled on<br />
several build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Negot<strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g ‘Serbia <strong>for</strong> Serbs’, ‘For a white future <strong>for</strong><br />
the race <strong>an</strong>d nation’ (next to a crossed-out Star of David), ‘11th 11th crystal<br />
clear’, ‘Racial equality is a Jewish trap’. 48<br />
M<strong>an</strong>y public figures <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g members of the Jewish community <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia took the position that such <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d their frequency <strong>in</strong>dicated the<br />
existence of <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized racist movement <strong>in</strong> Serbia, as well as that the<br />
‘burgeon<strong>in</strong>g of racism, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism <strong>an</strong>d fascism <strong>in</strong> Serbia has not been taken<br />
seriously by the competent <strong>in</strong>stitutions’. 49 Academic Dr Ljubomir Tadić,<br />
president of the Society of Serb-Jewish Friendship, agreed that the way the<br />
graffiti <strong>an</strong>d posters were ‘written <strong>an</strong>d worded <strong>in</strong>dicates the start of <strong>an</strong><br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized action’. 50<br />
The SPC Synod condemned the Belgrade posters <strong>an</strong>d graffiti as a<br />
phenomenon unacceptable <strong>in</strong> theological, moral, legal <strong>an</strong>d civilizational terms.<br />
It stressed that ‘Serbs <strong>in</strong> particular, both as Orthodox Christi<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d as a<br />
people which has experienced enormous suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a dist<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d more recent<br />
past, <strong>an</strong>d which cont<strong>in</strong>ues to suffer <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija today’ must show<br />
‘the martyr’s exceptional underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d victims of the<br />
Jewish people’. ‘If the wounds of our own people pa<strong>in</strong> us – as <strong>in</strong>deed they do –<br />
then all the wounds of all peoples must pa<strong>in</strong> us too, especially those of a<br />
people whose victims of genocide run <strong>in</strong>to the millions’. 51 Although the SPC<br />
had dist<strong>an</strong>ced itself from <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism on several occasions, its c<strong>an</strong>onization<br />
of Nikolaj Velimirović shows that ‘<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional sense it rema<strong>in</strong>s a strong<br />
promoter of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic ideas <strong>an</strong>d of a fitt<strong>in</strong>g hate speech’. 52 In view of the fact<br />
that the SPC has not yet addressed the consequences of war <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia, especially the genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica, the Synod’s<br />
<strong>an</strong>nouncement c<strong>an</strong> be regarded as a gesture of political propriety rather th<strong>an</strong><br />
as a fundamental st<strong>an</strong>ce of the SPC as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution.<br />
47 Ibid.<br />
48 D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 March 2005.<br />
49 Ver<strong>an</strong> Matić, Politika, 23 March 2005.<br />
50 Večernje novosti, 1 April 2005.<br />
51 Politika, 25 March 2005.<br />
52 Sonja Biserko, ‘Nova srpska desnica i <strong>an</strong>tisemitizam’, a discourse at the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia round table entitled ‘Nova srpska<br />
desnica i <strong>an</strong>tisemitizam’, Belgrade, 2 November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Indicatively, on the occasion of these <strong>in</strong>cidents, civil <strong>in</strong>itiatives po<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
out <strong>in</strong> a <strong>state</strong>ment that the new wave of extreme Serb nationalism was ‘under<br />
the aegis of certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d church <strong>in</strong>stitutions’. 53<br />
In a <strong>state</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> which it condemned the <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic outbursts, the<br />
SANU said: ‘Given that the history of the Serb people is marked by toler<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
<strong>an</strong>d good relations with all people regardless of their national, religious <strong>an</strong>d<br />
racial background, we are bound to follow these examples set by our<br />
<strong>an</strong>cestors’. 54 One rightly doubts the s<strong>in</strong>cerity of this <strong>state</strong>ment given that the<br />
SANU was the powerhouse of the wars <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. The defeats<br />
suffered <strong>in</strong> these wars are the source of frustration of Serbi<strong>an</strong> politics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
society, especially of the right-w<strong>in</strong>g youth org<strong>an</strong>izations advocat<strong>in</strong>g racial,<br />
religious <strong>an</strong>d national <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d hatred.<br />
In view of the recent historical <strong>an</strong>d present social <strong>an</strong>d political context<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia, there is no doubt that <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism itself is neither the only nor the<br />
chief problem which Serbi<strong>an</strong> society <strong>an</strong>d politics ought to address. In the<br />
broadest sense the problem concerns the attitude to difference <strong>an</strong>d otherness,<br />
the negation of which is m<strong>an</strong>ifested <strong>in</strong> various xenophobic, racist <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d discourses aimed at the establishment of a uni<strong>for</strong>m (ethnic)<br />
political, social <strong>an</strong>d cultural environment which, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the right-w<strong>in</strong>g<br />
youth org<strong>an</strong>izations, ought to be based on the traditional Serb values rooted <strong>in</strong><br />
the cult of St Sava.<br />
M<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong>sist that a people which has itself experienced a<br />
holocaust c<strong>an</strong>not be <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic (<strong>an</strong>d racist). Mladen Obradović of Obraz, <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, argues that ‘there is here no org<strong>an</strong>ized hatred with a nation, church,<br />
or even government beh<strong>in</strong>d it.’ 55 The object of such arguments is to relativize<br />
the <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>an</strong>d racist <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d play them down as isolated <strong>in</strong>cidents<br />
unrepresentative of the current <strong>state</strong> of affairs <strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> society <strong>an</strong>d politics.<br />
Evidence of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism <strong>in</strong> Serbia is rout<strong>in</strong>ely countered with claims that<br />
there are concentration camps <strong>in</strong> Kosovo no one talks about, <strong>an</strong>d the situation<br />
of the Serbs <strong>in</strong> Kosovo is used <strong>in</strong> counter-attacks on nongovernmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations urg<strong>in</strong>g punishment of those guilty of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d<br />
hate speech. The lack of adequate response to <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>in</strong>cidents by the<br />
authorities <strong>an</strong>d the public <strong>in</strong> general is a cause <strong>for</strong> concern. Although under<br />
Article 134 of the Penal Code <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism may be prosecuted as the<br />
spread<strong>in</strong>g of religious, national <strong>an</strong>d racial hatred, the prosecut<strong>in</strong>g authorities<br />
have failed to act upon m<strong>an</strong>y compla<strong>in</strong>ts aga<strong>in</strong>st publishers of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic<br />
texts by the Union of Jewish Communities <strong>in</strong> SCG. 56 The failure of the<br />
authorities to react adequately to the spread<strong>in</strong>g of racial, religious <strong>an</strong>d national<br />
53 D<strong>an</strong>as, 24 March 2005.<br />
54 Večernje novosti, 29 March 2005.<br />
55 NIN, 3 May 2005.<br />
56 Aca S<strong>in</strong>ger, president of the Union of Jewish Municipalities <strong>in</strong> SCG, D<strong>an</strong>as,<br />
26-27 March 2005.<br />
32<br />
33
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
hatred shows that they <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>stitutions are immature <strong>an</strong>d unwill<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
assume full political responsibility <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g radicalization of society<br />
<strong>an</strong>d politics <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Anti-Semitism <strong>in</strong> Serbia c<strong>an</strong>not be viewed as <strong>an</strong> isolated<br />
phenomenon <strong>an</strong>d its roots should be sought <strong>in</strong> the general radicalization of<br />
society <strong>an</strong>d politics. In this sense, the <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism <strong>an</strong>d its m<strong>an</strong>ifestations are<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegral part of the ma<strong>in</strong>stream exclusive policy <strong>an</strong>d thought that negate<br />
<strong>an</strong>d discrim<strong>in</strong>ate aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>an</strong>y difference on national, ethnic, religious or other<br />
grounds.<br />
Hate Speech<br />
As a party to the International Coven<strong>an</strong>t on Civil <strong>an</strong>d Political Rights<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the International Convention on the Elim<strong>in</strong>ation of All Forms of Racial<br />
Discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, Serbia is committed to penaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y propag<strong>an</strong>da <strong>an</strong>d hate<br />
speech <strong>in</strong>cit<strong>in</strong>g to discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d violence. Thus Article 20 (2) of the<br />
International Coven<strong>an</strong>t on Civil <strong>an</strong>d Political Rights specifies: ‘Any advocacy<br />
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes <strong>in</strong>citement to<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.’ 57 Further, the<br />
International Convention on the Elim<strong>in</strong>ation of All Forms of Racial<br />
Discrim<strong>in</strong>ation requires all <strong>state</strong>s to ‘...condemn racial discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
undertake to pursue by all appropriate me<strong>an</strong>s...’ 58 <strong>an</strong>d to ‘...prohibit...by all<br />
appropriate measures, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g legislation...racial discrim<strong>in</strong>ation by <strong>an</strong>y<br />
persons, group or org<strong>an</strong>ization...’ 59<br />
In Serbia, however, hate speech cont<strong>in</strong>ued to figure prom<strong>in</strong>ently <strong>in</strong><br />
public discourse <strong>in</strong> 2005 too. Although the Law on Public In<strong>for</strong>mation of the<br />
Republic of Serbia prohibits the publication of ideas, <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d op<strong>in</strong>ions<br />
<strong>in</strong>cit<strong>in</strong>g to discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, hatred or violence aga<strong>in</strong>st persons or groups on<br />
account of their race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, gender or sexual<br />
orientation (Article 38), as well as provides that violat<strong>in</strong>g the b<strong>an</strong> on hate<br />
speech is <strong>an</strong> actionable offence (Article 39), proceed<strong>in</strong>gs were <strong>in</strong>stituted aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
violators <strong>in</strong> only a few cases <strong>an</strong>d that on the <strong>in</strong>itiative of nongovernmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d the Union of Jewish Municipalities <strong>in</strong> SCG.<br />
There is no doubt that a large segment of the public <strong>in</strong> Serbia is<br />
<strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to look upon hate speech as the exercise of freedom of speech or the<br />
promotion of a legitimate political option: <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>itial response to<br />
Nomok<strong>an</strong>on’s ‘Truth About Srebrenica’ p<strong>an</strong>el discussion, 60 even Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
President Boris Tadić considered this the right to a different political st<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
57 The International Coven<strong>an</strong>t on Civil <strong>an</strong>d Political Rights.<br />
58 The International Convention on the Elim<strong>in</strong>ation of All Forms of Racial<br />
Discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, Article 2 (1).<br />
59 Ibid, Article 2 (1d).<br />
60 The discussion took place at the Belgrade Faculty of Law on 17 May 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The p<strong>an</strong>el discussion prompted eight nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations to<br />
request the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly to pass a resolution on Srebrenica committ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the <strong>state</strong> authorities to condemn <strong>an</strong>y negation, justification <strong>an</strong>d glorification of<br />
crime, spread<strong>in</strong>g of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>citement to violence.<br />
Nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d representatives of pro-Western<br />
liberal <strong>an</strong>d social democratic options are the ma<strong>in</strong> targets of hate speech. In its<br />
21st issue Ogledalo, a periodical close to the SPC, r<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong> article by Dr Miloš<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ić titled ‘Ust<strong>an</strong>i čistokrvni Srb<strong>in</strong>e’ (Rise, pure-blooded Serb) <strong>an</strong>d subtitled<br />
‘Srpska Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a protiv evrosl<strong>in</strong>avaca’ (Serb Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a aga<strong>in</strong>st the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
slabberers), a text brimm<strong>in</strong>g over with hate speech aga<strong>in</strong>st Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d pro-Europe bloc compris<strong>in</strong>g a small number of political options<br />
<strong>an</strong>d nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations. ‘Is it natural <strong>for</strong> a non-Serb who hates<br />
Serbs to live <strong>in</strong> Serbia?...Such people belong <strong>in</strong> a mental hospital...A person<br />
who applauds frenetically while catholic-protest<strong>an</strong>t bombs ra<strong>in</strong> down on<br />
Serbia is a son of a bitch who doesn’t belong <strong>in</strong> Serbia!’ 61 The author calls the<br />
nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations de-Serbi<strong>an</strong>ized bastards who are back<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
project to restore Austria-Hungary (<strong>in</strong> the context of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy)<br />
<strong>an</strong>d to destabilize the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>: ‘We’re go<strong>in</strong>g to settle with them with no<br />
quarter given. There won’t be <strong>an</strong>y time <strong>for</strong> them to <strong>in</strong>voke <strong>an</strong>y <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights at<br />
all...’ 62<br />
Besides members of nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations, persons with<br />
different sexual orientation are often the victims of all k<strong>in</strong>ds of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d hate speech <strong>an</strong>d attacks by nationalistic, clerofascist <strong>an</strong>d right-w<strong>in</strong>g<br />
groups. The fact that homosexuals <strong>an</strong>d lesbi<strong>an</strong>s are not treated as fully equal<br />
members of society ‘<strong>in</strong>dicates lack of political will <strong>for</strong> Serbia to become a<br />
modern Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> based on democratic values’, says the declaration of<br />
the Women <strong>in</strong> Black on the occasion of the 15th <strong>an</strong>niversary of gay <strong>an</strong>d lesbi<strong>an</strong><br />
activism. On 19 May 2005 Nacional r<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong> article on homosexuality <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
headl<strong>in</strong>ed ‘Interest <strong>in</strong> the Same Sex Is a Disease Which Has not Bypassed Us’.<br />
Another article, published <strong>in</strong> Glas javnosti <strong>an</strong>d discuss<strong>in</strong>g the ‘fitness’ of the<br />
members of the Incest Trauma Centre to deal with victims of trauma/<strong>in</strong>cest,<br />
shows that such attitudes are at least implicitly characteristic of some political<br />
elites <strong>an</strong>d public op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> Serbia: ‘Work with victims of trauma is responsible<br />
<strong>an</strong>d not at all easy <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e c<strong>an</strong>not be done by people who have not<br />
undergone tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g...If this work is per<strong>for</strong>med by those who do not belong to<br />
the category of psychically normal, so much the worse.’ 63 The debate on<br />
whether or not homosexual marriages should be allowed <strong>an</strong>d homosexual<br />
couples permitted to adopt children, as well as the political party<br />
commentaries <strong>in</strong> this connection, are evidence enough that homophobia exists<br />
61 Ogledalo, 15 December 2005.<br />
62 Ibid.<br />
63 Jov<strong>an</strong> Marić, Glas javnosti, 30 May 2005.<br />
34<br />
35
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
also with<strong>in</strong> the r<strong>an</strong>ks of the present democratic government which prefers our<br />
(Serb? Orthodox?) customs <strong>an</strong>d morals to the democratic (<strong>an</strong>d Western)<br />
concept of equality <strong>for</strong> all. Miloš Aligrudić of the Democratic Party of Serbia<br />
said: ‘While I am personally opposed to <strong>an</strong>y discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, the question arises<br />
as to what is <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests of society. I th<strong>in</strong>k that homosexual marriages<br />
aren’t at all. The legalization of homosexual marriages <strong>an</strong>d permitt<strong>in</strong>g them to<br />
adopt children clashes with our concepts of customs <strong>an</strong>d morals...’ 64 The<br />
spokeswom<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> the New Serbia party, Dubravka Filipovski, said that the<br />
party was adam<strong>an</strong>tly opposed to ‘k<strong>in</strong>ky marriages’ because, ‘after all, the SPC<br />
too is opposed to unisex marriages, which is yet <strong>an</strong>other reason why Nova<br />
Serbia is aga<strong>in</strong>st’. 65<br />
Apparently there is no <strong>an</strong>ti-discrim<strong>in</strong>atory legislation regard<strong>in</strong>g LGBT<br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d others. Although a number of laws such as the labour, broadcast<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
public <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d high education laws conta<strong>in</strong> provisions prohibit<strong>in</strong>g<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation on the basis of sexual orientation, the Family Law encourages<br />
such discrim<strong>in</strong>ation directly, its Article 1 (1) regard<strong>in</strong>g as common-law<br />
marriages only long-last<strong>in</strong>g cohabitation of persons of different sex. 66<br />
Radicalism <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>in</strong> its various m<strong>an</strong>ifestations as racism,<br />
chauv<strong>in</strong>ism, xenophobia, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism, homophobia, hate speech, etc., is a<br />
prom<strong>in</strong>ent feature of the country’s public life. Although some of it is partly<br />
due to the cont<strong>in</strong>uation of the Milošević-era policy, the fact that it draws its<br />
current momentum from resist<strong>an</strong>ce to Serbia’s Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
negation of Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d values gives rise to special concern. The<br />
flirtation with some of these phenomena on the part of the authorities, as well<br />
as their denial of the effects of these phenomena on social <strong>an</strong>d political trends<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>in</strong>dicates their fundamental unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to dist<strong>an</strong>ce themselves<br />
from the policy <strong>an</strong>d practice of crime which dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>ues to<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>ate Serbia.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
MEMORY REMODELED<br />
Weighted down by recent past <strong>an</strong>d a profound social crisis, Serbia is<br />
grappl<strong>in</strong>g with open <strong>an</strong>d salient problems, notably those of its self-def<strong>in</strong>ition<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> those terms of org<strong>an</strong>ization of collective memory. In that process the<br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d national elites have a monopoly. Inadequate policy of <strong>in</strong>terpretation<br />
made room <strong>for</strong> all k<strong>in</strong>ds of m<strong>an</strong>ipulations, aimed at <strong>an</strong> alleged protection of<br />
identity of the Serb people. Serb elite is still burdened by a political option<br />
("liberation <strong>an</strong>d unification of all Serbs"), ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed by vari<strong>an</strong>ts of ultra<br />
nationalism r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from Yugoslovenism (one of <strong>for</strong>ms of the Serb<br />
nationalism), to the far right (Fascist <strong>an</strong>d Nazi) <strong>for</strong>ms.<br />
In its process<strong>in</strong>g of the past the Serb elite shuns the recent historic<br />
bal<strong>an</strong>ce, that is the fact that the national project is defeated <strong>an</strong>d ended <strong>in</strong> crime.<br />
Instead of mak<strong>in</strong>g the right bal<strong>an</strong>ce, the Serb elite focused <strong>an</strong>d prioritized the<br />
trial of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic <strong>in</strong> the Hague <strong>an</strong>d Bosni<strong>an</strong> aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide<br />
charges 1 <strong>in</strong> order to foil <strong>in</strong>crim<strong>in</strong>ation of its whole project <strong>an</strong>d responsibility of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>for</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g the war. In parallel it has <strong>in</strong>ternally focused its<br />
energy on keep<strong>in</strong>g Montenegro with<strong>in</strong> the framework of the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>for</strong> the<br />
sake of preservation of a nucleus from which the new Yugoslavia (United Serb<br />
L<strong>an</strong>ds) could evolve. Dobrica Ćosić, who <strong>in</strong> early 70’s had advocated "ethnic<br />
<strong>state</strong>s" <strong>in</strong> the New Year issue of Belgrade Weekly NIN urged "restoration <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
pl<strong>an</strong>ned org<strong>an</strong>ization of the Yugoslav cultural market <strong>an</strong>d root<strong>in</strong>g out of the<br />
predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t ignor<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d pervasive ideological <strong>an</strong>imosities " 2 .<br />
Process<strong>in</strong>g of the past is additionally complicated because of different<br />
regional perceptions of dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of Yugoslavia. The Serb elite endeavours<br />
64 Kurir, 11 October 2005.<br />
65 Ibid.<br />
66 D<strong>an</strong>as, 15 December 2005.<br />
1 In 1995, the Archbishopric Council of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church reiterated<br />
its denial of the so-called AVNOJ borders under the pretext that “this would st<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong> official recognition that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people’s status is <strong>in</strong>ferior to those of other South<br />
Slavic nations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those that are newly created on ideological basis, while the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> people – Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong> the first place – will have to take the entire<br />
burden of responsibility <strong>for</strong> the outbreak of wars <strong>an</strong>d their fatal consequences; the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> people’s just <strong>an</strong>d defensive war would thus be logically <strong>in</strong>terpreted as<br />
aggression,” Svetigora, No. 38-39, 1995.<br />
2 Dobrica Ćosić, It is high time <strong>for</strong> the peoples of the <strong>for</strong>mer SFRJ to become<br />
<strong>in</strong>ward-look<strong>in</strong>g, NIN, 29 November 2005.<br />
36<br />
37
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
to relativize responsibility of Serbia by <strong>in</strong>sistence on responsibility of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>for</strong> the break-up of Yugoslavia (Vatic<strong>an</strong>, Germ<strong>an</strong>y,<br />
Austria, the US) <strong>an</strong>d secession-prone republics (Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia). Because<br />
of its selective amnesia <strong>an</strong>d obstruction of the f<strong>in</strong>al stages of the process of<br />
dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia is still a ma<strong>in</strong> hurdle on the road of a<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e re<strong>in</strong>tegration of the region on a new basis.<br />
Dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of Yugoslavia, collapse of communism <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-<br />
Communism of the West <strong>an</strong>d East <strong>in</strong> equal measure have made room <strong>for</strong> the<br />
new <strong>in</strong>terpretation of memory. In parallel at play is glorification of Draža<br />
Mihajlović as <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascist leader, <strong>an</strong>d of other Serb far-right leaders, notably,<br />
Dimitrije Ljotić <strong>an</strong>d Mil<strong>an</strong> Nedić. Ratko Mladić <strong>an</strong>d Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić are<br />
portrayed as their successors. Under the guise of <strong>an</strong>ti-Communism, total<br />
sidel<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascist movement was effected. That obviously led to the<br />
revision of the entire perception of victims <strong>an</strong>d executioners. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g<br />
logically leads to the deduction that communist <strong>an</strong>d not Serb nationalists were<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> crimes notably those committed <strong>in</strong> recent past. 3<br />
To atta<strong>in</strong> that goal the <strong>state</strong> policy <strong>in</strong> the post-5 October 2000 period<br />
through new school textbooks <strong>an</strong>d notably activities of the Serb Orthodox<br />
Church tried to create a new model <strong>an</strong>d consequently effect the makover of the<br />
Serb nationalism <strong>an</strong>d its leaders, a Qu<strong>in</strong>sl<strong>in</strong>g Nedic <strong>an</strong>d a Fascist Ljotic. Such<br />
re-appraisal of nationalism helped establish the new set of values <strong>in</strong> which<br />
Željko Ražnatović Ark<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Milorad Ulemek Legija are treated as desirable<br />
social models, <strong>an</strong>d Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Ratko Mladić as the cult heroic<br />
figures. Histori<strong>an</strong> Todor Kuljić says: "<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>itia phase of its re-<strong>in</strong>vention the<br />
past should not be challenged", <strong>for</strong> "as the time elapses <strong>an</strong>d as the <strong>in</strong>vented<br />
past is persistnetly reiterated, its fictitious character is weaken<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consequently it is more easily accepted as <strong>an</strong> authentic one." 4<br />
However such attempst at the <strong>state</strong>-orchestrated re-<strong>in</strong>terpretation of<br />
the past are countered by part of the elite, <strong>in</strong> the shape of various NGOs,<br />
political alternative (Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia, Liberal Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Social Democratic Union), as well as some prom<strong>in</strong>ent public figures, histori<strong>an</strong>s<br />
<strong>an</strong>d few media. Added to that the Hague trial of Slobad<strong>an</strong>u Milošević is<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>gly lay<strong>in</strong>g bare the fact that implementation of the project of<br />
"liberation <strong>an</strong>d unification of all Serbs" <strong>in</strong>evitably ended <strong>in</strong> the crime. That fact<br />
<strong>in</strong> turn impacts the conduct of elites <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>for</strong> they try through "damage<br />
control" to rationalize some consequences of that failed project which have<br />
3 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe will discuss the Draft<br />
Resolution on suppress<strong>in</strong>g neonacist ideology end of J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006. There was no<br />
mention of that Resolution <strong>in</strong> Serbia. It also illustrates the gap between Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
tendencies <strong>an</strong>d those <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
4 Todor Kuljić, Myth <strong>an</strong>d History “on the Market”, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter, issue 85-86,<br />
July-August 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
most bear<strong>in</strong>g on the Serb society. 5 Through relativization of crime the process<br />
of fac<strong>in</strong>g is reduced to apportionment of the blame to all sides <strong>in</strong> the conflict or<br />
equalization of their responsibility. Such a rationalization of committed crimes<br />
as well as the position of the most responsible prime movers on victims at this<br />
early stage <strong>in</strong>dicates that memory of the victims <strong>in</strong> the culture of memory of<br />
the Serb people shall be very selective <strong>an</strong>d limited. Notably because that<br />
process is accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by cherish<strong>in</strong>g of the cult of victim of the Serb people<br />
proper.<br />
In a persistent struggle <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the past s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the war, <strong>an</strong>d notably s<strong>in</strong>ce 5 October 2000, the lead<strong>in</strong>g elites <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia are try<strong>in</strong>g to curb the "more radical <strong>in</strong>terpretation" which recognizes the<br />
Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d takes a clear-cut st<strong>an</strong>ce on, that is condemns the<br />
aggression of Belgrade 6 , <strong>an</strong>d notably genocide <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. In<br />
those terms the thesis of the "Third Way" was launched. That middle ground<br />
approach tries to strike the bal<strong>an</strong>ce between those who favour the wrok of the<br />
Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d those who challenge it. That Third Way tack which is<br />
basically focused on relativization, <strong>an</strong>d enjoys the <strong>state</strong> support, is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
promoted through the Victimological Society of Serbia chaired by Vesna<br />
Nikolić Rist<strong>an</strong>ović.<br />
She espouses the thesis that deal<strong>in</strong>g with the past is a process <strong>in</strong> which<br />
all social groups, be they victims or particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d regardless of their<br />
national, political <strong>an</strong>d religious hallmarks, should take <strong>an</strong> active part.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Vesna Rist<strong>an</strong>ović, that project rallies about 20 NGOs <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals tackl<strong>in</strong>g Serbia’s past. They founded the association deal<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
the truth <strong>an</strong>d reconciliation through the idea of the "third way". Rist<strong>an</strong>ović,<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter alia, <strong>state</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> "Serbia most visible are st<strong>an</strong>ces aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> the<br />
ICTY ", but that "<strong>in</strong> between there are less visible tracks which should be<br />
embarked upon." Vesna Rist<strong>an</strong>ovic also noted that that the Association <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Truth <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation by d<strong>in</strong>t of its middle ground tack bridges a wide gap<br />
between the two extreme positions. The goal of the Association is jo<strong>in</strong>t, gradual<br />
work of social groups, victims of war, refugees, <strong>for</strong>mer camp <strong>in</strong>mates,<br />
5 Professor of the Belgrade Law Faculty, Oliver Antić <strong>state</strong>d the follow<strong>in</strong>g at<br />
the Radical Party meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Belgrade’s Save Centre: “Doctor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
historical circumst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> which the ICTY engages, notably as regards the <strong>in</strong>dictment<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Dr. Vojislav Šešelj is wong, <strong>for</strong> history does not accept either counterfeiters of<br />
justice or truth….the Hague trials are noth<strong>in</strong>g but restoration of the old <strong>in</strong>vention of this<br />
civilization <strong>in</strong> which the crim<strong>in</strong>al compels the victim to bow <strong>an</strong>d repent”, Politika, the<br />
Serb Virtual Past, 20 November 2005.<br />
6 Coalition of the “Eight NGOs”, prom<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong>dividuals, <strong>an</strong>d olitical<br />
alternative, notably the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia, Social Democratic Union, Liberal<br />
Democratic party, <strong>an</strong>d other parties, notably Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a League.<br />
38<br />
39
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
youngsters <strong>an</strong>d all those who embrace the Third Way, without <strong>in</strong>fliction of<br />
additional wounds to <strong>an</strong> already traumatized Serb society. 7<br />
In confrontation between the two, allegedly equally radical tacks (of<br />
part of NGO sector on the one h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>an</strong>d the Serb Radical Party, the far-right<br />
group<strong>in</strong>gs, notably Just<strong>in</strong> Popović, Dveri, Svetozar Mileitć, Nacionalni stroj, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
numerous refugee org<strong>an</strong>izations on the other h<strong>an</strong>d) "the Tird Way" fits <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
<strong>state</strong> policy, that is <strong>in</strong> the l<strong>in</strong>e toed by Kostunica-led government. After a yearlong<br />
break, under pressure of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community Vojislav Koštunica<br />
had to resume his co-operation with the ICTY, which he re-def<strong>in</strong>ed as<br />
"voluntary surrender" 8 . In l<strong>in</strong>e with that <strong>for</strong>mula he h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the Hague<br />
Tribunal 15 Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees, whilst their departure was presented to the<br />
domestic public as a heroic decision <strong>an</strong>d "sacrifice <strong>for</strong> national <strong>in</strong>terests of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the Serb people". 9 Their "surrender" was conditioned by hefty<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial guar<strong>an</strong>tees aimed at provod<strong>in</strong>g subsitence to <strong>in</strong>dictees’ families, <strong>in</strong><br />
fact allocations from the republic<strong>an</strong> budget, <strong>an</strong>d also by f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial support of<br />
tycoons. That k<strong>in</strong>d of "guar<strong>an</strong>tee" resulted from the relev<strong>an</strong>t decision of the<br />
"<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal coalition" between Democratic Party of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Socialist Party, <strong>for</strong><br />
the m<strong>in</strong>ority government of Vojislav Koštunica could not survie without the<br />
back<strong>in</strong>g of the latter.<br />
Through both the pr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d electronic media "the Third Way" is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
presented <strong>an</strong>d marketed as the most rational way. A negative tack, that is <strong>an</strong><br />
absolute denial of the Hague Tribunal is ascribed to the Milosevic era, though<br />
it is currently backed by part of political <strong>for</strong>ces (Soscialist Party of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Serb Radical Party), <strong>an</strong>d by part of elite identified as so-called patriotic block.<br />
The other, positive st<strong>an</strong>ce, is attributed to Western governments <strong>an</strong>d their<br />
embassies <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations, <strong>an</strong>d some domestic<br />
protagonists, rallied <strong>in</strong> some NGO. Such a st<strong>an</strong>ce is perceived as a radical one,<br />
<strong>for</strong> it espouses the thesis of <strong>an</strong> absolute guilt of Milosevic <strong>an</strong>d the Serbs side <strong>for</strong><br />
war wag<strong>in</strong>g, aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia dn Croatia, pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
7 CNPS, Review of Work of NGOs s<strong>in</strong>ce December 2005.<br />
8 Editorialist Ljubodrag Stojad<strong>in</strong>ović, Hajduk Myth, Politika, 21November 2005<br />
says: “This government tends to treat more tenderly the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees. If they<br />
surrender they fly to the North on special flights <strong>an</strong>d are guar<strong>an</strong>tees some benefits <strong>an</strong>d<br />
amenities”.<br />
9 Zor<strong>an</strong> Lončar, M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> State Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d Local Self-Rule, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
member of the National Council <strong>for</strong> Co-operation with the ICTY, thus spoke about his<br />
impressions at the departure: “While bidd<strong>in</strong>g them farewell at the airport, as the custom<br />
implies, I gave to each of them assur<strong>an</strong>ces that this country called Serbia <strong>an</strong>d this<br />
government, shall assist them maximally because of their heroic decision <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consequently their support <strong>for</strong> this country <strong>an</strong>d government”. D<strong>an</strong>as, 31 December 2005<br />
– 3 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
execution of genocide <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica, pl<strong>an</strong>ned mass ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d mass<br />
crimes <strong>in</strong> Kosovo… 10<br />
The third position, that is the ‘third way’, qualified as a pragmatic one<br />
by nationalists, is a response to the two previous extreme positions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
represents "the only possible way <strong>for</strong> the least detrimental settlement of the<br />
Hague problem <strong>an</strong>d preservation of <strong>in</strong>ternal stability" 11 . Part of that strategy is<br />
Kostunica-pursued policy of co-operation with the the Hague Tribunal<br />
through ‘voluntary surrender’. However, nationalists th<strong>in</strong>k that said strategy<br />
was upset by the "Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>niversary", <strong>for</strong> that "un<strong>for</strong>tunate story was<br />
terribly m<strong>an</strong>ipulated <strong>an</strong>d used as the pretext to pile both external <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
pressure on Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Serbs <strong>in</strong> general". Declaration on Srebrenica, which 8<br />
NGOs submitted to the Serb Parliament, dem<strong>an</strong>ded Serbia’s assumption <strong>for</strong><br />
Srebrenica massacre. However Serb elites <strong>in</strong>terpreted that Declaration as a<br />
pressure on Serbia to "accept its responsibility <strong>for</strong> Srebrenica…to accept the<br />
Western strategy of turn<strong>in</strong>g Srebrenica <strong>in</strong>to a symbol <strong>an</strong>d by air<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Skorpioni related-film shock<strong>in</strong>g domestic public <strong>an</strong>d mak<strong>in</strong>g it experience a<br />
strong catharsis." 12 Deft m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of such a schematic tack to co-operation<br />
with the Hague Tribunal (<strong>for</strong> the Third Way is identical to the first one, though<br />
under pressure of evidence it tries to effect "damage control’), serves to<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>an</strong> alleged threat of the second st<strong>an</strong>ce "a negative one…which paves<br />
the way <strong>for</strong> a political ascent of extreme, isolation-m<strong>in</strong>ded <strong>for</strong>ces" 13 . In order to<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imize the import<strong>an</strong>ce of NGO sector <strong>an</strong>d notably of "those un<strong>for</strong>tunate<br />
women 14 which someone is const<strong>an</strong>tly try<strong>in</strong>g to impose as objective <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>defatigable fighters <strong>for</strong> truth", the thesis that "professionals researchers <strong>for</strong><br />
‘truth’ should be given space equal to their genu<strong>in</strong>e representative strength <strong>in</strong><br />
the society – that is m<strong>in</strong>imal space" is be<strong>in</strong>g launched. For that is the condition<br />
<strong>for</strong> end<strong>in</strong>g the story about the Hague Tribunal, <strong>an</strong>d mov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ward." 15<br />
Along with the promoion of the "Third Way" a campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
NGOs, notably those deal<strong>in</strong>g with the recent past is be<strong>in</strong>g mounted. Those<br />
NGOs are vilified as "promoters of a new, genu<strong>in</strong>ely new <strong>an</strong>d vulgar<strong>in</strong>terpretative<br />
politick<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> which they have freely been engaged <strong>for</strong> the past<br />
decade <strong>in</strong> the Serb public scene." Those NGOs are also media-bashed <strong>for</strong><br />
"arrog<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d extreme st<strong>an</strong>ces, their strategy of doctor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d their ideology<br />
of <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb nationalism <strong>an</strong>d racism." It is said that those NGOs have<br />
"deservedly earned the reputation of be<strong>in</strong>g a malign<strong>an</strong>t growth on <strong>an</strong> already<br />
destroyed social issue of Serbia". It is though that activities of those NGOs<br />
could be curbed by their outright b<strong>an</strong>, that is through "regulation of that<br />
10 Misa Djurkovic, Resolution of Vital Issues, Politika, 28 July 2005<br />
11 Ibid<br />
12 Ibid<br />
13 Ibid<br />
14 Relat<strong>in</strong>g to Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovačevič. Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić <strong>an</strong>d Sonja Biserko<br />
15 idem<br />
40<br />
41
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
delicate area of civili<strong>an</strong> education, which would clearly def<strong>in</strong>e all its more<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t aspects (sources of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g, scope of activities, crim<strong>in</strong>al s<strong>an</strong>ctions<br />
<strong>for</strong> their encroachment…)" 16 . In parallel it is dem<strong>an</strong>ded that "cognitive<br />
appraisal of recent past of South Slavic peoples should be entrusted to the only<br />
socially fit <strong>an</strong>d authorized bodies-scientific <strong>in</strong>stitutions". It is highlighted that<br />
the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g is one of the most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>state</strong>-national <strong>in</strong>terests of a still<br />
territorially unconsolidated country, its totally deva<strong>state</strong>d society <strong>an</strong>d lethally<br />
stigmatized people." 17<br />
Resist<strong>an</strong>ce to NGOs was placed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-global context, which<br />
both the right- <strong>an</strong>d left-w<strong>in</strong>g factions of the Serb elite tend to present as <strong>an</strong><br />
"<strong>an</strong>ti-imperialist idea, <strong>for</strong> it confronts hegeonistic globalism which rests on a<br />
bl<strong>in</strong>d toe<strong>in</strong>g of the US <strong>for</strong>e<strong>in</strong>g policy l<strong>in</strong>e" 18 . NGOs are perceived as "bras long"<br />
of the US imperialism <strong>in</strong> countries undergo<strong>in</strong>g tr<strong>an</strong>sition. All the lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d prime movers of the Serb nationalism share such <strong>an</strong><br />
approach, notably Dobrica Ćosić (the greatest liv<strong>in</strong>g Serb writer <strong>an</strong>d<br />
academici<strong>an</strong>), Dr Ljubomir Tadić, (philosopher <strong>an</strong>d academici<strong>an</strong>), Dr. Kosta<br />
Čavoški (professor <strong>an</strong>d academic<strong>in</strong>a), Mihajlo Marković (philosopher <strong>an</strong>d<br />
academici<strong>an</strong>), Smilja Avramov (professor of <strong>in</strong>ternational law), numerous<br />
writers <strong>an</strong>d other prom<strong>in</strong>ent public figures. Among the younger generation the<br />
most active: are Slobod<strong>an</strong> Antonić (professor at the Belgrade Faculty of<br />
Philosophy), Djordje Vukad<strong>in</strong>ović (editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of Nova srpska politička misao,<br />
which aspires to be both a philosophical <strong>an</strong>d theoretical review), Mirj<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Vasović (professor at the Belgrade Political Sciences Faculty), Mirj<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Stef<strong>an</strong>ovska (professor at the Belgrade Law Faculty), Slavenko Terzić (a<br />
histori<strong>an</strong>), Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Tij<strong>an</strong>ić (director of Radio Television Serbia), Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Smajlović (editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of Belgrade daily Politika), Nenad Lj. Stef<strong>an</strong>ović<br />
(editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mative program of Radio Television Serbia), Dragoljub<br />
Žarković (director <strong>an</strong>d editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of Belgrade weekly Vreme), Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Reljić (editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of Belgrade weekly NIN), Boj<strong>an</strong>a Lekić (director <strong>an</strong>d<br />
editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of BK TV), etc.<br />
Serb nationalists see <strong>an</strong>y attempt at respect<strong>in</strong>g the reality as<br />
"imposition of <strong>in</strong>difference towards everyth<strong>in</strong>g that surrounds them", deem<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the latter as the greatest d<strong>an</strong>ger to Serbs. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to them the attempt to<br />
"make Serbs <strong>an</strong>ational, to make them first undrgo a k<strong>in</strong>d of catharsis, <strong>an</strong>d then<br />
16 Authorities have much delayed the pass<strong>in</strong>g of Act on NGOs (<strong>in</strong> the face of<br />
outside pressures) <strong>an</strong>d despite the general perception that NGOs are like “profitable<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>ies.”<br />
17 Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Radojičić, NGOs <strong>an</strong>d policy of <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g more recent South Slavic<br />
past, Nova srpska politicka misao, 9 September 2005.<br />
18 Mila Alečković-Nikolić, Conflict between Pro- <strong>an</strong>d Anti-Globalization<br />
Forces, Politika, 17 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
gradually kill off their national identity", r<strong>an</strong>ks among, "someth<strong>in</strong>g that may be<br />
characterize as <strong>an</strong> associated crim<strong>in</strong>al venture". 19<br />
Resist<strong>an</strong>ce to admitt<strong>in</strong>g responsibility, <strong>for</strong> the sake of argument that<br />
Serbs are be<strong>in</strong>g pushed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ational position, obviously <strong>in</strong>dicates that<br />
crime is the only firm ma<strong>in</strong>stay of that identity. In those terms even the EU <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic org<strong>an</strong>izations membership is be<strong>in</strong>g viewed as the process<br />
of de-nationalization of Serbs. Dobrica Ćosić says that "Serbia has not chosen<br />
the road which it follows…it was compelled to embark upon tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, <strong>an</strong>d "the Brussels commissioners who have bombed<br />
us, have then placed us <strong>in</strong>to a <strong>state</strong> limbo <strong>in</strong> which the people of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro are suffer<strong>in</strong>g." Ćosić furthermore ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that "we are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
threatened by new <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g associations aim<strong>in</strong>g at break<strong>in</strong>g up Republika<br />
Srpska <strong>an</strong>d compell<strong>in</strong>g Serbs to live <strong>in</strong> the camp of ‘multiethnic Kosovo’<br />
alongside their murderers". 20<br />
Perception of Crime<br />
Serb elite, as well as the Serb <strong>state</strong>, is aware that war crimes, m<strong>an</strong>y of<br />
which have been already proved <strong>in</strong> the Hague Tribunal, c<strong>an</strong>not be denied.<br />
Thus <strong>for</strong> them the ma<strong>in</strong> concern is how to avoid <strong>an</strong>y implication of<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement of the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>in</strong> those crimes, that is accusation that Serbia<br />
was the ma<strong>in</strong> generator of those crimes <strong>in</strong> the pursuit of its goal of "liberation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d unification" of Serbs <strong>in</strong>to one <strong>state</strong>. Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović says that "m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
are try<strong>in</strong>g to reduce everyth<strong>in</strong>g to war crimes <strong>in</strong> total disregard of the previous<br />
history". His thesis is that "no-one c<strong>an</strong> responsibly talk about responsibility <strong>for</strong><br />
the moves made dur<strong>in</strong>g the break-up of Yugoslavia, not even about war<br />
crimes, without previously establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itial responsibility <strong>for</strong> the break-up<br />
of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized <strong>state</strong>." 21 Hence the constructions aim<strong>in</strong>g at<br />
encompass<strong>in</strong>g a broad historical context <strong>in</strong> order to prove that at play was<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uation of WW2 <strong>an</strong>d that crimes were retaliation <strong>for</strong> genocide committed<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs dur<strong>in</strong>g WW2. Thus Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović says that "some<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreters of our tragic developments resolutely reject to take <strong>in</strong>to account<br />
our past, notably the more recent, WW2 related one. The try to limit their scope<br />
of research <strong>an</strong>d limitation to the period of Milosevic’s rule." 22<br />
Namely the defense of the project, both <strong>in</strong> the Hague <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> domestic<br />
scene uses those very arguments which had <strong>in</strong>titially served to mobilize Serbs<br />
19 Br<strong>an</strong>a Crnčević, ‘Germ<strong>an</strong> Europe ’ is be<strong>in</strong>g made <strong>in</strong> the US world, Nacional,<br />
31 May 2005.<br />
20 Dobrica Cosic, We shall be condemned by the time <strong>an</strong>d our offspr<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
Politika, 2 October 1995.<br />
21 Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, Crime aga<strong>in</strong>st Peace, Politika, 29 December 2005.<br />
22 Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, About Crime <strong>an</strong>d Punishment, Politika, 30 December<br />
2005.<br />
42<br />
43
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d prime them <strong>for</strong> retaliation. That was relatively easy <strong>in</strong> view of the<br />
campaign mounted on the eve of the war aga<strong>in</strong>st Croats, Muslims <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. Then the war propag<strong>an</strong>da was based on demonization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
de<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>ization of enemy, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> those terms the Serb elite <strong>in</strong>vested its<br />
authority <strong>in</strong>to mobilization of the Serb people by stress<strong>in</strong>g the threat of WW2<br />
enemies. Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović accord<strong>in</strong>gly ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that "the repressed th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
tend to <strong>for</strong>cibly come to the <strong>for</strong>e". He goes on to note that no-one should be<br />
surprised by the fact that "uncover<strong>in</strong>g of mass graves <strong>an</strong>d burial of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s came to happen on the eve of the break-up of jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>state</strong>", <strong>for</strong> "those<br />
mass graves represent a metaphor" 23 . In the same context Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović<br />
poses the issue of <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>an</strong>d not collective apology. He totally rejects the<br />
idea of collective responsibility, but notes that it were to be accepted then the<br />
time frame would have to be ch<strong>an</strong>ged: "And why only s<strong>in</strong>ce 1991, <strong>an</strong>d not<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce Jasenovac". 24 Interest<strong>in</strong>gly enough the Serb elite one the one h<strong>an</strong>d<br />
nationalizise past as a move away from Communism (<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> those terms<br />
promotes the Chetnik movement as <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascist one), while on the other<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, it resists external pressures aimed at "compell<strong>in</strong>g Serbsto nationalize<br />
their responsibility by d<strong>in</strong>t of apology". 25<br />
Despite its exclusively negatively appraisals of <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia, the<br />
Serb elite is yet to be emotionally separated from that framework <strong>for</strong> the<br />
settlement of the Serb issue. Hence m<strong>an</strong>y schizophrenic <strong>in</strong>terpretations. On the<br />
one h<strong>an</strong>d they ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that Serbs made up the bulk of Partis<strong>an</strong> movement,<br />
which under the leadership of Communists reconstructed the second<br />
Yugoslavia, while on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, they keep stress<strong>in</strong>g a long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>ticommunist position of Serbs. Such <strong>an</strong> ambivalence additionally <strong>in</strong>creases<br />
frustration <strong>an</strong>d sense of loss, with which the Serb elite skillfully m<strong>an</strong>ipulates<br />
notably <strong>in</strong> contacts with representatives of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community. In his<br />
expl<strong>an</strong>ation of the Serb frustration Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović mentions <strong>an</strong>other<br />
element: "Serbs are additionally sensitive to <strong>an</strong>d hurt because of long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
demonization of their nation by the world" hence "there is a d<strong>an</strong>ger that they<br />
might <strong>an</strong>grily conclude that under the guise of democracy <strong>an</strong>d prevention of<br />
the Serb dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce attempts are be<strong>in</strong>g made to wrest from them the<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g parts of their <strong>state</strong>." Insistence on such viewpo<strong>in</strong>t of Serbs makes<br />
room "<strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> accelerated rise of the Serb far-right". 26 In communication with<br />
the world only Radical Party members are considered the far-right or<br />
"ultr<strong>an</strong>ationalists," though the whole so-called democratic block is <strong>in</strong> coalition<br />
with them on various levels.<br />
23 Idem<br />
24 Idem, Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesic, President of Croatia, dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>an</strong>niversary of<br />
Jasenovac delivered a speech which was not covered by a s<strong>in</strong>gle Serb medium, barr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter.<br />
25 Idem<br />
26 Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, Feel<strong>in</strong>g of Togetherness, Politika, 24 December 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The 10 th Anniversary<br />
of the Srebrenica Massacre<br />
In 2005 was marked the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica massacre which<br />
symbolizes the evil <strong>an</strong>d massacre committed aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. At the same time 10-year period is a long enough historical<br />
dist<strong>an</strong>ce enabl<strong>in</strong>g a comprehensive underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d perception of the war<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. After the ICTY pass<strong>in</strong>g of several convictions <strong>for</strong><br />
Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d disclosure of a series of facts, it is no longer disputable that<br />
Serbia was the generator of wars <strong>in</strong> the territory of <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. Added<br />
to that no one contests <strong>an</strong>y longer the fact that <strong>in</strong> eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g of those wars<br />
Serbia was fully backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army, the Serb Interior<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry, <strong>an</strong>d secret services which played a key role <strong>in</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ization of war.<br />
Srebrenica was a juncture at which the Western civilization made a U<br />
turn, that is, retuned to its orig<strong>in</strong>al, <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascist values on which its foundations<br />
rest. The process of fac<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong> the whole world. Even the<br />
Republika Srpska government under pressure prepared the report on<br />
Srebrenica crime. Also under <strong>in</strong>ternational pressure it had to acknowledge the<br />
7.800 victims <strong>an</strong>d at least <strong>for</strong>mally to apologize. Only Serbia rema<strong>in</strong>ed outside<br />
that process. The number of killed <strong>an</strong>d miss<strong>in</strong>g is still denied. It is ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
that the victims were not civili<strong>an</strong>s, but rather soldiers <strong>in</strong> disguise. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>cumbent President of Serbia Boris Tadić was <strong>in</strong>augurated on the day of the<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica crime (<strong>in</strong> 2004). He touched just briefly on<br />
Srebrenica, by say<strong>in</strong>g that he had overlooked that date. But lack of shame <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dignation over that crime <strong>an</strong>d genu<strong>in</strong>e acknowledgment thereof by the <strong>state</strong><br />
authorities <strong>an</strong>d the Serb elite is a much more lethal fact <strong>for</strong> Serbia.<br />
On the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica the US Congress adopted a<br />
resolution <strong>in</strong> which it was said that the massacre <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica was a genocide<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that "the Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serbs <strong>in</strong> their crim<strong>in</strong>al enterprise <strong>an</strong>d implementation of<br />
policy of aggression <strong>an</strong>d ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g were backed by the SRY authorities.<br />
The last paragraph of resolution re-affirmed the US support to "Bosnia <strong>in</strong> its<br />
entirety". That paragraph is of a paramount import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> if removes the idea<br />
of division of Bosnia. Parliamentary assembly of Council of Europe also passed<br />
a Declaration <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that "the road to catharsis would free us of collective<br />
guilt, but it is necessary to urgently apprehend <strong>an</strong>d consequently convict<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>ders <strong>an</strong>d perpetrators of crimes."<br />
10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica was preceded by a series of pert<strong>in</strong>ent<br />
p<strong>an</strong>el discussions. Attention of public at large was mostly grabbed by the one<br />
held on 17 May 2005 at the Belgrade Law Faculty. That p<strong>an</strong>el discussion was of<br />
a multifold import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> it laid bare the <strong>state</strong> of <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> Serbia, that is<br />
their high level of both professional <strong>an</strong>d moral devastation. It bears say<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
the p<strong>an</strong>el discussion <strong>an</strong>nounced as "10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of liberation of<br />
Srebrenica", had to be renamed "The Truth about Srebrenica" due to responses<br />
44<br />
45
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
of part of general public. Those <strong>in</strong> attend<strong>an</strong>ce went <strong>in</strong>to a veritable delirium<br />
after hear<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment of Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Bulatović: "They arrive <strong>in</strong><br />
Potočare – a false place; they have conquered part of Republika Srpska to bury<br />
the alleged victims of Ratko Mladić. In July 1995 Srebrenica was liberated." 27<br />
Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Bulatović went on to note: "I suggest that they tr<strong>an</strong>sfer their graves <strong>an</strong>d<br />
monuments to their territory, <strong>for</strong> it is a fertile soil which should be cultivated<br />
by population. They should not allow that their victims, much-revered as<br />
fighters, be so humiliated by be<strong>in</strong>g tr<strong>an</strong>sferred from their territory to the one <strong>in</strong><br />
which they are not welcome.". 28 That p<strong>an</strong>el discussion because of responses of<br />
several NGOs attracted the <strong>in</strong>ternational attention. That <strong>in</strong> turn compelled the<br />
officials to publicly respond to the notorious p<strong>an</strong>el discussion. Then also<br />
President of Serbia Boris Tadić <strong>state</strong>d that "<strong>in</strong> every country citizens have the<br />
right to freely espouse their st<strong>an</strong>ds, even though it is contrary to the official<br />
policy of our country. " 29<br />
Eight NGOs submitted a proposal to Parliament of the Republic of<br />
Serbia to adopt Declaration on Committment of the State of Serbia to Take All<br />
Measures to Protect the Righhts of Victims of War Crimes, <strong>an</strong>d Notably of Srebrenica<br />
Genocide Victims. But that proposal was rejected 30 because afoot was the pl<strong>an</strong> to<br />
adopt a resolution or declaration condemn<strong>in</strong>g all crimes. However, refusal of<br />
Democratic Party to vote <strong>for</strong> that proposal, prevented the adoption of that k<strong>in</strong>d<br />
of resolution. Due to great watchfulness of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
expectations that Serbia shall be ultimately able to come up with a relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment, Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters issued a <strong>state</strong>ment on the 10th <strong>an</strong>niversary of<br />
the war crime <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica. The <strong>state</strong>ment read: "our condemnation of the<br />
Srebrenica crimes is not limited to condemnation of direct perpetrators thereof.<br />
We dem<strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>al responsibility of all those who comitted crimes both <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d elsewhere, or org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>an</strong>d ordered them." It furthermore<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted out: "No crime should be <strong>for</strong>gotten, regardless of its perpetrators <strong>an</strong>d<br />
victims". 31<br />
Boris Tadić, President of Serbia, under pressure of both domestic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational public, went to Srebrenica. Be<strong>for</strong>e departure he <strong>state</strong>d that "crime<br />
is a demarcation l<strong>in</strong>e between civilization <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-civilization", but also<br />
added: "My message is that crim<strong>in</strong>als are <strong>in</strong>dividuals, <strong>for</strong> if we accuse one<br />
people of crimes, then all the peoples <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s are crim<strong>in</strong>als, <strong>in</strong> view of<br />
history of the Balk<strong>an</strong>s countries". 32<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The Scorpions Case<br />
Video record<strong>in</strong>g of kill<strong>in</strong>g of Muslims <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica was shown at<br />
Milosevic trial. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Hague prosecution team, men <strong>in</strong> fatigues,<br />
Škorpioni, were under the comm<strong>an</strong>d of the Serb Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, with whose<br />
tacit consent they were relocated to Republika Srpska to committ the<br />
a<strong>for</strong>ementioned crime. That video record<strong>in</strong>g amply <strong>in</strong>dicates ties between the<br />
Serb Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Srebrenica massacre, <strong>an</strong>d also presence of the Serb<br />
Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d its support to those fighters. Namily the <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>itial scene is<br />
the one <strong>in</strong> which Father Gavrilo, head of monastery Priv<strong>in</strong>a Glava, around 8<br />
o'clock <strong>in</strong> the morn<strong>in</strong>g blesses the Škorpioni group with the follow<strong>in</strong>g words:<br />
"Brothers, we are fac<strong>in</strong>g a revival of Turkish belligerence, they w<strong>an</strong>t Serb<br />
sacred places. Please help your faithful army to prevail over our enemies." 33<br />
After the air<strong>in</strong>g of the video record<strong>in</strong>g, Monk Gavrilo <strong>state</strong>d: "I don't repent <strong>for</strong><br />
bless<strong>in</strong>g members of the paramilitary unit Škorpioni, <strong>for</strong> I did not bless the<br />
crime they have committed." He went on to note: "I blessed our people <strong>an</strong>d our<br />
flag to make it known that the Orthodox faith is equal to a Christ-lov<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
justice-lov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d calm-lov<strong>in</strong>g practice, <strong>an</strong>d to prevent <strong>an</strong>y confusion or<br />
veer<strong>in</strong>g towards the evil <strong>in</strong> their m<strong>in</strong>ds." In his m<strong>in</strong>d "the crime was committed<br />
probaly because they lost control or because they grew very embittered. But<br />
even the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g does not justify that crime. But at the same time we should<br />
not <strong>for</strong>get even worse crimes committed aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serb children." 34<br />
The a<strong>for</strong>ementioned video record<strong>in</strong>g compelled the Serb authorities to<br />
make a k<strong>in</strong>d of admission of guilt, though they immediately denied <strong>an</strong>y ties<br />
between the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d that group. The Interior Secretary tried to<br />
explicate <strong>in</strong> a psychological ve<strong>in</strong> the motives of Škorpiona to make such a video<br />
record<strong>in</strong>g ("they were puerile", "they w<strong>an</strong>ted to show off") 35 . It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
note that President of the Security <strong>Committee</strong>, Milorad Mirčić, after the air<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
that video dem<strong>an</strong>ded that "a probe should be launched <strong>in</strong>to possible<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement of Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić, Sonja Biserko <strong>an</strong>d Sonja Liht <strong>in</strong> prostitution<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> traffick<strong>in</strong>g." 36<br />
Responses of the lead<strong>in</strong>g Serb personalities were rather shameful. In<br />
view of the fact that it is difficult to deny the Srebrenica massacre, part of the<br />
Serb elite acknowledged the crime, but also noted that "attempts to establish<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ks between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d that crime are-sheer violence." Milorad Vučelić, <strong>an</strong><br />
official of the Socialist Party of Serbia, <strong>state</strong>d that "at play was <strong>an</strong> attempt to<br />
27 D<strong>an</strong>as, Terrible stench of the Serb shame, 19 May 2005.<br />
28 Vreme, Price of <strong>in</strong>sults <strong>an</strong>d vilification, 26 May 2005.<br />
29 www.b92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo/vesti, 21 May 2005.<br />
30 Tha proposal was submitted by Žarko Korać (Social Democratic Union) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Nataša Mičić (the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia)<br />
31 www.beta.co.yu , documents<br />
32 Večernje novosti, Denial of the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement, 9 June 2005.<br />
33 Večernje novosti, I have five <strong>in</strong> the package, 4 June 2005.<br />
34 D<strong>an</strong>as, Monk Gavrilo shows no sign of repent<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> bless<strong>in</strong>g Škorpione, 9<br />
June 2005.<br />
35 Velimir Curguz Kazimir, “Jews, <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d Skorpions”, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
Charter, No. 83-84, May-June 2005<br />
36 D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 June 2005<br />
46<br />
47
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
implicate us <strong>an</strong>d impose guilt on us, because of the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of<br />
Srebrenica, start -up of negotiations on Kosovo, <strong>an</strong>d a build-up to possible<br />
arrest of Mladic. That is why someone kept hid<strong>in</strong>g that crime until now." 37 In<br />
order to deny <strong>an</strong>y l<strong>in</strong>ks between the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the Srebrenica crime,<br />
the Serb media <strong>in</strong>terviewed different members of Škorpioni. They all<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "Škorpioni were under the comm<strong>an</strong>d of the 11 th Corps of<br />
Republika Srpska Kraj<strong>in</strong>a Army, first comm<strong>an</strong>ded by Bogd<strong>an</strong> Sladojević, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
then by General Duš<strong>an</strong> Lončar". 38 Milov<strong>an</strong> Drecun, a military commentator,<br />
however asserted that "someone is <strong>in</strong>tentionally try<strong>in</strong>g to implicate Serbs <strong>for</strong><br />
the genocide…the goal of that video record<strong>in</strong>g was to exert pressure on the<br />
Serb public to accept the idea that Republika Srpska was a genocide-style<br />
creations, <strong>an</strong> as such should now disappear." 39<br />
Tomislav Nikolić, the Serb Radical Party, said that "One-sided<br />
approach to Srebrenica is unacceptable <strong>for</strong> my party. It hurts me to see how<br />
most people <strong>in</strong> Serbia are speak<strong>in</strong>g about crimes committed by Serbs, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
noone speaks about crimes committed by crimes committed by Muslims. If <strong>an</strong>y<br />
Serb <strong>in</strong> Republika Srpska committed <strong>an</strong>y crime, what k<strong>in</strong>d of s<strong>in</strong> is that <strong>for</strong><br />
Serbia?" 40 Dragoljub Mićunović, Democratic Party <strong>state</strong>d that "the <strong>state</strong> of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d its people are not crim<strong>in</strong>als, but that the character of a regime was<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al." 41 After a meet<strong>in</strong>g with Carla del Ponte, Vojislav Koštunica, <strong>state</strong>d,<br />
"Several suspects were arrested <strong>an</strong>d deta<strong>in</strong>ed. Of utmost import<strong>an</strong>ce was our<br />
prompt reaction <strong>an</strong>d detention of few war crime suspects." He added that a<br />
shock<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d terrible video record<strong>in</strong>g showed a shameless <strong>an</strong>d brutal crime." 42<br />
Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić, Secretary General of the Serb Radical Party, <strong>state</strong>d that the<br />
ma<strong>in</strong> goal of the media campaign related to the Sorpioni case was:" media<br />
prim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the arrest of Ratko Mladić, <strong>an</strong>d prim<strong>in</strong>g of public at large <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mal abolition of Republika Srpska" 43 .<br />
Dragoljub Kojčić, Democratic Party of Serbia, stressed that some<br />
factors <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational community are bent on hurt<strong>in</strong>g Serbs <strong>an</strong>d that their<br />
goal is "to make the Serb public feel the collective guilt, <strong>an</strong>d consequently more<br />
easily swallow the <strong>in</strong>tended punishment. That punishment shall be most<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> the shape of destruction of the Dayton-time position of Republika<br />
Srpska, or back<strong>in</strong>g of Bosni<strong>an</strong> charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
possibly prepar<strong>in</strong>g of the ground <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija.<br />
37 Večernje novosti, Violence aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia, 9 June 2005.<br />
38 Statement of Mil<strong>an</strong> Mil<strong>an</strong>ović Mrgud, <strong>for</strong>mer Deputy Defence Secretary of<br />
Republika Srpska Kraj<strong>in</strong>a, Večernje novosti, I deem it sheer venge<strong>an</strong>ce, 9 June 2005.<br />
39 Nacional, There was no genocide, 10 June 2005.<br />
40 Witnesses of crime, D<strong>an</strong>as, 8 June 2005.<br />
41 Večernje novosti, Only the fomer regime is to be blamed, 4 June 2005.<br />
42“ Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of break up of brotherhood <strong>in</strong> crime”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 4-5 June 2005.<br />
43 Preparation of the ground <strong>for</strong> abolition of Republika Srpska, Nacional, 6 June<br />
2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Serbs are likely to face <strong>an</strong>ew major sidel<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ferior position." 44<br />
Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, representatives of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
International Court of Justice <strong>state</strong>d that "the video record<strong>in</strong>g would not<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g regard<strong>in</strong>g the court proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. It is just a short footage<br />
show<strong>in</strong>g how only 6 persons were shot, while it is ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica 8,000 persons were killed. That short footage only illustrated the<br />
situation, but did not <strong>in</strong>crease or lessen the degree of accusations. That<br />
record<strong>in</strong>g has not impact on the Bosni<strong>an</strong> charges aga<strong>in</strong>s Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d does not ch<strong>an</strong>ge the situation. It does not me<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g, or<br />
rather has no bear<strong>in</strong>g, s<strong>in</strong>ce the charges encompass Srebrenica developments<br />
<strong>in</strong> their entirety." 45 Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, the Serb Defence Secretary, <strong>state</strong>d with<br />
regret that "show<strong>in</strong>g of that record<strong>in</strong>g about Skorpioni crimes, once aga<strong>in</strong><br />
ta<strong>in</strong>ted the <strong>in</strong>ternational image of Serbia", but added that "the entire case<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates only responsibility of <strong>in</strong>dividuals, <strong>an</strong>d not the one of people <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>state</strong>." 46<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Čavić, Republika Srpska official who recognized genocide <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica breathed a sign of relief: "When I recently went public with<br />
acknowledgement of Srebrenica genocide, I met with condemnation of the<br />
official Serbia. M<strong>an</strong>y cursed me, called me names, labeled me as a traitor. But I<br />
did not care-<strong>for</strong> I as all the other politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia-had <strong>an</strong> opportunity to see<br />
that record<strong>in</strong>g." 47 Zvonimir Trajkovic, one of the closest aides of S. Milošević<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić, <strong>state</strong>d that the record<strong>in</strong>g of kill<strong>in</strong>g of Muslims <strong>in</strong><br />
Trnovo was doctored. He thus commented that fact that mother recognized<br />
her son while he was taken to the shoot<strong>in</strong>g scene: "I don’t believe those<br />
mothers. Had we shown the record<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong> ass, a mother could have also<br />
claimed that it was her son." 48<br />
Air<strong>in</strong>g of the Skorpion film <strong>in</strong> the Hague court-room, just a few days<br />
after the Belgrade Law Faculty p<strong>an</strong>el discussion, deeply shocked the Serb<br />
public, <strong>for</strong> the record<strong>in</strong>g showed what everyone more or less knew. Responses<br />
of the Serb politici<strong>an</strong>s were shameless, <strong>for</strong> as Olga Popović said: "Only those<br />
without <strong>an</strong>y shame may be shocked today by a cold-blooded execution of<br />
<strong>in</strong>nocent people <strong>an</strong>d be suddenly ready to offer a historical admission as a<br />
result of a TV Belgrade air<strong>in</strong>g of the video record<strong>in</strong>g." 49<br />
44Does the bestiality of <strong>in</strong>dividuals suffices <strong>for</strong> condemnation of the whole<br />
people?!, Nacional, 6 June 2005.<br />
45 Shall the air<strong>in</strong>g of footage on execution of Muslims have impact on the<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Hague, D<strong>an</strong>as, 6 June 2005.<br />
46"Crimes <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica ta<strong>in</strong>t Serbia's <strong>in</strong>ternational image”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 7 June 2005.<br />
47 Drag<strong>an</strong> Čavić: I admitted, they all knew, Nacional, 4 June 2005.<br />
48 Večernje novosti, 19 August 2005.<br />
49 Olga Popović, Shameless play-act<strong>in</strong>g, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter, no. 83-84, May-June<br />
2005.<br />
48<br />
49
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The Serb authorities saw the film several months be<strong>for</strong>e its "premiere"<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Hague 50 , hence no-one should be surprised by swift –with<strong>in</strong> 24 hourslocat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of all members of the said group <strong>an</strong>d their immediate arrest. It was a<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of a sacrifice of the Serb authorities <strong>in</strong> the face of enormous pressue by<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community to make official <strong>in</strong> one way or <strong>an</strong>other its<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> the Srebrenica massacre. However <strong>in</strong>ternational community<br />
accepted "shock <strong>an</strong>d surprise" of the Belgrade authorities, <strong>an</strong>d immediately<br />
proclaimed that the Serb people underwent a catharsis. Such a hasty response<br />
by some <strong>in</strong>ternation media (CNN, New York Times, etc.) impairs attempts <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia proper to tackle the process of fac<strong>in</strong>g with responsibility <strong>an</strong>d<br />
seriousness.<br />
Responses of the Serb elite to take a st<strong>an</strong>d on the Srebrenica crime<br />
were out of place. Namely the Serb Orthodox Church on July 12 org<strong>an</strong>ized<br />
commemoration <strong>in</strong> Bratunac <strong>for</strong> all Serbs victims <strong>in</strong> Republika Srpska.<br />
Belgrade large circulation tabloid Večernje novosti r<strong>an</strong> a Special Supplement,<br />
allegedly with names of all Serbs (3,287), who perished dur<strong>in</strong>g the Bosni<strong>an</strong><br />
war. The Muslim-executed massacre of Serbs (49 victims) <strong>in</strong> Kravice, a<br />
retaliation <strong>for</strong> the previous kill<strong>in</strong>g of 70 Muslim civili<strong>an</strong>s, was much hyped.<br />
That event happened <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary 1993 but was used a counterpo<strong>in</strong>t to<br />
Srebrenica. Front-page headl<strong>in</strong>e of the supplement was: "They were killed by<br />
the same h<strong>an</strong>d. Let them sleep their eternal sleep. Their graves are a symbol of<br />
a major historical tragedy <strong>an</strong>d a last<strong>in</strong>g warn<strong>in</strong>g to our offspr<strong>in</strong>g. They are<br />
sacrifices <strong>for</strong> the homel<strong>an</strong>d, faith <strong>an</strong>d freedome. Their sacrifices constitute the<br />
foundations of Republika Srpska". 51<br />
Separation between co-operation with the Hague Tribunal from<br />
establishment of the moral bal<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the society, helped promote a set a<br />
values which is directly <strong>in</strong> collusion with the consensus on the moral aspect<br />
<strong>an</strong>d seriousness of mass crimes, <strong>an</strong>d notably genocide, the consensus which<br />
had been atta<strong>in</strong>ed on the occasion of establishment of the Hague Tribunal.<br />
International community proper, because of its vacillat<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>ce on the ICTY<br />
<strong>in</strong> some stages of the latter’s work, is partly to be blamed <strong>for</strong> such a Serb st<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
on the Hague Tribunal. Hence it comes as no surprise that Ratko Mladić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić are still at large. In the early stages of the ICTY work the<br />
position that all three sides were equally responsible prevailed. Then it was<br />
consequently thought that such a position should have a bear<strong>in</strong>g on the<br />
numder of <strong>in</strong>dictees <strong>in</strong> the Hague. Thus Lord Owen as a mediator <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> crisis once <strong>state</strong>d that twenty people from each side should be tried.<br />
50 In <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tervew to Belgrade weekly NIN, 22. December 2005 , war crimes<br />
prosecutor Vukčević said:” We saw the tape on Scorpioni earlier <strong>an</strong>d we started to follow<br />
executors but we have not expected that Geoffrey Nice would show the tape <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Hague Tribunal. Because of that we immediately started the action of arrest<strong>in</strong>g. MUP<br />
<strong>an</strong>d BIA have accomplished it brilli<strong>an</strong>tly “.<br />
51 Večernje novosti, 30 June 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
With the passage of time that st<strong>an</strong>ce radically altered. And f<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> 2005 cooperation<br />
with the Hague Tribunal became the basic prerequisite <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>clusion<br />
of the Balk<strong>an</strong>s countries <strong>in</strong>to Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
International community missed out on a ch<strong>an</strong>ce to more seriouls<br />
work with the Serb society proper <strong>in</strong> the post-5 October 2000 period. And that<br />
failure shall have serious consequences <strong>for</strong> the future of Serbia. Serbia is a<br />
country with a very small <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> potential capable of carry<strong>in</strong>g out the serious<br />
process of fac<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> parallel putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> place moral positions on the recent<br />
past. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g must be preceded by build<strong>in</strong>g of structures tasked with<br />
"moralization of memory" 52 . But Serbia lacks the political will to do that. Due<br />
to a flexible position of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d notably some EU<br />
members, the Serb public made wrong deductions which helped extol<br />
cynicism <strong>an</strong>d arrog<strong>an</strong>ce as the dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t judgement value. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g was<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated by the survey conducted by the UNDP <strong>in</strong> 53 countries <strong>in</strong> the world<br />
(sample of 17,000 people). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that poll Serbs r<strong>an</strong>ked the highest with<br />
respect to their self-respect at the time when the Hague Tribunal was lay<strong>in</strong>g<br />
bare crimes committed <strong>in</strong> the last decade of the 20 th century. Dr. Jov<strong>an</strong> Marić, a<br />
psychiatrist, thus commented that <strong>in</strong>ternational survey: "Self-respect may be a<br />
misnomer <strong>for</strong> –the spite" <strong>an</strong>d "my impression is that the most impressive result<br />
which the Serbs scored <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational self-respect competition may bepolitically<br />
t<strong>in</strong>ted." He deems that "spite is the middle name <strong>for</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro, <strong>an</strong>d just a cursory brows<strong>in</strong>g of the national historical textbook<br />
unveils that we have said three times no <strong>in</strong> the last 100 years - first to Austo-<br />
Hungary, then to Hitler <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>ally to – NATO. Such conduct is typical only of<br />
a very spiteful, crazy or extremely self-confident person or people." 53 Dr Marić<br />
goes on to note that "the Serb unrealistic narcissism <strong>an</strong>d deceitful selfconfidence<br />
are one of the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal causes of our defeats." In his m<strong>in</strong>d that<br />
practically me<strong>an</strong>s that "every time they said no to the big powers, Serbs were<br />
beaten up." 54<br />
Such <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the survey also <strong>in</strong>dicates that the rout of Serbia<br />
is exclusively seen as a sign of <strong>in</strong>domitable character of the Serb people.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately such a conviction is propped by other, prom<strong>in</strong>ent parts of elite,<br />
notably by lead<strong>in</strong>g public figures <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectuals Svetozar Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Dobrica Ćosić. Both of them are not only <strong>in</strong>capable of mak<strong>in</strong>g a good bal<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of the last 20 years of Serb history, but also tend to defend their participation <strong>in</strong><br />
the project <strong>an</strong>d the project itself.<br />
In late 2005 Dobrica Ćosić summed up his views on the results of<br />
recent wars. That <strong>in</strong>terview of his to Belgrade weekly NIN was presented to<br />
52 Gabrijel Mockim, Memory of Crime <strong>an</strong>d Forg<strong>in</strong>g of Identity, Lesser Evil,<br />
moral tacks to the practices of genocide, Belgrade Circle, Beograd 2005<br />
53 Conceited Serbs, Politika, 19 October 2005, page 10<br />
54 idem<br />
50<br />
51
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the domestic public as the only truth despite irrefutable facts which are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
laid bare almost every day. Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the impact of Dobrica Ćosić on<br />
public op<strong>in</strong>ion, current affairs policy <strong>an</strong>d all national <strong>in</strong>stitutions relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong><br />
the process of construction of memory, that <strong>in</strong>terview is highly <strong>in</strong>dicative. He<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "all three warr<strong>in</strong>g sides committed war crimes, plunder <strong>an</strong>d<br />
torch<strong>in</strong>g", while "the current qu<strong>an</strong>titative assessments of war crimes are<br />
chauv<strong>in</strong>istic <strong>an</strong>d false". Furtermore he decl<strong>in</strong>ed to take a st<strong>an</strong>ce on Milošević,<br />
because "now when Milošević is beh<strong>in</strong>d the Schengen bars <strong>an</strong>d is be<strong>in</strong>g tried<br />
by the Hague Tribunal, the political tribunal <strong>an</strong>d no the one of truth <strong>an</strong>d<br />
justice, I don’t w<strong>an</strong>t to speak about policy of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević". Such a<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ce not only constitutes <strong>an</strong> amnesty of Milosevic, but also leaves open the<br />
issue of his responsibility <strong>for</strong> wars <strong>in</strong> the territory of <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. Ćosić<br />
also floated his conviction that that "Ustashi-masterm<strong>in</strong>ded expulsion of Serbs<br />
from Croatia <strong>an</strong>d the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>-m<strong>an</strong>aged ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g of Kosovo, are Serb<br />
routs. But as we all well know not all war defeats are victories <strong>for</strong> the other<br />
side. Outcomes of those wars are not f<strong>in</strong>al." Ćosić qualified war <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia as "a civil war with the <strong>state</strong>hood-mak<strong>in</strong>g goals <strong>an</strong>d underly<strong>in</strong>g<br />
strong, religious motives." Thus, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ćosić, "Sloveni<strong>an</strong>s fought <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent Slovenia, Croats <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> ethnically cle<strong>an</strong> Croatia, Serbs waged a<br />
war <strong>for</strong> Yugoslavia <strong>an</strong>d their national <strong>an</strong>d civil rights, Muslims fought <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Islamic Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>for</strong> a Greater Alb<strong>an</strong>ia …". Of course Ćosić<br />
believes that <strong>for</strong>eign factors are largely to be blamed <strong>for</strong> the war, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>gly asserts that "all the late 20 th century wars <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s were the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>al stages of WW2 <strong>an</strong>d beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the new war aga<strong>in</strong>st Europe, <strong>in</strong> which,<br />
un<strong>for</strong>tunately Europe proper took also part by its <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the 1999<br />
NATO-led aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia." 55<br />
Milosevic's Defense <strong>in</strong> the Service<br />
of the Greater Serbia Project<br />
Milošević's defence is also def<strong>in</strong>ed as defence of policy <strong>an</strong>d project of<br />
"liberation <strong>an</strong>d unification of all Serbs". In his first appear<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the court<br />
Milosevic espoused his t<strong>an</strong>d that the ICTY was not a legitimate tribunal.<br />
Added to that the start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts of the defence are that Serbia is the victim of<br />
the new world order <strong>an</strong>d globalizaiton, <strong>an</strong>d that Serbia fought aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
Islamic terrorism <strong>an</strong>d fundamentalism (<strong>in</strong> the wake of 11th September that<br />
thesis was considerably stregthened). Start<strong>in</strong>g from the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned<br />
premises Milosevic totally disregards the contents of the <strong>in</strong>dictment, <strong>an</strong>d rarely<br />
resorts to legal arguments <strong>in</strong> order to rebuff <strong>in</strong>dicment counts. Her is<br />
concentrated on arguments used to start the war <strong>in</strong> the first place. That is best<br />
55 Interview of Dobrica Cosic, “It is high time that the peoples of <strong>for</strong>mer SFRJ<br />
become <strong>in</strong>ward-look<strong>in</strong>g”, NIN, 29 December 2005, pages 30-37<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
attested to by the selection of witnesses-mostly academici<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d military <strong>an</strong>d<br />
police officials. Through their testimonies is best laid bare the fact that the<br />
masterm<strong>in</strong>ds of that project-both <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions- are still<br />
adher<strong>in</strong>g to it. It is becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly clear that Milošević was selected to<br />
execute or implement that project. His political capability made him idoneous<br />
<strong>for</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> charge of implementation of that project.<br />
Milošević's defence explicitly demonstrates that the policy pursued<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g his regime resulted from consensus of all the relev<strong>an</strong>t factors <strong>in</strong> the<br />
society. Thus, <strong>for</strong> example, professor Smilja Avramov <strong>state</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the Hague<br />
Tribunal court-room that "<strong>in</strong> such a difficult situation <strong>in</strong> the country it is<br />
obvious that Milošević was not the only decision-maker". She expressly<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the thesis of a sole decision-maker, notably Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Milosević, was utterly wrong. "That is not the way th<strong>in</strong>gs went. Half of the<br />
Serb Academy of Sciences, university professors, we all rallied". 56 Hence it is<br />
only logical that witnesses <strong>in</strong> the court-room reiterate the very same arguments<br />
they had advocated as members of the <strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>in</strong>tellectual elite dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
most brutal propag<strong>an</strong>da stage, that is dur<strong>in</strong>g the war-monger<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d prim<strong>in</strong>g<br />
stage.<br />
The first thesis espoused by witnesses <strong>in</strong> the Hague is that Yugoslavia<br />
was <strong>for</strong>cibly broken up by secession-m<strong>in</strong>ded republics of Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Slovenia,<br />
with assisst<strong>an</strong>ce of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, notably the US, Vatic<strong>an</strong>,<br />
Germ<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d Austria. To put it briefly, it was both "un upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d war<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Yugoslavia, the only <strong>in</strong>ternationally legally protected subject". 57<br />
Decision of Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia to claim <strong>in</strong>dependence, raised the<br />
issue of borders, <strong>for</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Smilja Avramov, those borders were "the<br />
Communist ones, that is AVNOJ-drawn ones" hence as such unacceptable <strong>for</strong><br />
Serbs. She stressed <strong>in</strong> the court that "abolition of revolutionary achievments is<br />
necessary". Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Avramov those borders, "lack legal legitimacy", <strong>for</strong><br />
"they are not recognized by <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>ternational treaty". Pr<strong>in</strong>cipal argument of<br />
Smilja Avramov aga<strong>in</strong>st AVNOJ borders was so-called draft of the 1915<br />
London Agreement, which <strong>in</strong> preparations <strong>for</strong> the war 70 years later, was<br />
considered as the basis <strong>for</strong> challeng<strong>in</strong>g the AVNOJ borders. That agreement<br />
was drafted with representatives of Italy, which were promised parts of<br />
Dalmatia, <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>for</strong> their stay<strong>in</strong>g away from the war with Austro-<br />
Hungary. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Čedomir Popov, "the second part of that agreement<br />
was a map offered to Serbia, as a compensation <strong>for</strong> the Croat losses <strong>in</strong><br />
Dalmatia <strong>an</strong>d the Serb ones <strong>in</strong> Macedonia" 58 . Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that Agreement<br />
borders of Serbia are more or less identical with the ones tailored by a Chetnik<br />
ideologue Moljević. However that Agreement has not legal validity, <strong>for</strong> it has<br />
56 www.icty.un.org<br />
57 Prof. Smilja Avramov, www.icty.un.org<br />
58 Prof. Čedmomir Popov, www.icty.un.org<br />
52<br />
53
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
never been made official or signed. The issue of <strong>in</strong>ternal borders of Yugoslavia,<br />
was raised <strong>in</strong> Serbia as early as <strong>in</strong> 1971, dur<strong>in</strong>g the Belgrade Law Faculty<br />
discussion on amendments to the then exist<strong>in</strong>g federal constitution. Even then<br />
the st<strong>an</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> that case Serbs would dem<strong>an</strong>d unificationf of all Serb ethnic<br />
territories was crystallized. And that thesis is still expounded <strong>an</strong>d adhered to.<br />
Along with the denial of <strong>in</strong>ternal borders, the second import<strong>an</strong>t thesis<br />
<strong>in</strong> the defence of Milošević, is denial of the idea of Greater Serbia, that is<br />
unification of all Serbs. However academici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> their testimonies still <strong>in</strong>sist<br />
on the right of the Serb people to unite <strong>in</strong>to a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>state</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d disregard the<br />
Bad<strong>in</strong>ter Commission pr<strong>in</strong>ciples which had made that body opt <strong>for</strong> the<br />
qualification of "disitegration of Yugoslavia" <strong>an</strong>d recongition <strong>an</strong>d respect of the<br />
republic<strong>an</strong> borders as the <strong>state</strong> ones. "Liberation <strong>an</strong>d unification" was the only<br />
political concept on which the Serb elites built their policy dur<strong>in</strong>g the two<br />
centuries of modern history of Serbia. That strategy was bl<strong>in</strong>dly adhered to<br />
even when it became clear that Milosevic war venture ended <strong>in</strong> rout. For<br />
example, Milorad Ekmečić, one of the masterm<strong>in</strong>ds of that strategy, at the<br />
Second Congress of Intellectuals <strong>in</strong> Belgrade <strong>in</strong> 1994, <strong>state</strong>d: "First we must<br />
stress that unification of the Serb people <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>depndent <strong>an</strong>d democratic <strong>state</strong><br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s our fixed goal." 59 After the Dayton Agreement, denied by the Serb<br />
elite, the ma<strong>in</strong> strategic guidel<strong>in</strong>e rema<strong>in</strong>ed unification, but, by other,<br />
diplomatic me<strong>an</strong>s. After 5 October 2000 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stallation of Vojislav Koštnica as<br />
President of SRY, that tactic ga<strong>in</strong>ed momentum. Namely it quickly became<br />
clear that Vojislav Koštunica was only a personal ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> the top SRY<br />
leadership. Mihajlo Marković <strong>in</strong> Srpska politička misao (2000) says that "Serbs<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d politici<strong>an</strong>s need not wait <strong>for</strong> the failure of process of<br />
globalization or weaken<strong>in</strong>g thereof <strong>in</strong> order to start work<strong>in</strong>g on unification of<br />
the Serb peoples". In the Hague court-room Mihajlo Markovic thus replied to<br />
Mr. Nice’s question about the map r<strong>an</strong> by magaz<strong>in</strong>e Epoha of 22 October 1991:<br />
"That is not the pl<strong>an</strong> of demarcation between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia. It is <strong>in</strong> fact<br />
Yugoslavia which has seceded from Croatia. So the question is if Croatia had<br />
seceded where the border should have been then? 60<br />
Smilja Avramov, <strong>in</strong> her testimony, also tackled the issue of unfication<br />
of all Serbs, notably as regarded Croat Serbs. She quoted a series of vari<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>for</strong><br />
Croat Serbs <strong>in</strong> case of secession of Croatia, which, "were tabled <strong>in</strong> broad-based<br />
consultations with <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d experts of all profiles". And her whole<br />
thesis may be reduced to the fact that "Croatia c<strong>an</strong>not take with itself Serbs to<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent Croatia". She also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "the Serb people spont<strong>an</strong>eously<br />
rose up aga<strong>in</strong>st violence" <strong>an</strong>d thus "paramilitary <strong>for</strong>ces were <strong>for</strong>med. Part of<br />
people did not w<strong>an</strong>t to flee <strong>an</strong>d surrender. So they set up first groups aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
violence which irritated population everwhere. And then volunteers started<br />
emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia ...<strong>an</strong>d they decided to place themselves under the<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>d of Yugoslav army". 61<br />
Testimonies of academici<strong>an</strong>s help reconstruct Belgrade's strategy:<br />
adherence to <strong>an</strong> alleged defence of Yugoslavia, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>strumentalization of the<br />
UN <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> round<strong>in</strong>g off the Serb territories. In his testimony Mihajlo<br />
Marković said that the pl<strong>an</strong> to <strong>in</strong>vite the UN peace-keepers aimed at "providng<br />
the Serb people with <strong>an</strong> opportunity to declare where it w<strong>an</strong>ts to live".<br />
Marković then underscored that "accord<strong>in</strong>g to that pl<strong>an</strong> one part of territory<br />
would rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Croatia, <strong>an</strong>d the other <strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia". At the 1991 press<br />
conference Mihajlo Marković thus commented the Hague conference: "Serbs<br />
claim a m<strong>in</strong>imum ensur<strong>in</strong>g their participation <strong>in</strong> negotiations, that is, creation<br />
of the Serb kraj<strong>in</strong>as <strong>in</strong> Croatia; that the people who w<strong>an</strong>t to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Yugoslavia should be given <strong>an</strong> opportunity to do so (a reference to Serbs <strong>in</strong><br />
Croatia); <strong>an</strong>d the Serb Socialist Party could not accept that national m<strong>in</strong>orities,<br />
notably Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Hungari<strong>an</strong>s be gr<strong>an</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> the future community the<br />
same rights already exercised by the Serb people <strong>in</strong> Croatia. 62<br />
The third thesis on which Milošević built his defence was denial of<br />
Memor<strong>an</strong>dum as a program document. His pr<strong>in</strong>cipal argument was that it was<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>complete paper, allegedly stolen <strong>an</strong>d then leaked <strong>in</strong>to the public; it is <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>alysis of economic, political <strong>an</strong>d social situation <strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia. Marković<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that at play was the dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> "national equality of Yugoslav<br />
peoples", which, as it later emerged, presupposed amendments to the 1974<br />
Constitution. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the academici<strong>an</strong>'s testimony the myth about<br />
Greater Serbia was <strong>in</strong>vented by big powers, <strong>for</strong> condemnation of Greater<br />
Serbia hegemonism allegedly practised by Serbs, would pave the way to<br />
advent of the New World Order <strong>an</strong>d globalization <strong>in</strong> this part of Europe. 63 In<br />
those terms they see Serbia sa a nation-victim, that is <strong>state</strong>-victim, the hallmark<br />
which Serbia bore throughout its history. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to academici<strong>an</strong>s-witnesses<br />
the creation of one, unified Serb <strong>state</strong>, that is, rally<strong>in</strong>g of the entire Serb people<br />
or its biggest part <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>state</strong>, is not a great-<strong>state</strong> idea, but a legitimate<br />
right of the Serb people. At this po<strong>in</strong>t it bears stress<strong>in</strong>g that none of testimonies<br />
gave a mention millions of people whose lives <strong>an</strong>d belong<strong>in</strong>gs were sacrificed<br />
<strong>for</strong> implementation of that idea, that is, that right of theirs.<br />
Stvar<strong>an</strong>je jed<strong>in</strong>stvene srpske države, odnosno okuplj<strong>an</strong>jem<br />
celokupnog srpskog naroda ili najvećeg njegovog dela u jednoj državi,<br />
akademici-svedoci ne smatraju velikodržavnom idejom već legitimnim<br />
pravom srpskog naroda. Pri tome, ni jed<strong>an</strong> od svedoka se nije osvrnuo na<br />
milionske žrtve koje su ugradjene u tu ideju, odnosno to njihovo pravo.<br />
59 Milorad Ekmečić, The Second Congress of the Serb Intellectuals, Beograd,<br />
22-23 April 1994<br />
60 Prof. Mihajlo Marković, www.icty.un.org<br />
61 Prof. Smilja Avramov, www.icty.un.org<br />
62 Prof. Mihajlo Marković, www.icty.un.org<br />
63 Idem<br />
54<br />
55
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The fourth thesis is that the 1974 Constitution was a time bomb <strong>for</strong><br />
dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of Yugoslavia. In the ICTY Marković backed the Memor<strong>an</strong>dum<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that "nationalism <strong>an</strong>d separatism rife <strong>in</strong> the social scene, were<br />
orientations ideologically put <strong>in</strong> place by the 1974 Constitution". Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Markovic, "because of that Constitution Yugoslavia was becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly chaotic country.". Academici<strong>an</strong>s-witnesses urged amendments to<br />
the constitution of Serbia aimed at equalization of Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> with other<br />
<strong>state</strong>-republics, <strong>for</strong> "under the 1974 Constitutions Serbia was stripped of its<br />
attributes of <strong>state</strong>hood". Even today, on the eve of Kosovo negotiations, that<br />
very group<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sists on settlement of Kosovo issue along the follow<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>es:<br />
"more th<strong>an</strong> autonomy, less th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>depndence" just as it had been resolved<br />
under the 1974 Constitution.<br />
The fifth thesis is related to the role of the Yugoslav People's Army <strong>in</strong><br />
dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of Yugoslavia. Namely the defence tries to protect the YPA from<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> the crimes <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>volvment <strong>in</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ization of "rebellion of<br />
Serbs". Arguments to that end are reduced to the follow<strong>in</strong>g: there were crimes,<br />
but they were committed by paramilitary groups outside the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
control.<br />
Such defence arguments <strong>in</strong> the court-room, their presentation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
domestic media <strong>in</strong>terpretation thereof, <strong>in</strong>dicate that such views are deeply<br />
<strong>in</strong>gra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> consciousness of broader public. The latter then by extension<br />
strengthens the conviction that Yugoslavia broke up because big powers<br />
w<strong>an</strong>ted such <strong>an</strong> outcome. State <strong>in</strong>stitutions are actively <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> defence of<br />
the project <strong>an</strong>d also <strong>in</strong> a bid to shun responsibility of the <strong>state</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> crimes<br />
<strong>an</strong>d genocide <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. In view of the fact that such a perception is<br />
widely accepted by public at large, the process of fac<strong>in</strong>g is made more difficult<br />
<strong>an</strong>d pro-EU orientations are blocked.<br />
History Textbooks <strong>an</strong>d the Recent Past<br />
As most signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> shap<strong>in</strong>g young people’s m<strong>in</strong>ds, textbooks are<br />
used as major <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g historical events <strong>an</strong>d developments,<br />
particularly those related to the recent past. After the ouster of the Milosevic<br />
regime <strong>in</strong> 2000, some progress has been made <strong>in</strong> this doma<strong>in</strong>, as textbook have<br />
been adjusted to Europe<strong>an</strong> trends. A t<strong>an</strong>gible outcome of the Council of<br />
Europe <strong>an</strong>d the Stability Pact’s <strong>in</strong>itiative was the attempt to have regional<br />
history <strong>in</strong>terpreted objectively.<br />
The project was launched dur<strong>in</strong>g Dj<strong>in</strong>djić-led government. Then the<br />
education re<strong>for</strong>m was successfully implemented <strong>in</strong> the face of very difficult<br />
political issues. One of the first moves of government of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Vojislav Koštunica was to make a U turn, that is to reverse the course of<br />
educational re<strong>for</strong>m. However, under pressure of part of public op<strong>in</strong>ion, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations, Kostunca-led government was <strong>for</strong>ced to re-embark<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
upon the orig<strong>in</strong>al re<strong>for</strong>m course. In those terms the a<strong>for</strong>mentioned textbooks<br />
were recommended by the Serb Education M<strong>in</strong>istry.<br />
On pages of Belgrade weekly NIN there was <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g polemic<br />
related to recent publish<strong>in</strong>g of four historical textbooks (the Ottom<strong>an</strong> Empire,<br />
Nations <strong>an</strong>d States <strong>in</strong> South East Europe, the Balk<strong>an</strong>s Wars, WW2), by<br />
"Prosvetni pregled" <strong>an</strong>d Thessaloniki-based Centre <strong>for</strong> Democracy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Reconciliation. Namely that project was supported <strong>an</strong>d funded by Council of<br />
Europe, Stability Pact, <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions, while those<br />
textbooks were backed <strong>an</strong>d approved <strong>for</strong> use by the Serb Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry. Those textbooks resulted from m<strong>an</strong>y-year work of 60 histori<strong>an</strong>s from<br />
11 countries of South East Europe. Textbooks are based on historical<br />
documents believed to most accurately present the Balk<strong>an</strong>s history. Editors of<br />
those textbooks also published collections of their historical sources. Tha<br />
publish<strong>in</strong>g venture <strong>an</strong>d notably free use of those textbooks was harshly<br />
criticized by Kosta Nikolić <strong>an</strong>d Suz<strong>an</strong>a Rajić, authors of the new history<br />
textbook <strong>for</strong> the 8th grade.<br />
Dubravka Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, who collaborated on the project, thus qualified<br />
the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned criticism "the big problem is the fact that the<br />
a<strong>for</strong>ementioned authors failed to follow development of <strong>in</strong>ternational history<br />
after the 30's of the 20th century, <strong>an</strong>d consequently ignored the existence of the<br />
key debate, the one on the historical truth." She added: "The idea of the one<br />
<strong>an</strong>d only truth is the basis of every authoritari<strong>an</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>an</strong>d totalitari<strong>an</strong><br />
order, <strong>an</strong>d hence the only scientific solution to that problem are multioutlooks,<br />
that is the way <strong>in</strong> which, without <strong>an</strong>y comments, are equally<br />
represented views of <strong>in</strong>terested parties. Such a multi-outlook solution paves<br />
the way <strong>for</strong> a dialogue." Dubravka Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović also po<strong>in</strong>ted out that objections<br />
to the project are reduced to count<strong>in</strong>g of Serbs, Serb sources, Serb data, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
comparisons between the space given to Serb <strong>an</strong>d other sources." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
histori<strong>an</strong> Stoj<strong>an</strong>ovic the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g is "a typical ethno-centric response to a<br />
comparative scientific tack, <strong>for</strong> the basic goal of that task is comparison, which<br />
by def<strong>in</strong>ition, limits the work of all those who see all the complex past <strong>an</strong>d<br />
present realities only through their lenses." 64<br />
Re<strong>in</strong>terpretation of Anti-Fascism<br />
Rituals of memory represent a position on the past <strong>an</strong>d on the basic<br />
values which help commemorate it. Anti-Fascism is a basic civilized value on<br />
which the present-day Europe rests. Serbia has excluded itself from the<br />
coalition of <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascist countries. At play is not only sidel<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the Partis<strong>an</strong><br />
Movement, the only prime mover of <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascism <strong>in</strong> the territory of <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia, but also a historical doctor<strong>in</strong>g of the role of Chetniks <strong>in</strong> WW2.<br />
64 Dubravka Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, To Disarm History, NIN, 22 December, pages 44-45<br />
56<br />
57
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Partis<strong>an</strong>s themselves, that is, the m<strong>in</strong>ders of the Partis<strong>an</strong> tradition, or those<br />
who perceived themselves or presented themselves as such (largely rallied<br />
round Slobod<strong>an</strong> Miločević <strong>an</strong>d his Socialists) identified themselves with the<br />
goal of Ravna Gora movement <strong>in</strong> the 90's. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g is best proved by the<br />
fact that Serbia failed to send <strong>an</strong> official delegation to the May commemoration<br />
of victims of Holocaust on the occasion of the 60 <strong>an</strong>niversary of victory over<br />
Fascism <strong>in</strong> Auschwitz. That attitude of Serbia towards <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascism was<br />
noticed by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, <strong>for</strong> Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> delegation<br />
was not <strong>in</strong>vitited to the ma<strong>in</strong> celebration of victory over Fascism celebrated <strong>in</strong><br />
Moscow. Mark<strong>in</strong>g of that 6oth <strong>an</strong>niversary <strong>in</strong> Moscow was particularly<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t because of nationalization of <strong>an</strong>ti-Fascism <strong>in</strong> nearly all post-<br />
Communist countries. The fact that <strong>in</strong> Moscow gathered all the world leaders<br />
was purported to symbolize the end of equalization between Nazism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Stal<strong>in</strong>ism. That gesture did not aim at lessen<strong>in</strong>g the improt<strong>an</strong>ce of victims of<br />
Stal<strong>in</strong>ism, that is, Communism, but <strong>in</strong> fact prevented the confusion over the<br />
policy of memory which underwent a total makeover after the collapse of<br />
Communism.<br />
Polititical elite <strong>in</strong> various ways marked the Victory Day, 9 May 2005 <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia. Vojislav Koštunica laid the wreath on the monument to Air Force<br />
members-defenders of Belgrade <strong>in</strong> the 1941 April war. He avoided to pay<br />
tribute to Partis<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Chetnics, <strong>an</strong>d chose <strong>in</strong>stead the Royal pilots. The <strong>state</strong>backed<br />
celebrations were held <strong>for</strong> the first time on 13 May at Ravna Gora.<br />
Foreign Secretary Vuk Drašković there commemorated the WW2 events <strong>an</strong>d<br />
thus sided the government <strong>an</strong>d parliament with the side defeated <strong>in</strong> WW2.<br />
Only several months earlier (December 2004) Serb Parliament with <strong>an</strong><br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority adopted the law which equalized the WW2 role of<br />
Partis<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Chetniks. On that occasion MPs of Socialist Party of Serbia,<br />
Social-democratic Union <strong>an</strong>d the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia abasta<strong>in</strong>ed from<br />
vot<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Additional confusion was made by the decision of the US government<br />
to award medals to the Nazi collaborators. Namely, the US delegation of war<br />
veter<strong>an</strong>s posthumously awarded with the Order of Merit the Serb general<br />
Dragoljub Draža Mihailovic, the leader of the Chetnic movement. That medal<br />
was first awarded to Mihailović <strong>in</strong> 1948, two years after his execution. That US<br />
move was met with <strong>an</strong>imosity <strong>in</strong> the region, notably <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, Croatia, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo. But <strong>in</strong> fact pragmatic Americ<strong>an</strong>s through that gesture sought to back<br />
the Foreign Secretary Vuk Drašković <strong>in</strong> his genu<strong>in</strong>e ef<strong>for</strong>ts to improve<br />
relations with the West. However, the fact to which all neighbours responded,<br />
namely that Draža Mihailović, like Vuk Drašković, represented symbols of a<br />
genocide-m<strong>in</strong>ded Greater Serbia project which caused great suffer<strong>in</strong>g both <strong>in</strong><br />
1941 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> 1991, should not be overlooked.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Dubravka Stoj<strong>an</strong>ovic, the need to re-def<strong>in</strong>e the whole<br />
past: the 90’s wars, Socialist Yugoslavia, WW2, K<strong>in</strong>gdom of Yugoslavia,<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
emergence of Yugoslavia, WW1, "golden age of the Serb democracy <strong>in</strong> 1903-<br />
1914 period, the 19 th century, the Turkish dom<strong>in</strong>ation, the <strong>state</strong> of Nem<strong>an</strong>jici,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates that "play<strong>in</strong>g with history" <strong>an</strong>d "non-resolution of <strong>an</strong>y salient issue"<br />
poses a great threat to society, which was stripped of all directions. Such a<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ce "leaves room <strong>for</strong> imposition of ideology which is at the same time both<br />
the far right- <strong>an</strong>d the far left-w<strong>in</strong>g one, <strong>an</strong>d which is <strong>in</strong> all respects contrary to<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d values on which the successful part of contemporary world rests." 65<br />
War Crimes Trials Be<strong>for</strong>e National Courts<br />
Trials <strong>for</strong> war crimes be<strong>for</strong>e national courts also vividly reflect the<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ce of the <strong>state</strong> on recent past. What characterizes those trials are the<br />
prosecution attempts to neutralize or obliterate <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>volvement of the <strong>state</strong> of<br />
Serbia, Yugoslav People’s Army <strong>an</strong>d police <strong>in</strong> crimes that had been committed.<br />
Prosecution is try<strong>in</strong>g to downsize thos crimes to "<strong>in</strong>cidents" committed by<br />
"isolated groups" that is paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mations. In that way the <strong>state</strong> is try<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to defend the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia from genocide- <strong>an</strong>d aggression-related charges<br />
<strong>an</strong>d accusations <strong>an</strong>d payment of compensatory war damage to Croatia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. In those terms co-operation with the Hague Tribunal,<br />
notably as regards military documentation, was conditioned by the <strong>state</strong><br />
strategy to avoid aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide qualification by the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
courts of justice <strong>in</strong> the Hague. Attempt to reach <strong>an</strong> out-of-court settlement with<br />
Bosnia failed, despite brokerage of some EU countries. 66 Defense be<strong>for</strong>e that<br />
court is one of the priorities of <strong>for</strong>eign policy of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. Serbia<br />
has already primed its witnesses <strong>an</strong>d tasked them with improv<strong>in</strong>g its image,<br />
notably the one which concerns its position on m<strong>in</strong>orities, notably Muslims.<br />
One of the witnesses shall be the Belgrade mufti effendi Hamdija Judufspahić.<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the import<strong>an</strong>ce of the right process<strong>in</strong>g of the past <strong>for</strong><br />
the future of Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>in</strong>to Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations, <strong>an</strong>d notably<br />
its relations with its neighbours, the follow<strong>in</strong>g conclusions c<strong>an</strong> be derived:<br />
65 Dubravka Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, Defeated Future, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter, issue 83-84, May-<br />
June 2005.<br />
66 Daily Politika of 18 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006 carries <strong>in</strong> text <strong>in</strong> which the <strong>in</strong>ternational law<br />
professor Frencis Boyle (legal representative of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
International Court of Justice) ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that “much pressure is brought to bear on the<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> authorities to drop their charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia be<strong>for</strong>e that court”. He goes on to<br />
note “not a s<strong>in</strong>gle big power w<strong>an</strong>ts that trial, (though the first hear<strong>in</strong>g is scheduled <strong>for</strong><br />
27 February). The US, UN, EU, <strong>an</strong>d even Holbrooke himself over a year ago piled<br />
enormous pressure on the Bosni<strong>an</strong> authorities to renounce evidence presentation”.<br />
58<br />
59
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
• Absence of political will of political <strong>an</strong>d cultural elites to<br />
responsibly tackle the process<strong>in</strong>g of the past to a large extent obstructs the<br />
open<strong>in</strong>g of Europe<strong>an</strong> prospects <strong>for</strong> Serbia;<br />
• Orientation to relativize responsibility <strong>for</strong> recent wars is also a<br />
hurdle on the road of normalization of regional relations;<br />
• The a<strong>for</strong>ementioned st<strong>an</strong>d constitutes <strong>an</strong> additional element <strong>in</strong><br />
clos<strong>in</strong>g up of the Serb society <strong>an</strong>d its total accept<strong>an</strong>ce of autistic <strong>an</strong>d retrograde<br />
set of values;<br />
• Issue of punishability is one of the key issues on which h<strong>in</strong>ges<br />
establishment of the legal framework <strong>an</strong>d legal system <strong>in</strong> Serbia;<br />
• "Commercialization" of relations with the Hague Tribunal (as<br />
<strong>for</strong>m of co-operation) is lethal <strong>for</strong> public op<strong>in</strong>ion, <strong>for</strong> it is t<strong>an</strong>tamount to<br />
miss<strong>in</strong>g out on <strong>an</strong> opportunity to establish a morally vertical system through<br />
expl<strong>an</strong>ation of background, contest <strong>an</strong>d responsibility of Milosevic regime;<br />
• Such a position on the ICTY is <strong>in</strong> its gist t<strong>an</strong>tamount to the policy<br />
of non-break with the previous regime, while through "commercialization" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
"damage control" attempts are made to relieve the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions from the war crimes <strong>an</strong>d genocide <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> recommends to the <strong>in</strong>ternational community:<br />
• To keep pil<strong>in</strong>g pressure on the Serb authorities to make them<br />
tackle <strong>in</strong> the right way the process<strong>in</strong>g of the past;<br />
• To assist <strong>in</strong> the right way the resolution of the Bosni<strong>an</strong> aggression<br />
<strong>an</strong>d genocide charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>in</strong> the International Court of Justice, <strong>for</strong><br />
without the right <strong>in</strong>terpretation of 1991-1999 wars <strong>in</strong> the territory of<br />
Yugoslavia, the right prerequisities <strong>for</strong> the regional normalization shall not be<br />
created;<br />
• To help <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> adequate way parts of the civili<strong>an</strong> society which<br />
deals with the fac<strong>in</strong>g process, <strong>in</strong> view of the ongo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d virulent vilification<br />
campaign mounted aga<strong>in</strong>st them;<br />
• To exert <strong>in</strong>fluence on the media (notably Radio Television Serbia,<br />
as <strong>an</strong> allegedly public service) to more adequately <strong>an</strong>d extensively cover the<br />
ICTY work;<br />
• To assist the professional researchers of the past, <strong>for</strong><br />
contemporary values may be unheld only through the right <strong>in</strong>terpretation of<br />
recent history;<br />
• To exert <strong>in</strong>fluence on the more liberal part of elite to <strong>for</strong>mulate<br />
such a policy of memory which would enable the Serb society, notably the<br />
young ones to take, that is, to embrace a critical tack to the responsibility of the<br />
<strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>for</strong> recent wars.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
SERBIA AND THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL:<br />
A HALFWAY COOPERATION<br />
Despite numerous promises by the Serb highest officials given dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
every s<strong>in</strong>gle meet<strong>in</strong>g with representatives of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d<br />
of the ICTY <strong>in</strong> 2005 that general Ratko Mladić would be h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the<br />
Hague Tribunal, those promises never materialized. General Ratko Maldić<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicted by the Hague Tribunal <strong>for</strong> the genocide of Muslims <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d<br />
also <strong>for</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g of about 10,000 denizens of Sarajevo dur<strong>in</strong>g the city's siege, is<br />
still at large. After death of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic <strong>an</strong>d a susbsequent, virulent,<br />
<strong>an</strong>ti-ICTY campaign mounted by the media with a view to even more discredit<br />
the Hague Tribunal, new delays <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of arrest of Ratko Mladic<br />
may be expected. Aside from Mladic, Serbia "owes" to the Hague Tribunal the<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d-over of about 10 war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees.<br />
By d<strong>in</strong>t of the <strong>for</strong>mula of so-called voluntary surrender of the Hague<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictees, devised by the Kostunica-led government <strong>in</strong> September 2004 (<strong>in</strong> the<br />
wake of decision of official Wash<strong>in</strong>gton to impose on Serbia so-called "soft<br />
s<strong>an</strong>ctions" because of the latter's non-cooperation with the Hague Tribunal) <strong>for</strong><br />
the sake of preservation of a coalition majority <strong>in</strong> parliament <strong>an</strong>d the image of<br />
reservations towards the Hague Tribunal, 17 war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees were sent to<br />
Scheven<strong>in</strong>gen <strong>in</strong> September 2004-April 2005 period. S<strong>in</strong>ce April 2005 not a<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictee has been h<strong>an</strong>ded over.<br />
Both the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d coalition partners were then<br />
pleased with the government's per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce: the Hague Tribunal commended<br />
Serbia <strong>for</strong> its co-operation, <strong>in</strong> late March Brussels approved the Serb Feasibility<br />
Study, <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Party of the Hague war crime <strong>in</strong>dictee S. Milosevic<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uned to back the government. SPS official Ivica Dačić confirmed that his<br />
party "was <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple aga<strong>in</strong>st arrests <strong>an</strong>d h<strong>an</strong>d-overs to the Hague Tribunal",<br />
but that "Kostunica's m<strong>an</strong>ner of voluntary surrender was correct both <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals". 1<br />
1 Kurir, 19-20 March 2005.<br />
60<br />
61
"Voluntary" Surrenders<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Procedure of voluntary surrender perhaps <strong>in</strong> the best way illustrated<br />
the position of the Serb authorities on responsibility <strong>for</strong> the war crimes, <strong>an</strong>d on<br />
the Hague Tribunal too. Be<strong>for</strong>e the TV cameras <strong>in</strong>dictees were received by the<br />
highest officials of the government of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d even by the Serb Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister proper, along with voiced assessments that "surrender was a patriotic,<br />
highly moral <strong>an</strong>d honest act" 2 (Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković on decision of<br />
Radivoje Miletiće to surrender himself voluntarily to the Hague Tribunal).<br />
Miletić, <strong>an</strong> officer of the Army of Republika Srpska, is charged with<br />
persecution <strong>an</strong>d kill<strong>in</strong>g of Muslim civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d Žepa.<br />
Be<strong>for</strong>e their h<strong>an</strong>d-overs high officers from Republika Srpska (Bosnia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a) <strong>an</strong>d Serbia were frequently received by Patriarch Pavle. TV<br />
cameras covered the departure of the war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees-escorted by the Serb<br />
high officials, the Serb govenrment m<strong>in</strong>isters- <strong>for</strong> the Hague. Charges or<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictments aga<strong>in</strong>st them have never been mentioned. They were sent away as<br />
national heroes, sacrific<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the good of Serbia, that is, its <strong>in</strong>itiation of the<br />
process of accession to EU <strong>an</strong>d Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace. Charges aga<strong>in</strong>st them<br />
<strong>an</strong>d their responsibility <strong>for</strong> crimes committed <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia are still<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g hushed up <strong>in</strong> Serbia. This official calculat<strong>in</strong>g policy towards the Hague<br />
Tribunal is characterized by the two ma<strong>in</strong> elements: political elite <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectuals close to them underscore the obligation of the <strong>state</strong> towards the<br />
ICTY, but at the same time espouse their st<strong>an</strong>d that the Hague Tribunal stages<br />
political trials.<br />
On the first <strong>an</strong>niversary of his government Vojislav Koštunica <strong>for</strong> the<br />
first time publicly expressed read<strong>in</strong>ess of his government "to h<strong>an</strong>d over to the<br />
Hague Tribunal the most w<strong>an</strong>ted <strong>in</strong>dictees <strong>for</strong> war crimes, Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Ratko Mladić" <strong>an</strong>d added that "all persons on the Hague Tribunal list of<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictees shall be extradited." He suggested that „some could surrender by late<br />
March, at the time of the EU decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g process on the feasibility study." 3<br />
In J<strong>an</strong>uary-April 2005, the arrests of the four police <strong>an</strong>d military<br />
generals –<strong>in</strong>dicted <strong>in</strong> October 2003-that is, Nebojiša Pavković, Sreten Lukić,<br />
Vlastimir Djordjević <strong>an</strong>d Vladimir Lazarević-were <strong>in</strong> the spotlight. Vladimir<br />
Lazarević was the first h<strong>an</strong>d-over case <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005. He was sent away with<br />
all the possible honours, compliments <strong>an</strong>d his family was even given a car by<br />
the Serb M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Capital Investments, Velimir Ilic. In a secret <strong>in</strong>dictment<br />
dated 25 September 2002 (made public <strong>in</strong> October 2003) the four generals were<br />
accused of "pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>stigat<strong>in</strong>g, order<strong>in</strong>g or committ<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y other way<br />
assist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d back<strong>in</strong>g commission of crimes <strong>in</strong> Kosovo". They were also<br />
charged with a <strong>for</strong>cible relocation <strong>an</strong>d deportation of 800,000 Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
2 Politika, 1 March 2005.<br />
3Interview to "F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Times", as carried by D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 March 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
civili<strong>an</strong>s, kill<strong>in</strong>gs of hundreds of Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> civili<strong>an</strong>s committed by the armed<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces of the FRY <strong>an</strong>d Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d sexual harassment <strong>an</strong>d rape of Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
women.<br />
After months-long negotiations, hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d threats "I shall not go<br />
alive to the Hague" 4 <strong>an</strong>d the issue of arrest warr<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> him not on grounds of<br />
the ICTY <strong>in</strong>dictment, but rather on grounds of his no-show at the trial relat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to attempted assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Vuk Draskovic <strong>in</strong> Budva, General Pavkovic was<br />
the last <strong>in</strong>dictee to be sent to the Hague, on 25 April, <strong>an</strong>d on that trip he was<br />
escroted by M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Lončar, two lawyers, <strong>an</strong>d a doctor from the<br />
Military Academy Hospital. Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters of EU conditioned<br />
greenlight<strong>in</strong>g of the feasibility study with Pavkovic's h<strong>an</strong>d-over.<br />
General Djordjević is still at large, he is allegedly hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Russia. For<br />
the rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d opposition parties the most controversial –<strong>in</strong> terms of<br />
honour<strong>in</strong>g the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of voluntary surrender-was the h<strong>an</strong>d-over of the<br />
retired police general Sreten Lukić on April 4.<br />
Although his departure was qualified as "a special mode of voluntary<br />
surrender", Lukić, on the day of his release from the hospital (he had been<br />
subjected to a surgical <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the Military Hospital) <strong>in</strong> the hospital<br />
pyjams was taken to the Hague. Contrary to other "patriots", <strong>an</strong>d the medialauded<br />
"heroes with high moral st<strong>an</strong>dards", <strong>an</strong>d "honourable men" no Serb<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister escorted Lukić to the Hague that time around. He was not even<br />
received by Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Koštunica "<strong>an</strong>d he was not publicly given money<br />
or a car probably because of his <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the Sword action". 5<br />
Commentaror of daily Politike Lj.Stojad<strong>in</strong>ović (a <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslav People's<br />
Army officer) <strong>in</strong> the text "Plastic Medal" ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "In Serbia there are no<br />
longer <strong>for</strong>ces which could be termed as the <strong>an</strong>ti-Hague lobby. Serbia has only<br />
one choice now. But it is not sure that fulfilment of our obligations shall make<br />
our lives better. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d failure to meet our obligations would only<br />
make our life worse. Resist<strong>an</strong>ce towards the Hague is reduced to folkloric<br />
elements <strong>an</strong>d the last vari<strong>an</strong>ts of Serb, hajduk-style <strong>in</strong>surgency. " 6 .<br />
H<strong>an</strong>d-over of Sreten Lukić, <strong>for</strong>mer comm<strong>an</strong>der of police chief of staff<br />
<strong>in</strong> Kosovo, <strong>an</strong>d after the 5-October ch<strong>an</strong>geover, a high police official <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
frontm<strong>an</strong> of action "Sword", prompted m<strong>an</strong>y negative <strong>an</strong>d stormy responses of<br />
Serb politici<strong>an</strong>s. That case also prompted the Serb Radical Party, the stiffest<br />
opponent of co-operation with the ICTY, to call on resignation of government<br />
of Serbia "because it has trampled upon its promise on a voluntary surrender<br />
of the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees". 7 An expl<strong>an</strong>ation about conditions of Lukic's surrender<br />
was also dem<strong>an</strong>ded by President of Serbia, Boris Tadić. He also dem<strong>an</strong>ded that<br />
4 D<strong>an</strong>as, 26. April 2005.<br />
5 Politika, 8 April 2005.<br />
6 Politika, 8 April 2005<br />
7 D<strong>an</strong>as, 9-10 April 2005.<br />
62<br />
63
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the ICTY "guar<strong>an</strong>tees to Lukić a medical treatment <strong>an</strong>d to take <strong>in</strong>to<br />
consideration his conditional release until the start-up of his trial." 8 Former<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia, Zor<strong>an</strong> Živković, took a very clear-cut position: "If<br />
Lukić was <strong>for</strong>cibly taken to the Hague, the government violated its own<br />
concept of voluntary surrender." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Zivkovic, Lukić be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d after<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Dj<strong>in</strong>jdic, was "<strong>an</strong> honourable officer, which is a<br />
rare case among the police <strong>for</strong>ces." Socialist Party of Serbia, a coalition partner,<br />
accused the government of abduction <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>cible h<strong>an</strong>d-over of Lukic. That<br />
party also cautioned its coalition partners <strong>in</strong> the government aga<strong>in</strong>st "<strong>an</strong>y<br />
future <strong>for</strong>cible h<strong>an</strong>d-overs to the ICTY...Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević is the most<br />
prom<strong>in</strong>ent fighter aga<strong>in</strong>st the Hague violence. His party would never allow<br />
<strong>an</strong>y citizen to be h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the ICTY <strong>in</strong> breach of constitution <strong>an</strong>d<br />
justice." 9<br />
Political m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of the Lukic case by both the rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
opposition parties brought about once aga<strong>in</strong> sidel<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of co-operation with<br />
the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d responsibility <strong>for</strong> the war crimes. After h<strong>an</strong>d-over of<br />
General Lukic, the threat of Socialists subsided <strong>an</strong>d they cont<strong>in</strong>ued to back the<br />
government.<br />
Serb Radical Party as the strongest party <strong>in</strong> the Serb parliament, every<br />
now <strong>an</strong>d then fuelled the <strong>an</strong>ti-Hague campaign. At a scientific rally on "alleged<br />
evidence aga<strong>in</strong>st the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictee, Vojislav Seselj," Professor of the Belgrade<br />
Law Faculty, Kosta Cavoski, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that Šešelj was the victim of <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
rather th<strong>an</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ternational policy :"Hague prosecution team only met the<br />
wishes of the DOS officials no longer will<strong>in</strong>g to tolerate Šešelj." Writer Br<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Crnčević, who like Čavoški, is a regular guest at the Radical Party-staged<br />
p<strong>an</strong>el-discussions <strong>an</strong>d meet<strong>in</strong>gs, assessed that "the Hague Tribunal is only a<br />
small element of the crim<strong>in</strong>al venture called globalization" that „Serbs, as a<br />
result of the Hague Tribunal operations, are be<strong>in</strong>g compelled to accept national<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>security</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ationality" 10 .<br />
The next meet<strong>in</strong>g with a similar topic "Forg<strong>in</strong>g of general, historical<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces as a mode of operation of the Hague Tribunal, notably as<br />
regards <strong>in</strong>dictment aga<strong>in</strong>st Vojislav Šešelj" was held by the Radical Party <strong>in</strong><br />
early November.<br />
Tomislav Nikolić, Vice President of the Serb Radical Party, then<br />
accused the Hague Tribunal of creat<strong>in</strong>g a virtual past, by its doctor<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
historical facts, <strong>in</strong> order to crreate the image of Serbs as crim<strong>in</strong>als. He also<br />
stressed that : "To ch<strong>an</strong>ge the truth, to amend the books or write the new ones,<br />
to erase the Serb victims, <strong>an</strong>d conv<strong>in</strong>ce Serbs proper, <strong>in</strong> addition to the rest of<br />
the world, that th<strong>in</strong>gs happened that way, <strong>an</strong>d that we are all crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>an</strong>d<br />
8 Glas javnosti, 5 April 2005.<br />
9 Večernje novosti, 31 March 2005.<br />
10 Večernje novosti, 30 May 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
murderers, - that is the ma<strong>in</strong> task of the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d his media<br />
stooges." 11<br />
At the time of the Radical Party rally <strong>in</strong> Save Centre, members of<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization "Sloboda" staged a sign<strong>in</strong>g of petition dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g the Serb<br />
parliament to pass a Resolution on Suspension of the ICTY proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
S. Milosevic on grounds of his medial treatment <strong>in</strong> the country <strong>an</strong>d provision<br />
of necessary <strong>state</strong> guar<strong>an</strong>tees thereof." 12<br />
Disclosure of the video record<strong>in</strong>g of kill<strong>in</strong>g of Muslims <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica,<br />
<strong>in</strong> July 1995, only momentarily contributed to the fac<strong>in</strong>g of the Serb public with<br />
the crime committed by members of the reserve unit of Serb police, Škorpioni.<br />
ICTY prosecution team on 1 June <strong>for</strong> the first time screened that film dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Milosevic trial. Then that record<strong>in</strong>g was, albeit selectively, aired by<br />
domestic electronic media. President of the Fund <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law,<br />
Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić, expla<strong>in</strong>ed that "the film was made on mounta<strong>in</strong> Treskavica<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the Srebrenica crime. Killed men were civili<strong>an</strong>s from Srebrenica. The<br />
crime was committed by members of Škorpioni <strong>an</strong>d their comm<strong>an</strong>der was<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Medić" 13 . Part of that unit was also responsible <strong>for</strong> the massacre of<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Podujevo, <strong>in</strong> 1999.<br />
Declaration on Srebrenica, prepared by 8 NGOs, dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g the Serb<br />
parliament to take a clear st<strong>an</strong>d on that crime, was not well-received. Most<br />
MPs <strong>state</strong>d that they were "shocked <strong>an</strong>d repulsed by the video record<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
execution, but we th<strong>in</strong>k that culprits should be punished <strong>in</strong>dividually, <strong>in</strong>stead<br />
of blam<strong>in</strong>g the whole people." 14 MPs of the rul<strong>in</strong>g Democratic Party of Serbia<br />
justified the rejection of declaration by the ongo<strong>in</strong>g trial aga<strong>in</strong>st Škorpioni. Their<br />
coalition partners from the Socialist Party of Serbia, cautioned that "a<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ction must be made between crimes, <strong>an</strong>d crimes committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
war by direct executioners".<br />
The Serb media tasked with so-called protection of Serbhood, notably<br />
daily Nacional, which keeps espous<strong>in</strong>g the thesis of "Western ef<strong>for</strong>ts to impose<br />
collective guilt on Serbs <strong>for</strong> genocide committed <strong>in</strong> wars <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia,", assessed the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned record<strong>in</strong>g of execution of Muslims,<br />
some of whom were underage, as <strong>an</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>t "to br<strong>in</strong>g pressure to bear on the<br />
general public <strong>in</strong> Serbia to accept Republika Srpska as a genocidal creation,<br />
which as such should cease to exist" <strong>an</strong>d "it should be said loud <strong>an</strong>d clear that<br />
there was no genocide <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica". 15<br />
After the Hague screen<strong>in</strong>g of that he<strong>in</strong>ous crime committed by<br />
Škorpioni, the Serb police arrested the eight perpetrators of that crime. A special<br />
department <strong>for</strong> war crimes of the District Court <strong>in</strong> Belgrade immediately<br />
11 Politika, 11 November 2005.<br />
12 Ibid.<br />
13 D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 June 2005.<br />
14 Ibid.<br />
15 Milov<strong>an</strong> Drecun, Nacional, 10 June 2005.<br />
64<br />
65
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituted pre-trial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>for</strong> the Srebrenica crime, <strong>an</strong>d brought charges<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the Škorpioni members. Circumst<strong>an</strong>cial evidence <strong>in</strong> the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs is<br />
the two-hour long film on liquidation of the Muslim prisoners. 16<br />
On that occasion Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Koštunica took a very clear-cut st<strong>an</strong>d:<br />
"This is a brutal, shameful <strong>an</strong>d heartless crime committed aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
civili<strong>an</strong>s". 17 Dur<strong>in</strong>g her visit to Belgrade, Carla del Ponte, th<strong>an</strong>ked the Serb<br />
authorities on their swift response to the film shown <strong>in</strong> the Hague Tribunal,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d assessed the arrest of perpetrators of that crime "as a brilli<strong>an</strong>t action" 18<br />
False Promises<br />
In meet<strong>in</strong>g obligations towards the Hague Tribunal, the <strong>in</strong>cumbent<br />
Serb authorities have take a tw<strong>in</strong>-track approach: they are send<strong>in</strong>g optimistic<br />
messages to the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, that is, claim<strong>in</strong>g that Serbia is ready<br />
<strong>for</strong> full co-operation with the ICTY, which <strong>in</strong>cludes all the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g h<strong>an</strong>dovers<br />
of the war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the territory of Serbia. Internally the<br />
authorities are promis<strong>in</strong>g ample assit<strong>an</strong>ce to all those who decide to<br />
voluntarily surrender, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial assist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d guar<strong>an</strong>tees of the<br />
<strong>state</strong> relat<strong>in</strong>g to the possible, pre-trial release of the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees. Thus the<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>t media trumpeted on their front-pages the temporary release of the four<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictees, namely General Vladimir Lazarević ( released only two months after<br />
his departure <strong>for</strong> the Hague), Nikola Ša<strong>in</strong>ović, Mil<strong>an</strong> Milut<strong>in</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d General<br />
Dragoljub Ojd<strong>an</strong>ić <strong>an</strong>d their reception at the Belgrade airport. The government<br />
made good use of their return to the country. Head of the government's Media<br />
Bureau, Srdj<strong>an</strong> Djurić, <strong>state</strong>d that the ICTY's decision was a confirmation of the<br />
government's credibility: "The word given by our <strong>state</strong> is respected, <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
release-related decision is a major result <strong>in</strong> co-operation of our <strong>state</strong> with the<br />
Hague Tribunal.". 19<br />
For the assist<strong>an</strong>ce to families of war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees (last year there<br />
were 32 of them <strong>in</strong> the Hague) the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia <strong>in</strong> 2005 earmarked 15 million<br />
d<strong>in</strong>ars. Every family gets 200 Euro every month-<strong>an</strong>d that is <strong>an</strong> average salary<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia-every two months three air tickets <strong>for</strong> the Hague, <strong>an</strong>d 250 Euro go to<br />
every family member travell<strong>in</strong>g to the Dutch capital. On that list are <strong>for</strong><br />
example families of N. Sa<strong>in</strong>ovic, M. Milut<strong>in</strong>ovic, V. Seselj.<br />
After a year-long stalemate, the government's strategy of "voluntary<br />
surrender" <strong>in</strong> 2005 yielded certa<strong>in</strong> results: 17 <strong>in</strong>dictees were sent to the Hague.<br />
Such a pro-active or agile st<strong>an</strong>ce of the Serb government resulted primarily<br />
from a strong pressure of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community. A highly-troubled<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d-over of General Pavkovic to the Hague was directly l<strong>in</strong>ked to<br />
greenlight<strong>in</strong>g of the Feasibility Study. Added to that the rest of the w<strong>an</strong>ted<br />
documents was submitted <strong>an</strong>d witnesses were exempted from <strong>state</strong> secret<br />
confidentiality pr<strong>in</strong>ciple only after the threat by Carla del Ponte that <strong>in</strong> her<br />
regular June -13th June-report to the UN Security Council- she would caution<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia's <strong>in</strong>sufficient co-operation with the Hague.<br />
Prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal, Carla del Ponte <strong>in</strong> 2005 visited<br />
Belgrade twice. In early June she told Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia, Koštunica,<br />
President of the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Marović, Foreign<br />
Secretary of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Drašković <strong>an</strong>d President of the National<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Co-operation <strong>for</strong> the Hague Tribunal, Ljajić, that despite some<br />
progress <strong>in</strong> co-operation the ICTY was still wait<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the h<strong>an</strong>d-over of Mladić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Karadžić: "The future <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> prospects of the <strong>state</strong> union directly<br />
depend on the arrest of General Mladić.". 20 International community<br />
nonetheless expected Mladic’s h<strong>an</strong>d-over be<strong>for</strong>e the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of<br />
Srebrenica massacre <strong>an</strong>d sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Dayton Accord. Head of the Dutch<br />
diplomacy, Bernard Bot also rem<strong>in</strong>ded Belgrade that "the message relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
co-operation with the Hague is very clear, but it must be clear to citizens of<br />
Serbia too." 21<br />
Under <strong>in</strong>ternational community's pressure Vojislav Koštunica also<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>ded the general public of results of co-operation with the Hague<br />
Tribunal, that is, voluntary surrenders, <strong>an</strong>d temporary, pre-trial releases, along<br />
with the follow<strong>in</strong>g claim: "I would be even happier if committments towards<br />
the Hague Tribunal were met earlier, but we shall strive to fulfil them quickly,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d by stick<strong>in</strong>g to our proven method or tack. ". 22 That implies the Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister is still aga<strong>in</strong>st the arrest of the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees. Perhaps a year-long<br />
lack of extraditions is due to lack of c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>for</strong> voluntary surrender.<br />
After a meet<strong>in</strong>g with Carla del Ponte, Foreign Secretary, Vuk<br />
Drašković, <strong>state</strong>d that "the h<strong>an</strong>d-over of the <strong>in</strong>dictees is the topmost national<br />
obligation", but added that "the public <strong>an</strong>d media <strong>state</strong>ments <strong>in</strong> defence of<br />
crimes <strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>als also constitute –a crime". Carla del Ponte reiterated that<br />
"added to non-extradition of 16 war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees" "Mladić is the biggest<br />
hurdle <strong>in</strong> co-operation between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the ICTY" <strong>an</strong>d "this is my last visit<br />
to Belgrade with this motivation". 23 Del Ponte rem<strong>in</strong>ded the Serb officials that<br />
the ICTY expected to see General Mladic <strong>in</strong> the dock on 11 July, on the 10th<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica crime:" I also told Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Koštunica that<br />
Mladic should be <strong>in</strong> the Hague by the 10th <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Dayton Accord,<br />
<strong>in</strong> the month of November." After talks with the ICTY Prosecutor, Prime<br />
16 Politika, 2 June 2005.<br />
17 Blic, 3 June 2005.<br />
18 Blic, 3 June 2005.<br />
19 D<strong>an</strong>as, 14 April 2005.<br />
20 Večernje novosti, 3 June 2005.<br />
21 D<strong>an</strong>as, 15. July 2005, Bota- Drašković meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Belgrade<br />
22 Večernje novosti, 3 June 2005.<br />
23 Politika, 30 September 2005.<br />
66<br />
67
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica <strong>state</strong>d: "Co-operation with the Hague is of vital <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>for</strong><br />
our country" <strong>an</strong>d "We are aware that the said co-operation should be fully<br />
honoured <strong>an</strong>d broughh to a close." 24<br />
With the same motive, m<strong>an</strong>y other representatives of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community visited Belgrade, notably the ICTY's President, Teodor Meron. He<br />
also urged President B. Tadić, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister V. Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d the Justice<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister, Z. Stojković to h<strong>an</strong>d over the war crime <strong>in</strong>dictee, Mladić, <strong>for</strong> as he has<br />
put it, "the court shall close its doors only after h<strong>an</strong>d-overs of Mladić, Karadžić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Gotov<strong>in</strong>a". 25 The Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sufficient co-operation with Serbia<br />
was the topic of talks between M<strong>in</strong>ister Ljajic <strong>an</strong>d Delegation of <strong>Committee</strong> of<br />
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe. The <strong>for</strong>mer tried to give<br />
assur<strong>an</strong>ces to his guests that <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro there existed a political<br />
will <strong>an</strong>d read<strong>in</strong>ess to meet the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g obligations towards the Hague<br />
Tribunal. 26<br />
Council of Europe also warned aga<strong>in</strong>st non-fulfilment of Serbia's<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational obligations. In its seventh report <strong>for</strong> period December 2004 –<br />
Febuary 2005, Council of Europe recommended to the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro to promote its co-operation with the Hague Tribubnal,<br />
notably as regarded the arrest of war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees. The said report also<br />
underscored "dur<strong>in</strong>g the whole observed period there were no encourag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
signs <strong>in</strong> this co-operation, <strong>in</strong> terms of surrender or h<strong>an</strong>d-over". 27<br />
The <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro is yet to meet obligation<br />
stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the 2004 Council of Europe EU decision on freez<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
accounts <strong>an</strong>d property of the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees. Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced the possibility of possible freez<strong>in</strong>g of property of Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees<br />
<strong>in</strong> early 2005 at the peak of the campaign of voluntary surrender of Lukic,<br />
Pavkovic <strong>an</strong>d other generals. 28 President of the National Council <strong>for</strong> Cooperation<br />
with the Hague Tribunal, Rasim Ljajic then underscored that it was<br />
necessary to urgently adopt such a law:" Darf law shall be passed with<strong>in</strong> a<br />
week. ". 29 Socialists <strong>an</strong>d Radicals immediately opposed such a law. The Serb<br />
Radical Party official, A. Vučić termed the law "sc<strong>an</strong>dalous <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ticonstitutional.<br />
It is rife with barbarous ideas to be used aga<strong>in</strong>st political<br />
opponents." 30 Under the procedure that draft law should be debated by<br />
member-<strong>state</strong>s of the <strong>state</strong> union, Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters, <strong>an</strong>d then the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament, whose MPs, due to various obstructions (lack of<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
quorum <strong>an</strong>d similar), have not met to discuss that draft law, a year on after its<br />
writ<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In the second half of 2005 the <strong>in</strong>ternational community lost patience<br />
because of dead-ended Hague-Belgrade co-operation. For the first time EU set<br />
a deal<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> the arrest of Mladic (5 April 2006.), <strong>an</strong>d conditioned cont<strong>in</strong>uation<br />
of talks on Serbia's accesion to EU with that arrest. In fact <strong>in</strong> late 2005 EU<br />
started dem<strong>an</strong>ded deeds <strong>an</strong>d not words from Belgrade. 31 The US Ambassador<br />
<strong>for</strong> War Crimes, Pierre Richard, tried to get across <strong>an</strong> even sterner message: "If<br />
Belgrade fails to arrest Mladic, our next condition shall be the arrest of<br />
Karadzic if he is to be found <strong>in</strong> the territory of Serbia." Richard also <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
the Hague Tribunal would wait <strong>for</strong> the two <strong>in</strong>dictees if necessary until –the<br />
year 2016." 32<br />
Plac<strong>in</strong>g faith <strong>in</strong> numerous promises 33 of the official Belgrade that it<br />
would arrest Mladic, the <strong>in</strong>ternational community has never set deadl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong><br />
the arrests, but only kept warn<strong>in</strong>g Serbia. On the eve of every import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational meet<strong>in</strong>g, the promis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ments of Serb politica<strong>in</strong>s kept<br />
multiply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d optimism was <strong>in</strong>stilled <strong>in</strong>to citizens with respect to alleged<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational praises of Serbia's co-operation with the Hague Tribunal. On the<br />
eve of December 2005 session of the UN Security Council, some local media<br />
even <strong>an</strong>nounced that the ICTY Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, regardless of<br />
denounement of the case of Ratko Mladic, would positively assess cooperation<br />
with Belgrade. Spokesm<strong>an</strong> of the ICTY Florence Artm<strong>an</strong>d then<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>ded Serbia that "s<strong>in</strong>ce the h<strong>an</strong>d-over of General Pavkovic, six months<br />
ago, there was no progress on the pl<strong>an</strong>e of arrest or surrender of fugitives from<br />
justice. ICTY prosecution is still refused the access to documents, mostly by the<br />
Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro.". She expressly rem<strong>in</strong>ded that the top<br />
priorities of the Hague Tribunal were "the arrest of rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 7 fugitives from<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational justice, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Mladić <strong>an</strong>d unh<strong>in</strong>dered access to<br />
documents <strong>an</strong>d witnesses" 34 .<br />
As threats relat<strong>in</strong>g to non-co-operation with the Hague co<strong>in</strong>cided with<br />
<strong>an</strong>nouncements of the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of negotiations on Kosovo, Belgrade media<br />
engaged <strong>in</strong> a veritable campaign of speculations. Thus Nedeljni telegraf of 12<br />
October 2005 leaked the follow<strong>in</strong>g scoop: special White House envoy, Nicholas<br />
Burns dur<strong>in</strong>g his imm<strong>in</strong>ent visit to Belgrade shall make a special, concrete offer<br />
to Tadic <strong>an</strong>d Kostunica: "Arrest Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Mladić, <strong>an</strong>d Kosmet shall not get<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence. ".<br />
24 Ibid.<br />
25 Politka, 16 March 2005.<br />
26 D<strong>an</strong>as, 21 April 2005.<br />
27 D<strong>an</strong>as, 15 March 2005.<br />
28 Politika, 19 March 2005.<br />
29 D<strong>an</strong>as, 21 March 2005.<br />
30 D<strong>an</strong>as, 22 March 2005.<br />
31 D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 November 2005, <strong>state</strong>ment of President of the ICTY, Tedor Meron,<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g his second visit to Belgrade.<br />
32 Večernje novosti, 5 November 2005.<br />
33 Rasim Ljajić <strong>state</strong>d that “all <strong>in</strong>dictees would be h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the Hague<br />
Tribunal by the end of the year”, Večernje novosti <strong>an</strong>d D<strong>an</strong>as, 2 April 2005.<br />
34 D<strong>an</strong>as, 23 November, 2005.<br />
68<br />
69
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
In his response to <strong>in</strong>ternational community's pressure, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Koštunica <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview to the Greek newspaper Tovima <strong>state</strong>d the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
"In Serbia there is a political will to h<strong>an</strong>d-over the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictee Ratko<br />
Mladić". He added: "Despite some objections co-operation with the Hague<br />
Tribunal is good, <strong>an</strong>d should be wrapped up by extradition of all the war<br />
crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees." Kostunica also sent the follow<strong>in</strong>g message to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community: "Independently of external pressure, we are<br />
dilligently work<strong>in</strong>g on improvement of that co-operation, because success <strong>in</strong><br />
that area would enh<strong>an</strong>ce our <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g." 35 .<br />
Subsequent developments (the February 2006 rally of the Radical<br />
Party loyalists who sent a direct message to Ratko Mladic not to surrender, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
at which ten thous<strong>an</strong>d people cheered on Mladic <strong>an</strong>d carried his photographs)<br />
made the <strong>in</strong>ternational community realize that Serbia had no serious <strong>in</strong>tention<br />
to h<strong>an</strong>d-over Mladic.<br />
The Case of Ratko Mladić<br />
The year 2005 was very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> the Hague Tribunal, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community. It marked the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica<br />
massacre, sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Dayton Accord, <strong>an</strong>d fil<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>dictment (25 July 1995)<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>for</strong>mer president of Republika Srpska Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadzic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Comm<strong>an</strong>der of the Army of Republika Srpska Ratko Mladic. Both of them are<br />
still at large.<br />
Mladić's hid<strong>in</strong>g, which <strong>in</strong> the past decade was most probably<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eered by the army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, led to <strong>an</strong> early 2006 very<br />
serious threat by EU relat<strong>in</strong>g to suspension of association negotiations with<br />
Serbia. Numerous denials of the Serb authorities <strong>an</strong>d military officials,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those by Boris Tadić <strong>an</strong>d Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, that the army had<br />
noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with Mladic's hid<strong>in</strong>g, proved <strong>in</strong>correct. The falsity of those<br />
denials was confirmed by a non-public disclosure of the list of 50 army <strong>an</strong>d<br />
military <strong>in</strong>telligence officers, who after <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>-depth <strong>in</strong>vestigation by the<br />
military <strong>security</strong> services, were <strong>in</strong>dicated as masterm<strong>in</strong>ds of Mladic's hid<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Their names are yet to be publicly disclosed. With respect to that list Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
St<strong>an</strong>ković, the Serb Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister, <strong>state</strong>d: "In the course of <strong>in</strong>vestigation<br />
they were tr<strong>an</strong>sferred to other workplaces or retired. Mladic hid <strong>in</strong> military<br />
facilities until 2002, when <strong>in</strong> a secret action of several officers he was ferried by<br />
a military vehicle to <strong>an</strong>other unit, where <strong>an</strong>other vehicle took him to <strong>an</strong><br />
undisclosed location. Only three officers knew about that action. Comm<strong>an</strong>der<br />
of the unit where the ch<strong>an</strong>ge of vehicle happened, was totally ignor<strong>an</strong>t of the<br />
whole action." 36 After disclosure of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned list, the Serb Interior<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry, the Military Intelligence <strong>an</strong>d the Military Security were said to be<br />
tasked with Mladic's arrest. Their work on that assignment would be allegedly<br />
co-ord<strong>in</strong>ated by the Special Prosecution <strong>for</strong> the War Crimes <strong>an</strong>d its prosecutor,<br />
Vladimir Vukčević.<br />
Defence Secretary of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković, whose<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tment to that high position was directly l<strong>in</strong>ked to Mladic's h<strong>an</strong>d-over,<br />
assessed that "<strong>in</strong> fact to date no-one has seriously worked on capture of<br />
Mladic", <strong>an</strong>d "only now a serious search has been launched, <strong>for</strong> the <strong>state</strong> union<br />
could f<strong>in</strong>d itself <strong>in</strong> a difficult situation if Mladic is not h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the<br />
Hague Tribunal". 37<br />
The case of Ratko Mladić is the most illustrative example of non-cooperation<br />
with the Hague Tribunal. The <strong>in</strong>cumbent authorities <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
needed three full years to submit to the ICTY the personal, military file of<br />
Ratko Mladić. That file was <strong>for</strong>warded page by page, with justification that the<br />
military documentation centre has been thrown <strong>in</strong>to disarray, <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
consequently some pages of that file went miss<strong>in</strong>g. Although the Supreme<br />
Defence Council <strong>in</strong> March 2005 decided to yield that document to the Hague<br />
Tribunal, it was done unwill<strong>in</strong>gly, several months later, <strong>an</strong>d there are<br />
grounded suspicions that the said document was <strong>in</strong>complete. That file is a very<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t document <strong>for</strong> the ICTY s<strong>in</strong>ce it constitutes a proof of direct l<strong>in</strong>ks<br />
between Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d the war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the media coverage Mladić File has 13 pages, <strong>an</strong>d has<br />
been the bone of contention between the ICTY <strong>an</strong>d the Serb <strong>state</strong> bodies. As a<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>der of Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serbs, Ratko Mladić was twice promoted by Belgrade,<br />
the first time the SFRY Presidency on 4 October 1991 promoted him from the<br />
r<strong>an</strong>k of colonel to the one of major general, together with other officers, <strong>for</strong><br />
"their war merits." He was promoted <strong>for</strong> the second time on 24 April 1992 to<br />
the r<strong>an</strong>k of lieuten<strong>an</strong>t general. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the orig<strong>in</strong>al file Mladic was retired<br />
on 28 Febuary 2002 <strong>in</strong> Belgrade. Be<strong>for</strong>e that he was retired <strong>in</strong> late 1996 by the<br />
decree signed by President of Republika Srpska, Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Plavsic. But Belgrade<br />
refused to recognize the first retirement. In the personal Mladic file submitted<br />
to the Hague Tribunal there are no data on Mladic's career <strong>an</strong>d work s<strong>in</strong>ce his<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tment to the Comm<strong>an</strong>der of the 2nd Military Area which amply<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates "the existence of a parallel documentation created with the <strong>in</strong>tention<br />
of deny<strong>in</strong>g Belgrade's <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the civil war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia." 38<br />
Media also mentioned that the <strong>for</strong>ward<strong>in</strong>g of the Mladic file to the<br />
ICTY was slowed down because of the fact that the decree on retirement of<br />
General Mladic was signed by Vojislav Kostunica, the then President of the<br />
FRY. The pert<strong>in</strong>ent file does not <strong>in</strong>clude data on the position of Mladic be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
his retirement.<br />
35 D<strong>an</strong>as, 7 November 2005.<br />
36 Defence Secretary, Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview to BBC, 9 February 2006.<br />
37 Blic, 18 February 2006.<br />
38 Where<strong>in</strong> lies the secrecy of Mladic’s file?, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 July 2005.<br />
70<br />
71
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The case of Ratko Mladic was aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the media spotlight on the<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica genocide, <strong>in</strong> mid 2005, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> view of <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community's dem<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> his h<strong>an</strong>d-over. The Serb authorities<br />
then re-launched the story that "all measures are taken to locate Mladic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d him over." Weekly Evropa of 9 June 2005 leaked the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation that the<br />
government of Serbia was negotiat<strong>in</strong>g with Mladic <strong>an</strong>d that "<strong>in</strong> that operation<br />
are <strong>in</strong>volved Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Koštunica, guards from Mladic's entourage, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Russi<strong>an</strong> ntelligence services." Then speculations were rife that Mladic<br />
allegedly dem<strong>an</strong>ded money <strong>for</strong> the care of his family, that he was sick, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that Kostunica's cab<strong>in</strong>et belatedly monitored his movements. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to one<br />
source of that weekly, Mladić spent some time <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad, then <strong>in</strong> Preševo,<br />
then <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>an</strong>other source Mladic was <strong>in</strong> Russia. Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Stojković, the Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister, denied the said speculations, 39 while Vladeta<br />
J<strong>an</strong>ković, <strong>an</strong> aide to Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica, <strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>an</strong> imm<strong>in</strong>ent h<strong>an</strong>dover<br />
of Mladic. 40<br />
At the same time President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, called on Mladić to<br />
surrender, but not because of crimes he had committed, but rather because his<br />
surrender would "resolve m<strong>an</strong>y Serbia's problems.". 41 That Tadic's <strong>state</strong>ment<br />
was <strong>in</strong>terpreted by Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić, the Serb Radical Party official as "a sheer<br />
nonsense", while Milorad Vučelić, represetnative of the Socialist Party of<br />
Serbia, thought that "Mladic's surrender to the Hague would not solve all<br />
Serbia's problem". Dordje Vukad<strong>in</strong>ović, a political <strong>an</strong>alyst, voiced his op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />
too: "Mladic's surrender would not solve all the problems of Serbia, it would<br />
only alleviate them. Serbia's problems c<strong>an</strong>not be resolved by d<strong>in</strong>t of cooperation<br />
with the Hague Tribunal." 42<br />
And while Serbia still ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that it ignores Mladic's whereabouts,<br />
but that it nonetheless has the political will to capture him <strong>an</strong>d works <strong>in</strong>tensely<br />
on f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g him, <strong>in</strong> parallel the ICTY ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that it knows with all the<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ty that the accused general is <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
Appo<strong>in</strong>tment of Dr Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković, a m<strong>an</strong> close to Kostunica's party,<br />
a retired Yugoslav Army officer, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer head of Military-Medical<br />
Academy to the post of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister (October 2005), was publicly<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreted as <strong>an</strong> attempt by the government of Serbia to get closer to Mladic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d persuade him to voluntarily surrender himself. In his <strong>for</strong>mer capacity of a<br />
doctor, St<strong>an</strong>ković had personal contacts with Mladic. Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić, <strong>an</strong><br />
official of the Serb Radical Party, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "St<strong>an</strong>ković was tasked with<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g a dirty job, <strong>for</strong> which Tadic <strong>an</strong>d Kostunica would be ultimately held<br />
accountable. They shall be held responsible if they decide to arrest Mladic, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
39 D<strong>an</strong>as, 10 July 2005.<br />
40 Blic, 12 July 2005.<br />
41 D<strong>an</strong>as, 15 July 2005.<br />
42 Nacional, 16 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
perhaps they are even able to do that." 43 On the eve of the Dayton Accord (25<br />
November) when the arrest of Mladic was expected, some media re-launched<br />
the campaign of his glorification.<br />
Particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the Rally of Matrix <strong>an</strong>d Diaspora <strong>in</strong> Belgrade ("D<strong>an</strong>as"<br />
4. October) stood up <strong>in</strong> the defence of the war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees. They<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded the authorities to take care of the Hague <strong>in</strong>dictees, "s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
Tribunal is <strong>an</strong> illegitimate, biased <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb court". A day be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
Dayton Accord <strong>an</strong>niversary daily "Nacional" <strong>an</strong>nounced imm<strong>in</strong>ent publication<br />
of Ratko Mladić's memoirs-"All My Victories <strong>an</strong>d All My Defeats" , which<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to one unidentified collaborator, would "be <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t testimony<br />
...<strong>an</strong>d help us underst<strong>an</strong>d the recent conflicts <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s."<br />
All promises of the Serb officials that Mladic would be h<strong>an</strong>ded over to<br />
the Hague Tribunal by the end of 2005, have not materialized. The official<br />
Serbia still ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that it ignores Mladic's whereabouts. The only ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong><br />
that regard is the army's confirmation that some of its members <strong>in</strong> the past<br />
decade helped <strong>an</strong>d guarded General Mladic.<br />
*<br />
* *<br />
1. Radivoj Miletić, general of the Army of Republika Srpska.<br />
Surrendered on 28 February. Was extradited to the Hague from Belgrade.<br />
Charged with persecution <strong>an</strong>d kill<strong>in</strong>g of Muslim civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Žepa.<br />
2. Momčilo Perišić, the Yugoslav People's Army general, <strong>for</strong>mer head<br />
of Chief of Staff of the FRY army. Charged with shell<strong>in</strong>g of Sarajevo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Zagreb <strong>an</strong>d crimes committed <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica. Perišić is the 11th general to be<br />
h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the Hague.<br />
3. Nebojša Pavković, Head of Chief of Staf of the FRY army. He<br />
arrived <strong>in</strong> the Hague on 25 April. Charged with crimes committed <strong>in</strong> Kosovo<br />
<strong>an</strong>d expulsion of 800,000 Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
4. Sreten Lukić, a police general. Arrived <strong>in</strong> the Hague on 4 April.<br />
Charged with the same crimes of which general Pavković is accused. .<br />
5. Mićo St<strong>an</strong>išić, <strong>an</strong> official of Republika Srpska. On 11 March<br />
surrendered voluntarily to Belgrade authorities. In 1992-1995 period was twice<br />
the Interior Secretary <strong>in</strong> the government of Republika Srpska. Charged with<br />
genocide. Cous<strong>in</strong> of Jovica St<strong>an</strong>išić, also a Hague <strong>in</strong>dictee, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer head of<br />
the State Security of Serbia. Mico St<strong>an</strong>isic was considered to be the Serb<br />
Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry m<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pale.<br />
6. V<strong>in</strong>ko P<strong>an</strong>durević, <strong>for</strong>mer general of the army of Republika Srpska.<br />
Belgrade sent him to the Hague on 23 March, <strong>an</strong>d expla<strong>in</strong>ed that surrender as<br />
43 Kurir, 14 October 2005.<br />
72<br />
73
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the "committment towards the <strong>state</strong>." Charged with genocide <strong>an</strong>d war crimes<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. Announc<strong>in</strong>g his surrender to the Hague Tribunal<br />
he appeared be<strong>for</strong>e TV cameras <strong>in</strong> the uni<strong>for</strong>m of the officer of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army.<br />
7. Gojko J<strong>an</strong>ković, a RS official. Was deputy comm<strong>an</strong>der of the<br />
military police <strong>an</strong>d leader of a paramilitary unit <strong>in</strong> Foca. On 14 March he<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med the government of Serbia of his voluntary surrender to the Hague<br />
tribunal. Charged with crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st non-Serb population <strong>in</strong> Foca, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
crimes committed aga<strong>in</strong>st imprisoned women <strong>an</strong>d men <strong>in</strong> a local penitentiary.<br />
8. Milorad Trbić, Assist<strong>an</strong>t Security Comm<strong>an</strong>der <strong>in</strong> the Dr<strong>in</strong>a Corps.<br />
Left <strong>for</strong> the Hague on 14 April. Charged with crimes <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica.<br />
9. Vujad<strong>in</strong> Popović, colonel of the army of Republika Srpska. Was sent<br />
to the Hague on 14 April from Belgrade. Charged with genocide <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica.<br />
Conclusion<br />
As regards the number of h<strong>an</strong>d-overs, Serbia <strong>in</strong> 2005 was more<br />
dilligent <strong>in</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g its <strong>in</strong>ternational commitment th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> previous years.<br />
Greenlight<strong>in</strong>g of the feasibility study <strong>an</strong>d beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the process of accesion<br />
to Europe was not only a reward, but also a solid proof that Serbia co-operates<br />
with the Hague Tribunal only under pressure. The feasibility study was<br />
approved, but then even the voluntary surrenders-stopped.<br />
War crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees who had voluntarily surrendered <strong>an</strong>d left <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Hague were glorified as heroes, honourable men sacrific<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the future of<br />
Serbia. For 10 years now Serbia has been cheer<strong>in</strong>g on Mladic <strong>an</strong>d persuad<strong>in</strong>g<br />
him not to surrender. Some even try to get the follow<strong>in</strong>g message across to<br />
Mladic: „It is better <strong>for</strong> you to commit suicide then go alive to the Hague." The<br />
authorities, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, espouse the st<strong>an</strong>d that Mladic's h<strong>an</strong>d-over to<br />
the Hague is <strong>in</strong>evitable. That new tack is opposed by the Radical Party <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
loyalits, which make up about one third of the Serbia's electorate.<br />
At the last February rally of the Serb Radical Party, be<strong>for</strong>e a ten<br />
thous<strong>an</strong>d –strong crowd, President of the SRP, Tomislav Nikolic, sent the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g message to Mladic: "It is better <strong>for</strong> you to commit suicide th<strong>an</strong> to go<br />
alive to the Hague.". A similar message was voiced by the Defence Secretary,<br />
Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković: "Do you th<strong>in</strong>k that you are more import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>an</strong> this country<br />
<strong>an</strong>d people? Do you underst<strong>an</strong>d that you are plung<strong>in</strong>g this country <strong>in</strong>to<br />
poverty <strong>an</strong>d isolation? You are belittl<strong>in</strong>g yourself <strong>an</strong>d the army that you had<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>ded. I th<strong>in</strong>k that a m<strong>an</strong> sometimes must take justice <strong>in</strong>to his own<br />
h<strong>an</strong>ds if he is responsible <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> crimes. 44 St<strong>an</strong>ković is the only high<br />
official of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro who <strong>an</strong>nounced his<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
resignation <strong>in</strong> case of Mladic's non-surrender, <strong>an</strong>d also the first high official to<br />
mention the crimes committed.<br />
After spectacular m<strong>an</strong>ipulations with the death of Milosevic, it is<br />
difficult to predict whether Mladic shall surrender. Without a strong<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational pressure Prime M<strong>in</strong>siter Kostunica shall not be will<strong>in</strong>g to arrest<br />
Mladic. If he were to do that a stake would be too high <strong>for</strong> his government: his<br />
coalition partner, the Socialist Party of Serbia, which helps ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the<br />
government's majority, could then bolt the government.<br />
Argument <strong>in</strong> support of the above thesis is the emergence of the third<br />
option recently <strong>for</strong>mulated by the Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister, Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković,: "We must<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d valid evidence to conv<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>in</strong>ternational community that Mladic is not<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia.". 45 In the me<strong>an</strong>time the Radical Party is send<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
message: „We don't need Europe, we shall jo<strong>in</strong> the non-aligned movement."<br />
Government of Serbia is essentially cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to relativize the<br />
committed crimes. Instead of the fac<strong>in</strong>g process <strong>an</strong>d condemnation of the<br />
crimes, war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees are depicted as people sacrific<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> their <strong>state</strong>. In<br />
such a general mood the h<strong>an</strong>d-over of Ratko Mladic is very unlikely. The<br />
majority of population <strong>in</strong> Serbia, 15 years after the wars, approves the bloody<br />
conflict <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, but accuses the Serb leaders <strong>for</strong> los<strong>in</strong>g the wars, <strong>an</strong>d not <strong>for</strong><br />
wag<strong>in</strong>g them.<br />
44Blic, 18 February 2006<br />
45 Ibid.<br />
74<br />
75
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA<br />
TAKES SERBIA-MONTENEGRO BEFORE<br />
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE<br />
Bosnia’s application <strong>in</strong> respect of a dispute concern<strong>in</strong>g the FRY’s<br />
alleged genocide <strong>an</strong>d aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosniaks, dates back to 1993, to the<br />
peak of the campaign of the most grave mass crimes. Those Bosni<strong>an</strong> claims<br />
were at the same time <strong>an</strong> attempt to attract the world’s attraction to what was<br />
happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Bosnia. In 1997 the FRY filed counter-claims aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>for</strong> a genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs, s<strong>in</strong>ce "Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a is to<br />
be held responsible <strong>for</strong> the crime of genocide committed aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs <strong>in</strong><br />
Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a…there<strong>for</strong>e all persons responsible <strong>for</strong> those crimes<br />
must be punished." In the FRY’s claims was also underscored the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
"Genocide was abetted by the Islamic Declaration, notably its position that<br />
"there c<strong>an</strong>not be peace or cohabitation between the Islamic faith <strong>an</strong>d non-<br />
Islamic social <strong>an</strong>d political <strong>in</strong>stitutions." Those counter-claims were later<br />
withdrawn at the request of the then Foreign Secretary, Gor<strong>an</strong> Svil<strong>an</strong>ović.<br />
M<strong>an</strong>y legal experts were then, <strong>an</strong>d are even now aga<strong>in</strong>st that move, deem<strong>in</strong>g it<br />
harmful <strong>for</strong> the FRY position. One the eve of pert<strong>in</strong>ent proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
International Court of Justice, Professor Iv<strong>an</strong> Čukalović, <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational law<br />
expert, said that "the withdrawal of the FRY counter-cliams could cost very<br />
much both the present <strong>an</strong>d future generations of Serbs." 1<br />
After NATO <strong>in</strong>tervention Serbia filed genocide-related claims aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
some NATO member-countries be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Hague. 2 That Court <strong>in</strong> fact declared that it had no jurisdiction over those<br />
claims, s<strong>in</strong>ce at the time the FRY was not <strong>an</strong> UN member. 3 At the meet<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
1 Inter-nacional, 1 April 2004.<br />
2 FRY <strong>in</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g 1999 be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice, filed claims<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Fr<strong>an</strong>ce, Great Brita<strong>in</strong>, Germ<strong>an</strong>y, C<strong>an</strong>ada, Italy, Belgium <strong>an</strong>d Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds, <strong>for</strong><br />
genocide, unlawful use of <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d acts aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>ity committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
bombardment. Out of procedural reasons the court did not take <strong>in</strong>to consideration<br />
claims aga<strong>in</strong>st the US <strong>an</strong>d Spa<strong>in</strong>.<br />
3 Serb jurists thought that the fact that the FRY was not a member of the UN <strong>in</strong><br />
1999 should be applied <strong>in</strong> the case of Bosni<strong>an</strong> claims, <strong>for</strong> at the time -1993-the FRY was<br />
not a UN member either.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters, Vuk Drašković proposed that claims aga<strong>in</strong>st NATO be<br />
withdrawn, 4 <strong>an</strong>d that suggestion of his was welcomed by some MPs with<br />
expl<strong>an</strong>ation that "is is a condition <strong>for</strong> further EU <strong>in</strong>tegrations", while other MPs<br />
were aga<strong>in</strong>st that proposal <strong>for</strong> "it would be t<strong>an</strong>tamount to amnesty<strong>in</strong>g<br />
aggression <strong>an</strong>d destruction of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." 5 Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission<br />
backed Draskovic’s <strong>in</strong>itiative deem<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>centive <strong>for</strong> acceleration of the<br />
process of accession to "Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace". Radicals were expressly aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
that suggestion, <strong>an</strong>d Toma Nikolic just said that he was not will<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
comment the <strong>state</strong>ment of that fool. 6 M<strong>an</strong>y prom<strong>in</strong>ent jurists were <strong>in</strong> favour of<br />
stick<strong>in</strong>g to those claims, <strong>for</strong> they hoped, that the Court, regardless of its<br />
judgment, would apply a similar tack to the Bosni<strong>an</strong> claims aga<strong>in</strong>st the FRY,<br />
that is Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. Professor Voj<strong>in</strong> Dimitrijević told Radio B92 :<br />
"That application was filed <strong>in</strong> 1999, at the peak of bombardment, <strong>an</strong>d it was a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>dless gesture." He went on to note: "We have <strong>in</strong>herited those claims from<br />
Milosevic, <strong>an</strong>d we c<strong>an</strong>not renounce them. And now our onerous burden has<br />
been made even heavier by that application." 7<br />
Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Smajlović, the then commentator of weekly NIN, <strong>an</strong>d close to<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica, thus <strong>in</strong>terpreted the court’s non-juridiction-related<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment: "Sarajevo must ask itself if it st<strong>an</strong>ds to ga<strong>in</strong> more by withdraw<strong>in</strong>g<br />
those genocide-related claims-<strong>for</strong> the sake of good neighbourly relations <strong>an</strong>d<br />
regional stability-or by possibly los<strong>in</strong>g a dispute on grounds of court’s nonjurisdiction<br />
rationae personae. Now we are <strong>in</strong> fact fac<strong>in</strong>g a real ch<strong>an</strong>ce to see all<br />
claims <strong>an</strong>d counter-claims be withdrawn by a dom<strong>in</strong>o effect." 8 Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković,<br />
the Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister, also thought that "the International Court of Justice must<br />
declare whether it has jurisdiction over the case of Bosni<strong>an</strong> claims." 9<br />
After 5 October 2000 the new authorities submitted a request <strong>for</strong> the<br />
revision of the non-jurisdiction -related judgement dat<strong>in</strong>g back go July 1996.<br />
However, the Court <strong>in</strong> 2003 rejected the Yugoslav request <strong>for</strong> revision <strong>an</strong>d thus<br />
essentially declared its non-jurisdiction. That fact was corroborated by the<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of public hear<strong>in</strong>gs on 27 February 2006.<br />
DOS government <strong>in</strong>sisted on BH withdrawal of its claims. Vlad<strong>an</strong><br />
Batić, the then Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister, <strong>state</strong>d that "it would be good if Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
4 Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Smajlović qualified that <strong>in</strong>itiative as “<strong>an</strong> unsuitable <strong>an</strong>d<br />
unprofessional scene: the two <strong>state</strong> officials who like a NGO or <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal group br<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pressure to bear on the <strong>state</strong> <strong>for</strong> which they work <strong>in</strong> order to topple the legal strategy of<br />
that <strong>state</strong> be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> the Hague.” Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Smajlović,<br />
Varadi, NIN, 26 August 2004.<br />
5 Politika, 23 July 2004<br />
6 Ibid.<br />
7 Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, We Must Reject Rotten Legacy, Politika, 3 September<br />
2004.<br />
8 Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Smajlović, NIN, 16 December 2004.<br />
9 Vešernje novosti, 16 December 2004.<br />
76<br />
77
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Herezgov<strong>in</strong>a withdrew its genocide <strong>an</strong>d aggression- related claims aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> the Hague,<br />
<strong>for</strong> the sake of future <strong>an</strong>d good neighbourly relations." Batić ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that<br />
"unless it is done, then we should defend ourselves <strong>an</strong>d prove <strong>an</strong>other truth."<br />
He warned that the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry of Justice prepared such "evidence which is<br />
likely to surprise the <strong>in</strong>ternational public." 10 Bosni<strong>an</strong> side has never shown <strong>an</strong>y<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention of withdraw<strong>in</strong>g those claims, despite numerous pressures from<br />
Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d the world. Belgrade threats were seen as "sheer fabrications" with<br />
which Belgrade tried "by unlawful me<strong>an</strong>s to call <strong>in</strong>to question a clear-cut legal<br />
situation." " 11 . Legal representative of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a Sakib Softić<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that "<strong>for</strong> us the most import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>in</strong>g is to prove that genocide was<br />
committed" <strong>for</strong> Bosniaks "w<strong>an</strong>t to survive <strong>an</strong>d live like <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs", <strong>an</strong>d<br />
such a life shall be guar<strong>an</strong>teed to them "only by the court’s judgement. 12 "<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> claims were contested <strong>in</strong> other ways too, notably as<br />
concerned <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the war. Belgrade has persistently espoused the<br />
thesis of civil war, aga<strong>in</strong>st the background of unlawful secessionism of the two<br />
republics, Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia. It is thought that the claims "stem from a<br />
political-diplomatic <strong>an</strong>d media-shaped stereotype of responsibility of the Serb<br />
side <strong>an</strong>d the Yugoslav <strong>state</strong> <strong>for</strong> all the war atrocities", along with ignor<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
the fact that "at play was a civil war <strong>in</strong> Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a,<br />
caused by <strong>an</strong>ti-constitutional <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>cible secession." 13<br />
In addition to Belgrade the application was contested by Republika<br />
Srpska, whose MPs, dur<strong>in</strong>g the adoption of the 2003 <strong>state</strong> budget, refused to<br />
allocate special funds <strong>for</strong> the work of legal representatives <strong>an</strong>d the application<br />
expenses. Bosniak authorities then turned to other sources of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
notably to <strong>in</strong>dividual f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ciers. National Assembly of Republika Srpska<br />
adopted a declaration dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g BH to withdraw claims aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro, <strong>for</strong> the application was t<strong>an</strong>tamount to claims aga<strong>in</strong>st Republika<br />
Srpska <strong>an</strong>d the gist of the Dayton Accord. Declaration also <strong>state</strong>d that the said<br />
application was "<strong>an</strong> enormous hurdle on the road to rapprochement <strong>an</strong>d<br />
reconciliation between peoples <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a." 14<br />
The issue of responsibility resurfaced every time a new mass grave<br />
was discovered. Thus, after discovery of the mass grave at Crni Vrh near<br />
Zvornik, a member of the BH Presidency, Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Tihić, <strong>state</strong>d that the crime<br />
<strong>in</strong> that location was committed <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized way, which confirmed that<br />
"beh<strong>in</strong>d the crime were the RS authorities". On that occasion Sakib Softić made<br />
it clear that BH would not withdraw its claims, but also ruled out the<br />
10 Politika, 1 July 2003.<br />
11 D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 August 2003.<br />
12 D<strong>an</strong>as, 10 July 2003.<br />
13 Čedomir Štrbac, Establishment of Truth <strong>for</strong> the Sake of Our Future, Politika,<br />
31 August 2004.<br />
14 Večernje novosti, 2 October 2003.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
possibility of out-of-court settlement <strong>an</strong>d added: "We repeat that the most<br />
simple solution would be acknowledgment by the defend<strong>an</strong>t of the contents of<br />
our claims." 15<br />
Denial of Republika Srpska both <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the world, is a<br />
recurr<strong>in</strong>g theme, notably <strong>in</strong> the light of the ongo<strong>in</strong>g revision of the Dayton<br />
Accord. Borislav Paravac, a Serb member of the BH Presidency, deems denials<br />
of RS unlawful <strong>an</strong>d asserts that "RS was created by d<strong>in</strong>t of the political will of<br />
the Serb people even be<strong>for</strong>e the war, <strong>an</strong>d out of sheer necessity". 16 Drag<strong>an</strong><br />
Čović, President of BH Presidency, urged <strong>in</strong>dividual responsibility <strong>for</strong> the past<br />
crimes, <strong>in</strong> the last decade, notably dur<strong>in</strong>g the war. He th<strong>in</strong>ks that "the issue<br />
should be primarily viewed <strong>in</strong> the context of law, <strong>an</strong>d its politization should be<br />
maximally reduced", <strong>for</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, "we should leave beh<strong>in</strong>d the legacy<br />
of the past <strong>in</strong> order to be able to live normally now <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the future. " 17 .<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro built its strategy on its assertion that it was not<br />
<strong>an</strong> UN member, <strong>an</strong>d that the Court has already declared its non-jursdiction<br />
over the case of the FRY claims aga<strong>in</strong>st NATO. But, Nikola Radm<strong>an</strong>ović, <strong>an</strong><br />
expert <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational relations, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that "our politici<strong>an</strong>s don’t make<br />
<strong>an</strong>y difference between our claims <strong>an</strong>d the claims of our others. Namely if you<br />
are not <strong>an</strong> UN member you don’t have the right to sue <strong>an</strong>y member of that<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization, but if your threaten <strong>an</strong>y UN member, that org<strong>an</strong>ization may<br />
punish you <strong>for</strong> that move." 18<br />
In parallel to pressures brought to bear on BH to withdraw its claims,<br />
Belgrade cont<strong>in</strong>ued to deny Srebrenica genocide. Namely Belgrade fears that<br />
the conviction of General Krstic would strengthen the arguments of the<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> side, hence the denial of Srebrenica genocide even by the most<br />
em<strong>in</strong>ent jurists. For example, Mil<strong>an</strong> Bulajić, President of the Fund <strong>for</strong> Research<br />
of Genocide, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "neither the <strong>in</strong>ternational prosecutor nor the trial<br />
chamber of the International Crim<strong>in</strong>al Tribunal have proved the crime of the<br />
Serb-committed genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Muslims, <strong>an</strong>d consequently the comm<strong>an</strong>d<br />
responsibility of Comm<strong>an</strong>der of the Dr<strong>in</strong>a Corps, General Radoslav Krstić."<br />
Bulajic went on to note that "the very enclave has never been<br />
demilitarized…which facilitated the tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of ‘safe heaven areas’ <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the centres of Muslim terrorism aga<strong>in</strong>st Serb villages <strong>an</strong>d the RS army." 19 Mil<strong>an</strong><br />
Paunović, professor of <strong>in</strong>ternational law th<strong>in</strong>ks that the Hague Tribunal has<br />
committed <strong>an</strong> error when <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g genocide <strong>in</strong> the Krstic case. He<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that the Tribunal "def<strong>in</strong>ed genocide <strong>in</strong> much more broader terms <strong>in</strong><br />
contrast to def<strong>in</strong>ition thereof <strong>in</strong> the Convention on the Prevention <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Punishment of Genocide….thus lay<strong>in</strong>g the groundwork <strong>for</strong> proclaim<strong>in</strong>g RS a<br />
15 D<strong>an</strong>as, 19 August 2003.<br />
16 Politika, 14 August 2003.<br />
17 Balk<strong>an</strong>, 21 August 2003.<br />
18 Balk<strong>an</strong>, 18 December 2004.<br />
19 Svedok, 19 August 2003.<br />
78<br />
79
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
genocidal creation, which would jeopardize the survival of RS as <strong>an</strong> entity <strong>in</strong><br />
Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a." 20 Professor Paunović th<strong>in</strong>ks that after the conviction<br />
of Krstic, "there is only one miss<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>k…namely the conviction of Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Milošević <strong>for</strong> the same crime." 21<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the International Court of Justice declared its non-jurisdiction<br />
over the BH application, the pressure on Bosniaks to widhraw their claims<br />
kept pil<strong>in</strong>g. New legal representative of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Radoslav<br />
Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, <strong>state</strong>d that the strategy was to "settle a dispute by diplomatic<br />
me<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d not by trial." That strategy is based on the assessment that "Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong>d Croatia, all together are on the<br />
doorstep of EU, Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace <strong>an</strong>d NATO, hence disputes, <strong>an</strong>d claims<br />
may surely damage them all, stall reconciliation <strong>an</strong>d closer ties, while a<br />
diplomatic solution may br<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>an</strong> agreement on end<strong>in</strong>g the dispute." 22<br />
Sakib Softic thus responded to those Belgrade offers: "the Serb <strong>state</strong> must be<br />
convicted because of its territorial aspirations, but the idea of a Greater Serbia<br />
is not the idea shared <strong>an</strong>d espoused by all Serbs." 23 Republika Srpska is also<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g its pressure <strong>in</strong> view of "a slim ch<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> out-of-court, diplomatic<br />
settlement" <strong>an</strong>d schedul<strong>in</strong>g of the first hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> 26 February 2006. Thus<br />
Borislav Paravac, the Serb member of BH Presidency submitted to the<br />
Constitutional Court <strong>in</strong> Sarajevo, a request <strong>for</strong> the settlement of dispute<br />
between BH <strong>an</strong>d Republika Srpska on grounds of "breach of constitution by<br />
fil<strong>in</strong>g a genocide-related claims aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> the Hague." 24<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, Bosniaks <strong>in</strong>sist that a judgment favour<strong>in</strong>g Bosniaks<br />
would not only be just, but also useful <strong>for</strong> the whole region. Avdo Sofradžija,<br />
President of Foundation, "Justice <strong>for</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a" <strong>state</strong>d that a<br />
positive judgment would satisfy the justice <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> that case "<strong>in</strong> our territories<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs would ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>for</strong> the better." 25<br />
Preparation <strong>for</strong> the First Public Hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, legal representative of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice, on the eve of the first public hear<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that "our defence is based on the fact that no-one may prove that Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d the Serb people w<strong>an</strong>ted to destroy the Muslim people." 26<br />
He also h<strong>in</strong>ted that some countries, members of the UN Security Council,<br />
20 Blic, 25 April 2004.<br />
21 Večernje novosti, 23 April 2004.<br />
22 Politika, 27 September 2005.<br />
23 Blic, 22 May 2005.<br />
24 Start, 14 December 2005.<br />
25 Politika, 26 February 2004.<br />
26Večernje novosti, 24 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
suggested to Bosnia to withdraw its claims, <strong>an</strong>d to resort to diplomatic<br />
negotiations lead<strong>in</strong>g up to the process of reconciliation. Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović<br />
was not will<strong>in</strong>g to disclose all details of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> strategy, but<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced the possibility of the Serb legal team ask<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a re-appraisal of the<br />
court’s jurisdiction over the case, <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the <strong>in</strong>tiative submitted by<br />
Tibor Varadi as early as <strong>in</strong> 2001. The Serb team shall present 15 witnesses,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Duško Mihajlović, <strong>for</strong>mer Serb Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister. Mihajlovic should<br />
testify "on relations between the FRY political leadership <strong>an</strong>d Republika<br />
Srpska, that is on <strong>in</strong>dependence of RS". 27 Dragoslav Mićunović, from<br />
Democratic Party should speak about attempts to reach a peaceful resolution<br />
of the conflict <strong>an</strong>d about the nature <strong>an</strong>d structure of Milosevic’s regime.<br />
Micunovic ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that "not only the Serb <strong>state</strong> did not pl<strong>an</strong> the attack on<br />
Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, but the Serb parliament even launched <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tiative to<br />
protect BH from the conflicts." Added to that Micunovic <strong>state</strong>d the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
"Under the FRY Constitution, the parliament has the prerogative to declare a<br />
war, <strong>an</strong>d such a parliamentary decision has never been taken." 28<br />
Media coverage of preparations <strong>for</strong> the first public hear<strong>in</strong>g focused on<br />
the fact that the application implied "genocidal character of the Serb people."<br />
Media have <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y days r<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terviews with domestic experts <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational law, but only few of them dared realistically <strong>in</strong>terpret the reasons<br />
beh<strong>in</strong>d the BH application. Professor Voj<strong>in</strong> Dimitrijević tried to <strong>in</strong>dicate that<br />
no-one claimed that Serbs were genocidal people, by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out that "we had<br />
faced a situation, <strong>in</strong> which the Serbs, as the strongest <strong>for</strong>ce with the Yugoslav<br />
People’s Army on their side, that is, their most milit<strong>an</strong>t members, had been<br />
able to make the most damage <strong>an</strong>d commit the most he<strong>in</strong>ous, mass crimes. " 29<br />
However, Voj<strong>in</strong> Dimitrijević is also of op<strong>in</strong>ion that Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montengro<br />
should rely on the argument of non-jurisdiction of the International Court of<br />
Justice. If that strategy fails, then, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Dimitrijevic, Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro "shall be left with only one option, that is to try to prove that<br />
genocide was committed by other groups, with no connection whatsoever to<br />
the Yugoslav authorities….or to try to prove that genocide was committed by<br />
the army of Republika Srspka, without <strong>in</strong>volvement of the FRY army, without<br />
<strong>an</strong>y assist<strong>an</strong>ce or approval from the FRY." 30 However, Dimitrijevic also prefers<br />
<strong>an</strong> out-of-court settlement by d<strong>in</strong>t of ensur<strong>in</strong>g damage compensation to<br />
families of genocide victims.<br />
Media were obviously tasked with creat<strong>in</strong>g a picture of Serbia’s good<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the field of the fac<strong>in</strong>g process, whereas part of NGO sector kept<br />
<strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that "Serbia has not sufficiently condemned crimes committed on her<br />
27 Politika, 15 February 2006.<br />
28 Ibid.<br />
29 Politika, 13. February 2006.<br />
30 Ibid.<br />
80<br />
81
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
behalf <strong>in</strong> the 90’s." It was also po<strong>in</strong>ted out that "NGOs th<strong>in</strong>k that the justice has<br />
not been dispensed <strong>an</strong>d satisfied by plac<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d the Scheven<strong>in</strong>gen bars<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y high officials <strong>an</strong>d officers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević proper." But the<br />
focus, accord<strong>in</strong>g to daily, Politika, "is no longer on Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević, his<br />
generals, <strong>an</strong>d closest collaborators, but on the new authorities <strong>for</strong> their alleged<br />
failure to take a clear-cut position on their ‘crim<strong>in</strong>al ’ past". 31<br />
Strategy of Kostunica-led government is to wrap up its commitments<br />
towards the world <strong>an</strong>d the Serb society by h<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g over all the war crimes<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictees to the Hague Tribunal. Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Fatić, Director of Institute <strong>for</strong><br />
International Politics <strong>an</strong>d Economy, is of op<strong>in</strong>ion that by d<strong>in</strong>t of fil<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
application be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice, Serbia is additionally<br />
punished <strong>an</strong>d that the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g "results from a well-known prop<strong>in</strong>quity of<br />
immoral people to punish <strong>an</strong>d humiliate those who are co-operative." He<br />
th<strong>in</strong>ks that the Bosni<strong>an</strong> claims aga<strong>in</strong>st the FRY are a failure from the moral<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>for</strong> "the then political leaderships of Croatia, the FRY <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Muslim one spearheaded by Alija Izetbegović are responsible <strong>for</strong> the Bosni<strong>an</strong><br />
tragedy." He went on to note that "Serbia is not guilty <strong>for</strong> that tragedy, <strong>for</strong> she,<br />
like other protagonists was simply thrown <strong>in</strong>to the mach<strong>in</strong>e from hell." Fatic<br />
also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that "Serbia is the most constructive country <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that the time is up "<strong>for</strong> sober<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>for</strong> draw<strong>in</strong>g a l<strong>in</strong>e under the Balk<strong>an</strong>s rows, <strong>for</strong><br />
penitence <strong>an</strong>d pardon, but also <strong>for</strong> patriotism." He also underscored that "there<br />
are no <strong>in</strong>tellectuals without patriotism" <strong>an</strong>d that "the NGO sector should rally<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectuals". 32 Djordje Vukad<strong>in</strong>ović, editor of the New Serbi<strong>an</strong> Thought is of<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g op<strong>in</strong>ion: "If NGOs –that is K<strong>an</strong>dic <strong>an</strong>d Biserko-are so openly<br />
concerned about the truth <strong>an</strong>d reconciliation, then they should po<strong>in</strong>t out that<br />
the genocide-related claims c<strong>an</strong>not contribute to that end or goal…", <strong>for</strong> this<br />
process "shall only deepen misunderst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d may even provoke new<br />
conflicts. " 33<br />
One of the key commitments of Serbia towards the Hague Tribunal is<br />
the submission h<strong>an</strong>d-over of documents relat<strong>in</strong>g to Ratko Mladic. However,<br />
Serbia hopes that it would m<strong>an</strong>age to ensure that "those documents are<br />
discussed with special protection measures", that is "<strong>in</strong> a closed hear<strong>in</strong>g" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that "they would not be used outside the Hague court-room, due to their close<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ks to the national <strong>security</strong> issues." In fact Serbia is try<strong>in</strong>g to prevent the use<br />
31 Jelena Cerov<strong>in</strong>a, A Heavy Burden of Anathema, Politika, 13 February 2006.<br />
She quoted the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment of Žarko Korac: “But what about those who gave<br />
orders, how is it possible that they are so much glorified?! The courage <strong>an</strong>d morality to<br />
speak about masterm<strong>in</strong>ds of that entire policy lacks. It is necessary to pursue <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
dialogue about the past events, <strong>in</strong> order to prevent their repeat, <strong>an</strong>d the repeat of the<br />
ideas which fuelled them.”<br />
32 Ibid.<br />
33 Press, 1 March 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
of those documents by the International Court of Justice, <strong>for</strong> it would make<br />
more difficult the position of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. 34<br />
Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of Public Hear<strong>in</strong>g<br />
In expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g BH claims, legal representative of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, Sakib Softić, <strong>state</strong>d that the Bosni<strong>an</strong> side filed the application<br />
because "the Belgrade authorities <strong>in</strong>tentionally took non-Serbs from BH on the<br />
road to hell, on the road strewn with dead bodies <strong>an</strong>d broken up families, lost<br />
youth, lost future, destroyed cities, cultural <strong>an</strong>d religious <strong>in</strong>stitutions…". He<br />
furthermore <strong>state</strong>d that BH was not aspir<strong>in</strong>g towards <strong>an</strong>y venge<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>for</strong><br />
"Serbs were obviously misled by their leaders, who implemented what they<br />
had <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong> the 90’s of the past century." He also underscored that the<br />
Bosniak side move was approved by m<strong>an</strong>y people <strong>in</strong> Serbia, notably NGOs<br />
who w<strong>an</strong>ted to establish Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> responsibility <strong>for</strong> the war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. However, he added that "the defence is try<strong>in</strong>g to proclaim<br />
itself <strong>in</strong>nocent. Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the stakes, it is not a very honourable option." 35<br />
Sofic stressed that the violence which hit Bosnia <strong>in</strong> 1992-1995 period, was a<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of a natural disaster, a k<strong>in</strong>d of tsunami, which "heavily dented the very<br />
gist of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>aged to destroy a large part of non-<br />
Serb population <strong>in</strong> BH." Softić also <strong>state</strong>d that "it is impossible to develop<br />
good-neighbourly relations <strong>an</strong>d sit <strong>in</strong> the Europe<strong>an</strong> parliament on the basis of<br />
a persistent denial. The truth shall be pa<strong>in</strong>ful <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro, but that pa<strong>in</strong> c<strong>an</strong>not be likened with the <strong>in</strong>tentional pa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>flicted<br />
on non-Serbs <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. Heal<strong>in</strong>g of that pa<strong>in</strong> is <strong>an</strong> additional<br />
reason <strong>for</strong> wish<strong>in</strong>g this court to render its judgment." Sofic did not deny that<br />
Serbs were also victims of war crimes, but suggested that "those developments<br />
did not result from the policy approved by the BH government." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Sofic "the goal of the claims is not to <strong>in</strong>crim<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong>dividually citizens of Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Republika Srpska….but we <strong>in</strong> fact w<strong>an</strong>t to establish the<br />
responsibility of the <strong>state</strong> which via its leadership <strong>an</strong>d bodies committed the<br />
most brutal violation of one of the most sacros<strong>an</strong>ct <strong>in</strong>stitutes of law. 36 "<br />
Thomas Fr<strong>an</strong>k, <strong>an</strong> US professor, also a BH legal representative,<br />
espoused the way BH <strong>in</strong>tended to prove that the FRY committed genocide <strong>in</strong><br />
BH. For him the irrefutable evidence kept pil<strong>in</strong>g as m<strong>an</strong>y bodies kept be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dug out from mass graves BH-wide. The Bosni<strong>an</strong> side shall ask the court to<br />
acknowledge some general, "notorious" facts, which need not be proved,<br />
unless denied by the defend<strong>an</strong>t. One of those facts is the massacre <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica, committed <strong>in</strong> July 1995. Bosni<strong>an</strong> side shall not present witnesses<br />
34 Ljubica Gojgić, Judical F<strong>in</strong>als , NIN, 23 February 2006.<br />
35 Politika, 28 February 2006.<br />
36 D<strong>an</strong>as, 28 February 2006.<br />
82<br />
83
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the court, <strong>for</strong> there are thous<strong>an</strong>ds of them. Instead it shall show footage<br />
from their testimonies be<strong>for</strong>e the Hague Tribunal. Also presented shall be<br />
testimonies of some "leaders of genocide," notably the <strong>state</strong>ment of Bilj<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Plavšić, then audio record<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>in</strong>tercepted conversations between Karadžić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Milošević <strong>an</strong>d other protagonists of the Bosni<strong>an</strong> tragedy. His evidence<br />
shall be also the video record<strong>in</strong>g of kill<strong>in</strong>g of 6 Muslim boys at the h<strong>an</strong>ds of<br />
"Skorpion" military unit. A import<strong>an</strong>t part of evidence shall be reports <strong>an</strong>d<br />
conclusions of the UN bodies, notably resolutions passed by the Security<br />
Council <strong>an</strong>d the General Assembly, <strong>an</strong>d also reports of Secretary General.<br />
Thomas Fr<strong>an</strong>k also <strong>in</strong>dicated that Bosnia still does not have access to other<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t evidence, due to Belgrade’s refusal to submit it. Some import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
documents have been recently submitted to the ICTY, but with a request "not<br />
to be made available to the Bosni<strong>an</strong> side <strong>an</strong>d the International Court of Justice."<br />
Ala<strong>in</strong> Pele, the French professor, also a member of the Bosni<strong>an</strong> legal team, out<br />
of sheer caution, espoused prelim<strong>in</strong>ary arguments on possible declaration<br />
relat<strong>in</strong>g to non-jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. He th<strong>in</strong>ks that<br />
the said jurisdiction over this dispute was confirmed four times. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
him the 2004 Court’s non-jurisdiction judgment relat<strong>in</strong>g to the FRY claims<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st eight NATO countries "does not have <strong>an</strong>y impact" on the current<br />
dispute. Pele said that "the said decision had a b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ce only on the<br />
parties <strong>in</strong> the then dispute, <strong>an</strong>d is not applicable to other parties <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
disputes." 37<br />
Magda Karadjij<strong>an</strong>ikis, <strong>an</strong> Australi<strong>an</strong> legal representative of BH, spoke<br />
about the Serb detention camps <strong>for</strong> Bosni<strong>an</strong> Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Croats. She <strong>state</strong>d<br />
that <strong>in</strong> 50 Bosni<strong>an</strong> municipalities there were 520 such camps "<strong>in</strong> which<br />
thous<strong>an</strong>ds of Muslims were imprisoned <strong>an</strong>d kept under <strong>in</strong><strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>e conditions,<br />
tortured <strong>an</strong>d killed…with<strong>in</strong> the framework of <strong>an</strong> ethnic-cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g campaign."<br />
She also expounded <strong>in</strong> detail the ICTY convictions of Drag<strong>an</strong> Nikolić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Milorad Krnojelac, comm<strong>an</strong>ders of the detention camp Sušica near Vlasenica<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Foča penitentiary. Lora Dob<strong>an</strong>, also a BH legal representative, <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
the Serb <strong>for</strong>ces dur<strong>in</strong>g the war <strong>in</strong> BH <strong>in</strong> a pl<strong>an</strong>ned way <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tentionally<br />
destroyed religious <strong>an</strong>d cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions of Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Croats to<br />
perm<strong>an</strong>ently remove them from the Serb-occupied territories. She said that <strong>in</strong><br />
Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a 277 mosques were damaged <strong>an</strong>d destroyed, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
added that "the ethnic-cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g campaign was followed by a barbari<strong>an</strong><br />
destruction of cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions, as <strong>an</strong>other mode of kill<strong>in</strong>g the people <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their spirit." 38<br />
Another BH legal representative V<strong>an</strong> den Bisen l<strong>in</strong>ked the siege <strong>an</strong>d<br />
shell<strong>in</strong>g of Sarajevo <strong>an</strong>d a sniper campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st civili<strong>an</strong>s to the fifth<br />
strategic goal-division of Sarajevo <strong>in</strong>to the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Muslim parts, driven by<br />
37 D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 March 2006.<br />
38 Politika, 2 March 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the <strong>in</strong>tention "to impose such liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions lead<strong>in</strong>g to partial or whole<br />
destruction of <strong>an</strong> ethnic group." BH legal representatives often touched on the<br />
6 strategic goals proclaimed <strong>in</strong> May 1992 by the Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serb parliament. In a<br />
bid to prove that "Belgrade was always <strong>in</strong> one way or <strong>an</strong>other present dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the longest siege of <strong>an</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> city", V<strong>an</strong> den Bisen showed the video<br />
record<strong>in</strong>g of Vojislav Kostunica’s tour of the RS army positions, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
mounta<strong>in</strong>s above Sarajevo. The court then also heard the <strong>state</strong>ment of the then<br />
opposition leader: "From these positions one c<strong>an</strong> best see the outl<strong>in</strong>es of the<br />
future Serbi<strong>an</strong> borders, on both sides of river Dr<strong>in</strong>a." 39<br />
Key po<strong>in</strong>t of the Serb strategy be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice,<br />
as expounded by the legal representative of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Radoslav<br />
Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, is that "there was no genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosniaks…the Hague<br />
Tribunal accepted a broad def<strong>in</strong>ition of genocide, but despite that could only<br />
prove the commission of genocide <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica, but not <strong>in</strong> whole Bosnia."<br />
Stoj<strong>an</strong>ovic stressed tha the conviction of RS general Radoslav Krstić was based<br />
on a special theory denied by a legal doctr<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>an</strong>d which was not thereafter<br />
confirmed by verdicts of other ICTY trial chambers. Stoj<strong>an</strong>ovic arguments<br />
focused on the future relations <strong>in</strong> the region. Namely he ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the<br />
Court’s judgement "c<strong>an</strong>not contribute to rais<strong>in</strong>g of awareness of what has<br />
happened, but may <strong>in</strong>stead contribute to deepen<strong>in</strong>g of problems, notably<br />
among peoples <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a." He th<strong>in</strong>ks that one side, or<br />
perhaps both sides, shall be dissatisfied, hence "the read<strong>in</strong>ess of the Serb side<br />
<strong>for</strong> a political agreement, as the best path towards the reconciliation of the<br />
three peoples <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a proper, <strong>an</strong>d the peoples of the two<br />
countries." 40<br />
Saša Obradović, co-representative of the Serb legal team, denied m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
documents proposed as evidence by the Bosni<strong>an</strong> side, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sisted that they<br />
were based on <strong>an</strong>onymous sources, unproven assertions, <strong>an</strong>d even on media<br />
reports. He furthermore ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that some events <strong>in</strong>voked by the applic<strong>an</strong>t<br />
have never been mentioned <strong>in</strong> the charges dealt with by the Hague Tribunal.<br />
After stat<strong>in</strong>g that the prosecutor <strong>in</strong>creased the number of victims <strong>in</strong> some<br />
localities (Zvornik, Trnopolje, Keraterm), Obradović said that "from the moral<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t we c<strong>an</strong>not underst<strong>an</strong>d the wish of prosecutor to magnify that<br />
number" <strong>an</strong>d "perhaps the prosecutor, <strong>in</strong> absence of better evidence, resorts to<br />
high figures, <strong>for</strong> without exaggerat<strong>in</strong>g the number of casualties he could not<br />
have filed the genocide-related application <strong>in</strong> the first place. He seems to be<br />
aware of his lack of credibility." 41<br />
39 D<strong>an</strong>as, 2 March 2006.<br />
40 Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović; We Deny the Claims, but Not the Suffer<strong>in</strong>g of Victims, D<strong>an</strong>as, 9<br />
March 2006.<br />
41 Ibid.<br />
84<br />
85
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Tibor Varadi, also a member of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> legal team, tried<br />
to prove non-jurisdiction of the court, <strong>in</strong> view of the two facts "each one of<br />
which is sufficient to make the court declare its non-jurisdiction": firstly, the<br />
FRY at the time of the claim-fil<strong>in</strong>g did not have the access to the court, <strong>for</strong> it<br />
was not <strong>an</strong> UN-member, <strong>an</strong>d secondly, Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro was not <strong>an</strong>d is<br />
not duty-bound to <strong>an</strong>swer those claims under Article 9 of the Convention on<br />
Genocide, which constitutes the basis of jurisdiction of the International Court<br />
of Justice. 42 Varadi also rem<strong>in</strong>ded the Court that the war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia was not<br />
only the conflict between Serbs <strong>an</strong>d non-Serbs, <strong>for</strong> "there was also the conflict<br />
between the Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Croats."<br />
Xavier de Roux, the French lawyer <strong>an</strong>d legal representative of<br />
Belgrade, <strong>in</strong> his argument, <strong>state</strong>d that "Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a was not the<br />
victim of <strong>an</strong> external aggression. In that country the three sides, Serbs, Muslims<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Croats, waged a civil war." In deny<strong>in</strong>g the BH claims about systematic<br />
kill<strong>in</strong>gs of Bosni<strong>an</strong> Muslims, de Roux, <strong>in</strong>dicated that "the victims,<br />
un<strong>for</strong>tunately, are <strong>in</strong>separable part of every war or armed conflict" <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
"<strong>in</strong>tentional kill<strong>in</strong>gs of civili<strong>an</strong>s may be possibly qualified as a crime aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>ity, but not as a genocide." He also floated the assertion that "President<br />
Izetbegović <strong>an</strong>d the BH war propag<strong>an</strong>da were very successful <strong>in</strong> that game, to<br />
the extent that the people soon <strong>for</strong>got their true war goals." The Serb team<br />
denied the number of victims <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dicated "sheer exaggeration of figures."<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Serb team to that propag<strong>an</strong>da succumbed also some<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations which were collect<strong>in</strong>g facts <strong>an</strong>d figures on BH<br />
developments <strong>in</strong> 1992-1995 period. 43<br />
Reactions<br />
First responses to the Bosni<strong>an</strong> team arguments were negative. Thus<br />
Miroljub Labus, Vice President of the government of Serbia, assessed that the<br />
court’s accept<strong>an</strong>ce of BH claims, might have negative consequences: "After<br />
such a development I c<strong>an</strong>not see how BH shall be able to survive as a unified<br />
<strong>state</strong>, <strong>for</strong> then the Muslim side shall be very frustrated." He assessed the<br />
pursuit of judicial resolution of the dispute as "play<strong>in</strong>g with fire, <strong>for</strong> it would<br />
have been much better if the Bosni<strong>an</strong> side had accepted our <strong>in</strong>itiative to resolve<br />
the problem <strong>in</strong> a diplomatic way." On the other h<strong>an</strong>d Professor Voj<strong>in</strong><br />
Dimitrijević <strong>state</strong>d that it was too early to say whether the court shall reta<strong>in</strong> its<br />
jurisdiction. In his op<strong>in</strong>ion only <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>an</strong>d not the <strong>state</strong> may be held<br />
responsible: "The <strong>state</strong> c<strong>an</strong>not have the <strong>in</strong>tent to commit a genocide, <strong>an</strong>d as<br />
regards genocide, the very <strong>in</strong>tent is essential. Hence the FRY c<strong>an</strong>not be tried<br />
<strong>for</strong> genocide, but the claims may be voiced that the FRY enabled, participated<br />
42 Ibid.<br />
43 Genocid Is a Product of “War Propag<strong>an</strong>da”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16 March 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d approved act someone else committed with that very genocidal<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention." 44<br />
Tibor Varadi underscored that the war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia "was a conflict<br />
between people, <strong>an</strong>d the court is deal<strong>in</strong>g with a dispute between <strong>state</strong>s". In<br />
other words, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Varadi, "if the BH w<strong>in</strong>s the lawsuit, <strong>an</strong>d we are<br />
sentenced to pay reparations, then we would face a very bizarre situation,<br />
namely reparations would be paid by all citizens of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Bosniaks from S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>an</strong>d Kosovar Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s to all citizens of<br />
Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Serbs from Republika Srpska." 45<br />
Uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty surround<strong>in</strong>g proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court<br />
of Justice, prompted m<strong>an</strong>y commentators to write about the need <strong>for</strong><br />
reconciliation, <strong>for</strong> the sake of the regional future, which must rest on a just <strong>an</strong>d<br />
stable basis-"to avoid that some are absolutely rewarded, while others would<br />
be absolutely punished" <strong>for</strong> the conflicts <strong>in</strong> which we all took part." In that<br />
context, it is ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the BH Application c<strong>an</strong>not constitute a step<br />
towards stabilization of circumst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> still volatile Balk<strong>an</strong>s. 46 It is<br />
underscored that politics need great ideas <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>ward-look<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the future "c<strong>an</strong>not be a small Serbia totally cut off from Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d its fellow-nationals <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a." It is<br />
furthermore stressed that the Western Balk<strong>an</strong>s "need Serbia as a regional <strong>for</strong>ce,<br />
which together with Croatia would <strong>for</strong>m a rally<strong>in</strong>g centre <strong>an</strong>d be a focal po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
of regional bal<strong>an</strong>ce." It is thought that "co-peration between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia<br />
may help lay down the groundwork of the Europe<strong>an</strong>, civil culture <strong>in</strong> this<br />
region, which would be beneficial <strong>for</strong> all the Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>state</strong>s." 47<br />
At the first hear<strong>in</strong>g it was once aga<strong>in</strong> underscored by the Serb side<br />
that "our <strong>state</strong> took a too hasty decision to withdraw its counter-claims with<br />
respect to genocide committed aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs <strong>in</strong> BH." A three-tier l<strong>in</strong>e of<br />
defence be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice is be<strong>in</strong>g suggested. Firstly the<br />
Serb legal must <strong>in</strong>sist that Serbia does not have a passive legitimization to be<br />
sued (one <strong>state</strong> c<strong>an</strong>not exist when it is sued, <strong>an</strong>d not exist when it sues, the<br />
second is a reference to the FRY claim aga<strong>in</strong>st NATO members). Secondly,<br />
attempts are to be made to show that the FRY was not directly l<strong>in</strong>ked to BH<br />
developments, that Republika Srpska <strong>an</strong>d its army operated totally<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependently from the FRY authorities <strong>an</strong>d army. It is to be stressed that<br />
Republika Srpska dur<strong>in</strong>g the war bore all the hallmarks of a sovereign <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d had all the <strong>state</strong> prerogatives <strong>in</strong> its territory. The third l<strong>in</strong>e of defence shall<br />
be that dur<strong>in</strong>g the civil war <strong>in</strong> BH no genocide was committed. The <strong>for</strong>eogo<strong>in</strong>g<br />
is due to the fact that the Srebrenica case is the foundation stone of the<br />
44 Politika, 28 February 2006.<br />
45 Politika, 1 March 2006.<br />
46 Neven Cvetić<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, Reconciliators W<strong>an</strong>ted , Politika, 2 March 2006.<br />
47 Ibid.<br />
86<br />
87
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
applic<strong>an</strong>t’s claim, but that the BH legal team lacks evidence to corroborate that<br />
claim. (Much smaller number of corpses has been exhumed, th<strong>an</strong> mentioned <strong>in</strong><br />
reports <strong>an</strong>d arguments, <strong>an</strong>d a number of casualties <strong>in</strong> fact perished <strong>in</strong> armed<br />
conflicts). 48<br />
Though the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs have only just started, the media are already<br />
deal<strong>in</strong>g with consequences of a positive judgment, that is, the one favour<strong>in</strong>g<br />
BH claims. London-based Daily Telegraph stressed that <strong>in</strong> that case "Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro would face not only enormous war reparations, but also the fact<br />
that a series of generations would be proscribed." M<strong>an</strong>y pr<strong>in</strong>t media carried<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment of Fr<strong>an</strong>cis Boyle, the law professor from Chicago: "A<br />
positive outcome <strong>for</strong> BH <strong>in</strong> this dispute is easy to predict…thus it would<br />
acquire the right to part of mobile <strong>an</strong>d immobile property of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro." 49 However, he suggested to the Bosni<strong>an</strong> authorites, <strong>in</strong> case of<br />
w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g the dispute, to "<strong>in</strong>stitute proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>for</strong> abolishment of Republika<br />
Srpska <strong>in</strong> the UN." 50 . Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs was also commented by Ala<br />
Jaskova, a Russi<strong>an</strong> expert <strong>for</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s: "BH claims aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro <strong>for</strong> genocide dur<strong>in</strong>g the civil war are absurd, <strong>an</strong>d ch<strong>an</strong>ces of<br />
Sarajevo be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court are slim." She added: "Genocide-related<br />
claims may be filed aga<strong>in</strong>st certa<strong>in</strong> personalities, notably <strong>for</strong>mer leader of<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serbs, Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić, or <strong>for</strong>mer Comm<strong>an</strong>der of the Republika<br />
Srpska Army, Ratko Mladić, but not aga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d people". 51<br />
But Ratko Mladić is <strong>in</strong> fact a key personality <strong>in</strong> the dispute be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
International Court of Justice, notably as regards the BH genocide claims. That<br />
is why m<strong>an</strong>ipulation with his file is <strong>in</strong>dicative. Namely the file conta<strong>in</strong>s m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
documents of import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the International Court of Justice, that is, amply<br />
demonstrates m<strong>an</strong>y denied l<strong>in</strong>ks between the <strong>state</strong> leadership of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
war leadership <strong>in</strong> Pale. It also <strong>in</strong>dicates a political cont<strong>in</strong>uity, embrac<strong>in</strong>g even<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica whose signature is found on the 2001 decree<br />
on Mladic’s retirement.<br />
Milorad Dodik, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Republika Srpska, dur<strong>in</strong>g his visit<br />
to Belgrade, <strong>state</strong>d that "RS does not back the BH application aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice", <strong>for</strong> those claims "do<br />
not contribute to stability <strong>an</strong>d are not <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of <strong>in</strong>tegration processes".<br />
After his meet<strong>in</strong>g with Dodik, Koštunica assessed that "the application is<br />
controversial, <strong>for</strong> there is no agreement of the three constituent peoples <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the two entities <strong>in</strong> BH, that is, there is not consent of the Serb people <strong>for</strong><br />
the fil<strong>in</strong>g of that application." In his communiqué Koštunica also po<strong>in</strong>ted out<br />
"the need to respect law <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational agreements, as well as to preserve<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d respect the Dayton Accord". 52 It is thought that such a st<strong>an</strong>ce of RS, or<br />
rather lack of consent of the three peoples <strong>an</strong>d the two entities <strong>for</strong> the<br />
application-fil<strong>in</strong>g would be <strong>an</strong> unsurmountable obstacle <strong>for</strong> the International<br />
Court of Justice. Belgrade treats as the new argument the fact that no official<br />
application has been filed with the Court’s registry barr<strong>in</strong>g the one filed <strong>in</strong><br />
March 1993 by the BH Ambassador to the UN Muhamed Sacirbej <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational law professor Fr<strong>an</strong>cis Boyle under authorization of the then BH<br />
President, Alija Izetbegović.<br />
In Belgrade it is thought that the death of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
end of his trial be<strong>for</strong>e the ICTY shall positively impact the current proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice. International law experts th<strong>in</strong>k that<br />
Serbia st<strong>an</strong>ds a better ch<strong>an</strong>ce to avoid a negative judgement, if the court’s nonjurisdiction<br />
is proclaimed. Tibor Varadi th<strong>in</strong>ks that Milosevic’s death shall<br />
weaken the BH arguments <strong>an</strong>d position, s<strong>in</strong>ce "of all charges aga<strong>in</strong>st him, the<br />
only relev<strong>an</strong>t one <strong>for</strong> the dispute was the genocide-related charge." On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d, Amir Ahmić, BH liaison officer with the ICTY ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that<br />
evidence of BH shall not be weakened, though after Milosevic death no other<br />
person from the political structure of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro has been charged<br />
with the BH genocide by the ICTY. 53<br />
Jurists <strong>in</strong> Belgrade th<strong>in</strong>k that the latest development shall smooth over<br />
the oversights noticeable <strong>in</strong> the first argument of Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović. It is<br />
thought that he, by <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on a deal, <strong>in</strong> fact denied the defence thesis on nonjurisdiction<br />
of the court, whose foundations had been laid by his predecessor,<br />
Tibor Varadi. Added to that the offer relat<strong>in</strong>g to the sett<strong>in</strong>g up of the Victims<br />
Damage Compensation Fund is considered contradictory with respect to<br />
denial of claims <strong>an</strong>d the civil nature of war. 54<br />
Srdja Popović, Belgrade lawyer, th<strong>in</strong>ks that m<strong>an</strong>y arguments aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the BH claims, are foggy, <strong>for</strong> those "who are held directly responsible <strong>for</strong> that<br />
policy w<strong>an</strong>t to persuade the public that such arguments protect the general<br />
public, while <strong>in</strong> fact they serve to hide those truly accountable from the public<br />
scrut<strong>in</strong>y." As regards m<strong>an</strong>ipulation l<strong>in</strong>ked to the damage compensation/<br />
reparations, Popovic says: "Both damage <strong>an</strong>d the f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of debtor<br />
are be<strong>in</strong>g assessed, but no debtor has ever been pushed <strong>in</strong>to death <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
pay compensatory damage! Added to that the said reparations shall not be<br />
used by all-not even by family of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić, as some are imply<strong>in</strong>g- but<br />
by those wo prove that they have <strong>in</strong>curred some damage." 55<br />
48 Mil<strong>an</strong> Škulić, Three-Tier Defence, Politika, 3 March 2006.<br />
49 Politika, 2 March 2006.<br />
50 NIN, 2 March 2006.<br />
51 Politika, 2 March 2006.<br />
2006.<br />
52 Controvesial BH Claims aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16 March<br />
53 Death Annuls All Auto-Goals, Politika, 17 March 2006.<br />
54 Ibid.<br />
55 Genocide <strong>an</strong>d Play<strong>in</strong>g with Fire, Vreme, 2 March 2006.<br />
88<br />
89
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
CAMPAIGNING AGAINST<br />
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS<br />
The <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO camp is very broad, it comprises the <strong>in</strong>cumbent<br />
political authorities, opposition, political <strong>an</strong>alysts, tabloids <strong>an</strong>d "serious" media<br />
alike, representatives of "approved" NGOs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>in</strong>dividuals. On<br />
the matter they speak with one voice, <strong>for</strong> they ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that some NGOs,<br />
notably those deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, compromise the civili<strong>an</strong> sector <strong>an</strong>d<br />
contribute to radicalization of the society <strong>an</strong>d consequently the rise <strong>in</strong> the<br />
popularity rat<strong>in</strong>g of the Radical Party. Start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> vilification <strong>an</strong>d denial<br />
of the NGO sector is the allegation that they are a modern <strong>in</strong>vention, imported<br />
from the West, <strong>an</strong>d consequently <strong>an</strong>ti-Orthodox <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb. The authorities<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ifested not only the essential misunderst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of the role of NGOs <strong>in</strong><br />
protect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d champion<strong>in</strong>g <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, but also misapprehension of the<br />
role of the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the rul<strong>in</strong>g structures as <strong>an</strong> ideologiocal controller of<br />
freedom of association. Essentially at play is a genu<strong>in</strong>e censorship of freedom<br />
of association, systematic misuse <strong>an</strong>d limitation of freedom of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In<br />
parallel, by back<strong>in</strong>g the preservation of prejudices aga<strong>in</strong>st NGOs the<br />
authorities show ignor<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>in</strong>ternational mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>an</strong>d documents,<br />
notably of the UN Charter on Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d Universal Declaration on<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights. 1<br />
Found<strong>in</strong>g of a group of eight NGOs <strong>in</strong> early 2005 has subst<strong>an</strong>tively<br />
contributed to sensitivization of the public with respect to the import<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
co-operation with the Hague Tribunal, <strong>an</strong>d raiz<strong>in</strong>g of issue of responsibility <strong>for</strong><br />
the war crimes. The eight NGO proposal of Declaration of Srebrenica provoked a<br />
series of responses notably of the <strong>in</strong>cumbent authorities. The tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary<br />
of Srebrenica genocide prompted the whole world to address the issue of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational responsibility <strong>for</strong> the Srebrenica crime. Serbia was also expected<br />
to make a move show<strong>in</strong>g a k<strong>in</strong>d of empathy <strong>for</strong> victims. Instead the<br />
government directly accused the group of 8 NGOs <strong>for</strong> underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its strategy<br />
of „voluntary surrender." Then a campaign was mounted aga<strong>in</strong>st those NGOs<br />
with the argument that they were illegitimately deal<strong>in</strong>g with the political<br />
issues. The NGO Declaration was publicly depicted as a radical provocation<br />
1 See YUCOM’s report on NGO’s<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
aimed at underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the government. Demonization of the NGO group,<br />
notably of the four women front<strong>in</strong>g four NGOs, was effected through wellproven<br />
stereotypes: the issue of their „non-tr<strong>an</strong>sparent," their support to<br />
„illegitimate" <strong>state</strong> of emergency, portrayal of NGOs as a factor of<br />
radicalization of Serbia, their illegitimacy, <strong>an</strong>d identification of NGOs with<br />
„the female foursome."<br />
Mystification of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g of NGOs serves as a ma<strong>in</strong> argument aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
them <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> their disqualification as „<strong>for</strong>eign mercenaries". The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g<br />
calls <strong>in</strong>to question their good <strong>in</strong>tentions <strong>an</strong>d patriotism. It is be<strong>in</strong>g implied that<br />
their activities are ordered by the Western colonizers who are bent on<br />
destroy<strong>in</strong>g the Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodoxy <strong>an</strong>d identity of the Serb people. A genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of those org<strong>an</strong>izations is rarely mentioned, though the<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t data may be easily donwloaded from the web sites of those NGOs, or<br />
obta<strong>in</strong>ed from the Public Revenues Directorate. Namely all donations are paid<br />
<strong>in</strong>to local b<strong>an</strong>ks <strong>an</strong>d consequently taxed as „<strong>in</strong>come of produc<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies",<br />
which constitutes a genu<strong>in</strong>e discrim<strong>in</strong>ation with respect to the NGO treatment<br />
<strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g country <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the world <strong>in</strong> general. 2 It is also frequently<br />
implied that some NGOs are funded by mafia, <strong>an</strong>d most frequently by the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> mafia. 3 Duško J<strong>an</strong>jić, Co-ord<strong>in</strong>ator of the Forum <strong>for</strong> Ethnic Relations,<br />
stresses that a play is <strong>an</strong> attempt to depict NGOs as org<strong>an</strong>izations enjoy<strong>in</strong>g<br />
lucrative benefits from non-tr<strong>an</strong>sparent f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g. In fact, accord<strong>in</strong>g to J<strong>an</strong>jic,<br />
„the s<strong>in</strong>tagm of tr<strong>an</strong>sparent fund<strong>in</strong>g is be<strong>in</strong>g used to place under control<br />
activities of allegedly "politick<strong>in</strong>g" NGOs <strong>an</strong>d thus limit their freedom of<br />
expression <strong>an</strong>d their criticism of the exist<strong>in</strong>g situation <strong>in</strong> the society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>." 4<br />
This <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO- f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g campaign is similar to the one recently<br />
mounted by Put<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Russia. In fact at play is <strong>an</strong> attempt to effect<br />
"put<strong>in</strong>ization" of the NGO sector <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Such <strong>an</strong> extreme st<strong>an</strong>d on the<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> sector most evidently <strong>in</strong>dicates the weaknesses of the <strong>in</strong>cumbent<br />
govenrment <strong>an</strong>d its extreme sensitivity to <strong>an</strong>y critical op<strong>in</strong>ion. However, the<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> sector has its weaknesses too. Part of NGOs is very close to<br />
government, does not have a critical dist<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d often emerges as the most<br />
vocal detractor of the "disobedient part of NGOs." In fact at play is <strong>an</strong> attempt<br />
to control <strong>for</strong>eign donations <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izations perceived as <strong>in</strong>ternationally<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluential, notably org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>for</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights. Sonja Liht, presented to the<br />
2 Projects of NGOs are funded (mostly) by <strong>for</strong>eign donors <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with a<br />
strict procedure, that is if NGOs meet the conditions of the previously, publicly<br />
disclosed project. Thereafter the approved funds are paid <strong>in</strong>to the current account of<br />
those org<strong>an</strong>izations.<br />
3 Marko Nicović <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview to Svedok of 29 November 2006, says :” It is<br />
fairly easy to establish who is flirt<strong>in</strong>g with Shiptari, <strong>in</strong> terms of render<strong>in</strong>g support to<br />
their idea of <strong>in</strong>dependence. There are reported meet<strong>in</strong>gs, firm <strong>an</strong>d public <strong>state</strong>ments,<br />
contacts…But I c<strong>an</strong> say that Shiptari fund over 70% of NGOs <strong>in</strong> Serbia. ”<br />
4 Politika,<br />
90<br />
91
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
public as a „veter<strong>an</strong> of NGO sector <strong>in</strong> Serbia", is the sharpest detractor with her<br />
thesis that the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned NGOs are „necrophile, vengeful, bent on<br />
prevent<strong>in</strong>g Serbia's democratization." In fact that part of NGOs is used to<br />
underm<strong>in</strong>e the second part of NGOs <strong>an</strong>d discredit them be<strong>for</strong>e the eyes of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community.<br />
It is underscored that „private NGOs, funded by billions of dollars of<br />
George Soros, are publicly work<strong>in</strong>g on toppl<strong>in</strong>g of the regime which they don't<br />
like, mostly by d<strong>in</strong>t of the local media fund<strong>in</strong>g", <strong>an</strong>d „personalities like Nataša<br />
K<strong>an</strong>dić, Sonja Biserko <strong>an</strong>d Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovačević Vučo, are paid by those very<br />
circles <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions to do that..." Dr Srdja Trifković, Director of the<br />
Internationl Relations Centre of the US Rock<strong>for</strong>d Institute, deems that NGOs<br />
"should be abolished...or cease to exist." He th<strong>in</strong>ks that the <strong>state</strong> bodies of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d of Republika Srpska should exam<strong>in</strong>e sources of<br />
their f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d close them down by a summary procedure, if it is proved<br />
that those NGOs are <strong>in</strong> fact politically motivated <strong>in</strong>stitutions. 5 Sonja Liht aired<br />
similar arguments: „<strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> average Serb Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dic, Sonja Biserko <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovačevic Vučo embody all those NGOs", <strong>for</strong> „they call <strong>in</strong>to question<br />
the nature, the role <strong>an</strong>d existence of NGOs".<br />
The authorities blamed some NGOs <strong>for</strong> the 2005 decision of State<br />
Department to deprive Serbia of $ 100,000 million worth of assit<strong>an</strong>ce on<br />
grounds of its non-cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. That accusation was<br />
also due to the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment of the State Department<br />
representative:"That is why the sum of $ 73 million shall reach only those<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m-m<strong>in</strong>ded org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d projects which are beyond the central<br />
authorities control." 6<br />
In the <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO campaign oft espoused is the fact that some of them<br />
<strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple backed the <strong>state</strong> of emergency as a way of prevent<strong>in</strong>g the collapse<br />
of the <strong>state</strong>. They are be<strong>in</strong>g accused of not hav<strong>in</strong>g a critical st<strong>an</strong>d on the<br />
government's violations of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights dur<strong>in</strong>g the Sword operation. That<br />
allegation is not only true, but also became the common denom<strong>in</strong>ator <strong>in</strong> the<br />
country <strong>an</strong>d abroad. It is be<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>an</strong>ipulated by politici<strong>an</strong>s, NGO activists,<br />
some <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, <strong>an</strong>d most often by representatives of authorities. The fact is<br />
that the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the Jurists'<strong>Committee</strong> backed the <strong>state</strong> of<br />
emergency deem<strong>in</strong>g that after a coup d etait it was necessary, via legitimate<br />
measures <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> keeep<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>ternational obligations stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the<br />
Pact on Civil <strong>an</strong>d Political Rights <strong>an</strong>d the Europe<strong>an</strong> Charter Liberties, to reestablish<br />
<strong>security</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights protection. The Fund <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong><br />
Law was aga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>in</strong>troduction of the <strong>state</strong> of emergency <strong>for</strong> "without<br />
establishment of certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions such a <strong>state</strong> of emergency may contribute<br />
to cement<strong>in</strong>g of crim<strong>in</strong>alized services." However all those three org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
5 Inter-Nacional, 5 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
6 Inter-nacional, Profiteers <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>ctions, 17 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>ed various groups <strong>for</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g possible violations of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the authorities-taken measures possibly subject to political misuses. Those ad<br />
hoc groups were set up with<strong>in</strong> the UN <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
embraced representatives of a larger number of <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>an</strong>d domestic NGOs,<br />
as well as representatives of <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
embassies. In the immediate aftermath of proclamation of the <strong>state</strong> of<br />
emergency, nearly all domestic NGOs rallied <strong>in</strong> the Centre <strong>for</strong> Cultural<br />
Decontam<strong>in</strong>ation to launch a campaign "Stop the Crimes".<br />
Under the pressure of <strong>in</strong>ternational community the authorities were<br />
compelled to establish a k<strong>in</strong>d of co-operation ("voluntary surrender") with the<br />
Hague Tribunal, which on the <strong>in</strong>ternal pl<strong>an</strong>e resulted <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased represion<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st part of civili<strong>an</strong> society, notably NGOs deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d<br />
fac<strong>in</strong>g up to the past, political opponents <strong>an</strong>d political rivals.<br />
Attacks on NGOs peaked after <strong>in</strong>itiative of he eight NGOs aimed at<br />
prompt<strong>in</strong>g the Serb parliament to adopt Declaration on Srebrenica. That<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiative was publicly demonized as "a cuckoo's nest" <strong>an</strong>d allegation was<br />
floated that "adoption of that declaration would have a broader impact on the<br />
International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> the Hague, be<strong>for</strong>e which the FRY was accused<br />
of aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide." 7 When the campaign peaked Dragoljub Kojčić<br />
(DPS), called on the Serb parliament to set up „a special committee to launch a<br />
probe <strong>in</strong>to the NGO-led <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb campaign", while Ivica Dačić (SSP) criticized<br />
the <strong>in</strong>itiative of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a authorities that "the <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica<br />
crime, the 11th July, be proclaimed a day of mourn<strong>in</strong>g. " 8<br />
Though the unwill<strong>in</strong>gness of both the government <strong>an</strong>d parliament to<br />
adopt the Declaration on Srebrenica was evident, the said document was<br />
nonetheless debated by the Serb parliament. MPs though fail<strong>in</strong>g to agree on<br />
adoption of the resolution on condemnation of war crimes nonetheless <strong>for</strong> 5<br />
hours discussed the Srebrenica event, though it was not on the agenda. At the<br />
very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the emergency session MPs of the Serb Radical Party,<br />
Democratic Party of Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Party of Serbia, accused NGOs of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d "the <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb campaign.". Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić (SRP) accused the<br />
Chair of the Fund <strong>for</strong> the Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law of front<strong>in</strong>g the „<strong>an</strong>ti-Serb<br />
campaign" <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>d that she „falsely accused Tomislav Nikolić of<br />
participation <strong>in</strong> a war crime". The column "Psychological Profile of Sonja<br />
Biserko" of daily Glas javnosti read: "Through her half-closed eyes, covered by<br />
<strong>an</strong> unusual hair-style, that wom<strong>an</strong> watches over the results of her work, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
th<strong>in</strong>ks up other activity which would be liked better by her boss <strong>an</strong>d those who<br />
evaluate her." 9<br />
7 Srpski nacional, Cuckoo’s Egg, 26 April 2005, page 11.<br />
8 Kurir, NGOs Pursue <strong>an</strong> Anti-Serb Campaign, 25 June 2005.<br />
9 Glas javnosti, Psychological Profile, 27 July 2005.<br />
92<br />
93
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
That campaign escalated after the screen<strong>in</strong>g of a documentary film on<br />
Škorpioni, <strong>in</strong> the Hague Tribunal, <strong>an</strong>d its later air<strong>in</strong>g on most domestic TV<br />
stations. Patriotic camp immediately qualified that film as a "doctored video"<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> attempt to disqualify Serbs. It was stressed that "as of late, by its <strong>in</strong>tense<br />
activity, the video/film doctor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d political m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of the Srebrenica<br />
case, the "NGO government" <strong>in</strong> Serbia headed by the notorious Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić,<br />
showed its true power. And it seems that the <strong>in</strong>ternal war <strong>for</strong> primacy among<br />
enemies systematically <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> Serbia, Natasa K<strong>an</strong>dic has f<strong>in</strong>ally won with<br />
a major score difference to her adv<strong>an</strong>tage. Thus the "silver medal" could go to<br />
"famous" Sonja Biserko <strong>an</strong>d the bronze medal to the follow<strong>in</strong>g media<br />
entourage: B92, „D<strong>an</strong>as", „Vreme",... All others rema<strong>in</strong>ed on the sidel<strong>in</strong>es of the<br />
competition "How To Successfully Demonize Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Serbia," though m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
are stubbornly struggl<strong>in</strong>g not to lose their place <strong>in</strong> the league of users of Sorosthe<br />
US-, <strong>an</strong>d the Shiptari drug mafia-funded projects. It is obvious that Natasa<br />
K<strong>an</strong>dic would so keenly tra<strong>in</strong> the Hague witnesses only <strong>for</strong> a solid sum of<br />
money! Thus the second-league NGOs, cont<strong>in</strong>ue their tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g with the hope of<br />
jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the first league. And there are m<strong>an</strong>y of them: Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovačević Vučo,<br />
Borka Pavićević, Vesna Pešić, Lat<strong>in</strong>ka Perović...,the bereaved revolutionary<br />
Čeda Jov<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d „the ever-merry Žarko Korać". „But when speak<strong>in</strong>g about<br />
Natasa K<strong>an</strong>dic, her satellite Sonja Biserko <strong>an</strong>d others from those leagues of<br />
rogues, Soros-funded Mudjahed<strong>in</strong>s, to mention the hard facts <strong>an</strong>d morals, is a<br />
useless venture." 10<br />
Eight NGOs on the 10th <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica genocide org<strong>an</strong>ized<br />
a series of m<strong>an</strong>ifestations, which were sharply criticized as be<strong>in</strong>g "<strong>an</strong>ti-Serb,"<br />
<strong>an</strong>d leaders of those org<strong>an</strong>izations were br<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>an</strong>d demonized as-traitors.<br />
The NGO-staged rally to mark the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of Srebrenica <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade’s central square, ended with the police throw<strong>in</strong>g tear-gas on the circle<br />
made up by NGO activists. Thus the protest "Let Us Not Forget" staged by the<br />
Women <strong>in</strong> Black was <strong>in</strong>terrupted. Some <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO milit<strong>an</strong>ts be<strong>for</strong>e the police<br />
action ch<strong>an</strong>ted: „Knife, Wire, Srebrenica" Srebrenica", <strong>an</strong>d „Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić Is a<br />
Whore". Police deta<strong>in</strong>ed 9 youngsters with shaved head, <strong>an</strong>d the rally was<br />
protected by three police cordons. The rally was attended by NGO activists<br />
from Italy, Israel, the US, Germ<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d also by the Chair of the<br />
Fund <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law, Natasa K<strong>an</strong>dic, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d its Chair Sonja Biserko, the Jurists <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights, <strong>an</strong>d its chair Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovačević-Vučo 11 <strong>an</strong>d Borka Pavićević,<br />
from the Cultural Decontam<strong>in</strong>ation Centre". 12<br />
10 www.srpskenov<strong>in</strong>eogledalo.co.yu, Who is <strong>in</strong> fact Natasa K<strong>an</strong>dić? No. 53.<br />
11 Both the media <strong>an</strong>d judicial campaign has been mounted aga<strong>in</strong>st Bilj<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Kovačević-Vučo. Namely, she, <strong>in</strong> her capacity of lawyer of Vladimir Popović protected<br />
his <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights dur<strong>in</strong>g the media-bash<strong>in</strong>g campaign target<strong>in</strong>g Popovic, at the time of<br />
the Sword Action. As a part of his defense strategy she made certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong>ments at a<br />
press conference. At a later date crim<strong>in</strong>al charges were filed aga<strong>in</strong>st her “<strong>for</strong> sl<strong>an</strong>der <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Initiative of the Young <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights on 27 June 2005 placed over<br />
30 billboards <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš <strong>an</strong>d Čačak, with photos of the<br />
Sarajevo author, Tarik Samarah, orig<strong>in</strong>ally from Srebrenica. The message next<br />
to the photo was the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "To See, To Know, To Remember". With<strong>in</strong> a<br />
few days, all billboards were destroyed. The follow<strong>in</strong>g was written with a<br />
black pa<strong>in</strong>t over them: Knife, Wire, Srebrenica; Ratko Mladić; There Shall Be<br />
Reprisals, etc. Campaign was commented by numerous public personalities,<br />
notably Drag<strong>an</strong> Kojad<strong>in</strong>ović, the Culture M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia: „We should speak<br />
about all crimes, <strong>in</strong>stead of condemn<strong>in</strong>g only one people of all the wrongdo<strong>in</strong>g."<br />
Savo Štrbac, President of Documentation Centre Veritas, thus<br />
commented the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned billboards: "This is someth<strong>in</strong>g that the late<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong> Rašković, called <strong>an</strong> aggression of conscience, when speak<strong>in</strong>g about the<br />
Croat Democratic Community pressure on Serbs <strong>in</strong> Croatia, <strong>an</strong>d that party’s<br />
claim that everyth<strong>in</strong>g was Croat, even the air <strong>an</strong>d water." He ended his text<br />
with the follow<strong>in</strong>g words: „It is odd that <strong>in</strong> our country we don’t have a<br />
regulatory body, controll<strong>in</strong>g contents of all ads <strong>an</strong>d thus prevent<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
emergence of similar photos on the streets. Such a body exists <strong>in</strong> all Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
countries, but we, faced with its absence, leave everyth<strong>in</strong>g to the free will of<br />
those who place such ads." 13<br />
Media <strong>in</strong> Serbia underscored that „one does knot know whether such<br />
billboards <strong>in</strong>sult more the dead people <strong>in</strong> their coff<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d their families, who<br />
thus become the object of a money-collect<strong>in</strong>g market<strong>in</strong>g campaign of NGOs (I<br />
have never be<strong>for</strong>e heard of that org<strong>an</strong>ization the „Initiative of the Young <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights"), or it is more <strong>in</strong>sult<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> citizens of this city <strong>an</strong>d their<br />
children, <strong>for</strong> they are supposed to feel, like Germ<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> 1944, collective guilt,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d are furthermore thus compelled to feel pa<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d repent<strong>an</strong>ce." 14<br />
There is much <strong>in</strong>sistence on money donated <strong>for</strong> such actions:<br />
„Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong>s who are <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>e only when they get some money, have<br />
adorned Belgrade with billboards relat<strong>in</strong>g to Srebrenica, probably with the<br />
idea of compell<strong>in</strong>g us to cont<strong>in</strong>ue to "genocidal actions", that is, of driv<strong>in</strong>g us to<br />
str<strong>an</strong>gle <strong>an</strong>yone who even dares mention the genocide. ". 15<br />
<strong>in</strong>sult”. Borislav Mikelić <strong>an</strong>d Bogd<strong>an</strong> Tirn<strong>an</strong>ic filed private charges aga<strong>in</strong>st her “<strong>for</strong><br />
sl<strong>an</strong>der <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sult”. Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Tij<strong>an</strong>ic, director of Radio-Television Serbia, filed four<br />
lawsuits aga<strong>in</strong>st Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovacevic Vuco, that is, aga<strong>in</strong>st the Jurists’ <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights publication compil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ments made by Tij<strong>an</strong>ic. Tij<strong>an</strong>ić also<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded damage compensation to the value of 8.5 million d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gement of<br />
his copyright. He subsequently dem<strong>an</strong>ded a provisional measure t<strong>an</strong>tamount to<br />
b<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the book “The Case of Clerk Aleks<strong>an</strong>dra Tij<strong>an</strong>ić”, as well as further pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d sale thereof, until the end of the lawsuit.<br />
12 D<strong>an</strong>as, Tear-Gas aga<strong>in</strong>st Srebrenica, 11 July 2005.<br />
13 Glas javnosti, Crime as <strong>an</strong> Advertisement, 2 July 2005.<br />
14 Kurir, Column Isidora Bjelice, 2-3 July 2005.<br />
15 Glas javnosti, column penned by Dragoljub Petrović, 8 July 2005.<br />
94<br />
95
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The sharpest criticism <strong>an</strong>d most virulent attacks come from the<br />
academic circles notably those <strong>an</strong>ti-Western ones. In his <strong>in</strong>terview to Svedok,<br />
academici<strong>an</strong> Kosta Čavoški said: "Sonja Biserko is the person with the least<br />
moral right to criticize <strong>an</strong>yone on <strong>an</strong>y ground. She has <strong>for</strong> a long time worked<br />
as a <strong>state</strong>, that is a diplomatic employee, <strong>an</strong>d as such was vetted regard<strong>in</strong>g her<br />
loyalty to the authorities. And that vett<strong>in</strong>g was primarily done by the secret<br />
police. After <strong>an</strong> extensive vett<strong>in</strong>g she was considered ‘absolutely theirs", that is<br />
a true communist. She worked closely with M<strong>in</strong>ister Lončar, who was, as far as<br />
I may recall, a m<strong>in</strong>ister dur<strong>in</strong>g the time of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević... Hence she<br />
does not have the moral right to take to task <strong>an</strong>yone." 16<br />
Ogledalo <strong>in</strong> a very cynical tone covered the <strong>in</strong>itiative "Thous<strong>an</strong>d<br />
Women <strong>for</strong> Nobel Peace Prize", <strong>an</strong>d Sonja Biserko, Chair of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, was among that group of all-female<br />
contenders: "By propos<strong>in</strong>g those "activists" was someone "just hav<strong>in</strong>g fun:"<br />
…on the other h<strong>an</strong>d the last th<strong>in</strong>g K<strong>an</strong>dić’s 'stooge' Sonja Biserko needs is a<br />
Nobel prize." That text, which is <strong>in</strong> fact a re-pr<strong>in</strong>t of her alleged biography<br />
from Internacional (11 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005) reads: 'Sonja Biserko 17 is not terribly keen<br />
on questions related to her nationality, <strong>an</strong>d she hides m<strong>an</strong>y other biographical<br />
data from the Serb public. However, it is known that she has worked <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Foreign M<strong>in</strong>istry as <strong>an</strong> aide to the <strong>for</strong>mer, famous Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister, Budimir<br />
Lončar, that she has no children <strong>an</strong>d other family-related obligations, <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
16 Svedok, It is more probable that Miloš Vasić was tasked by f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ciers to vilify<br />
<strong>an</strong>d tell on their “foes,” <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce I am on that list he gave a free re<strong>in</strong> to his bash<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
me, too. 15 March 2005, page 11.<br />
17 In the text r<strong>an</strong> on 8 September by daily "Tabloid" Sonja Biserko, was, <strong>in</strong>ter<br />
alia, accused of be<strong>in</strong>g the Croat spy. Although some pr<strong>in</strong>t media are const<strong>an</strong>tly rife with<br />
lies <strong>an</strong>d hatred relat<strong>in</strong>g to Sonja Biserko, this was a genu<strong>in</strong>e call to lynch, <strong>for</strong> her private<br />
address (street, number of build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d flat) was made public too. Added to that data<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g her immediate family-which may be only <strong>in</strong> the possession of the State<br />
Security Services- were disclosed too.<br />
Throughout last year Sonja Biserko was repeatedly physically assaulted <strong>in</strong><br />
front of ther flat, <strong>an</strong>d those assaults were reported to the police. Also her flat was<br />
burglazired. But the police <strong>in</strong>vestigation produced no results. After the burglary a police<br />
patrol <strong>in</strong> front of her apartment block kept secur<strong>in</strong>g her physical well-be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a month.<br />
On grounds of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned text <strong>in</strong> "Tabloid", lawyers of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia filed a sl<strong>an</strong>der lawsuit aga<strong>in</strong>st the said daily to<br />
the republic<strong>an</strong> public prosecutor.<br />
We are duty bound to caution the most responsible representatives of<br />
authorities of this country aga<strong>in</strong>st the fact that the mood characterized by purges <strong>an</strong>d<br />
physical assaults on public personalities does not contribute to creation of a toler<strong>an</strong>t<br />
environment, necessary <strong>for</strong> development of <strong>an</strong>y democratic society. Passivity of elites <strong>in</strong><br />
the face of pogrom-style methods destroys criteria/set of values/st<strong>an</strong>dards, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
generates apathy, while the absence of the <strong>state</strong> bodies measures aga<strong>in</strong>st violence calls<br />
<strong>in</strong>to question the <strong>security</strong> of citizens <strong>an</strong>d of the soceity.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
she is entirely devoted to the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned 'activities'" ("... that is to a<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ual <strong>an</strong>d unlimited vilification of the most hated people on the Earth, –<br />
the Serb people"). 18<br />
Hate <strong>an</strong>d Violence Incited<br />
One of <strong>for</strong>ms of the <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO campaign is graffiti-writ<strong>in</strong>g. Thus on<br />
the night of 4 November 2004 over the name plate of the Fund <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law, next to the entr<strong>an</strong>ce to the NGO seat, a Nazi swastika was<br />
pa<strong>in</strong>ted with a spray. On 22 March 2005. on the same plate the Star of David<br />
was pa<strong>in</strong>ted, <strong>an</strong>d on the wall fac<strong>in</strong>g the FHL entry seat’s the follow<strong>in</strong>g graffiti<br />
were pa<strong>in</strong>ted: „Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić is a Jewish stooge –<strong>an</strong> obedient serv<strong>an</strong>t of the<br />
Jewish World Order", „No to the Zionist occupation of the world", „In the<br />
combat <strong>for</strong> Serbia to the ultimate victory", "Serbia to Serbs"; on 11 July 2005 <strong>for</strong><br />
the third time over the FHL name plate the Star of David was pa<strong>in</strong>ted with a<br />
spray. 19<br />
With<strong>in</strong> the framework of the latest <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO campaign the graffiti<br />
"Members of Sect Must Leave Serbia Immediately" was pa<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>for</strong> months on<br />
the wall fac<strong>in</strong>g the office of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade. On the office door <strong>an</strong>d other walls the follow<strong>in</strong>g graffiti were<br />
written: "Sonja Biserko – a Jewish stooge –<strong>an</strong> obedient serv<strong>an</strong>t of the Jewish<br />
World Order", "Serbia to Serbs" <strong>an</strong>d "B92 = Star of David." . 20<br />
Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić’s <strong>state</strong>ment that Toma Nikolić, Vice President of the<br />
Serb Radical Party was accountable <strong>for</strong> the death of several old men <strong>in</strong> village<br />
Ant<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> 1991, prompted the Radicals to mount a brutal, <strong>an</strong>ti-NGO campaign,<br />
even <strong>in</strong> the Serb parliament. At a parliamentary session, Radical Party, DPS<br />
<strong>an</strong>d SPS MPs sharply criticized NGO, <strong>an</strong>d even accused them of be<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d<br />
’’the <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb campaign.’’ Added to that the Deputy Head of SRP MP group,<br />
Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić, br<strong>an</strong>ded the Chair of the Fund <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law,<br />
Natasa K<strong>an</strong>dic "a g<strong>an</strong>g-leader conduct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb campaign". 21 Vučić also<br />
said that the Chair of FHL was „a pathological liar"....Vucic also accused<br />
K<strong>an</strong>dic of „mount<strong>in</strong>g a campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st all th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d persons bear<strong>in</strong>g a Serb<br />
hallmark" <strong>an</strong>d expressed his conviction that she would "end beh<strong>in</strong>d the bars" 22<br />
…<strong>an</strong>d accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, "then, the others…all those con-men <strong>an</strong>d con-women<br />
shall also end up <strong>in</strong> the only place they merit-the jail." 23<br />
18 Ogledalo, 6 July 2005.<br />
19 Source: Fund <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law<br />
20 Source: Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
21 Srpski nacional, K<strong>an</strong>dić Is a G<strong>an</strong>g- Leader, 25 June 2005.<br />
22 D<strong>an</strong>as, Radical Party Members were the Yugoslav Peoples Army Volunteers,<br />
16 June 2005.<br />
23 Srpski nacional, Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić <strong>an</strong>d Ver<strong>an</strong> Matić Must Go to Jail, 19 June 2005.<br />
96<br />
97
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The leak of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation that the Serb Secret Services were monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the work of NGOs was the last <strong>in</strong> a series of the authorities’ actions aimed at<br />
both compromis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>timidat<strong>in</strong>g NGO activists. In other words, Head of<br />
the Security-Intelligence Agency of Serbia, Rade Bulatović, at the session of the<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Security <strong>an</strong>d Defense of the Serb parliament <strong>state</strong>d that those<br />
services were monitor<strong>in</strong>g the work of some NGOs. Daily D<strong>an</strong>as thus<br />
commented that <strong>state</strong>ment: "When the first m<strong>an</strong> of <strong>security</strong> services says that<br />
his services are monitor<strong>in</strong>g the work of some NGOs <strong>an</strong>d stresses that they<br />
"misuse the NGO status <strong>an</strong>d are mostly funded by those <strong>for</strong>eign centers to later<br />
promote political <strong>an</strong>d <strong>security</strong> tasks notably <strong>in</strong> the area of Raska <strong>an</strong>d South<br />
Serbia," that the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g signals the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of a witch-hunt. One may<br />
quite ef<strong>for</strong>tlessly recognize those monitored NGOs: Centre <strong>for</strong> Cultural<br />
Decontam<strong>in</strong>ation, the Belgrade Circle, Jurists’ <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights,<br />
the Fund <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law, Initiative of the Young, Women <strong>in</strong> Black,<br />
Civil Initiatives <strong>an</strong>d the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia." 24<br />
II<br />
LEGAL SYSTEM<br />
24 D<strong>an</strong>as, Witch Hunt, 7 July 2005.<br />
98<br />
99
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
INSTITIONS IN THE CLUTCHES<br />
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH<br />
The establishment of a legal system that would br<strong>in</strong>g Serbia closer to<br />
developed democracies is still underway. As it turned out, a genu<strong>in</strong>e political<br />
will to have newly adopted laws <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards implemented did not follow <strong>in</strong><br />
the footsteps of legislative activism. This is about a slow-paced process that<br />
almost stalled <strong>in</strong> 2005. Though the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament passed scores of laws,<br />
what marked 2005 was that those laws were not implemented. For a<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sitional <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its functional re<strong>for</strong>ms the legislation that lacks<br />
en<strong>for</strong>ceable mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>an</strong>d a new methodology is more of a regress th<strong>an</strong><br />
progress. The government failed to adopt bylaws that would secure<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement of a number of laws, the same as it failed to establish necessary<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms of control. The much delayed Serbi<strong>an</strong> constitution<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicates a chronic absence of political will to f<strong>in</strong>alize the necessary re<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
<strong>an</strong>d safeguard them by <strong>an</strong> adequate legal system. All this only moves Serbia<br />
away from Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
The function<strong>in</strong>g of the State Union’s <strong>in</strong>stitutions kept spiral<strong>in</strong>g down<br />
throughout 2005. As <strong>in</strong> 2004 Montenegr<strong>in</strong> top politici<strong>an</strong>s were focused on<br />
turn<strong>in</strong>g the issue of referendum <strong>in</strong>to “the question of all questions,” the one<br />
exceed<strong>in</strong>g the Union’s <strong>in</strong>terests, the deadl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> call<strong>in</strong>g the elections <strong>for</strong> the<br />
State Union’s Assembly was missed. In early 2005, the State Union’s Assembly<br />
was legally deadlocked: parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s’ m<strong>an</strong>dates were runn<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>in</strong><br />
February. Namely, Article 20 of the Constitutional Charter provides that over<br />
the first two years representatives shall be elected <strong>in</strong>directly, <strong>in</strong> proportion<br />
with their representation <strong>in</strong> the member-<strong>state</strong>s’ assemblies. After that period,<br />
they shall be elected directly by voters <strong>in</strong> both member-<strong>state</strong>s. The Assembly of<br />
the State Union is unicameral – out of 126 parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s, 91 come from<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d 35 from Montenegro.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> leadership took that call<strong>in</strong>g direct elections made no<br />
sense aga<strong>in</strong>st the backdrop of <strong>an</strong> unavoidable referendum that, as they<br />
expected, would result <strong>in</strong> Montenegro’s <strong>in</strong>dependence. There<strong>for</strong>e, <strong>in</strong> early 2005<br />
the Union’s Assembly was faced with illegitimacy, which not only seriously<br />
questioned the Union’s function<strong>in</strong>g but also fueled citizens’ distrust <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
100<br />
101
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
International mediators had to <strong>in</strong>tervene. Namely, Javier Sol<strong>an</strong>a <strong>in</strong> his<br />
capacity as the EU’s high representative <strong>for</strong> the common <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>an</strong>d <strong>security</strong><br />
policy made Serbia’s <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro’s political leaders agree on the m<strong>an</strong>ner<br />
<strong>in</strong> which to overcome this absurd situation. Amendments to the Constitutional<br />
Charter were agreed on April 7 <strong>an</strong>d subsequently adopted by the member<strong>state</strong>s’<br />
assemblies on June 29, 2005. The amendments <strong>in</strong>vested the composition<br />
of the Union’s Assembly with legitimacy by provid<strong>in</strong>g that direct elections<br />
would be called <strong>in</strong> both constituencies <strong>in</strong> parallel with their regular<br />
parliamentary elections.<br />
Though a solution as such made it possible <strong>for</strong> the Assembly to<br />
function smoothly, its activity was practically <strong>in</strong>visible <strong>an</strong>d hardly effective.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> MPs became less <strong>an</strong>d less present at parliamentary sessions.<br />
Moreover, they <strong>in</strong>troduced a novelty unprecedented <strong>in</strong> democratic practice –<br />
vot<strong>in</strong>g by phone. Due to the very fact that, <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the Constitutional<br />
Charter, Serbia’s share <strong>in</strong> the common budget amounts to 95 percent, the<br />
bal<strong>an</strong>ce of power of political parties represented <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament was<br />
soon mirrored <strong>in</strong> the function<strong>in</strong>g of the Union’s Assembly.<br />
The startup of the negotiations on the status of Kosovo made th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
even more complicated <strong>in</strong> 2005. Serbia’s political parties failed to reach a<br />
consensus on the matter, while Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parties claimed the issue had<br />
noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with the State Union as such.<br />
Speak<strong>in</strong>g of legitimacy <strong>an</strong>d citizens’ trust <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions, it should be<br />
noted that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament kept compromis<strong>in</strong>g itself throughout 2005.<br />
Actually, what s<strong>in</strong>gles out the present composition of the parliament is a<br />
longst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g discrep<strong>an</strong>cy between the period of its power <strong>an</strong>d the level of<br />
citizens’ trust. The sc<strong>an</strong>dals that marked parliamentary proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> 2005<br />
raised scores of questions about the political system, parties, parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s,<br />
ethics, corruption, the parliament-government relationship, <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal centers of<br />
power <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> particular, “bad” or “good” laws. Th<strong>in</strong>gs culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> late 2005<br />
when the budget <strong>for</strong> 2006 was on the parliamentary agenda – actually, that<br />
was the seventh confidence vote <strong>for</strong> the government (preceded by the budget<br />
vote <strong>in</strong> 2004, rebal<strong>an</strong>ce of the budget <strong>for</strong> 2004, rebal<strong>an</strong>ce of the budget <strong>for</strong> 2005,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the August 2005 vote <strong>for</strong> the set of the laws deriv<strong>in</strong>g from the arr<strong>an</strong>gement<br />
with the IMF).<br />
What mostly marked the work of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament <strong>in</strong> 2005 were<br />
split coalitions <strong>an</strong>d parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s’ tr<strong>an</strong>sfers to other caucuses, even those<br />
<strong>for</strong>med by non-parliamentary parties. In was only natural that the general<br />
public more discussed the highest legislative body from the <strong>an</strong>gle of the parties<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g it th<strong>an</strong> from that of their policies <strong>an</strong>d the quality of the laws it passed.<br />
Throughout the year the public was also bombarded with corruption affairs<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the parliament, speculations about f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial arr<strong>an</strong>gements <strong>an</strong>d<br />
“purchase of MPs.”<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Split coalitions are not phenomena unknown to developed<br />
democracies. Corruption is also omnipresent, but developed democracies have<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms to combat it, the same as they posses the<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>isms of civili<strong>an</strong> control over parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s’ work. For their part,<br />
parliamentari<strong>an</strong>s have to const<strong>an</strong>tly struggle <strong>for</strong> citizens’ favor by meet<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
promises they had made, by their efficiency, consistency of their actions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
competence. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament m<strong>an</strong>ifested none of those democratic<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
Split coalitions <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament additionally jeopardized the<br />
government that has been exist<strong>in</strong>g as a m<strong>in</strong>ority one from the very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
By comparison with the situation <strong>in</strong> the wake of the 2003 elections, <strong>in</strong> late 2005<br />
the government enjoyed the support of the MPs from the Democratic Party of<br />
Serbia (53), the G17 Plus (31), the Socialist Party of Serbia (22), the New Serbia<br />
(17) <strong>an</strong>d the so-called “9+9” <strong>in</strong>dependent MPs. Speak<strong>in</strong>g about the MPs<br />
without a caucus of their own, the government is supported by those loyal to<br />
Vuk Draskovic’s Serbi<strong>an</strong> Renewal Movement <strong>an</strong>d one from the r<strong>an</strong>ks of the<br />
Social Democratic Party. With its 80 MPs, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party is still the<br />
most powerful oppositionist party. Thirty-three MPs from the Democratic<br />
Party withdrew from the parliamentary proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, some<br />
parties on the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political arena united. The Social Democratic Party<br />
emerged from the Social Democratic Union <strong>an</strong>d a faction of the Social<br />
Democracy. Hav<strong>in</strong>g passed the electoral threshold on the G17 Plus’ list, the<br />
party united with Nebojsa Covic’s Democratic Alternative (which failed to<br />
pass the electoral threshold) <strong>an</strong>d then <strong>in</strong> August 2005 walked out on the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
coalition. Vuks<strong>an</strong>ovic’s New Democratic Party jo<strong>in</strong>ed the Democratic Party of<br />
Serbia. As <strong>for</strong> the Democratic Party, it united with Micunovic’s Democratic<br />
Center, broke with Cedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ovic’s Liberal Democratic Faction, admitted<br />
several members of the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d took <strong>in</strong> the Coalition <strong>for</strong><br />
S<strong>an</strong>dzak on its electoral list. In August 2005 the latter sided with the<br />
government (the case of MPs Esad Dzudzevic <strong>an</strong>d Bajro Omeragic).<br />
Blurred <strong>an</strong>d ill-def<strong>in</strong>ed rules on ownership of m<strong>an</strong>dates just added<br />
fuel to the fire. The Supreme Court’s decision of 2003 whereby MPs are owners<br />
of m<strong>an</strong>dates (passed <strong>in</strong> the case of the Democratic Party of Serbia’s MPs<br />
deprived of their m<strong>an</strong>dates at the request of the Democratic Party) added to<br />
the confusion over the matter <strong>an</strong>d opened the door not only to disputable<br />
moves of some MPs, but also to gross corruption affairs. Namely, the legality<br />
of at least five parliamentary m<strong>an</strong>dates was questioned <strong>in</strong> 2005. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
newly established concept that MPs are sole owners of their m<strong>an</strong>dates, Esad<br />
Dzudzevic <strong>an</strong>d Bajro Omeragic decided to support the government though<br />
they had been elected on the list of the Democratic Party, now <strong>in</strong> opposition.<br />
Later on, they were appo<strong>in</strong>ted assist<strong>an</strong>t m<strong>in</strong>isters, which, under the law,<br />
should have put <strong>an</strong> end to their parliamentary m<strong>an</strong>dates. However, the two<br />
kept attend<strong>in</strong>g parliamentary sessions <strong>an</strong>d secur<strong>in</strong>g the government’s majority.<br />
102<br />
103
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, hav<strong>in</strong>g walked out on the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),<br />
one MP was deprived of his m<strong>an</strong>date under the pretext that he had actually<br />
submitted his resignation. The compla<strong>in</strong>t this MP lodged be<strong>for</strong>e a court of law<br />
has not been decided <strong>for</strong> ten months now. In the me<strong>an</strong>time other DSS member<br />
occupies his parliamentary seat. Two MPs from the r<strong>an</strong>ks of the G17 Plus, who<br />
also decided aga<strong>in</strong>st mak<strong>in</strong>g their m<strong>an</strong>dates available to the party, were given<br />
the red light. So the party simply reassigned their m<strong>an</strong>dates, i.e. appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
other people MPs. As <strong>in</strong> the case of DSS’ MPs, it is more th<strong>an</strong> obvious that<br />
parties use “bl<strong>an</strong>k resignations” to bypass rules <strong>an</strong>d regulations. Such<br />
parliamentary practice unprecedented <strong>in</strong> democratic <strong>state</strong>s testifies of the<br />
government’s <strong>in</strong>tention to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> power at all costs, <strong>an</strong>d of foul play with<br />
both electoral <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary rules that depends on whether or not a<br />
political party is <strong>in</strong> the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition of <strong>in</strong> opposition. The issue of ownership<br />
of m<strong>an</strong>dates is crucial <strong>for</strong> the stability of <strong>an</strong>y political system <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
development of democratic culture, rather th<strong>an</strong> just a technical one. Moreover,<br />
one should bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that, under the <strong>for</strong>mer parliament, the parties mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
today’s rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition used to harshly criticize such practices while<br />
promis<strong>in</strong>g to restore dignity to <strong>in</strong>stitutions once <strong>in</strong> power.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, the actual outcomes of their work are far from<br />
democratic values. For, those outcomes opened up the question of citizens<br />
misguided <strong>in</strong> the elections <strong>an</strong>d the right of MPs elected on party lists not only<br />
to walk out on their parties <strong>an</strong>d keep their m<strong>an</strong>dates, but also to jo<strong>in</strong> nonparliamentary<br />
parties. Hav<strong>in</strong>g the parties that have not passed the electoral<br />
threshold or have even been non-existent at the time of elections <strong>in</strong><br />
parliamentary life seriously questioned both the ethics of today’s Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
society <strong>an</strong>d the respect of citizens’ electoral will that crucially determ<strong>in</strong>es the<br />
stability of <strong>an</strong>y political system.<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> political elite’s <strong>in</strong>difference to see the issue through to the<br />
best <strong>in</strong>terest of Serbia’s citizens culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> the establishment of Bogoljub<br />
Karic’s political party, the Force of Serbia Movement, <strong>an</strong>d the “purchase” of<br />
MPs that, <strong>in</strong> late 2005, grossly end<strong>an</strong>gered the government’s parliamentary<br />
majority. A showdown with Karic <strong>an</strong>d the tycoons <strong>an</strong>d 1990s profiteers close to<br />
the Milosevic regime rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the shade of petty party <strong>in</strong>terests. The<br />
showdown came on the agenda only once their rat<strong>in</strong>gs were seriously<br />
threatened. What also marked the end of 2005, there<strong>for</strong>e, was the startup of the<br />
Belgrade District Public Attorney’s official <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to alleged bribes<br />
offered to Serbi<strong>an</strong> MPs to vote aga<strong>in</strong>st the government’s budget proposal <strong>for</strong><br />
2006.<br />
The ever louder protests aga<strong>in</strong>st misuse of the judiciary <strong>for</strong> political<br />
purposes, threats to MPs <strong>an</strong>d misconduct – that fuel the suspicion about<br />
corruption at the chronically <strong>in</strong>stable political arena – com<strong>in</strong>g from the r<strong>an</strong>ks of<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Democratic Party noth<strong>in</strong>g but put a<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g touch on the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament’s bad per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> 2005. 1<br />
Serbia's Constitution<br />
Though Serbia’s lead<strong>in</strong>g politici<strong>an</strong>s kept mak<strong>in</strong>g promises <strong>an</strong>d<br />
claim<strong>in</strong>g that a new constitution was on their priority list, its draft<strong>in</strong>g was still<br />
underway throughout 2005. In J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005, President Boris Tadic put <strong>for</strong>th<br />
<strong>an</strong>other draft the def<strong>in</strong>itions <strong>an</strong>d provisions of which differed the<br />
government’s model. Unlike the government’s draft that still def<strong>in</strong>es Serbia as<br />
“the <strong>state</strong> of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people <strong>an</strong>d the citizens <strong>in</strong>habit<strong>in</strong>g her,” Tadic’s<br />
version determ<strong>in</strong>es Serbia as “the <strong>state</strong> of all its citizens, based on unalienable<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights.” Further, President Tadic’s draft provides more dist<strong>in</strong>ct criteria<br />
<strong>for</strong> the establishment of autonomies <strong>an</strong>d is more clear-cut when it comes to<br />
presidential authority that gives the upper h<strong>an</strong>d to the government’s<br />
competence <strong>an</strong>d, to a certa<strong>in</strong> extent, to the Constitutional Court. The draft also<br />
provides <strong>in</strong>terpellation as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument of keep<strong>in</strong>g the control over the<br />
government primarily by the opposition.<br />
Regardless of the facts that a sufficient number of constitutional drafts<br />
were <strong>in</strong> circulation, that the Constitutional Commission begun to deliberate<br />
back <strong>in</strong> 2003 <strong>an</strong>d that three sub-commissions were set up, the attempt made <strong>in</strong><br />
September 2005 to revive the entire procedure was of no avail – it testified of<br />
the absence of political will to see the project through.<br />
The Court of Serbia-Montenegro started to work <strong>in</strong> June 2005.<br />
Amendments <strong>an</strong>d supplements to the relev<strong>an</strong>t law that <strong>in</strong>vested the Court<br />
with the authority to decide on member-<strong>state</strong>s constitutions’ adjustment to the<br />
Constitutional Charter were adopted <strong>in</strong> early 2005. Besides, the Court was<br />
authorized to decide <strong>in</strong> jurisdiction disputes <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the two member-<strong>state</strong>s<br />
<strong>an</strong>d common <strong>in</strong>stitutions. The amendments also provide that the Court shall<br />
decide citizens’ compla<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the Constitutional Charter. The<br />
outcomes of the Court’s per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce have not been brought to the public eye<br />
by the end of 2005.<br />
International Obligations<br />
Though the great majority of lead<strong>in</strong>g politici<strong>an</strong>s kept parrot<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
the <strong>state</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>ternational obligations were not on their priority list, it was <strong>in</strong> that<br />
doma<strong>in</strong> that Serbia actually made the biggest progress <strong>in</strong> 2005.<br />
Serbia-Montenegro’s adoption of a feasibility study on April 12, 2005<br />
was the first t<strong>an</strong>gible step the Union made <strong>in</strong> its movement towards the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Union. S<strong>in</strong>ce the Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission concluded that Serbia-<br />
1 Vreme No. 778, December 1, 2005 <strong>an</strong>d No. 780, December 15, 2005.<br />
104<br />
105
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Montenegro was ready enough <strong>for</strong> the start of stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association<br />
negotiations, on April 25, 2005 the EU Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters gave the green light<br />
to the feasibility study <strong>an</strong>d ordered the Europe<strong>an</strong> to set <strong>in</strong>structions <strong>for</strong> the<br />
talks.<br />
The negotiations on the Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association Agreement were<br />
officially launched on October 10, 2005 at a ceremony assembl<strong>in</strong>g lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
politici<strong>an</strong>s from the two member-<strong>state</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d the Europe<strong>an</strong> enlargement<br />
commissioner, Olli Rehn. The first, November 2005 round of negotiations dealt<br />
with the Agreement’s preamble: general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>an</strong>d political issues relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
to Serbia-Montenegro’s relations with the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union. The second round,<br />
scheduled <strong>for</strong> December, was postponed till February 2006 <strong>an</strong>d conditioned by<br />
the Union’s cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.<br />
The obligations the <strong>state</strong> took upon itself by ratify<strong>in</strong>g the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Convention on Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> March 2004 were not duly met – i.e. the <strong>state</strong><br />
failed to meet the deadl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> appo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>state</strong> agent that would represent it<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Strasbourg. A year later, <strong>in</strong><br />
March 2005 the Serbia-Montenegro’s Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters passed a decree on<br />
the <strong>state</strong> agent, provid<strong>in</strong>g that Serbia should appo<strong>in</strong>t the agent, while<br />
Montenegro his/her deputy <strong>for</strong> the period of 4 years, i.e. that the agent <strong>an</strong>d<br />
his/her deputy should rotate <strong>in</strong> a 2-year <strong>in</strong>terval. The decree also provided the<br />
establishment <strong>an</strong>d function<strong>in</strong>g of the State Agent’s Office with<strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
of Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights. Though the competition <strong>for</strong> the <strong>state</strong> agent<br />
was called as early as <strong>in</strong> April 2005, the procedure of short-list<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>for</strong> the office lasted till September 2005 when the <strong>state</strong> agent was<br />
actually appo<strong>in</strong>ted. The fact that the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation was publicized <strong>in</strong> the Official<br />
Gazette of Serbia-Montenegro only testified of the <strong>state</strong>’s sluggishness <strong>in</strong> this<br />
matter as it practically kept the general public <strong>in</strong> the dark about both the agent<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Office. The is issue of the <strong>state</strong>’s representation be<strong>for</strong>e the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Court is grow<strong>in</strong>gly press<strong>in</strong>g, given that some 1,000 citizens of Serbia-<br />
Montenegro have already lodged compla<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> the Court’s consideration.<br />
On October 22, 2005, the State Union’s Assembly ratified the<br />
Convention to Combat Corruption <strong>an</strong>d on December 1, 2005 the Optional<br />
Protocol of the Convention <strong>for</strong> the Prevention of Torture <strong>an</strong>d In<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> or<br />
Degrad<strong>in</strong>g Treatment or Punishment. By sign<strong>in</strong>g the Optional Protocol the<br />
<strong>state</strong> committed itself to establish the system of regular, <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>an</strong>d domestic monitor<strong>in</strong>g of prisons <strong>an</strong>d other facilities<br />
accommodat<strong>in</strong>g persons deprived of their liberty, as well as to set up one or<br />
more national bodies authorized to conduct such monitor<strong>in</strong>g with a view to<br />
prevent torture <strong>an</strong>d other degrad<strong>in</strong>g treatment. Further, the <strong>state</strong> took upon<br />
itself the obligation to establish – with<strong>in</strong> a year from the day the Optional<br />
Protocol was signed – national preventive mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>an</strong>d allow visits to <strong>an</strong>y<br />
facility hous<strong>in</strong>g the persons deprived of their liberty either by <strong>an</strong> authorized<br />
body of ex officio.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
HUMAN RIGHTS<br />
AND LEGISLATION<br />
Conscientious Objection: Civili<strong>an</strong> Army Service<br />
Firstly regulated <strong>in</strong> 2003, the terms of the civili<strong>an</strong> army service were<br />
amended under a relev<strong>an</strong>t decree enacted <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005. Though even the<br />
2003 law had not been <strong>in</strong> compli<strong>an</strong>ce with <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards – as<br />
reported <strong>in</strong> detail by the Amnesty International 1 - the said amendments<br />
additionally jeopardized the rights of draftees. By amend<strong>in</strong>g the Article 26a of<br />
the Law, the Article 4 of the Decree provides a draftee opt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the civili<strong>an</strong><br />
service shall submit the relev<strong>an</strong>t request with<strong>in</strong> eight days from the day he is<br />
summoned <strong>for</strong> the army service. The provision practically deprived recruits of<br />
the right to civili<strong>an</strong> service, as it restricted the latter to the period prior to the<br />
draft. As p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ted by the Amnesty International, the Decree stipulates that <strong>an</strong><br />
appeal <strong>for</strong> the review of a rul<strong>in</strong>g does not postpone the execution of the rul<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
i.e. a draftee is obliged to show up <strong>for</strong> the army service. Thus all draftees who<br />
have opted <strong>for</strong> civili<strong>an</strong> service have to wait <strong>in</strong> their respective units until their<br />
appeals are decided on.<br />
Further, the Decree fails to provide that members of armed <strong>for</strong>ces shall<br />
be entitled to conscientious objection, which is, as the Amnesty International put<br />
it, contrary to Recommendations 1518 of the International Agreement, Chapter<br />
5.2. stat<strong>in</strong>g that all citizens shall have the right to conscientious objection,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g members of armed <strong>for</strong>ces, who c<strong>an</strong> opt <strong>for</strong> it at <strong>an</strong>y time dur<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
service.<br />
The J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005 Decree also amended the Law’s Article 27a<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g that certa<strong>in</strong> categories of persons shall not be entitled to civili<strong>an</strong><br />
service (those with licence to bear arms, the persons convicted <strong>for</strong> violent<br />
crimes with<strong>in</strong> the period of three years from the day they applied <strong>for</strong> civili<strong>an</strong><br />
service, members of sports <strong>an</strong>d hunt<strong>in</strong>g societies, as well as those whose jobs<br />
imply sales or repair of firearms). Such regulation not only deprives the<br />
persons who have ever used arms or have had <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g to do with them – e.g.<br />
1 Source: www. amnesty. org/library<br />
106<br />
107
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
as members of sports or hunt<strong>in</strong>g societies – of the right to conscientious<br />
objection, but also bluntly disqualifies them as conscientious objectors. Even<br />
the new provision that the right to conscientious objection shall be restricted <strong>in</strong><br />
the case of the persons convicted <strong>for</strong> violent crimes noth<strong>in</strong>g but blurs the fact<br />
that those persons too may be conscientious objectors.<br />
Ombudsm<strong>an</strong><br />
After endless deliberations <strong>an</strong>d unjustified postponements, the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament eventually, <strong>in</strong> September 2005, passed the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong><br />
Law. Under the Law, the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> is appo<strong>in</strong>ted by the parliament <strong>for</strong> the<br />
period of five years <strong>an</strong>d may be reelected. The parliament also appo<strong>in</strong>ts four<br />
deputies each <strong>in</strong> charge of specific doma<strong>in</strong>s such as the rights of convicted<br />
persons, gender equality, children’s rights, m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>an</strong>d the rights of<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups <strong>an</strong>d disabled persons.<br />
The Law provides that the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> shall be authorized to<br />
supervise <strong>an</strong>d control the respect <strong>for</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights by <strong>state</strong> bodies, i.e. the<br />
Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> shall be entitled to scrut<strong>in</strong>ize their per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce, decisions,<br />
actions or failures to act. The Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> shall not have the control over<br />
parliamentary proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, the President of the Republic, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
government, the Constitutional Court, as well as courts of law <strong>an</strong>d<br />
prosecutions, says the Law.<br />
The Ombudsm<strong>an</strong>’s competence <strong>in</strong>cludes the right to <strong>in</strong>itiate<br />
amendments to laws <strong>an</strong>d pass<strong>in</strong>g of new regulations, as well as to comment<br />
the draft laws concerned with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights that have been submitted to the<br />
parliamentary consideration.<br />
The Law authorizes the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> to dem<strong>an</strong>d deposal of a person<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y violation of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>in</strong>itiate discipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st a public serv<strong>an</strong>t accountable <strong>for</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> actions or failures<br />
to act appropriately. If he/she suspects that a crime has been committed, the<br />
Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> may also <strong>in</strong>itiate crim<strong>in</strong>al or misdeme<strong>an</strong>or proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the suspect.<br />
In spite of a number of adequate solutions, the Law is not fully<br />
compatible with the idea of <strong>an</strong> Ombudsm<strong>an</strong>. It is <strong>an</strong> obvious product of the<br />
accommodation of different political <strong>in</strong>terests with<strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament.<br />
What strikes one’s attention is that be<strong>for</strong>e turn<strong>in</strong>g to the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> a citizen<br />
must exploit all legal me<strong>an</strong>s available to him/her. A provision as such<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imizes the role of the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> – contrary to the very idea beh<strong>in</strong>d the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution, the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> thus becomes the last step on the ladder towards<br />
protection of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights.<br />
Though passed <strong>in</strong> September, the Law has not been implemented by<br />
the end of 2005. The government failed to <strong>in</strong>itiate the procedure of appo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d his/her deputies, <strong>an</strong>d did noth<strong>in</strong>g to secure <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
material resources necessary <strong>for</strong> function<strong>in</strong>g of the Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> office. The<br />
same as <strong>in</strong> the case of the public <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation commissioner, the government<br />
trends towards normativism, while lack<strong>in</strong>g genu<strong>in</strong>e commitment <strong>for</strong> the<br />
respect of legal <strong>an</strong>d political st<strong>an</strong>dards the would speed up the society’s<br />
democratization. Conflict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests of the political parties that support the<br />
government at this po<strong>in</strong>t considerably contribute to such <strong>state</strong> of affairs.<br />
Law on Associations<br />
The draft law on associations was practically deadlocked throughout<br />
2005. The only step taken was the one by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of State Adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Local Self-government – actually, the M<strong>in</strong>istry adopted the<br />
recommendations of the expert team of the Council of Europe <strong>an</strong>d amended<br />
the first version of the law drafted <strong>in</strong> November 2004. It was only <strong>in</strong> November<br />
2005 that this amended version was brought be<strong>for</strong>e the public eye <strong>an</strong>d<br />
presented to non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d citizens’ associations.<br />
Though much improved by comparison with the first draft, this one is still<br />
under par. This primarily refers to the blurred def<strong>in</strong>ition of a non-profit<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d the powers <strong>in</strong>vested on the <strong>state</strong>. M<strong>an</strong>y provisions have not<br />
been adjusted with other domestic regulations - notably those deal<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
non-profit org<strong>an</strong>izations’ ownership rights or f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial obligations – <strong>an</strong>d with<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d conventions. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, the article<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g that “<strong>in</strong> the event <strong>an</strong> association ceases to exist, its property, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
its statute, shall be passed only to <strong>an</strong>other non-profit legal person" is <strong>in</strong>compatible<br />
both with the Inherit<strong>an</strong>ce Law <strong>an</strong>d the Europe<strong>an</strong> Convention on Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights that guar<strong>an</strong>tees the right to dispose of property by free will. Further, the<br />
Article 74 of this Law collides with the 1995 Law on the Republic of Serbia’s<br />
Real Property that is still <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce. The latter provides that all real property<br />
used by local self-governments (towns <strong>an</strong>d municipalities), other org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d legal person shall be proclaimed the property of the Republic of Serbia. In<br />
this context, lawmakers did not have <strong>an</strong>y authority whatsoever to lay down<br />
<strong>state</strong> ownership over the “public property” used by public org<strong>an</strong>izations,<br />
which they did <strong>in</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sitory <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>al provisions of the Draft Law on<br />
Associations. This opens the door to arbitrary implementation of the Law on<br />
the Republic of Serbia’s Real Property, i.e. to <strong>state</strong> ownership of the property<br />
that has rema<strong>in</strong>ed out of the Law’s reach so far. Further, the same article<br />
provides that a local self-government body shall set down the criteria <strong>for</strong> the lease<br />
of real property, but fails to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>an</strong>y valid criterion. The article’s provision<br />
that the terms under which <strong>an</strong> association uses leased property “shall not be<br />
more disadv<strong>an</strong>tageous th<strong>an</strong> those under which a local self-government body rents out<br />
the real property of similar quality <strong>an</strong>d size to other associations <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
pursu<strong>in</strong>g similar or same goals” is also unacceptable. Apart from be<strong>in</strong>g contrary<br />
to general obligational rules provid<strong>in</strong>g that a leaser shall not ch<strong>an</strong>ge the terms<br />
108<br />
109
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
of a lease <strong>in</strong> his favor, the same article raises the question of the comparative<br />
criteria to be applied if there is no other association with “similar or same<br />
goals” <strong>in</strong> the territory of a local self-government. Moreover, lawmakers had no<br />
justifiable reason whatsoever to regulate the issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y different m<strong>an</strong>ner th<strong>an</strong><br />
laid down <strong>in</strong> the Law on Local Self-Government – they should have simply<br />
taken over the latter’s provision on leases of premises. Besides, lawmakers<br />
were notable restrictive when it came to the provisions deal<strong>in</strong>g with the b<strong>an</strong>s<br />
on associations. The draft’s Article 64 practically <strong>an</strong>nuls the right to appeal by<br />
stat<strong>in</strong>g, “The Supreme Court of Serbia shall decide on the b<strong>an</strong>” – i.e. it turns null<br />
<strong>an</strong>d void one of fundamental rights guar<strong>an</strong>teed under the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Convention on Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Law on Org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Jurisdiction of Courts <strong>in</strong> the Republic of Serbia, the Supreme Court of Serbia is<br />
the highest appeal body <strong>an</strong>d its decisions are f<strong>in</strong>al s<strong>in</strong>ce the Constitutional<br />
Court of Serbia deals not with constitutional appeals.<br />
The very fact that only one meet<strong>in</strong>g with the org<strong>an</strong>izations mostly<br />
concerned with the draft has been convened clearly <strong>in</strong>dicates the government’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention to keep a tight hold on the civil sector <strong>an</strong>d its unread<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> open<br />
dialogue that could lead to better solutions.<br />
Access to In<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g delayed <strong>for</strong> long the implementation of the Law on Access to<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation of Public Interest passed back <strong>in</strong> 2004, it was only <strong>in</strong> June 2005 that<br />
the government subsidized the launch of the Office of the Commissioner <strong>for</strong><br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation of Public Interest. The Office came public with its 4-month<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs at a press conference <strong>in</strong> November 2005. In brief, the number of<br />
applic<strong>an</strong>ts was practically <strong>in</strong> reverse proportion with the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation provided<br />
by <strong>state</strong> bodies <strong>an</strong>d the latter’s cooperativeness. The great majority of<br />
applic<strong>an</strong>ts compla<strong>in</strong>ed of <strong>state</strong> bodies’ failures to respond with<strong>in</strong> the set<br />
deadl<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>in</strong> spite of the fact that their applications had been approved <strong>an</strong>d<br />
properly processed.<br />
Tr<strong>an</strong>sparency Serbia conducted a ten-month survey to determ<strong>in</strong>e the<br />
<strong>state</strong>’s read<strong>in</strong>ess to implement the Law on Access to In<strong>for</strong>mation of Public<br />
Interest. Actually, the org<strong>an</strong>ization applied to a variety of <strong>state</strong> bodies <strong>an</strong>d<br />
governmental agencies <strong>for</strong> specific <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation related to their doma<strong>in</strong>s. The<br />
outcome of its action mirrored devastat<strong>in</strong>g effects – over 40 percent of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>an</strong>d governmental agencies <strong>an</strong>d over 60 percent of local selfgovernment<br />
authorities <strong>in</strong> Serbia did not even trouble to reply, while those that<br />
did mostly m<strong>an</strong>ifested that they had misunderstood either the requests or the<br />
Law’s provisions. At the same time, f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the survey showed that<br />
citizens were rather unaware of their rights under the Law <strong>an</strong>d its provisions.<br />
The fact that the government failed to develop appropriate<br />
methodology <strong>an</strong>d efficient mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>for</strong> the implementation of this law that<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
figures as a major regulation <strong>in</strong> the <strong>an</strong>ti-corruption legislation (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Law on Cross Ownership, the Law on F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g Political Parties <strong>an</strong>d the Law<br />
on Public Procurements) testifies of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political elite’s unread<strong>in</strong>ess to<br />
come to grips with some of most delicate issues.<br />
Set of Crim<strong>in</strong>al Laws<br />
The new set of crim<strong>in</strong>al laws adopted by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament <strong>in</strong><br />
September 2005 <strong>in</strong>cludes the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code of Serbia, the Law on the<br />
Execution of Crim<strong>in</strong>al S<strong>an</strong>ctions, the Law on Juvenile Offenders <strong>an</strong>d the Law<br />
on the Protection of the Parties <strong>in</strong> Crim<strong>in</strong>al Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
The Law on Juvenile offenders – a novelty <strong>in</strong> Serbia’s legislation –<br />
differentiates juvenile offenders both <strong>in</strong> terms of relev<strong>an</strong>t crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d sentences that c<strong>an</strong> be ruled to them. As <strong>for</strong> the Law on the Protection of<br />
the Parties <strong>in</strong> Crim<strong>in</strong>al Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, it <strong>in</strong>troduces <strong>for</strong> the first time the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution of witness protection. The law lays down the terms <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
procedure <strong>for</strong> the protection of the persons whose testimonies be<strong>for</strong>e a court of<br />
law may jeopardize their lives. The protection as such may be given to<br />
suspects, defend<strong>an</strong>ts, collaborat<strong>in</strong>g witnesses, eyewitnesses, experts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
victims. Witness protection programs <strong>in</strong>clude protection of property <strong>an</strong>d<br />
person, relocation, tr<strong>an</strong>sfer to other detention facility, concealed identity <strong>an</strong>d<br />
property <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, as well as a ch<strong>an</strong>ge of identity. The latter may be partial<br />
or total, imply<strong>in</strong>g the possibility of bodily or facial tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation. .<br />
The law provides that its adm<strong>in</strong>istration shall be entrusted to a special<br />
police department – the special protection department <strong>in</strong> charge of both the<br />
protection procedure <strong>an</strong>d the protection of confidential <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
records. The law posits that a special commission shall decide on the<br />
protection procedure, its duration or term<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />
The newly passed Law on the Execution of Crim<strong>in</strong>al S<strong>an</strong>ctions is more<br />
detailed th<strong>an</strong> its predecessor when it comes to prisoners’ rights <strong>an</strong>d duties, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their appeals to courts of law aga<strong>in</strong>st prison adm<strong>in</strong>istrations’ decisions. The<br />
Law considerably le<strong>an</strong>s on <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>for</strong> the quality of life <strong>in</strong><br />
detention facilities, particularly on the st<strong>an</strong>dards laid down by the Council of<br />
Europe’s <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> the Prevention of Torture (CPT).<br />
Serbia’s new Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code lays down <strong>for</strong> the first time crimes such<br />
as torture, <strong>an</strong>d provides protection of <strong>in</strong>tellectual property, environment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
computer data bases. Though generally <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards, this newly passed law raised certa<strong>in</strong> doubts <strong>an</strong>d dilemmas – it<br />
shortened sentences <strong>for</strong> some crimes (theft, robbery <strong>an</strong>d traffick<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
narcotics) <strong>an</strong>d provided maximal imprisonment of 30-40 years <strong>in</strong> specific cases.<br />
As <strong>for</strong> f<strong>in</strong>es, the new law <strong>for</strong> the first time takes <strong>in</strong>to account a convicted<br />
person’s overall f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial situation. A f<strong>in</strong>e is thus expressed <strong>in</strong> daily amounts<br />
110<br />
111
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with the convicted person’s average earn<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation<br />
about which is provided by the Public Revenue Service.<br />
Police Law<br />
After m<strong>an</strong>y dilemmas, controversial drafts <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> particular,<br />
commentaries <strong>an</strong>d recommendations provided by <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
<strong>an</strong>d experts, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> parliament adopted a new Police Law <strong>in</strong> November<br />
2005. This much delayed law testified on the one h<strong>an</strong>d that the parliament had<br />
to overcome scores of problems be<strong>for</strong>e endors<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>for</strong><br />
the function<strong>in</strong>g of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> police <strong>an</strong>d laid bare conflict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests of some<br />
political parties on the other. Generally, the law was perceived as a step <strong>in</strong> the<br />
right direction lead<strong>in</strong>g to the re<strong>for</strong>m of the police <strong>an</strong>d their tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>in</strong>to<br />
a professional service subjected to public control. And yet, some provisions<br />
questioned such general perception <strong>an</strong>d prompted the civil sector to raise hue<br />
<strong>an</strong>d cry.<br />
Namely, the Law <strong>in</strong>vests the M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Police with too much<br />
discretionary power. The M<strong>in</strong>ister is authorized to determ<strong>in</strong>e the police’s<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce through m<strong>an</strong>datory <strong>in</strong>structions <strong>an</strong>d orders. Though the Law<br />
generally provides that the M<strong>in</strong>ister’s <strong>in</strong>structions shall be based on law, none<br />
of its provisions relates to the review of the legality of such decisions.<br />
The access to the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about the effects of the police’s<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce is regulated contrary to the provisions of the Law on Access to<br />
the In<strong>for</strong>mation of Public Interest. In this context, lawmakers were not only<br />
restrictive, but also created a confusion about which of the two laws is<br />
applicable. Further, some segments of the provisions deal<strong>in</strong>g with the police’s<br />
authority are contrary to other regulations that are <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce. This primarily<br />
refers to the protection of juvenile offenders, treatment of juveniles <strong>in</strong> general,<br />
the use of firearms <strong>an</strong>d physical <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d searches of premises, which<br />
contradicts the provisions of the Law on Crim<strong>in</strong>al Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
By the m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> which it treats juveniles <strong>an</strong>d younger adults, the<br />
Article 38 of the Law grossly violates other regulations deal<strong>in</strong>g with the rights<br />
of juveniles. Domestic legislation provides that <strong>an</strong>y action aga<strong>in</strong>st a juvenile by<br />
<strong>state</strong> bodies shall be taken <strong>in</strong> the presence of his/her natural or custodial<br />
parents. Article 38, para 4, of the Law, however, provides that <strong>in</strong> the exercise of<br />
the police authority shall call <strong>for</strong> the presence of a representative of a custodial<br />
agency <strong>in</strong> the event the presence of natural parents might be detrimental <strong>for</strong> a<br />
juvenile or so irritat<strong>in</strong>g to him/her as to end<strong>an</strong>ger the police’s duty. The<br />
provision’s def<strong>in</strong>ition opens the door not only to discretionary authority, i.e.<br />
arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess that breaches a juvenile’s rights, but also <strong>in</strong>vests a police officer<br />
with the power to decide on matters beyond his professional competence.<br />
The Article 43, para 2, quot<strong>in</strong>g that the police c<strong>an</strong> assert a person’s<br />
identity on the grounds of a <strong>state</strong>ment given by that person whose identity has<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
already been checked questions other paragraphs deal<strong>in</strong>g with “check<strong>in</strong>g of a<br />
person’s identity” <strong>an</strong>d the Article 50 provid<strong>in</strong>g that a person may be taken <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong> the purpose of assert<strong>in</strong>g his/her identity. The law fails to justify why a<br />
person whose identity c<strong>an</strong>not be checked via his/her identification card or<br />
other documents bear<strong>in</strong>g his/her photo shall be taken <strong>in</strong> at all when his/her<br />
identity c<strong>an</strong> be asserted on the grounds of a relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>state</strong>ment. Further, the<br />
police’s authorization to take <strong>in</strong> a person whose identity c<strong>an</strong>not be asserted<br />
otherwise, opens the question of the circumst<strong>an</strong>ces under which <strong>an</strong>y person<br />
c<strong>an</strong> assert his/her identity by provid<strong>in</strong>g a relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>state</strong>ment.<br />
The legal solutions referred to <strong>in</strong> the paragraphs above open the door<br />
to arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess on the part of the police <strong>an</strong>d, there<strong>for</strong>e, threaten <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d freedoms.<br />
The Law’s provisions on the police’s authority to use physical <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
(Article 88) are disputable <strong>in</strong> the sections specify<strong>in</strong>g permissible use of <strong>for</strong>ce as<br />
the use of the methods of martial arts <strong>in</strong> the event of passive resistence, i.e. a<br />
suspect who sits down, kneels of lies prostrate. The bottom l<strong>in</strong>e here is that<br />
those <strong>for</strong>ms of passive resistence c<strong>an</strong>not be treated as physical resist<strong>an</strong>ce,<br />
which lawmakers probably had <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d while list<strong>in</strong>g the cases of authorized<br />
use of <strong>for</strong>ce.<br />
The Article 90 loosely def<strong>in</strong>es the use of the <strong>in</strong>struments of restra<strong>in</strong>t<br />
<strong>for</strong> the purpose of prevent<strong>in</strong>g escapes. Prevention of <strong>an</strong> escape is <strong>in</strong> itself a<br />
loose phrase – “prevention of <strong>an</strong> attempted escape” would be more<br />
appropriate the more so s<strong>in</strong>ce the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> detail the notion of<br />
attempted escape. In other words, the Law should have provided the use of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>struments of restra<strong>in</strong>t by the police <strong>in</strong> the event of <strong>an</strong> attempted escape. As it<br />
is, <strong>an</strong>y movement c<strong>an</strong> be /arbitrarily/ <strong>in</strong>terpreted as <strong>an</strong> escape <strong>an</strong>d imply the<br />
use of the <strong>in</strong>struments of restra<strong>in</strong>t aga<strong>in</strong>st the person mak<strong>in</strong>g such movement.<br />
Also, disputable are the Law’s provisions deal<strong>in</strong>g with the police’s<br />
authority to use of arms aga<strong>in</strong>st a number of persons. The same refers to the<br />
Article 100 provid<strong>in</strong>g that firearms c<strong>an</strong> be used to prevent “the escape of a person<br />
caught <strong>in</strong> flagr<strong>an</strong>te delicto, who is already prosecuted ex officio <strong>for</strong> the crime<br />
punishable with up to ten-year imprisonment, as well as the escape of a person who has<br />
been legally deprived of his/her liberty.” A provision as such is hardly acceptable<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce it places a burden of responsibility on <strong>an</strong> authorized officer who must<br />
<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>t<strong>an</strong>eously decide whether or not a person caught <strong>in</strong> flagr<strong>an</strong>te delicto is<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g prosecuted ex officio <strong>for</strong> the crime punishable with up to ten-year<br />
imprisonment with longer <strong>in</strong>carceration. It goes without say<strong>in</strong>g that a police<br />
officer on duty is neither qualified nor <strong>in</strong> the position to qualify a perpetrator’s<br />
action as a specific crime.<br />
The Law, <strong>for</strong> the first time <strong>in</strong> domestic practice, provides the<br />
establishment of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal control department. The director of the<br />
department, under the law, has the r<strong>an</strong>k of <strong>an</strong> assist<strong>an</strong>ce m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d is<br />
responsible to the M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Police. The director is authorized to <strong>in</strong>itiate<br />
112<br />
113
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs ex officio or at a compla<strong>in</strong>er’s request, to take appropriate<br />
measures on his/her own or <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the M<strong>in</strong>ister of authorized bodies if there<br />
is a reasonable doubt of the guilt call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al, misdeme<strong>an</strong>or or<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>ary proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st a police officer.<br />
However, the Law <strong>in</strong>dicates that the <strong>in</strong>ternal control director c<strong>an</strong><br />
hardly act <strong>in</strong>dependently s<strong>in</strong>ce it is the M<strong>in</strong>ister who supervises the<br />
department’s per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d issues orders <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>structions. Moreover, the<br />
director is obliged to ask <strong>for</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>ister’s permission be<strong>for</strong>e tak<strong>in</strong>g some<br />
actions or measures. Further, the provision that entitles a suspected police<br />
officer to deny <strong>in</strong>ternal control without the M<strong>in</strong>ister’s consent – without<br />
specify<strong>in</strong>g what is to be done <strong>in</strong> the event such consent is never given –<br />
considerably impairs the efficiency of <strong>in</strong>ternal control over the police<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce. Aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia’s complex political backdrop where<strong>in</strong> all offices<br />
are highly politicized, legal solutions as such are more th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>appropriate<br />
guar<strong>an</strong>tees <strong>for</strong> democratic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dependent control over the police.<br />
Re<strong>for</strong>m of the Judiciary<br />
It was more of mere rhetoric th<strong>an</strong> concrete steps that marked the<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> judiciary <strong>in</strong> 2005. The ambitious strategic project <strong>for</strong> the<br />
judiciary re<strong>for</strong>m, developed years back, was not completed <strong>in</strong> spite of all<br />
promises. S<strong>in</strong>ce the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic, the <strong>in</strong>cumbent,<br />
“legalistic” government has been <strong>an</strong>nounc<strong>in</strong>g fundamental re<strong>for</strong>ms of the<br />
judiciary. And yet, while the re<strong>for</strong>ms have not been even launched, the politics<br />
has one aga<strong>in</strong> stepped <strong>in</strong> all judicial <strong>in</strong>stitutions. Disgraceful rul<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
filibuster<strong>in</strong>g of major trials, corruption <strong>an</strong>d the executive br<strong>an</strong>ch meddl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
ongo<strong>in</strong>g proceed<strong>in</strong>gs were earmarks of the doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2005.<br />
Though a number of org<strong>an</strong>izational <strong>an</strong>d procedural laws related to the<br />
judiciary were passed, none of major judicial postulates of a tr<strong>an</strong>sitional<br />
society – <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent judiciary equal to the other two govern<strong>an</strong>ce br<strong>an</strong>ches,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutionally <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially <strong>in</strong>dependent judges <strong>an</strong>d public prosecutors<br />
– was atta<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
Overt attempts of the executive br<strong>an</strong>ch <strong>an</strong>d even the parliament, as the<br />
highest legislative body, to <strong>in</strong>fluence judges’ rul<strong>in</strong>gs seriously challenged the<br />
judiciary’s declarative <strong>in</strong>dependence. Powerful <strong>an</strong>d affluent <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d<br />
groups – from the f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial oligarchy symbolized by Bogoljub Karic to the<br />
Zemun <strong>an</strong>d other “cl<strong>an</strong>s” -openly <strong>an</strong>d, to all appear<strong>an</strong>ces, successfully<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluenced the judiciary. Such overt temper<strong>in</strong>g with the judiciary was<br />
perceived almost as normal at the everyday political arena.<br />
In 2005, the <strong>state</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued to endeavor to hold the judiciary under<br />
control. At the peak of the actual government’s re<strong>for</strong>mist “<strong>in</strong>spiration” it took<br />
the parliament only one day, July 15, to adopt over 30 laws <strong>an</strong>d amendments,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those to the Law on Judges <strong>an</strong>d the Law on Public Prosecution<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Office. The said amendments entitled the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Justice to decide on<br />
judges <strong>an</strong>d prosecutors’ salaries, a practice totally <strong>in</strong>compatible with so much<br />
<strong>in</strong>voked <strong>in</strong>dependent judiciary. Ever s<strong>in</strong>ce he came to office, M<strong>in</strong>ister of Justice<br />
Stojkovic has been was so concerned with the matter that he firstly attempted<br />
to shut down the Belgrade District Court’s Special Department under the<br />
pretext that its “overpaid judges <strong>an</strong>d prosecutors make other colleagues feel<br />
<strong>in</strong>ferior” <strong>an</strong>d then <strong>an</strong>nounced crim<strong>in</strong>al charges aga<strong>in</strong>st the ex-m<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces <strong>for</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g allowed the judges of the Supreme Court’s Trail Chamber<br />
to grab “exorbit<strong>an</strong>t salaries.”<br />
The Law on Judges provid<strong>in</strong>g that the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Justice c<strong>an</strong> also<br />
propound dismissal of judges also mirrors the <strong>state</strong>’s, i.e. executive br<strong>an</strong>ch’s<br />
impermissible <strong>in</strong>terference. By <strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> earlier decision of the<br />
Constitutional Court (made at the time of ex-m<strong>in</strong>ister Vlad<strong>an</strong> Batic) stat<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Justice c<strong>an</strong>not propound deposition of judges, the Lawyers’<br />
Association <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights (YUKOM) dem<strong>an</strong>ded constitutional assessment<br />
of the Law. However, the Constitutional Court overruled the motion <strong>an</strong>d<br />
adjourned the deliberation of the provision deal<strong>in</strong>g with the M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Justice’s authority. It was evident that the Constitutional Court tried to buy<br />
time unwill<strong>in</strong>g to cross the swords with the executive br<strong>an</strong>ch. 2<br />
Practically, throughout 2005 all moves the government persistently<br />
labeled re<strong>for</strong>mist boiled down to personnel reshuffles.<br />
In early 2005, the Supreme Judicial Council <strong>for</strong>warded a list of<br />
c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>for</strong> the judges of municipal <strong>an</strong>d district courts, as well as of the<br />
Supreme Court, to the parliamentary Judicial <strong>Committee</strong>. The list caused hue<br />
<strong>an</strong>d cry, particularly by a group of senior advisers work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the Belgrade<br />
Second Municipal Court, whose public protest aga<strong>in</strong>st the Supreme Judicial<br />
Council’s choice brimmed with accusations of disrespect <strong>for</strong> the set criteria<br />
such as professional experience, competence, etc. that even resulted <strong>in</strong><br />
nepotism. The parliamentary committee asked the Supreme Judicial Council to<br />
provide the list of all senior advisers out of which the latter had short-listed 34<br />
c<strong>an</strong>didates. As the Council never responded, the <strong>Committee</strong> practically<br />
<strong>an</strong>nulled the list of c<strong>an</strong>didates proposed <strong>for</strong> municipal judges <strong>an</strong>d asked the<br />
Council to reconsider it. 3 The <strong>Committee</strong> gave its support to 16 c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>for</strong><br />
the Supreme Court’s judges <strong>an</strong>d 14 <strong>for</strong> the judges of the Belgrade District<br />
Court.<br />
The c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>for</strong> public prosecutors also protested, while senior<br />
advisers of the Belgrade District Court sent letters of protest to the M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council <strong>an</strong>d heads of parliamentary caucuses. 4<br />
The situation culm<strong>in</strong>ated when the representatives of the Democratic Party<br />
2 Ekonomist magaz<strong>in</strong>e, No. 297, J<strong>an</strong>uary 30, 2005.<br />
3 D<strong>an</strong>as daily, February 18, 2005.<br />
4 Novosti daily, February 16, 2005.<br />
114<br />
115
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
walked out on the Judicial <strong>Committee</strong>’s session to m<strong>an</strong>ifest their disagreement<br />
with the proposed list of highest judicial officers. The proposed c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the actual <strong>state</strong> of affairs <strong>in</strong> the society, as they put it, <strong>in</strong>dicate that the<br />
Democratic Party of Serbia was <strong>in</strong>tent to hold the re<strong>in</strong>s <strong>for</strong> the showdown with<br />
its political opponents. Be<strong>for</strong>e that, the DS MPs questioned c<strong>an</strong>didacies <strong>for</strong><br />
prosecution offices’ military departments – their po<strong>in</strong>t was that civili<strong>an</strong>s who<br />
could have competed <strong>for</strong> those offices were discrim<strong>in</strong>ated by the very terms of<br />
the competition. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to them, the government w<strong>an</strong>ted to safeguard<br />
military courts at all costs, regardless of law, relev<strong>an</strong>t political decisions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the st<strong>an</strong>dards Serbia was obliged to adopt as a member-<strong>state</strong> of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community. 5<br />
Public polemic <strong>an</strong>d doubts about regularity of judges <strong>an</strong>d prosecutors’<br />
election, along with ever louder protests aga<strong>in</strong>st the executive power’s blunt<br />
meddl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to judiciary reached their peak <strong>in</strong> July 2005 when the c<strong>an</strong>didates<br />
<strong>for</strong> some100 prosecutors <strong>an</strong>d judges were on parliamentary agenda. The MPs<br />
from the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition <strong>an</strong>d the Democratic Party on the one h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>an</strong>d those<br />
from the Socialist Party of Serbia on the other clashed swords over Ratko<br />
Zecevic, nom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>for</strong> a deputy municipal prosecutor <strong>in</strong> Kursumlija, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Milov<strong>an</strong> Bozovic, nom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>for</strong> the office of the Belgrade district prosecutor<br />
(c<strong>an</strong>didacies opposed by the Democratic Party) <strong>an</strong>d Gord<strong>an</strong>a Mihajlovic,<br />
nom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>for</strong> the president of the Second Municipal Court <strong>in</strong> Belgrade (a<br />
c<strong>an</strong>didacy opposed by the Socialist Party of Serbia). 6<br />
All <strong>in</strong> all, the parliament voted down 20 out of 100 c<strong>an</strong>didates. The<br />
Supreme Judicial Council was thus “doubly” discredited – it was rebuked <strong>for</strong><br />
not hav<strong>in</strong>g nom<strong>in</strong>ated the c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with professional st<strong>an</strong>dards,<br />
while the parliamentary vote testified that the rul<strong>in</strong>g majority did not perceive<br />
it as a professional, let alone <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>in</strong>stitution. An overview of the<br />
newly elected presidents of municipal courts <strong>an</strong>d certa<strong>in</strong> judges <strong>an</strong>d<br />
prosecutors shows that the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition removed most cadres appo<strong>in</strong>ted by<br />
the previous government while reassign<strong>in</strong>g responsible offices to the people<br />
compromised <strong>in</strong> Milosevic’s era. Expert circles were those that reacted <strong>in</strong> the<br />
first place. In <strong>an</strong> open letter, a group of renowned judges (Vucetic,<br />
Karamarkovic, Ivosevic, Vasilic, Rasic, etc.) alerted the public that the m<strong>an</strong>ner<br />
<strong>in</strong> which some presidents of courts had been deposed was hardly propitious to<br />
the re<strong>for</strong>m of the judicial system. The l<strong>an</strong>guage MPs used while referr<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
some judges could have hardly boosted people’s trust <strong>in</strong> legal system.<br />
Especially the fact that Gord<strong>an</strong>a Mihajlovic – recognized by expert circles <strong>for</strong><br />
her org<strong>an</strong>izational capacity <strong>an</strong>d genu<strong>in</strong>e commitment to re<strong>for</strong>ms - was not<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
reelected president of the Second Municipal Court <strong>in</strong> Belgrade threw bad light<br />
on the parliament. 7<br />
Noth<strong>in</strong>g less sc<strong>an</strong>dalous was the deposal of Special Prosecutor Jov<strong>an</strong><br />
Prijic whose m<strong>an</strong>date expired on July 23, 2005. However, his deposal had been<br />
firstly h<strong>in</strong>ted at back <strong>in</strong> March under the pretext that he had been appo<strong>in</strong>ted on<br />
March 1, 2004. The fact that, under a new law, he had been assigned the office<br />
on July 23, 2004 was overlooked. In a letter to the Act<strong>in</strong>g Prosecutor of the<br />
Republic of Serbia, Prijic <strong>in</strong>dicated that his early deposal would seriously affect<br />
the motions the Special Prosecution had made <strong>in</strong> some ongo<strong>in</strong>g trials. Ensu<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>state</strong>ments by the responsible people <strong>in</strong> the Prosecution Office started <strong>an</strong><br />
aval<strong>an</strong>che of public reactions that hardly contributed to the Special<br />
Prosecutor’s unimpeded per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, Miroslav Milosevic, head<br />
of the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry’s Public Security Department, said, “The murderers of<br />
Police General Bosko Buha are still at large. In the months to come, the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior shall concentrate its ef<strong>for</strong>ts on disclos<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces under which Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic has been gunned down.<br />
The trial to his assass<strong>in</strong>s is turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a farce, s<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>in</strong>dictment is built on<br />
s<strong>an</strong>d.” 8 In other words, the Special Prosecutor was not up to his task <strong>an</strong>d<br />
should be deposed. Milosevic’s claim that the police had new clues about the<br />
Dj<strong>in</strong>djic case drew public attention <strong>in</strong> particular. The atmosphere of lynch <strong>an</strong>d<br />
stigmatization of the Special Prosecutor persisted till July 2005 when Jov<strong>an</strong><br />
Prijic was reassigned deputy special prosecutor regardless of strong<br />
disapproval of expert circles <strong>an</strong>d a number of non-governmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations. Slobod<strong>an</strong> Radov<strong>an</strong>ovic from Kragujevac was appo<strong>in</strong>ted Special<br />
Prosecutor. Lawyer Rajko D<strong>an</strong>ilovic labeled the act bad <strong>in</strong>tention on the part of<br />
the government <strong>an</strong>d a compromise between the United States, the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Union <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government enabl<strong>in</strong>g Prijic to complete his work. 9<br />
Apart from disputable personnel arr<strong>an</strong>gements, general climate<br />
prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> courts of law, unprofessionally m<strong>an</strong>aged proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d rul<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
that questioned courts’ competence <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dependence additionally aggravated<br />
the situation of the Serbia judiciary.<br />
Illogical network of courts <strong>an</strong>d distribution of cases were earmarked<br />
as major causes of courts’ <strong>in</strong>efficiency <strong>an</strong>d sluggishness. Serbia has 138<br />
municipal courts <strong>an</strong>d 1,653 municipal judges, out of whom 500-odd are <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade. Out of 30 district courts with 429 judges, 100 judges work <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Belgrade District Court. Such outdated arr<strong>an</strong>gement plagues commercial<br />
courts as well – out of 208 judges, 100 are assigned to the Belgrade Commercial<br />
Court. Judg<strong>in</strong>g by the number of processed cases, the Belgrade District Court is<br />
short of 150 judges, <strong>an</strong>d metropolit<strong>an</strong> municipal courts lack some 500 judges.<br />
5 D<strong>an</strong>as daily, February 13, 2005.<br />
6 Politika daily, July 20, 2005.<br />
7 Ekonomist Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, No. 273, August 15, 2005.<br />
8 Politika daily, J<strong>an</strong>uary 30, 2005.<br />
9 Politika daily, July 28, 2005.<br />
116<br />
117
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The Belgrade Commercial Court processes 80 percent of the cases that are most<br />
complex from the <strong>an</strong>gle of the <strong>state</strong>. At the same time, the Belgrade Higher<br />
Commercial Court, understaffed by 30 judges, tackles the cases from all over<br />
Serbia.<br />
Absurdly enough, such org<strong>an</strong>izational arr<strong>an</strong>gements call <strong>for</strong> more<br />
judges, while official claim their number should be rationalized. With the<br />
executive br<strong>an</strong>ch’s <strong>in</strong>fluence on judges <strong>an</strong>d the judges covered with unsolved<br />
cases one c<strong>an</strong> hardly expect <strong>an</strong> efficient judiciary. This is the more so s<strong>in</strong>ce new<br />
courts – the Appeal Court <strong>an</strong>d the Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative Court – pl<strong>an</strong>ned under the<br />
Law on Court have not been set up so far.<br />
In 2005, some rul<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d motions not only raised public <strong>an</strong>ger, but<br />
also further deepened the doubts about illegal <strong>in</strong>fluence on judges <strong>an</strong>d<br />
prosecutors’ per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
In June 2005, <strong>in</strong> the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Markovic (wife of<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic) charged <strong>in</strong> absentia <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>ipulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>-owned flats<br />
the Belgrade District Court – at her lawyers request <strong>an</strong>d with the prosecution’s<br />
consent – ruled that the arrest warr<strong>an</strong>t aga<strong>in</strong>st her should be <strong>an</strong>nulled on the<br />
grounds of her lawyers’ promise that she would show up <strong>for</strong> the trial<br />
scheduled <strong>for</strong> September 15. Express<strong>in</strong>g the feel<strong>in</strong>gs of the general public some<br />
political parties (G17 Plus, Social Democratic Union) 10 labeled the act a slap <strong>in</strong><br />
the face of democratic public. President of the Constitutional Court of Serbia<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vucetic said hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> arrest warr<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>nulled on the grounds of<br />
“scout’s honor” was unusual, the more so s<strong>in</strong>ce the court could have asked<br />
either the defend<strong>an</strong>t or her lawyers to provide guar<strong>an</strong>tees that she would<br />
appear. 11 Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Markovic did not appear be<strong>for</strong>e the court <strong>in</strong> September. No<br />
one seemed to be surprised except <strong>for</strong> the District Court that once aga<strong>in</strong> issued<br />
<strong>an</strong> arrest warr<strong>an</strong>t.<br />
Two months later, <strong>in</strong> August 2005, the Pozarevac deputy district<br />
prosecutor, Dmitar Krstev, dropped crim<strong>in</strong>al charges aga<strong>in</strong>st /her son/ Marko<br />
Milosevic accused of abus<strong>in</strong>g his townsm<strong>an</strong> Zor<strong>an</strong> Milov<strong>an</strong>ovic.<br />
Simult<strong>an</strong>eously, the prosecution lifted the <strong>in</strong>ternational arrest warr<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong><br />
young Milosevic. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the deputy prosecutor, Milosevic was acquitted<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce Zor<strong>an</strong> Milov<strong>an</strong>ovic claimed he could not recall whether or not Marko<br />
Milosevic had threatened him with a power saw but stuck to the <strong>state</strong>ment that<br />
other accused had maltreated him. The deputy prosecutor admitted that Public<br />
Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia Slobod<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>kovic had ordered him to<br />
drop the charges. Everyth<strong>in</strong>g happened soon after Miroslav Voj<strong>in</strong>ovic was not<br />
reelected president of the Pozarevac District Court, <strong>in</strong> spite of the Supreme<br />
10 D<strong>an</strong>as daily, June 1, 2005.<br />
11 D<strong>an</strong>as daily, June 2, 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Judicial Council’s recommendation, <strong>an</strong>d the election of a new president who<br />
allegedly enjoyed the support of the Socialist Party of Serbia. 12<br />
The public <strong>an</strong>d some political parties, the Democratic Party <strong>in</strong> the first<br />
place, once aga<strong>in</strong> reacted fiercely, call<strong>in</strong>g the act a compromise between the<br />
Kostunica cab<strong>in</strong>et <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Party of Serbia that further destroyed<br />
Serbia’s legal system <strong>an</strong>d moved Serbia away from the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union.<br />
The judiciary was aga<strong>in</strong> compromised when on September 28 the<br />
police took <strong>in</strong> the ex-m<strong>in</strong>ister of justice, Vlad<strong>an</strong> Batic, <strong>for</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d kept<br />
him <strong>in</strong> custody <strong>for</strong> 48 hours. Actually, it was the <strong>in</strong>cumbent m<strong>in</strong>ister of justice,<br />
Stojkovic, who had accused Batic of hav<strong>in</strong>g ordered the <strong>for</strong>mer director of the<br />
Central Prison Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, Drag<strong>an</strong> Vulic, to release certa<strong>in</strong> Nenad<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>ovic from the Krusevac prison. Batic underwent a lie detector at his<br />
request but was nevertheless kept <strong>in</strong> custody under the pretext that, s<strong>in</strong>ce he<br />
could have lied, he could <strong>in</strong>fluence other witnesses. After 48 hours the<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g judge released Batic without press<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y charge aga<strong>in</strong>st him.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>cident not only disgraced M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojkovic <strong>for</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g attempted to<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ate a political opponent through <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g the police <strong>an</strong>d judicial<br />
bodies, but also laid bare the fact that those <strong>in</strong>stitutions were too weak <strong>an</strong>d<br />
unprofessional to resist such pressure. The polygraph is not regularly used <strong>in</strong><br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>vestigations – one may ask <strong>for</strong> it <strong>an</strong>d one may deny it - <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
polygraph results c<strong>an</strong>not be used as evidence be<strong>for</strong>e a court of law. The<br />
decision on custody solely based on the polygraph results is illegal. Further,<br />
back on June 5, 2003 the Constitutional Court made a disputable decision <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>for</strong>m of a decree whereby it <strong>an</strong>nulled the provision of the Law on Crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs restrict<strong>in</strong>g the duration of the police custody to 30 days at the<br />
most. Consequently, on June 6, 7 <strong>an</strong>d 8, 2003, the police released all persons<br />
who had spent more th<strong>an</strong> 30 days <strong>in</strong> custody, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the said Nenad<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>ovic. M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojković justified himself by stat<strong>in</strong>g that no decision of the<br />
Constitutional Court of June 5, 2003 had been publicized <strong>in</strong> the Official Gazette<br />
of Serbia, while <strong>for</strong> his part Vlad<strong>an</strong> Batic <strong>in</strong>dicated that, as a rule, the<br />
Constitutional Court’s decisions made <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m of decrees were never<br />
publicized. At a press conference, Batic accused Premier Kostunica <strong>an</strong>d Police<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Drag<strong>an</strong> Jocic of fram<strong>in</strong>g up their political opponents <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>nounced<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al charges aga<strong>in</strong>st M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojkovic <strong>for</strong> misconduct.<br />
In September 2005, the judge of the Supreme Court of Serbia,<br />
Ljubomir Vuckovic, was arrested <strong>for</strong> reveal<strong>in</strong>g confidential <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, while<br />
the deputy special prosecutor, Mil<strong>an</strong> Radov<strong>an</strong>ovic under the suspicion that he<br />
had received a bribe to <strong>in</strong>tervene <strong>in</strong> the case of the so-called Jotka’s group, i.e.<br />
to have a suspect released from custody <strong>an</strong>d the rul<strong>in</strong>g of the Special<br />
Department of the Belgrade District Court <strong>an</strong>nulled. Zor<strong>an</strong> /Jotka/ Jotic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
his g<strong>an</strong>g were arrested <strong>for</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized crime dur<strong>in</strong>g the police Saber operation<br />
12 D<strong>an</strong>as daily, August 6-7, 2005.<br />
118<br />
119
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
launched after the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic. In November 2004,<br />
the first accused Zor<strong>an</strong> Jotic was sentenced to 12-year imprisonment, while the<br />
second accused, Gor<strong>an</strong> Petrovic, to 11-year <strong>in</strong>carceration. Justice Ljubomir<br />
Vuckovic was arrested two days be<strong>for</strong>e the Supreme Court was supposed to<br />
decide on the group’s appeal. Justice Vuckovic had been nom<strong>in</strong>ated a<br />
presid<strong>in</strong>g judge <strong>in</strong> the case. 13<br />
The cases of corruption, misconduct <strong>an</strong>d encroachment throw a bad<br />
light on Serbia’s judiciary. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the president of the Supreme Court of<br />
Serbia, Vida Petrovic-Skero, s<strong>in</strong>ce 2003 crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs have been<br />
<strong>in</strong>stituted aga<strong>in</strong>st 27 judges. Three judges stood trial <strong>for</strong> corruption, eight <strong>for</strong><br />
bribery, six <strong>for</strong> misconduct <strong>an</strong>d ten <strong>for</strong> violation of law. All those proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
have been <strong>in</strong>stituted ex officio. Five accused judges were found guilty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sentenced – their appeals are presently processed. Three judges accused of<br />
misconduct <strong>an</strong>d violation of law were given conditional sentences. Crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st three presidents of municipal courts are underway. 14<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
short of space. The competition <strong>for</strong> the election of deputy prosecutors <strong>for</strong><br />
military departments was called <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005 – three vac<strong>an</strong>cies were<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Public Prosecution Office, three <strong>in</strong> the Belgrade<br />
District Prosecution Office, two <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d three <strong>in</strong> Nis.<br />
The authorities decided that the officers under sentences should be<br />
accommodated <strong>in</strong> the military ward of the Nis Penitentiary-Re<strong>for</strong>matory. The<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister of Justice was tasked with specify<strong>in</strong>g their regimes. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
same decision, the arrested officers st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g trials were to be tr<strong>an</strong>sferred to<br />
district prisons <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d Nis.<br />
Dissolution of Military Courts<br />
Under the Law on the Tr<strong>an</strong>sfer of Military Courts’ Jurisdiction, the<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> judiciary completely took over the jurisdiction of the military judiciary<br />
on J<strong>an</strong>uary 1, 2005. The said law provides dissolution of military courts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
prosecution offices, as well as of the Supreme Military Court, <strong>an</strong>d sett<strong>in</strong>g up of<br />
special military departments with<strong>in</strong> district courts <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Nis. Under the law, a military department was also established <strong>in</strong> the Supreme<br />
Court of Serbia. District prosecution offices <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d Nis took<br />
over the jurisdiction of military prosecutions, while the Public Attorney Office<br />
of Serbia took upon itself all the cases that used to be <strong>in</strong> the competence of the<br />
Military Attorney.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to some estimates, the civili<strong>an</strong> judiciary was supposed to<br />
take over some 11,000 cases that were be<strong>in</strong>g processed by their military<br />
counterparts on the day the law came <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce. The procedure had to begun<br />
immediately, i.e. the deadl<strong>in</strong>e provided under the law was December 31, 2004<br />
<strong>for</strong> the press<strong>in</strong>g cases, <strong>an</strong>d J<strong>an</strong>uary 15 <strong>for</strong> the rest. However, the process begun<br />
<strong>in</strong> mid-J<strong>an</strong>uary <strong>for</strong> all cases <strong>an</strong>d was concluded only <strong>in</strong> late May.<br />
The Belgrade District Court set up a military department <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
reception commission <strong>in</strong> late 2004. The military department <strong>in</strong>cludes five<br />
judges who are, apart from their regular duties, tasked with military cases. The<br />
Belgrade District Prosecution Office also begun to overtake military charges <strong>in</strong><br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary. Deadl<strong>in</strong>es were not met not only because of scores of cases that had to<br />
be taken over, but also due to the fact that the courts were understaffed <strong>an</strong>d<br />
13 D<strong>an</strong>as daily, September 9, 2005.<br />
14 Blic daily, November 17, 2005.<br />
120<br />
121
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION<br />
At first conscientious objection was looked upon as a religious belief<br />
(or choice) <strong>an</strong>d it took several centuries <strong>for</strong> it to become accepted as a<br />
fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> right. As a ‘modern legal <strong>in</strong>stitute’, however,<br />
‘conscientious objection came <strong>in</strong>to existence <strong>in</strong> Sc<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>avi<strong>an</strong> protest<strong>an</strong>t<br />
countries at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the twentieth century’. 1 ‘The Council of Europe<br />
was the first <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitution to take a clear <strong>an</strong>d specific political <strong>an</strong>d<br />
legal position on conscientious objection’, as expressed <strong>in</strong> Resolution 337 (1967)<br />
of its Parliamentary Assembly. 2 It was only <strong>in</strong> the late 1980s that the United<br />
Nations adopted the first document elevat<strong>in</strong>g conscientious objection to the<br />
level of a fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> right, which the UN Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>Committee</strong><br />
adopted <strong>in</strong> 1993.<br />
The right to conscientious objection derives from the right to freedom<br />
of thought <strong>an</strong>d conscience conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the UN International Coven<strong>an</strong>t on<br />
Civil <strong>an</strong>d Political Rights <strong>an</strong>d is also based on the Europe<strong>an</strong> Convention <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Protection of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d Fundamental Freedoms <strong>an</strong>d on other<br />
numerous documents (resolutions, declarations, recommendations) of the UN,<br />
Parliamentary Assembly <strong>an</strong>d other bodies of the Council of Europe <strong>an</strong>d OSCE.<br />
As to the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro (SCG), conscientious<br />
objection has followed a highly specific normative course <strong>an</strong>d a still more<br />
convoluted path of practical realization. The fact that SCG was among the last<br />
countries <strong>in</strong> the region to acknowledge conscientious objection, among other<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs, is <strong>in</strong>dicative enough. What is more, the SCG authorities did not<br />
recognize conscientious objection as <strong>an</strong> accomplishment of modern<br />
civilization, nor as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>evitable concomit<strong>an</strong>t of the tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
society (necessitat<strong>in</strong>g, of course, re<strong>for</strong>ms of the armed <strong>for</strong>ces, defence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>security</strong> sectors); conscientious objection, as officially acknowledged <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>in</strong> particular, is the outcome of external <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal pressure on the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d military sets <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
1 Petar Milićević, representative of the Belgrade Office of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Bureau<br />
<strong>for</strong> Conscientious Objection (EBCO Balk<strong>an</strong>s), <strong>state</strong>ment published <strong>in</strong> ‘Dug marš kroz<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitucije’, Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
2 Dej<strong>an</strong> Milenković of the Lawyers’ <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights, a Belgrade<br />
NGO, ‘Dug marš kroz <strong>in</strong>stitucije’, Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
On <strong>an</strong> external level, SCG has <strong>an</strong> obligation towards the Council of<br />
Europe (stemm<strong>in</strong>g from its membership) to br<strong>in</strong>g the matter of conscientious<br />
objection <strong>an</strong>d alternative civil service <strong>in</strong>to con<strong>for</strong>mity with the relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards by 3 April 2006, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g that conscientious objection <strong>an</strong>d<br />
alternative civil service, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, will have to be regulated by law.<br />
Internally, <strong>in</strong> both member <strong>state</strong>s, the non-governmental sector, notably the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, has exerted const<strong>an</strong>t pressure<br />
on the authorities to regulate conscientious objection <strong>an</strong>d alternative civil<br />
service accord<strong>in</strong>g to Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
Regard<strong>in</strong>g the normative regulation of conscientious objection, the<br />
first such <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce is found not earlier th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Article 137 (2) of the 1992<br />
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which <strong>state</strong>s: ‘A citizen who<br />
is a conscientious objector <strong>for</strong> religious or other reasons <strong>an</strong>d does not wish to fulfil his<br />
military obligations under arms shall be permitted to serve <strong>in</strong> the Army of Yugoslavia<br />
without bear<strong>in</strong>g arms or <strong>in</strong> civili<strong>an</strong> service, <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with federal law.’ 3<br />
However, at that time the federal <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its army did not recognize the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitute of conscientious objection <strong>in</strong> practice, nor was conscientious objection<br />
recognized as a fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> right by that Constitution or <strong>in</strong> practice.<br />
This is borne out by the fact that the Constitution places conscientious<br />
objection <strong>in</strong> the section deal<strong>in</strong>g with the Army of Yugoslavia, as a mode of<br />
discharg<strong>in</strong>g one’s military obligation.<br />
Article 137 (2) of the FRY Constitution was rendered specific by<br />
Articles 296 through 300 of the Yugoslav Army Law, these provisions<br />
themselves hav<strong>in</strong>g later been amended by the 1994 Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of Military Service. 4 But it was only <strong>in</strong> 2003 that SCG regulated the right to<br />
conscientious objection accord<strong>in</strong>g to at least a m<strong>in</strong>imum of st<strong>an</strong>dards of<br />
developed world democracies; the piece of legislation <strong>in</strong> question was the<br />
Regulation on Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military<br />
Service, 5 adopted by the SCG Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters on 27 August (<strong>for</strong> the sake<br />
of clarity, here<strong>in</strong>after: Basic Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service).<br />
Conservative M<strong>in</strong>dset<br />
The considerably flawed Basic Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military<br />
Service tailored by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence <strong>an</strong>d adopted by the SCG Council of<br />
M<strong>in</strong>isters barely survived the test of implementation dur<strong>in</strong>g just over a year.<br />
Faced with traditionalistic military op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>an</strong>d no less conservative military<br />
practice, the Basic Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service underwent<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tial modification nearly all of which was at the expense of the<br />
3 Ustav SRJ, Savremena adm<strong>in</strong>istracija, Belgrade, 1992.<br />
4 Službeni list SRJ, No. 36/94.<br />
5 Službeni list SCG, No. 37/2003.<br />
122<br />
123
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
conscientious objector. The modifications came <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m of the Regulation<br />
on Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service, 6<br />
adopted early <strong>in</strong> February 2005 <strong>in</strong> the same way as its predecessor. This new<br />
Regulation is <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the Basic Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military<br />
Service which rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce.<br />
The military-political establishment of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro (<strong>for</strong>merly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) long resisted the<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ds of m<strong>an</strong>y young recruits <strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g the right to conscientious objection,<br />
of non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro concerned with<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d directly with the matter of conscientious objection, <strong>an</strong>d of<br />
non-governmental associations <strong>an</strong>d other relev<strong>an</strong>t actors <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community to recognize this right of the conscientious objectors <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>troduce<br />
civil service as <strong>an</strong> alternative to military service. The resist<strong>an</strong>ce to these<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ds was so tough that SCG was among the last <strong>state</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Europe to<br />
acknowledge this accomplishment of modern civilization.<br />
The conservative <strong>an</strong>d traditionalistic segment of Serbia accepted<br />
alternative civil service with the greatest resentment. Lament<strong>in</strong>g this ‘ill<br />
<strong>for</strong>tune’, Colonel Duš<strong>an</strong> Knežević, deputy editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief of the Army weekly<br />
Vojska, wrote: ‘The other day, a m<strong>an</strong> compla<strong>in</strong>ed to his friend <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
school mate about a shame that had befallen him <strong>in</strong> his old age. His gr<strong>an</strong>dson<br />
had applied <strong>for</strong> alternative civil service...The day on which the son comes of<br />
age <strong>an</strong>d is ready <strong>for</strong> soldier<strong>in</strong>g has always been a memorable event <strong>in</strong> the<br />
family. In m<strong>an</strong>y families, the send-offs of recruits have rivalled wedd<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
festivities <strong>in</strong> terms of the number of guests, of feast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d merrymak<strong>in</strong>g. We<br />
have no record of <strong>an</strong>y "civili<strong>an</strong> soldier" org<strong>an</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g a send-off, nor have we<br />
heard of <strong>an</strong>y such th<strong>in</strong>g...Is it possible, <strong>in</strong> such circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, to wish your heir<br />
a happy soldier<strong>in</strong>g life? There isn’t go<strong>in</strong>g to be a soldier’s photo to be<br />
displayed <strong>in</strong> the ch<strong>in</strong>a cab<strong>in</strong>et or carried about <strong>in</strong> the wallet. No attend<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
swear<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong> ceremony, no visits, no parcels or money orders. Will there be <strong>an</strong>y<br />
un<strong>for</strong>gettable memories he c<strong>an</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g back to share at get-togethers with his<br />
pals or class reunions? These were the questions the disconsolate friend asked<br />
<strong>in</strong> his <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> grief, but he got no <strong>an</strong>swers...’ 7<br />
Fear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> their future among other th<strong>in</strong>gs (the more recruits opt <strong>for</strong><br />
alternative civil service, the less need there is <strong>for</strong> the already excessive officer<br />
corps!), the drafters of the Basic Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service<br />
– mostly officers – designed the documents <strong>in</strong> such a way as to pose serious<br />
obstacles <strong>for</strong> the conscientious objectors. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, each conscientious<br />
objector must appear be<strong>for</strong>e a board which decides on his application <strong>for</strong><br />
alternative civil service though, to be fair, the Regulation lays down that no<br />
2005.<br />
6 Službeni list SCG, No. 4/2005; ‘Prigovor ne odlaže vojsku’, Politika, 9 February<br />
7 ‘Ispraćaji’, Vojska, 6 May 2004.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
professional soldier may sit on it. 8 Nonetheless, the boards are de facto under<br />
the control of the General Staff of the Army of SCG (VSCG) because they are,<br />
as a rule, set up at the proposal of the heads of draft departments who are all<br />
military personnel. In other words, the conscientious objectors’ applications <strong>for</strong><br />
alternative civil service are <strong>in</strong> the h<strong>an</strong>ds of the military almost from beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to end. This is not only contrary to the basic idea of conscientious objection, but<br />
also makes <strong>for</strong> a selective attitude <strong>an</strong>d even discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, as well as mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
possible other negative phenomena <strong>in</strong> the process of conscientious objection<br />
realization.<br />
"A Blow to the Defence Capacity of the State"<br />
The traditionalistic m<strong>in</strong>dset <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro suffered <strong>an</strong><br />
even heavier blow with young men opt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> alternative civil service on a<br />
massive scale. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Belgrade office of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Bureau <strong>for</strong><br />
Conscientious Objection (EBCO Balk<strong>an</strong>), there were about 20,000 conscientious<br />
objectors <strong>in</strong> SCG <strong>an</strong>d a further 9,000 on a ‘wait<strong>in</strong>g list’ <strong>in</strong> April 2005! 9 The office<br />
predicted that the number of conscientious objectors <strong>in</strong> SCG would level off<br />
only after reach<strong>in</strong>g as much as 50 per cent of the conscript population.<br />
Neither the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence, nor the Army, nor the <strong>state</strong> union<br />
<strong>an</strong>d its members was fully prepared to provide adequate service conditions <strong>for</strong><br />
even half the young men whose applications <strong>for</strong> alternative civil service had<br />
been gr<strong>an</strong>ted. 10 The year-long experience of civil service <strong>in</strong> SCG has on the<br />
whole been positive <strong>in</strong> spite of obstructions <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y bungles <strong>an</strong>d even<br />
comical situations, e.g. where several conscientious objectors per<strong>for</strong>med their<br />
civil service <strong>in</strong> a private factory <strong>in</strong> Smederevo, whose owner not only exploited<br />
them but compla<strong>in</strong>ed that they did not work hard enough. 11 Such <strong>in</strong>cidents<br />
reflect very badly on the <strong>in</strong>stitute of conscientious objection.<br />
The opponents of alternative civil service <strong>in</strong> both members of the <strong>state</strong><br />
union, particularly <strong>in</strong> Serbia, have risen to the defence of the traditional<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of military service almost <strong>in</strong> a body. The arguments aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
conscientious objection offered publicly vary from <strong>in</strong>nocuous <strong>state</strong>ments such<br />
as, ‘Both my gr<strong>an</strong>dfather <strong>an</strong>d father served <strong>in</strong> the army, so I’m go<strong>in</strong>g to serve<br />
8 Regulation on Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military<br />
Service, Article 21 (a), Službeni list SCG, No. 4/2005.<br />
9 ‘Vojska bez vojnika’, Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 November 2005.<br />
10 Article 27 of the Regulation on the Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of Military Service provides that alternative civil service is per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong> ‘health, rescue<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations, org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>for</strong> the rehabilitation of disabled persons <strong>an</strong>d other org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions engaged <strong>in</strong> activities of general <strong>in</strong>sterst which are f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced from the budget <strong>an</strong>d<br />
designated by the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Defence...’, Službeni list SCG, No. 4/2005.<br />
11 ‘Vojska bez vojnika’, Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 Novembar 2005.<br />
124<br />
125
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
too’ 12 to pathetic utter<strong>an</strong>ces charged with patriotism such as, ‘Serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />
army is sacros<strong>an</strong>ct’. 13 But the most serious counterstroke came from the VSCG<br />
General Staff <strong>an</strong>d the SCG M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence.<br />
In February 2005, the Defence Obligations Adm<strong>in</strong>istration of the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence’s Hum<strong>an</strong> Resources Sector hastily org<strong>an</strong>ized a<br />
‘Professional Debate on Criteria <strong>for</strong> Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g Military Service <strong>in</strong> Civil<br />
Service’. 14 The very subject of this ‘professional debate’ <strong>in</strong>dicates that the<br />
military experts from the VSCG General Staff <strong>an</strong>d SCG M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence do<br />
not dist<strong>in</strong>guish between the notions military service <strong>an</strong>d civil service, because, <strong>for</strong><br />
one th<strong>in</strong>g, one c<strong>an</strong>not per<strong>for</strong>m one’s military service <strong>in</strong> a civil service (this<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g a contradiction <strong>in</strong> adjecto). Secondly, the military experts have<br />
demonstrated on this occasion too that they are dis<strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to regard<br />
conscientious objection as a fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> right: the syntagm<br />
‘per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of military service <strong>in</strong> a civil service’ occurs <strong>in</strong> every law <strong>an</strong>d bylaw<br />
of SCG (<strong>for</strong>merly FRY) deal<strong>in</strong>g with conscientious objection, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Regulation on Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military<br />
Service.<br />
The critical remarks regard<strong>in</strong>g alternative civil service <strong>in</strong> SCG of the<br />
representatives of non-governmental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights org<strong>an</strong>izations from Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro who attended the debate failed to draw <strong>for</strong>th <strong>an</strong> adequate<br />
response, with nearly all the generals <strong>an</strong>d colonels <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their papers that<br />
alternative civil service is detrimental to the defence of the homel<strong>an</strong>d. All the<br />
same, one must not lose sight of the fact that a number of young men who<br />
have opted <strong>for</strong> civil service have shown a lack of responsibility <strong>an</strong>d conscience<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g this alternative; that some of them have not only failed to grasp the<br />
essence of civil service <strong>an</strong>d conscientious objection but they do not care either,<br />
their chief aim be<strong>in</strong>g to avoid serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the army. By their improper conduct<br />
while work<strong>in</strong>g at some org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions, a number of them have<br />
cast a shadow on alternative civil service. For all these deviations <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>an</strong>omalies, however, there is no truth <strong>in</strong> the conclusions drawn at the<br />
‘professional debate’ that ‘civil service as <strong>an</strong> alternative to military service is a<br />
screen <strong>for</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g compulsory military service’, 15 as well as that alternative<br />
civil service has seriously underm<strong>in</strong>ed the defence capacity of the <strong>state</strong> union<br />
of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. 16<br />
Already the next day, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence proclaimed the<br />
a<strong>for</strong>esaid Regulation on Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
Military Service (actually the modified version of what we tentatively called<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the ‘Basic Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service’). This new<br />
Regulation ‘went <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce’ on 5 February 2005.<br />
"Amendments <strong>an</strong>d Supplements"<br />
The non-governmental sector <strong>in</strong> both Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro reacted<br />
sharply to the fact that the Regulation was en<strong>for</strong>ced so soon after the a<strong>for</strong>esaid<br />
‘Professional Debate on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service <strong>in</strong> Civil Service’.<br />
Speak<strong>in</strong>g on behalf of the Belgrade EBCO Balk<strong>an</strong> office <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> his own name,<br />
Petar Milićević compla<strong>in</strong>ed: ‘The gather<strong>in</strong>g which debated the criteria <strong>for</strong><br />
alternative civil service was held a few days ago, which me<strong>an</strong>s that the<br />
Regulation on the Amendments to the Regulation on Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military<br />
Service was already written, <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> secret. No member of the team which<br />
drafted the orig<strong>in</strong>al Regulation was <strong>in</strong>vited to attend the draft<strong>in</strong>g of its<br />
amendments. Someone ought to be called to account <strong>for</strong> such <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights<br />
violations.’ 17<br />
In spite of the NGO reactions, no one was called to account <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g irregularities. The key po<strong>in</strong>ts of the February 2005 ‘amendments’<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the Regulation on the Amendments to the Regulation on<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of Military Service, that is, <strong>in</strong> the ‘Basic Regulation’, were as<br />
follows: First, the right to conscientious objection had hitherto belonged to<br />
both conscripts <strong>an</strong>d those already sent to serve <strong>in</strong> their units, whereas now the<br />
‘amendments’ deprive the second category of this right; second, the deadl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
<strong>for</strong> conscientious objectors apply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> alternative military service has been<br />
shortened from 60 to eight days; <strong>an</strong>d third, under the February ‘amendments’,<br />
the civili<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions provid<strong>in</strong>g civil service must pay the<br />
conscientious objectors 308 d<strong>in</strong>ars a month, equall<strong>in</strong>g a soldier’s pay at the<br />
time. 18<br />
Colonel Petar Radojčić, head of the Defence Obligations<br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istration of the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence’s Hum<strong>an</strong> Resources Sector <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ardent advocate of the February ‘amendments’, alleged that the ‘soldiers<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g their military service <strong>in</strong> units <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions of the Army are <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ferior position’ to the youths opt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> alternative civil service. ‘A soldier <strong>in</strong><br />
regular military service c<strong>an</strong>not chose the place of his military service, his<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g day is much longer, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of his duties he is subject<br />
to much greater stra<strong>in</strong> day <strong>an</strong>d night...’; ‘Also, the hitherto practice whereby a<br />
soldier was gr<strong>an</strong>ted the right to conscientious objection gave rise to serious<br />
12 ‘Napred marš’, Ekonomist magaz<strong>in</strong>, 11 October 2004.<br />
13 ‘Odbr<strong>an</strong>a otadžb<strong>in</strong>e je sveta dužnost‘, Vojska, 23 June 2005.<br />
14 ‘Iskustva, kriterijumi, rešenja’, Vojska, 10 February 2005.<br />
15 Ibid.<br />
16 ‘Civili ugrozili odbrambeni potencijal’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 9 February 2005.<br />
17 ‘Ogr<strong>an</strong>ičeno pravo na prigovor savesti’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 5-6 February 2005; ‘Prigovor<br />
prigovoru savesti’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 7 February 2005.<br />
18 ‘Uredba o izmenama i dopunama Uredbe o vršenju vojne obaveze’, čl. 26 (a),<br />
27 <strong>an</strong>d 27 (a), Službeni list SCG, No. 4/2005; ‘Poštov<strong>an</strong>je ljudskih prava svih građ<strong>an</strong>a’,<br />
Vojska, 24 February 2005.<br />
126<br />
127
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
problems <strong>in</strong> the discharge of duties by units <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions of the Army. We<br />
had soldiers apply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> civil service after complet<strong>in</strong>g their tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which<br />
highly complicated <strong>an</strong>y pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g on the level of units to which they were to be<br />
assigned...’<br />
As a key argument <strong>in</strong> his defence of the February ‘amendments’ to the<br />
Regulation, Colonel Radojčić said: ‘Dur<strong>in</strong>g the course of last year it was found<br />
that soldiers <strong>in</strong> alternative civil service had no problem substitut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong><br />
employees of certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions, as a result of which, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, seventeen<br />
<strong>security</strong> staff of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Hospital Centre lost their jobs, <strong>an</strong>d thirty<br />
employees were dismissed from the Psychiatric Hospital <strong>in</strong> Kov<strong>in</strong>...’ ‘Whereas<br />
cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions are under considerable pressure to employ recruits, there<br />
is far less <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> hospitals, old people’s homes <strong>an</strong>d similar places,’ he<br />
said. 19<br />
If <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g, Colonel Radojčić’s argument shows that he does not<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d the fundamentals of conscientious objection, that is, he does not<br />
view it as a fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> right. At the same time, he is by virtue of his<br />
office <strong>in</strong> a position to decide on crucial problems of conscientious objectors,<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g part of the sector which <strong>for</strong>mulated the February Regulation<br />
‘amendments’.<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, at a news conference <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad, a number of<br />
non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Regional Conscientious<br />
Objection Centre <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia, voiced a sharp criticism of the military <strong>an</strong>d civili<strong>an</strong> authorities that<br />
adopted the February ‘amendments’ regard<strong>in</strong>g alternative civil service,<br />
<strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that their key provisions were contrary to the Charter on Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights <strong>an</strong>d Civil Liberties <strong>an</strong>d the Constitutional Charter of the State<br />
Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. Also, the representatives of these two nongovernmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations called on the authorities <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong><br />
union to ‘publicly def<strong>in</strong>e their position’ on the fact that the rights of<br />
conscientious objectors had been curtailed <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>an</strong>ner outl<strong>in</strong>ed above. 20 The<br />
officials ignored such criticism <strong>an</strong>d alternative civil service cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be<br />
regulated dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005 accord<strong>in</strong>g to the ‘Basic Regulation’ <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
February ‘amendments’.<br />
F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Problems<br />
Under the February ‘amendments’ to the Regulation the ‘pay’ of<br />
conscientious objectors <strong>an</strong>d their tr<strong>an</strong>sport costs are to be paid by the civili<strong>an</strong><br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> which they worked. However, quite a<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
number of these org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions could not foot the bill <strong>an</strong>d had<br />
to close their doors to conscientious objectors.<br />
These cases, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g problems <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac, were duly covered by<br />
the media. 21 In 2004 there were <strong>in</strong> that town as m<strong>an</strong>y as ’19 <strong>in</strong>stitutions which<br />
took on soldiers <strong>in</strong> civili<strong>an</strong> clothes regularly’; however, ‘dur<strong>in</strong>g September<br />
2005’ only four civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac decided to extend their<br />
contracts with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence, that is, to cont<strong>in</strong>ue employ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
conscientious objectors. One of those which discont<strong>in</strong>ued alternative civil<br />
service was the local Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Hospital Centre: the 400,000 d<strong>in</strong>ars a month it<br />
paid the young men per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g alternative civil service was more th<strong>an</strong> it<br />
could af<strong>for</strong>d.<br />
The non-governmental sector <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro also reacted<br />
on time to these negative effects of the ‘amendments’, call<strong>in</strong>g on the military<br />
<strong>an</strong>d civili<strong>an</strong> authorities to end the ‘discrim<strong>in</strong>atory attitude’ towards the<br />
conscientious objectors by provid<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> their ‘pay’ <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sport costs<br />
‘from the same source provid<strong>in</strong>g funds <strong>for</strong> soldiers do<strong>in</strong>g their military<br />
service’, namely ‘from the same budget’.<br />
Given that <strong>for</strong> these reasons m<strong>an</strong>y conscientious objectors have been<br />
unable to do alternative civil service <strong>in</strong> their places of residence, nongovernmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization officials warned the military <strong>an</strong>d civili<strong>an</strong><br />
authorities that this practice was <strong>in</strong> direct ‘contravention of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
documents <strong>an</strong>d recommendations’. 22 But the authorities did not appear overly<br />
worried over this either; on the contrary, the colonels <strong>an</strong>d generals viewed the<br />
matter through a different prism: the fewer org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g alternative civil service, the greater the number of recruits opt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong><br />
conventional service.<br />
Because the civili<strong>an</strong> authorities, particularly <strong>in</strong> Serbia, showed almost<br />
complete lack of <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the problems concern<strong>in</strong>g alternative civil service,<br />
non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations representatives engaged <strong>in</strong> dialogue with<br />
military authorities, that is, officials <strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence. They agreed as<br />
a result to conceptualize a draft law on alternative civil service, <strong>in</strong> view of the<br />
<strong>state</strong> union’s commitment to the Council of Europe to treat the matter<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the relev<strong>an</strong>t Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards by April 2006, that is, to regulate<br />
it by a law. The M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence <strong>an</strong>nounced repeatedly that it was work<strong>in</strong>g<br />
on a draft law on alternative civil service but no such draft was offered<br />
publicly <strong>for</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>ation. A Draft Law on Alternative Civil Service was drawn<br />
up by the experts of EBCO Balk<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d, follow<strong>in</strong>g a debate by experts on 19<br />
October 2005, submitted <strong>for</strong> public appraisal. 23<br />
19 ‘Ravnoprav<strong>an</strong> tretm<strong>an</strong>’, boxed item <strong>in</strong> ‘Poštov<strong>an</strong>je ljudskih prava svih<br />
građ<strong>an</strong>a’, Vojska, 24 February 2005.<br />
20 ‘Prekršena Povelja o ljudskim pravima’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 February 2005.<br />
21 ‘Vojnici civili nisu svuda dobrodošli’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 Oktobar 2005.<br />
22 Ibid.<br />
23 Draft Law on Alternative Civil Service, www.ebcobalk<strong>an</strong>.org.<br />
128<br />
129
Draft Law on Civili<strong>an</strong> Army Service<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Article 2 of the Draft Law 24 <strong>in</strong>cludes the follow<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>itions: 1)<br />
‘Alternative civil service is a service substitut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> that segment of<br />
compulsory military service which relates to the per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of compulsory<br />
military service <strong>an</strong>d to the reserve <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d is per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong> civili<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions...’; 2) ‘An <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>in</strong> which alternative civil service is per<strong>for</strong>med<br />
is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution, a public enterprise or <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ization per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g a scientific,<br />
educational, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, cultural, sports, social, health, <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>itari<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
activity of general concern, as well as a <strong>state</strong> org<strong>an</strong> or <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong> of <strong>an</strong><br />
autonomous prov<strong>in</strong>ce or of local self-government <strong>in</strong> the Republic of Serbia’; 3)<br />
‘A conscientious objector is a conscript (a recruit, a person per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g military<br />
service or a person <strong>in</strong> the reserve <strong>for</strong>ce) who wishes on religious, moral,<br />
political, philosophical or other justifiable grounds of conscience to substitute<br />
alternative civil service <strong>for</strong> compulsory military service under the conditions<br />
laid down by this Law’; 4) ‘A civil conscript is a person whose application has<br />
been gr<strong>an</strong>ted to per<strong>for</strong>m civil service or reserve <strong>for</strong>ce civil service...’; 5) ‘A Civil<br />
Service Board is <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ization with<strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour which decides<br />
on the applications of conscientious objectors concern<strong>in</strong>g civil service<br />
("Board")’; 6) ‘A Civil Service Centre is <strong>an</strong> professional adm<strong>in</strong>istrative body<br />
attached to a Board <strong>an</strong>d conduct<strong>in</strong>g affairs <strong>an</strong>d exercis<strong>in</strong>g functions <strong>in</strong><br />
accord<strong>an</strong>ce with this Law’; 7) ‘A responsible person is a person who, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution where a civil service is per<strong>for</strong>med, exercises supervision of the work<br />
of a civil conscript accord<strong>in</strong>g to the provisions of this Law...’<br />
Unlike the current legislation regulat<strong>in</strong>g the per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of civil<br />
service <strong>in</strong> SCG, the Draft Law on Alternative Civil Service def<strong>in</strong>es all they key<br />
notions relev<strong>an</strong>t to the practice of civil service <strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>an</strong>d helps to<br />
avoid <strong>an</strong>y misunderst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs. Of special import<strong>an</strong>ce is the fact that it clearly<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guishes between military service <strong>an</strong>d civil service, between a military<br />
conscript <strong>an</strong>d a civil conscript, <strong>an</strong>d so on.<br />
The Draft Law devotes a whole section (Art. 25-37) 25 to the Civil<br />
Service Boards whose ma<strong>in</strong> duty it is to decide on the applications submitted<br />
by conscientious objectors who w<strong>an</strong>t to per<strong>for</strong>m alternative civil service. Under<br />
the Draft Law, the Boards are removed from the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour, that is, <strong>in</strong> a civili<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istry (the full<br />
name of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istry be<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour, Employment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Social Policy). The Board members (five under the Draft Law rather th<strong>an</strong> eight<br />
as at present) are appo<strong>in</strong>ted by the m<strong>in</strong>ister at the head of the civili<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istry,<br />
a major step towards the full demilitarization of civil service.<br />
24 Ibid., Article 2.<br />
25 Ibid., Articles 25-37.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Article 3 of the Draft Law provides that a conscientious objector ‘must<br />
be ensured service <strong>in</strong> a civil service <strong>for</strong> a period of eight months’, naturally<br />
under the conditions specified by law. (At present this period is n<strong>in</strong>e months.)<br />
Article 4 provides that a civil conscript ‘shall enter upon civil service at the<br />
latest by the end of the calendar year <strong>in</strong> which he atta<strong>in</strong>s to the age of 30 years’<br />
or, <strong>in</strong> exceptional cases, by the end of the calendar year ‘<strong>in</strong> which he atta<strong>in</strong>s to<br />
the age of 35 years’. Also, ‘The civil service obligation of a member of the<br />
reserve <strong>for</strong>ce cont<strong>in</strong>ues until the end of the calendar year <strong>in</strong> which the civil<br />
conscript atta<strong>in</strong>s to the age of 55 years.’ 26<br />
Articles 15 <strong>an</strong>d 16 lay down the procedure <strong>for</strong> apply<strong>in</strong>g to per<strong>for</strong>m<br />
civil service. The most signific<strong>an</strong>t novelty <strong>in</strong> this section of the Draft Law is the<br />
restoration of the right to alternative civil service to recruits already sent to<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m their compulsory military service <strong>in</strong> VSCG units <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions 27 (a<br />
right denied them under the February ‘amendments’!).<br />
As to the matter of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce, the Draft Law has the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
provision: 28 ‘An <strong>in</strong>stitution org<strong>an</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g civil service shall provide a civil<br />
conscript with pay equall<strong>in</strong>g the pay of soldiers per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g their military<br />
service <strong>in</strong> their military units.’ Also, ‘Records of civil conscripts shall be kept<br />
by the professional service/Civil Service Centre of a Civil Service Board. A<br />
Civil Service Centre shall issue a civil conscript with a civil service book<br />
serv<strong>in</strong>g as proof of per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of civil service <strong>an</strong>d of his identity while <strong>in</strong><br />
alternative civil service.’ 29 The Draft Law also provides <strong>for</strong> the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of civil<br />
conscripts, the mode of per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d supervision of civil service, the<br />
conditions under which alternative civil service may be term<strong>in</strong>ated,<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ts, punishment, penalties <strong>an</strong>d other practical matters relat<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of alternative civil service <strong>in</strong> SCG.<br />
Adoption of the Draft Law on Alternative Civil Service, which is<br />
conceptualized accord<strong>in</strong>g to the relev<strong>an</strong>t Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, would be a<br />
major step by the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>an</strong>d/or its members towards the demilitarization<br />
of <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d society, <strong>an</strong>d also a step nearer the societies characterized by<br />
developed liberal democracy.<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
• In the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro civil service as <strong>an</strong><br />
alternative service is not grounded either <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>ds of the citizens, or <strong>in</strong><br />
normative acts, or <strong>in</strong> practice <strong>for</strong> that matter; on the contrary, it cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be<br />
referred to as ‘civil per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of military service’ at all these levels.<br />
26 Ibid., Articles 3 <strong>an</strong>d 4.<br />
27 Ibid., Articles 15 <strong>an</strong>d 16.<br />
28 Ibid., Article 10.<br />
29 Ibid., Article 48.<br />
130<br />
131
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Likewise, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong> union conscientious objection is not accepted as a<br />
fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> right; what is more, it has been shown that most<br />
conscientious objectors themselves look upon this right as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ferior right <strong>an</strong>d<br />
act accord<strong>in</strong>gly.<br />
• Furthermore, evidence abounds that the traditionalistic<br />
conservative m<strong>in</strong>dset – which prevails <strong>in</strong> both member <strong>state</strong>s but is more<br />
pronounced <strong>in</strong> Serbia – looks upon alternative civil service as <strong>an</strong> ‘artifice of the<br />
so-called Western democracy’ <strong>an</strong>d noth<strong>in</strong>g if not ‘a pernicious method of<br />
destroy<strong>in</strong>g our Army’, as was often po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong> connection with this topic<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005 too.<br />
• Nonetheless, the civili<strong>an</strong> authorities <strong>in</strong> Montenegro demonstrated<br />
<strong>an</strong> appreciation of the problems of alternative civil service. The Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
authorities, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, took a markedly conservative l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d let the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence deal with the matter. The military authorities acceded to<br />
conscientious objection not as <strong>an</strong> accomplishment of the modern civilization<br />
but as a necessary evil <strong>an</strong>d obstructed its realization whenever they could.<br />
• This negative fundamental attitude gave rise to all k<strong>in</strong>ds of<br />
fallacies help<strong>in</strong>g to at least push alternative civil service <strong>in</strong>to the background.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the thesis was launched that alternative civil service is ‘absolutely<br />
useless’ <strong>an</strong>d only helps conscientious objectors to ‘avoid compulsory military<br />
service’. Another thesis <strong>in</strong> circulation has it that alternative civil service ‘is<br />
destroy<strong>in</strong>g our defence <strong>an</strong>d national <strong>security</strong>’. The non-governmental sector <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational actors, <strong>for</strong> all their<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tial ef<strong>for</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the doma<strong>in</strong> of realization of the right to conscientious<br />
objection, failed to ‘re<strong>for</strong>m’ the attitudes even of the more liberal segments of<br />
society.<br />
• Alternative civil service <strong>in</strong> SCG m<strong>an</strong>ifested some subst<strong>an</strong>tial<br />
flaws. But they could be elim<strong>in</strong>ated easily if the <strong>state</strong> itself were to ch<strong>an</strong>ge its<br />
attitude, thus enabl<strong>in</strong>g a new model of legislative regulation <strong>an</strong>d practice of<br />
alternative civil service, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d education of civil conscripts<br />
to per<strong>for</strong>m various jobs <strong>in</strong> a public-spirited civil service sector.<br />
• The <strong>state</strong> union is mov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this direction only very slowly. The<br />
future of the Draft Law on Alternative Civil Service, which is based on modern<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> solutions, is still uncerta<strong>in</strong>. There<strong>for</strong>e, the Draft Law may not be<br />
adopted by the SCG Assembly by the end of 2006, let alone dur<strong>in</strong>g its spr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
session.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
ORGANIZED CRIME TRIALS<br />
The Trial of the Accused<br />
of the Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic Assass<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
The defend<strong>an</strong>ts charged with the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić have been on trial <strong>for</strong> full two years now. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first year<br />
nearly all the particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs – above all the Trial Chamber,<br />
Prosecutor’s Office <strong>an</strong>d Special Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Division – were under<br />
concerted pressure from certa<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government representatives,<br />
politici<strong>an</strong>s, lawyers (both those represent<strong>in</strong>g the defend<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d others),<br />
various experts, representatives of a number of professional org<strong>an</strong>izations,<br />
defend<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d their supporters. In addition to this, the Special Prosecutor’s<br />
Office, Special Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Division, <strong>an</strong>d Trial Chamber President were<br />
targets of a media smear campaign. 1<br />
Though the second-year proceed<strong>in</strong>gs passed <strong>in</strong> a somewhat calmer<br />
atmosphere, a number of developments could have had serious consequences.<br />
The first of these was the decision of the competent authorities to block the<br />
reappo<strong>in</strong>tment of Jov<strong>an</strong> Prijić as Special Prosecutor. In the words of the<br />
Republic Public Prosecutor, Slobod<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>ković, Prijić was appo<strong>in</strong>ted Deputy<br />
Special Prosecutor at his own request. Expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the decision to name<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Radov<strong>an</strong>ović Special Prosecutor <strong>for</strong> Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime <strong>an</strong>d Prijić his<br />
deputy, J<strong>an</strong>ković said that ‘that was what he [Prijić] w<strong>an</strong>ted because the job<br />
carries a lot of responsibility, it is extensive <strong>an</strong>d always a focus of public<br />
attention. Believe me, this job is not easy to do. Prijić had served his term of<br />
office <strong>an</strong>d w<strong>an</strong>ted to keep work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that prosecutor’s office’. 2<br />
A second major development was the arrest of the Deputy Special<br />
Prosecutor, Mil<strong>an</strong> Radov<strong>an</strong>ović, who was Chief Trial Attorney at the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić<br />
trial. Radov<strong>an</strong>ović was arrested on 14 September 2005 on charges of disclos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong> official secret relat<strong>in</strong>g to eavesdropp<strong>in</strong>g on Supreme Court Judge Ljubomir<br />
Vučković. Vučković <strong>an</strong>d Radov<strong>an</strong>ović were arrested the same day, the first on<br />
1 Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, ‘Ljudska prava i kolektivni<br />
identitet’, pp. 165-215.<br />
2 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Slobod<strong>an</strong> Radov<strong>an</strong>ović novi specijalni tužilac, Prijić zamenik’, M.<br />
Torov, V.Z. Cvijić, M. Miloradović, 28 July 2005.<br />
132<br />
133
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
charges of tak<strong>in</strong>g a bribe <strong>in</strong> return <strong>for</strong> which he was to quash a first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
judgement aga<strong>in</strong>st members of a Kruševac crim<strong>in</strong>al group led by Zor<strong>an</strong> ‘Jotka’<br />
Jotić. 3 A few days follow<strong>in</strong>g the arrest of the Deputy Special Prosecutor,<br />
Nebojša Maraš, <strong>an</strong>other Deputy Special Prosecutor <strong>an</strong>d Trial Attorney,<br />
resigned <strong>an</strong>d immediately set up as <strong>an</strong> attorney. Comment<strong>in</strong>g on this, Rajko<br />
D<strong>an</strong>ilović, who is represent<strong>in</strong>g the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić family at the trial, said, ‘Maraš’s<br />
request to be relived of his prosecutorial office on the eve of the term<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st the defend<strong>an</strong>ts charged with the<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Đ<strong>in</strong>đić was astonish<strong>in</strong>g. I know Maraš <strong>an</strong>d I<br />
am sure that he wouldn’t have done that without a strong cause <strong>an</strong>d<br />
motive...one’s immediate assumption is that he is under pressure from the<br />
people aga<strong>in</strong>st whom the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are conducted. It is possible that he is<br />
under pressure from a lobby beh<strong>in</strong>d the BIA [Security Intelligence Agency],<br />
given that the Special Court <strong>an</strong>d Prosecutor’s Office have been under pressure<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e. I am sure that this too is a <strong>for</strong>m of pressure on the court.’ 4<br />
In spite of the fact that Government <strong>an</strong>d party officials have, under<br />
public pressure, stopped openly advocat<strong>in</strong>g the closure of the Special Division<br />
<strong>an</strong>d a revision of the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić trial <strong>in</strong>dictment, certa<strong>in</strong> actions by the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Internal Affairs (MUP) c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as pressure on the<br />
Special Division <strong>an</strong>d the Trial Chamber President, Marko Kljajević. Thus, on 4<br />
November 2005, the MUP issued a <strong>state</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> which it accused holders of<br />
judicial office of clock<strong>in</strong>g excessive mileages <strong>in</strong> official MUP cars. The<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment said this, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs: ‘To be fair, the M<strong>in</strong>istry members<br />
provide <strong>security</strong> to n<strong>in</strong>e holders of judicial office, who have at their disposal<br />
ten official MUP vehicles of which a number are armoured. The activities of<br />
the police officers <strong>in</strong>volved usually come down to driv<strong>in</strong>g them to work <strong>an</strong>d<br />
back, to their flats or such other addresses as are given. Although no <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of <strong>an</strong>y activity directed at jeopardiz<strong>in</strong>g their personal safety has been<br />
registered so far, it has been noted that the official MUP vehicles placed at their<br />
disposal have clocked <strong>an</strong> excessive mileage, <strong>in</strong> some cases approximately<br />
50,000 kilometres <strong>in</strong> a relatively short period of time.’ 5 Several weeks later, the<br />
MUP decided to deny the Trial Chamber President, Marko Kljajević, access to<br />
<strong>an</strong> armoured car <strong>an</strong>d the use of <strong>an</strong> official telephone, as well as ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g his<br />
personal bodyguards. On 22 December 2005 the Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law Centre<br />
issued a <strong>state</strong>ment characteriz<strong>in</strong>g the MUP action as a pressure on the court<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Kljajević. 6<br />
At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of December 2005, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Court<br />
President, Vida Petrović-Škero, requested the Belgrade District Court<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
President, S<strong>in</strong>iša Važić, to establish whether the trial chambers presided over<br />
by Kljajević were guilty of <strong>an</strong>y omissions, <strong>in</strong> view of the length of their<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, three persons suspected of belong<strong>in</strong>g to the ‘Zemun<br />
g<strong>an</strong>g’ (Paž<strong>in</strong>, Gavrić <strong>an</strong>d Maletić) had to be released ow<strong>in</strong>g to the expiration of<br />
their detention period. In his reply to Petrović-Škero, Važić wrote: ‘There is no<br />
reason <strong>for</strong> me to react <strong>in</strong> my capacity as Court President, above all because the<br />
Special Prosecutor has let it be known expressly <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> no uncerta<strong>in</strong> terms that<br />
Judge Kljajević is conduct<strong>in</strong>g the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs efficiently <strong>an</strong>d promptly. Of no<br />
less import<strong>an</strong>ce is the fact that the attorneys represent<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>jured party<br />
have <strong>state</strong>d the same. Also, even counsel <strong>for</strong> the accused have raised no<br />
objections as to the efficiency <strong>an</strong>d promptness of the Trial Chamber. Quite the<br />
contrary.’ 7<br />
Independently of the action taken by Petrović-Škero, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Supreme Court Supervisory Board itself exam<strong>in</strong>ed the case papers of the trial<br />
chambers presided over by Kljajević <strong>an</strong>d its President, Nikola Lat<strong>in</strong>ović, said:<br />
‘The Supervisory Board has established that Judge Marko Kljajević has broken<br />
no law while conduct<strong>in</strong>g proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> connection with the Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d ‘Zemun g<strong>an</strong>g’ membership trials...He also acted correctly <strong>in</strong><br />
discont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g the detention of Paž<strong>in</strong>, Maletić <strong>an</strong>d Gavrić because, as a judge,<br />
he was duty bound to comply with the provisions of the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Procedure<br />
Code relat<strong>in</strong>g to the length of detention. The law, such as it is, has to be<br />
obeyed.’ 8<br />
After Kljajević had to discont<strong>in</strong>ue the detention of the three<br />
defend<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Procedure Code, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government under <strong>an</strong> emergency procedure adopted a draft law amend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Procedure Code <strong>in</strong> order to extend the detention of persons<br />
charged with the gravest offences <strong>in</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>itiated by the Special<br />
Prosecutor from two to four years. 9<br />
Although the media pressure on the court <strong>an</strong>d the Special Prosecutor<br />
was not as severe as it was <strong>in</strong> 2004, the weekly NIN <strong>an</strong>d the journalist Nikola<br />
Vrzić cont<strong>in</strong>ued try<strong>in</strong>g to prove the groundlessness of the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić assass<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
trial <strong>in</strong>dictment. In a succession of articles published <strong>in</strong> November <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
refute witness <strong>an</strong>d expert evidence, Vrzić <strong>in</strong>sisted that Đ<strong>in</strong>đić had been shot by<br />
a third unidentified sniper. The launch of this version followed a media<br />
controversy, itself triggered by the <strong>state</strong>ment of the Interpol Secretary General,<br />
Ronald Noble, that Đ<strong>in</strong>đić was known to have been shot dead by a m<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
possession of a stolen Croati<strong>an</strong> passport bear<strong>in</strong>g 26 stamps of six Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
countries <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>in</strong>gapore. Noble made the <strong>state</strong>ment to Agence Fr<strong>an</strong>ce Presse<br />
3 Kurir, ‘Uhapšeni sudija Vrhovnog suda i zamenik specijalnog tužioca!’ Lj.K.,<br />
G.K., 15 September 2005.<br />
4 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Nebojša Maraš prelazi u advokate’, V.Z. Cvijić, 28 September 2005.<br />
5 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘MUP: Sudije mnogo troše’, V.Z. Cvijić, 5-6 November 2005.<br />
6 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘FHP: Pojač<strong>an</strong> pritisak na sudsko veće’, R.D., 22 December 2005.<br />
2005.<br />
7 Večernje novosti, ‘Nema razloga da reagujem’, 8 December 2005.<br />
8 Večernje novosti, ‘Marko Kljajević nije kriv’, Dragica P. Veljković, 8 Decembar<br />
9 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Vlada za produženje pritvora’, S.Č., 9 November 2005.<br />
134<br />
135
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
after address<strong>in</strong>g the Counter-Terrorism <strong>Committee</strong> of the UN Security Council<br />
<strong>in</strong> New York on 3 November 2005. 10<br />
First the daily Večernje novosti published <strong>an</strong> article headl<strong>in</strong>ed ‘Who is<br />
shield<strong>in</strong>g the "Croati<strong>an</strong> connection"?’. The author, identified by the <strong>in</strong>itials<br />
V.N., wondered whether Noble was referr<strong>in</strong>g to Milorad Ulemek or some<br />
other person. 11 Five days later, <strong>in</strong> a NIN article headl<strong>in</strong>ed ‘Foto-robot iz Legije<br />
str<strong>an</strong>aca‘, Vrzić wrote: ‘NIN has the sole privilege to disclose the identity of the<br />
hitherto unknown particip<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić, whose<br />
features are built <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>for</strong>gotten identikit. Although this m<strong>an</strong> with a<br />
Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d a French passport, a <strong>for</strong>mer member of the Foreign legion, was<br />
known to the police as early as the even<strong>in</strong>g of 12 March, his existence has been<br />
kept secret until today...’ 12 In the article Vrzić refers to two Croati<strong>an</strong> citizens<br />
who crossed the Croati<strong>an</strong>-Serbi<strong>an</strong> border at Bajkovo-Batrovci on 11 March.<br />
Soon afterwards, however, it was established that the two Croati<strong>an</strong> citizens<br />
who had entered Serbia the day be<strong>for</strong>e the assass<strong>in</strong>ation could not have taken<br />
part <strong>in</strong> it: they were identified as Rajmond Rojnik, a conductor from Varažd<strong>in</strong>,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Nedeljko Duduković, <strong>an</strong> entrepreneur from Kurmrovec. 13 But <strong>in</strong> spite of<br />
immediate denials <strong>in</strong> the Croati<strong>an</strong> press <strong>an</strong>d electronic media, a number of<br />
dailies <strong>an</strong>d weeklies, such as Svedok, cont<strong>in</strong>ued to <strong>in</strong>sist on the ’<strong>in</strong>volvement of<br />
the identikit [m<strong>an</strong>] <strong>in</strong> the murder of the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’. 14<br />
Early <strong>in</strong> November 2005 the daily Večernje novosti published a series of<br />
texts try<strong>in</strong>g to prove the <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of people who did<br />
not like the fact that prior to his death Đ<strong>in</strong>đić had established himself as a<br />
‘national leader’. Under the superscript headl<strong>in</strong>e ‘Was Đ<strong>in</strong>đić actually<br />
murdered over Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d which parts of his "Kosovo plat<strong>for</strong>m" could be of<br />
use to our negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team’, the daily wrote: ‘...The complete truth about the<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation will be known only after it is established who <strong>in</strong> the country <strong>an</strong>d<br />
abroad resented the fact that Đ<strong>in</strong>đić had grown <strong>in</strong>to a "national leader" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
begun to oppose most resolutely the idea of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community<br />
turn<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> "eighth passenger" corrod<strong>in</strong>g Serbia from with<strong>in</strong>’. In<br />
this way, Večernje novosti implicitly backed the conspiracy theory alleg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>telligence service <strong>in</strong>volvement over Kosovo. 15<br />
Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, the late Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’s bodyguard Mil<strong>an</strong> Veruović,<br />
who was wounded <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident, took a very prom<strong>in</strong>ent part <strong>in</strong> the ef<strong>for</strong>ts to<br />
10 Glas javnosti, ‘Legija – čovek sa pasošem Hrvatske’, D.Ć. – Agencije, 5<br />
November 2005.<br />
11 Večernje novosti, ‘Ko skriva “hrvatsku vezu”?’, V.N., 5 November 2005.<br />
12 NIN, ‘Foto-robot iz Legije str<strong>an</strong>aca’, Nikola Vrzić, 10 November 2005.<br />
13 Blic, ‘Kako je varažd<strong>in</strong>ski dirigent postao ubica Đ<strong>in</strong>đića’, Tamara Marković-<br />
Subota, 12 November 2005.<br />
14 Svedok, ‘Da li plavokosi Hrvat i Sk<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>avac sportski građen imaju veze sa<br />
ubistvom Zor<strong>an</strong>a Đ<strong>in</strong>đića’, B.M., N.M., 15 November 2005.<br />
15 Večernje novosti, ‘Koga je ujela “Kobra”’, 7 November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
prove that the present <strong>in</strong>dictment does not relate to the real, direct perpetrators<br />
of the crime. Thus, <strong>in</strong> connection with Vrzić’s identikit article, he said: ‘That<br />
identikit corresponds to the description of a m<strong>an</strong> who lived <strong>in</strong> [the] Bež<strong>an</strong>ijska<br />
kosa [district of Belgrade]. The women work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the food store where that<br />
m<strong>an</strong>, a <strong>for</strong>eigner, used to do his shopp<strong>in</strong>g went to the police station <strong>an</strong>d<br />
identified him. He disappeared after 12 March.’ 16<br />
Veruović went out of his way to pick holes <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dictment after<br />
Vladimir Popović testified be<strong>for</strong>e the Special Court. Popović po<strong>in</strong>ted out that<br />
Veruović had first publicly mentioned hav<strong>in</strong>g heard a third shot <strong>an</strong>d hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
seen the bullet strike the wall of the Government build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a radio B92<br />
<strong>in</strong>terview <strong>in</strong> October 2003, rather th<strong>an</strong> referr<strong>in</strong>g to this immediately after the<br />
<strong>in</strong>cident, <strong>in</strong> which he was wounded by the second bullet (the first hav<strong>in</strong>g killed<br />
Đ<strong>in</strong>đić). 17 A day or two after Popović testified NIN carried <strong>an</strong> extensive<br />
<strong>in</strong>terview with Veruović given to Vrzić. 18 In the <strong>in</strong>terview, Veruović denied<br />
Popović’s allegations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sisted that from the very start he had never<br />
departed from his three-shot account either <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terviews with the<br />
authorities <strong>an</strong>d media or privately. Veruović not only challenged what Popović<br />
had said but also took issue with f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the expert witnesses (how come<br />
the entry wound on his body was three <strong>an</strong>d a half times as small as that on<br />
Đ<strong>in</strong>đić’s body), the appo<strong>in</strong>tment of Gor<strong>an</strong> Petrović as BIA Director, etc. 19<br />
At the middle of September 2005, Veruović was given the job of<br />
guard<strong>in</strong>g the Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro embassy build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Paris. On the eve of<br />
his departure <strong>for</strong> Paris, he gave <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview to the daily Kurir <strong>in</strong> which he said<br />
that the ‘speculation that my Paris job was my award <strong>for</strong> underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />
official <strong>in</strong>dictment gave me the creeps.’ 20<br />
In his subsequent <strong>in</strong>terviews Veruović reiterated the po<strong>in</strong>ts Vrzić was<br />
try<strong>in</strong>g to put across <strong>in</strong> his articles. Thus, <strong>in</strong> November 2005, Veruović was<br />
quoted as wonder<strong>in</strong>g: ‘The ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t is, how come the witness from the<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g on Gepratova Street failed to identify Zvezd<strong>an</strong> Jov<strong>an</strong>ović as the<br />
person leav<strong>in</strong>g that build<strong>in</strong>g? There’s someth<strong>in</strong>g fishy about that, someone let<br />
him pass without mak<strong>in</strong>g a check.’ 21<br />
In <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview headl<strong>in</strong>ed ‘I w<strong>an</strong>t the truth’, published <strong>in</strong> Kurir on 22<br />
November 2005, Veruović said this as to what he expected of a report by<br />
Germ<strong>an</strong> experts from Wiesbaden: ‘I expect them to <strong>state</strong> clearly whether there<br />
was a third shot, or whether I only heard <strong>an</strong> echo, whether the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
had his back turned to the door, or whether he faced it...I’m prepared to accept<br />
16 Svedok, ‘Čovek sa fotorobota je živeo na Bež<strong>an</strong>ijskoj kosi’, B.M., N.M., 15<br />
November 2005.<br />
17 Večernje novosti, ‘Narušio kredibilitet‘, Nataša Bjelić, 18 May 2005.<br />
18 NIN, ‘Hoću da se suočim sa Bebom’, Nikola Vrzić, 19 May 2005.<br />
19 Ibid.<br />
20 Kurir, ‘Pariz nije nagrada’, D<strong>an</strong>ijela Isailović, 10-11 September 2005.<br />
21 Kurir, ‘Razjasniti Vrzićev foto-robot’, Đ. Odavić, 22 November 2005.<br />
136<br />
137
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong> official account of two shots hav<strong>in</strong>g been fired from the same place only if it<br />
is possible subst<strong>an</strong>tiate this’. 22<br />
At the middle of J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006 the Special Division of the Belgrade<br />
District Court received the report from Wiesbaden corroborat<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> experts who ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that at the critical moment two rather th<strong>an</strong><br />
three shots were fired, both from the same place. Regardless of his promise to<br />
accept the Wiesbaden report whatever its conclusions, Veruović made the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g comment: ‘As to the existence of the third shot, which was fired at us<br />
on 12 March, there is no dilemma whatever. I have been <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on this from<br />
the very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g: the first bullet hit my late boss, the second hit me, <strong>an</strong>d I<br />
heard the third <strong>an</strong>d saw it smash <strong>in</strong>to the corner of the build<strong>in</strong>g, I wasn’t<br />
merely hear<strong>in</strong>g or see<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs.’ 23<br />
The damage caused the Special Division of the District Court by<br />
irresponsible <strong>state</strong>ments of some officials <strong>an</strong>d by tendentious <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sensationalistic articles <strong>in</strong> some papers was summed up by the Division’s<br />
spokeswom<strong>an</strong>, Maja Kovačević-Tomić <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview with Nedeljni telegraf <strong>in</strong><br />
November 2005: ‘We are a <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>an</strong>d we have <strong>for</strong>mal support.<br />
However, <strong>in</strong> everyday life, one often hears questions such as "Was it necessary<br />
to set up that division at all?" or "Accord<strong>in</strong>g to what criteria was it set up?" I<br />
resent those newspaper headl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d the arguments that the Special Court<br />
ought to be abolished, which became <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly frequent some time ago<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g [Justice] M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojković’s <strong>state</strong>ment. In the event, he paid us a<br />
visit <strong>an</strong>d said that he had never asked nor was go<strong>in</strong>g to ask that the Special<br />
Court be abolished. He expla<strong>in</strong>ed that he had merely been misquoted. But the<br />
damage had already been done <strong>an</strong>d we felt the consequences of such<br />
mis<strong>in</strong>terpretations. Plots beg<strong>an</strong> to be hatched, there were all sorts of <strong>in</strong>trigues,<br />
there was talk that cases were go<strong>in</strong>g to be referred back to the regular courts <strong>in</strong><br />
Požarevac, Kruševac, Novi Sad...Defence counsel started to request<br />
adjournments <strong>an</strong>d disqualifications <strong>an</strong>d defend<strong>an</strong>ts to compla<strong>in</strong> about health<br />
problems...’ 24 She further expla<strong>in</strong>ed the ways <strong>in</strong> which media coverage could<br />
harm proceed<strong>in</strong>gs that are already under way: ‘Newspaper headl<strong>in</strong>es such as<br />
"Special Court to Be Abolished" <strong>an</strong>d "Čume <strong>an</strong>d Đura Mutavi to Appear <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Dock", which are designed to shake cooperat<strong>in</strong>g witnesses by hold<strong>in</strong>g out the<br />
prospect of their be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicted, are impermissible! This is what bothers all of<br />
us, all the citizens of Serbia. It is <strong>in</strong> the best <strong>in</strong>terests of all the citizens that<br />
everyth<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>ked to Đ<strong>in</strong>đić’s assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ized crime should be<br />
ascerta<strong>in</strong>ed to the last detail, brought to a close, determ<strong>in</strong>ed, clarified...This is<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> our future.’ 25<br />
22 Ibid.<br />
23 NIN, ‘Trećeg metka nije bilo’, N.V., 19 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
24 Nedeljni telegraf, ‘Sudijama upozorenja stižu <strong>in</strong>direktno’, S. Vlajnić, 9<br />
November 2005.<br />
25 Ibid.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Try as Judge Kovačević-Tomić did to demonstrate to what extent<br />
irresponsible <strong>state</strong>ments by politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d public officials jeopardized<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e the Special Court, the President of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme<br />
Court, Vida Petrović-Škero, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview published <strong>in</strong> NIN 26 <strong>in</strong> May 2005,<br />
set out identical arguments aga<strong>in</strong>st the Special Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Division to<br />
those put <strong>for</strong>ward by M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojković. 27 Judge Petrović-Škero said this: ‘I<br />
recognize no specialization regard<strong>in</strong>g org<strong>an</strong>ized crime at all. There’s no<br />
specialization <strong>in</strong> that. A murder’s a murder, here or there. While on the one<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d people charged with typical org<strong>an</strong>ized crime offences (kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
murder, rape) are tried by regular courts, on the other, <strong>for</strong> the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, those same people are on trial <strong>in</strong> the Special Court<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g...I am aware that specialization exists. But what k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
specialization? As to specialization regard<strong>in</strong>g try<strong>in</strong>g war crimes, it ought to<br />
exist by all me<strong>an</strong>s because a judge try<strong>in</strong>g war crimes must be fully convers<strong>an</strong>t<br />
with <strong>in</strong>ternational public law, <strong>an</strong>d often with <strong>in</strong>ternational private law too...As<br />
to org<strong>an</strong>ized crime, it’s classic crime, the only difference be<strong>in</strong>g that when it<br />
comes to the trial stage the risk is greater.’ 28<br />
The Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
The testimony of Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Vladimir Popović be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
Trial Chamber of the District Court Special Division, presided over by Judge<br />
Marko Kljajević, attracted special media attention. Jov<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Popović<br />
testified on 11-13 April, with Popović giv<strong>in</strong>g further evidence on 16-17 May<br />
2005. Their evidence concerned the socio-political context <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces lead<strong>in</strong>g to the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić. 29<br />
The next to testify be<strong>for</strong>e the Chamber, on 18-19 May, was Gor<strong>an</strong><br />
Petrović, who served as Chief of Serbi<strong>an</strong> State Security (DB) dur<strong>in</strong>g 2001. He<br />
resigned follow<strong>in</strong>g the mut<strong>in</strong>y of the Special Operations Unit (JSO) <strong>in</strong><br />
November that year. 30 After his testimony, Kljajević read out a <strong>state</strong>ment made<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>vestigation by witness Kujo Kriještorac, who was shot dead <strong>in</strong><br />
2004. On the last day of the week, 20 May, two expert witnesses, the ballistics<br />
expert Mil<strong>an</strong> Kunjadić <strong>an</strong>d the pathologist Duš<strong>an</strong> Dunjić, expla<strong>in</strong>ed their<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs. Based on the material evidence at their disposal, both witnesses said<br />
that two shots had been fired from the same place, the first kill<strong>in</strong>g Đ<strong>in</strong>đić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
26 NIN, ‘Ne postoji specijalni krim<strong>in</strong>al’, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Ikonić, 26 May 2005.<br />
27 Balk<strong>an</strong>, ‘Ukida se Specijalni sud i ispituju se čelnici Specijalnog tužilaštva i<br />
MUP’, Drag<strong>an</strong>a M<strong>an</strong>ilović, 23 March 2004.<br />
28 NIN, ‘Ne postoji specijalni krim<strong>in</strong>al’, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Ikonić, 26 May 2005.<br />
29 A representative of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia was<br />
present at the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
30 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Gor<strong>an</strong> Petrović: Pobunu crvenih beretki org<strong>an</strong>izovali Ulemek,<br />
Spasojević i Buha’, V.Z. Cvijić.<br />
138<br />
139
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the second wound<strong>in</strong>g his bodyguard Mil<strong>an</strong> Veruović. A video record of the<br />
on-site <strong>in</strong>vestigation outside the Government build<strong>in</strong>g, shot on 12 March 2003,<br />
was shown next. 31<br />
The trial was resumed on 11 July, after a break of nearly two months,<br />
with counsel <strong>for</strong> the defence exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the expert witnesses Mil<strong>an</strong> Kunjadić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Duš<strong>an</strong> Dunjić. Although Special Prosecutor Jov<strong>an</strong> Prijić requested the Trial<br />
Chamber <strong>for</strong>mally to gr<strong>an</strong>t Dej<strong>an</strong> ‘Bagzi’ Milenković the status of cooperat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
witness, the Trial Chamber took no immediate action. 32 The next day the court<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ed Zor<strong>an</strong> Đorđević, a physical chemistry scene of crime officer of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Suppression Directorate (UBPOK), who had<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ed the clothes worn by Đ<strong>in</strong>đić <strong>an</strong>d Veruović. 33 On 13 July two BIA<br />
experts, Marija Đurić <strong>an</strong>d Nataša Milivojević, gave evidence regard<strong>in</strong>g blood<br />
samples collected outside the Government build<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> the corridor, <strong>in</strong> the car<br />
<strong>in</strong> which Đ<strong>in</strong>đić was taken to the hospital, on his <strong>an</strong>d his bodyguard’s<br />
clothes. 34<br />
At the hear<strong>in</strong>g on 19 September, the Trial Chamber President, Marko<br />
Kljajević, <strong>an</strong>nounced the Chamber’s decision to turn down the prosecution’s<br />
request that Dej<strong>an</strong> ‘Bagzi’ Milenković be gr<strong>an</strong>ted the status of cooperat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
witness. That day Kljajević read out the records of the on-site <strong>in</strong>vestigations<br />
carried out on 12 March 2003 outside the Government build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the<br />
office No. 55 at 14 Admirala Geprata Street from which Đ<strong>in</strong>đić was shot,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>in</strong>dictment. Kljajević also read out a record of a 17 March 2003<br />
on-site <strong>in</strong>vestigation carried out <strong>in</strong> the same office. He also decided, on behalf<br />
of the Trial Chamber, to remove from the case papers records <strong>an</strong>d photographs<br />
show<strong>in</strong>g Zvezd<strong>an</strong> Jov<strong>an</strong>ović po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to the spot from which the shots were<br />
fired at Đ<strong>in</strong>đić. He expla<strong>in</strong>ed the move by say<strong>in</strong>g that the record had been<br />
signed neither by the recorder nor by Jov<strong>an</strong>ović. 35<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g the arrest of Deputy Special Prosecutor Radov<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the resignation of the other Deputy Special Prosecutor, Nebojša Maraš, 36<br />
Miroljub Vitorović took over as Trial Attorney <strong>an</strong>d made his first appear<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the Trial Chamber on 9 November. That day Judge Kljajević read out<br />
the MUP reports on the confiscated Volkswagen Passat <strong>an</strong>d Audi A8 cars<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
believed to have been used dur<strong>in</strong>g the assass<strong>in</strong>ation. 37 Next day Kljajević read<br />
out the MUP reports on the search of the flats the accused used be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d<br />
after the assass<strong>in</strong>ation. 38 Because the reports on <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alyses of f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
collected by police <strong>in</strong> those flats were flawed, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jov<strong>an</strong><br />
Prijić, who on that day appeared <strong>in</strong> the courtroom <strong>for</strong> the first time <strong>in</strong> his<br />
capacity as Trial Attorney, requested a new, complete f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>t report. Judge<br />
Kljajević agreed but remarked that the Prosecutor’s Office ought to have<br />
submitted complete evidence be<strong>for</strong>e the open<strong>in</strong>g of the trial. Kljajević also<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ed that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP did not respect the court: ‘The court<br />
requested the Chief of UBPOK to submit to it the confiscation receipt <strong>for</strong> the<br />
r<strong>an</strong>gef<strong>in</strong>der <strong>an</strong>d to f<strong>in</strong>d out whether it had been taken away from the JSO<br />
sniper team leader Željko Pavlović. The Chief submitted a photocopy of the<br />
receipt stat<strong>in</strong>g that the item had been taken away from a person named Željko<br />
Pavlović. The request was repeated but the orig<strong>in</strong>al r<strong>an</strong>gef<strong>in</strong>der confiscation<br />
receipt has not been submitted to date. So much <strong>for</strong> respect <strong>for</strong> the court on the<br />
part of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP.’ 39<br />
On 21 December 2005 evidence was taken from members of the<br />
Belgrade Police Department (SUP) Dactiloscopy Unit. The head of the unit told<br />
the court that on 24 March 2003 a f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>t left by Zvezd<strong>an</strong> Jov<strong>an</strong>ović on a<br />
copy of the daily Nacional was compared with Jov<strong>an</strong>ović’s f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ts taken at<br />
the Central Prison the same day. Jov<strong>an</strong>ović objected to this, say<strong>in</strong>g he was<br />
f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ted shortly be<strong>for</strong>e midnight on 24 March, so the two sets of<br />
f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ts could not have been compared the same day. The court then<br />
agreed to Prijić’s suggestion to exam<strong>in</strong>e the officer who f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>ović on the premises of the Central Prison. 40 The next day the Belgrade<br />
SUP experts completed their testimony regard<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ts found <strong>in</strong> the<br />
flats.<br />
The report of the Federal Bureau of Crim<strong>in</strong>al Investigations <strong>in</strong><br />
Wiesbaden arrived at the middle of J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006. Because no Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
tr<strong>an</strong>slation of it was available when the trial resumed on 17 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006,<br />
Judge Kljajević read out the report from the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić post-mortem exam<strong>in</strong>ation,<br />
which was followed by the screen<strong>in</strong>g of the seven-m<strong>in</strong>ute footage taken by a<br />
B92 TV crew outside the Government build<strong>in</strong>g on the day of the assass<strong>in</strong>ation.<br />
Kljajević also <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med those present that he had extended <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vitation,<br />
31 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Veštaci utvrdili - dva hica iz Gepratove’, V.Z. Cvijić, 21-22 May 2005.<br />
32 Večernje novosti, ‘Čaure iz istog snajpera’, D.P. Veljković, N. Bjelić, 12 July<br />
2005.<br />
33 Večernje novosti, ‘Prevideo tragove na p<strong>an</strong>talonama’, N.B., D.P. V., 13 July<br />
2005.<br />
34 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Veštaci BIA zapažaju bolje od kolega iz policije’, V.Z.C., 14 July 2005.<br />
35 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Bagzi i zv<strong>an</strong>ično bez statusa svedoka saradnika’, V.Z. Cvijić, 20<br />
September 2005.<br />
36 See the first part of the report deal<strong>in</strong>g with Radov<strong>an</strong>ović’s arrest <strong>an</strong>d Maraš’s<br />
resignation.<br />
2005.<br />
2005.<br />
37 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Odbr<strong>an</strong>a osporava izveštaje MUP’, V.Z. Cvijić, 10 November 2005.<br />
38 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘O “štekovima” atentatora’, V.Z. Cvijić, 11 November 2005.<br />
39 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Sud nezadovolj<strong>an</strong> radom tužilaštva i MUP’, V.Z. Cvijić, 14 December<br />
40 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Spor oko otisaka Zvezd<strong>an</strong>a Jov<strong>an</strong>ovića’, V.Z. Cvijić, 22 December<br />
140<br />
141
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
through the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights, to the Wiesbaden experts<br />
to present their report <strong>in</strong> the Special Court build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Belgrade. 41<br />
At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of February 2006 media reported that Dej<strong>an</strong> ‘Bagzi’<br />
Milenković had offered new evidence to the Special Prosecutor <strong>in</strong> order that he<br />
might aga<strong>in</strong> apply <strong>for</strong> cooperat<strong>in</strong>g witness status <strong>in</strong> the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić trial. The Trial<br />
Chamber’s 16 September dismissal of the prosecution’s request to this effect<br />
had me<strong>an</strong>while been appealed, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Court allow<strong>in</strong>g the appeal<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>null<strong>in</strong>g the first <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce rul<strong>in</strong>g. The Trial Chamber was yet to decide on<br />
the repeated request. 42<br />
When the trial resumed on February 6 Judge Kljajević relayed to the<br />
parties the Wiesbaden experts’ request that <strong>an</strong>y questions they may have<br />
relat<strong>in</strong>g to their report were to be sent <strong>in</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ce. An Interpol letter was also<br />
read out say<strong>in</strong>g that two Croati<strong>an</strong> passports had been found dur<strong>in</strong>g a search of<br />
Ulemek’s flat. The trial cont<strong>in</strong>ues, with the Wiesbaden experts <strong>an</strong>nounc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
their arrival <strong>in</strong> March 2006 to address the parties.<br />
Other Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Trials<br />
After a year <strong>an</strong>d a half, the persons charged with the murder of Iv<strong>an</strong><br />
Stambolić <strong>an</strong>d the assass<strong>in</strong>ation attempt aga<strong>in</strong>st Vuk Drašković <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> town of Budva were found guilty of both crimes on 18 July 2005<br />
by the three-judge Trial Chamber presided over by Dragoljub Albij<strong>an</strong>ić. In<br />
connection with the Stambolić murder, Milorad Ulemek, Br<strong>an</strong>ko Berček, Duš<strong>an</strong><br />
Maričić <strong>an</strong>d Nenad Bujošević were sentenced to 40 years <strong>in</strong> prison each <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Radomir Marković <strong>an</strong>d Leonid Milivojević to 15 years each. Regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Drašković assass<strong>in</strong>ation attempt, Ulemek, Berček <strong>an</strong>d Nenad Ilić were given 15<br />
years each, Milivojević 13 years <strong>an</strong>d Marković 12 years. Furthermore, Ulemek<br />
was sentenced to 5 years <strong>for</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al conspiracy <strong>an</strong>d Milorad Brac<strong>an</strong>ović to 4<br />
years <strong>for</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to report the preparation of a crim<strong>in</strong>al offence. In accord<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
with the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code, the Trial Chamber brought down s<strong>in</strong>gle 40-year<br />
prison sentences on Ulemek <strong>an</strong>d Berček <strong>an</strong>d 15-year prison sentences on<br />
Milivojević <strong>an</strong>d Marković. 43<br />
Although the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs with respect to the accused, Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Milošević <strong>an</strong>d Nebojša Pavković, were separated, Judge Albij<strong>an</strong>ić <strong>state</strong>d <strong>in</strong> his<br />
grounds <strong>for</strong> decision that it had been determ<strong>in</strong>ed that ‘as JSO comm<strong>an</strong>der,<br />
Milorad Ulemek established <strong>in</strong> Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Kula a crim<strong>in</strong>al group with a<br />
41 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Izveštaj iz Visbadena odgovara nalazu veštaka iz Srbije’, V.Z. Cvijić,<br />
18 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
42 Politika, ‘Bagzi očevidac ubistva Spasojevića i Lukovića’, Dorotea Čarnić, 1<br />
February 2006.<br />
43 Večernje novosti, ‘209 god<strong>in</strong>a za ubistvo Stambolića’, Dragica Veljković,<br />
Nataša Bjelić, 19 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
view to ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g wealth <strong>an</strong>d power <strong>an</strong>d to committ<strong>in</strong>g murder by order of<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević, each member of this crim<strong>in</strong>al association be<strong>in</strong>g allocated a<br />
specific task. At Milošević’s behest, the order <strong>for</strong> them to kill Vuk Drašković<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Iv<strong>an</strong> Stambolić was issued at several meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.’ 44<br />
On the same day as the judgment was <strong>an</strong>nounced orally at the ma<strong>in</strong><br />
hear<strong>in</strong>g, media published the follow<strong>in</strong>g absurdity: ‘The Socialist Party of<br />
Serbia has protested vigorously because <strong>in</strong> his oral grounds <strong>for</strong> decision the<br />
Trial Chamber President <strong>in</strong>crim<strong>in</strong>ated Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević.’ 45<br />
The un<strong>an</strong>imous verdict of counsel <strong>for</strong> the accused was that the<br />
judgement was the result of pressure brought to bear on the court. On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d, the late Stambolić’s wife Katar<strong>in</strong>a Stambolić said: ‘This is what I<br />
expected, I have no further comment to make.’<br />
Vuk Drašković said that those who killed Stambolić <strong>an</strong>d tried to kill<br />
him were sentenced accord<strong>in</strong>g to the law, but that Radomir Marković <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Milorad Brac<strong>an</strong>ović got off lightly. 46<br />
In order to <strong>for</strong>estall <strong>an</strong>y accusations of a political score-settl<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
Albij<strong>an</strong>ić said <strong>in</strong> his oral <strong>state</strong>ment of the grounds: ’As a court, we c<strong>an</strong>not<br />
accept that part of the Prosecutor’s conclud<strong>in</strong>g argument that this was not <strong>an</strong><br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ary trial because it was a trial of the regime of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević. If it<br />
were so, this would have been a political trial, someth<strong>in</strong>g the court c<strong>an</strong>not<br />
accept. The import<strong>an</strong>ce of this trial lies <strong>in</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g else, namely <strong>in</strong> the gravity<br />
of the crim<strong>in</strong>al offences – they are of the gravest k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d we dealt solely with<br />
the crim<strong>in</strong>al responsibility of the accused. The court is not concerned with the<br />
question whether this judgement will have political implications too. The fact<br />
that the accused <strong>in</strong>clude Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>an</strong>d Nebojša Pavković, who were<br />
tried separately, Radomir Marković, Milorad ‘Legija’ Ulemek <strong>an</strong>d Milorad<br />
Brac<strong>an</strong>ović gives no one cause to characterize this trial as political.’ 47<br />
The trial of the persons charged with the murder of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Renewal Movement (SPO) members <strong>an</strong>d officials on the Ibar highway ended <strong>in</strong><br />
the pronouncement of the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement on 29 June 2005. The Trial<br />
Chamber presided over by Judge Boj<strong>an</strong> Mišić sentenced Milorad Ulemek,<br />
Duš<strong>an</strong> Maričić, Br<strong>an</strong>ko Berček, Nenad Ilić, Nenad Bujošević <strong>an</strong>d Leonid<br />
Milivojević to 15 years <strong>in</strong> prison each. Radomir Marković was sentenced to 10<br />
years <strong>an</strong>d Mihalj Kertes to 3 years as accessaries after the fact; the then Chief of<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Traffic Police, Dragiša D<strong>in</strong>ić, <strong>an</strong>d the Chief of Belgrade Traffic Police,<br />
Vid<strong>an</strong> Mijajlović, were sentenced to 2 years <strong>an</strong>d 1 year respectively as<br />
accessories be<strong>for</strong>e the fact. Belgrade DB Centre Chief Mil<strong>an</strong> Radonjić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Belgrade SUP Chief Br<strong>an</strong>ko Đurić were acquitted. 48<br />
44 Ibid.<br />
45 Ibid.<br />
46 Ibid.<br />
47 Ibid.<br />
48 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Ulemeku 15, Markoviću 10 god<strong>in</strong>a zatvora’, V.Z. Cvijić, 29 June 2005.<br />
142<br />
143
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
In his oral expl<strong>an</strong>ation of the judgement <strong>an</strong>d especially of the<br />
sentences, Trial Chamber President Boj<strong>an</strong> Mišić said that ’the JSO members<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Marković were given the maximum sentences prescribed by law <strong>in</strong> this<br />
particular <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, though a fundamental pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code lays<br />
down that, should the law be amended dur<strong>in</strong>g the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, the penalty<br />
most adv<strong>an</strong>tageous to the accused shall then be applied.’ The death penalty<br />
was abolished <strong>in</strong> November 2001 <strong>an</strong>d the 40-year prison penalty <strong>in</strong>troduced on<br />
1 March 2002. In the <strong>in</strong>terim, the maximum prison sentence <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce was 15<br />
years, the 20-year prison sentence substitut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the death penalty hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
been abolished too. 49<br />
Vuk Drašković commented on Judge Mišić’s judgement as follows:<br />
‘The judge tried to becloud the obvious fact that the judgement is the result of<br />
a political deal follow<strong>in</strong>g "Legija’s" surrender...I’d like to ask those who<br />
subscribed to this chic<strong>an</strong>ery, if some future government were to org<strong>an</strong>ize the<br />
murder of the present Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, of Jočić, of Rade Bulatović, of a number<br />
of others, would the maximum sentence still be 15 years? You could f<strong>in</strong>d lots of<br />
volunteers offer<strong>in</strong>g to murder people <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> such a maximum<br />
penalty...To <strong>an</strong>nounce to all <strong>an</strong>d sundry that the Belgrade police conducted the<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigation brilli<strong>an</strong>tly is a whopp<strong>in</strong>g lie <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>solent act. The <strong>in</strong>vestigation<br />
was conducted by the SPO try<strong>in</strong>g to break the blockade by Đurić.’ 50<br />
Shortly afterwards, political parties <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals (the Civic<br />
Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia, Liberal Democratic Fraction, Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Kovačević-Vučo) <strong>in</strong><br />
their <strong>an</strong>nouncements <strong>an</strong>d media <strong>state</strong>ments characterized the judgement as<br />
proof that the judiciary was powerless to free itself from political <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
pressure. Vlad<strong>an</strong> Batić said: ‘This is not a surprise, given Vojislav Koštunica’s<br />
protective attitude towards Rade Marković, as well as the sympathy Milorad<br />
Ulemek enjoys with<strong>in</strong> the present government.’ 51<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, some legal experts <strong>an</strong>d officials condemned such<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ions as pressure on judges. Thus the President of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme<br />
Court said: ‘The judiciary will not be <strong>in</strong>dependent as long as public officials<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k they have the right to publicly comment <strong>an</strong>d pass op<strong>in</strong>ion on judicial<br />
decisions. If they encourage the lynch<strong>in</strong>g of those who conduct judicial<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, then they do not w<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent judiciary. 52 The Socialist<br />
Party of Serbia issued a protest <strong>an</strong>nouncement <strong>in</strong> a similar ve<strong>in</strong>, 53 <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Society of Judges took the follow<strong>in</strong>g position: ‘The right to publicly<br />
criticize the work of <strong>state</strong> org<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d officials is the constitutional right of<br />
49 Ibid.<br />
50 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Drašković: Presuda posledica nagodbe Vlade sa Ulemekom’, V.Z.<br />
Cvijić, 29 June 2005.<br />
51 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Prve reakcije na presudu’, V.Z. Cvijić, 29 June 2005.<br />
52 Večernje novosti, ‘Ne pretite više sudijama!’, E. Radosavljević, N. Bjelić, 2 July<br />
2005.<br />
53 Večernje novosti, ‘Oštre kritike’, E. Radosavljević. N. Bjelić, 2 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
every citizen. However, this must be done <strong>in</strong> such a m<strong>an</strong>ner as to ensure<br />
respect <strong>for</strong> the dignity of the court <strong>an</strong>d judges <strong>an</strong>d not to jeopardize their<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence.’ 54<br />
Although the Trial Chamber President, Boj<strong>an</strong> Mišić, <strong>an</strong>nounced the<br />
judgement on 29 June 2005, he produced the written copy of it only on 22<br />
November the same year. Impatient at the delay, the SPO early <strong>in</strong> November<br />
called <strong>for</strong> ‘energetic action on the part of M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Supreme Court President Vida Petrović-Škero because Judge Boj<strong>an</strong> Mišić has<br />
not put that judgement <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g four months after it was pronounced,<br />
although the statutory prescribed period is eight days after its rendition.’ 55<br />
Act<strong>in</strong>g on the request, the Belgrade District Court President, S<strong>in</strong>iša Važić,<br />
asked Mišić to <strong>state</strong> the reasons <strong>for</strong> the delay <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g. Mišić wrote back<br />
say<strong>in</strong>g the case was large <strong>an</strong>d complicated, he was deal<strong>in</strong>g with m<strong>an</strong>y other<br />
cases too, <strong>an</strong>d besides his father had died recently. 56 In the op<strong>in</strong>ion of attorney<br />
Dragoljub Todorović, the SPO was fully justified <strong>in</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g the question of the<br />
delay: ‘There is aga<strong>in</strong> the d<strong>an</strong>ger of the accused, especially Rade Marković,<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g released from prison because the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Courts has a year to<br />
render its decision. If it does not render its decision with<strong>in</strong> that period,<br />
Marković will be set free. However, four months have passed already, the<br />
appeals procedure is very long, by the time the judgement is delivered half the<br />
term will have passed.’ 57<br />
The attorneys of the accused have appealed the judgement <strong>an</strong>d it is<br />
now up to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Court to decide the matter. This decision, as<br />
well as the decision on appeal regard<strong>in</strong>g the Stambolić <strong>an</strong>d Drašković cases,<br />
will be of considerable import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> that it will reflect the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme<br />
Court’s position on the correct <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the maximum penalties that could be imposed on the accused. The two Trial<br />
Chambers have, namely, taken two completely different positions on the<br />
maximum penalty applicable, the one under Judge Mišić opt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> 15 years<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the other under Judge Albij<strong>an</strong>ić decid<strong>in</strong>g on 40 years.<br />
Recommendations<br />
• The <strong>state</strong> org<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d officers who represent them ought to refra<strong>in</strong><br />
from <strong>an</strong>y pressure, action, public commentary, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, op<strong>in</strong>ion aimed<br />
at defeat<strong>in</strong>g the ef<strong>for</strong>ts of the Special Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Division, Special<br />
Prosecutor’s Office <strong>an</strong>d some Division judges;<br />
2005.<br />
54 Večernje novosti, ‘Ugrožena nezavisnost’, E. Radosavljević, N. Bjelić, 2 July<br />
55 www.b92.net ‘SPO: Šta je sa presudom za Ibarsku?’, 6 November 2005.<br />
56 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Preopterećenost i smrt oca’, V.Z. Cvijić, 9 November 2005.<br />
57 www.b92.net ‘SPO: Šta je sa presudom za Ibarsku?’, 6 November 2005.<br />
144<br />
145
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
• The competent <strong>state</strong> authorities ought to react, <strong>in</strong> con<strong>for</strong>mity with<br />
the law, to <strong>an</strong>y commentary, text, newspaper article, <strong>state</strong>ment publicly<br />
disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d pass<strong>in</strong>g judgement on evidence be<strong>for</strong>e it is presented at the<br />
trial.<br />
WAR CRIME TRIALS<br />
Responsibility Denied<br />
At the time of the controversy surround<strong>in</strong>g the extradition of Army<br />
<strong>an</strong>d police generals to the International Crim<strong>in</strong>al Tribunal <strong>for</strong> the Former<br />
Yugoslavia at The Hague, the opponents of the Tribunal <strong>in</strong>sisted that all<br />
members of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong>ces who had committed crimes <strong>in</strong> Kosovo had been<br />
prosecuted. The military courts <strong>in</strong> Niš <strong>an</strong>d Belgrade presented statistics on the<br />
prosecution of perpetrators of Kosovo crimes from 1 March 1998 until 26 June<br />
1999, when the jurisdiction of war military courts <strong>an</strong>d prosecutor’s offices <strong>in</strong><br />
Third Army units ceased. 1 In addition to this report, the Military Prosecutor’s<br />
Office <strong>in</strong> Niš issued <strong>an</strong> item, dated 11 April 2001, <strong>in</strong> which it said that ‘...dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the war operations <strong>in</strong> Kosmet [Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija] a total of 245 persons<br />
were reported, 183 of whom were charged, with 47 persons be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigated<br />
at the time...The number of crim<strong>in</strong>al offences result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> death <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
imperilment of life <strong>an</strong>d limb was <strong>in</strong>considerable, the number of crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
offences of crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st the civili<strong>an</strong> population be<strong>in</strong>g negligible <strong>in</strong><br />
particular...Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> connection with the crim<strong>in</strong>al offence of war crimes<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the civili<strong>an</strong> population were conducted <strong>in</strong> only three cases, two of<br />
which were discont<strong>in</strong>ued ow<strong>in</strong>g to lack of evidence <strong>an</strong>d the third be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
referred to a civili<strong>an</strong> court because the accused had been demobilized.’ 2 The<br />
item also <strong>state</strong>d that the Prosecutor’s Office had received charges aga<strong>in</strong>st three<br />
persons <strong>in</strong> connection with the crim<strong>in</strong>al offence of unlawful kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
wound<strong>in</strong>g of enemy <strong>in</strong> war, only one of whom was prosecuted or, more<br />
correctly, referred to a civili<strong>an</strong> court. The Military Prosecutor’s Office also<br />
received charges aga<strong>in</strong>st four persons accused of rape; proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st two<br />
were discont<strong>in</strong>ued ow<strong>in</strong>g to lack of evidence <strong>an</strong>d the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g two were<br />
referred to a civili<strong>an</strong> court. At the time the item was <strong>an</strong>nounced (11 April 2001),<br />
none of the cases had been closed <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e no first <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement<br />
rendered. 3 The majority members of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>security</strong> <strong>for</strong>ces had been<br />
February 2005.<br />
2 Ibid.<br />
3 Ibid.<br />
1 Nedeljni telegraf, ‘Ratni sudovi sudili zloč<strong>in</strong>cima nad civilima’, M.A., 2<br />
146<br />
147
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
prosecuted <strong>for</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al offences aga<strong>in</strong>st property: out of 169 crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ts 90 per cent had been prosecuted <strong>an</strong>d sentenced <strong>for</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
offences aga<strong>in</strong>st property <strong>an</strong>d 8 per cent acquitted, with the Military Court<br />
disclaim<strong>in</strong>g jurisdiction over two cases <strong>an</strong>d referr<strong>in</strong>g them to civili<strong>an</strong> courts. 4<br />
The conclud<strong>in</strong>g section of the Niš Military Court’s report conta<strong>in</strong>s the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g statistics: ‘...of the 200,000 or so members of the Third Army only<br />
0.005 per cent were charged with crim<strong>in</strong>al offences of war crimes, that is, 0.003<br />
with rape, 0.01 with murder <strong>an</strong>d 0.14 with theft.’<br />
Although the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g applies only to reported cases, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> spite of<br />
the fact that at the time of writ<strong>in</strong>g none of the persons be<strong>in</strong>g prosecuted <strong>for</strong><br />
war crimes of rape <strong>an</strong>d murder (6) had been found guilty even <strong>in</strong> first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, the report ends as follows: ‘The conclusion begs to be made that<br />
the officers at all levels of the Third Army <strong>an</strong>d its soldiers <strong>an</strong>d conscripts<br />
absolutely respected <strong>an</strong>d ensured respect <strong>for</strong> the laws of war <strong>in</strong> all the<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces. The comm<strong>an</strong>ders of the Third Army, Prišt<strong>in</strong>a Corps <strong>an</strong>d<br />
military districts set up military courts <strong>an</strong>d military prosecutor’s offices which<br />
prosecuted <strong>an</strong>d tried the perpetrators of all the a<strong>for</strong>esaid offences.’ 5<br />
An <strong>an</strong>alysis of the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g statistics reveals that the military courts<br />
convicted only perpetrators of crim<strong>in</strong>al offences aga<strong>in</strong>st property <strong>an</strong>d none <strong>for</strong><br />
war crimes, murder or rape. These reports are signific<strong>an</strong>t also <strong>in</strong> that they<br />
demonstrate explicitly that the <strong>state</strong> actually never had the <strong>in</strong>tention of<br />
prevent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d genu<strong>in</strong>ely punish<strong>in</strong>g the perpetrators of the he<strong>in</strong>ous crimes<br />
committed by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>security</strong> <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, also imply<strong>in</strong>g that the<br />
<strong>state</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>an</strong>d encouraged all these crimes.<br />
The War Crimes Prosecutor's Office<br />
The War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office was established on 1 July 2003,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Special Prosecutor <strong>for</strong> War Crimes, Vladimir Vukčević, was appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
on 23 July 2003. Two <strong>an</strong>d a half years later the prosecutor <strong>an</strong>d the team of his<br />
deputies soldier on amid pressure <strong>an</strong>d threats as well as praise. Th<strong>an</strong>ks to<br />
necessary legislative amendments the Prosecutor’s Office succeeded <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tensify<strong>in</strong>g its ef<strong>for</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d render<strong>in</strong>g them more effective. In this connection, of<br />
special import<strong>an</strong>ce were the Amendments to the Law on the Org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Jurisdiction of State Org<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs Aga<strong>in</strong>st Perpetrators of War<br />
Crimes, passed at the middle of December 2004. 6 The amendments enable the<br />
Hague Tribunal to refer certa<strong>in</strong> cases to the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office, as<br />
well as permitt<strong>in</strong>g evidence collected by the Hague Prosecutor to be used<br />
directly as evidence <strong>in</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e domestic courts. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
4 Ibid.<br />
5 Ibid.<br />
6 Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, No. 135/04, 21 December 2004.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
adoption of the amendments, the Hague Tribunal referred to the domestic<br />
Prosecutor’s Office a case aga<strong>in</strong>st persons charged with committ<strong>in</strong>g war crimes<br />
<strong>in</strong> Zvornik <strong>in</strong> 1992. 7 In October 2005 Prosecutor Vukčević gave <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview to<br />
the daily Politika <strong>in</strong> which he said: ‘Our cooperation with the Tribunal is<br />
excellent. We are the only <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>in</strong> this region which may access their<br />
databases <strong>an</strong>d their entire documentation. They c<strong>an</strong> take away from us <strong>an</strong>y<br />
case whenever they w<strong>an</strong>t because they are a supr<strong>an</strong>ational court, they c<strong>an</strong> even<br />
adjudicate a case already decided by our court if they are not satisfied with our<br />
prosecution or believe that we tried to help the perpetrators. But this has not<br />
happened <strong>an</strong>d we are the first prosecutor’s office <strong>in</strong> the region entrusted with a<br />
case by the Hague Tribunal, Carla del Ponte hav<strong>in</strong>g personally delivered the<br />
case papers to me when she first came here.’ 8<br />
Up till now the special Prosecutor’s Office has brought several<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictments aga<strong>in</strong>st persons with respect of whom there is ground <strong>for</strong><br />
suspicion that they committed war crimes <strong>in</strong> the territory of the <strong>for</strong>mer SFRY.<br />
The trial <strong>in</strong> connection with the war crime at the Ovčara farm near Vukovar<br />
was completed with most accused found guilty <strong>in</strong> the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement.<br />
Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs dubbed ‘Ovčara IV’ aga<strong>in</strong>st Saša Radak are still pend<strong>in</strong>g, as are<br />
those <strong>in</strong> connection with the Zvornik crime <strong>an</strong>d the trial of the members of the<br />
Škorpioni paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation charged with the execution of six Srebrenica<br />
Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> the summer of 1995. First-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are also <strong>in</strong> progress<br />
on ch<strong>an</strong>ges brought by the Prosecutor’s Office aga<strong>in</strong>st Antun Lekaj, who<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ds accused of committ<strong>in</strong>g war crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong> 1999.<br />
A group of members of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Internal Affairs (MUP)<br />
are be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigated over a crime aga<strong>in</strong>st Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s committed at Suva Reka<br />
<strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong> 1999. A member of the paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation Munje (Lightn<strong>in</strong>g),<br />
Nebojša M<strong>in</strong>ić, is under <strong>in</strong>vestigation on suspicion of be<strong>in</strong>g responsible <strong>for</strong> the<br />
kill<strong>in</strong>g of a six-member Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> family <strong>in</strong> Peć <strong>in</strong> 1999; members of the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation are also under <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong> connection with crimes which<br />
occurred that year at Zahač, Čuška <strong>an</strong>d Pavlj<strong>an</strong>. 9<br />
Investigation is also under way <strong>in</strong> connection with war crimes<br />
committed aga<strong>in</strong>st civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Orahovac, Meja, Meja Orize, Bistraž<strong>in</strong>, Izbice,<br />
Gnjil<strong>an</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d Bitići, <strong>an</strong>d pre-trial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong> progress over crimes<br />
committed <strong>in</strong> Povlen <strong>an</strong>d Pusto selo. 10<br />
Summ<strong>in</strong>g up on the results thus far regard<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
completed <strong>in</strong>vestigations, Vukčević said: ‘The war crimes prosecuted by the<br />
Prosecutor’s Office left a total of some 2,500 victims, men, women <strong>an</strong>d children<br />
cruelly deprived of their lives dur<strong>in</strong>g armed conflict <strong>in</strong> Croatia, BiH <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2005.<br />
7 Vreme, ‘Optužnica za zloč<strong>in</strong> u Zvorniku’, T.T., 18 August 2005.<br />
8 Politika, ‘Suočav<strong>an</strong>je sa zloč<strong>in</strong>om’, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dra Petrović, 7 October 2005.<br />
9 www.tuzilastvorz.org.yu, D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Specijalnost - etničko čišćenje’, R.D., 6 June<br />
10 www.tuzilastvorz.org.yu<br />
148<br />
149
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Kosmet.’ 11 As to the position of the Prosecutor’s Office <strong>an</strong>d his own position,<br />
he said <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terview with Politika: ‘It hasn’t been easy, given the attitude of<br />
the public. I felt like the capta<strong>in</strong> of a ship be<strong>in</strong>g tossed about far out at sea by<br />
the w<strong>in</strong>d, lightn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d huge waves from all sides, <strong>an</strong>d I knew I had to br<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that ship to a calm harbour – to trials <strong>an</strong>d judgements.’ 12<br />
The Executive Br<strong>an</strong>ch<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the War Crimes Prosecutor's Office<br />
Vladimir Vukčević <strong>an</strong>d the spokesm<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> the War Crimes<br />
Prosecutor’s Office, Bruno Vekarić, spoke repeatedly of various obstructions as<br />
well as of direct pressure brought to bear on the office by government officials<br />
<strong>an</strong>d some m<strong>in</strong>istry officers. This is what Vukčević had to say about the present<br />
position of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on the work of the<br />
Prosecutor’s Office <strong>an</strong>d on the war trials be<strong>for</strong>e the domestic court: ‘The<br />
previous government was more appreciative <strong>an</strong>d enthusiastic. The present<br />
government is focused on the extradition of <strong>in</strong>dictees to The Hague.’ 13 Asked<br />
whether he expected to encounter so much resist<strong>an</strong>ce when he accepted the<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tment, he replied <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview with the weekly Vreme <strong>in</strong> December<br />
2004: ‘I knew there would be obstruction, but I did not imag<strong>in</strong>e it would be so<br />
great. I must say that the political climate today is less favourable th<strong>an</strong> it was at<br />
the time I beg<strong>an</strong> to work. This is borne out by certa<strong>in</strong> articles <strong>an</strong>d media<br />
<strong>state</strong>ments of certa<strong>in</strong> people, as well as by what one hears said <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Assembly.’ 14 The attitude Vukčević was referr<strong>in</strong>g to is best illustrated by what<br />
the present M<strong>in</strong>ister of Justice, Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković, said: ‘The War Crimes<br />
Prosecutor’s Office jeopardizes the national <strong>in</strong>terests by not br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictments aga<strong>in</strong>st the generals, f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g it easier <strong>in</strong>stead to have us ship<br />
people off to The Hague.’ 15 Regard<strong>in</strong>g the pressure <strong>an</strong>d threats the office<br />
encountered daily while <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g war crimes, Vukčević told Vreme: ‘There<br />
is more pressure com<strong>in</strong>g from various political power centres believ<strong>in</strong>g they<br />
have every right to judge how <strong>an</strong>d whom I c<strong>an</strong> prosecute.’ 16 As to his<br />
cooperation with the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Justice <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojković, Vukčević said:<br />
‘S<strong>in</strong>ce the start of his term of office M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojković has not bothered to<br />
11 Politika, ‘Suočav<strong>an</strong>je sa zloč<strong>in</strong>om’, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dra Petrović, 7 October 2005.<br />
12 Ibid.<br />
13 Nedeljni telegraf, ‘Optužnice za Batajnicu do kraja god<strong>in</strong>e’, Vojislava<br />
Crnj<strong>an</strong>ski Spasojević, 13 April 2005.<br />
14 Vreme, ‘Možemo da sudimo i Šešelju’, Dej<strong>an</strong> Anastasijević, 15 December<br />
2004.<br />
15 www.tuzilastvorz.org.yu/drugi o nama.<br />
16 Vreme, ‘Možemo da sudimo i Šešelju’, Dej<strong>an</strong> Anastasijević, 15 December<br />
2004.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
contact us, nor has he shown <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> what the Prosecutor’s Office is<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g, other th<strong>an</strong> publicly criticiz<strong>in</strong>g us.’ 17<br />
The present Government is cutt<strong>in</strong>g the Prosecutor’s Office’s budget as<br />
a me<strong>an</strong>s of exert<strong>in</strong>g pressure on it. Or, as Vukčević put it: ‘Last but not least,<br />
we are com<strong>in</strong>g up aga<strong>in</strong>st f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial pressure. The M<strong>in</strong>istry has cut our budget<br />
by 13 per cent <strong>an</strong>d we have been passed over <strong>for</strong> pay <strong>in</strong>crease on three<br />
occasions. It was only th<strong>an</strong>ks to the appreciation of the M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce that<br />
we have been able to improve our per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce through <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
projects.’ 18 Regard<strong>in</strong>g the 2005 budget, Vukčević confirmed that it had been<br />
reduced by one-third: ‘We are occasionally short of such trivial th<strong>in</strong>gs as<br />
staples <strong>an</strong>d paper. There’s only so much of everyth<strong>in</strong>g we’re allowed to have.<br />
One would’ve thought there was a lobby...The Supreme Court President says<br />
the judges are sore over our pay. I’d like to ask those malcontents to ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
places with us, let them come <strong>an</strong>d adm<strong>in</strong>ister justice here. Do you th<strong>in</strong>k that<br />
Kljajević, who’s <strong>in</strong> charge of the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić assass<strong>in</strong>ation case, or Albij<strong>an</strong>ić, who’s<br />
<strong>in</strong> charge of the Stambolić murder case, is hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> easy time of it?...I wish to<br />
assure you that no one has come here because they’ve been attracted by high<br />
pay...But <strong>for</strong> the US donation I’m not sure that we’d be able to travel<br />
<strong>an</strong>ywhere. They also provided the equipment. Th<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g as they are, we’re<br />
underrated. I th<strong>in</strong>k that the Prosecutor’s Office’s greatest achievement lies <strong>in</strong><br />
its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d that we’re of great use to the<br />
<strong>state</strong>, though it treats us as if it were our stepmother.’ 19 The Prosecutor’s Office<br />
spokesm<strong>an</strong>, Bruno Vekarić, said this about the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s<br />
donations <strong>for</strong> the Office’s projects: ‘We are helped by <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
as well, but we c<strong>an</strong>not ask them to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce our <strong>in</strong>vestigations. That would be<br />
counterproductive <strong>an</strong>d would compromise our <strong>in</strong>dependence.’ 20<br />
On several occasions Vukčević specified the Prosecutor’s Office’s<br />
problems <strong>in</strong> its day-to-day cooperation with the MUP. A major compla<strong>in</strong>t<br />
concerns the MUP’s total passivity whenever the Prosecutor’s Office needs<br />
assist<strong>an</strong>ce with various <strong>in</strong>vestigative activities aimed at identify<strong>in</strong>g war crime<br />
perpetrators <strong>an</strong>d secur<strong>in</strong>g evidence. Vukčević described the cooperation with<br />
the MUP as follows: ‘There are problems with the <strong>in</strong>stitutions, especially with<br />
the MUP. Although the law was passed as early as July provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the<br />
sett<strong>in</strong>g up of a special police service to work on war crimes, this hasn’t<br />
materialized yet. Reluct<strong>an</strong>ce on the part of police officers to apply <strong>for</strong> the job is<br />
one of the reasons why there isn’t a full complement yet. Although the job is<br />
17 Vreme, ‘Možemo da sudimo i Šešelju’, Dej<strong>an</strong> Anastasijević, 15 December<br />
2004.<br />
18 Vreme, ‘Možemo da sudimo i Šešelju’, Dej<strong>an</strong> Anastasijević, 15 December<br />
2004.<br />
19 Nedeljni telegraf, ‘Optužnice za Batajnicu do kraja god<strong>in</strong>e’, Vojislava<br />
Crnj<strong>an</strong>ski Spasojević, 13 April 2005.<br />
20 Večernje novosti, ‘Svako da sudi svojima’, E. Radosavljević, 3 August 2005.<br />
150<br />
151
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
d<strong>an</strong>gerous <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, there’s no provision <strong>for</strong> them to be better paid <strong>an</strong>d<br />
to have more benefits th<strong>an</strong>, say, their colleagues regulat<strong>in</strong>g traffic. Also, there<br />
is the embarrassment of encounter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the course of their work a great m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
of their colleagues who figure as perpetrators. The fact that the police do not<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t to take the <strong>in</strong>itiative regard<strong>in</strong>g war crimes is <strong>an</strong>other problem. To be fair,<br />
they do everyth<strong>in</strong>g you tell them to do, but if you don’t, they do noth<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
their own <strong>in</strong>itiative. Which is how they ought to be work<strong>in</strong>g.’ 21 In April 2005<br />
the situation was not much better compared with 2004: the special MUP unit<br />
supposed to be assist<strong>in</strong>g the Prosecutor’s Office numbered only five, receiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
no benefits <strong>an</strong>d no support from the relev<strong>an</strong>t M<strong>in</strong>istry. 22<br />
Regard<strong>in</strong>g this unit, th<strong>in</strong>gs came to a head on 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006 when<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Borisavljević was appo<strong>in</strong>ted its head: it will be recalled that from 1<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary until 20 June 1999 Borisavljević was chef de cab<strong>in</strong>et of Vlastimir<br />
Đorđević, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Deputy M<strong>in</strong>ister of Internal Affairs <strong>an</strong>d Head of the<br />
Public Security Department of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP. In this connection, the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law Centre (HLC) <strong>an</strong>nounced that it had requested<br />
Borisavljević’s replacement from the post <strong>an</strong>d dismissal from the MUP, as well<br />
as fil<strong>in</strong>g a crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>t aga<strong>in</strong>st him with the War Crimes Prosecutor’s<br />
Office. In expl<strong>an</strong>ation of the compla<strong>in</strong>t, the HLC said <strong>in</strong> the <strong>an</strong>nouncement:<br />
‘The grounds <strong>for</strong> suspicion that Borisavljević was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> war crimes <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo stem above all from the written <strong>state</strong>ment Slobod<strong>an</strong> Borisavljević made<br />
on 23 May 2001 at the request of Capta<strong>in</strong> Drag<strong>an</strong> Karleuša, then head of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP work<strong>in</strong>g group conduct<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the refrigerator<br />
truck that was packed with bodies <strong>an</strong>d found <strong>in</strong> the D<strong>an</strong>ube, the <strong>state</strong>ment<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g been submitted as a document to the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d produced <strong>in</strong><br />
the case aga<strong>in</strong>st Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević.’ 23 Media reported later that Carla del<br />
Ponte had personally <strong>in</strong>sisted that Borisavljević should be removed from the<br />
post of head of the MUP war crimes detection unit. Borisavljević was replaced<br />
at the middle of February under public pressure. 24<br />
Non-Governmental Sector<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the War Crimes Prosecutor's Office<br />
Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs of the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office have been<br />
criticized by non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals represent<strong>in</strong>g<br />
victims’ families. Šefko Alomerović, President of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
21 Vreme, ‘Možemo da sudimo i Šešelju’, Dej<strong>an</strong> Anastasijević, 15 December<br />
2004.<br />
22 Nedeljni telegraf, ‘Optužnice za Batajnicu do kraja god<strong>in</strong>e’, Vojislava<br />
Crnj<strong>an</strong>ski Spasojević, 13 April 2005.<br />
23 www.hlc.org.yu/saopstenja<br />
24 Kurir, ‘Koštunica smenjuje Borisavljevića’, R.K., 14 February 2006.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>an</strong>d attorney <strong>for</strong> the victims’ families <strong>in</strong> the Sjever<strong>in</strong><br />
case, po<strong>in</strong>ted out that Vukčević had at the last moment renamed the<br />
paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation Osvetnici (Avengers) <strong>an</strong> ‘armed group’. 25 HLC <strong>an</strong>alyst<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong> Nicić expla<strong>in</strong>ed that call<strong>in</strong>g the Osvetnici <strong>an</strong> armed group or a<br />
paramilitary org<strong>an</strong>ization was <strong>an</strong> attempt to avoid l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g them to the Army of<br />
Republika Srpska (VRS), that is, to avoid referr<strong>in</strong>g to the fact that they<br />
belonged to the VRS Višegrad Brigade. Nicić says that this fact is of great<br />
import<strong>an</strong>ce given that the VRS comm<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g officers were once members of the<br />
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Nicić says: ‘Thus the comm<strong>an</strong>ders of the<br />
Višegrad, Goražde <strong>an</strong>d Rudo brigades (Dragićević, Metraš<strong>in</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Tuba)<br />
were JNA officers assigned to the VRS by decision of the General Staff, after<br />
which all three were assigned duties <strong>in</strong> the then Army of Yugoslavia follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Dayton Agreement...This close cooperation between the VRS<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the JNA, later the Army of Yugoslavia, po<strong>in</strong>ts to one of the ma<strong>in</strong> reasons<br />
<strong>for</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g reference to regular VRS units <strong>in</strong> the context of these crimes, s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
this would almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly raise the question of responsibility of the superiors<br />
<strong>an</strong>d of the participation of the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> them.’ 26<br />
Comment<strong>in</strong>g on the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d judgement aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the persons <strong>in</strong>dicted <strong>for</strong> the Ovčara crime, HLC Executive Director Nataša<br />
K<strong>an</strong>dić availed herself of the opportunity to say what she thought of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictment: ‘The <strong>in</strong>dictment was calculated to show that others were to blame;<br />
even one of the defence attorneys, Đorđe Dozet, wondered today whether the<br />
object of the trial had been to f<strong>in</strong>d guilty persons other th<strong>an</strong> the officers<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicted at The Hague. So, the objection of both the victims’ representatives<br />
<strong>an</strong>d defence counsel was that the <strong>in</strong>dictment had been calculated to shield the<br />
officers from crim<strong>in</strong>al responsibility. It applies selectively to the Šešeljites <strong>an</strong>d<br />
territorials, <strong>in</strong> spite of the fact that the <strong>in</strong>vestigation yielded sufficient proof<br />
that officers <strong>in</strong> high positions were heavily <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the execution at<br />
Ovčara. The prosecutor obviously had been given a political assignment, to<br />
make sure the <strong>in</strong>dictment doesn’t apply to the officers.’ 27<br />
On 12 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006 the HLC <strong>an</strong>nounced that Executive Director<br />
Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić had written to Vladimir Vukčević <strong>an</strong>d asked him to revise<br />
several import<strong>an</strong>t po<strong>in</strong>ts of the <strong>in</strong>dictment aga<strong>in</strong>st six members of the<br />
Škorpioni charged with the execution of Srebrenica Bosniaks. The HLC <strong>in</strong>sists<br />
that the unit be qualified as one belong<strong>in</strong>g to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP <strong>an</strong>d operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
under the immediate comm<strong>an</strong>d of Serbi<strong>an</strong> State Security (DB), given that there<br />
is ample proof of this <strong>in</strong> the amended ICTY <strong>in</strong>dictment aga<strong>in</strong>st Jovica St<strong>an</strong>išić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Fr<strong>an</strong>ko Simatović of 11 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006. The HLC also said it had asked<br />
2005.<br />
2005.<br />
25 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Č<strong>in</strong>jenice nema ko da čuje’, Mil<strong>an</strong>ka Šaponja-Hadžić, 25 February<br />
26 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Dug je put do pravde’, Jov<strong>an</strong> Nicić, 25 February 2005.<br />
27 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Brilj<strong>an</strong>tno suđenje po m<strong>an</strong>jkavoj optužnici’, B. Tončić, 7 December<br />
152<br />
153
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Vukčević to def<strong>in</strong>e the armed conflict <strong>in</strong> BiH <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dictment accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational law <strong>an</strong>d to specify its character. In the end, the HLC po<strong>in</strong>ted to<br />
several facts which are mis<strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dictment: ‘The <strong>in</strong>dictment<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st five members of the Škorpioni is replete with <strong>in</strong>terpretations of events<br />
aimed at revis<strong>in</strong>g history <strong>an</strong>d the past. Thus it is said that the oilfields at<br />
Đeletovci are situated alongside the border with Croatia, with which the<br />
Republic of Serb Kraj<strong>in</strong>a was <strong>in</strong> armed conflict, although it is common<br />
knowledge that Đeletovci is <strong>in</strong> the Republic of Croatia.’ 28<br />
An <strong>an</strong>alysis of the hitherto work of the War Crimes Prosecutor’s<br />
Office based on the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g examples shows that the war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictments<br />
apply only to members of various paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mations, armed groups or<br />
territorial defence units. For all the wealth of evidence conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
accessible archives of the Hague Tribunal, the domestic Prosecutor’s Office<br />
avoids l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g these paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mations with the official structures of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>, above all with the Army <strong>an</strong>d the police. Furthermore, the<br />
Prosecutor’s Office avoids <strong>in</strong>stitut<strong>in</strong>g proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st members of the<br />
Army although some proceed<strong>in</strong>gs have demonstrated strong grounds <strong>for</strong><br />
suspicion that Army officers too are <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> crimes <strong>in</strong> respect of which<br />
others have either been convicted or are currently on trial. From the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictments brought to date it follows that the crimes committed <strong>in</strong> Croatia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d BiH were <strong>in</strong>dividual, isolated <strong>in</strong>cidents caused by paramilitary groups<br />
gone off the deep end or by obscure <strong>in</strong>dividuals. This is elaborated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g chapter.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS<br />
Vukovar territorial defence<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the ‘Leva supoderica’<br />
The trial of members of the Vukovar territorial defence <strong>an</strong>d the Leva<br />
supoderica paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation charged with the execution of about 200<br />
prisoners at the Ovčara farm near Vukovar started on 9 March 2004 be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
Trial Chamber of the Special War Crimes Unit presided over by Judge Vesko<br />
Krstajić. The trial ended on 12 December 2005 <strong>in</strong> a first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement<br />
sentenc<strong>in</strong>g the accused as follows: <strong>for</strong>mer Vukovar territorial defence<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>der Miroljub Vujović, his deputy St<strong>an</strong>ko Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović, ‘Leva supoderica’<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>der Mil<strong>an</strong> L<strong>an</strong>čuž<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, Predrag Milivojević, Predrag Dragović, Iv<strong>an</strong><br />
At<strong>an</strong>asijević, Đorđe Šošić <strong>an</strong>d Miroslav D<strong>an</strong>ković to 20 years each; Vujo Zlatar,<br />
Jovica Perić <strong>an</strong>d Mil<strong>an</strong> Vojnović to 15 years each; Predrag Madžarac, 12 years;<br />
Nada Kalaba, 9 years; <strong>an</strong>d Gor<strong>an</strong> Mugoša, 5 years. Marko Ljuboja <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Katić were acquitted <strong>for</strong> lack of evidence. 1 Saša Radak was <strong>in</strong>dicted<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2005 <strong>an</strong>d the case is still pend<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs as well as the<br />
professional public, the trial was conducted with exemplary professional skill<br />
th<strong>an</strong>ks mostly to Judge Krstajić. ‘The Trial Chamber prosecuted the case<br />
brilli<strong>an</strong>tly; at every step presid<strong>in</strong>g Judge Vesko Krstajić took account of the<br />
rights of the accused <strong>an</strong>d showed special consideration <strong>for</strong> the victims <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
impeccable m<strong>an</strong>ner. He accomplished someth<strong>in</strong>g which is characteristic of the<br />
Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d is absent from our domestic practice, namely he clarified<br />
the context <strong>in</strong> which the crime occurred,’ said Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić who represented<br />
the families of the victims at the trial. 2 Although the <strong>in</strong>dictment did not<br />
encompass the comm<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g officers <strong>an</strong>d soldiers of the then JNA, the trial<br />
established that the Army ‘left the prisoners at the mercy of the territorials <strong>an</strong>d<br />
others’. 3 It is <strong>in</strong> this light that one should <strong>in</strong>terpret the words of the Trial<br />
Chamber president, Vesko Krstajić, who said <strong>in</strong> his expl<strong>an</strong>ation of the<br />
28 www.hlc.org.yu/saopstenja.<br />
2005.<br />
1 Vreme, ‘Sudska overa zloč<strong>in</strong>a’, Tatj<strong>an</strong>a Tagirov, 15 December 2005.<br />
2 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Brilj<strong>an</strong>tno suđenje po m<strong>an</strong>jkavoj optužnici’, B. Tončić, 7 December<br />
3 Vreme, ‘Sudska overa zloč<strong>in</strong>a’, Tatj<strong>an</strong>a Tagirov, 15 December 2005.<br />
154<br />
155
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
judgement: ‘The culprits are not all here, there are m<strong>an</strong>y of them who are not<br />
<strong>in</strong> this courtroom.’ 4 Most witnesses, who were members of the JNA, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vasiljević, head of the Security Adm<strong>in</strong>istration of the Federal<br />
Secretariat <strong>for</strong> National Defence, alleged they had only learned of the crime<br />
from the media. The evidence presented dur<strong>in</strong>g the trial <strong>in</strong>cluded a twom<strong>in</strong>ute<br />
video record<strong>in</strong>g by Radio Television Belgrade shot on 19 November<br />
1991 <strong>an</strong>d a special programme broadcast on 20 November. Regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
video footage shot outside the Vukovar hospital, Rajko D<strong>an</strong>ilović, attorney <strong>for</strong><br />
the Vukovar victims’ families, said: ‘We have today been shown shots of the<br />
great orator Vesel<strong>in</strong> Šljiv<strong>an</strong>č<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d, st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g next to him, of the late Momir<br />
Gavrilović, then a colonel, a m<strong>an</strong> assigned to Ark<strong>an</strong>, a m<strong>an</strong> from Serbi<strong>an</strong> State<br />
Security. There was also Nebojša Pavković, then chef de cab<strong>in</strong>et of M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Defence Veljko Kadijević. So, the Army <strong>an</strong>d the police were beh<strong>in</strong>d all that; the<br />
paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mations didn’t do the kill<strong>in</strong>g on their own <strong>in</strong>itiative, which<br />
isn’t to say that they didn’t relish it. But someone had to have ordered that.’ 5<br />
Try<strong>in</strong>g to predict the reaction of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> public to the judgement,<br />
Obrad Savić, the President of the Belgrade Circle, said: ‘...it is probably go<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to be conflict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d some will consider it unjust.’ 6 And Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić, a<br />
deputy of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament, said: ‘Who on<br />
earth are Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić, Sam Nazzaro <strong>an</strong>d Br<strong>an</strong>kica St<strong>an</strong>ković? Why is Bruno<br />
Vekarić the said untouchable?’ 7<br />
The proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d judgements <strong>in</strong> connection with this crime ought<br />
not to be limited to the sentenc<strong>in</strong>g of the direct perpetrators. The top<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g officers (Šljiv<strong>an</strong>č<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, Mrkšić <strong>an</strong>d Radić) are at The Hague <strong>an</strong>d<br />
will be tried by the Tribunal. It rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen whether the Prosecutor’s<br />
Office will <strong>in</strong>vestigate <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dict every member of the Army <strong>in</strong> the middle of<br />
the cha<strong>in</strong> of comm<strong>an</strong>d between the executors <strong>an</strong>d the comm<strong>an</strong>ders. In this<br />
connection, Prosecutor Vukčević said: ‘The list of persons <strong>in</strong> whom we are<br />
<strong>in</strong>terested is not f<strong>in</strong>al regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y of our cases, even with respect to Ovčara.<br />
Such is the nature of these crim<strong>in</strong>al offences that a great m<strong>an</strong>y people are<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved, so we keep obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ever new <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d are on to more <strong>an</strong>d<br />
more people who are direct particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> war crimes.’ (‘Pravda u tr<strong>an</strong>ziciji’,<br />
No. 2) 8<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The Scorpions<br />
At the moment there are two trials <strong>in</strong> Serbia of members of the<br />
Škorpioni (Scorpios) paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation <strong>in</strong> respect of whom there is<br />
reasonable suspicion of committ<strong>in</strong>g war crimes <strong>in</strong> BiH <strong>in</strong> 1995 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Kosovo<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1999. Saša Cvjet<strong>an</strong> was tried by the Belgrade District Court <strong>in</strong> connection<br />
with the kill<strong>in</strong>g of Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Podujevo <strong>in</strong> March 1999 while <strong>an</strong>other<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictee, Dej<strong>an</strong> Demirović, is <strong>in</strong> C<strong>an</strong>ada <strong>an</strong>d is expected to be extradited <strong>in</strong> due<br />
course. Under the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement passed on 17 April 2004 Cvjet<strong>an</strong><br />
was given a 20-year prison sentence. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Court quashed the<br />
judgement on 22 December 2004 are ordered a retrial. The retrial was<br />
conducted <strong>in</strong> 2005 by a trial chamber of the Belgrade District Court presided<br />
over by Judge Bilj<strong>an</strong>a S<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ović. 9 On 17 June 2005 the Trial Chamber found<br />
Cvjet<strong>an</strong> guilty of the crime <strong>an</strong>d imposed on him the maximum sentence of 20<br />
years imprisonment. 10<br />
The end of the retrial <strong>an</strong>d the pass<strong>in</strong>g of the sentence more or less<br />
co<strong>in</strong>cided with the arrest on 1 June 2005 of four other members of the unit. Its<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>der Slobod<strong>an</strong> Medić, Pero Petrašević, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Medić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vukov were arrested <strong>for</strong> execut<strong>in</strong>g a group of Srebrenica Bosniaks<br />
at God<strong>in</strong>ske Bare near Trnovo <strong>in</strong> July 1995. 11 At that time a number of TV<br />
stations <strong>in</strong> Serbia broadcast footage show<strong>in</strong>g the execution of the six Srebrenica<br />
Bosniaks. At one time the video record<strong>in</strong>g was distributed to video clubs <strong>in</strong> Šid<br />
where some of the unit members took up their residence after 1995. 12 A<br />
resident of Šid, Jov<strong>an</strong> Mirilo, spoke out about m<strong>an</strong>y of the th<strong>in</strong>gs that went on<br />
<strong>in</strong> the town <strong>in</strong> the post-war years, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g about the conspiracy of silence<br />
among the residents. Mirilo was accused by some of talk<strong>in</strong>g Gor<strong>an</strong> Stoparić, a<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer member of the unit, <strong>in</strong>to testify<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st Saša Cvjet<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> connection<br />
with the Podujevo 1999 execution. 13 Mirilo told of the execution video<br />
cassettes, which could be obta<strong>in</strong>ed from the local Laser video club, as well as<br />
spoke about the relationship between the Škorpioni <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> DB: ‘The m<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> charge of liaison between the Škorpioni <strong>an</strong>d DB <strong>in</strong> 1995 was Mil<strong>an</strong> ‘Mrgud’<br />
Milov<strong>an</strong>ović, a member of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP, <strong>an</strong>d it was he that took them <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the field <strong>in</strong> Bosnia. He is now <strong>in</strong> Belgrade. If the <strong>state</strong> w<strong>an</strong>ts to show that it is<br />
will<strong>in</strong>g to get done with this th<strong>in</strong>g it ought to arrest Milov<strong>an</strong>ović; if it does not,<br />
it me<strong>an</strong>s that the <strong>state</strong> regards this as <strong>an</strong> embarrass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cident which has<br />
come to light <strong>an</strong>d must somehow be covered up. Several Škorpioni members<br />
4 Ibid.<br />
5 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘D<strong>an</strong>ilović: Neko je morao da naredi ubij<strong>an</strong>je’, B.T., 25 November 2005.<br />
6 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Presuda i komentari’, Boj<strong>an</strong> Tončić, 17-18 December 2005.<br />
7 Ibid.<br />
8 Vreme, ‘Sudska overa zloč<strong>in</strong>a’, Tatj<strong>an</strong>a Tagirov, 15 December 2005.<br />
9 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Cvjet<strong>an</strong> isključen iz sudnice’, Beta, 10 June 2005.<br />
10 www.freeb92.net ‘Cvjet<strong>an</strong>u ponovo 20 god<strong>in</strong>a’, 17 June 2005.<br />
11 Politika, ‘Četvorica uhapšena, trojica u bekstvu’, D.T., 4 June 2005.<br />
12 Blic, ‘Snimak zloč<strong>in</strong>a mogao da se iznajmi u video klubu’, Željka Jevtić, 4<br />
June 2005.<br />
13 Blic, ‘Snimak zloč<strong>in</strong>a mogao da se iznajmi u video klubu’, Željka Jevtić, 4<br />
June 2005.<br />
156<br />
157
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
have boasted knowledge of Mrgud cart<strong>in</strong>g money to <strong>an</strong>d fro, of the go<strong>in</strong>g rate<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g public knowledge. One of them shot his mouth off about be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dispatched by Mrgud to the Security Institute <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, where the boot of<br />
his car was stuffed with packets of money, <strong>in</strong> support of the th<strong>in</strong>gs the<br />
Škorpioni were do<strong>in</strong>g.’ 14<br />
On Sunday, 5 June 2005, media published <strong>an</strong> open letter from the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law Centre to the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Internal Affairs, Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the War Crimes Prosecutor, Vladimir Vukčević, <strong>in</strong> connection with the threats<br />
which had been made aga<strong>in</strong>st Jov<strong>an</strong> Mirilo <strong>for</strong> some time. To avoid the threats,<br />
Mirilo found it necessary to flee abroad <strong>for</strong> a while. The HLC quoted Mirilo as<br />
say<strong>in</strong>g that the <strong>in</strong>timidation <strong>in</strong>tensified after Jovica St<strong>an</strong>išić <strong>an</strong>d Fr<strong>an</strong>ko<br />
Simatović were provisionally released from detention at The Hague <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
he had been threatened on behalf of some import<strong>an</strong>t persons. The open letter<br />
said this, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs: ‘...thereupon the head of the Operations<br />
Department of the Šid OUP [Internal Affairs Org<strong>an</strong> – police station], Nedeljko<br />
Makijević, put out a contract on his life. He was told this personally by<br />
Vladimir Trbojević, a <strong>for</strong>mer member of the Škorpioni from Šid...Be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
leav<strong>in</strong>g the country Jov<strong>an</strong> Mirilo reported all this to the OUP comm<strong>an</strong>der <strong>in</strong><br />
Šid, Predrag Kovilj<strong>an</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g his <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation that Operations Department<br />
head Makijević had hired Đorđe Armbašić to liquidate him. Mirilo claims to<br />
have received a message from Armbašić say<strong>in</strong>g, "Your days are numbered."’ 15<br />
Although the shock<strong>in</strong>g footage of the execution drew <strong>an</strong> immediate<br />
response from m<strong>an</strong>y politici<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>dividuals, public figures <strong>an</strong>d associations,<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica rema<strong>in</strong>ed conspicuously silent. In this<br />
connection the President of the Liberal Democratic Party, Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović,<br />
said: ‘He didn’t do it [react], just as he never spoke about Sarajevo, Dubrovnik,<br />
Vukovar, Peć <strong>an</strong>d Prišt<strong>in</strong>a, though he harped daily on who tore down [the<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g on] Šilerova [street – the headquarters of the ‘Zemun g<strong>an</strong>g’<br />
demolished after Đ<strong>in</strong>đić’s assass<strong>in</strong>ation]. Koštunica, we’re ask<strong>in</strong>g you who<br />
razed all those graves <strong>an</strong>d murdered the hundreds of thous<strong>an</strong>ds of <strong>in</strong>nocent<br />
people!’ 16<br />
The War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office brought <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dictment aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
seven members of the Škorpioni on 7 December 2005. The proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e a<br />
trial chamber of the Special War Crimes Unit of the Belgrade District Court,<br />
presided over by Judge Gord<strong>an</strong>a Božilović-Petrović, started on 20 December<br />
2005. Those on trial <strong>in</strong> Belgrade are Slobod<strong>an</strong> Medić, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Medić,<br />
Br<strong>an</strong>islav Medić, Pera Petrašević <strong>an</strong>d Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vuković; Milorad Momić is<br />
14 Blic, ‘Mrgud veza “Škorpiona” i “DB”’, N.M.J., 4 June 2005.<br />
15 Večernje novosti, ‘Nezgodni svedoci na meti’, B.B. Mijić, 5 June 2005.<br />
16 Blic, ‘Koštunica ćutao’, Beta, 5 June 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
at large <strong>an</strong>d Slobod<strong>an</strong> Davidović is on trial be<strong>for</strong>e the County Court <strong>in</strong><br />
Zagreb. 17<br />
War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević has signalled that three<br />
more <strong>in</strong>dictments were likely to be brought <strong>in</strong> connection with this crime: ‘We<br />
are go<strong>in</strong>g to be hunt<strong>in</strong>g round <strong>for</strong> all the perpetrators, there isn’t go<strong>in</strong>g to be<br />
<strong>an</strong>y selectivity regard<strong>in</strong>g responsibility.’ 18<br />
All the same, one ought to keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that the <strong>in</strong>dictment has been<br />
criticized <strong>for</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to characterize the Škorpioni as a unit under the direct<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>d of Serbi<strong>an</strong> DB <strong>an</strong>d to l<strong>in</strong>k the execution to the then authorities <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade. This is discussed <strong>in</strong> the previous section of the report entitled<br />
‘Criticism from the non-governmental sector’.<br />
The Revengers<br />
The retrial of Mil<strong>an</strong> Lukić, Oliver Krsm<strong>an</strong>ović, Dragut<strong>in</strong> Dragićević<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Đorđe Šević <strong>in</strong> connection with the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d kill<strong>in</strong>g of 16 Muslims<br />
from Sjever<strong>in</strong> took place be<strong>for</strong>e the Belgrade District Court. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictment of the Belgrade District Prosecutor’s Office, on 22 October 1992 at<br />
Mioče <strong>in</strong> Republika Srpska, these four members of the Osvetnici (Avengers)<br />
paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation kidnapped the Muslims from a Pljevlja-Priboj bus <strong>an</strong>d<br />
liquidated them the same day after cruelly tortur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d humiliat<strong>in</strong>g them. On<br />
29 September 2003 the Belgrade District Court found them guilty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sentenced the first three to 20 years <strong>in</strong> prison each <strong>an</strong>d the last to 15 years. 19<br />
Dragićević <strong>an</strong>d Šević were present at the trial while Lukić <strong>an</strong>d Krsm<strong>an</strong>ović<br />
were tried <strong>in</strong> absentia. In September 2004 the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Court quashed<br />
the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement <strong>an</strong>d ordered a retrial. The retrial opened on 17<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005 be<strong>for</strong>e a trial chamber presided over by Judge V<strong>in</strong>ka Behara <strong>an</strong>d<br />
lasted until mid-July 2005. 20 At the hear<strong>in</strong>g on 14 July, attorney Dragoljub<br />
Todorović said <strong>in</strong> his clos<strong>in</strong>g argument that the four accused ought not to be<br />
treated as members of a paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation that had allegedly got out of<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, but as part of the Army of Republika Srpska. After all, Momčilo Grubač,<br />
appear<strong>in</strong>g as witness, declared that General Ratko Mladić had told him<br />
personally that he occasionally used this unit. Todorović remarked that Mladić<br />
must have controlled the unit if, by his own admission, he used it. Todorović<br />
also noted that the responsibility of the then President of the FRY, Dobrica<br />
Ćosić, had not been raised dur<strong>in</strong>g the trial. 21<br />
17 Kurir, ‘Suđenje Škorpionima’, Beta, 20 December 2005.<br />
18 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Vukčević: Nove optužnice za ubistvo šest Bošnjaka’, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dra<br />
Roknić, 21 December 2005.<br />
19 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Ubicama 75 god<strong>in</strong>a zatvora’, B.T., 16-17 July 2005.<br />
20 Politika, ‘Proces zbog Sjever<strong>in</strong>a’, M.D., 17 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
21 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Svirepost, hladnokrvnost, nečovečnost i okrutnost’, A Roknić, 14 July<br />
2005.<br />
158<br />
159
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The Trial Chamber passed the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce judgement on 15 July 2005<br />
found<strong>in</strong>g guilty all four <strong>an</strong>d sentenc<strong>in</strong>g Lukić, Krsm<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Dragićević to<br />
20 years <strong>in</strong> prison each <strong>an</strong>d Šević to 15 years. 22 Comment<strong>in</strong>g on the judgement<br />
<strong>an</strong>d proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, the attorney of the victims’ families, Šefko Alomerović, said<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview with D<strong>an</strong>as: ‘Throughout the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs no one referred to<br />
the existence of a paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation called Osvetnici, or to the existence of<br />
<strong>an</strong>y document about that. One is astonished to f<strong>in</strong>d that the purpose of this<br />
trial was to cover up the real perpetrators – the Army of Republika Srpska. On<br />
16 October 16 Serb fighters were captured on the b<strong>an</strong>k of the River Dr<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d,<br />
as Colonel Luka Dragićević confirmed, the Muslims were kidnapped <strong>for</strong> the<br />
purpose of <strong>an</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge. But s<strong>in</strong>ce the exch<strong>an</strong>ge fell through – they were<br />
killed.’ 23<br />
The appellate proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are under way.<br />
The Zvornik Territorials <strong>an</strong>d "Yellow Wasps"<br />
The trial of members of Zvornik Territorial Defence <strong>an</strong>d of the Žute<br />
ose (Yellow Wasps) paramilitary group accused of war crimes committed <strong>in</strong><br />
1992 was the first case the Hague Tribunal entrusted to the domestic War<br />
Crimes Prosecutor’s Office. On the basis of evidence made available by the<br />
Tribunal, the Prosecutor’s Office brought <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dictment aga<strong>in</strong>st the then Major<br />
of Zvornik, Br<strong>an</strong>ko Grujić, the then Comm<strong>an</strong>der of the Territorial Defence<br />
Staff, Br<strong>an</strong>ko Popović, <strong>an</strong>d the members of the Žute ose paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation<br />
<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g part of Zvornik Territorial Defence, Duško Vuković, Drag<strong>an</strong><br />
Slavković, Iv<strong>an</strong> Korać, S<strong>in</strong>iša Filipović <strong>an</strong>d Dragut<strong>in</strong> Dragićević. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictment was brought on 12 August 2005. 24 The a<strong>for</strong>ementioned persons are<br />
accused of <strong>for</strong>cibly relocat<strong>in</strong>g 1,882 civili<strong>an</strong>s of Bosniak nationality from the<br />
villages of Kozluk <strong>an</strong>d Skočić to Hungary via Serbia. Another part of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dictment relates to the torture, mutilation, sexual abuse <strong>an</strong>d murder of 19<br />
Muslims out of 174 held <strong>in</strong>side the Culture Club <strong>in</strong> Čelopek. 25 The trial of this<br />
group beg<strong>an</strong> on 28 November 2005 be<strong>for</strong>e the first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce Trial Chamber of<br />
the Special War Crimes Unit of the Belgrade District Court presided over by<br />
Judge Tatj<strong>an</strong>a Vuković. All the accused were brought be<strong>for</strong>e the Trial Chamber<br />
except Duško Vuković who, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Judge Vuković, was found dead <strong>in</strong> a<br />
Belgrade District Court toilet several days be<strong>for</strong>e the open<strong>in</strong>g of the trial. 26 The<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are under way.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The Trial of Anton Lekaj<br />
The trial of Anton Lekaj, a member of the UCK (Kosovo Liberation<br />
Army), opened be<strong>for</strong>e the Special War Crimes Unit of the Belgrade District<br />
Court on 17 November 2005. Lekaj is accused of the murder of four civili<strong>an</strong>s –<br />
one Serb <strong>an</strong>d three Roma – <strong>an</strong>d the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g, rape <strong>an</strong>d maltreatment of 13<br />
Roma civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Đakovica <strong>in</strong> 1999. The first-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce Trial Chamber is<br />
presided over by Judge Olivera Anđelković, with Tatj<strong>an</strong>a Vuković <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Miroslav Alimpić as members. The hear<strong>in</strong>g of evidence is <strong>in</strong> progress. 27<br />
Investigations<br />
There are two cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong>to war crimes <strong>in</strong> Kosovo,<br />
the first concern<strong>in</strong>g Nebojša M<strong>in</strong>ić <strong>an</strong>d other members of the Munje<br />
paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation suspected of committ<strong>in</strong>g crimes around Peć <strong>in</strong> 1999.<br />
The members of this paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation are believed to be responsible <strong>for</strong><br />
the deaths of some 70 civili<strong>an</strong>s from the villages of Čuška, Zahač <strong>an</strong>d Pavlj<strong>an</strong>,<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ić alone be<strong>in</strong>g suspected of personally kill<strong>in</strong>g six members of the Baljaj<br />
family from Peć on 12 June 1999. M<strong>in</strong>ić was arrested <strong>in</strong> Argent<strong>in</strong>a on 24 May<br />
2005 <strong>for</strong> illegally enter<strong>in</strong>g the country <strong>an</strong>d possession of false papers. 28 After<br />
his arrest the public learned that the paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation was established <strong>in</strong><br />
1997, consist<strong>in</strong>g of the ablest members of the Special Police Units (PJP) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
persistent offenders from the underworld specially tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> some police<br />
camps <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the one at Leskovac. The unit, stationed <strong>in</strong> Peć, was on the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP payroll. There are <strong>in</strong>dications that the unit specialized <strong>in</strong> ethnic<br />
cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g: dur<strong>in</strong>g 1999 villages were rout<strong>in</strong>ely first shelled by the Army <strong>an</strong>d<br />
then mopped up by the Munje. 29<br />
The other <strong>in</strong>vestigation relates to the massacre of 48 Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> civili<strong>an</strong>s<br />
from Suva Reka on 26 March 1999. There are grounds <strong>for</strong> suspicion that the<br />
massacre was committed by members of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP <strong>an</strong>d DB. At the<br />
moment the <strong>in</strong>vestigation encompasses n<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong>mer <strong>an</strong>d active MUP <strong>an</strong>d DB<br />
members who were arrested on 26 October 2005 30 <strong>an</strong>d deta<strong>in</strong>ed after<br />
question<strong>in</strong>g by order of Investigative Judge Mil<strong>an</strong> Dilparić. The difference<br />
between this case <strong>an</strong>d the rest is that the <strong>in</strong>vestigative judge ordered that all<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation regard<strong>in</strong>g the case be kept secret: whereas <strong>in</strong> other <strong>in</strong>vestigations<br />
the names of the suspects were known be<strong>for</strong>e the charges were made (i.e.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ić), Dilparić made clear that special care would be taken to prevent the<br />
2005.<br />
22 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Ubicama 75 god<strong>in</strong>a zatvora’, B.T., 16-17 July 2005.<br />
23 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Ubicama 75 god<strong>in</strong>a zatvora’, B.T., 16-17 July 2005.<br />
24 Vreme, ‘Optužnica za zloč<strong>in</strong> u Zvorniku’, T.T., 18 August 2005.<br />
25 Ibid.<br />
26 Politika, ‘Počelo suđenje “Žutim osams”’, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dra Petrović, 29 November<br />
2006.<br />
27 www.law<strong>in</strong>itiative.com, ‘Brat i supruga žrtve optužuju Lekaja’, 20 J<strong>an</strong>uary<br />
28 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Specijalnost – etničko čišćenje’, R.D., 6 June 2005.<br />
29 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Na platnom spisku MUP Srbije’, 6 June 2005.<br />
30 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Među osumnjičenima bivši pripadnik DB’, Z.R., 14 November 2005.<br />
160<br />
161
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
leak<strong>in</strong>g of the suspect’s names: ‘If they had known that they were be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigated, the suspects would probably have escaped across the border. But<br />
this is not the only reason why their names were not <strong>an</strong>d c<strong>an</strong>not be made<br />
public until further notice. This was done <strong>for</strong> the sake of the victims <strong>an</strong>d their<br />
families, as well as <strong>for</strong> the sake of the members of the suspects’ families<br />
themselves. Besides, the object of the <strong>in</strong>vestigation is to f<strong>in</strong>d out whether there<br />
is <strong>an</strong>y ground <strong>for</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dictment aga<strong>in</strong>st them, not to pronounce them<br />
guilty.’ 31 In the <strong>in</strong>terview, Dilparić said that of the 1,110 or so bodies of Kosovo<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s found <strong>in</strong> mass graves at Batajnica, Petrovo Selo <strong>an</strong>d Perućac, a total<br />
of 641 had been identified. 32<br />
Nearly all who committed this crime are either retired or active MUP<br />
members (six of them). After the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>security</strong> <strong>for</strong>ces pulled out of Kosovo<br />
they were tr<strong>an</strong>sferred to eight towns <strong>in</strong> Serbia. 33 War Crimes Prosecutor<br />
Vladimir Vukčević expla<strong>in</strong>ed why it was very difficult to conduct this<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigation: ‘My estimate is that there are still people <strong>in</strong> the r<strong>an</strong>ks of the<br />
police whose conscience is not clear regard<strong>in</strong>g the events <strong>in</strong> Kosovo. We shall<br />
have difficulty uncover<strong>in</strong>g perpetrators until these r<strong>an</strong>ks are weeded out.’ 34<br />
The crime was <strong>in</strong>vestigated by the Balk<strong>an</strong> Investigative Report<strong>in</strong>g Network <strong>in</strong><br />
2003. When its Director Gord<strong>an</strong>a Igrić asked the MUP whether one of the<br />
suspects, who was a DB officer <strong>in</strong> Suva Reka, was still on the MUP payroll, she<br />
was advised by someone from the M<strong>in</strong>istry to ‘concern herself with nicer<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>get this topic’. The next morn<strong>in</strong>g she found her front door<br />
boarded up <strong>an</strong>d a threaten<strong>in</strong>g letter on her doormat. 35 The fact that a m<strong>an</strong> who<br />
knew about the cart<strong>in</strong>g of bodies from Kosovo to Serbia was appo<strong>in</strong>ted to head<br />
the MUP war crimes detection unit lends credence to the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment<br />
by a judiciary officer, who blames groups with<strong>in</strong> the MUP <strong>for</strong> obstruct<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigation of the Kosovo crimes: ‘I’m not talk<strong>in</strong>g about the org<strong>an</strong>ization as a<br />
whole, I’m talk<strong>in</strong>g about people who are l<strong>in</strong>ked together as perpetrators,<br />
accomplices or witnesses. They watch each other’s backs, take care of each<br />
other <strong>an</strong>d try to make sure that as little <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation as possible leaks out.’ 36<br />
By establish<strong>in</strong>g the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office <strong>an</strong>d Special War<br />
Crimes Unit Serbia has made it possible to prosecute war crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>an</strong>d thus<br />
free itself from at least some of the huge burden from its recent warlike past.<br />
However, the Government of the Republic of Serbia has shown no evidence of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g genu<strong>in</strong>ely <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> this process. The public utter<strong>an</strong>ces of Justice<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Stojković, the controversy regard<strong>in</strong>g the prosecutors’ <strong>an</strong>d judges’ pay<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
launched by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Supreme Court President, the withhold<strong>in</strong>g of funds<br />
necessary <strong>for</strong> the work of the Prosecutor’s Office, <strong>an</strong>d the obstruction on the<br />
part of the MUP are unmistakable signs that genu<strong>in</strong>e desire <strong>an</strong>d need are felt<br />
to follow this course. Such <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>an</strong>d judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><br />
connection with war crimes as there are are the result of the enthusiasm <strong>an</strong>d<br />
diligence of <strong>in</strong>dividual members of the Prosecutor’s Office <strong>an</strong>d Unit <strong>an</strong>d of the<br />
assist<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions. This is why the <strong>in</strong>dictments are not<br />
complete <strong>an</strong>d do not encompass all who are to blame. The conclusion to be<br />
drawn from this is that the <strong>in</strong>dictments <strong>an</strong>d proceed<strong>in</strong>gs will rema<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>complete until such time as the <strong>state</strong> w<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d is ready, without <strong>an</strong>y ulterior<br />
motives, to deal with all who are responsible without exception.<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
• Thoroughly re<strong>for</strong>m the Serbi<strong>an</strong> MUP <strong>an</strong>d remove from service all<br />
persons known to have been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> war crimes <strong>in</strong> the territory of the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia;<br />
• The Government should fully support to the work of the War<br />
Crimes Prosecutor’s Office, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g giv<strong>in</strong>g full f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial support <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g war crimes;<br />
• The Government <strong>an</strong>d other relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions should take <strong>an</strong><br />
uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e on war crimes <strong>an</strong>d should publicly def<strong>in</strong>e the character<br />
of the conflict <strong>in</strong> the territory of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia, because this is the only<br />
way to enable the prosecution <strong>an</strong>d the court to operate without obstruction<br />
<strong>an</strong>d to do their job properly.<br />
31 Politika, ‘Pucali u civile’, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dra Petrović, 4 November 2005.<br />
32 Ibid.<br />
33 Večernje novosti, ‘Pohapšeni širom Srbije’, E. Radosavljević, D.P. Veljković, 27<br />
October 2005.<br />
34 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Opstrukcija iz policijskih redova’, Balk<strong>an</strong> Insajt, 28 October 2005.<br />
35 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Opstrukcija iz policijskih redova’, Balk<strong>an</strong> Insajt, 28 October 2005.<br />
36 Ibid.<br />
162<br />
163
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
POLICE TORTURE<br />
The Police Law of the Republic of Serbia was adopted on 14<br />
November 2005 <strong>an</strong>d went <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce eight days after its publication <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Official Gazette. 1 The fundamentals of prevent<strong>in</strong>g police torture <strong>an</strong>d protect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
citizens aga<strong>in</strong>st it are built <strong>in</strong>to the provisions relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>security</strong>. The<br />
Law abolishes the Service of the Inspector-General who had authority to<br />
exercise <strong>in</strong>ternal supervision of the work of the police. Under the Law this is<br />
replaced with the Internal Security Sector under the charge of the sector head.<br />
The jurisdiction of this org<strong>an</strong> is laid down by Article 172: ‘The Internal Security<br />
Sector of the police exercises supervision of the lawfulness of police work,<br />
especially with regard to respect <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d protection of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>in</strong> the<br />
discharge of police tasks <strong>an</strong>d the exercise of police powers.’ 2<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation is collected <strong>an</strong>d facts ascerta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> particular cases either<br />
<strong>in</strong> response to applications, representations <strong>an</strong>d motions by physical <strong>an</strong>d legal<br />
persons or on the <strong>in</strong>itiative of the Sector itself. After the facts are ascerta<strong>in</strong>ed,<br />
the Sector head must <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d the Director of Police about each<br />
case <strong>in</strong> a written report. A report must end <strong>in</strong> suggestions as to the type of<br />
remedial action needed. This me<strong>an</strong>s that the Sector head has no authority to<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitute proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e competent <strong>state</strong> authorities aga<strong>in</strong>st officials found<br />
to have broken the law. The f<strong>in</strong>al decision thereon rests with the M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Director of Police. The M<strong>in</strong>ister is the only authority empowered to<br />
exercise supervision of the work of the Internal Security Sector, whereas the<br />
duty of the Sector is to discharge responsibilities fall<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> its competence<br />
<strong>an</strong>d to take specific action accord<strong>in</strong>g to directives, guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d orders of the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister. 3<br />
The bottom l<strong>in</strong>e of this arr<strong>an</strong>gement is that the Internal Security Sector<br />
is fully subord<strong>in</strong>ated to the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Internal Affairs, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong> the last<br />
resort the M<strong>in</strong>ister exercises <strong>in</strong>ternal control of the lawfulness of police work.<br />
We hold that plac<strong>in</strong>g excessive powers <strong>in</strong> the h<strong>an</strong>ds of the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Internal<br />
Affairs is not the best way to control police work when it comes to respect <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d protection of citizens’ <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Article 137 of the new Penal Code of the Republic of Serbia, 4 which<br />
went <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce on 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006, <strong>in</strong>troduces a crim<strong>in</strong>al offence termed ‘abuse<br />
<strong>an</strong>d torture’, reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>t to penalize <strong>an</strong>y torture <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual or a<br />
group may perpetrate aga<strong>in</strong>st others. The aggravated degrees of this crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
offence attach to officials who, <strong>in</strong> the course of their duty, apply <strong>an</strong>y <strong>for</strong>m of<br />
torture aga<strong>in</strong>st citizens to extract confession or <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation or as a me<strong>an</strong>s of<br />
<strong>in</strong>timidation.<br />
In one of his last Serbi<strong>an</strong> media <strong>in</strong>terviews, Inspector-General<br />
Vladimir Božović presented statistical <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation by way of summ<strong>in</strong>g up the<br />
work of his office: ‘S<strong>in</strong>ce April 2004 we have received 6,343 representations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d applications regard<strong>in</strong>g police work, 4,207 of which have been processed<br />
(with 643 justified ones). Dur<strong>in</strong>g the same period, the Inspectorate has filed 97<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>ts aga<strong>in</strong>st 124 MUP members <strong>an</strong>d 11 citizens <strong>in</strong> connection<br />
with 181 crim<strong>in</strong>al offences. Of these, 67 crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>ts were filed aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
95 MUP employees over 118 offences <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g corruption, <strong>an</strong>d 8 crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ts aga<strong>in</strong>st 10 persons over 9 offences <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g elements of torture.’ 5<br />
What Božović’s statistics did not reveal was the outcome of the<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>ts filed aga<strong>in</strong>st the police officers (the public does not know<br />
how m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>dictments were brought on the basis of these crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ts), the outcome of the judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs, if <strong>an</strong>y, aga<strong>in</strong>st the police<br />
officers concerned <strong>an</strong>d, lastly, whether these people are still members of the<br />
police <strong>for</strong>ce.<br />
Last year will be remembered <strong>for</strong> the first proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>stituted<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st a <strong>for</strong>mer general <strong>an</strong>d Belgrade police chief on charges of torture. Major-<br />
General Mil<strong>an</strong> Obradović was prosecuted follow<strong>in</strong>g a crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>t by<br />
the Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Suppression Adm<strong>in</strong>istration (UBPOK) that he was<br />
suspected of hav<strong>in</strong>g tortured a number of members of what is referred to as<br />
the ‘Maka g<strong>an</strong>g’. The Maka g<strong>an</strong>g is <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized crim<strong>in</strong>al group some of<br />
whose members were prosecuted <strong>in</strong> 2003-04 <strong>in</strong> connection with the<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation of police General Boško Buha. Aside from the UBPOK crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>t, the Inspector General too conducted <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong> this<br />
connection <strong>an</strong>d made a report. S<strong>in</strong>ce Obradović was among people trusted by<br />
the late Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić <strong>an</strong>d occupied a top position <strong>in</strong> the police dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Operation Sabre follow<strong>in</strong>g Đ<strong>in</strong>đić’s assass<strong>in</strong>ation, a number of politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
NGOs saw the <strong>in</strong>stitution of the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d especially Obradović’s<br />
detention as <strong>an</strong> act of retaliation by the present regime <strong>for</strong> the arrest dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
operation of close associates of Vojislav Koštunica, rather th<strong>an</strong> as a genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
desire on the part of the <strong>state</strong> to deal with the problem of police torture<br />
effectively <strong>an</strong>d consistently. ‘Everybody owes someth<strong>in</strong>g to everybody else<br />
1 Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, No. 101/05, 21 November 2005.<br />
2 Ibid.<br />
3 Ibid.<br />
4 Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, No. 85/2005, 29 September 2005.<br />
5 Svedok, ‘Istraga o istragama vodi ka konačnom odgovoru: Ko je ubio<br />
Ćuruviju...’, No. 288, 28 November 2005.<br />
164<br />
165
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
there, so Božović is <strong>in</strong> debt to his mentor Borivoje Borović,’ said Čedomir<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>ović. He claimed that the report was the bra<strong>in</strong>child of Serbi<strong>an</strong> Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica, <strong>for</strong>mer head of the Security Adm<strong>in</strong>istration of the<br />
Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro Aco Tomić, head of the Security Intelligence<br />
Agency (BIA) Rade Bulatović <strong>an</strong>d the justice <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>isters, Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Stojković <strong>an</strong>d Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić, with Gradimir Nalić <strong>an</strong>d Vladimir Božović directly<br />
work<strong>in</strong>g on it. 6 The <strong>for</strong>mer m<strong>in</strong>ister of <strong>in</strong>ternal affairs <strong>in</strong> the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić<br />
government, Duš<strong>an</strong> Mihajlović, said: ‘This is why the reckon<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>ues with<br />
the dead Đ<strong>in</strong>đić <strong>an</strong>d with his "trusted" personnel who, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Beba<br />
Popović, were <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> the MUP by him personally. We’re by no me<strong>an</strong>s<br />
<strong>an</strong>gels, but what the present government is try<strong>in</strong>g to do is worse, revenge is<br />
the devil’s own work.’ 7 On the occasion of Obradović’s arrest, the Civic<br />
Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia made <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>nouncement <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g accusation:<br />
‘...the arrest of <strong>for</strong>mer chief of the Belgrade police Mil<strong>an</strong> Obradović was a "new<br />
strike" aga<strong>in</strong>st the judiciary, the Special Court <strong>an</strong>d the Special Prosecutor.’ 8 The<br />
move was also denounced <strong>in</strong> a jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>nouncement by a group of NGOs<br />
(Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights, Lawyers <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights, Women <strong>in</strong> Black, Belgrade Circle <strong>an</strong>d Centre <strong>for</strong> Cultural<br />
Decontam<strong>in</strong>ation) which said: ‘...the arrest of General Mil<strong>an</strong> Obradović is the<br />
work of a "political-crim<strong>in</strong>al" lobby, it is a question of impermissible pressure<br />
by the executive power on the prosecutor’s office <strong>an</strong>d the court.’ 9<br />
In response of such characterizations of the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs by politici<strong>an</strong>s,<br />
political parties <strong>an</strong>d NGOs, the District Prosecutor’s Office said <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>nouncement: ‘...the <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the extraction of evidence from<br />
members of the "Maka g<strong>an</strong>g" has no political background, <strong>an</strong>d certa<strong>in</strong> media<br />
<strong>an</strong>d political allegations constitute obstruction of the <strong>in</strong>vestigation. We<br />
characterize the media <strong>an</strong>d political m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of this particular crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>g as direct obstruction of the <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>an</strong>d impermissible<br />
pressure on the work of judicial org<strong>an</strong>s.’ 10<br />
The undeniable fact is, however, that this is the first case <strong>in</strong> Serbia’s<br />
judicial practice of crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stituted aga<strong>in</strong>st, <strong>an</strong>d of<br />
custody be<strong>in</strong>g imposed on, a police official <strong>in</strong> so high a position <strong>in</strong> connection<br />
with alleged torture. Comment<strong>in</strong>g on the practice of s<strong>an</strong>ction<strong>in</strong>g police<br />
brutality <strong>in</strong> Serbia, attorney Rajko D<strong>an</strong>ilović said: ‘I don’t recall a police officer<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g convicted throughout my practice; I have had cases of marathon<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs dragg<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>an</strong>d eventually becom<strong>in</strong>g statute-barred.’ 11<br />
6 Blic, ‘Jov<strong>an</strong>ović: Neću biti priveden, meni će se suditi na ulici’, N.M.J., 24<br />
March 2005.<br />
7 Blic, ‘Mihajlović: Nismo bili <strong>an</strong>đeli, ali ovo je osveta’, N.M.J., 24 March 2005.<br />
8 Večernje novosti, ‘Novi udar’, 25 March 2005.<br />
9 Kurir, ‘NVO: “Slučaj Obradović” pritisak na sud’, Beta, 26-27 March 2005.<br />
10 Kurir, ‘Tužilaštvo: Istraga nema političku pozad<strong>in</strong>u’, Beta, 26-27 March 2005.<br />
11 www.vreme.com ‘Uni<strong>for</strong>mis<strong>an</strong>i bat<strong>in</strong>aši’, Jov<strong>an</strong> Dulović, archive, No. 625.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
In contrast to the Obradović case, the competent authorities of the<br />
Republic of Serbia have not yet established whether the police are or are not<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> the death of Mil<strong>an</strong> Ristić of Šabac. In view of this the Belgrade<br />
District Court has upheld the judgement of the Belgrade First Municipal Court<br />
award<strong>in</strong>g compensation to the late Ristić’s parents, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong> spite of the 11 May<br />
2001 rul<strong>in</strong>g of the UN <strong>Committee</strong> Aga<strong>in</strong>st Torture the State of Serbia has failed<br />
to conduct a prompt <strong>an</strong>d impartial <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the death of this young<br />
m<strong>an</strong>. 12<br />
At the end of November 2005 the UN <strong>Committee</strong> Aga<strong>in</strong>st Torture<br />
made two more rul<strong>in</strong>gs f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities <strong>in</strong> breach of Articles 12 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
13 of the Convention Aga<strong>in</strong>st Torture <strong>for</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to carry out prompt <strong>an</strong>d<br />
impartial <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong>to allegations of police torture of Nikola Nikolić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
D<strong>an</strong>ilo Dimitrijević. 13<br />
The assur<strong>an</strong>ces that the prosecution of General Obradović is not <strong>an</strong> act<br />
of revenge <strong>an</strong>d that no politics is <strong>in</strong>volved are hardly tenable, if one takes a<br />
close look at the facts presented above. The present Government <strong>an</strong>d<br />
competent m<strong>in</strong>istries have not assured us that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> is ready to deal<br />
with police officers <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to use violence aga<strong>in</strong>st citizens by promptly <strong>an</strong>d<br />
impartially <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g each case where reasonable suspicion exists <strong>an</strong>d by<br />
punish<strong>in</strong>g the perpetrators accord<strong>in</strong>g to the law.<br />
Registered Cases<br />
One of the most drastic cases of police torture was the beat<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
Zdravko Triv<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Kik<strong>in</strong>da on 21 October 2005. About 3 a.m. Triv<strong>an</strong>, who was<br />
under the <strong>in</strong>fluence, was stopped by a police patrol outside his house. The<br />
patrol consisted of police officer Saša Mij<strong>in</strong>, aged 22, <strong>an</strong>d his colleague Tatj<strong>an</strong>a<br />
Radišić, aged 25. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to one of the eyewitnesses among Triv<strong>an</strong>’s<br />
neighbours who watched the <strong>in</strong>cident from their w<strong>in</strong>dows, ‘A m<strong>an</strong> of medium<br />
height <strong>in</strong> uni<strong>for</strong>m was say<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g to our neighbour, who stood mute<br />
<strong>an</strong>d still, not mak<strong>in</strong>g a move. There was the echo of truncheon blows, of a<br />
savage beat<strong>in</strong>g. It was horrible. The police officer struck Zdravko mostly on the<br />
stomach. He fell under the <strong>for</strong>ce of the blows, but the m<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> uni<strong>for</strong>m kept<br />
lay<strong>in</strong>g on. He would lift him up, then punch him hard <strong>in</strong> the lower back.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the hour or so this went on he only gave two or three mo<strong>an</strong>s of pa<strong>in</strong>.<br />
The wom<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> police uni<strong>for</strong>m stood a few metres away. She did noth<strong>in</strong>g. At<br />
one po<strong>in</strong>t Zdravko was on his h<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>an</strong>d knees. As if follow<strong>in</strong>g a ritual, the<br />
policem<strong>an</strong> started to beat him methodically from head to feet. He struck him<br />
hard on the soles of his feet <strong>an</strong>d the poor m<strong>an</strong> gave a sharp cry of pa<strong>in</strong>. Next<br />
12 www.b92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo/vesti ‘Porodici Ristić milion d<strong>in</strong>ara’, 27 September 2005.<br />
13 www.hlc.org.yu/tortura/izvestaji 24/11/2005/CAT/C/35/D/174/2000<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 16/11/2005/CAT/C/35 /D/172/200<br />
166<br />
167
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
th<strong>in</strong>g he lifted Zdravko up, yelled at him to put out his tongue, <strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />
to beat him. At around half past three the policem<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d policewom<strong>an</strong><br />
dragged Zdravko away towards the nearby founta<strong>in</strong>. I thought that the torture<br />
might hopefully ceased...’ 14 Next morn<strong>in</strong>g Triv<strong>an</strong> was found dead on a bench.<br />
The duty ambul<strong>an</strong>ce service doctor failed to detect visible marks of beat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d attributed the death to <strong>an</strong> overdose of dr<strong>in</strong>k. However, a neighbour who<br />
had witnessed the <strong>in</strong>cident told the family <strong>an</strong>d it requested a post mortem to<br />
establish the cause of death. The post mortem exam<strong>in</strong>ation attributed the death<br />
to liver fracture <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal bleed<strong>in</strong>g, as well as establish<strong>in</strong>g damage to other<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal org<strong>an</strong>s. 15 A few days after the <strong>in</strong>cident, the Kik<strong>in</strong>da police filed a<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>t aga<strong>in</strong>st Saša Mij<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d he was deta<strong>in</strong>ed. His colleague<br />
Tatj<strong>an</strong>a Radišić, who had patrolled the town with him that night <strong>an</strong>d looked<br />
on, was suspended, as were other police officers on that night shift: Lieuten<strong>an</strong>t<br />
Blagoje Vlajkov who was <strong>in</strong> charge of the night shift, police station deputy<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>der Junior Lieuten<strong>an</strong>t Duš<strong>an</strong> Gliš<strong>in</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d Serge<strong>an</strong>t Vasilij Đumić. These<br />
three police officers will have to <strong>an</strong>swer discipl<strong>in</strong>ary charges. Discipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs were also <strong>in</strong>stituted aga<strong>in</strong>st the police station comm<strong>an</strong>der,<br />
Capta<strong>in</strong> Radov<strong>an</strong> Kecm<strong>an</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d two police officers, Serge<strong>an</strong>t Radov<strong>an</strong><br />
Arađ<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Junior Serge<strong>an</strong>t Uroš Ivetić. 16<br />
Soon after the <strong>in</strong>cident media <strong>an</strong>nounced that Mij<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Radišić were<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ee police officers, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g they were taken on follow<strong>in</strong>g only a brief<br />
period of tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Although Mij<strong>in</strong> had been punished <strong>for</strong> discipl<strong>in</strong>ary offences<br />
on ten occasions with<strong>in</strong> a very short time, until he brutally beat up Triv<strong>an</strong> no<br />
superior officer thought it necessary to dismiss him from the <strong>for</strong>ce. 17<br />
At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 2005 <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, police picked up eleven young<br />
women <strong>an</strong>d men from a birthday party <strong>an</strong>d brought them <strong>in</strong>to the police<br />
station on Majke Jevrosime<br />
Street. That night one of the youths, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Zlatarov, aged 19,<br />
was brutally beaten at the station. Zlatarov’s mother said this, based on<br />
witness evidence <strong>an</strong>d her son’s account: ‘At the police station Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar had<br />
his teeth broken <strong>an</strong>d suffered numerous bruises <strong>an</strong>d cuts on the head. The<br />
policemen h<strong>an</strong>dcuffed him, brought him down, kicked <strong>an</strong>d beat him with<br />
batons – this <strong>for</strong> merely object<strong>in</strong>g to Jov<strong>an</strong>ović’s detention as he stood <strong>in</strong> the<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y of friends outside the police station.’ Another youth, 19-year-old<br />
Borko Vujičić, was struck on the head two or three times by a member of <strong>an</strong><br />
armed response team <strong>in</strong> the presence of his mother. 18<br />
14 Politika, ‘Bat<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>je do smrti’, Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Živković, 24 October 2005.<br />
15 Ibid.<br />
16 Politika, ‘Policajci suspendov<strong>an</strong>i, građ<strong>an</strong>i revoltir<strong>an</strong>i’, Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Živković, 28<br />
October 2005.<br />
17 Politika, ‘Negira bat<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>je do smrti’, 29 October 2005.<br />
18 Glas javnosti, ‘S<strong>in</strong>a su mi vezali i prebili u policiji’, P. Rosić, 5 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law Centre issued <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>nouncement over yet<br />
<strong>an</strong>other case of police torture which occurred <strong>in</strong> Belgrade on 5 July 2005.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g a compla<strong>in</strong>t by a neighbour of loud music be<strong>in</strong>g played <strong>in</strong> a flat on 3<br />
Fruškogorska Street, three police officers from the Stari Grad police station<br />
entered the flat of Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Petrović. The officers h<strong>an</strong>dcuffed <strong>an</strong>d brought<br />
him to the floor, strik<strong>in</strong>g him all over the body with batons, as well as kick<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d punch<strong>in</strong>g him. The torture cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong> the police vehicle <strong>an</strong>d the station<br />
to which he was taken. A m<strong>an</strong> who was with Petrović <strong>in</strong> the flat, Iv<strong>an</strong><br />
Mar<strong>in</strong>ković, was also brought to the station <strong>an</strong>d beaten on the soles with<br />
batons so hard that <strong>an</strong> emergency medical service had to be called <strong>in</strong>. Petrović<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Mar<strong>in</strong>ković were brought <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the early morn<strong>in</strong>g hours <strong>an</strong>d released <strong>in</strong><br />
the afternoon. Be<strong>for</strong>e be<strong>in</strong>g allowed to go, they were made to sign <strong>state</strong>ments<br />
about the <strong>in</strong>cident they had not written themselves or allowed to see. They had<br />
to sign the <strong>state</strong>ments on pa<strong>in</strong> of be<strong>in</strong>g charged with unspecified crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
offences. 19<br />
In Kragujevac on 17 September 2005, a police officer from the local<br />
police station, Simon Nedović, caused grievous bodily harm to Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Badrljica, a taxi driver. He was on patrol duty when he stopped Badrljica <strong>an</strong>d<br />
asked to see his papers, punch<strong>in</strong>g him several times as well as strik<strong>in</strong>g him<br />
with the door of the car <strong>in</strong> the process. Doctors at the local Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Hospital<br />
Centre established fractures <strong>in</strong> a cheekbone <strong>an</strong>d the bottom of <strong>an</strong> eye socket, as<br />
well as a dislocation of the lower jaw. The Municipal Prosecutor’s Office<br />
ordered <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation of Nedović on charges of caus<strong>in</strong>g grievous bodily<br />
harm to Badrljica. 20<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>’s previous reports stress the problem of<br />
passivity of the prosecut<strong>in</strong>g authorities regard<strong>in</strong>g police torture <strong>an</strong>d cite<br />
several cases where the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> acted <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>jured parties. 21<br />
Practice <strong>in</strong> this doma<strong>in</strong> has not ch<strong>an</strong>ged other th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> such cruel <strong>an</strong>d extreme<br />
cases as the murder of Zdravko Triv<strong>an</strong>. In this case the <strong>in</strong>cident was not<br />
hushed up th<strong>an</strong>ks to the public pressure exerted on the <strong>state</strong> authorities by<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y citizens of Kik<strong>in</strong>da.<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> considers that:<br />
• the provisions of the Police Law relat<strong>in</strong>g to the work of the<br />
Internal Security Sector <strong>an</strong>d the org<strong>an</strong>’s jurisdiction must be amended;<br />
19 Blic, ‘Mladići prebijeni u policijskoj st<strong>an</strong>ici’, Željka Jevtić, 23 July 2005.<br />
20 Blic, ‘Policajac mi je upropastio život’, Nebojša Radišić, 5 November 2005.<br />
21 Hels<strong>in</strong>ški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, ‘Ljudska prava i kolektivni<br />
identitet’, p. 151.<br />
168<br />
169
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
• the Internal Security Sector must have greater <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> its<br />
work from the M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d the Director of Police;<br />
• the system of education of police officers must be fundamentally<br />
re<strong>for</strong>med, plac<strong>in</strong>g emphasis on problems of protection of citizens’ <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d on education of police officers about modern lawful methods of<br />
evidence collection;<br />
• the education of judges <strong>an</strong>d prosecutors must go on to familiarize<br />
them with the practice of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d with<br />
judgements establish<strong>in</strong>g breaches of Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Convention on Hum<strong>an</strong> Right, as well as with other <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
conventions deal<strong>in</strong>g with the subject.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
PRISON MONITORING<br />
The new Law on the En<strong>for</strong>cement of Crim<strong>in</strong>al S<strong>an</strong>ctions (ZIKS)<br />
entered <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce on 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006. 1 Compared with its predecessor, this Law<br />
<strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y of its segments offers more modern solutions <strong>an</strong>d guar<strong>an</strong>tees aimed at<br />
protect<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights of the prisoners. The very def<strong>in</strong>ition of the<br />
purpose of the en<strong>for</strong>cement of crim<strong>in</strong>al s<strong>an</strong>ctions <strong>in</strong> this Law is much clearer<br />
<strong>an</strong>d more specific compared with the one it supersedes, as well as reflect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
contemporary penological th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In brief, the purpose of crim<strong>in</strong>al s<strong>an</strong>ctions<br />
is to separate perpetrators of crim<strong>in</strong>al offences from the social community <strong>in</strong><br />
order to both protect the social community <strong>an</strong>d fit these people by me<strong>an</strong>s of<br />
specific treatment <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent existence upon their release.<br />
The new Law conta<strong>in</strong>s a chapter generally regulat<strong>in</strong>g the status of the<br />
prisoners. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciples it upholds guar<strong>an</strong>tee respect <strong>for</strong> the dignity of the<br />
prisoners as persons, protection of their fundamental rights <strong>in</strong> con<strong>for</strong>mity with<br />
the Constitution <strong>an</strong>d the rules of <strong>in</strong>ternational law, prohibition of torture <strong>an</strong>d<br />
of <strong>an</strong>y <strong>for</strong>m of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. These basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples also guar<strong>an</strong>tee judicial<br />
protection regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>dividual act relat<strong>in</strong>g to prisoners’ rights <strong>an</strong>d duties<br />
<strong>in</strong> the course of their <strong>in</strong>carceration.<br />
The Law provides that special care will be taken, consistent with the<br />
publicity of work <strong>an</strong>d the entire s<strong>an</strong>ctions en<strong>for</strong>cement system, to enable<br />
domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d bodies concerned with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
rights protection, media outlets <strong>an</strong>d scientists to visit the <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> which<br />
custodial sentences are served.<br />
The Law enumerates the rights of the prisoners <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> this context,<br />
lays emphasis on their right to health care, the legislator hav<strong>in</strong>g decided that<br />
the hitherto arr<strong>an</strong>gements had been <strong>in</strong>adequate. The duties of the prison<br />
doctor or rather his obligations towards the prisoners are specified with the<br />
object of provid<strong>in</strong>g better medical services <strong>an</strong>d assist<strong>an</strong>ce. The Law expressly<br />
<strong>for</strong>bids the <strong>for</strong>ced medical treatment <strong>an</strong>d feed<strong>in</strong>g of prisoners <strong>an</strong>d guar<strong>an</strong>tees<br />
the right of the prisoner <strong>an</strong>d his relatives to know the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong><br />
the prisoner’s medical record, someth<strong>in</strong>g that had not been possible be<strong>for</strong>e.<br />
1 Službeni glasnik RS, No. 85/2005, 6 October 2005.<br />
170<br />
171
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The Law regulates the matter of prisoners’ compla<strong>in</strong>ts by <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the obligation of the prison adm<strong>in</strong>istration director to reply to a compla<strong>in</strong>t<br />
with<strong>in</strong> 15 days.<br />
Instead of privileges, the Law <strong>in</strong>troduces special rights which<br />
prisoners may acquire dur<strong>in</strong>g their terms of sentence.<br />
For the first time the Law regulates the procedure <strong>for</strong> placement of<br />
prisoners <strong>in</strong> heightened surveill<strong>an</strong>ce units <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the obligation to issue a<br />
placement order, the right of appeal, <strong>an</strong>d the maximum duration of such<br />
placement. Further, the Law specifies the grounds <strong>for</strong> apply<strong>in</strong>g discipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
measures aga<strong>in</strong>st prisoners, def<strong>in</strong>es serious discipl<strong>in</strong>ary offences, <strong>an</strong>d lays<br />
down the procedure <strong>for</strong> the conduct of discipl<strong>in</strong>ary proceed<strong>in</strong>gs. It <strong>in</strong>troduces<br />
judicial safeguards aga<strong>in</strong>st discipl<strong>in</strong>ary punishment orders <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>augurates<br />
the right of prisoners to engage the services of professionals <strong>in</strong> discipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
A book of rules on the work of prisons <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
prepared to give def<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>for</strong>m to the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g legislative provisions. The new<br />
normative arr<strong>an</strong>gements will no doubt be <strong>in</strong> con<strong>for</strong>mity with the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d recommendations of the domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d bodies which have had occasion to study the relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
legislation as well as the practice of the en<strong>for</strong>cement of <strong>in</strong>stitutional s<strong>an</strong>ctions<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> prisons. 2<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the course of 2005 a team of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia visited 15 places <strong>in</strong> Serbia where persons are serv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
their custodial sentences. In common with the previous report, 3 we shall here<br />
present our basic f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d key problems identified dur<strong>in</strong>g our visits.<br />
The Quality <strong>an</strong>d Conditions of Life<br />
a) Build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d grounds, equipment, ventilation <strong>an</strong>d light<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
s<strong>an</strong>itary conditions, <strong>an</strong>d hygiene<br />
The <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited are architecturally so diverse as to defy a<br />
general description. Some of the build<strong>in</strong>gs were erected towards the end of the<br />
n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century (Sremska Mitrovica Penal-Correctional Institution - KPZ),<br />
2 In September 2004, a <strong>Committee</strong> Aga<strong>in</strong>st Torture (CAT) team made a tour of<br />
places <strong>in</strong> Serbia where persons deprived of their liberty are held. The CAT report is<br />
completed but not yet <strong>for</strong>mally published. At the end of May 2005 teams of the<br />
International Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Federation <strong>an</strong>d of several regional Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>s visited a<br />
number of <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> Serbia hous<strong>in</strong>g persons deprived of their liberty. The report<br />
was <strong>for</strong>mally presented <strong>in</strong> Vienna on 24 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005 <strong>an</strong>d is available on the website of<br />
the International Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Federation, http://www.ihf-hr.org.<br />
3 Hels<strong>in</strong>ški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, ‘Ljudska prava i kolektivni<br />
identitet’, p. 155, chapter ‘Zatvori’.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
others at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the twentieth century (Prokuplje District Prison -<br />
OZ, Kruševac Juvenile Correction Facility - VPD, <strong>an</strong>d others), <strong>an</strong>d others<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1980s <strong>an</strong>d 1990s (OZ Novi Sad, KPZ Sombor open unit). On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d, some of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions were built only last year (OZ Prokuplje<br />
open unit <strong>an</strong>d KPZ Ćuprija). Given the age <strong>an</strong>d orig<strong>in</strong>al quite different<br />
purpose of some of the facilities, the build<strong>in</strong>gs are more or less <strong>in</strong>appropriate<br />
<strong>for</strong> modern st<strong>an</strong>dards relat<strong>in</strong>g to the en<strong>for</strong>cement of custodial sentences.<br />
With the exception of OZ Leskovac, nearly all the district prisons<br />
visited are situated <strong>in</strong> town centres or <strong>in</strong> their vic<strong>in</strong>ity close to commercial,<br />
municipal or high-rise residential build<strong>in</strong>gs (OZ Užice OZ, OZ Kruševac OZ,<br />
Subotica, OZ Novi Pazar, <strong>an</strong>d others), their <strong>an</strong>d prison walls often abutt<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
each other. This does not make <strong>for</strong> <strong>security</strong> <strong>an</strong>d does not allow the <strong>in</strong>mates<br />
sufficient privacy.<br />
As to the open-type penal-correctional <strong>in</strong>stitutions, some have their<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>mates’ quarters <strong>in</strong>side towns <strong>an</strong>d their open<br />
facilities outside (KPZ Ćuprija <strong>an</strong>d KPZ Sombor), or are completely outside<br />
<strong>in</strong>habited places (KPZ Šabac <strong>an</strong>d KPZ Pad<strong>in</strong>ska Skela).<br />
VPD Kruševac is situated outside the town.<br />
Because of their location, all the district prisons save OZ Leskovac<br />
suffer from <strong>in</strong>adequate build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d shortage of space <strong>for</strong> both <strong>in</strong>mate<br />
accommodation <strong>an</strong>d staff work. For this reason, most of these prisons lack day<br />
rooms, special rooms <strong>for</strong> visits by relatives <strong>an</strong>d lawyers, <strong>an</strong>d sports facilities.<br />
Although untried <strong>an</strong>d sentenced prisoners are not as overcrowded <strong>in</strong><br />
the smaller <strong>in</strong>stitutions as they are <strong>in</strong> the bigger ones, this was still a problem<br />
<strong>in</strong> eight of the 14 <strong>in</strong>stitutions we visited last year. In three of the eight the<br />
impression of overcrowd<strong>in</strong>g is augmented by the large number of unused beds<br />
crammed <strong>in</strong>to the rooms. However, the extent of overcrowd<strong>in</strong>g is hard to<br />
judge because there is still no data on real <strong>in</strong>stitution capacity accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>an</strong>d ZIKS st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
Ow<strong>in</strong>g to the age of the build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d poor <strong>an</strong>d irregular<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce, most <strong>in</strong>stitutions suffer from plumb<strong>in</strong>g problems <strong>an</strong>d dampness<br />
is <strong>in</strong> evidence on the dilapidated, mostly brick walls.<br />
The sleep<strong>in</strong>g quarters are poorly equipped, mostly with a bed <strong>for</strong> each<br />
prisoner, a shared table, a couple or chairs or benches, <strong>an</strong>d small lockers <strong>for</strong><br />
personal items but often not <strong>for</strong> all.<br />
For these reasons, hygiene is difficult to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> properly. All the<br />
same, nearly all the <strong>in</strong>stitutions are mak<strong>in</strong>g visible ef<strong>for</strong>ts to keep hygiene<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards as high as possible through regular pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g of walls, cle<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge of bedd<strong>in</strong>g every two weeks <strong>an</strong>d frequent small repairs <strong>an</strong>d<br />
adaptations.<br />
In nearly half the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited <strong>in</strong>mates f<strong>in</strong>d it difficult to<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> personal hygiene ow<strong>in</strong>g to the poor <strong>state</strong> of repair of the s<strong>an</strong>itary<br />
172<br />
173
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
rooms <strong>an</strong>d appli<strong>an</strong>ces. Also, a bath more th<strong>an</strong> once a week is considered a<br />
privilege <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
In all the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited except KPZ Ćuprija untried <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sentenced prisoners wear their own shoes <strong>an</strong>d clothes, but prisoners who work<br />
are issued work clothes. As po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong> the previous report, the <strong>in</strong>mates<br />
must provide their own me<strong>an</strong>s of ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g personal hygiene (soap,<br />
shampoo, wash<strong>in</strong>g powder). Inmates must also wash their own clothes <strong>an</strong>d<br />
these are often seen hung about the rooms because of lack of proper dry<strong>in</strong>g<br />
facilities.<br />
b) The kitchen, mess-hall <strong>an</strong>d food<br />
Though the facilities <strong>an</strong>d conditions <strong>in</strong> which food is stored, prepared<br />
<strong>an</strong>d served vary from one <strong>in</strong>stitution to <strong>an</strong>other, the level of hygiene is<br />
generally low to medium. This is due mostly to the age of the build<strong>in</strong>gs, the<br />
<strong>in</strong>adequate location of kitchens (mostly <strong>in</strong> basements) <strong>an</strong>d years of neglect.<br />
In the majority of <strong>in</strong>stitutions food is prepared by professional cooks<br />
assisted by <strong>in</strong>mates. In all the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited the kitchen staff undergo<br />
regular s<strong>an</strong>itary checks <strong>an</strong>d the assist<strong>an</strong>ts are accommodated separately.<br />
The quality of food varies from one <strong>in</strong>stitution to <strong>an</strong>other but is<br />
generally bad. As po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong> our previous report, the quality of food is<br />
better <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
The food is unappetiz<strong>in</strong>g, there is little or no milk <strong>an</strong>d milk products,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d no fruit whatever (other th<strong>an</strong> occasionally dur<strong>in</strong>g season).<br />
In some <strong>in</strong>stitutions we noticed the impermissible practice of serv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the same dish <strong>for</strong> lunch <strong>an</strong>d d<strong>in</strong>ner.<br />
Generally, a special diet is available <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>mates subject to<br />
the doctor’s prescription, but this tends to be restricted to the elim<strong>in</strong>ation of fat,<br />
salt <strong>an</strong>d spices dur<strong>in</strong>g cook<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
In some <strong>in</strong>stitutions care is taken of the special food requirements of<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates of Islamic faith, whereas <strong>in</strong> others they are left to their own devices if<br />
they c<strong>an</strong>not eat the food prepared <strong>for</strong> the rest.<br />
There are prison c<strong>an</strong>teens <strong>in</strong> three <strong>in</strong>stitutions (KPZ Šabac, KPZ<br />
Pad<strong>in</strong>ska Skela KPZ <strong>an</strong>d VPD Kruševac). In others, <strong>in</strong>mates make up their<br />
orders <strong>an</strong>d the goods are bought once or twice a week <strong>in</strong> the local shops.<br />
c)The medical care of prisoners<br />
The org<strong>an</strong>ization of the health care services <strong>in</strong> prisons is a very<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d delicate segment of prison life. In our system of the en<strong>for</strong>cement<br />
of crim<strong>in</strong>al s<strong>an</strong>ctions the exist<strong>in</strong>g health care model is its weakest po<strong>in</strong>t, be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
both <strong>in</strong>adequate <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>compatible with m<strong>in</strong>imum Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
We shall there<strong>for</strong>e first discuss the necessary parameters <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the org<strong>an</strong>izational arr<strong>an</strong>gements the fulfilment of which constitutes the bare<br />
essentials <strong>for</strong> the function<strong>in</strong>g of a health care service.<br />
In all the <strong>in</strong>stitutions we visited there is a m<strong>in</strong>imum of medical care<br />
mostly provided by part-time doctors, KPZ Pad<strong>in</strong>ska Skela <strong>an</strong>d VDP Kruševac<br />
alone hav<strong>in</strong>g full-time medical practitioners. Hav<strong>in</strong>g had no tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> specific<br />
features of prison pathology, the part-time doctors provide services accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to their <strong>in</strong>dividual ability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> their work.<br />
Four of the n<strong>in</strong>e district prisons <strong>an</strong>d three of the four penalcorrectional<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions visited had a paramedic (44 per cent <strong>an</strong>d 75 per cent<br />
respectively); <strong>in</strong> KPZ Sombor this vac<strong>an</strong>cy is temporary <strong>an</strong>d we hope that very<br />
soon there will be a full complement of paramedics as far as the penalcorrectional<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions are concerned. In this connection, we noted that the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions employ<strong>in</strong>g paramedics are better rated <strong>in</strong> other respects too<br />
because their paramedics run the dispensaries, dispense drugs, <strong>an</strong>d open<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates’ medical record cards. The paramedics are also <strong>in</strong> charge of most drug<br />
therapy adm<strong>in</strong>istration with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stitution; such arr<strong>an</strong>gements not only<br />
make <strong>for</strong> considerable sav<strong>in</strong>gs but also simplify org<strong>an</strong>ization because fewer<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates have to be taken to the local health or hospital centre.<br />
Some <strong>in</strong>stitutions (e.g. OZ Kruševac, OZ Subotica, KPZ Ćuprija <strong>an</strong>d<br />
KPZ Pad<strong>in</strong>ska Skela) employ paramedics also to keep accurate records of the<br />
health services rendered; this practice is praiseworthy <strong>an</strong>d should further be<br />
improved by keep<strong>in</strong>g track of <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>juries <strong>an</strong>d marks of violence.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately none of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited keeps such records although<br />
they would be <strong>in</strong>valuable <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>state</strong> of affairs <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>an</strong>d,<br />
especially, <strong>in</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g abuse <strong>an</strong>d torture by both <strong>in</strong>mates <strong>an</strong>d prison guards.<br />
This is why this matter requires immediate attention. Also, such records<br />
should be regularly presented, say once a month, at team meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d/or<br />
submitted to the prison adm<strong>in</strong>istration.<br />
An out-patient cl<strong>in</strong>ic as a separate room exists <strong>in</strong> three out of n<strong>in</strong>e<br />
district prisons <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> all the penal-correctional <strong>in</strong>stitutions, mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> better<br />
medical services <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> safer keep<strong>in</strong>g of drugs <strong>in</strong> more adequate conditions.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the out-patient cl<strong>in</strong>ics <strong>in</strong> all these <strong>in</strong>stitutions are equipped with the bare<br />
necessities, even modest <strong>in</strong>vestments could go a long way towards improv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the quality of their services.<br />
Regrettably, privacy of exam<strong>in</strong>ation out of the hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sight of<br />
other <strong>in</strong>mates <strong>an</strong>d prison staff is not ensured even <strong>in</strong> out-patient cl<strong>in</strong>ics<br />
operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> separate rooms: the presence of guards dur<strong>in</strong>g exam<strong>in</strong>ations was<br />
noticed <strong>in</strong> most <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited <strong>an</strong>d we believe that this is so <strong>in</strong> those which<br />
gave us assur<strong>an</strong>ces to the contrary. Confidentiality of medical exam<strong>in</strong>ation is<br />
vital <strong>for</strong> the development of <strong>in</strong>mates’ trust <strong>in</strong> the medical staff; if <strong>in</strong>mates trust<br />
their doctors they will be more likely to compla<strong>in</strong> of <strong>an</strong>y violent behaviour <strong>an</strong>d<br />
related <strong>in</strong>juries, <strong>in</strong> which case the doctor will have to note the <strong>in</strong>juries <strong>an</strong>d<br />
174<br />
175
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
report them <strong>in</strong> general terms to the competent authorities. In<strong>for</strong>mation on<br />
specific cases should only be disclosed with the consent of the <strong>in</strong>mate<br />
concerned. The same policy should be pursued after <strong>an</strong>y violent <strong>in</strong>cident<br />
<strong>in</strong>side the prison <strong>an</strong>d regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y case of use of <strong>for</strong>ce. One must bear <strong>in</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>d that the prison doctor is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>mate’s personal doctor <strong>an</strong>d is bound by the<br />
rules of confidentiality.<br />
Medical record cards are opened <strong>in</strong> 75 per cent of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
surveyed, but they do not necessarily accomp<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>mates upon their tr<strong>an</strong>sfer<br />
to ensure cont<strong>in</strong>uation of treatment.<br />
The first medical exam<strong>in</strong>ation is very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> the future health<br />
care of <strong>in</strong>mates; but although they are <strong>for</strong>mally exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> the first time<br />
upon admission to most <strong>in</strong>stitutions, these exam<strong>in</strong>ations are extremely<br />
perfunctory. Anamnestic history alone is almost the rule although a detailed<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ation is also necessary. Any marks of violence must be carefully<br />
recorded <strong>an</strong>d accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by the <strong>in</strong>mate’s relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>state</strong>ments <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
doctor’s conclusions; also, the <strong>in</strong>mate must have access to this <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation but<br />
this is not always the case. The fact that <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about communicable<br />
diseases (AIDS/HIV+, hepatitis, B/C, TBC, etc.) or addiction to psychoactive<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d other psychiatric problems is obta<strong>in</strong>ed from patients <strong>an</strong>d not<br />
on the basis of thorough laboratory tests or other me<strong>an</strong>s is a serious<br />
shortcom<strong>in</strong>g. In this respect, the strategy should be modified on the level of all<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
Special mention must be made to the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number among<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates of addicts to psychoactive subst<strong>an</strong>ces; there are no material conditions<br />
whatever <strong>for</strong> their treatment <strong>an</strong>d no consolidated treatment programmes or,<br />
rather, no programmes at all.<br />
The law is not respected <strong>in</strong> a high percentage of cases regard<strong>in</strong>g daily<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>in</strong>mates <strong>in</strong> solitary conf<strong>in</strong>ement, <strong>an</strong>d we had reason to suspect<br />
that the assur<strong>an</strong>ces we were given to the contrary were not completely true.<br />
This problem c<strong>an</strong> easily be solved if the full-time paramedics are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong><br />
this activity.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce most <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited have no <strong>in</strong>firmary, it is necessary to set<br />
aside a room <strong>an</strong>d equip it to facilitate the separation of healthy <strong>an</strong>d sick<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates, especially dur<strong>in</strong>g respiratory <strong>in</strong>fections <strong>an</strong>d other highly<br />
communicable diseases.<br />
The requirement that health care should <strong>in</strong>clude prevention is fully<br />
neglected <strong>in</strong> our penal <strong>in</strong>stitutions. None of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited had staff<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ed to recognize suicidal behaviour <strong>an</strong>d only a few educated their staff <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates about communicable <strong>an</strong>d addictive diseases.<br />
Institution staff were not tra<strong>in</strong>ed either to recognize HIV <strong>an</strong>d hepatitis<br />
C sufferers, <strong>an</strong>d especially not to discrim<strong>in</strong>ate aga<strong>in</strong>st them. The duties of the<br />
health workers <strong>in</strong>clude food <strong>an</strong>d hygiene control <strong>an</strong>d this is <strong>for</strong>mally done <strong>in</strong><br />
all the <strong>in</strong>stitutions, the staff concerned hav<strong>in</strong>g to sign the book of records; but<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
we noticed no quality control regard<strong>in</strong>g nutrition <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>mates’ conditions of<br />
life <strong>an</strong>d work <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>stitution.<br />
Another import<strong>an</strong>t matter concerns the org<strong>an</strong>ization of psychiatric<br />
care, which is highly necessary <strong>in</strong> these <strong>in</strong>stitutions. The arr<strong>an</strong>gements vary<br />
from one <strong>in</strong>stitution to <strong>an</strong>other, mostly depend<strong>in</strong>g on the attitude of the doctor<br />
concerned. With regard to psychiatric care it will be necessary to work out a<br />
strategy at the <strong>in</strong>stitutional level as a whole <strong>an</strong>d to provide guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong><br />
adv<strong>an</strong>ced work, as well as to <strong>in</strong>clude psychotherapeutic activities <strong>an</strong>d work<br />
therapy, someth<strong>in</strong>g no member on the staff of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited was<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ed to do.<br />
Security<br />
The district prisons, which accommodate mostly untried prisoners but<br />
also some prisoners serv<strong>in</strong>g their custodial sentences, have <strong>security</strong><br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gements which give them the appear<strong>an</strong>ce of closed establishments,<br />
whereas the open-type penal-correctional <strong>in</strong>stitutions have no barriers to<br />
prevent escape. All the same, except <strong>for</strong> KPZ Pad<strong>in</strong>ska Skela, those classed as<br />
open establishments also have their closed units which are used to keep<br />
untried prisoners <strong>an</strong>d such sentenced prisoners as, <strong>in</strong> the op<strong>in</strong>ion of the<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration, require semi-open or closed-type treatment. The <strong>security</strong><br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gements regard<strong>in</strong>g these closed units are such as to give them the look of<br />
closed establishments.<br />
A great m<strong>an</strong>y district prisons as well as the closed units of KPZ<br />
Sombor <strong>an</strong>d KPZ Ćuprija are located <strong>in</strong> town centres. From the po<strong>in</strong>t of view<br />
of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>an</strong>d external <strong>security</strong>, such location of district prisons is a<br />
considerable drawback. As a case <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>in</strong> OZ Novi Pazar, OZ Kruševac,<br />
OZ Subotica <strong>an</strong>d OZ Užice the w<strong>in</strong>dows of neighbour<strong>in</strong>g build<strong>in</strong>gs have a<br />
clear view of the exercise yards. Prisoners from two of these (OZ Užice <strong>an</strong>d OZ<br />
Subotica) have made escapes th<strong>an</strong>ks to the proximity of the surround<strong>in</strong>g<br />
build<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
As noted be<strong>for</strong>e, some of the build<strong>in</strong>gs have been converted <strong>in</strong>to<br />
prisons follow<strong>in</strong>g alteration <strong>an</strong>d adaptation. The closed unit of KPZ Sombor<br />
was a convent, the OZ Novi Pazar build<strong>in</strong>g served as a courthouse, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
close units of OZ Kruševac <strong>an</strong>d KPZ Ćuprija were built to serve as horsestables.<br />
As a result of poor adaptation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>security</strong> arr<strong>an</strong>gements, a group of<br />
prisoners escaped from KPZ Sombor a few years ago through a hole <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prison build<strong>in</strong>g wall.<br />
In our first report we stressed that the overcrowd<strong>in</strong>g of prisons <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other establishments was a <strong>security</strong> risk. We noticed this problem <strong>in</strong> the<br />
establishments visited last year, especially <strong>in</strong> KPZ Ćuprija (closed unit), KPZ<br />
Čačak, <strong>an</strong>d OZ Prokuplje.<br />
176<br />
177
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Also, nearly all the <strong>in</strong>stitutions we visited had a shortage of <strong>security</strong><br />
staff, <strong>in</strong>adequate car pools, obsolete equipment <strong>an</strong>d arms <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>tiquated video<br />
surveill<strong>an</strong>ce equipment or none at all.<br />
In our op<strong>in</strong>ion, <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stitutions certa<strong>in</strong> arr<strong>an</strong>gements or<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative decisions either jeopardized <strong>security</strong> or were excessive. For<br />
<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, at OZ Subotica the problem of heat<strong>in</strong>g the pavilions was also a<br />
<strong>security</strong> risk. In KPZ Pad<strong>in</strong>ska Skela, the guard <strong>in</strong> the prison grounds outside<br />
the pavilions carried firearms, while the exercise yard <strong>in</strong> Negot<strong>in</strong> prison is<br />
fenced <strong>in</strong> with barbed wire <strong>in</strong> a m<strong>an</strong>ner likely to cause <strong>in</strong>juries to the untried<br />
prisoners or let them <strong>in</strong>flict self-<strong>in</strong>juries. The exercise yard <strong>in</strong> the KPZ Ćuprija<br />
closed unit is not only walled <strong>in</strong> with barbed wire runn<strong>in</strong>g along the top, but<br />
also has a wire structure serv<strong>in</strong>g as a roof over the entire area. In OZ Novi<br />
Pazar, the adm<strong>in</strong>istration entrusted a prisoner with the keys to the gate<br />
separat<strong>in</strong>g the prisoners’ quarters <strong>an</strong>d the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative area.<br />
In our op<strong>in</strong>ion a rigid attitude on the part of <strong>security</strong> staff towards<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sistence on a strict discipl<strong>in</strong>e even <strong>in</strong> cases where this is<br />
<strong>in</strong>appropriate <strong>an</strong>d unprovoked do not make <strong>for</strong> better <strong>security</strong>. Although such<br />
practices are more characteristic of closed establishments, we noticed them also<br />
<strong>in</strong> KPZ Ćuprija <strong>an</strong>d OZ P<strong>an</strong>čevo. We hold that such practices do not contribute<br />
to the establishment of necessary mutual trust, nor are they conducive to a<br />
good climate between guards <strong>an</strong>d prisoners.<br />
Legality of Prison Regime<br />
This dimension is fundamentally determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the new ZIKS, which<br />
entered <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce on 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006. It supersedes the ZIKS from 1997 <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
great m<strong>an</strong>y by-laws some of which date back to 1977 <strong>an</strong>d 1978 <strong>an</strong>d are<br />
naturally at great vari<strong>an</strong>ce with relev<strong>an</strong>t modern st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
The negative effects of the outdated provisions of the exist<strong>in</strong>g ZIKS<br />
<strong>an</strong>d by-laws are made worse by failure to respect them <strong>an</strong>d to apply them<br />
consistently <strong>in</strong> day-to-day practice.<br />
Although the law makes clear that untried <strong>an</strong>d sentenced prisoners<br />
must be made familiar with the house rules on their admission, this is done<br />
only very perfunctorily <strong>an</strong>d we often heard accounts of <strong>in</strong>mates say<strong>in</strong>g they<br />
learned the house rules from others. M<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>stitutions do not display the<br />
house rules at all or display only certa<strong>in</strong> provisions, mostly <strong>in</strong>mates’ duties; the<br />
orig<strong>in</strong>al is either kept by a tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g officer or the director, or is said to be<br />
‘kick<strong>in</strong>g around’. Copies of the ZIKS are about as much <strong>in</strong> evidence, <strong>an</strong>d we<br />
saw no copies <strong>an</strong>ywhere of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Prison Rules or CAT St<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
In the majority of <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited, neither external nor <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
classification had been carried out accord<strong>in</strong>g to law. It has become established<br />
practice to send to open establishments or district prisons prisoners who have<br />
less th<strong>an</strong> a year to serve irrespective of the length of their sentences. These are<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
mostly <strong>in</strong>mates whose good behaviour has earned them such treatment, but<br />
there are among them others who do not qualify. This practice started <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions about to be renovated, but also reflects ef<strong>for</strong>ts to deal with<br />
overcrowd<strong>in</strong>g where it has become a press<strong>in</strong>g issue. Whatever the reasons, the<br />
reassignments give rise to at least three k<strong>in</strong>ds of problems.<br />
First, <strong>in</strong>mates who are reassigned to <strong>an</strong>other prison or open-type<br />
establishment often have to start all over aga<strong>in</strong> regardless of the type of their<br />
previous placement, which <strong>in</strong> most cases was <strong>an</strong> open-type unit. Their new<br />
place of detention is usually a closed-type unit <strong>an</strong>d they resent the fact that<br />
their will have aga<strong>in</strong> to earn a more favourable treatment.<br />
Second, newly arrived prisoners (mostly from KPZ Sremska Mitrovica<br />
<strong>an</strong>d KPZ Niš) tend to impose themselves <strong>an</strong>d show the others that they are the<br />
ones call<strong>in</strong>g the shots, thus provok<strong>in</strong>g the ‘hosts’ <strong>an</strong>d possibly caus<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d clashes.<br />
Third, <strong>security</strong> staff as well as other services <strong>in</strong> open establishments<br />
<strong>an</strong>d district prisons are not tra<strong>in</strong>ed enough to deal with prisoners serv<strong>in</strong>g long<br />
sentences <strong>for</strong> serious crim<strong>in</strong>al offences. Occasionally these people also have<br />
difficulty fitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a much more liberal environment th<strong>an</strong> the one from<br />
which they come.<br />
The problem of <strong>in</strong>adequate classification is all the more signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d<br />
serious <strong>in</strong> view of the fact that <strong>in</strong> more th<strong>an</strong> half the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited <strong>in</strong>mates<br />
serv<strong>in</strong>g sentences <strong>for</strong> misdeme<strong>an</strong>our are not properly separated from other<br />
prisoners or not at all.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate legal status of persons serv<strong>in</strong>g sentences while<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g subject to other crim<strong>in</strong>al proceed<strong>in</strong>gs gives rise to considerable practical<br />
difficulties <strong>an</strong>d great resentment among <strong>in</strong>mates. Such persons are mostly kept<br />
<strong>in</strong> enh<strong>an</strong>ced surveill<strong>an</strong>ce units (where they exist) or <strong>in</strong> closed units. Although<br />
they are <strong>for</strong>mally not under detention because there is no reason <strong>for</strong> that, the<br />
regime to which they are subject is very similar to detention, which is<br />
<strong>in</strong>comparably harder th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>y other category of prison treatment.<br />
We would also like to draw special attention to the problems prisoners<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions have with courts of law regard<strong>in</strong>g conditional release.<br />
Members of staff say it often happens that their recommendations <strong>for</strong><br />
conditional release are turned down by the courts, such decision discourag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
both <strong>in</strong>mates <strong>an</strong>d staff.<br />
Consequently, <strong>in</strong> respect to prisoners whose conditional release<br />
applications have been turned down by the courts, most directors are<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly reluct<strong>an</strong>t to approve early release <strong>an</strong>d some not at all.<br />
As a result, on the one h<strong>an</strong>d, the loss of confidence on the part of<br />
prisoners <strong>in</strong> staff, directors <strong>an</strong>d courts weakens their motivation to be well<br />
behaved while serv<strong>in</strong>g their sentences; on the other, they are effectively<br />
deprived of their lawful right to sentence remission through <strong>in</strong>stitutes such as<br />
conditional <strong>an</strong>d early release.<br />
178<br />
179
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Lastly, we c<strong>an</strong> reiterate our conclusion from our previous report that<br />
the theory <strong>an</strong>d practice of deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>mates’ compla<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d applications<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s deplorable <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>compatible with adopted st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
Although our data show only a small number of <strong>in</strong>mates’ compla<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
<strong>an</strong>d applications regard<strong>in</strong>g discipl<strong>in</strong>ary punishment, benefits <strong>an</strong>d violations of<br />
rights, our <strong>in</strong>ference is that <strong>in</strong>mates see no po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> bother<strong>in</strong>g to write<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d applications because they believe that the system does not<br />
work <strong>an</strong>d all is <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong>.<br />
Social Rehabilitation<br />
We wish to recall that the ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>carceration as a punitive<br />
measure is to <strong>in</strong>dispose the prisoner towards committ<strong>in</strong>g crim<strong>in</strong>al offences <strong>in</strong><br />
future. Although this me<strong>an</strong>s that the course <strong>an</strong>d type of treatment dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>carceration ought to fit the personality of the prisoner <strong>an</strong>d be modified<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g as he is successful or unsuccessful on his road to resocialization, the<br />
practice of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited is quite the contrary. Lack of space <strong>an</strong>d<br />
shortage of competent staff <strong>an</strong>d lack of material resources <strong>in</strong> these <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicate that they are either not engaged <strong>in</strong> resocialization or only partially.<br />
In the majority of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions, architecture, accommodation<br />
capacity, considerations whether <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>mate arrived under escort or on his own,<br />
etc, carry far more weight <strong>in</strong> assign<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>mate to a unit <strong>an</strong>d prescrib<strong>in</strong>g<br />
treatment (classification, reclassification) th<strong>an</strong> the <strong>in</strong>mate’s personality,<br />
behaviour <strong>an</strong>d conduct.<br />
Inmates convicted of misdeme<strong>an</strong>our <strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>al offences are often<br />
not physically separated, <strong>an</strong>d those serv<strong>in</strong>g long sentences (recidivists <strong>an</strong>d<br />
committers of serious crimes) are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>for</strong> various reasons, assigned to<br />
open <strong>an</strong>d semi-open establishments where regimes are not suited to deal<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with such prisoners.<br />
Most <strong>in</strong>stitutions face serious problems of hav<strong>in</strong>g to deal with more<br />
<strong>an</strong>d more <strong>in</strong>mates addicted to psychoactive subst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> the absence of<br />
adequately tra<strong>in</strong>ed staff.<br />
District prisons have either <strong>in</strong>complete reception teams or none at all.<br />
The classification <strong>an</strong>d reclassification of <strong>in</strong>mates is often the responsibility of<br />
the director or one or rarely two tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g officers who have to deal with the<br />
complete reception procedure, re-education, preparation prior to release, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
aftercare. These officers are often <strong>in</strong> charge of the personal records, which<br />
consumes more of their energy <strong>an</strong>d time at the expense of improved<br />
re<strong>for</strong>mative tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g work. As a result, <strong>in</strong>mates see <strong>an</strong>d talk with their tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
officers only very rarely, their contacts <strong>in</strong> this k<strong>in</strong>d of prison be<strong>in</strong>g reduced to<br />
submitt<strong>in</strong>g applications <strong>for</strong> various benefits. In the absence of proper<br />
resocialization work, <strong>in</strong>mates have far more frequent contacts with, <strong>an</strong>d deal<br />
with their problems through, <strong>security</strong> staff. This practice gives rise to<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
corruption, privileged <strong>in</strong>mates, <strong>an</strong>d classification <strong>an</strong>d reclassification based on<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal criteria.<br />
The situation <strong>in</strong> the penal-correctional <strong>in</strong>stitutions regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
number <strong>an</strong>d competence of staff <strong>in</strong> charge of re-education is somewhat better.<br />
However, the ma<strong>in</strong> problem <strong>in</strong> these <strong>in</strong>stitutions is the lack of adequate<br />
programmes <strong>an</strong>d activities coupled with <strong>in</strong>ertia <strong>an</strong>d listlessness on the part of<br />
the staff.<br />
The activities offered the <strong>in</strong>mates should be varied <strong>an</strong>d stimulat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
(education, library, sport, vocational work, etc.). Leisure time which is not<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized properly <strong>an</strong>d constructively leaves too much room <strong>for</strong> idleness <strong>an</strong>d<br />
fall<strong>in</strong>g under the negative <strong>in</strong>fluence of certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>mates.<br />
We wish to po<strong>in</strong>t out the lack of physical recreation of <strong>an</strong>y k<strong>in</strong>d.<br />
Relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards specify that <strong>in</strong>mates must without exception<br />
be allowed to spend at least one hour a day <strong>in</strong> the open, as well as be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
entitled to adequate physical activity <strong>an</strong>d recreation.<br />
In most <strong>in</strong>stitutions one notices that <strong>in</strong>mates <strong>in</strong> closed units <strong>an</strong>d those<br />
subject to open treatment (work on farms) have unequal opportunity <strong>for</strong><br />
resocialization <strong>in</strong> nearly all its segments. In other words, <strong>in</strong>mates <strong>in</strong> closed<br />
units are denied almost all their rights <strong>in</strong> this respect because there is hardly<br />
<strong>an</strong>y activity <strong>for</strong> them outside their rooms.<br />
None of the <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited had a school although the law<br />
provides that <strong>in</strong>mates are entitled to elementary <strong>an</strong>d secondary education. The<br />
absence of schools is attributed to lack of space <strong>an</strong>d money <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terest on the<br />
part of <strong>in</strong>mates. However, there is a cry<strong>in</strong>g need <strong>for</strong> at least literacy classes,<br />
given that a large part of the prison population has not f<strong>in</strong>ished even primary<br />
school.<br />
It should be noted that school<strong>in</strong>g is compulsory at VPD Kruševac<br />
ow<strong>in</strong>g to the age of its population.<br />
Import<strong>an</strong>t new developments <strong>in</strong> the school<strong>in</strong>g of juveniles concern<br />
improved premises <strong>an</strong>d content, that is, activities aimed at encourag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
juveniles to attend school <strong>in</strong> greater numbers (e.g., <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d shift<br />
towards creative teach<strong>in</strong>g methods, benefits l<strong>in</strong>ked to top marks, etc.). The<br />
facility currently provides elementary education but has pl<strong>an</strong>s <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>-house<br />
secondary school<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> future.<br />
The number of juveniles with special needs is still large, though there<br />
are still no school programmes tailored to these needs. Admittedly, there is a<br />
will to use alternative solutions (<strong>in</strong> the absence of a special <strong>in</strong>stitution provided<br />
by law). Some classes provide separate <strong>in</strong>struction <strong>for</strong> such juveniles with<br />
somewhat modified curricula, attitudes <strong>an</strong>d grad<strong>in</strong>g. The <strong>in</strong>stitution is<br />
pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to employ a specialist <strong>in</strong> oligophrenics to work with these children.<br />
In the prisons <strong>an</strong>d penal-correctional <strong>in</strong>stitutions nearly all reeducation<br />
work takes the <strong>for</strong>m of <strong>in</strong>dividual work, the staff identify<strong>in</strong>g<br />
obstacles to group work <strong>an</strong>d other methods <strong>in</strong> a number of objective<br />
180<br />
181
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
difficulties (space, <strong>in</strong>mate structure, <strong>in</strong>adequate staff tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g). We were<br />
however encouraged to see that <strong>in</strong> most <strong>in</strong>stitutions staff were <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong><br />
new methods of work <strong>an</strong>d education.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce our previous visit VPD Kruševac has opened, at the end of 2003,<br />
a Mediation Centre. Although at present conflict mediation is a pilot project,<br />
we are confident that the very <strong>in</strong>itiative is a very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d commendable<br />
first step <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>novat<strong>in</strong>g re-education work methods.<br />
In most <strong>in</strong>stitutions libraries or rather their stocks are old <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>appropriate to contemporary <strong>in</strong>terests, consist<strong>in</strong>g mostly of classics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
works written dur<strong>in</strong>g the socialist period. A number of <strong>in</strong>stitutions have no<br />
library.<br />
Work arr<strong>an</strong>gements <strong>an</strong>d vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>mates as import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
components of resocialization are unsatisfactory <strong>in</strong> most <strong>in</strong>stitutions. Even<br />
where possible, no account is taken of the personal wishes <strong>an</strong>d aff<strong>in</strong>ities of<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates, who are assigned such work as the <strong>in</strong>stitution needs done. A very few<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions have m<strong>an</strong>ufactur<strong>in</strong>g workshops <strong>an</strong>d programmes.<br />
Other th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce work, most <strong>in</strong>mates are employed <strong>in</strong><br />
farm<strong>in</strong>g. The farms, do<strong>in</strong>g only seasonal agricultural work, are often without<br />
modern mech<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d equipment. They do not offer proper opportunity<br />
<strong>for</strong> vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d no one likes work<strong>in</strong>g there. Where possible,<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates are employed outside the <strong>in</strong>stitution though this work is entirely<br />
physical <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>ds no skill.<br />
Our general impression is that rather th<strong>an</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g re-educated through<br />
work, <strong>in</strong>mates are used as cheap labour <strong>in</strong> poor work<strong>in</strong>g conditions without<br />
<strong>in</strong>dustrial safety measures to speak of. The exception is the juvenile correction<br />
facility which offers its <strong>in</strong>mates a wider r<strong>an</strong>ge of occupations, though not<br />
attractive enough <strong>for</strong> its female population.<br />
Most <strong>in</strong>stitutions have no space <strong>for</strong> religious service. Although most<br />
population of these <strong>in</strong>stitutions c<strong>an</strong> exercise this right dur<strong>in</strong>g frequent out<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
this is not possible <strong>for</strong> untried prisoners <strong>an</strong>d those kept <strong>in</strong> closed units.<br />
Contacts With the Outside World<br />
The <strong>in</strong>mates communicate with the outside world mostly by telephone<br />
<strong>an</strong>d less often by letter. The number of <strong>in</strong>stitutions hav<strong>in</strong>g no pay telephones is<br />
negligible but they all have pl<strong>an</strong>s to <strong>in</strong>stall them soon.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce treatment <strong>in</strong> closed units implies limited exercise of this right,<br />
telephone calls are made under the supervision of <strong>an</strong> officer. The length of calls<br />
varies from one <strong>in</strong>stitution to <strong>an</strong>other, depend<strong>in</strong>g on the number of telephones<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>mates.<br />
The right to correspond is unrestricted though <strong>in</strong> most <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
letters of closed unit <strong>in</strong>mates are checked by retra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g officers.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The procedure regard<strong>in</strong>g visits, out<strong>in</strong>gs, contracts with attorneys <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other contacts with the outside world is accord<strong>in</strong>g to the law, i.e., determ<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
by the treatment <strong>an</strong>d regime <strong>in</strong> question. Inmates <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>ed to us that visits were shorter th<strong>an</strong> they should be, to which<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agement replied that visits were m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d space limited.<br />
The rooms set aside <strong>for</strong> visits by relatives <strong>an</strong>d attorneys were<br />
<strong>in</strong>adequate regard<strong>in</strong>g space, furniture <strong>an</strong>d, often, heat<strong>in</strong>g. A room often serves<br />
several purposes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>mates not <strong>in</strong>frequently receive visitors <strong>in</strong> corridors or<br />
<strong>in</strong> the open.<br />
Of the district prisons visited, that <strong>in</strong> Leskovac alone had separate<br />
rooms <strong>for</strong> visits by spouses <strong>an</strong>d children, <strong>an</strong>d the penal-correctional<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions were equally ill-equipped <strong>in</strong> this regard.<br />
Television <strong>an</strong>d radio are the most numerous me<strong>an</strong>s by which<br />
sentenced prisoners, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stitutions untried prisoners too, receive<br />
their general <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. Every <strong>in</strong>stitution has at least one TV set, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>mates<br />
are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly allowed to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their own sets.<br />
Inmates are entitled to subscribe to daily newspapers <strong>an</strong>d periodicals<br />
not supplied by the <strong>in</strong>stitution.<br />
The cooperation with the local community leaves much to be desired.<br />
Contacts with local cultural establishments, social work centres <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions are reduced to occasional purely personal contacts, so<br />
there is no established <strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>uous cooperation with them.<br />
Though cooperation with the local community should exist also <strong>for</strong><br />
the purpose of post-penal treatment, this un<strong>for</strong>tunately is still a dead letter as<br />
far as our system is concerned.<br />
Preparations prior to release are reduced to a f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>terview with the<br />
<strong>in</strong>mate <strong>an</strong>d sometimes with his family, <strong>an</strong>d to notify<strong>in</strong>g the police <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>mate’s place of residence.<br />
Institutional Personnel<br />
F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g staff, let alone qualified ones, to work <strong>in</strong> prisons is one of the<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrations’ ma<strong>in</strong> problems.<br />
District prisons <strong>for</strong> the most part have no org<strong>an</strong>ized re-education,<br />
tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d employment services because this is not envisaged <strong>in</strong> the job<br />
systematization act. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stitutions this work is done<br />
by staff not qualified accord<strong>in</strong>g to the law or job systematization act, me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
that these highly sensitive <strong>an</strong>d responsible duties are entrusted to people not<br />
fully qualified <strong>for</strong> the job.<br />
On the whole, the re-education, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d employment services are<br />
better org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>an</strong>d staffed <strong>in</strong> the penal-correctional <strong>in</strong>stitutions visited, but<br />
these too are understaffed <strong>an</strong>d lack mostly psychologists.<br />
182<br />
183
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Members of these services often see themselves as auxiliary staff<br />
reduced to deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>mates’ applications, rather th<strong>an</strong> as members of<br />
services designed to play a lead<strong>in</strong>g role <strong>in</strong> the treatment of <strong>in</strong>mates from the<br />
time they enter the <strong>in</strong>stitution until the moment they leave it.<br />
The <strong>state</strong> of affairs is even worse regard<strong>in</strong>g staff of the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
employment services, which do not exist <strong>in</strong> all <strong>in</strong>stitutions. They are expected<br />
to oversee the work of <strong>in</strong>mates with a view to ensur<strong>in</strong>g profit <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution, rather th<strong>an</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> them <strong>an</strong>d thus fit them <strong>for</strong> life <strong>in</strong> freedom.<br />
Our general impression was that the resocialization <strong>an</strong>d treatment of<br />
<strong>in</strong>mates is pushed to the background, which accounts <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creases the<br />
lack of motivation of these people <strong>in</strong> their everyday work.<br />
Also, very few members of the staff are <strong>in</strong> a position to keep abreast of<br />
modern trends or are <strong>in</strong>terested at all <strong>in</strong> further tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d the application of<br />
new knowledge <strong>in</strong> penology. The ma<strong>in</strong> responsibility <strong>for</strong> this <strong>state</strong> of affairs is<br />
borne by the competent members of the adm<strong>in</strong>istration: the conduct of<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized education <strong>an</strong>d vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of staff ought to be their<br />
responsibility <strong>an</strong>d duty, rather th<strong>an</strong> depend<strong>in</strong>g on the enthusiasm <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ambition of <strong>in</strong>dividual staff members.<br />
There is still no org<strong>an</strong>ized education <strong>an</strong>d vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of staff.<br />
Sem<strong>in</strong>ars are held occasionally to deal with specific topics, which is<br />
commendable, but is far from enough.<br />
Lack of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>adequate tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of members of the<br />
<strong>security</strong> services is pronounced <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>an</strong>d is especially disturb<strong>in</strong>g given<br />
the service’s central role.<br />
There was hardly <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>in</strong> which we noticed that <strong>security</strong> staff<br />
keep abreast of, or are versed <strong>in</strong>, modern penological developments, methods<br />
of work <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards of conduct <strong>an</strong>d treatment of <strong>in</strong>mates, though this is<br />
what membership of the Council of Europe implies. Although most <strong>security</strong><br />
staff underwent basic tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g org<strong>an</strong>ized by the OSCE a couple of years ago,<br />
their ignor<strong>an</strong>ce of or disrespect <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>mates’ fundamental rights is still<br />
conspicuous. Save <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals, members of the <strong>security</strong> service do not<br />
show <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> personal improvement, nor do their superiors perceive<br />
<strong>an</strong>y such need. However, most consider skills acquired dur<strong>in</strong>g weapon drill<br />
<strong>an</strong>d martial arts necessary <strong>in</strong> their everyday work.<br />
We hope that the recent establishment of the Staff Education Centre <strong>in</strong><br />
Niš, operat<strong>in</strong>g as part of the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>for</strong> the En<strong>for</strong>cement of Crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
S<strong>an</strong>ctions, will help improve the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of staff <strong>in</strong> every skill necessary <strong>for</strong> the<br />
proper <strong>an</strong>d successful operation of the prison services.<br />
In the end, we would like to po<strong>in</strong>t out that proper <strong>an</strong>d conscientious<br />
work of prison services depends largely on adequate fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
support. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, <strong>for</strong> quite some time staff have not been paid <strong>in</strong><br />
proportion to the high dem<strong>an</strong>ds of their work, nor have there been <strong>an</strong>y<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>in</strong>centives <strong>for</strong> employees st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g out by virtue of their enterprise, dedication<br />
<strong>an</strong>d skills.<br />
Recommendations<br />
• Cont<strong>in</strong>ue to realize the strategies <strong>for</strong> re<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g the prison system<br />
with the participation of experts from the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Justice, <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights protection, <strong>an</strong>d other relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
professional org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals;<br />
• Tra<strong>in</strong> prison staff with a view to better <strong>an</strong>d more effective<br />
implementation of the new ZIKS <strong>an</strong>d of the rules regulat<strong>in</strong>g work <strong>an</strong>d life <strong>in</strong><br />
these <strong>in</strong>stitutions;<br />
• Pl<strong>an</strong> improvement of material conditions <strong>in</strong> prisons <strong>an</strong>d set aside<br />
funds <strong>for</strong> this purpose.<br />
184<br />
185
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
III<br />
ECONOMIC AND<br />
SOCIAL TRANSITION<br />
186<br />
187
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
CONTRADICTORY ECONOMIC TRENDS:<br />
THE IMPOSED REFORMS AND<br />
INFLATIONARY SPIRAL<br />
Serbia entered the last year, 2005, with <strong>an</strong> extremely signific<strong>an</strong>t re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
move on <strong>an</strong> economic pl<strong>an</strong>e – it <strong>in</strong>troduced the value-added tax (VAT). This<br />
move, which was postponed several times, revealed the weaknesses of the<br />
unf<strong>in</strong>ished process of restructur<strong>in</strong>g the economic system <strong>an</strong>d started the new<br />
cycle of <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong>flation. Namely, the <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>flationary shock, which is<br />
always caused by the <strong>in</strong>troduction of VAT <strong>in</strong>to the countries <strong>in</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition,<br />
resulted <strong>in</strong> the strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>flationary expectations throughout the year.<br />
This was all the more so, because the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong> budget became the ma<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>strument of "alleviat<strong>in</strong>g" tr<strong>an</strong>sitional problems, so that there was almost no<br />
reaction to <strong>in</strong>flation by fiscal policy measures, while monetary restrictions<br />
proved to be almost counterproductive <strong>in</strong> this case.<br />
In fact, the persistent <strong>in</strong>flation rate which, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official<br />
estimates, reached about 16.5 per cent at the end of 2005 1 (although s<strong>in</strong>gle-digit<br />
<strong>in</strong>flation was pl<strong>an</strong>ned), reflects the unf<strong>in</strong>ished process of tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>an</strong>d<br />
exposes certa<strong>in</strong> "hypocrisy" on the part of the lead<strong>in</strong>g people <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government, emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that they are able to reconcile the old concepts of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> of social justice <strong>an</strong>d susta<strong>in</strong>able development with the need <strong>for</strong><br />
macroeconomic equilibrium dur<strong>in</strong>g the tr<strong>an</strong>sition process. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>flation is<br />
actually the poorly disguised <strong>for</strong>m of the broadest taxation of the population<br />
(as was also proved <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> case by the well-known <strong>an</strong>alyst Vladimir<br />
Gligorov), its high rate problematized the allegedly crucial success of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> economic policy makers <strong>in</strong> 2005 – a budget surplus. At the same time,<br />
it underm<strong>in</strong>ed all other, seem<strong>in</strong>gly good economic results of Koštunica’s<br />
Government.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>flationary shocks came at a very <strong>in</strong>convenient time <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government, <strong>in</strong> the year <strong>in</strong> which it had to f<strong>in</strong>ilize its arr<strong>an</strong>gement<br />
worth nearly one billion dollars with the International Monetary Fund, which<br />
started three years ago. The positive assessment of this arr<strong>an</strong>gement me<strong>an</strong>s not<br />
1 Most other <strong>an</strong>alytical <strong>in</strong>stitutions estimate the <strong>in</strong>flation rate <strong>in</strong> 2005 at about<br />
17.5 per cent or about 18 per cent.<br />
188<br />
189
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
only the write-off of nearly 700 million dollars from the write-off package,<br />
which was already agreed with the Paris Club creditors, but also the positive<br />
assessment of the Feasibility Study <strong>for</strong> Serbia’s accession to the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Union, thus open<strong>in</strong>g the negotiations on stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association with the<br />
EU. S<strong>in</strong>ce the orig<strong>in</strong> of every <strong>in</strong>flation should be sought, <strong>in</strong> essence, <strong>in</strong> public<br />
consumption, the year 2005 passed <strong>in</strong> a tug-of-war between the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government <strong>an</strong>d the IMF relat<strong>in</strong>g to the cont<strong>in</strong>uation of those re<strong>for</strong>ms which<br />
should consolidate, that is, cut public consumption (through more radical<br />
pension, army <strong>an</strong>d health re<strong>for</strong>ms, <strong>in</strong> particular) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiate the restructur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of the real public sector (this is why there was so much m<strong>an</strong>oeuvr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the privatization of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Oil Industry -<br />
NIS).<br />
Squeezed by political pressure <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ertial <strong>in</strong>flation <strong>for</strong> all these<br />
reasons, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government submitted to the IMF’s requirements <strong>an</strong>d,<br />
almost under compulsion, cont<strong>in</strong>ued the re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>in</strong> 2005, which enabled it to<br />
make the first step towards Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration – the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
negotiations on stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association with the EU (early <strong>in</strong> October).<br />
Although it was made possible <strong>in</strong> such a way, the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of these<br />
negotiations carries great political weight <strong>an</strong>d represents the signific<strong>an</strong>t<br />
obligation <strong>for</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government, s<strong>in</strong>ce the suspension of the<br />
negotiations (due to a st<strong>an</strong>dstill <strong>in</strong> cooperation with the Hague War Crimes<br />
Tribunal, <strong>for</strong> example) would face the country with the new political<br />
crossroads <strong>an</strong>d longer-term risks (this is still threaten<strong>in</strong>g Serbia).<br />
If we return to the purely economic results <strong>in</strong> 2005, it must be noted<br />
that this essential contradiction between a high current <strong>in</strong>flation rate, as the<br />
synthetic <strong>in</strong>dicator of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government’s (un)successful economic<br />
policy, on one side, <strong>an</strong>d all other, mostly good economic <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>for</strong> 2005, on<br />
the other, leaves the debate about the ability of Koštunica’s coalition<br />
government to complete the first phase of tr<strong>an</strong>sition - whether voluntarily or<br />
under compulsion – open.<br />
Namely, the officially estimated rate of growth of GDP of 6.5 per cent<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2005 2 is beyond all expectations <strong>an</strong>d surprised all critics, who held that the<br />
exhaustion of <strong>in</strong>dustrial production <strong>an</strong>d a fall <strong>in</strong> agricultural output would<br />
affect the pl<strong>an</strong>ned growth rate of 4.5 per cent. Namely, dur<strong>in</strong>g 11 months <strong>in</strong><br />
2005, <strong>in</strong>dustrial output rose by only 0.6 per cent (the f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>crease rate will<br />
reach "break-even po<strong>in</strong>t" th<strong>an</strong>ks to power generation <strong>in</strong> December), while<br />
agricultural output fell by 5.3 per cent.<br />
2 This official estimate of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Bureau of Statistics of Serbia is also<br />
disputed, s<strong>in</strong>ce it is estimated that <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> GDP will be somewhat lower. See the<br />
monthly Makroekonomske <strong>an</strong>alize i trendovi published by the Economics Institute <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Consequently, the greatest contribution to the growth of GDP was<br />
made by the f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial sector (the exp<strong>an</strong>sion of credit by 14.6 per cent) <strong>an</strong>d retail<br />
trade (the <strong>in</strong>crease of 22.5 per cent). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister Mladj<strong>an</strong><br />
D<strong>in</strong>kić, the high growth of GDP brought about <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> per capita GDP<br />
to 3,183 dollars. An <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> GDP reduced the share of public expenditures<br />
<strong>in</strong> it from 44 per cent <strong>in</strong> 2004 to 40.8 per cent <strong>in</strong> 2005, as well as the share of<br />
public debt from about 72 per cent <strong>in</strong> 2003 to 48.6 per cent <strong>in</strong> 2005.<br />
To this list of favourable results M<strong>in</strong>ister D<strong>in</strong>kić adds the already<br />
mentioned budget surplus – which was recorded <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> the first time<br />
after m<strong>an</strong>y decades. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the available data, the budget deficit <strong>in</strong> 2005<br />
amounted to 26.8 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars, or about 330 million euros. In 2005, accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce, 418.4 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars flowed <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>state</strong><br />
treasury <strong>an</strong>d 391.6 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars were spent. The pl<strong>an</strong>ned tax revenues were<br />
realized 99.3 per cent, while the pl<strong>an</strong>ned public consumption was cut by 9<br />
billion d<strong>in</strong>ars. When the budgetary expenditures are compared with the<br />
estimated GDP, it turns out that their share was reduced by 2.7 per cent <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that of the revenues by 1.4 per cent. Thus, it c<strong>an</strong> be concluded that public<br />
consumption was reduced <strong>in</strong> relative terms.<br />
Such favourable trends <strong>in</strong> the collection of government revenues were<br />
enabled, first of all, by the <strong>in</strong>troduction of VAT, which <strong>in</strong>creased the revenues<br />
from the earlier sales tax by even 38 per cent. A great contribution was also<br />
made by <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the revenues from tobacco excise taxes (excise taxes on<br />
the import of crude oil were lowered so as to offset <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the crude oil<br />
prices on the world market). Here mention should also be made of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
<strong>in</strong> the revenues from the (less signific<strong>an</strong>t) profit tax, i.e. they <strong>in</strong>creased by even<br />
49 per cent. It should be noted, however, that the total profit generated by<br />
enterprises <strong>in</strong> Serbia is only 1.25 billion euros, which is a very small amount <strong>for</strong><br />
the country of this size.<br />
It seems that the record <strong>in</strong>flow of <strong>an</strong>nual <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>vestment to the<br />
amount of 1.5 billion euros also had <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence on a high rate of growth <strong>in</strong><br />
general, <strong>in</strong> addition to the signific<strong>an</strong>t privatization revenues of 42.2 billion<br />
d<strong>in</strong>ars (about 390 million euros). Accoord<strong>in</strong>g to a <strong>state</strong>ment by M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong><br />
International Economic Relations Mil<strong>an</strong> Parivodić (on 30 December 2005), this<br />
is also due to the credit given to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government <strong>for</strong> its current policy<br />
by some of the lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational economic <strong>in</strong>stitutions. In 2005, Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro was the first on the World B<strong>an</strong>k’s list of 155 countries r<strong>an</strong>ked<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to the progress made <strong>in</strong> regulatory re<strong>for</strong>ms. In addition, Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro was r<strong>an</strong>ked among the first 27 countries on the list of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>for</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d Development <strong>for</strong> its re<strong>for</strong>m moves.<br />
Such a high "re<strong>for</strong>m rat<strong>in</strong>g" is not only the result of the mentioned <strong>in</strong>troduction<br />
of VAT, but also of the adoption of a set of long-awaited re<strong>for</strong>m laws, such as:<br />
the b<strong>an</strong>kruptcy law, <strong>for</strong>eign trade law, mortgage law, etc. (regardless of the<br />
fact that, practically, they have not yet been implemented).<br />
190<br />
191
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
In 2005, apart from a relatively high <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> economic activity <strong>in</strong><br />
general, exports were also extremely dynamized, i.e. they <strong>in</strong>creased by about<br />
17.5 per cent <strong>in</strong> real terms. At the same time, there was a slowdown <strong>in</strong> imports<br />
<strong>in</strong> relative terms. Namely, imports were reduced <strong>in</strong> real terms, s<strong>in</strong>ce their<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease was only about 5 per cent <strong>in</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>al terms (the dollar appreciated<br />
relative to the d<strong>in</strong>ar by about 20.8 per cent). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the available data <strong>for</strong><br />
11 months <strong>in</strong> 2005, exports amounted to 4.09 billion dollars (they <strong>in</strong>creased by<br />
31.1 per cent <strong>in</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>al terms), while visible imports amounted to 9.5 billion<br />
dollars (they <strong>in</strong>creased by 4.7 per cent <strong>in</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>al terms). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to these<br />
data, total <strong>for</strong>eign trade <strong>for</strong> 11 months <strong>in</strong> 2005 amounted to 13.6 billion dollars<br />
(it <strong>in</strong>creased by 11.4 per cent), but the trade deficit of 5.4 billion dollars was<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>tly lower. Consequently, the trade deficit was reduced by 9 per cent,<br />
which will certa<strong>in</strong>ly cut the current account deficit – <strong>an</strong>d that was one of the<br />
Fund’s ma<strong>in</strong> requirements vis-à-vis Serbia <strong>in</strong> 2005. Namely, s<strong>in</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
D<strong>in</strong>kić estimates that the 2005 exports <strong>an</strong>d imports will be valued at about 4.5<br />
billion dollars <strong>an</strong>d slightly over 11.5 billion dollars respectively, he <strong>for</strong>ecasts<br />
that the share of the bal<strong>an</strong>ce of payments deficit will decl<strong>in</strong>e from about 15 per<br />
cent to less th<strong>an</strong> 10 per cent of Serbia’s GDP. Such a cut was explicitly<br />
requested by the IMF Mission.<br />
In 2005, <strong>for</strong>eign exch<strong>an</strong>ge reserves also <strong>in</strong>creased to a signific<strong>an</strong>t<br />
extent. Altogether, they <strong>in</strong>creased by over 1.5 billion dollars, thus amount<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
5.7 billion dollars. Out of this amount about 5 billion dollars are held with the<br />
National B<strong>an</strong>k of Serbia, thus triply cover<strong>in</strong>g the d<strong>in</strong>ar supply. The Central<br />
B<strong>an</strong>k took adv<strong>an</strong>tage of these trends, which are the result of a large <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
currency flow <strong>in</strong>to the country through donations, <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>an</strong>d<br />
remitt<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>for</strong> the slowed-down float<strong>in</strong>g devaluation of the d<strong>in</strong>ar relative to<br />
the euro by about 10.3 per cent <strong>an</strong>d relative to the US dollar by about 20.8 per<br />
cent.<br />
Consequently, the year 2005 beg<strong>an</strong> with contradictory trends. From a<br />
technical viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce successfully ch<strong>an</strong>ged the<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>ism of collect<strong>in</strong>g the most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>direct tax (sales tax) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
stabilized the VAT collection system relatively fast. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
however, there was <strong>an</strong> unexpectedly high <strong>in</strong>flationary shock at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of the year, s<strong>in</strong>ce the current <strong>in</strong>flation rate <strong>in</strong> the first two months rose to 4.2<br />
per cent, which immediately po<strong>in</strong>ted to the d<strong>an</strong>ger that it might reach the<br />
unpl<strong>an</strong>ned two-digit figure at the <strong>an</strong>nual level. This d<strong>an</strong>ger was all the more<br />
greater, because this shock came even be<strong>for</strong>e the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government adjusted<br />
the price parities <strong>for</strong> oil products <strong>an</strong>d electric power due to the record <strong>in</strong>creases<br />
<strong>in</strong> crude oil prices on the world market toward the end of 2004, so that it could<br />
be immediately noticed that the projected level of consumption <strong>for</strong> 2005 was<br />
too high.<br />
The problem was further aggravated by the fact that the <strong>in</strong>flation rate<br />
tied the h<strong>an</strong>ds of the National B<strong>an</strong>k of Serbia <strong>in</strong> its attempt to cut the almost<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>in</strong>tolerable trade deficit – which was the ma<strong>in</strong> reason <strong>for</strong> Serbia’s high current<br />
account deficit <strong>for</strong> a few years - through the policy of the exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the<br />
d<strong>in</strong>ar as well. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Professor Pavle Petrović, this bal<strong>an</strong>ce of payments<br />
deficit was between 11 per cent <strong>an</strong>d 13 per cent of Serbia’s GDP <strong>for</strong> a longer<br />
period, thus be<strong>in</strong>g twice as high as the critical level accord<strong>in</strong>g to economic<br />
theory. There<strong>for</strong>e, the NBS was immediately <strong>for</strong>ced to direct its ef<strong>for</strong>ts to <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>ti<strong>in</strong>flationary policy <strong>an</strong>d give up some <strong>for</strong>ms of support to the exp<strong>an</strong>sion of<br />
exports through the real depreciation of the exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the d<strong>in</strong>ar (as<br />
opposed to the cont<strong>in</strong>uous appreciation of the d<strong>in</strong>ar dur<strong>in</strong>g the previous three<br />
<strong>an</strong>d a half years, thus discourag<strong>in</strong>g exporters <strong>in</strong> some way). However, it is<br />
questionable as to whether the monetary restrictions <strong>an</strong>d obsessive fight<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st consumption (<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g supply) had <strong>an</strong>y effect on the <strong>in</strong>flationary<br />
pressures, consider<strong>in</strong>g their partial efficiency <strong>an</strong>d the mech<strong>an</strong>ism of shift<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest costs which was triggered.<br />
In essence, those measures could not remedy the situation that dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the past few years the level of consumption <strong>in</strong> Serbia exceeded output by about<br />
25 per cent <strong>an</strong>d that this fact, <strong>in</strong> addition to the accelerated current spend<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign currency privatization revenues <strong>for</strong> budgetary purposes, represents<br />
one of the ma<strong>in</strong> generators of current <strong>in</strong>flation. When <strong>in</strong> such a relationship<br />
between monetary <strong>an</strong>d fiscal policies (i.e. monetary restrictions, on one side,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the large appropriation of tax revenues, on the other), the collection of<br />
taxes was improved (by me<strong>an</strong>s of the VAT mech<strong>an</strong>ism) <strong>an</strong>d when the<br />
government demonstrated its ambition to <strong>in</strong>crease budgetary expenditures <strong>in</strong><br />
real terms (s<strong>in</strong>ce the tax revenues <strong>in</strong>creased by 20 million euros <strong>in</strong> the first<br />
quarter already, as opposed to the same period <strong>in</strong> the previous year), the<br />
economy responded by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g retail prices so as to cover the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
costs associated with public consumption. In such a situation it is logical that<br />
the tensions between the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d National B<strong>an</strong>k of<br />
Serbia came to the surface, whereby both sides accused each other of "fail<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
take <strong>an</strong>y action aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>flationary expectations". Naturally, this debate was<br />
immediately projected on Serbia’s attitude towards the IMF.<br />
As early as February 2005, after <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>alysis of the current<br />
macroeconomic trends, the IMF Mission left Belgrade, leav<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d<br />
considerable comments about the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government’s macroeconomic<br />
policy <strong>an</strong>d without promis<strong>in</strong>g that it would unconditionally propose the<br />
release of the penultimate tr<strong>an</strong>che of the lo<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> the recovery of <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
exch<strong>an</strong>ge reserves to the amount of 190 million dollars, under the three-year<br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gement worth 994 million dollars. In such a situation, Serbi<strong>an</strong> Vice-<br />
Premier Miroljub Labus <strong>state</strong>d that the time-limit <strong>for</strong> clos<strong>in</strong>g the bal<strong>an</strong>ce with<br />
the IMF (May 2005), under the above mentioned agreement, would be<br />
extended <strong>for</strong> three months. Thereafter, the extension of the time-limit until the<br />
end of 2005 was requested. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the time-limit <strong>for</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g all requirements<br />
of the IMF was set <strong>for</strong> February 2006.<br />
192<br />
193
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The crux of the problem lied <strong>in</strong> the fact that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government<br />
held that all hitherto re<strong>for</strong>ms could come to noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> political reasons<br />
should Serbia plunge aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>to recession. Most m<strong>in</strong>isters still hold that only<br />
the <strong>state</strong> c<strong>an</strong> encourage economic activity. There<strong>for</strong>e, it needs signific<strong>an</strong>t tax<br />
revenues <strong>an</strong>d must have the right to run <strong>in</strong>to a higher budget deficit. Vice-<br />
Premier Miroljub Labus emphasized on several occasions that the Government<br />
needed higher tax revenues, above all, to support agricultural exports <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
employment programmes <strong>for</strong> those who will lose their jobs <strong>in</strong> the process of<br />
restructur<strong>in</strong>g the public sector. However, this idea was not accepted <strong>in</strong><br />
Wash<strong>in</strong>gton. This could be clearly shown by the fact that, dur<strong>in</strong>g the Spr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Meet<strong>in</strong>g of the IMF <strong>an</strong>d the World B<strong>an</strong>k, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> delegation was requested<br />
to revise the already adopted Serbi<strong>an</strong> budget <strong>for</strong> 2005. In fact, when the IMF<br />
Mission returned to Belgrade late <strong>in</strong> April, the retail prices already <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
by nearly 7 per cent (as opposed to the pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>in</strong>flation rate of 9.6 per cent <strong>for</strong><br />
the whole year), so that pr<strong>in</strong>cipled discussions were out of question. In other<br />
words, at the end of May, the Republic<strong>an</strong> Bureau of Statistics disclosed that the<br />
retail prices <strong>in</strong> that month rose by 1.1 per cent relative to the April level.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the prices <strong>in</strong>creased by 7.1 per cent <strong>in</strong> the first five months<br />
already – which me<strong>an</strong>t that the average monthly price <strong>in</strong>crease should not<br />
exceed 0.4 per cent until the end of 2005 so as to keep all other economic policy<br />
parameters with<strong>in</strong> the pl<strong>an</strong>ned limits. Naturally, this did not happen.<br />
In its April negotiations with the IMF <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
delegation did not achieve <strong>an</strong>y of its aims. Thus, it was decided to cooperate<br />
with the IMF <strong>in</strong>stead of confront<strong>in</strong>g it. So, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government assumed<br />
the obligation to revise its decisions on the macroeconomic policy <strong>for</strong> 2005,<br />
which were brought at the end of the previous year without the IMF’s consent.<br />
In fact, Vice Premier Labus <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ister D<strong>in</strong>kić were <strong>for</strong>ced to depart from<br />
their requests, s<strong>in</strong>ce the mentioned write-off of about 700 dollars owed to the<br />
Paris Club (with which it was agreed, not by accident, that the debt would be<br />
written off accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>for</strong>mula "51 per cent right away <strong>an</strong>d 15 per cent<br />
after the IMF’s approval") depended on the positive assessment of Belgrade’s<br />
economic policy dur<strong>in</strong>g the realization of its three-year arr<strong>an</strong>gement with the<br />
IMF.<br />
Why did the IMF take such a firm st<strong>an</strong>d aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia? It probably<br />
concluded that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government should be pushed to accelerate the<br />
re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d privatization or, <strong>in</strong> other words, that it should be faced without<br />
delay with the real extent of Serbia’s backwardness <strong>an</strong>d underdevelopment,<br />
thus dispell<strong>in</strong>g the illusions that it would be possible to restore the values of<br />
the "old regime" <strong>an</strong>d deflat<strong>in</strong>g the hopes of the old nationalist <strong>for</strong>ces that<br />
Serbia could rema<strong>in</strong> "someth<strong>in</strong>g special" <strong>in</strong> the new constellation of powers <strong>in</strong><br />
the region.<br />
However, when we return to the purely economic issues, it becomes<br />
clear that after "giv<strong>in</strong>g up the fight" <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, Koštunica’s Government<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
had only two options: to cont<strong>in</strong>ue the pa<strong>in</strong>stak<strong>in</strong>g restructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
privatization of the public sector (the sale of the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g b<strong>an</strong>ks <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
privatization of the energy sector <strong>an</strong>d large <strong>in</strong>dustries) <strong>an</strong>d the restructur<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> budget (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g pension <strong>an</strong>d health re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d cutt<strong>in</strong>g down<br />
defence spend<strong>in</strong>g), coupled with monetary restrictions, or to postpone solv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the problem by a large devaluation of the d<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>an</strong>d then to fight with<br />
difficulty once aga<strong>in</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>in</strong>flationary consequences of such a decision<br />
or, <strong>in</strong> other words, to prevent all "<strong>in</strong>jured parties" from recover<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
position prior the devaluation of the d<strong>in</strong>ar by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their prices. The<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government decided <strong>for</strong> the first option. There<strong>for</strong>e, the year 2005 was<br />
<strong>in</strong> the sign of scrap<strong>in</strong>g along with the IMF as regards the already adopted<br />
budget (this created a basis <strong>for</strong> the path from a deficit to a surplus <strong>in</strong> the<br />
budget), re<strong>for</strong>m of the pension system (the new pension law) <strong>an</strong>d privatization<br />
of the public sector (primarily the energy one).<br />
In some way, the Fund’s pressure was the logical result of the<br />
situation that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government was also <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> some way <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>flation race, because, at the end of June, it pushed through the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Parliament the revised budget <strong>for</strong> 2005, <strong>an</strong>ticipat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the current<br />
"cost of government" of about 9.5 per cent. So, by this budget revision the<br />
government revenues <strong>in</strong>creased from 396 billion to 433 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars.<br />
In fact, s<strong>in</strong>ce Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić has taken hold of the <strong>state</strong> treasury as the<br />
F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister, the fiscal policy <strong>an</strong>alysts c<strong>an</strong> hardly follow the f<strong>an</strong>tastic<br />
twists <strong>an</strong>d turns of the pl<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d data concern<strong>in</strong>g the government revenues<br />
<strong>an</strong>d expenditures, s<strong>in</strong>ce deficits turn mysteriously <strong>in</strong>to surpluses. Also, <strong>in</strong>sofar,<br />
as public consumption is concerned, it is allegedly spent more <strong>an</strong>d saved more<br />
at the same time. In other words, one th<strong>in</strong>g is pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>other is realized,<br />
so that some costs are recorded <strong>in</strong> the budget today <strong>an</strong>d tomorrow they<br />
disappear from it <strong>for</strong> methodological reasons. However, they immediately<br />
reappear as "c<strong>an</strong>didates" <strong>for</strong> the alleged budget surpluses (<strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign debt<br />
servic<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>for</strong> example).<br />
Here are just a few examples of these unbelievable, pl<strong>an</strong>ned jumps<br />
<strong>an</strong>d falls of the budgetary revenues <strong>an</strong>d expenditures dur<strong>in</strong>g the past year<br />
(2005), based on the data of the M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce. For example, at the end of<br />
2005, D<strong>in</strong>kić proposed to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament the <strong>an</strong>nual budget <strong>for</strong> 2006,<br />
<strong>an</strong>ticipat<strong>in</strong>g the total revenues of 487.9 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>an</strong>d total expenditures of<br />
448.3 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars, that is, the surplus of 39.5 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars. Only one year<br />
earlier, he pushed, through the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament, the budget <strong>for</strong> 2005 with<br />
the total budgetary revenues <strong>an</strong>d expenditures of 396 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>an</strong>d 473.4<br />
billion d<strong>in</strong>ars respectively, thus <strong>an</strong>ticipat<strong>in</strong>g the budget deficit of 77.4 billion<br />
d<strong>in</strong>ars. In April 2005, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister went with this budget to<br />
Wash<strong>in</strong>gton to attend the <strong>an</strong>nual meet<strong>in</strong>g of the IMF <strong>an</strong>d the World B<strong>an</strong>k,<br />
where he was told that such a high budget deficit was unacceptable. D<strong>in</strong>kić<br />
came back <strong>an</strong>d said that "there is no problem". In July, he prepared the revised<br />
194<br />
195
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
budget <strong>for</strong> 2005, <strong>an</strong>ticipat<strong>in</strong>g the budgetary revenues <strong>an</strong>d expenditures of 432.9<br />
billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>an</strong>d 400.7 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars respectively. In other words, the deficit<br />
of 32.9 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars was <strong>an</strong>ticipated. Several months after this parliamentary<br />
decision, the F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister suddenly <strong>an</strong>nounced that there would be a<br />
budget surplus <strong>in</strong> 2005 already, so that it could be pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g year,<br />
too. Thus, the payment of the first <strong>in</strong>stalment of "old debt" to pensioners,<br />
which was the subject of much debate dur<strong>in</strong>g the recent negotiations with the<br />
IMF, would not pose a problem, not only <strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g year, but also <strong>in</strong> the<br />
current one. So, the first <strong>in</strong>stalment of 12 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars was paid to pensioners<br />
<strong>in</strong> cash, not <strong>in</strong> bonds, be<strong>for</strong>e Christmas, <strong>an</strong>d the second <strong>in</strong>stalment, <strong>in</strong> 2006,<br />
will also be paid <strong>in</strong> cash.<br />
If we wish to represent the situation <strong>in</strong> caricature, we c<strong>an</strong> say that, all<br />
of sudden, D<strong>in</strong>kić m<strong>an</strong>aged to turn the budget deficit of 77.4 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the surplus of at least 12 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>in</strong> only one year <strong>an</strong>d that this surplus<br />
would be quadrupled <strong>in</strong> 2006. In short, it turns out that <strong>in</strong> only two years, at<br />
least accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official data, it was possible to <strong>in</strong>crease the taxes to<br />
Serbia’s economic sector by 100 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the average growth<br />
rate of GDP of about 5 per cent not only <strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g year, but also <strong>in</strong> 2005. Is<br />
Serbia really gett<strong>in</strong>g along so f<strong>in</strong>e?<br />
There are several reasons <strong>for</strong> this <strong>state</strong> of confusion. First, s<strong>in</strong>ce 2005<br />
was the first year <strong>in</strong> which Serbia started to collect the crucial <strong>in</strong>direct tax<br />
under the VAT system, it came to light how much the payment of the sales tax<br />
was evaded <strong>in</strong> the past. Second, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce (with the Fund’s<br />
approval) ch<strong>an</strong>ged the method of record<strong>in</strong>g specified government<br />
expenditures <strong>in</strong> some "nu<strong>an</strong>ces". Thus, the repayment of public debt is not<br />
recorded under budgetary expenditures as a compulsory item, but as a<br />
plausible reason <strong>for</strong> the use of a budget surplus. Someone might say that it all<br />
boils down to the same old th<strong>in</strong>g, but at least, <strong>in</strong>stead of a deficit, we c<strong>an</strong> talk<br />
about the alleged budget surplus. And f<strong>in</strong>ally, the third reason <strong>for</strong> this great<br />
confusion c<strong>an</strong> be a high rate of current <strong>in</strong>flation twhich has been "pl<strong>an</strong>ned" at<br />
too low a level <strong>for</strong> a few years already, thus distort<strong>in</strong>g both the structure of<br />
budgetary revenues <strong>an</strong>d the structure of budgetary expenditures.<br />
The picture will become clearer, if we convert several basic budget<br />
figures <strong>in</strong>to euros. Let us see, <strong>for</strong> example, how the budgetary revenues <strong>an</strong>d<br />
expenditures were pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>in</strong> euros, by us<strong>in</strong>g the exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the euro <strong>in</strong><br />
the period when the decisions were made. If the exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the euro was<br />
about 77 d<strong>in</strong>ars when the first budget <strong>for</strong> 2005 was adopted, it turns out that<br />
<strong>for</strong> that year D<strong>in</strong>kić pl<strong>an</strong>ned the revenues amount<strong>in</strong>g to a little more th<strong>an</strong> 5<br />
billion euros <strong>an</strong>d the expenditures amount<strong>in</strong>g to about 6 billion euros (the<br />
deficit of one billion euros). The budget was revised <strong>in</strong> July 2005, when the<br />
middle exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate was about 83 d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>for</strong> one euro, so that it c<strong>an</strong> be said<br />
that it was f<strong>in</strong>ally decided to collect the budgetary revenues of about 4.8 billion<br />
euros <strong>an</strong>d spend about 5.2 billion euros that same year. However, if the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>in</strong>flation rate of nearly 10 per cent is ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d if the exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
rate of the d<strong>in</strong>ar "slides" only so much as to offset that <strong>in</strong>flation rate, it will turn<br />
out that the <strong>state</strong> budget <strong>an</strong>ticipat<strong>in</strong>g the revenues of about 5.2 billion euros<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the expenditures of about 4.8 billion euros is pl<strong>an</strong>ned just <strong>for</strong> 2006.<br />
Consequently, it is pl<strong>an</strong>ned that everyth<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>s the same as <strong>in</strong> the revised<br />
budget <strong>for</strong> 2005.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the IMF has concluded that five-year subsidies are sufficient to<br />
see which firms c<strong>an</strong> survive, M<strong>in</strong>ister D<strong>in</strong>kić was <strong>in</strong>structed to start<br />
immediately to reduce the assist<strong>an</strong>ce to large loss-mak<strong>in</strong>g firms <strong>in</strong> 2005<br />
already. It has also been requested to en<strong>for</strong>ce the new b<strong>an</strong>kruptcy law right<br />
away. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government agreed to that, but actually did not lift a f<strong>in</strong>ger<br />
to implement such a policy. So, M<strong>in</strong>ister D<strong>in</strong>kić cont<strong>in</strong>ued to talk about the<br />
subsidies <strong>for</strong> 2006, which would amount to "only 2.3 per cent of GDP". This<br />
amount of "only 2.3 per cent" is 36.8 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars, which will not be a small<br />
amount <strong>in</strong> 2006 either (with this amount the Government will feed the<br />
employed <strong>in</strong> RTB <strong>an</strong>d Zastava <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac, as well as about 150,000<br />
employees of the largest 75 loss-mak<strong>in</strong>g enterprises <strong>in</strong> Serbia). At the same<br />
time, it will support the restructur<strong>in</strong>g of specified <strong>in</strong>dustrial sectors that c<strong>an</strong><br />
rapidly <strong>in</strong>crease their exports (textile <strong>in</strong>dustry).<br />
Consequently, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government still does not desist from its<br />
"entrepreneurial" actions. It is evident that the IMF does not like that. Namely,<br />
it holds that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> economy is overburdened with public consumption<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that it should get more air <strong>an</strong>d make "development <strong>in</strong>vestments" by itself.<br />
Truly, the Fund also holds that a rise <strong>in</strong> economic activity <strong>in</strong> Serbia exceeds its<br />
potentials, thus request<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the already high <strong>in</strong>terest rates.<br />
This "dualistic" policy of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government – show<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational factors that it is re<strong>for</strong>m-oriented, while at the same time<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g some k<strong>in</strong>d of stability by us<strong>in</strong>g the old <strong>state</strong> mech<strong>an</strong>isms, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
situation when the economic structures have not been re<strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong> real fact -<br />
was conducted under the "pressure" of Europe’s goodwill throughout 2005. In<br />
this connection, of utmost signific<strong>an</strong>ce was the positive assessment of the<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro Feasibility Study by the Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission (on 12<br />
April), after which Serbia’s "Europe<strong>an</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>" set off <strong>for</strong>mally. The fact that<br />
Europe decided to support Serbia on that path was especially evident at the<br />
May Meet<strong>in</strong>g of the EBRD <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, when the hosts were conspicuously<br />
try<strong>in</strong>g to conv<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>vestors that it was profitable <strong>an</strong>d safe to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d that Serbia was absolutely committed to Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration. This<br />
tactics was mostly successful, s<strong>in</strong>ce dur<strong>in</strong>g the May Meet<strong>in</strong>g of the EBRD<br />
rather signific<strong>an</strong>t new lo<strong>an</strong> arr<strong>an</strong>gements (worth about 250 million euros) were<br />
negotiated with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, which would be <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d larger economic projects. That amount should be considered<br />
<strong>in</strong> the context of the fact that the Europe<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>in</strong>vested 66.2 million euros <strong>in</strong><br />
more th<strong>an</strong> 33 projects <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong> the previous year.<br />
196<br />
197
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The relatively modest level of <strong>in</strong>vestment ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> import<strong>an</strong>ce if one<br />
takes <strong>in</strong>to account that Serbia was isolated dur<strong>in</strong>g the first decade of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k’s activities (<strong>in</strong> the 1990s), so that all mentioned arr<strong>an</strong>gements<br />
were made after 2000. This is why its <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> the neighbour<strong>in</strong>g<br />
countries were much larger: <strong>in</strong> Croatia – one billion <strong>an</strong>d 310 million euros; <strong>in</strong><br />
Hungary – one billion <strong>an</strong>d 740 million euros; <strong>in</strong> Bulgaria – over one million<br />
euros <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Rom<strong>an</strong>ia over two <strong>an</strong>d a half billion euros. Consequently, when<br />
one observes the comparative data, it appears that Serbia is mak<strong>in</strong>g up lost<br />
time at a good pace. However, someth<strong>in</strong>g that is lost <strong>in</strong> the econommy c<strong>an</strong>not<br />
be fully compensated later on, especially because EBRD President Je<strong>an</strong> Lemière<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong> Belgrade that the Europe<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k’s activities <strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g years<br />
would be directed to the east, that is, to the countries neighbour<strong>in</strong>g on Russia.<br />
In 2005, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government could not compla<strong>in</strong> about the<br />
economic <strong>in</strong>centives provided by the United States. Namely, on 30 June 2005,<br />
President George Bush approved to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro the use of the<br />
Generalized System of Preferences <strong>in</strong> trade with the United States, thus<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g import tariffs on 4,000 different products <strong>an</strong>d enabl<strong>in</strong>g their sale on<br />
the market consist<strong>in</strong>g of 280 million solvent consumers. In Belgrade, however,<br />
this decision was received with the traditional "economic resignation", because<br />
Serbia’s ma<strong>in</strong> problem <strong>in</strong> 2005 was the fact that it had no enough goods <strong>for</strong><br />
export. Nevertheless, this decision is signific<strong>an</strong>t, above all, <strong>for</strong> Americ<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>vestors, who are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly "mov<strong>in</strong>g" the production of certa<strong>in</strong> goods <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the regions where they c<strong>an</strong> be produced much cheaper, or be less pressurized<br />
by the environmental st<strong>an</strong>dards (US Steel Sartid).<br />
The approval of the Americ<strong>an</strong> preferences, immediately after the<br />
decision of the IMF Board (on 28 June) to agree to the fifth, penultimate<br />
revision of its three-year arr<strong>an</strong>gement with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, was a<br />
good illustration of the Fund’s signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> Serbia’s overall <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
economic position. The "St Vitus’ Day decision" <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton did not only<br />
help release the Fund’s additional lo<strong>an</strong> of 182.9 million dollars. Such decisions<br />
also exert <strong>in</strong>fluence on all other decisions <strong>in</strong> the world’s centres.<br />
Nevertheless, the negotiations with the IMF <strong>in</strong> 2005 were very difficult<br />
<strong>for</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government, s<strong>in</strong>ce it was not oriented to fast re<strong>for</strong>ms. The most<br />
delicate negotiations were conducted with respect to the restructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
partial privatization of large economic systems. In part, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> delegation<br />
"defended" the pl<strong>an</strong>ned subsidies to large loss-mak<strong>in</strong>g enterprises <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
ownership (i.e. the famous 66 large firms, which should have undergone the<br />
b<strong>an</strong>kruptcy proceed<strong>in</strong>gs under the new Law, but <strong>in</strong> their case this Law has not<br />
been en<strong>for</strong>ced). However, the Government was <strong>for</strong>ced to beg<strong>in</strong> with the<br />
restructur<strong>in</strong>g of public enterprises <strong>an</strong>d place all "non-core" activities of the<br />
public sector (EPS, NIS, ZTP, JAT, etc.) with<strong>in</strong> the competence of the<br />
Privatization Agency <strong>in</strong> the course of the year. However, this step has not yet<br />
produced its logical result - privatization.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
There<strong>for</strong>e, it is no wonder that dur<strong>in</strong>g its negotiations <strong>in</strong> Belgrade,<br />
early <strong>in</strong> May (the current agreement was concluded on 12 May), the IMF<br />
immediately accepted the offer - which was "hastefully" made by the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
side as a specific "compensation" <strong>for</strong> its failure to meet the assumed obligation<br />
– that the revised agreement should stipulated that Belgrade would beg<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
2005 already with the privatization of "its majority share <strong>in</strong> the NIS ref<strong>in</strong>eries",<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that it would first <strong>in</strong>vite tenders <strong>for</strong> the privatization advisor <strong>for</strong> this<br />
operation. This agreement was <strong>state</strong>d precisely <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government’s<br />
Memor<strong>an</strong>dum of 8 July. Later on, this promise was the subject of large-scale<br />
public debate <strong>in</strong> Serbia, whose ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts will be presented here <strong>in</strong> greater<br />
detail so as to get the picture about the "thoughness" of the old economic<br />
system <strong>an</strong>d the hesist<strong>an</strong>cy of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political elite to face that problem.<br />
Immediately after the adoption of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government’s<br />
Memor<strong>an</strong>dum, it was realized what problems would be faced <strong>in</strong> the process of<br />
privatization of the public sector – s<strong>in</strong>ce it clashed with the <strong>in</strong>terests of all<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions of the "old regime", as well as with the current <strong>in</strong>terests of almost<br />
all political parties <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Namely, at the 9 th extraord<strong>in</strong>ary session of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament (which beg<strong>an</strong> on 21 July), when the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government<br />
proposed the adoption of the Law Repeal<strong>in</strong>g the Law on the Formation of the<br />
Public Enterprise <strong>for</strong> Oil <strong>an</strong>d Natural Gas Exploration, Extraction, Ref<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Distribution, which was enacted <strong>in</strong> 1991 (the Law on NIS), <strong>in</strong> order to create<br />
legal conditions <strong>for</strong> the promised implementation of the NIS reorg<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
<strong>an</strong>d privatization programme, the proposal did not get the majority of votes <strong>in</strong><br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament.<br />
In the first round of the parliamentary debate (on 21 <strong>an</strong>d 22 July), it<br />
was evident that, <strong>in</strong> addition to the representatives of the opposition parties,<br />
the Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party, the representatives of the<br />
Social Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Party of Serbia, which constitute the<br />
Government’s parliamentary majority, also had signific<strong>an</strong>t reservations <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the same applied to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Renewal Movement.<br />
It was especially surpris<strong>in</strong>g that the Democratic Party was also aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the Government’s <strong>in</strong>itiative. So, Duš<strong>an</strong> Petrović, leader of the Debuties’ Club of<br />
the Democratic Party – Boris Tadić, <strong>state</strong>d that, by repeal<strong>in</strong>g the Law on NIS,<br />
"the Parliament would renounce its controll<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> one of the most<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t energy comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d create legal-<strong>for</strong>mal conditions <strong>for</strong> the<br />
privatization of NIS". He added that the Democratic Party was not aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge, but the Government did not present its true <strong>in</strong>tentions to the<br />
Parliament or, <strong>in</strong> other words, it did not present its privatization strategy. Later<br />
on, on 9 August, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Ćirilović, Chairm<strong>an</strong> of the Democratic Party<br />
Energy <strong>Committee</strong>, pleaded <strong>for</strong> the postponement of NIS privatization <strong>for</strong> at<br />
least one year <strong>an</strong>d commented on the agreement between the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government <strong>an</strong>d the IMF <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way: "One must <strong>state</strong> loud <strong>an</strong>d clear<br />
that it was not the IMF’s wish that the ref<strong>in</strong>eries should be privatized at the<br />
198<br />
199
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 2006, but our Government or, better said, the part of the<br />
Government which seems to be <strong>in</strong> great haste, <strong>in</strong>cluded such a provision <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Government’s Memor<strong>an</strong>dum on Economic <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Policies of July 8,<br />
which was then adopted by the IMF. It is still not late that the Government<br />
corrects its rashness <strong>an</strong>d whether alone or with the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of privatization<br />
advisor - adopts the NIS Privatization Strategy, which should be publicly<br />
adopted, thus provid<strong>in</strong>g the basis <strong>for</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g its agreement with the IMF."<br />
In the first round of the parliamentary debate about the Draft Law<br />
Repeal<strong>in</strong>g the Old Law on NIS, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party, through its deputies,<br />
criticized the proposed solutions as be<strong>in</strong>g "contrary to the national <strong>in</strong>terest",<br />
because "the m<strong>in</strong>isters equated the national <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests with the party<br />
<strong>an</strong>d personal ones". So, Milorad Mirčić, a deputy of this party to the<br />
Parliament, emphasized that "NIS <strong>an</strong>d EPS are all that has been left to the<br />
<strong>state</strong>", that these public enterprises "support the <strong>state</strong> budget" <strong>an</strong>d that the<br />
policy of "the cont<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>in</strong>debtedness is pursued, so that the creditors will take<br />
over NIS" <strong>an</strong>d ga<strong>in</strong> a monopoly on the domestic market. After the first two<br />
days of the parliamentary debate about the Draft Law Repeal<strong>in</strong>g the Law on<br />
NIS of 1991, the Speaker of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament, Predrag Marković,<br />
<strong>in</strong>terrupted the session <strong>an</strong>d scheduled its cont<strong>in</strong>uation <strong>for</strong> 22 August 2005.<br />
At the time when the parliamentary debate about the Law Repeal<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Old Law on NIS just started, Mrs. Pirita Sorsa, Chief of the IMF Mission to<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, <strong>state</strong>d at the press conference on 22 July, <strong>in</strong> Belgrade,<br />
that the IMF would not give up <strong>an</strong>y of the "execution criteria" <strong>for</strong> the Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro three-year arr<strong>an</strong>gement with the IMF or, <strong>in</strong> other words, that<br />
the "privatization of the majority share <strong>in</strong> the NIS ref<strong>in</strong>eries early <strong>in</strong> 2006 is one<br />
of the major obligations with<strong>in</strong> the structural re<strong>for</strong>ms that was unambiguously<br />
assumed by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government". She added that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government<br />
also obliged itself to <strong>in</strong>vite tenders <strong>for</strong> the NIS privatization advisor by the end<br />
of July <strong>an</strong>d that the IMF Mission advised it that NIS should not enter <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong>y<br />
commitment or <strong>in</strong>vestment, s<strong>in</strong>ce that might dim<strong>in</strong>ish its prospects <strong>for</strong><br />
successful privatization.<br />
After the mentioned first round of the parliamentary debate, various<br />
commentaries on the solution agreed with the IMF appeared <strong>in</strong> public. In his<br />
talk with journalists on 25 July, Serbi<strong>an</strong> F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić said<br />
that the "Government has no room <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>oeuvre so as to ch<strong>an</strong>ge its view, but<br />
there is strong resist<strong>an</strong>ce with<strong>in</strong> NIS itself, from the people who sit on its board<br />
on behalf of the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d who – <strong>in</strong>stead of protect<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest – care<br />
only about their own positions <strong>an</strong>d privileges."<br />
On 28 July, Deputy M<strong>in</strong>ister of M<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d Energy Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Sokolović <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med the public that on that day the M<strong>in</strong>istry submitted to the<br />
Republic<strong>an</strong> Government the draft of the tender <strong>for</strong> the NIS privatization<br />
advisor, thus fulfill<strong>in</strong>g its obligation to prepare this document by the end of<br />
July, as specified by the Government’s Memor<strong>an</strong>dum on Economic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Policies, which had been submitted to the IMF. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him,<br />
this tender <strong>an</strong>ticipates that, with<strong>in</strong> five months upon his appo<strong>in</strong>tment, the<br />
privatization advisor should "propose to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government all models,<br />
phases <strong>an</strong>d pace of the privatization of NIS."<br />
In his official <strong>in</strong>terview <strong>for</strong> the T<strong>an</strong>jug news agency on 30 July, Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Vice-Premier Miroljub Labus said that the NIS m<strong>an</strong>agement "has a great<br />
problem with privatization" <strong>an</strong>d that "it is try<strong>in</strong>g to carry out privatization by<br />
the back door, under different f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial arr<strong>an</strong>gements, thus postpon<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e privatization". Vice-Premier Labus also said that the Government<br />
signed the agreement with the IMF relat<strong>in</strong>g to the appo<strong>in</strong>tment of the<br />
privatization advisor, who would say how the ref<strong>in</strong>eries, pumps or someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
else would be privatized, <strong>an</strong>d that the advisor should be a renowned firm. He<br />
added that "there c<strong>an</strong> be no private arr<strong>an</strong>gements just with <strong>an</strong>yone" <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
"there are seven big <strong>in</strong>ternational comp<strong>an</strong>ies that are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> this bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
<strong>an</strong>d, if the m<strong>an</strong>agement favours one of them, there will be a great sc<strong>an</strong>dal,<br />
because those who lose will do everyth<strong>in</strong>g to vilify us – with good reason".<br />
In his talk with journalists on 9 August, the Governor of the National<br />
B<strong>an</strong>k of Serbia, Radov<strong>an</strong> Jelašić, po<strong>in</strong>ted out that Serbia had only two more<br />
months to fulfil its obligations towards the IMF, so that it would be necessary<br />
to resolve the questions concern<strong>in</strong>g the privatization of NIS <strong>an</strong>d the pension<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m by the end of October. In the opposite, there would be no visit of the<br />
IMF, which should thereafter submit its report to its Board of Directors<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g the approval of the sixth revision of Serbia’s three-year<br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gement with the IMF toward the end of the year.<br />
After it was <strong>an</strong>nounced on 6 August, <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, that Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Vojislav Koštunica received the letter from the IMF <strong>in</strong> which the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government was warned that it was obliged to fulfil its obligations vis-à-vis<br />
NIS <strong>an</strong>d that, should it fail to do that with<strong>in</strong> two months, the revision of the<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro three-year arr<strong>an</strong>gement with the IMF would be<br />
brought <strong>in</strong>to question. The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Economy <strong>an</strong>d Privatization, Predrag<br />
Bubalo, <strong>state</strong>d (<strong>for</strong> Belgrade’s Politika of 12 August) that "the Government did<br />
not give up the re<strong>for</strong>ms" <strong>an</strong>d that "they are <strong>in</strong>evitable regardless of the Fund’s<br />
requirements <strong>an</strong>d external pressures". M<strong>in</strong>ister Bubalo also <strong>an</strong>nounced that<br />
tenders <strong>for</strong> the privatization advisor would be <strong>in</strong>vited very soon <strong>an</strong>d that "the<br />
privatization advisor should provide the <strong>an</strong>swer <strong>an</strong>d resolve the dilemma as to<br />
whether it would be better to carry out the recapitalization of the entire oil<br />
system, with the strategic partner, or also with the participation of the citizens<br />
(who would buy the shares) – or opt <strong>for</strong> the sale of capital, that is, only only<br />
two ref<strong>in</strong>eries".<br />
In his <strong>state</strong>ment to the T<strong>an</strong>jug news agency on 11 August, M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
M<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d Energy Radomir Naumov said that his M<strong>in</strong>istry presented to the<br />
IMF delegation the arguments <strong>an</strong>d reasons <strong>in</strong> 14 po<strong>in</strong>ts why the separate<br />
privatization of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> ref<strong>in</strong>eries would be wrong. Naumov then<br />
200<br />
201
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
emphasized: "We hold that the NIS privatization process should encompass<br />
the whole national comp<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d not only one part of it." He added that it<br />
would also be necessary to wait <strong>for</strong> the op<strong>in</strong>ion of the privatization advisor,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Energy prepared the tender <strong>for</strong> his selection with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
agreed time-limit.<br />
Željko Popović, the then Act<strong>in</strong>g General M<strong>an</strong>ager of NIS, also<br />
expressed his view on a number of occasions (<strong>for</strong> example, <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terview <strong>for</strong><br />
Novi Sad’s Dnevnik on 4 August) that, <strong>in</strong> the end, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament<br />
would br<strong>in</strong>g the decision to repeal the Law on NIS "because that is <strong>in</strong> the<br />
national <strong>in</strong>terest" <strong>an</strong>d that this was also "a prerequisite <strong>for</strong> the restructur<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
NIS <strong>an</strong>d its subsequent privatization."<br />
When speak<strong>in</strong>g about the privatization of the oil ref<strong>in</strong>eries <strong>in</strong> P<strong>an</strong>čevo<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Novi Sad, as well as about the Fund’s requirement that they should be<br />
privatized first, Popović emphasized that, <strong>in</strong> the view of the NIS m<strong>an</strong>agement,<br />
as well as of the trade union <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>istry of M<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d Energy, it would<br />
be necessary to carry out vertical privatization so as to generate a large profit<br />
<strong>for</strong> NIS, the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the society as a whole. Željko Popović justified his view<br />
<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way: "Vertical privatization, that is, the sale of the share <strong>in</strong><br />
NIS, <strong>an</strong>d not of one part of it, is the best way to <strong>in</strong>crease the total value of the<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y. The sale of <strong>an</strong>y part of NIS would be <strong>an</strong> extreme measure, s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
other parts would be devalorized <strong>an</strong>d the total value of NIS would be reduced.<br />
Those are simply the economic <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>an</strong>d, if the estimated value of NIS is<br />
three billion dollars, the <strong>in</strong>vestment of one billion dollars will <strong>in</strong>crease the<br />
value of NIS to six billion dollars. That is the economic effect that should be<br />
kept <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d when decid<strong>in</strong>g on the model of privatization. However, the f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
decision should be brought by the privatization advisor. As <strong>for</strong> the NIS<br />
ref<strong>in</strong>eries, not one solution should be prejudged."<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, with great difficulty, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government pushed the Law<br />
Repeal<strong>in</strong>g the Law on NIS of 1991 through the National Parliament (on 22<br />
August), thus be<strong>in</strong>g able to take the next steps <strong>in</strong> the restructur<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
reorg<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d privatization of one of the major <strong>state</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> the real<br />
sector, whose <strong>in</strong>ternal org<strong>an</strong>izational structure was not ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>for</strong> 14 years<br />
<strong>an</strong>d which is still <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> ownership. When the Law was f<strong>in</strong>ally enacted on 18<br />
August, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government (with a certa<strong>in</strong> delay relative to the time-limit<br />
set <strong>for</strong> 31 July 2005) adopted the text of the tender <strong>for</strong> the privatization advisor<br />
<strong>for</strong> NIS (<strong>an</strong>d not <strong>for</strong> the privatization of the ref<strong>in</strong>eries), who would propose,<br />
with<strong>in</strong> 90 days upon his appo<strong>in</strong>tment, "the most optimal model of NIS<br />
privatization" with<strong>in</strong> a period of 4 months. After shorter delays <strong>in</strong> the<br />
procedure, on the eve of the new year (on 29 December 2005), the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government f<strong>in</strong>ally selected the consult<strong>an</strong>ts’ consortium led by Merrill Lynch,<br />
a renowned New York-based firm, <strong>for</strong> the NIS privatization advisor.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government also tried to prepare itself <strong>for</strong><br />
the years when its <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>an</strong>d public debt burden would <strong>in</strong>crease. The year<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
2007 is especially regarded as be<strong>in</strong>g critical, because Serbia will have to pay<br />
over one billion dollars to <strong>for</strong>eign creditors <strong>an</strong>d domestic <strong>for</strong>eign currency<br />
creditors (the liability aris<strong>in</strong>g from public debt). Truly, that burden is already<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t, because <strong>in</strong> 2004 already Serbia had to meet its <strong>for</strong>eign liabilities<br />
amount<strong>in</strong>g to about 885 million dollars, while <strong>in</strong> 2005 those liabilities<br />
amounted to about 878 million dollars. It is estimated that the repayment of<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign debt to the amount of about 646 million dollars will become due <strong>in</strong><br />
2006, that 805 million dollars will become due <strong>in</strong> 2007, <strong>an</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> 2008 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2009 it will be necessary to earmark over one million dollars <strong>for</strong> debt servic<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
One should also bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that the experts dist<strong>in</strong>guish between<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign debts hav<strong>in</strong>g the character of public debt <strong>an</strong>d total <strong>for</strong>eign debt. So, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce calculated that the country’s <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
debt amounted to 6.5 billion dollars. At the same time, the National B<strong>an</strong>k of<br />
Serbia estimated Serbia’s total <strong>for</strong>eign debt at 12.4 billion dollars (the <strong>state</strong> as<br />
on September 2004). S<strong>in</strong>ce we present the data verified at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
2005, it c<strong>an</strong> be assumed that this bal<strong>an</strong>ce ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>in</strong> the me<strong>an</strong>time, but it<br />
should not be <strong>for</strong>gotten that the current account deficit was about 2 billion<br />
dollars at the end of 2004, so that it is hard to assume that it c<strong>an</strong> be essentially<br />
reduced by the end of 2005. As <strong>for</strong> the government’s <strong>for</strong>eign exch<strong>an</strong>ge bal<strong>an</strong>ce,<br />
one should not <strong>for</strong>get the signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternal (outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g) total public debt of<br />
4.9 billion dollars, which must also be repaid mostly <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign currency (old<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign currency sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d the Serbia Economic Revival Lo<strong>an</strong>).<br />
Although Serbia sharply reduced its <strong>for</strong>eign debt from nearly 118 per<br />
cent (<strong>in</strong> 2000) to about 32 per cent of GDP (<strong>in</strong> 2004) after reschedul<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
liabilities to the World B<strong>an</strong>k, the Europe<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>for</strong> Reconstruction <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development <strong>an</strong>d the Europe<strong>an</strong> Investment B<strong>an</strong>k, as well as after the write-off<br />
of its liabilities to the Paris Club <strong>an</strong>d London Club creditors, this relief will<br />
amount to noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the long run without a fundamental ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> its <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
trade <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational competitiveness. In that sense, <strong>in</strong> particular, one should<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d the warn<strong>in</strong>g of Governor Radov<strong>an</strong> Jelašić, who was not relieved to<br />
learn of a slight improvement <strong>in</strong> Serbia’s credit rat<strong>in</strong>g, which was recently<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced (from B plus to BB m<strong>in</strong>us) <strong>an</strong>d should also po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
creditors’ greater confidence <strong>in</strong> Serbia’s liquidity.<br />
On 5 October, due to <strong>in</strong>ternal political frictions, Serbia marked the<br />
fifth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the fall of the Milošević regime with different assessments<br />
of the hitherto results <strong>in</strong> the area of democratization <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal social<br />
stabilization. The economic <strong>in</strong>dicators of that tr<strong>an</strong>sition period came <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
<strong>for</strong>eground, s<strong>in</strong>ce not much progress was made on the political pl<strong>an</strong>e. All the<br />
more so, because the economic results of that five-year period are relatively<br />
good.<br />
However, although no one disputes that the <strong>an</strong>nual growth rate of<br />
GDP of about 5 per cent on the average <strong>in</strong> that period is amaz<strong>in</strong>gly high, this<br />
synthetic <strong>in</strong>dicator c<strong>an</strong> also be looked at through "different glasses". Namely,<br />
202<br />
203
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the fact that - accord<strong>in</strong>g to the World B<strong>an</strong>k’s methodology (the one which<br />
calculates GDP on the basis of the purchas<strong>in</strong>g power of the d<strong>in</strong>ar, that is, the<br />
dollar) - GDP <strong>in</strong>creased from about 8 billion dollars <strong>in</strong> 2000 to about 12 billion<br />
dollars <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>an</strong>d that it is expected to amount to about 13 billion dollars <strong>in</strong><br />
2005 – c<strong>an</strong> also be relativized no matter how good it may seem. Namely,<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g this five-year period, the price of one euro (2 Germ<strong>an</strong> marks <strong>in</strong> 2000)<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased only from 51 d<strong>in</strong>ars to 84 d<strong>in</strong>ars (by about 11 per cent <strong>an</strong>nually on<br />
the average), while at the same time the <strong>in</strong>flation rate was considerably higher<br />
(over 20 per cent <strong>an</strong>nually on the average), so that we c<strong>an</strong> conclude that the<br />
growth of GDP – despite the methods used to calculate it <strong>in</strong> real terms – seems<br />
better th<strong>an</strong> it is, all the more so because <strong>in</strong>flation is gather<strong>in</strong>g strength once<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
Consequently, if the exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the d<strong>in</strong>ar was not follow<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
trends <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> economy realistically – it will be very difficult to get the<br />
picture of real economic progress. This c<strong>an</strong> be illustrated by the fact that<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the five-year period, after the famous 5 October 2000, GDP <strong>in</strong>creased –<br />
at the current exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the dollar - from about 9.5 billion dollars (<strong>in</strong><br />
2000) to nearly 22 billion dollars (<strong>in</strong> 2004). Thus, accord<strong>in</strong>g to this method<br />
which does not follow <strong>in</strong>flation, but the "underestimated" exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate of the<br />
dollar, the picture of our economic growth after the democratic ch<strong>an</strong>ge seems<br />
to be even better th<strong>an</strong> that based on the World B<strong>an</strong>k’s method.<br />
However, one should bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> both cases (the<br />
measurement based on the World B<strong>an</strong>k’s method, or the current exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate<br />
of the dollar) the old methodology of determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the synthetic <strong>in</strong>dicator of<br />
economic growth was also ch<strong>an</strong>ged. In the past, "value added" by f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
services was not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> GDP, nor was government spend<strong>in</strong>g reported as<br />
the "production of public goods", as required <strong>in</strong> modern theory (so, value<br />
added is created both <strong>in</strong> the army <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the police <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> GDP).<br />
Moreover, if we return to the old, most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>dicator of real<br />
economic progress – <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the wages expressed <strong>in</strong> euros, it turns out<br />
as follows: if the average wage <strong>in</strong> Serbia was 97.5 Germ<strong>an</strong> marks on 5 October<br />
2000, i.e. below 50 euros at the current exch<strong>an</strong>ge rate <strong>an</strong>d if the average net<br />
wage was about 210 euros at the end of 2005, it is clear that at least the<br />
employed <strong>in</strong> Serbia derived a benefit from the fall of the Milošević regime.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, dur<strong>in</strong>g the past five years Serbia recorded a fall <strong>in</strong> the<br />
level of employment, so that at the end of 2005 it had about 165,000 <strong>for</strong>mally<br />
employed people less th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2000. Dur<strong>in</strong>g that period, 390,000 people lost<br />
their jobs <strong>an</strong>d 225,000 were employed. Truly, it must be noted that these are<br />
the statistics on workplaces <strong>an</strong>d not on work itself – because, dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Milošević regime, hundreds of thous<strong>an</strong>ds of workers had work<strong>in</strong>g places, but<br />
had noth<strong>in</strong>g to do <strong>an</strong>d practically had no pay (i.e. it was small social assist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
rather th<strong>an</strong> the pay <strong>for</strong> work done).<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Most economists hold that the best result of "five democratic years" is<br />
the breakthrough of the private sector <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> economy, because, as<br />
already shown, it is more efficient th<strong>an</strong> the <strong>state</strong> or socialist sector (the profit <strong>in</strong><br />
the private sector is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g at the rate of over 40 per cent, while the profit of<br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d socially-owned enterprises is decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g). However, the fact is that<br />
more th<strong>an</strong> 50 per cent of capital is still <strong>in</strong> the public sector, that is, <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
ownership, so that one c<strong>an</strong>not speak about the f<strong>in</strong>al results of the tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
process without the privatization of that part of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> economy.<br />
Truly, most economists also agree that the privatization process <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia is also accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by <strong>in</strong>justice, sc<strong>an</strong>dals <strong>an</strong>d unlawful tr<strong>an</strong>sactions.<br />
The gloomiest side of the story is that almost everyth<strong>in</strong>g valuable <strong>in</strong> social<br />
ownership has already been sold <strong>an</strong>d that the proceeds from the sale amount<br />
to only 1.7 billion euros (the book value of the property that was on sale after<br />
the adoption of the new privatization law, <strong>in</strong> the summer of 2001, was<br />
allegedly about 20 billion euros). Out of these privatization revenues, about<br />
one billion euros were paid by <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>vestors <strong>an</strong>d the rema<strong>in</strong>der by<br />
domestic tycoons. Those firms had about 227,000 employees <strong>an</strong>d the future of<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>in</strong> Serbia will depend <strong>in</strong> large measure on their fate after the expiry<br />
of the "protection period".<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, the <strong>in</strong>itial results of the tr<strong>an</strong>sition process over the past five<br />
years are def<strong>in</strong>itely favourable, but the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government still has no<br />
sufficient will <strong>an</strong>d capacity to br<strong>in</strong>g the re<strong>for</strong>m processes faster to their logical<br />
end. In addition, it is still spend<strong>in</strong>g too much resources <strong>in</strong> the political sphere<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to preserve some of the strategic illusions of the old regime.<br />
204<br />
205
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
A BURDEN OF POVERTY<br />
Despite the mentioned positive economic <strong>in</strong>dicators, the citizens of<br />
Serbia c<strong>an</strong> hardly give a pass<strong>in</strong>g grade to the previous year. Expert <strong>an</strong>alyses<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the optimistic <strong>for</strong>ecasts of politici<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>in</strong> particular, are still <strong>in</strong> a great<br />
disproportion to the feel<strong>in</strong>gs of the citizens about their st<strong>an</strong>dard of liv<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
which mostly did not live up to expectations, while their perception of the<br />
future is gloomy. Although Serbia’s re<strong>for</strong>m potential has never been too high,<br />
apathy <strong>an</strong>d lethargy among the population have been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g over the<br />
years, thus assum<strong>in</strong>g disturb<strong>in</strong>g proportions. Most citizens describe their<br />
situation as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tolerable <strong>an</strong>d very difficult, <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Dj<strong>in</strong>djić there has been <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of those who<br />
believe that Serbia is mov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the wrong direction, whereby such a view<br />
should not be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as the result of their collective matur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d greater<br />
awareness. All <strong>in</strong>dicators po<strong>in</strong>t to the opposite: the Koštunica cab<strong>in</strong>et failed to<br />
w<strong>in</strong> the confidence of "Dj<strong>in</strong>djić’s supporters"; it lost its credibility among the<br />
supporters of the so-called "patriotic bloc" <strong>an</strong>d, by pursu<strong>in</strong>g the policy of "slow<br />
<strong>an</strong>d cautious steps", it exhausted every possibility <strong>for</strong> resublimation of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ner energy required <strong>for</strong> mobilization <strong>an</strong>d commitment to re<strong>for</strong>ms (at least <strong>in</strong><br />
the case of a more educated segment of society <strong>an</strong>d young people).<br />
The Government’s <strong>in</strong>ability <strong>an</strong>d hesit<strong>an</strong>cy with respect to re<strong>for</strong>ms are<br />
directly reflected on economic <strong>an</strong>d social rights: the consequences of wrong or<br />
delayed political decisions, <strong>in</strong>sufficient competence <strong>an</strong>d (personal <strong>an</strong>d party)<br />
nepotism, reluct<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d unenthusiastic campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st corruption <strong>an</strong>d<br />
crime, successful <strong>an</strong>d unsuccessful privatizations, short-term <strong>an</strong>d partial<br />
solutions <strong>an</strong>d the lack of a long-term vision. Every policy develops or fails to<br />
develop on <strong>an</strong> economic <strong>an</strong>d social pl<strong>an</strong>e, so that the disappo<strong>in</strong>tment of the<br />
citizens should be a clear signal to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government to review its policy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d method of work.<br />
It is the fact that, due to its delayed tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>an</strong>d extremely bad<br />
start<strong>in</strong>g position, Serbia faced m<strong>an</strong>y problems more dramatically th<strong>an</strong> the East<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> countries, <strong>for</strong> example, but the personal experience of its citizens<br />
(poverty, maladjustment, lack of perspective, fear <strong>an</strong>d the like) is common to<br />
all. One of the aggravat<strong>in</strong>g circumst<strong>an</strong>ces is that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> population had<br />
great <strong>an</strong>d frequently unrealistic expectations at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
process (which was also due to its vivid recollection of better life <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
relatively high st<strong>an</strong>dard of liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia). There<strong>for</strong>e, the<br />
"threshold of toler<strong>an</strong>ce" <strong>for</strong> the price of tr<strong>an</strong>sition among the citizens of Serbia<br />
is not very high, while the Koštunica Government succeeded <strong>in</strong> lower<strong>in</strong>g it<br />
<strong>an</strong>d br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g the hitherto results <strong>in</strong>to question with its <strong>in</strong>consistent policy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cheap demagoguery.<br />
The M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour, Employment <strong>an</strong>d Social Policy was one of the<br />
rare m<strong>in</strong>istries that had no subst<strong>an</strong>tive remarks on the work of its predecessors<br />
<strong>an</strong>d cont<strong>in</strong>ued with the re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>in</strong> this sensitive area without <strong>an</strong>y radical step.<br />
So, the Law on Social Welfare <strong>an</strong>d the Provision of Social Security <strong>for</strong> Citizens 1 , on<br />
which the <strong>for</strong>mer m<strong>in</strong>istry had also worked, was f<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>an</strong>d adopted as the<br />
basic document <strong>in</strong> the re<strong>for</strong>m of the social welfare system, which should last<br />
eight years (2001-2008). The new Law on Social Welfare should come <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
on 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2009, after review<strong>in</strong>g all re<strong>for</strong>m results. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, the<br />
current laws <strong>an</strong>d bylaws will be adjusted to the current needs, especially due<br />
to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial ch<strong>an</strong>ges (to that end, the Law was amended at the end of the<br />
year 2 ).<br />
In mid-2005, the M<strong>in</strong>istry presented to the municipalities throughout<br />
Serbia its Draft Strategy of the Re<strong>for</strong>m of the Social Welfare System, which<br />
envisages the improvement of the social welfare system <strong>an</strong>d its adjustment to<br />
the relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational conventions <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, while at the<br />
same time preserv<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms that proved their<br />
efficiency <strong>in</strong> practice. The strategy also <strong>an</strong>nounces some very signific<strong>an</strong>t<br />
novelties. This is very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> view of the fact that the social welfare<br />
system was established <strong>in</strong> the 1970s, so that it is obsolete <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y respects <strong>an</strong>d<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not meet the current needs. In addition to strengthen<strong>in</strong>g the professional<br />
capacity of the employed (which appeared to be a great problem <strong>in</strong> all<br />
segments of society, especially <strong>in</strong> the work with sensitive groups), it provides<br />
<strong>for</strong> partial decentralization by tr<strong>an</strong>sferr<strong>in</strong>g a part of competence <strong>in</strong> the area of<br />
social welfare to the local level (these ch<strong>an</strong>ges will first be effected <strong>in</strong> four pilot<br />
municipalities: Bor, Zemun, Kraljevo <strong>an</strong>d Užice). It was correctly noted that, at<br />
present, Serbia does not meet two basic conditions <strong>for</strong> full decentralization:<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y municipalities are <strong>in</strong>sufficiently developed (some of them are very poor),<br />
while the level of democracy <strong>an</strong>d exist<strong>in</strong>g legislation are <strong>in</strong>sufficient to ensure<br />
the tr<strong>an</strong>sparency of the budget <strong>an</strong>d the ch<strong>an</strong>ge of local authorities <strong>in</strong> case of<br />
abuse. 3 Serbia’s uneven development <strong>an</strong>d the need <strong>for</strong> decentralization<br />
(political, economic, etc.) will certa<strong>in</strong>ly become a priority issue <strong>in</strong> the near<br />
1 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 84/2004, 24 July 2004.<br />
2 The Law Amend<strong>in</strong>g the Law on Social Welfare <strong>an</strong>d the Provision of Social<br />
Security <strong>for</strong> Citizens <strong>an</strong>d the Law Amend<strong>in</strong>g the Law on F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Assist<strong>an</strong>ce to the<br />
Family with Children, Official Gazette of the RS, No.115/05, 22 December 2005.<br />
3 Some countries <strong>in</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition faced great problems, because poor local<br />
communities used to spend money <strong>for</strong> other purposes, so that the most destitute did not<br />
receive <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
206<br />
207
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
future, but its current situation does not allow <strong>an</strong>y experiment <strong>in</strong> the area of<br />
social welfare, <strong>in</strong> particular. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, the service system offered to<br />
welfare recipients should be further decentralized, while at the same time<br />
encourag<strong>in</strong>g a greater participation of the private sector (despite its expressed<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest, it seems that the <strong>state</strong> is slow <strong>an</strong>d unprepared to control it <strong>in</strong> a<br />
responsible <strong>an</strong>d adequate way <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of welfare recipients’ protection).<br />
The next import<strong>an</strong>t step <strong>in</strong> the re<strong>for</strong>m of the social welfare system is<br />
de<strong>in</strong>stitutionalization, that is, the gradual dissolution of <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>for</strong> the<br />
needy <strong>an</strong>d the provision of more <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>e <strong>an</strong>d more efficient care <strong>for</strong> them. For<br />
example, by promot<strong>in</strong>g foster-care placement <strong>an</strong>d adoption <strong>in</strong> the case of<br />
children; by improv<strong>in</strong>g specialized services <strong>an</strong>d the service system <strong>in</strong> the case<br />
of the elderly <strong>an</strong>d disabled, <strong>an</strong>d by develop<strong>in</strong>g open-ended <strong>for</strong>ms of welfare <strong>in</strong><br />
the case of persons with special needs. However, despite tak<strong>in</strong>g positive steps<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the social welfare re<strong>for</strong>m, it is <strong>in</strong>comprehensible that the M<strong>in</strong>istry has<br />
no s<strong>in</strong>gle database relat<strong>in</strong>g to welfare recipients, so that, <strong>for</strong> example, it does<br />
not know the exact number of persons with special needs stay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions throughout Serbia. Judg<strong>in</strong>g by several alarm<strong>in</strong>g stories<br />
about the molestation of wards that have been heard <strong>in</strong> public, it seems that<br />
visits to these <strong>an</strong>d similar <strong>in</strong>stitutions are very rare (especially <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces<br />
or, more precisely, outside large cities) <strong>an</strong>d that the supervision of social<br />
services over them is poor 4 .<br />
Directors of various social-care <strong>in</strong>stitutions are mostly satisfied with<br />
their cooperation with the competent M<strong>in</strong>istry. However, their cooperation<br />
with the competent bodies at the lower level is problematic, which must be<br />
regarded as neglect on the part of the M<strong>in</strong>istry. In 2005, the public was shocked<br />
a few times by media reports on molestation <strong>an</strong>d violence <strong>in</strong> the families<br />
registered with the competent Social Welfare Centres, <strong>an</strong>d even more so by the<br />
absolute lack of professionalism of the employed, as well as the lack of basic<br />
supervision, expert assist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d coord<strong>in</strong>ation among the relev<strong>an</strong>t services<br />
(the police, health <strong>in</strong>stitutions, judiciary, educational authorities, etc.).<br />
There<strong>for</strong>e, the frequently repeated <strong>state</strong>ment about the "phenomenon" of<br />
<strong>in</strong>tolerable behaviour with<strong>in</strong> the needy groups c<strong>an</strong>not be taken as be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
correct. The truth is that such behaviour has been observed throughout Serbia<br />
<strong>for</strong> a long time, but has been brought <strong>in</strong>to the focus just recently.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, it is also true that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society is not sufficiently sensitive<br />
to these problems, which is partly due to its collective frustration <strong>an</strong>d difficult<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions over the past 15 or so years, as well as due to the fact that<br />
poverty, persons with special needs, disabled persons <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
4 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the visit of the representatives of the Little Big Men Org<strong>an</strong>ization,<br />
Nedžad Mec<strong>in</strong>ović, Director of the Home <strong>for</strong> Mentally Retarded Persons <strong>in</strong> Tut<strong>in</strong>, said<br />
that it was the first time <strong>in</strong> two years that someone from Belgrade came to this<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution (Vreme, 19 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006).<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
disadv<strong>an</strong>taged groups have always been looked at as someth<strong>in</strong>g shameful <strong>an</strong>d<br />
devi<strong>an</strong>t, thus be<strong>in</strong>g most frequently hidden from the public so as not to disturb<br />
it by their presence 5 .<br />
The government funds earmarked <strong>for</strong> social welfare amount to about<br />
17 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars 6 yearly, which is not sufficient to provide optimal care <strong>for</strong><br />
welfare recipients. Another problem is posed by their abuse. Namely, dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the past two years, a number of crim<strong>in</strong>al acts was revealed, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g bribes,<br />
the <strong>for</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g of documents <strong>an</strong>d abuse of official position <strong>in</strong> the provision of<br />
various social <strong>security</strong> benefits (<strong>for</strong> maternity leave, disability pensions,<br />
reduced service years <strong>for</strong> retirement, children’s allow<strong>an</strong>ce, etc.). It is assumed,<br />
however, that the number of such cases is even greater.<br />
Due to the problems relat<strong>in</strong>g to the function<strong>in</strong>g of the system, lack of<br />
control mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sufficient cooperation between different m<strong>in</strong>istries<br />
<strong>an</strong>d public services, such abuses will be possible <strong>for</strong> a long time. This stirs up a<br />
revolt <strong>an</strong>d discontent with government <strong>in</strong>stitutions among the beneficiaries, as<br />
well as <strong>in</strong> the whole, generally poor society. When it was disclosed that the<br />
national budget was stripped of several hundred million d<strong>in</strong>ars due to the<br />
abuse of maternal leave, mostly by private firms <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dependent shops,<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Lalović <strong>an</strong>nounced that such cases would be prevented <strong>in</strong> the future.<br />
However, he added that no legal action would be brought aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
perpetrators, "because evidence gather<strong>in</strong>g is a long <strong>an</strong>d uncerta<strong>in</strong> process; it’s<br />
beat<strong>in</strong>g the air" 7 . The M<strong>in</strong>ister’s view implies several import<strong>an</strong>t conclusions:<br />
abuses are possible <strong>an</strong>d are not always punishable; the authorities will turn a<br />
bl<strong>in</strong>d eye to m<strong>an</strong>y illegal acts <strong>in</strong> the name of "higher aims" (<strong>for</strong> example, to<br />
protect the private sector <strong>an</strong>d preserve social tr<strong>an</strong>quility; to avoid com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />
conflict with powerful <strong>in</strong>terest groups if a certa<strong>in</strong> law suits them; to preserve<br />
political stability among the coalition partners; to protect corrupt judges who<br />
are always "useful", etc.). 8<br />
5 The Homes <strong>for</strong> Persons with Special Needs, which were built at the time of<br />
the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia, are mostly located at remote <strong>an</strong>d dist<strong>an</strong>t places (Kul<strong>in</strong>a, Izvor,<br />
Stamnica, Tut<strong>in</strong>, Veliki Popovac, Male Pčelice, etc.), while certa<strong>in</strong> groups of persons<br />
under social care are still outside <strong>an</strong>y <strong>for</strong>m of org<strong>an</strong>ized public assist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d are left to<br />
the resourcefulness of their families.<br />
6 The <strong>in</strong>terview of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Lalović, M<strong>in</strong>ister of Labour, Employment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Social Policy, <strong>for</strong> D<strong>an</strong>as, 15 October 2005.<br />
7 Vreme, 15 December 2005.<br />
8 In a similar way one c<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret numerous <strong>state</strong>ments made by officials of<br />
the political parties participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament relat<strong>in</strong>g to the fraudulent<br />
collection of per diem allow<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d travell<strong>in</strong>g expenses. All representatives of the<br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d lead<strong>in</strong>g opposition parties revoked their adherence to the bad Rules of<br />
Procedure, whereby they “legalized” this evident abuse of funds with the undisputed<br />
elements of a crim<strong>in</strong>al act. The reason lies <strong>in</strong> the fact that all of them were tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>tage of such Rules of Procedure (only to a vary<strong>in</strong>g degree) <strong>an</strong>d that a subst<strong>an</strong>tial<br />
portion of that money pours <strong>in</strong>to the party funds accord<strong>in</strong>g to the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple a<br />
208<br />
209
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005, serious public concern <strong>an</strong>d reaction were caused by<br />
several cases of family violence, especially aga<strong>in</strong>st children, whose brutality<br />
shocked the citizens of Serbia. Although the Family Law 9 , which improves the<br />
protection of women <strong>an</strong>d children <strong>in</strong> the family to a signific<strong>an</strong>t degree, was<br />
adopted at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the year, the whole society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions proved<br />
to be unprepared <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> adequate reaction. When a few acts of violence ended<br />
with the death of children, the government bodies were <strong>for</strong>ced to take<br />
immediate action. This resulted <strong>in</strong> the jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d coord<strong>in</strong>ated activities of<br />
several m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions (the M<strong>in</strong>istries of Labour, Employment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Social Policy, the Interior, Education, Justice <strong>an</strong>d Health, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government’s Council <strong>for</strong> the Rights of the Child, the Centre <strong>for</strong> the Rights of<br />
the Child, etc.), while the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government, on 25 August, adopted the<br />
General Protocol on the Protection of Children Aga<strong>in</strong>st Abuse <strong>an</strong>d Neglect. On 7<br />
October already, the Framework <strong>for</strong> the National Anti-Violence Strategy <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Draft Law on the Child’s Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> were also presented <strong>an</strong>d their adoption is<br />
expected at the spr<strong>in</strong>g session of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament. The Family Law<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced m<strong>an</strong>y novelties <strong>in</strong> the area of family relations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g specifically<br />
the right of the victim of violence to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the flat or the house regardless<br />
of the right of ownership or ten<strong>an</strong>cy. In view of the fact that the most frequent<br />
victims of family violence <strong>in</strong> Serbia are women <strong>an</strong>d children <strong>an</strong>d that flats <strong>an</strong>d<br />
houses are owned by men <strong>in</strong> almost 90 per cent of cases, such a solution<br />
represents a radical step <strong>for</strong>ward. The en<strong>for</strong>cement of the Law beg<strong>an</strong> on 1 July,<br />
so that there are still no data on its effectiveness, but there is no doubt that it<br />
will depend <strong>in</strong> large measure on the adequate <strong>an</strong>d timely reaction by the<br />
police, judiciary <strong>an</strong>d social services. Otherwise, this is the first time that the<br />
provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was ratified 15<br />
years ago, are explicitly stipulated. The Law also provides <strong>for</strong> new<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>for</strong> child protection, while at the same time improv<strong>in</strong>g the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ones; there are also m<strong>an</strong>y novelties <strong>in</strong> the area of marital relations, which<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts to the <strong>in</strong>tention of the society to devote itself seriously to redef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />
family.<br />
There is no doubt that the greatest problem relat<strong>in</strong>g to family relations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d children’s rights also lies <strong>in</strong> undeveloped social awareness, which treats<br />
the family <strong>an</strong>d violence aga<strong>in</strong>st women <strong>an</strong>d children as a private matter <strong>an</strong>d<br />
not as a social problem of paramount import<strong>an</strong>ce, or as <strong>an</strong> essential element of<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d the generally adopted democratic st<strong>an</strong>dards. In this case too,<br />
the competent government bodies have no systematized data or uni<strong>for</strong>m<br />
compulsory contribution towards f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g party activities. As expected, such a<br />
synchronous position of the representatives of the legislative authority, not one<br />
government body found it necessary to carry out <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation. The Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament ch<strong>an</strong>ged the disputed provisions, but only after<br />
the extensive media coverage of this topic <strong>for</strong> days <strong>an</strong>d under strong public pressure.<br />
9 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 18/05, 24 February 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d track<strong>in</strong>g system. After the adoption of the Family Law, the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour, Employment <strong>an</strong>d Social Policy prepared the appropriate<br />
bylaws 10 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>nounced the provision of other mech<strong>an</strong>isms that should<br />
educate the population, improve gender equality <strong>an</strong>d strengthen the protection<br />
of women <strong>an</strong>d children.<br />
The situation is all the more complex, because family relations <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
position of women <strong>an</strong>d children are <strong>in</strong> a casual relationship with poverty,<br />
which is the crucial social <strong>an</strong>d political problem <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
research carried out <strong>in</strong> 2005, 20 per cent of the population is poor, while<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g a comprehensive survey, which was conducted <strong>in</strong> 2002 <strong>for</strong> the<br />
purpose of prepar<strong>in</strong>g the Poverty Reduction Strategy, 11 there is 10.6 per cent of<br />
the poor. At his press conference on 10 October 2005, M<strong>in</strong>ister Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Lalović expla<strong>in</strong>ed such a difference by the application of different criteria: <strong>in</strong><br />
the comprehensive survey of 2002, all those hav<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> 2.4 dollars a day<br />
were considered to be poor, while <strong>in</strong> 2005 this limit was 2.9 dollars, which<br />
me<strong>an</strong>s that all those hav<strong>in</strong>g less th<strong>an</strong> 6,000 d<strong>in</strong>ars each per month are<br />
considered to be poor.<br />
The hardest hit by poverty, apart from women <strong>an</strong>d children, are the<br />
oldest citizens of Serbia – pensioners, who have become real hostages of the<br />
government’s quasi-idea about the <strong>state</strong> of social justice. The economically<br />
exhausted <strong>state</strong>, <strong>in</strong> which all segments of society are ru<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d closer to<br />
welfare considerations th<strong>an</strong> to a healthy recovery, required fast <strong>an</strong>d radical<br />
re<strong>for</strong>ms so as to be laid on a sound foundation. Such measures were also<br />
necessary <strong>in</strong> the area of old-age pension <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, so that the work on the<br />
amendments to the Law on Old-Age Pension <strong>an</strong>d Disability Insur<strong>an</strong>ce 12 was <strong>in</strong> the<br />
focus of attention of the experts, various power brokers, trade unions <strong>an</strong>d,<br />
naturally, pensioners almost throughout the year. The problem of illiquid<br />
pension funds is faced by all countries <strong>in</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sition, but they addressed it <strong>in</strong><br />
different ways. For example, Slovakia, Bulgaria <strong>an</strong>d Rom<strong>an</strong>ia reduced the<br />
pensions to 40 per cent of the average pay, because their governments decided<br />
that their impoverished economies could not bear a heavier burden.<br />
Conversely, the average pension <strong>in</strong> Serbia c<strong>an</strong>not be below 60 per cent of the<br />
average pay, so that half the amount required <strong>for</strong> the payment of pensions is<br />
subsidized from the budget. Such a solution rema<strong>in</strong>ed as a concession to the<br />
trade unions <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Party of Serbia, without whose support the Law<br />
would not be adopted.<br />
10 Official Gazette of the RS, Nos. 56/05, 60/05, 63/05 <strong>an</strong>d 67/05.<br />
11 For more detail about the results of this, hitherto most serious survey of the<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dard of liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d the Poverty Reduction Strategy, see the 2002 Annual Report<br />
“Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> the Shadow of Nationalism – Serbia 2002”, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, Belgrade 2003.<br />
12 The Law Amend<strong>in</strong>g the Law on Old-Age Pension <strong>an</strong>d Disability Insur<strong>an</strong>ce,<br />
Official Gazette of the RS, No. 85/05, 29 September 2005.<br />
210<br />
211
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Serbia has the highest share of pension funds <strong>in</strong> GDP, 14.2 per cent,<br />
compared to the OECD countries where the average share is about 8.2 per cent.<br />
Such a heavy burden imposed on the national economy <strong>an</strong>d the budget is not<br />
susta<strong>in</strong>able over a longer period, while the persistent rejection of more radical<br />
cuts me<strong>an</strong>s the block<strong>in</strong>g of funds <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>an</strong>d job creation. In turn, this<br />
would exert <strong>in</strong>fluence on the stabilization of the pension fund (through a<br />
greater number of paid contributions). Although the Government pl<strong>an</strong>s to<br />
lower the unemployment rate to 10.6 per cent by 2010, "which will me<strong>an</strong> 80 per<br />
cent more of those who pay contributions", 13 m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>alysts f<strong>in</strong>d this to be<br />
unrealistic due to the excessive burden imposed on the economy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong><br />
uncerta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>flow. The Law has one more provision that was<br />
strongly opposed by the IMF: the pensions will be adjusted twice a year, on 1<br />
October <strong>an</strong>d on 1 April. Despite the resist<strong>an</strong>ce of the trade unions <strong>an</strong>d some<br />
political parties, the retirement age will be raised from 58 to 60 years <strong>for</strong><br />
women <strong>an</strong>d from 63 to 65 <strong>for</strong> men. This will be done at six-month <strong>in</strong>tervals,<br />
over a period of four years (2006-2010); the trade unions requested that the<br />
retirement age be raised as of 2015.<br />
At the end of the year, <strong>in</strong> addition to some other, seem<strong>in</strong>gly safeguard<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>for</strong> pensioners, the Parliament adopted the amendments to two<br />
laws govern<strong>in</strong>g the public debt of the Republic of Serbia to pensioners, 14 which<br />
envisage the cash payment of so-called "large debt" <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stalments up to 2008<br />
(payments to farmer pensioners will be made from 2007 to 2010). On the other<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, the reason <strong>for</strong> delay<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>troduction of other types of pension<br />
<strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, the so-called second <strong>an</strong>d third pillars of the pension system -<br />
supplementary voluntary pension <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d autonomous pension<br />
<strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce - lies <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>sufficiently developed bus<strong>in</strong>ess environment. The EU<br />
regulations stipulate that at least 16 per cent of the work<strong>in</strong>g-age population<br />
should <strong>in</strong>vest just <strong>in</strong> these two types of pension <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce. Despite the<br />
presence of several comp<strong>an</strong>ies offer<strong>in</strong>g this type of service (Dunav-TBIH,<br />
Wiener Städtische, Zepter, Delta…), the legal conditions have been created<br />
only recently with the adoption of the Law on Voluntary Pension Funds <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Pension Pl<strong>an</strong>s 15 . Bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the difficult f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial situation of the majority<br />
of the population, as well as great abuses committed with<strong>in</strong> various funds,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the pension one, it c<strong>an</strong> be assumed that it will take quite a bit of time<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e these types of <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce take root. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, the mentioned<br />
measures will not improve the social position of pensioners more signific<strong>an</strong>tly,<br />
while the Government’s hesit<strong>an</strong>cy <strong>an</strong>d calculations will end<strong>an</strong>ger the already<br />
lagg<strong>in</strong>g re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d prolong the agony of the pension fund <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
beneficiaries.<br />
13 Slobod<strong>an</strong> Lalović, Večernje novosti, 17 June 2005.<br />
14 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 115/05, 22 December 2005.<br />
15 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 85/05, 29 September 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Scrap<strong>in</strong>g along with the IMF, as well as empty boast<strong>in</strong>g us<strong>in</strong>g cheap<br />
demagoguery on the <strong>in</strong>ternal pl<strong>an</strong>e produced only partial results. The<br />
negotiations with the IMF were successfully f<strong>in</strong>alized; a compromise solution<br />
was found with respect to the re<strong>for</strong>m of the pension funds, but the government<br />
obliged itself to cut its costs by about 25 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>in</strong> 2006, by reduc<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
number of employed <strong>in</strong> educational <strong>an</strong>d health care <strong>in</strong>stitutions, salaries of<br />
beneficiaries of budgetary funds <strong>an</strong>d the employed <strong>in</strong> public enterprises, as<br />
well as subsidies to ru<strong>in</strong>ed socially-owned enterprises. Instead of creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> a free market competition, the Government opted from the very<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> strict control of the economic agents <strong>an</strong>d the market itself (by the<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t laws <strong>an</strong>d regulations <strong>an</strong>d permissible <strong>an</strong>d impermissible<br />
<strong>in</strong>terventions), thus contribut<strong>in</strong>g to the preservation of a negative picture about<br />
the bus<strong>in</strong>ess climate <strong>in</strong> Serbia. In general, this is the major reason <strong>for</strong> the lack of<br />
large <strong>an</strong>d serious <strong>in</strong>vestments. More detailed comments <strong>an</strong>d the evaluation of<br />
the Government’s work were also made by the Foreign Investors Council 16 <strong>in</strong><br />
its White Book, which was published at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the year. The<br />
Government was almost <strong>in</strong>sulted at the comments, while Vice Premier<br />
Miroljub Labus called the Council "a group of speculative <strong>in</strong>vestors look<strong>in</strong>g<br />
only after their own <strong>in</strong>terests" 17 . Among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, the Foreign Investors<br />
Council described the Government’s policy as be<strong>in</strong>g populist, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>flexible Labour Law as <strong>an</strong> example. 18 The Law was adopted early <strong>in</strong> 2005,<br />
under the pressure of the trade unions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the atmosphere filled with high<br />
tensions <strong>an</strong>d strike threats, which marked the previous year (2004). It is no<br />
secret that the Law is the result of Vojislav Koštunica’s barga<strong>in</strong> with the two<br />
largest trade unions, the Independent Trade Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the Br<strong>an</strong>ch<br />
Union Confederation "Independence", <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>for</strong> their political support at<br />
the elections staged after the fall of the DOS. The <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>vestors’<br />
representatives, the World B<strong>an</strong>k <strong>an</strong>d the IMF, political parties constitut<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer DOS, as well as G-17 Plus resisted resolutely the ch<strong>an</strong>ge of the previous<br />
Labour Law (adopted on 12 December 2001), which was regarded as one of the<br />
most pro-re<strong>for</strong>m laws after 5 October 2000. The new Labour Law reaffirmed<br />
collective contracts; improved the protection of workers <strong>an</strong>d restricted the<br />
employers’ rights; returned the social function to enterprises, etc. After the<br />
long-last<strong>in</strong>g reconciliation of the views of all <strong>in</strong>terested parties <strong>an</strong>d the sc<strong>an</strong>dal<br />
caused by the submission to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> President <strong>for</strong> signature of a different<br />
version th<strong>an</strong> that adopted <strong>in</strong> the Parliament, the Labour Law was f<strong>in</strong>ally<br />
adopted on 8 March 2005.<br />
16 The Foreign Investors Council gathers more th<strong>an</strong> one hundred largest<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>ies, which have so far <strong>in</strong>vested about two billion euros <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
17 Ekonomist, 28 March 2005.<br />
18 Official Gazette of the SR, No. 24/05, 15 March 2005.<br />
212<br />
213
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, numerous laws of utmost signific<strong>an</strong>ce have not<br />
been adopted without justification. At the end of 2002 already, when the<br />
process of privatization under the new law actually beg<strong>an</strong>, the then<br />
Government <strong>an</strong>nounced the urgent draft<strong>in</strong>g of the Law on Investment Funds<br />
so as to prevent the entry of speculative <strong>an</strong>d dubious <strong>in</strong>vestment funds <strong>in</strong>to<br />
Serbia. However, the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Dj<strong>in</strong>djić, a few months<br />
later, marked the end of this legislative activity <strong>an</strong>d it took the new<br />
Government two years to prepare the draft law. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, a number of<br />
enterprises was privatized by dubious <strong>in</strong>vestment funds, to say the least, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the law has not been enacted to the present day. On the website of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Parliament one c<strong>an</strong> read that the Government submitted the Draft Law on<br />
Investment Funds to the Parliament on 8 September 2005. Despite the appeals of<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>essmen, the Draft Law on Foreign Exch<strong>an</strong>ge Operations was submitted to<br />
the Parliament as late as 15 July <strong>an</strong>d it is still <strong>in</strong> parliamentary procedure. The<br />
Law on the Employment of Foreign Citizens has been necessary s<strong>in</strong>ce the arrival of<br />
a greater number of <strong>for</strong>eign firms <strong>in</strong> Serbia. In addition, it should regulate<br />
migratory movements which have been go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> some parts of the country<br />
<strong>for</strong> years. The draft law has been <strong>in</strong> parliamentary procedure s<strong>in</strong>ce 22 June<br />
2005. The Government was especially criticized <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>tentions were<br />
doubted due to the non-existence of the Law on the Takeover of Jo<strong>in</strong>t-Stock<br />
Comp<strong>an</strong>ies. The sale of shares <strong>an</strong>d takeovers were accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by several<br />
greater sc<strong>an</strong>dals (which also raised doubt about a high degree of corruption),<br />
while the bypass<strong>in</strong>g of the stock exch<strong>an</strong>ge, the only legal market mech<strong>an</strong>ism,<br />
has almost become a regular feature. Nevertheless, the Government submitted<br />
the Draft Law on the Takeover of Jo<strong>in</strong>t-Stock Comp<strong>an</strong>ies to the Parliament as late as<br />
14 December 2005, which me<strong>an</strong>s that it will be adopted <strong>in</strong> the near future. Only<br />
the long-awaited Mortgage Law 19 was adopted at the very end of the year.<br />
An even greater problem is posed by the non-application of the<br />
exist<strong>in</strong>g laws, modified operat<strong>in</strong>g conditions (<strong>for</strong> example, the Government<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased tobacco excise taxes twice <strong>in</strong> a year, although it guar<strong>an</strong>teed to British<br />
Tobacco <strong>an</strong>d Philip Morris that they would not be ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>for</strong> five years),<br />
<strong>in</strong>efficient public services, unregulated property-law relations, <strong>state</strong> ownership<br />
of municipal l<strong>an</strong>d, etc. If one also takes <strong>in</strong>to account the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly more<br />
frequent <strong>in</strong>dications that there is corruption at the very top of the government,<br />
it is clear why Serbia is still not attractive <strong>for</strong> serious <strong>in</strong>vestors.<br />
All this exerts <strong>in</strong>fluence on the "question of all questions", the problem<br />
of unemployment. Early <strong>in</strong> March 2005, M<strong>in</strong>ister Lalović said that "the<br />
<strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g restructur<strong>in</strong>g of large enterprises will certa<strong>in</strong>ly contribute to a rise<br />
<strong>in</strong> unemployment <strong>an</strong>d that this Government has no <strong>in</strong>tention to ease its<br />
conscience with sever<strong>an</strong>ce pay, after which the same workers will become<br />
19 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 115/05, 22 December 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
welfare cases; <strong>in</strong>stead, it wishes to solve this problem over a long term". 20<br />
Three months later, the restructur<strong>in</strong>g of enterprises was still "<strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g"<br />
("The restructur<strong>in</strong>g process <strong>in</strong> public enterprises should be accelerated so as to<br />
be f<strong>in</strong>ished dur<strong>in</strong>g the current <strong>an</strong>d the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the com<strong>in</strong>g year" 21 ) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
noth<strong>in</strong>g signific<strong>an</strong>t has happened to the present day. Although all economic<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicators po<strong>in</strong>t to the unviability of these expensive <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>efficient <strong>state</strong><br />
monopolists (it is held that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Railways, EPS, JAT Airways, NIS, PTT<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Telekom had the greatest <strong>in</strong>fluence on high <strong>in</strong>flation <strong>in</strong> 2005), the current<br />
Government is still hesit<strong>an</strong>t about solv<strong>in</strong>g this problem. Naturally, the greatest<br />
problem is not posed by the separation of non-core activities from core ones,<br />
although the employed also stood up to that process (where it was<br />
conducted). 22<br />
Although some workers have accepted the offer to leave their<br />
enterprises voluntarily <strong>an</strong>d receive sever<strong>an</strong>ce pay, that is far from be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
sufficient to relieve public enterprises of redund<strong>an</strong>cies. Early <strong>in</strong> 2005, only n<strong>in</strong>e<br />
large public enterprises at the republic<strong>an</strong> level had 137,000 employees (as <strong>for</strong><br />
redund<strong>an</strong>cies <strong>in</strong> public enterprises at the local level, the Government has not<br />
yet dealt with this problem) <strong>an</strong>d only a few thous<strong>an</strong>d applied <strong>for</strong> voluntary<br />
leave. Be<strong>in</strong>g aware that a great number of people should leave the restructured<br />
public systems <strong>an</strong>d that there are no new jobs <strong>for</strong> them, the Government does<br />
not hurry to accelerate this pa<strong>in</strong>ful process, thus buy<strong>in</strong>g social tr<strong>an</strong>quility<br />
which it needs very much <strong>in</strong> the year of great political challenges. Despite the<br />
fact that the whole monetary-economic system is burdened by this problem,<br />
which has not yet been solved, there is no much justice <strong>in</strong> that false "social<br />
care". Namely, <strong>in</strong> public enterprises new jobs are still be<strong>in</strong>g created (<strong>for</strong> those<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g politically fit <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> party officials), which <strong>in</strong>cites the revolt of those<br />
who have lost their jobs, as well as the justified fear of the employed that,<br />
when it comes to the dismissal of redund<strong>an</strong>t workers, political adherence will<br />
be more import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>an</strong> one’s work<strong>in</strong>g experience or social situation. Unequal<br />
treatment, based on a political assessment, was also faced by the employed <strong>in</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>y privatized enterprises <strong>an</strong>d even more so by those whose enterprises<br />
went b<strong>an</strong>krupt. The government provided <strong>for</strong> their social <strong>security</strong> by<br />
20 The press conference held on the occasion of the first <strong>an</strong>niversary of the<br />
Government’s work, Belgrade, 2 March 2005.<br />
21 The <strong>in</strong>terview of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Lalović <strong>for</strong> Politika, 20 June 2005.<br />
22 The underly<strong>in</strong>g reason <strong>for</strong> numerous strikes staged by railway workers,<br />
Telekom employees, certa<strong>in</strong> divisions of EPS <strong>an</strong>d NIS, as well as blockades <strong>in</strong> JAT<br />
Airways <strong>for</strong> several months dur<strong>in</strong>g 2004 <strong>an</strong>d 2005 should be sought <strong>in</strong> the fear of the<br />
employed that the <strong>an</strong>nounced restructur<strong>in</strong>g of their enterprises would leave them<br />
without their jobs, or that the newly established firms would be left to the market <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cutthroat competition <strong>for</strong> which they were not prepared.<br />
214<br />
215
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
establish<strong>in</strong>g the Solidarity Fund 23 , which should cover a part of the f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
obligations towards the employees of b<strong>an</strong>krupt enterprises, whose b<strong>an</strong>krupt<br />
e<strong>state</strong> is not sufficient <strong>for</strong> the settlement of their claims. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Lalović, 300 million d<strong>in</strong>ars from the 2005 budget were earmarked <strong>for</strong> this<br />
purpose <strong>an</strong>d the Fund will also function <strong>in</strong> 2006. The Law stipulates only the<br />
payment of a portion of money owed (on four grounds) <strong>for</strong> the calendar year<br />
<strong>in</strong> which the b<strong>an</strong>kruptcy proceed<strong>in</strong>gs were <strong>in</strong>itiated. In addition to the fact that<br />
such a small amount c<strong>an</strong>not improve the desperate social position of these<br />
workers, there rema<strong>in</strong>s the problem of outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g payments <strong>for</strong> the previous<br />
years.<br />
The employed <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y enterprises undergo<strong>in</strong>g the b<strong>an</strong>kruptcy<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are rightfully <strong>in</strong>dign<strong>an</strong>t because m<strong>an</strong>y m<strong>an</strong>agers (<strong>an</strong>d members of<br />
their M<strong>an</strong>agement Boards) became unjustly rich at the time when their<br />
enterprises were ru<strong>in</strong>ed, not to mention high fees paid to trustees <strong>in</strong><br />
b<strong>an</strong>kruptcy thereafter. Suffice it to say that m<strong>an</strong>y m<strong>an</strong>agers also bought their<br />
enterprises at extremely low prices later on <strong>an</strong>d that nobody was ever the<br />
subject of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation or a court trial.<br />
In order to lessen great social differences <strong>an</strong>d improve the position of<br />
those who were especially affected by s<strong>an</strong>ctions, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament<br />
adopted, <strong>in</strong> September, the Law on the Payment of Contributions Towards Old-Age<br />
Pension <strong>an</strong>d Disability Insur<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> Specified Categories of Insured Employees 24 ,<br />
which was popularly called the Law on the Consolidation of Years of Service.<br />
Under the Law, the <strong>state</strong> assumed the obligation to consolidate years of service<br />
(by pay<strong>in</strong>g contributions) <strong>for</strong> all those who were employed from 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary<br />
1999 to 31 December 2003 <strong>an</strong>d whose employers did not pay contributions <strong>for</strong><br />
them. The time-limit <strong>for</strong> the submission of the prescribed documentation<br />
expired on 14 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006, but there are still no official data on the number of<br />
submitted applications. As already practiced, this Law is imprecise, naturally,<br />
<strong>for</strong> a very pragmatic reason: only when the F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister estimates the cost<br />
of this "social care" measure, it will be known whether some enterprises will<br />
pay the necessary amount by themselves, or the <strong>state</strong> will discharge this<br />
obligation towards the Old-Age Pension <strong>an</strong>d Disability Insur<strong>an</strong>ce Fund <strong>in</strong> full<br />
(albeit to the lowest amount). M<strong>an</strong>y have also observed that the competent<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istries (especially the M<strong>in</strong>istries of Labour <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce) did not bother too<br />
much to expla<strong>in</strong> to the citizens the signific<strong>an</strong>ce of submitt<strong>in</strong>g such <strong>an</strong><br />
application, nor did this topic receive adequate media coverage. S<strong>in</strong>ce the time-<br />
23 The establishment of the Solidarity Fund is stipulated by the new Labour<br />
Law, but it beg<strong>an</strong> to function only six months later. At the press conference held on this<br />
occasion on 16 September, Director Jabl<strong>an</strong> Obradović said that he expected about 10,000<br />
applications by the end of the year. However, there are still no exact data on the number<br />
of workers who submitted their applications to the Fund <strong>an</strong>d whether their claims were<br />
settled.<br />
24 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 85/05, 29 September 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
limit was not extended, m<strong>an</strong>y of them heard about this possibility too late.<br />
However, M<strong>in</strong>ister D<strong>in</strong>kić expressed his satisfaction, emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that the<br />
number of applications was smaller th<strong>an</strong> expected (feared). But, even if the<br />
<strong>state</strong> assumes full responsibility <strong>for</strong> the consolidation of years of service <strong>for</strong><br />
those who submitted their applications with<strong>in</strong> the prescribed time-limit by the<br />
end of 2006, it will be confronted sooner or later with tens of thous<strong>an</strong>ds of<br />
workers who did not take this opportunity.<br />
Instead of reliev<strong>in</strong>g itself of the social function <strong>an</strong>d mak<strong>in</strong>g more<br />
resolute steps so as to provide <strong>for</strong> a creative <strong>an</strong>d productive bus<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
environment, one gets <strong>an</strong> impression that, <strong>in</strong> comparison with the Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Dj<strong>in</strong>djić Government, the economic <strong>an</strong>d social policy pursued by this<br />
Government represents a big step backward. While certa<strong>in</strong> steps of the first<br />
pro-re<strong>for</strong>m Government c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>for</strong>given (or at least understood <strong>in</strong> view of the<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces), there is hardly <strong>an</strong>y excuse <strong>for</strong> the current Government. Despite<br />
clear economic logic <strong>an</strong>d bad experience, the Government cont<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
subsidize ru<strong>in</strong>ed enterprises <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>crease social <strong>security</strong> benefits. In the middle<br />
of the year, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Lalović admitted that such a policy did not make much<br />
sense: "Only <strong>in</strong> the period from 2001 to the present day, about 11 billion d<strong>in</strong>ars<br />
from the budget were <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong> Zastava <strong>an</strong>d, as you c<strong>an</strong> see, there are no<br />
results". 25 At that time, however, the discontented workers of ru<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
enterprises <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac received the lump-sum f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial assist<strong>an</strong>ce of 15,000<br />
d<strong>in</strong>ars each from the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government. The <strong>in</strong>tention was to help the 9,000<br />
most destitute workers, but this sparked off the protests of other Zastava<br />
workers, so that the Mayor of Kragujevac, Veroljub Stev<strong>an</strong>ović, rushed to their<br />
aid <strong>an</strong>d promised additional funds from the municipal budget <strong>for</strong> all 15,500<br />
workers (naturally, at the expense of some other destitute groups). Lump-sum<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial assist<strong>an</strong>ce was also provided to Kuršumlija <strong>an</strong>d this is how the<br />
Government frequently reacted <strong>in</strong> its negotiations with the dissatisfied trade<br />
unions <strong>an</strong>d workers. The National Employment Strategy <strong>for</strong> 2005/2010, which<br />
was adopted by the Government on 14 April 2005, also relies on social welfare.<br />
Contradictory <strong>state</strong>ments are even more characteristic of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić who, at the sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Memor<strong>an</strong>dum on Cooperation<br />
between the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government <strong>an</strong>d the local governments of Kragujevac Bor<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Vr<strong>an</strong>je, 26 said that subsidies would be stopped <strong>in</strong> 2006; a few months later,<br />
<strong>in</strong> the 2006 budget, subsidies were reported as a separate item <strong>an</strong>d as hidden<br />
subsidies with<strong>in</strong> the rather large current reserves. The mentioned<br />
Memor<strong>an</strong>dum <strong>an</strong>ticipates the credit<strong>in</strong>g of beneficiaries <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac, Bor <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Vr<strong>an</strong>je (<strong>in</strong> the previous period the largest subsidies were gr<strong>an</strong>ted just to these<br />
25 Politika, 20 June 2005.<br />
26 The Memor<strong>an</strong>dum on Cooperation was signed on 27 June 2005, <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
On behalf of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government it was signed by F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić,<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister of Economy Predrag Bubalo <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Labour, Employment <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Social Policy, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Lalović.<br />
216<br />
217
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
two municipalities 27 ) so as to encourage development <strong>an</strong>d employment. The<br />
amount of 800 million d<strong>in</strong>ars was provided <strong>for</strong> long-term credit<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
projects enabl<strong>in</strong>g a rise <strong>in</strong> employment <strong>an</strong>d exports (out of this amount, 400<br />
million d<strong>in</strong>ars went to Kragujevac <strong>an</strong>d 200 million d<strong>in</strong>ars each to Vr<strong>an</strong>je <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Bor). Although these funds will not be sufficient to ch<strong>an</strong>ge the economic<br />
situation <strong>in</strong> these municipalities more signific<strong>an</strong>tly, they are still very<br />
import<strong>an</strong>t if one bears <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that, over the past five years, 520 million d<strong>in</strong>ars<br />
have been ch<strong>an</strong>nelled only <strong>in</strong>to Kragujevac, <strong>for</strong> example. F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić <strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong> May 28 that the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> International<br />
Economic Relations was mak<strong>in</strong>g preparations <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
conference <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac on which occasion the city would offer favourable<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mation of new comp<strong>an</strong>ies to potential <strong>in</strong>vestors (free<br />
municipal l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d utility hook-ups, free <strong>an</strong>d fast gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g of build<strong>in</strong>g<br />
permits, etc.).<br />
Underway is also the preparation of the Law on Industrial E<strong>state</strong>s (with<br />
<strong>in</strong>centive taxes, lower th<strong>an</strong> the current ones), accord<strong>in</strong>g to which one of those<br />
e<strong>state</strong>s would be located <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac, as <strong>an</strong> added impetus to faster<br />
employment <strong>an</strong>d the recovery of this large <strong>an</strong>d ru<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>dustrial centre (which<br />
is also politically problematic due to cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g workers’ strikes 29 ). In the<br />
course of the year, the unemployed <strong>in</strong> Serbia could also obta<strong>in</strong> micro-credits to<br />
the amount of 5,000-20,000 euros <strong>for</strong> the start-up of a bus<strong>in</strong>ess, but their<br />
number is still <strong>in</strong>sufficient <strong>an</strong>d the credit terms are frequently restrictive. The<br />
credit terms offered by commercial b<strong>an</strong>ks are even more unfavourable, which<br />
prevents m<strong>an</strong>y economically active agents from <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the volume of their<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d, thus, creat<strong>in</strong>g new jobs. Despite all this, if the Government<br />
reduces its subsidies drastically <strong>an</strong>d ch<strong>an</strong>nels these funds <strong>in</strong>to employment,<br />
that will be a signific<strong>an</strong>t step <strong>for</strong>ward – at least towards discont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
practice of buy<strong>in</strong>g social tr<strong>an</strong>quility over a short term. A rise <strong>in</strong> employment<br />
would not only ease the pressure on social funds, but would also ensure their<br />
stability <strong>an</strong>d better care <strong>for</strong> those welfare recipients who really need it. One of<br />
the most import<strong>an</strong>t problems <strong>in</strong> all countries, especially tr<strong>an</strong>sition ones, is<br />
(un)employment.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the data of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Bureau of Statistics, 30 <strong>in</strong><br />
December 2005 <strong>in</strong> Serbia, there were 2,045,087 employed <strong>an</strong>d 990,669 job<br />
27 F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić said on 13 May <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac that <strong>in</strong> the<br />
period from 2001 to the present day the Government subsidized Zastava with 150<br />
million euros.<br />
28 www.m<strong>in</strong>rzs.sr.gov.yu.<br />
29 Dur<strong>in</strong>g his visit to Kragujevac on 13 May, Capital Investments M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Velimir Ilić po<strong>in</strong>ted out that “subsidies <strong>an</strong>d workers’ protests are not the correct way to<br />
solve the perennial problems of the factories”.<br />
30 Mesečni statistički bilten broj 40, National Employment Office, Belgrade,<br />
December 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
seekers, of whom 542,376 (54.7 per cent) were women; among the latter there<br />
were 895,697 active job seekers, while other job seekers <strong>in</strong>cluded those be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
temporarily unable or unready to work 31 , part-time employees, persons<br />
wish<strong>in</strong>g to ch<strong>an</strong>ge their jobs, as well as persons whose rights were temporarily<br />
suspended as stipulated by law. 32 What especially raises concerns is the fact<br />
that among the unemployed there were 466,924 persons seek<strong>in</strong>g employment<br />
<strong>for</strong> the first time (of whom 269,160, or 50.7 per cent, were women). Serbia holds<br />
the first place <strong>in</strong> Europe accord<strong>in</strong>g to the number of unemployed persons<br />
younger th<strong>an</strong> 30. The M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour <strong>an</strong>nounced the adoption of a set of<br />
measures <strong>in</strong> mid-2006, which would motivate employers to employ just this<br />
category of unemployed persons, bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that it was the question of<br />
educated personnel be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> all sectors (69.8 per cent of the<br />
registered needs <strong>in</strong> 2005 accounted <strong>for</strong> skilled labour).<br />
The unstable bus<strong>in</strong>ess environment generates one more negative trend<br />
<strong>in</strong> the area of employment. Like <strong>in</strong> the previous years, even 60.1 per cent of<br />
vac<strong>an</strong>cies <strong>in</strong> 2005 accounted <strong>for</strong> part-time employment <strong>an</strong>d 39.9 per cent <strong>for</strong><br />
full-time employment. Numerous other statistical data also po<strong>in</strong>t to the trends<br />
<strong>an</strong>d provide the guidel<strong>in</strong>es that the Government should <strong>an</strong>alyze more<br />
seriously. However, experience has shown that political <strong>in</strong>dicators have most<br />
frequently taken priority over economic ones, so that there is little hope that<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g will ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> that respect. This is also shown by the fact that the<br />
private sector (no matter how weak <strong>an</strong>d without <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>an</strong>d adequate<br />
protection) is cont<strong>in</strong>uously record<strong>in</strong>g a rise <strong>in</strong> productivity <strong>an</strong>d creat<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
greatest number of new jobs 33 , despite political pragmatism <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> ideologized<br />
economy, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the suspension of the privatization process <strong>in</strong> 2004,<br />
prolongation of the process of restructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sell<strong>in</strong>g large systems <strong>an</strong>d<br />
public enterprises <strong>an</strong>d the "protection" of the <strong>state</strong>/national <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
other cases <strong>in</strong> a very dubious way.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the data of the Privatization Agency, 34 1,247 enterprises<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia have been sold by public auction <strong>an</strong>d 1,003 have not; 58 enterprises<br />
have been sold by tender <strong>an</strong>d 95 have not. Underway are preparations <strong>for</strong> the<br />
privatization of 37 enterprises, while 93 enterprises are still undergo<strong>in</strong>g<br />
31 Persons who are currently unable or unready to work <strong>for</strong> justified reasons,<br />
such as: maternity leave, longer sick leave, natural disaster, respond<strong>in</strong>g to the call of a<br />
government body, etc.<br />
32 For example, the rights <strong>an</strong>d responsibilities are temporarily suspended<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g military service, while serv<strong>in</strong>g a sentence, <strong>for</strong> the duration of the pronounced<br />
<strong>security</strong>, corrective or protective measure, etc.<br />
33 Compared to 2004, the labour dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the private sector rose by 33.8 per<br />
cent, as opposed to the socially-owned one, where it rose by only 1.5 per cent; the<br />
private sector recorded a rise <strong>in</strong> employment by 36.3 per cent, as opposed to the sociallyowned<br />
one, where it rose by only 5.63 per cent.<br />
34 www.mpriv.sr.gov.yu.<br />
218<br />
219
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
restructur<strong>in</strong>g. Despite be<strong>in</strong>g the "proponent of fast privatization", the M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
of Economy <strong>an</strong>d Privatization, Predrag Bubalo, defended the subsidiz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
strategy <strong>in</strong> 2005, argu<strong>in</strong>g that those firms should "be prepared <strong>for</strong><br />
privatization, that is, be recovered to such <strong>an</strong> extent as to be <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>vestors" 35 . M<strong>in</strong>ister Bubalo often cites the cases of firms which used to be<br />
subsidized <strong>in</strong> the past "but after be<strong>in</strong>g sold, those subsidies are gr<strong>an</strong>ted by<br />
buyers". However, he never <strong>state</strong>d precisely what benefit (if <strong>an</strong>y) the <strong>state</strong><br />
derived from delay<strong>in</strong>g the privatization process <strong>an</strong>d whether the buyers were<br />
selected solely on the basis of economic considerations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> a tr<strong>an</strong>sparent<br />
procedure. These issues are subject to severe criticism by economic <strong>an</strong>alysts<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the public, as well as by the Anticorruption Council, whose Chairwom<strong>an</strong><br />
Verica Barać accused the present Government of be<strong>in</strong>g the centre of<br />
corruption: "It is evident that the executive authority enables high corruption<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that the judiciary permits that such corruption is not punishable." 36<br />
Although the first dubious privatizations were carried out dur<strong>in</strong>g the Dj<strong>in</strong>djić<br />
Government already, Verica Barać emphasizes that at that time they at least<br />
talked to her <strong>an</strong>d that the topic was not "whether there is corruption", but how<br />
to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the dubious cases <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiate the relev<strong>an</strong>t proceed<strong>in</strong>gs so as to<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>e responsibility. The general public still remembers the extensive<br />
debate between the Anticorruption Council <strong>an</strong>d the then M<strong>in</strong>istry of Economy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Privatization, as well as the serious documentation prepared by the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d the Privatization Agency <strong>in</strong> response to the Council’s accusations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d their meet<strong>in</strong>gs devoted to the problem of corruption. In this connection,<br />
the present Government exhibits arrog<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d irresponsible behaviour,<br />
argu<strong>in</strong>g that there is no <strong>an</strong>y affair or corruption. However, reality denied it to<br />
be the case. The Government was faced with real sc<strong>an</strong>dals a few times, but<br />
none of them has been <strong>in</strong>vestigated to the present day, nor has the public been<br />
appeased by a basic yet <strong>in</strong>complete <strong>in</strong>vestigation.<br />
In the case of the Knjaz Miloš m<strong>in</strong>eral water factory, the Government<br />
disavowed the Securities Commission, laws <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament itself<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> unprecedented way. However, it was never <strong>in</strong>vestigated who exerted<br />
pressure on the Commission, who stood beh<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>vestment fund Balk<strong>an</strong><br />
Ltd, which m<strong>in</strong>isters were directly <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the unlawful sale, etc. The<br />
takeover of C-market was also marked by pressure on the shareholders <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
very dubious sale, but there was no <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong> this case either. There are<br />
also no <strong>an</strong>swers with respect to illegal sugar imports <strong>an</strong>d exports, electric<br />
power imports <strong>an</strong>d the l<strong>in</strong>k of the top m<strong>an</strong>agement of the British comp<strong>an</strong>y ETF<br />
with the rul<strong>in</strong>g Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), tender <strong>for</strong> the Airport,<br />
found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d subsequent sale of the National Sav<strong>in</strong>gs B<strong>an</strong>k, Jugoremedija,<br />
Veter<strong>in</strong>ary Research Institute, Venčac, etc. The past year will also be<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
remembered because the Public Procurement Law was violated by the highest<br />
government bodies <strong>an</strong>d large public enterprises. Namely, after a number of<br />
disputed procurements by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior, which raised doubts<br />
about corruption, the Government decided to exempt the M<strong>in</strong>istry from the<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement of this Law by a decree, 37 thus allow<strong>in</strong>g it to proclaim virtually<br />
everyth<strong>in</strong>g to be confidential procurement - immovable <strong>an</strong>d movable property,<br />
as well as spare parts. Thus, the Government assigned the legislative function<br />
to itself <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>ister was given a free h<strong>an</strong>d to procure property,<br />
equipment, services <strong>an</strong>d works through direct contract<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The purchase of used tra<strong>in</strong>s from Sweden <strong>for</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Railways<br />
also received wide media coverage. It was made outside the legal procedure<br />
<strong>an</strong>d despite the warn<strong>in</strong>g of the Public Procurement Adm<strong>in</strong>istration. On the<br />
pretext that the purchase was <strong>in</strong>dispensable <strong>an</strong>d urgently needed <strong>for</strong> the<br />
approach<strong>in</strong>g summer season, this public enterprise bought tra<strong>in</strong>s (with the<br />
benevolence of the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Capital Investments) under a direct leas<strong>in</strong>g<br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gement, through the supplier – private cloth<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies – at a very<br />
high price (unrealistic, accord<strong>in</strong>g to experts)! The UBPOK (Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime<br />
Directorate) launched <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation, but it has not yet produced <strong>an</strong>y results,<br />
nor have these tra<strong>in</strong>s been put <strong>in</strong>to operation to the present day (although<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Velimir Ilić argued that they were <strong>in</strong> good order <strong>an</strong>d almost new, due<br />
to which they were expensive).<br />
In 2005, the greatest attention was attracted by the sale of the private<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y BK Trade, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a part of Mobtel. The sensational news about the<br />
sale of Mobtel to the Russi<strong>an</strong> Alpha Group was <strong>an</strong>nounced early <strong>in</strong> March. The<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g month, this news was confirmed <strong>an</strong>d denied from various sources,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the parties to the deal <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government. The public was<br />
showered with confused <strong>an</strong>d contradictory <strong>state</strong>ments by the highest<br />
government officials on a daily basis, thus creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> impression that some<br />
negotiations were conducted, that some government officials knew or were<br />
"<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the deal" <strong>an</strong>d that the negative outcome followed due to the clash<br />
of different <strong>in</strong>terests (economic <strong>an</strong>d political), which rema<strong>in</strong>ed a secret <strong>for</strong> the<br />
general public. This deal was unacceptable <strong>for</strong> the Government <strong>an</strong>d, after the<br />
talks with the Russi<strong>an</strong> diplomats, the whole case was dismissed <strong>an</strong>d nobody<br />
knows what actually happened. The Government imposed <strong>an</strong> impression that<br />
it blocked the deal so as to protect the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> Mobtel. However, on 12<br />
May, the media reported that BK Trade, which is the (disputed) owner of 51<br />
per cent of Mobtel, was sold to the Austri<strong>an</strong> Schlaf Group. Like <strong>in</strong> the first case,<br />
the representatives of the Government <strong>an</strong>d JP PTT Serbia claimed at first they<br />
had no <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about this sale <strong>an</strong>d that the Government would not<br />
negotiate it with <strong>an</strong>ybody prior to the settlement of the dispute be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
35 Vreme, 12 May 2005.<br />
36 Vreme, 5 May 2005.<br />
37 The Decree on Special-Purpose Resources, Official Gazette of the RS, No.<br />
29/2005, 1 April 2005.<br />
220<br />
221
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational arbitration <strong>in</strong> Zurich. It turned out very soon that – outside the<br />
eyes of the public <strong>an</strong>d other potential buyers – the Government held the talks<br />
with Mart<strong>in</strong> Schlaf about the payment of dividends which PTT Serbia claimed<br />
from Mobtel. So, the Government accepted the new co-owner of Mobtel <strong>an</strong>d<br />
turned to the negotiations with him.<br />
The media reported on this deal only <strong>in</strong> brief <strong>an</strong>d from time to time.<br />
Instead, they beg<strong>an</strong> to show a keen <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong> of the wealth of the<br />
Karić family. F<strong>in</strong>ally, two days be<strong>for</strong>e the New Year, the Government made a<br />
radical move - it revoked the licence to Mobtel justify<strong>in</strong>g this act by the<br />
generally known, two-year old "harmful agreement" with the firm Mobikos<br />
from Peć owned by Ekrem Lluka, thus open<strong>in</strong>g up two fronts: it entered <strong>in</strong>to a<br />
(seem<strong>in</strong>gly) radical showdown with the Karić family <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>to a less pleas<strong>an</strong>t<br />
dispute with the Austri<strong>an</strong> owner of BK Trade <strong>an</strong>d the co-owner of Mobtel.<br />
Apart from tax evasion, the proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st Bogoljub Karić are also<br />
conducted <strong>for</strong> his alleged attempt to bribe deputies <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament,<br />
whereby the whole case assumed a political dimension. Every day the public is<br />
supplied with new <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about the wealth of the Karić family, tax<br />
evasion <strong>an</strong>d damage <strong>in</strong>flicted on the <strong>state</strong>. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, they proclaimed<br />
themselves the victim of political persecution <strong>an</strong>d left the country. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the<br />
sc<strong>an</strong>dal assumed such proportions on the <strong>in</strong>ternational pl<strong>an</strong>e that Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica also <strong>in</strong>cluded himself <strong>in</strong> its solv<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
After harsh tones from Vienna, the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister met with Austri<strong>an</strong><br />
Vice-Ch<strong>an</strong>cellor Hubert Gorbach, which resulted <strong>in</strong> their agreement on the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation of a mixed group by the Austri<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> Governments, which<br />
should f<strong>in</strong>d a solution <strong>for</strong> the newly created situation. Although this case will<br />
probably be settled <strong>in</strong> 2006, there are already too m<strong>an</strong>y open questions, as well<br />
as attempts to conceal or m<strong>in</strong>imize them, not to mention the Government’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong> the economy, judiciary, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d tax systems, etc. In<br />
addition to doubts about the s<strong>in</strong>cerity of its <strong>in</strong>tention to deal with Milošević’s<br />
tycoons (because such <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tention on the part of Vojislav Koštunica or his<br />
Government was never observed), it is evident that once aga<strong>in</strong> the<br />
Government appo<strong>in</strong>ted itself as chief arbitrator <strong>in</strong> the affairs <strong>in</strong> which it should<br />
not <strong>in</strong>terfere, that it marg<strong>in</strong>alized the legal role of JP PTT Serbia, the<br />
Telecommunications Agency <strong>an</strong>d the competent M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Capital<br />
Investments, <strong>an</strong>d that it bypassed the Trade Court.<br />
The decision to revoke the licence is legally dubious disputed (<strong>an</strong>d<br />
null <strong>an</strong>d void, accord<strong>in</strong>g to experts) 38 <strong>an</strong>d the same applies to the way <strong>in</strong> which<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
it was returned; it is unclear whether the pre-emption right will be observed<br />
<strong>an</strong>d whether the aim (agreed <strong>in</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ce?) is to have the Austri<strong>an</strong> operator –<br />
Mobilkom become the sole owner of Mobtel (<strong>in</strong> such a way as to bypass the<br />
market <strong>an</strong>d potential competitors); what the role of the privatization advisor<br />
will be (his appo<strong>in</strong>tment was <strong>an</strong>nounced a long time ago); whether the<br />
Government is still await<strong>in</strong>g the arbitration award from Zurich, or this<br />
<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce will also be ignored should that suit its <strong>in</strong>terests (as it is do<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
the domestic judiciary); how the whole "deal" will be reflected on JP PTT<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>terests, etc. Firm <strong>in</strong>sistence (only) on tax evasion by the Karić<br />
family (only by them, although it is known that m<strong>an</strong>y of the "newly rich" are<br />
large tax debtors, if that is <strong>in</strong> question) suggests that the "Karić case" will end<br />
with a certa<strong>in</strong> barga<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d that the public <strong>an</strong>d the relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions will be<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ipulated <strong>an</strong>d shamelessly humiliated once aga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
No matter how the case of Mobtel will be settled, damage has already<br />
been done. Serious <strong>in</strong>vestors <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>eign governments will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to look at<br />
Serbia as a <strong>state</strong> without law <strong>an</strong>d order, <strong>in</strong> which noth<strong>in</strong>g is impossible. Even if<br />
numerous questions imposed by the Government rema<strong>in</strong> un<strong>an</strong>swered, it is<br />
hardly unlikely that <strong>an</strong>yone will regard it as "pro-re<strong>for</strong>m", or call it "the<br />
government of social justice". This is the crux of the problem.<br />
38 The licence c<strong>an</strong> be revoked only by the Telecommunications Agency<br />
(RATEL). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> International Economic Relations, Mil<strong>an</strong><br />
Parivodić, the Agency was bypassed “because it does not function”. Immediately after<br />
this <strong>state</strong>ment was made, the President of the M<strong>an</strong>agement Board of RATEL, Jov<strong>an</strong><br />
Radunović, issued a denial <strong>in</strong> which he <strong>state</strong>d that the Agency did not receive <strong>an</strong>y<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about Mobtel from the Government <strong>an</strong>d that the Telecommunications<br />
Agency was ready to per<strong>for</strong>m all tasks assigned to it by law. Ekonomist, 298/6 February<br />
2006.<br />
222<br />
223
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
CULTURAL RIGHTS<br />
AND CULTURAL POLICY<br />
Regardless of its def<strong>in</strong>ition or <strong>in</strong>terpretation, culture has never been<br />
favoured by authorities. Even <strong>in</strong> happier times <strong>in</strong> Serbia, there was very little<br />
appreciation <strong>for</strong> cultural creativity, not to mention the related <strong>in</strong>centives.<br />
Truly, some better org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>state</strong>s do not pay enough attention to culture<br />
either, but their st<strong>an</strong>dard of liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d gross national <strong>in</strong>come enable not only<br />
culture to survive, but also enable the meet<strong>in</strong>g of cultural needs, development<br />
of cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d their ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce at <strong>an</strong> enviable level,<br />
encouragement of creative endeavour, as well as the establishment of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational cooperation <strong>an</strong>d dialogue (the Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission declared<br />
2008 "Europe<strong>an</strong> Year of Intercultural Dialogue").<br />
The tr<strong>an</strong>sition process <strong>in</strong> Serbia, culture is pay<strong>in</strong>g the most expensive<br />
price. Despite the fact that, by default, the least amount of money is earmarked<br />
<strong>for</strong> culture both at the national <strong>an</strong>d local levels <strong>an</strong>d that a small number of<br />
employed <strong>in</strong> cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions "burdens" the budget, numerous re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d<br />
rationalizations always beg<strong>an</strong> with culture. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, the dissolution of<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions, reduction <strong>in</strong> the number of employed <strong>an</strong>d potential beneficiaries<br />
of budgetary funds, reduction <strong>in</strong> the number of cultural projects, m<strong>in</strong>imization<br />
of the funds <strong>for</strong> cover<strong>in</strong>g material costs <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the facilities<br />
(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those be<strong>in</strong>g of national signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d protected by the Republic),<br />
as well as a number of other "re<strong>for</strong>m measures" are not only the characteristics<br />
of this Government. That culture is overrun by events is also confirmed by the<br />
fact that <strong>in</strong> the period from 5 October 2000 to 31 December 2005 the National<br />
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia did not enact <strong>an</strong>y import<strong>an</strong>t law <strong>in</strong> the area<br />
of culture. So far, only one legislative proposal has arrived <strong>in</strong> the Parliament<br />
(dur<strong>in</strong>g the Dj<strong>in</strong>djić Government, when the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Culture was Br<strong>an</strong>islav<br />
Lečić). It dealt with the protection of cultural property, but was so bad <strong>an</strong>d<br />
imprecise that it was withdrawn by the M<strong>in</strong>istry itself, after a debate <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Culture <strong>an</strong>d In<strong>for</strong>mation. If one also takes <strong>in</strong>to account that<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y laws <strong>in</strong> the area of culture were adopted <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that m<strong>an</strong>y laws do not exist (<strong>for</strong> example, the Law on Theatrical-Scenic<br />
Activities), the picture of a depressive <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>archic situation <strong>in</strong> culture<br />
becomes complete. Without its development strategy, laws <strong>an</strong>d regulations<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial support, culture survives through sheer <strong>in</strong>ertia th<strong>an</strong>ks to a<br />
smaller number of creative persons <strong>an</strong>d operatives <strong>for</strong> whom culture is not<br />
only the source of <strong>in</strong>come, but is also their way of life.<br />
Culture is probably the only area <strong>in</strong> which the process of tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
has not yet started. Left to itself, culture is also left to the so-called market<br />
ruled by party bosses <strong>an</strong>d cronism, which has disastrous consequences <strong>for</strong> the<br />
theatre, museum-related activities, publish<strong>in</strong>g, film <strong>in</strong>dustry, etc. The facilities<br />
of cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions, such as halls, c<strong>in</strong>ema theatres <strong>an</strong>d cultural centres, have<br />
become either the object of grabb<strong>in</strong>g, or are just decay<strong>in</strong>g due to the shortage<br />
of funds <strong>for</strong> their basic ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce, or have been closed. Whereas the <strong>for</strong>mer,<br />
so-called communist regime pursued a thought-out cultural policy, <strong>in</strong> this<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sition period neither the authorities nor culture have found <strong>an</strong> adequate<br />
<strong>an</strong>swer to the ch<strong>an</strong>ge that took place at the very end of the 20 th century, both <strong>in</strong><br />
Europe <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>herited centralistic system of government proved to be<br />
acceptable even <strong>for</strong> those democratic parties <strong>an</strong>d their leaders <strong>in</strong> whose<br />
campaigns the concept of Serbia’s decentralization <strong>an</strong>d regionalization <strong>in</strong> all<br />
areas, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g culture, has been resolutely supported. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately,<br />
centralism <strong>in</strong> decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d government has rema<strong>in</strong>ed the favourite<br />
model of every government, thus encourag<strong>in</strong>g subservience <strong>an</strong>d discourag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
creativity, encourag<strong>in</strong>g crime <strong>an</strong>d avoid<strong>in</strong>g tr<strong>an</strong>sparency, cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g with the<br />
further "Belgradization" of Serbia, while at the same time allow<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g of those sparse <strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>an</strong>d creative potentials <strong>in</strong> the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ces. With the exception of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, which is still somehow m<strong>an</strong>ag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to defend its cultural potentials th<strong>an</strong>ks to its status of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce, the rest of<br />
Serbia, outside Belgrade, is literally decay<strong>in</strong>g while wait<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> better days.<br />
There is no doubt that Belgrade, as the national capital, is <strong>an</strong>d should be the<br />
"w<strong>in</strong>dow" of Serbia, with the widest possible r<strong>an</strong>ge of top-level cultural<br />
activities. By the nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs, the capital city also gathers the greatest<br />
number of artists, creative persons, <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>in</strong>ternational cultural centres,<br />
festivals <strong>an</strong>d the like. But, someth<strong>in</strong>g should also be found <strong>in</strong> other Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
cities. In view of the fact that culture c<strong>an</strong> have a signific<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>fluence on the<br />
development of democratic st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d greater public awareness, <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
the easiest way to establish communication between different nations <strong>an</strong>d<br />
religions, as well as to promote cooperation <strong>an</strong>d mutual underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, is<br />
through culture, it is no wonder that <strong>in</strong> Serbia it has been marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>an</strong>d has<br />
even become undesirable. The systematic destruction of culture beg<strong>an</strong> with<br />
Milošević’s rise to power (<strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m of showdown with communism), but it<br />
has actually cont<strong>in</strong>ued to the present day, thus keep<strong>in</strong>g millions of citizens <strong>in</strong><br />
specific isolation. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, culture was unscrupulously abused <strong>for</strong><br />
political ends, serv<strong>in</strong>g as the source of retrograde ideas <strong>an</strong>d nationalism.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, five years after the fall of Milošević, there is still no read<strong>in</strong>ess to<br />
redef<strong>in</strong>e culture, despite declarative support to it by politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d their<br />
224<br />
225
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
const<strong>an</strong>t <strong>state</strong>ments about its signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the promotion of new,<br />
democratic values. Suffice it to cast a gl<strong>an</strong>ce at the number <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> of cultural<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions, its facilities <strong>an</strong>d events throughout Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d conclude that<br />
culture is still a me<strong>an</strong>s of political control <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ipulation. That says a lot not<br />
only about culture, but also about the policy pursued by Serbia.<br />
In addition to enabl<strong>in</strong>g full <strong>an</strong>d direct control, centralization is also a<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>ism by me<strong>an</strong>s of which one c<strong>an</strong> create the value system, what is<br />
desirable <strong>an</strong>d undesirable <strong>in</strong> culture <strong>an</strong>d among the population. There<strong>for</strong>e,<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y events or creators are often labelled <strong>in</strong> public as "pro-Western" (which, <strong>in</strong><br />
a pejorative sense, should po<strong>in</strong>t to their <strong>in</strong>sufficient patriotism), while other<br />
ones are imposed as <strong>in</strong>disputable values, although this is <strong>in</strong> disproportion to<br />
their real cultural <strong>an</strong>d artistic signific<strong>an</strong>ce. From such a viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, it is<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>dable why cultural policy is conducted from Belgrade, because it is<br />
also reduced to <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument of political power. S<strong>in</strong>ce culture c<strong>an</strong>not be<br />
programmed <strong>an</strong>d fit <strong>in</strong>to the desired system (at least not completely), it<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ifested the <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct to survive as well as some other creativity even dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
wartime. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, <strong>in</strong>stead of hav<strong>in</strong>g freedom <strong>an</strong>d unlimited space <strong>for</strong> its<br />
presentation, the little that is valuable <strong>in</strong> culture is concentrated <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
Thus, culture becomes the privilege of some citizens of Serbia, while others are<br />
<strong>in</strong> a similar situation – they are left to themselves or the <strong>in</strong>fluence of electronic<br />
media. The situation is especially disastrous among the youth <strong>an</strong>d students as<br />
potential users of cultural goods. Outside Belgrade, the possibility of meet<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>y cultural need depends on the enthusiasm of school teachers, who may<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ize from time to time, with great personal <strong>in</strong>volvement, a visit to a<br />
museum or a theatre, or may prepare a programme that will, at least a little,<br />
compensate the absence of culture <strong>in</strong> their community. There<strong>for</strong>e, it is not rare<br />
that m<strong>an</strong>y young people – only after admission to the university – get<br />
acqua<strong>in</strong>ted with certa<strong>in</strong> cultural activities (opera, ballet, art galleries…) <strong>in</strong><br />
which they most often do not show <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>terest. Their failure to underst<strong>an</strong>d<br />
culture <strong>an</strong>d its signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the development of personal <strong>an</strong>d collective<br />
identity contributes to further self-isolation <strong>an</strong>d dim<strong>in</strong>ishes Serbia’s<br />
underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of modern global trends. Moreover, social stratification, the<br />
unavoidable comp<strong>an</strong>ion of tr<strong>an</strong>sition, is creat<strong>in</strong>g conditions <strong>for</strong> the<br />
development of quasi-elitist culture (<strong>an</strong>d its f<strong>an</strong>s), whose quality is not<br />
measured aga<strong>in</strong>st the valid contents <strong>an</strong>d artistic achievements <strong>in</strong> the country<br />
<strong>an</strong>d abroad, but <strong>in</strong> the isolated circle of self-proclaimed "values".<br />
The non-existence of the relev<strong>an</strong>t laws <strong>an</strong>d regulations <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
shortage of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial resources are not the only h<strong>an</strong>dicaps of culture <strong>in</strong> the past<br />
decade. Due to the feel<strong>in</strong>gs of hopelessness <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>security</strong>, most creators <strong>an</strong>d<br />
employed <strong>in</strong> cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions do not show <strong>an</strong>y more serious <strong>in</strong>itiative to<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge or <strong>in</strong>itiate someth<strong>in</strong>g, thus enabl<strong>in</strong>g culture to catch up with tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
re<strong>for</strong>ms. The half-century habit acquired at the time of communism – the<br />
conception of culture based on budgetary funds, where one’s party function is<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
more import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>an</strong> a strategy or specific project - has not ch<strong>an</strong>ged to the<br />
present day, except that one party has been replaced by a number of them. So,<br />
statism <strong>an</strong>d partocracy have rema<strong>in</strong>ed deeply rooted <strong>in</strong> one’s m<strong>in</strong>d, while the<br />
unch<strong>an</strong>ged or non-existent legal framework supplies them with <strong>for</strong>mal cover.<br />
After 5 October 2000, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Culture was also charged with<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. Due to the signific<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation dissem<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
media <strong>in</strong> the unend<strong>in</strong>g political campaigns, the M<strong>in</strong>istry is much more<br />
concerned with <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, so that a number of the relev<strong>an</strong>t laws has been<br />
adopted. Thus, culture does not have the major role <strong>in</strong> its own M<strong>in</strong>istry. Such a<br />
picture is tr<strong>an</strong>sferred from the national level to the lower one, i.e. to the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce, cities <strong>an</strong>d municipalities. Stripped of their rights <strong>an</strong>d competence<br />
they should have by the nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d be<strong>in</strong>g most frequently poor, local<br />
governments do not even try to f<strong>in</strong>d the alternative sources of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals. Instead, the l<strong>in</strong>ear f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g model is<br />
simply copied, without a more detailed <strong>an</strong>alysis. Rare <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>an</strong>d<br />
domestic contests <strong>an</strong>d donations provide <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>fusion <strong>in</strong>to the diseased cultural<br />
tissue only periodically <strong>an</strong>d partly, while most <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals are<br />
left to themselves <strong>an</strong>d their own abilities to f<strong>in</strong>d sponsors. Experience has<br />
shown that this is very difficult, even if the promotion or protection of very<br />
valuable cultural property is <strong>in</strong> question. Those who have money <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
today are mostly prepared to support only those cultural <strong>in</strong>itiatives which are<br />
promoted by the political <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectual elites be<strong>in</strong>g close to the authorities.<br />
Due to its specificity, culture c<strong>an</strong>not, at least not <strong>in</strong> full, be treated like<br />
other merch<strong>an</strong>dise which is subjected to market <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d mech<strong>an</strong>isms.<br />
Fail<strong>in</strong>g to meet the needs of culture <strong>an</strong>d cultural needs of the citizens, the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government reduces the already limited f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial resources quite<br />
easily, at the expense of the number of new films, publish<strong>in</strong>g or purchase of<br />
books, protection of cultural property, number of theatre premieres, etc. In<br />
addition to the unregulated relations concern<strong>in</strong>g copyright protection <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>ti-piracy drive, that is, fight<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st the grey economy <strong>in</strong> culture, the <strong>state</strong><br />
also demonstrates its <strong>in</strong>ability, as well as the lack of <strong>in</strong>terest to rehabilitate the<br />
products of both the communist <strong>an</strong>d nationalist heritage. The empty <strong>an</strong>d<br />
unregulated cultural space is left at the "mercy" of the newly rich who, with the<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t assist<strong>an</strong>ce of most media, proclaim the new "cultural values" of<br />
tabloid proven<strong>an</strong>ce. Thus, the "newly rich" style <strong>in</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>g becomes the<br />
only true "br<strong>an</strong>d" of Serbia, shrouded to a greater or lesser degree <strong>in</strong> false<br />
patriotism <strong>an</strong>d nationalism, pl<strong>an</strong>ted on culture as a generally accepted value<br />
<strong>an</strong>d civilizational achievement. The greatest number of uncontrolled <strong>an</strong>d semilicenced<br />
electronic media are the major promoters of such a disastrous cultural<br />
policy <strong>in</strong> which the <strong>state</strong> or, to be more precisely, the politici<strong>an</strong>s who represent<br />
it, do not show <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>terest or concern. On the contrary, they are frequently its<br />
constituent part. With his activities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>ments, the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Culture <strong>an</strong>d<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation himself exemplifies the <strong>state</strong> of culture <strong>in</strong> the best way; otherwise,<br />
226<br />
227
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
he will be remembered only because he "decorated" his M<strong>in</strong>istry with the wax<br />
figure of the Chetnik general.<br />
For a start, the cultural re<strong>for</strong>m requires as follows:<br />
• The establishment of the legal framework <strong>for</strong> the cherish<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
development <strong>an</strong>d protection of culture <strong>an</strong>d creativity;<br />
• The adoption of the national strategy relat<strong>in</strong>g to the development<br />
<strong>an</strong>d aims of cultural policy, lay<strong>in</strong>g special emphasis on the decentralization of<br />
culture <strong>an</strong>d its accessibility to the greatest possible number of citizens, that is,<br />
potential users of cultural goods;<br />
• The reorg<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d adoption of new models of work <strong>in</strong> the<br />
cultural sectors operat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> public adm<strong>in</strong>istration agencies;<br />
• Introduction of the <strong>in</strong>stitution of public contests;<br />
• Professional conduct of personnel policy;<br />
• Tak<strong>in</strong>g a position on privatization <strong>in</strong> culture <strong>an</strong>d ensur<strong>in</strong>g access<br />
<strong>an</strong>d treatment on terms of equality;<br />
• The creation of better material <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial conditions as <strong>an</strong><br />
impetus to creativity;<br />
• More profitable use of cultural resources;<br />
• Modern <strong>an</strong>d market<strong>in</strong>g-based presentation <strong>an</strong>d protection of<br />
cultural creativity <strong>an</strong>d potentials;<br />
• Gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g scholarships <strong>for</strong> the education <strong>an</strong>d adv<strong>an</strong>ced tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
talented <strong>in</strong>dividuals.<br />
The mentioned activities <strong>for</strong>m only a small part of the complex of adm<strong>in</strong>istrative-law<br />
issues, which should also <strong>in</strong>clude those <strong>in</strong> the area of culture,<br />
so that culture is not treated as consumption, enterta<strong>in</strong>ment or, what is even<br />
more bizarre, <strong>an</strong> unnecessary budgetary expenditure. However, when consider<strong>in</strong>g<br />
cultural policy, one should devote special attention to the problem that<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not be regulated by law – how to ch<strong>an</strong>ge the attitude towards culture, its<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals. In that long-term process, special attention should<br />
be devoted to the education of the youngest population with a view to restor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the corrupted cultural <strong>an</strong>d civilizational values, creat<strong>in</strong>g cultural needs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d potentialities <strong>for</strong> their satisfaction. Among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, cultural rights<br />
<strong>for</strong>m part of the basic <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights as set <strong>for</strong>th <strong>in</strong> Article 27 of the Universal<br />
Declaration of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights: "Everyone has the right freely to participate <strong>in</strong><br />
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts <strong>an</strong>d to share <strong>in</strong> scientific<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>cement <strong>an</strong>d its benefits". If we add to all this the problems <strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d meet<strong>in</strong>g the cultural needs aris<strong>in</strong>g from numerous differences <strong>an</strong>d<br />
specifics (such as ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities, or persons with special needs – persons<br />
with visual or hear<strong>in</strong>g impairment, persons with physical disability, etc.), the<br />
situation <strong>in</strong> culture, especially outside Belgrade, is alarm<strong>in</strong>g, to say the least.<br />
Due to their import<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>in</strong>ternational cultural cooperation <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
presentation of cultural creativity require special attention. There<strong>for</strong>e, they<br />
must be supported <strong>in</strong> a synchronized way by the competent M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
whole Government, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g specifically the M<strong>in</strong>istry of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce. As a<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t cohesive factor with<strong>in</strong> the world cultural heritage, culture <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
strategy provide, by def<strong>in</strong>ition, the first <strong>an</strong>d fastest opportunity <strong>for</strong> the ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
of Serbia’s negative image, which was created due to the events occurr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the collapse of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia, as well as <strong>an</strong> opportunity <strong>for</strong><br />
cultural dialogue, pluralism <strong>an</strong>d mutual respect. In this process, a special role<br />
should be played by cultural centres <strong>in</strong> large Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d world capitals.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, a partocratic personnel policy, coupled with <strong>in</strong>adequate<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial support, prevents once aga<strong>in</strong> the favourable effects that culture c<strong>an</strong><br />
generate. Individual successes are the result of ad hoc projects (which are<br />
mostly carried out on the private <strong>in</strong>itiative of their creators) rather th<strong>an</strong> a part<br />
of the overall national strategy <strong>an</strong>d support. Noteworthy results could be<br />
especially achieved <strong>in</strong> cooperation with the M<strong>in</strong>istries of Culture <strong>an</strong>d Tourism,<br />
as well as with other relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions to no lesser degree.<br />
Thus, the process of Serbia’s Europe<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d harmonization with<br />
the st<strong>an</strong>dards of adv<strong>an</strong>ced democratic countries is conducted as requested by<br />
the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d its org<strong>an</strong>izations on a daily basis rather th<strong>an</strong><br />
due to the fact that Serbia <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>stitutions recognize them as their own<br />
need. There<strong>for</strong>e, the only more serious action <strong>in</strong> the area of culture was taken<br />
after <strong>in</strong>tense pressure from the <strong>in</strong>ternational community that the <strong>state</strong> should<br />
fight aga<strong>in</strong>st piracy. The <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Culture, as well as other<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istries (such as the M<strong>in</strong>istries of F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce, Justice, the Interior <strong>an</strong>d the like)<br />
did not f<strong>in</strong>d it necessary to regulate copyright protection because of their own<br />
creators <strong>an</strong>d revenues, but carried on this campaign on <strong>an</strong> ad hoc basis, seiz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pirated goods only from street sellers, while the bosses rema<strong>in</strong>ed protected<br />
<strong>an</strong>d untouched. The action taken <strong>in</strong> 2002 1 was only a demonstration drill that<br />
the <strong>state</strong> c<strong>an</strong> act if it w<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d that it has the relev<strong>an</strong>t control mech<strong>an</strong>isms.<br />
However, it is evident that it does not w<strong>an</strong>t to act, s<strong>in</strong>ce most producers of<br />
pirated goods recovered very fast <strong>an</strong>d returned to the grey market. Even RTV<br />
Serbia (as well as most other electronic media), which is still under the<br />
Government’s control, behaves <strong>in</strong> a similar way. Namely, it does not observe<br />
the basic <strong>in</strong>tellectual property rights of domestic authors relat<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
payment of royalties <strong>for</strong> the first or second broadcast<strong>in</strong>g of films, musical<br />
works, enterta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>an</strong>d documentary programmes, theatre per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ces,<br />
etc. The ma<strong>in</strong>stream TV stations are <strong>for</strong>ced to meet their liabilities when<br />
purchas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>eign programmes, but their unauthorized reproduction <strong>an</strong>d<br />
broadcast<strong>in</strong>g by hundreds of small TV stations is cont<strong>in</strong>uously practiced. This<br />
1 Dur<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>an</strong>ti-piracy drive, market <strong>in</strong>spectors seized 35,360 compact discs,<br />
16,801 audio cassettes <strong>an</strong>d more th<strong>an</strong> 2,000 film record<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>in</strong> VHS <strong>an</strong>d DVD); dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
its control the f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial police seized 22,601 video cassettes, 11,175 CDs <strong>an</strong>d over 10,000<br />
audio cassettes; 35 decisions on the clos<strong>in</strong>g of shops were brought due to their illicit<br />
trade <strong>in</strong> music <strong>an</strong>d film record<strong>in</strong>gs; about 2,000 reports were submitted to the magistrate<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 283 m<strong>an</strong>datory f<strong>in</strong>es were pronounced.<br />
228<br />
229
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
example is sufficiently illustrative of the sick <strong>state</strong> of culture, but it also po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
to great f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial potentials <strong>an</strong>d possible abuses. There<strong>for</strong>e, the International<br />
Intellectual Property Alli<strong>an</strong>ce put Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro on its Watch List of<br />
the countries that do not observe <strong>in</strong>tellectual property rights. The regulations<br />
govern<strong>in</strong>g copyright protection <strong>in</strong> Serbia are obsolete <strong>an</strong>d require new<br />
systemic solutions so as to be <strong>in</strong> step with the times <strong>an</strong>d meet different needs.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>state</strong> has not yet expressed its will<strong>in</strong>gness to regulate this area, it will<br />
do that, like <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y other cases, under pressure <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m of <strong>an</strong><br />
ultimatum by the relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d EU <strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
The period after 5 October 2000 represents a missed opportunity that<br />
the area of culture is re<strong>for</strong>med <strong>an</strong>d that it undergoes the tr<strong>an</strong>sition process<br />
much faster <strong>an</strong>d more effectively th<strong>an</strong> other segments of society. Despite<br />
belong<strong>in</strong>g to socialist realism <strong>in</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y respects, culture <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia (<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Serbia) was still much more open to other cultures <strong>an</strong>d<br />
different <strong>in</strong>fluences th<strong>an</strong> culture <strong>in</strong> the East Europe<strong>an</strong> countries under "hardcore<br />
communism". The already established contacts with the Western<br />
democracies <strong>an</strong>d so-called Third World countries provided a sound basis <strong>for</strong><br />
the free<strong>in</strong>g of culture from ideological <strong>in</strong>fluences <strong>an</strong>d its redef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Instead,<br />
<strong>state</strong>-sponsored <strong>an</strong>d subservient culture was easily abused <strong>for</strong> new political<br />
ends – nationalist ones this time. It was expected, however, that the new<br />
authorities would have a better ear <strong>for</strong> culture <strong>an</strong>d use its possibilities <strong>for</strong> a<br />
faster reestablishment of relations which were broken off, as well as <strong>for</strong><br />
convergence towards the rest of the world. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, culture as well as its<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d method of work have rema<strong>in</strong>ed at the same level. Whereas<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Dj<strong>in</strong>djić’s Government at least had <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tention to dist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
itself from its predecessors, the current authorities are mak<strong>in</strong>g every ef<strong>for</strong>t to<br />
restore the shaken cont<strong>in</strong>uity, thus rehabilitat<strong>in</strong>g those cultural <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>for</strong> whom we believed to have gone <strong>for</strong>ever. In fact, the <strong>state</strong> has<br />
not yet adopted a cultural strategy. It has not proclaimed its cultural policy nor<br />
has it <strong>for</strong>mulated the national <strong>in</strong>terest, s<strong>in</strong>ce that <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>an</strong>d that policy are<br />
basically confronted with the progressive trends <strong>in</strong> Europe <strong>an</strong>d the rest of the<br />
world. There<strong>for</strong>e, culture is generally <strong>in</strong> a very poor condition, deva<strong>state</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d<br />
weakened to such <strong>an</strong> extent that it c<strong>an</strong>not recover by rely<strong>in</strong>g on its own <strong>for</strong>ces.<br />
The funds earmarked <strong>for</strong> culture from the republic<strong>an</strong> budget (as well as from<br />
the prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d municipal ones) resemble social welfare that is distributed<br />
among numerous recipients (<strong>in</strong>stitutions, events, etc.) whose activities, quality<br />
<strong>an</strong>d achievements should not be found at the same place.<br />
The process of privatization, the most signific<strong>an</strong>t tr<strong>an</strong>sition activity,<br />
has not yet been <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong> the area of culture. It seems contradictory that, one<br />
side, the <strong>state</strong> wishes to relieve itself of all unnecessary budgetary expenditures<br />
<strong>an</strong>d treats one segment of culture as unnecessary government expenditure<br />
<strong>an</strong>d, on the other side, it does noth<strong>in</strong>g to establish the legal framework <strong>for</strong> different<br />
yet equally treated <strong>for</strong>ms of cultural creativity <strong>an</strong>d entrepreneurship. The<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
private <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>in</strong> the area of culture has not been given a ch<strong>an</strong>ce to articulate<br />
itself <strong>an</strong>d demonstrate its numerous potentials, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g profitable ones! Such<br />
<strong>an</strong> example is a great number of c<strong>in</strong>ema theatres at excellent locations, which<br />
are mostly decay<strong>in</strong>g due to the lack of necessary equipment, programme <strong>an</strong>d,<br />
thus, visitors. The situation is not much better <strong>in</strong> the case of numerous "Potemk<strong>in</strong><br />
villages", that is, cultural <strong>an</strong>d youth centres, not to mention art galleries<br />
<strong>an</strong>d museums, whose valuable art collections are decay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the cellars. All<br />
these examples po<strong>in</strong>t to the tragic attitude of society towards culture <strong>an</strong>d cultural<br />
heritage. The historical conflict between traditionalists <strong>an</strong>d modernists,<br />
which has been go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> a century, is even more evident <strong>an</strong>d<br />
more dramatic <strong>in</strong> the area of culture. The two opposite <strong>an</strong>d conflict<strong>in</strong>g<br />
concepts have been tr<strong>an</strong>sferred from politics to culture: the nationalist, that is,<br />
ethnocentric concept, which is rather hermetic, conservative, autistic <strong>an</strong>d even<br />
xenophobic, on one side, <strong>an</strong>d the globalist, modern <strong>an</strong>d open concept which is,<br />
above all, <strong>in</strong>tercultural <strong>an</strong>d provocative, on the other.<br />
However, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> undeveloped <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sufficiently educated society,<br />
mythology <strong>an</strong>d religion, old customs <strong>an</strong>d folklore, populism <strong>an</strong>d demagoguery<br />
c<strong>an</strong> easily be used to establish the cultural st<strong>an</strong>dards. Thus, everyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
becomes politics <strong>an</strong>d artists exch<strong>an</strong>ge their "credo" on the new quasi-market<br />
<strong>for</strong> high government offices <strong>an</strong>d ambassadorial posts. Truly, this does not<br />
happen only now <strong>an</strong>d here, but <strong>in</strong> the past, just like <strong>in</strong> well-org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>state</strong>s<br />
today, personal <strong>an</strong>d cultural identity of such <strong>in</strong>dividuals was not end<strong>an</strong>gered,<br />
nor did the functions to which they were appo<strong>in</strong>ted devalue. Culture <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
has been tak<strong>in</strong>g political sideswipes s<strong>in</strong>ce its beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs, while at the same<br />
time try<strong>in</strong>g to offset their impact <strong>an</strong>d relativize it to a tolerable level. In Serbia<br />
the relics of socialist realism c<strong>an</strong> also be found at every step, but not as the<br />
monuments of <strong>an</strong> era, but as the regular stumbl<strong>in</strong>g block to new, more modern<br />
<strong>an</strong>d more profitable challenges like those <strong>in</strong> democratic countries which attach<br />
much greater attention <strong>an</strong>d signific<strong>an</strong>ce to culture. Serious <strong>an</strong>d responsible<br />
<strong>state</strong>s have elevated their museums, are galleries, theatres, artists <strong>an</strong>d cultural<br />
events to the national (not nationalist) pedestal, without suppress<strong>in</strong>g, or<br />
turn<strong>in</strong>g a bl<strong>in</strong>d eye to modern trends <strong>an</strong>d their exponents. The gloomy<br />
situation <strong>in</strong> culture c<strong>an</strong> be ch<strong>an</strong>ged relatively fast should the <strong>state</strong> take a clear<br />
st<strong>an</strong>d on the strategy relat<strong>in</strong>g to culture <strong>an</strong>d cultural creativity, thus ensur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
more modern <strong>for</strong>ms of org<strong>an</strong>ization, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>in</strong> this area, as<br />
well as much greater <strong>in</strong>volvement of persons prom<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong> cultural life, who<br />
should display a much greater <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>an</strong>d the wish to solve the crucial<br />
problems of the cultural re<strong>for</strong>m faster <strong>an</strong>d more efficiently. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, a<br />
great number of talented <strong>in</strong>dividuals, without see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y ch<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> such<br />
Serbia, will leave <strong>for</strong> the countries that will have more underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
more f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial resources <strong>for</strong> them. A good start <strong>for</strong> dispell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y mistaken<br />
notion about "us" <strong>an</strong>d "others" should be to reconsider the narcissistic <strong>an</strong>d false<br />
idea that their success is due exclusively to their orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d national identity.<br />
230<br />
231
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
IV<br />
INSTITUTIONS IN AN<br />
UNFINISHED STATE<br />
232<br />
233
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
ARMY OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO:<br />
POOR RATINGS AND DELAYED REFORMS<br />
Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro is implod<strong>in</strong>g, as a result of general<br />
demoralization <strong>an</strong>d numerous sc<strong>an</strong>dals <strong>an</strong>d affairs. Its approval rat<strong>in</strong>gs are<br />
also plummet<strong>in</strong>g, that is, citizens of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro no longer consider<br />
it "the most trusted <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>in</strong> the country." At the year-end the armyrelated<br />
situation was bleak: shaken by numerous sc<strong>an</strong>dals <strong>an</strong>d unresolved<br />
(some even mysterious) murders <strong>an</strong>d suicidies of soldiers, thrown <strong>in</strong>to<br />
disarray <strong>an</strong>d confused by frequent re-shuffles <strong>in</strong> the top brass <strong>an</strong>d at the very<br />
top of its hearachical pyramid, p<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g under the onerous burden of its past,<br />
heavy <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> recent wars (<strong>an</strong>d well-grounded assumption that under<br />
the auspices of its special agents <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>telligence services traces of fugitives<br />
from the Hague justice, notably of Ratko Mladic are be<strong>in</strong>g skillfully hidden ),<br />
<strong>an</strong>d convictions <strong>for</strong> genocide <strong>an</strong>d the most he<strong>in</strong>ous war crimes, the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army subsists on the social <strong>an</strong>d political sidel<strong>in</strong>es of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> union.<br />
Depth of its ru<strong>in</strong> may be likened to the period when its <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal<br />
supreme comm<strong>an</strong>der Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević (<strong>in</strong> mid-90s) has cruelly rejected <strong>an</strong>d<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially marg<strong>in</strong>alized the then army of Yugoslavia. Then he strengthened<br />
the Serb police by morph<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>to his second army, much more reliable <strong>for</strong><br />
deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>ternal opposition. However, he "resurrected" the army on<br />
the eve of the "Second Kosovo Battle."<br />
However, the above bleak picture is regularly re-touched <strong>in</strong><br />
workshops of military-political propag<strong>an</strong>da by the highest army echelons, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
then <strong>in</strong> such a doctored <strong>an</strong>d perked-up version is launched <strong>for</strong> public<br />
consumption. Un<strong>for</strong>tunately citizens of Serbia still fail to contest or at least to<br />
disbelieve communiqués <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation issued <strong>an</strong>d imparted by <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mative<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions of Chief of Staff <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence. But that deeply rooted<br />
popular trust <strong>in</strong> "our army" was heavily dented <strong>in</strong> late 2004, after the Topcider<br />
tragedy, <strong>an</strong>d then by a similar series of unresolved deaths of soldiers<br />
throughout 2005.<br />
Serb top leadership headed by Vojislav Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d Boris Tadić has<br />
never had political will or ability to name <strong>an</strong>d qualify <strong>in</strong> the right way to the<br />
most salient <strong>an</strong>d numerous army problems. On the contrary they were content<br />
234<br />
235
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
to produce a superficial <strong>an</strong>d benign diagnosis of a crisis, the most often quoted<br />
reasons thereof, accord<strong>in</strong>g to them, be<strong>in</strong>g of social <strong>an</strong>d political nature, notably<br />
frequent re-shuffles <strong>in</strong> the top echelons of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Chief of<br />
Staff. Instead of seriously tackl<strong>in</strong>g the army re<strong>for</strong>m, <strong>an</strong>d also the one of other<br />
defence system segments, political prime movers <strong>in</strong>tentionally or<br />
un<strong>in</strong>tentionally kept f<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g army-related sc<strong>an</strong>dals.<br />
On may ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> with all certa<strong>in</strong>ty that those sc<strong>an</strong>dals <strong>an</strong>d affairs set<br />
the tone of total work of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army <strong>an</strong>d the Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
throughout 2005. Series of unresolved deaths (murders?) of soldiers has not<br />
only shaken Chief of Staff <strong>an</strong>d Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry but has also, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of various polls, caused a rapidly fall<strong>in</strong>g trust of citizenry <strong>in</strong> the army.<br />
The scond series of sc<strong>an</strong>dals was l<strong>in</strong>ked to active <strong>an</strong>d retired servicemen, who,<br />
to put it bluntly, were "<strong>in</strong> the service" of fugitive from the Hague justice Ratko<br />
Mladić. "P<strong>an</strong>cir" Affair which disclosed the Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry’s sign<strong>in</strong>g of a<br />
contract on purchase of expensive military equipment with Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y "Proizvodnja Mile Dragić", also adversely affected the army’s rat<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d cost the Defense Secretary, Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, his job. What amazes, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
light of the year-end total fiasco of both contract<strong>in</strong>g partners, is the fact that the<br />
a<strong>for</strong>ementioned comp<strong>an</strong>y was repeatedly extolled on the pages of weekly<br />
"Vojska", notably <strong>in</strong> early 2005. 1<br />
Progress <strong>in</strong> the army re<strong>for</strong>m or overhaul is still expected. That is, the<br />
army is be<strong>in</strong>g re<strong>for</strong>med without participation of civili<strong>an</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
without a basic project of tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation. In 2005 that "re<strong>for</strong>m" was mostly<br />
reduced to m<strong>in</strong>or shake-ups or reorg<strong>an</strong>izations, to problems related to<br />
downsiz<strong>in</strong>g of the army <strong>an</strong>d its "supplement<strong>in</strong>g" from recruits cont<strong>in</strong>gents. In<br />
that whole process conservative that is retrograde st<strong>an</strong>ds of military <strong>an</strong>d some<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> segments were publicly m<strong>an</strong>ifested. Added to that frequent re-shuffles<br />
<strong>an</strong>d replacements <strong>in</strong> the top echelons of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Chief of<br />
Staff, <strong>an</strong> unusual practice both at home <strong>an</strong>d abroad, very adversely affected the<br />
army morale.<br />
Soldiers Die Mysterious Deaths<br />
Investigation <strong>in</strong>to death of two guards <strong>in</strong> Topčider on 5 October 2004,<br />
was cont<strong>in</strong>ued without major results. Generals ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the report of<br />
the Military Commission headed by then military <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g judge, Capta<strong>in</strong>,<br />
Vuk Tufegdžić, was accurate Accord<strong>in</strong>g to f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of that commission<br />
soldiers Dražen Milov<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Drag<strong>an</strong> Jakovljević killed each other.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the first version Jakovljević <strong>in</strong> a mentally der<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>state</strong> first<br />
killed his colleague, <strong>an</strong>d then himself. In the second version those roles were<br />
reversed, while <strong>in</strong> the third version, the commission "found out" that the dead<br />
1 "Highly Reliable Anti-Terrorist Equipment", weekly Vojska 13 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
soldiers were "perverts, that is homosexuals". That allegation was <strong>in</strong>tended to<br />
shed new light on the accident. Such <strong>in</strong>terpretations additionally hurt parents<br />
of youngsters, <strong>an</strong>d the public <strong>an</strong>ger towards the military establishment <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army grew.<br />
Topčider tragedy seems to have been a prologue <strong>in</strong>to a host of similar<br />
tragedies which happened <strong>in</strong> the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army <strong>in</strong> the course of<br />
2005. 2 Here’s the chronology of those deaths:<br />
On 1st J<strong>an</strong>uary : a soldier Duš<strong>an</strong> Petrović was found dead at his guard<br />
post at the military airport Ladjevci near Kraljevo; the official report declared<br />
his death a suicide; on 10th J<strong>an</strong>uary, a soldier Sadud<strong>in</strong> Adrović, while do<strong>in</strong>g his<br />
guard duty <strong>in</strong> the Podgorica barracks "Masl<strong>in</strong>e", out of unclarified reasons,<br />
shot dead his guard comm<strong>an</strong>der, serge<strong>an</strong>t Jadr<strong>an</strong>ko K<strong>an</strong>dić; accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigation f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs Adrović committed that crime "<strong>in</strong> a mentally der<strong>an</strong>ged<br />
<strong>state</strong>"; on 18 th February a soldier Drag<strong>an</strong> Živković, <strong>in</strong> a military base situated<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the area of L<strong>an</strong>d Zone of Security <strong>in</strong> Buj<strong>an</strong>ovac, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official<br />
version, by accidentally fir<strong>in</strong>g his gun <strong>in</strong>flicted grave wounds to his fellowsoldier,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>ijel St<strong>an</strong>ojević 3 ; on 30th June a soldier Radom<strong>an</strong> Žarković was found<br />
dead on a view<strong>in</strong>g post <strong>in</strong> the L<strong>an</strong>d Zone of Security <strong>in</strong> municipality Leb<strong>an</strong>e.<br />
His death was not clarified.<br />
On 19 th July Iv<strong>an</strong> Kozlovački, a civili<strong>an</strong> serv<strong>in</strong>g his military service <strong>in</strong><br />
Zr<strong>an</strong>j<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> garrison, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official <strong>in</strong>vestigation, committed suicide,<br />
while on night guard duty <strong>in</strong> the military facility "Silos"; 29 th September soldier<br />
Srđ<strong>an</strong> Lazić was found dead <strong>in</strong> a Nis garrison; accord<strong>in</strong>g to official version, he<br />
committed suicide too; on 13 th October soldier Mil<strong>an</strong> Matić was found dead at<br />
the guard post <strong>in</strong> barracks "Bagremar" <strong>in</strong> Mladenovac, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official<br />
post-<strong>in</strong>vestigation report he committed suicide; on 14 th October soldier Darko<br />
Milov<strong>an</strong>ović killed himself with firearms, be<strong>for</strong>e the eyes of his unit. It was<br />
confirmed that he had committed suicide <strong>in</strong> the drills grounds of Pirot<br />
barracks "The third <strong>in</strong>f<strong>an</strong>try squad". And the last <strong>in</strong> a series of soldiers’ deaths<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2005 was the one of Boj<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ojević, who "after suddenly feel<strong>in</strong>g unwell" <strong>in</strong><br />
a Nis barracks, was hospitalized. He died <strong>in</strong> the Nis military hospital on 2 nd<br />
October. 4<br />
After the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned accidents, resentment of parents <strong>an</strong>d<br />
disbelief <strong>in</strong> the efficiency of military org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>an</strong>d veracity of its official<br />
reports <strong>an</strong>d communiqués on causes of soldiers’ deaths, escalated. Parents of<br />
2005.<br />
2 "Traumas of Once Powerful Institution ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 15-16 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
"Mach <strong>in</strong> NATO Rhythm", Politika, 13 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
"Guard Kills Comm<strong>an</strong>der", Večernje novosti, 11 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
"Country of Dead Soldiers", Glas javnosti, 15 October 2005.<br />
3 "Life Lesson", weekly Vojska, 24 February 2005.<br />
4"He Shoots Himself <strong>in</strong> Mouth Be<strong>for</strong>e His Mates", Glas javnosti, 15 October<br />
"Country of Dead Soldiers", Glas javnosti, 15 October 2005.<br />
236<br />
237
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong>a Kostića – who accord<strong>in</strong>g to the official report-committed suicide <strong>in</strong> a<br />
military uni<strong>for</strong>m on 27 august 2004 <strong>in</strong> Leksovac barracks "Jabl<strong>an</strong>ica", <strong>an</strong>d was<br />
buried <strong>in</strong> a military cemetery <strong>in</strong> Požegi – 14 months after his death dug out the<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s of their son <strong>an</strong>d tasked private <strong>for</strong>ensic experts to establish the true<br />
cause of his death. 5<br />
Only <strong>in</strong> the case of wound<strong>in</strong>g of soldier D<strong>an</strong>ijel St<strong>an</strong>ojević <strong>in</strong> a<br />
military base <strong>in</strong> Buj<strong>an</strong>ovac, the then Defence Secretary threatened to "sack<br />
irresponsible superiors", <strong>for</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to his assessment, that wound<strong>in</strong>g<br />
"resulted from a gross breach of discipl<strong>in</strong>e with<strong>in</strong> the framework of a military<br />
unit, moreover of a very import<strong>an</strong>t unit, tasked with secur<strong>in</strong>g the L<strong>an</strong>d Zone of<br />
Security." 6 Other responses by the army <strong>an</strong>d Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry were of a purely<br />
self-defence character. But the exception from that rule, was a <strong>state</strong>ment by a<br />
retired general, Head of NGO Centre fro Development of Democracy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Security, <strong>in</strong> which he implied that the accidents were provoked by not so<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> relations with<strong>in</strong> the army: "…Our rules of service procedure are 20<br />
years old, they have no been amended <strong>in</strong> the least, there<strong>for</strong>e relations between<br />
superiors <strong>an</strong>d common soldiers have not become more <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>. …" 7<br />
One must say that both Chief of Staff <strong>an</strong>d the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry tried to discover causes of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned accidents. But<br />
<strong>in</strong> all their official versions that event was reduced to –sucides, while civili<strong>an</strong><br />
health <strong>in</strong>stitutions were criticized <strong>for</strong> send<strong>in</strong>g to recruit<strong>in</strong>g commissions<br />
perverts <strong>an</strong>d mentally weak, suicidal young people. It is also noteworthy that<br />
not a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>an</strong>alysis po<strong>in</strong>ted a f<strong>in</strong>ger at superiors <strong>in</strong>competent <strong>an</strong>d unwill<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to help the recruits adjust to the liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions <strong>in</strong> their military units <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
the soldiers’ rhythm of life, or to shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d weaknesses of military<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization, that is of its <strong>in</strong>ternal services, <strong>an</strong>d excessive red tape <strong>in</strong> military<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d excessive drills at lower echelons of military hearachy. 8<br />
Death of Dashnim Hajrulah<br />
Though the death of 16-year old Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Dashnim Hajrulah was<br />
different from deaths of soldiers we mentioned <strong>in</strong> the previous paragraph, it<br />
was nonetheless-sc<strong>an</strong>dalous. On 7th J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005 member of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> armed <strong>for</strong>ces secur<strong>in</strong>g the L<strong>an</strong>d Zone of Security killed <strong>an</strong><br />
underage Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>. That tragic event happened dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> illegal cross<strong>in</strong>g at<br />
the border between Serbia, Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia, when Hajrulah was<br />
return<strong>in</strong>g from a visit to his mother <strong>in</strong> Macedonia, on the other side of the<br />
2005.<br />
5 "Unveil<strong>in</strong>g the Secret of Death <strong>in</strong> Leskovac Garrison", D<strong>an</strong>as, 30 September<br />
6 "Life Lesson ", weekly Vojska, 24 February 2005.<br />
7 "Why the Suicide Rate of Our Recruits is Increas<strong>in</strong>g", Blic, 16 October 2005.<br />
8 "When Internal Sun Darkens", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
border. 9 Death of that boy (orig<strong>in</strong>ally from village Oraovica near Preševo) was<br />
politically capitalized both by Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. Only three days after that<br />
event, on 10 th J<strong>an</strong>uary the <strong>in</strong>tellectual <strong>an</strong>d political crème of Serbia, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Patariarch Pavle, gathered <strong>in</strong> the Guard House <strong>in</strong> Topčider to send a message<br />
to the world, notably to Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s "wherever they live". The gist of the<br />
message was expla<strong>in</strong>ed by Marko Jakšić, one of the leaders of Kosovo Serbs,<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the cameras of Radio-Television Serbia: "In this way we would like to<br />
tell Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s that Serbia shall never renounce Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija".<br />
Topčider rally was <strong>in</strong> fact the response of official Belgrade to the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> rally after death of Hajrulah. Vocal spokesmen of milit<strong>an</strong>t factions of<br />
the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> political parties <strong>in</strong> South Serbia ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the boy Dasim<br />
was <strong>in</strong>tentionally killed, <strong>an</strong>d that his murder was part of "the Serb scenario" of<br />
<strong>an</strong>nouncement of the "hot spr<strong>in</strong>g," that is the idea of provok<strong>in</strong>g Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s to<br />
"make reckless move" that is, respond with violence to the death of of their<br />
young fellow-countrym<strong>an</strong> But the <strong>in</strong>verse happened, because even Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
milit<strong>an</strong>ts agreed to a political consensus <strong>an</strong>d resolutely opted <strong>for</strong> "non-violent<br />
methods of action" <strong>in</strong> their struggle <strong>for</strong> atta<strong>in</strong>ment of their <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>, civil <strong>an</strong>d<br />
national rights. 20,000 people gathered at Hajrulah’s funeral, but none of them<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that <strong>an</strong>y k<strong>in</strong>d of retributive action was afoot.<br />
On that occasion the Serb side reacted awkwardly, not so say –<br />
<strong>in</strong>adequately. In a blat<strong>an</strong>t show of absence of political tack <strong>an</strong>d elementary<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>ity official condolences were not proferred to the family of family of the<br />
murdered boy. That non-gesture conv<strong>in</strong>ced even peaceful <strong>an</strong>d very toler<strong>an</strong>t<br />
part of Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> population that "Serb soldiers" <strong>in</strong>tentionally killed Dasnim.<br />
Such a conviction was not dispelled by the military authorities official<br />
communiqué on the reconstruction of event: "Soldier-frontierm<strong>an</strong> did not<br />
shoot directly the "target", that is a youngster, but the bullet from automatic<br />
rifle ricocheted back from the trunk of a fig-tree <strong>an</strong>d hit Dasnim." The general<br />
public was not <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med that the f<strong>in</strong>al, official version should have been given<br />
by the Nis District Court.<br />
Interest<strong>in</strong>gly enough illegal cross<strong>in</strong>gs are frequent at that part of<br />
border, because a legal pass is far away from that place. But military <strong>an</strong>d<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> authorities turned a deaf ear to requests <strong>for</strong> legalization made by<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s from Presevo Valley. And consequently <strong>in</strong>nocent people kept los<strong>in</strong>g<br />
their lives. Prior to the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned case, three Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s lost their lives<br />
there. Chief of Staff of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army mounted <strong>an</strong> old-style<br />
defence <strong>in</strong> the face of criticism of a more conscientious part of the general<br />
public: The soldier acted <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the rules of service. In a well-ordered<br />
world, such situations are not resolved by bullets, plus, such a murder would<br />
9 "Bordera", Ekonomist magaz<strong>in</strong>, 17 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
"How Bad We Have Become", weekly Vojska, 13 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
"Fear of 'hot' Year ", Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter, J<strong>an</strong>uary-February 2005.<br />
238<br />
239
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
compel the Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister to h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> his resignation. But <strong>in</strong> the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army no one was held accountable <strong>for</strong> those tragic accidents.<br />
Officers of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army<br />
In the Service of General Ratko Mladic<br />
Regardless of m<strong>an</strong>ner of clarification of the murder of the two guards,<br />
Topcider tragedy became a reference po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>alysis of the total status <strong>an</strong>d<br />
situation of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army. In fact it gave rise both to<br />
assumptions <strong>an</strong>d t<strong>an</strong>gible facts that Ratko Mladić nearly until the very end of<br />
the year 2005 enjoyed full support of the army, though that fact was denied by<br />
the top military leadership <strong>an</strong>d Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry. 10 Some domestic <strong>an</strong>alysts<br />
<strong>an</strong>d opposition politici<strong>an</strong>s claimed that Ratko Mladić hid <strong>in</strong> a secret military<br />
facility "Karaš" (which due to popular pressure <strong>in</strong> the wake of tragedy was<br />
opened to the public). 11 Some hypothesis went as far as to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that "the<br />
two soldiers, on that fatal morn<strong>in</strong>g saw what they were not supposed to see,<br />
that is, General Mladic, <strong>an</strong>d that cost them their life."<br />
Serge<strong>an</strong>t Petrović<br />
– "Ratko Mladić's C<strong>an</strong>non Fodder"<br />
Miroslav Petrović, fomer, lower-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g soldier of the Serb-<br />
Monteneg<strong>in</strong> army, accord<strong>in</strong>g to his own confessions to daily D<strong>an</strong>as – was one<br />
of those military officers tasked with "guard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d protect<strong>in</strong>g Ratko<br />
Mladić". 12 He admitted that at the time "there was a three-tier protection<br />
around Mladic", <strong>an</strong>d that he was <strong>in</strong> the tier closest to Mladic <strong>in</strong> person, that is –<br />
"live flesh around Ratko Mladić".<br />
Petrović admitted that <strong>in</strong> "In May 2004 <strong>in</strong> Prokuplje barracks two<br />
high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g officers from Republika Srpska army were appo<strong>in</strong>ted to <strong>in</strong>vented<br />
positions which don’t exist with<strong>in</strong> the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army. Then <strong>in</strong> June<br />
all three of us were <strong>in</strong>vited to a meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d consultations to Topcider<br />
barracks. At that meet<strong>in</strong>g there were m<strong>an</strong>y high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g officers of RS army,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d there I met officers tasked with secur<strong>in</strong>g General Mladic’s passage to<br />
North or to Bosnia…." Petrović also <strong>state</strong>d that Ratko Mladić "was <strong>in</strong> October<br />
<strong>in</strong> Topčider barracks, mis<strong>for</strong>tunate soldiers saw him <strong>an</strong>d were thus<br />
immediately liquidated …"<br />
Story of soldier Miroslav D. Petrović – who deserted from the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> November 2004 was a member of a team de-m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
part of the L<strong>an</strong>d Zone of Security <strong>in</strong> Buj<strong>an</strong>ovac region- does not sound<br />
10 "Krga: Army Does Not Protect Hague Fugitives", D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 November 2004.<br />
11 "Korać: Army Was Hid<strong>in</strong>g Hague Indictees", D<strong>an</strong>as, 4 November 2004.<br />
12 "Victim of Ratko Mladić", D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 April 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g. However M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence disclaimers of his story (r<strong>an</strong> by daily<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as) 13 seemed like <strong>an</strong> outright disqualification of M, Petrovic <strong>in</strong> professional<br />
<strong>an</strong>d moral terms (it was alleged that he was prone to theft <strong>an</strong>d alcohol <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
he had a crim<strong>in</strong>al record prior to jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the army as a professional soldier). On<br />
the other h<strong>an</strong>d Public Communications Department of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
has not denied <strong>an</strong>y detail disclosed by Petrovic, which made his story<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g to the general public.<br />
The Ćosić "Comp<strong>an</strong>y" – Colonel& Son<br />
Radomir Ćosić, a colonel serv<strong>in</strong>g as a Comm<strong>an</strong>der of a Guard Brigade,<br />
defended Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević, his <strong>for</strong>mer Supreme Comm<strong>an</strong>der, the night<br />
when Milosevic was arrested. 14 Despite that, Ćosić reta<strong>in</strong>ed his position of the<br />
comm<strong>an</strong>der of that elite unit of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army until 15 March<br />
2005, when he was replaced by Radoje Trifunović. 15 There are no <strong>in</strong>dications or<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about <strong>an</strong>y contact between Ćosić <strong>an</strong>d Ratko Mladic, though some<br />
media r<strong>an</strong> speculations of that nature, hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d his "patriotism" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
open <strong>an</strong>d persistent loyalty to Slobod<strong>an</strong> Miloševiće. But despite everyth<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
only l<strong>in</strong>k between Radomir Cosic <strong>an</strong>d the fugitive General Mladic is the<br />
fomer’s son Nenad. 16 Namely colonel’s son was employed as a civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Guard Brigade. The fact that on the critical night of the death of the two<br />
soldiers he was <strong>in</strong> a nearby build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d the first one to appear on the crime<br />
scene gave rise to a wide rage of speculations which gradually ga<strong>in</strong>ed wide<br />
currency. Because of the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g Nenad Ćosić was sacked from the army on<br />
5 June 2005. But suspicions that he might know someth<strong>in</strong>g about Topcider<br />
tragedy ga<strong>in</strong>ed ground after his raid –the night of 23 July 2005- of a Defence<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry premise <strong>in</strong> search of some documents. 17 However, he was not<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicted <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g after <strong>in</strong>vestigation, but the suspicion rema<strong>in</strong>ed that he<br />
knew someth<strong>in</strong>g about the Topcider tragedy.<br />
Capta<strong>in</strong> Puhalo – Ratko Mladic's Trusted Associate<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia Br<strong>an</strong>islav Puhalo was a comm<strong>an</strong>der of the<br />
unit of Military police <strong>in</strong> so-called Dr<strong>in</strong>a operational group of Republika<br />
Srpska army. 18 As a supreme comm<strong>an</strong>der of RS army, Ratko Mladić decided<br />
to make him part of his personal <strong>security</strong> team. And Puhalo reta<strong>in</strong>ed that<br />
13 "Personal Promotion ", weekly Vojska,<br />
14 "Case of Colonel Ćosić", D<strong>an</strong>as, 9 November 2004.<br />
15 "New Comm<strong>an</strong>der ", weekly Vojska, 17 March 2005.<br />
16 "Colonel's Son Tries to Rob the Army", Blic, 10 August 2005.<br />
17 Idem<br />
18 "Not a S<strong>in</strong>gle Officer Received Mladic's Pension", D<strong>an</strong>as, 31 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
240<br />
241
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
position till the end of war. Later, so-called 30 th Personnel Centre <strong>in</strong> the FRY<br />
Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry negotiated his tr<strong>an</strong>sfer to the 46 th logistical base, <strong>in</strong> Belgrade<br />
barracs <strong>in</strong> Topcider, where he still works as <strong>an</strong> active military officer.<br />
Until mid- 2005, that is, until the emergence of a more explicit request<br />
of the ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte <strong>for</strong> the h<strong>an</strong>d-over of all Serbia’s<br />
fugitives, notably Ratko Mladic, the general public was not aware of Puhalo’s<br />
existence. General public learnt of Puhalo’s "duties" only when <strong>for</strong>mer Head of<br />
the State Security (currently Security-In<strong>for</strong>mative Agency) Gor<strong>an</strong> Petrović told<br />
Belgrade daily Blic, on 20 July 2005 that his service knew that Mladic was<br />
protected by "the ten men", both retired <strong>an</strong>d active servicemen.<br />
In her capacity of President of Republika Srpska, Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Plavšić, <strong>in</strong><br />
late 1996, retired Mladic. But his fictituous post rema<strong>in</strong>ed open <strong>in</strong> Chief of Staff<br />
of the FRY Army, so he kept receiv<strong>in</strong>g his salary from the Yugoslav army<br />
coffers until 28 February 2002, when he was retired by Vojislav Koštunica, then<br />
then President of the FRY That me<strong>an</strong>s that Mladic was retired <strong>for</strong> the second<br />
time. As regards the general public, it was a well-guarded secret. In the face of<br />
the ICTY arrest <strong>an</strong>d h<strong>an</strong>dover warr<strong>an</strong>t, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the advice of military<br />
<strong>in</strong>telligence services which protected him, Ratko Mladić went <strong>in</strong>to hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
empowered only his son, his wife <strong>an</strong>d the two high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g military officers,<br />
one of whom was Br<strong>an</strong>islav Puhalo, to receive his pension.<br />
Colonel Krstović – A Logistic Expert of a War Crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
Former Head of State Security, also disclosed that Colonel Dragomir<br />
Krstović was <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t "player" <strong>in</strong> that sc<strong>an</strong>dalous game with the Hague<br />
Tribunal. But what caused a veritable stir was the <strong>an</strong>nouncement that Krstović,<br />
then the <strong>in</strong>cumbent Head of Logistics Department of Chief of Staff of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army, was one of the key <strong>security</strong> men <strong>in</strong> Mladic's entourage. 19<br />
Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry reacted <strong>in</strong> a very confused m<strong>an</strong>ner to that disclosure. Its<br />
Public Communications Department on 20 July issued a communique to the<br />
effect that "no active officer of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army, not even Colonel<br />
Dragomir Krstovic, s<strong>in</strong>ce adoption of the Act on Co-operation with the Hague<br />
Tribunal, had <strong>an</strong>y contact with General Ratko Mladić or <strong>an</strong>y other fugitive<br />
from the ICTY justice, nor rendered them <strong>an</strong>y assist<strong>an</strong>ce." 20<br />
Obviously such a communique only <strong>in</strong>creased the then confusion.<br />
Media <strong>in</strong>sisted on a disclosure of truth about Krstovic’s role <strong>in</strong> hid<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
Hague <strong>in</strong>dictee, notably <strong>in</strong> the light of colonel’s promotion to Head of Logistics<br />
Department on the eve of the Army Day, 16 June 2005, which position<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
moreover guar<strong>an</strong>teed him the r<strong>an</strong>k of general <strong>in</strong> the future. It also bears<br />
mention<strong>in</strong>g that Krstović, who was considered <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> the<br />
provision of all necessary conditions <strong>for</strong> life of General Mladic <strong>in</strong> hid<strong>in</strong>g, s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
tak<strong>in</strong>g on that duty, also became head of the Steer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Committee</strong> of Chief of<br />
Staff.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g himself <strong>in</strong> a scrape, Defense Secretary Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić<br />
covertly <strong>an</strong>d urgently retired General Krstovića. But the follow-up to that<br />
move of his was a total confusion: Krstovic <strong>for</strong> a while kept com<strong>in</strong>g to his<br />
workplace, claim<strong>in</strong>g that he knew noth<strong>in</strong>g about his retirement, while the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>nounced that he was longer <strong>in</strong> active service. 21<br />
It is odd, notably <strong>in</strong> the light of J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006 arrest of the retired<br />
Colonel of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army Jovo Djogo, also a war particip<strong>an</strong>t, <strong>an</strong><br />
officer of Republika Srpska army, <strong>an</strong>d one of the officers from Mladic<br />
protection entourage, that neither Puhalo or Kostovic were arrested or<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigated.<br />
"Good guys" from "Cvećara 2"<br />
"Cvećara", or "Cvećara 1" is the name of luxurious apartment blocks<br />
built <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> exclusive Belgrade location, that is <strong>in</strong> Ded<strong>in</strong>je, <strong>in</strong> August Cesarec<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Rad<strong>an</strong>ska streets as far back as <strong>in</strong> 1992. The block comprises 32<br />
apartments, each hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> average of 150 square metres. They were given to<br />
"a glorious generation" of Milosevic’s generals who contributed to the war<br />
devastation of <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. Nearly three fourths of those luxurious flats,<br />
purchased <strong>for</strong> small amounts of money, were later sold <strong>for</strong> 300,000-500,000<br />
Euro each. 22 Here’s the list of some generals who moved <strong>in</strong>to "Cvećara":<br />
Jevrem Cokić, Nikola Uzelac, Miodrag Vukad<strong>in</strong>ović, Dragoljub Perišić, Milut<strong>in</strong><br />
Kuk<strong>an</strong>jac, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vasiljević, Andrija Rašeta, Blagoje Adžić…<br />
"Cvećara 2" Affair received wide media exposure <strong>in</strong> August 2005.<br />
Namely a group of generals moved <strong>in</strong>to that luxurious 17-apartment block <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong> exlusive Belgrade location although the block had not been vetted by the<br />
competent authorities. Generals were gr<strong>an</strong>ted those flats by the commission<br />
possibly named by General Nebojsa Pavkovic.<br />
This generation followed <strong>in</strong> the footsteps of their older colleagues<br />
from "Cvećara 1" 23 apartment block: Zlatoje Terzić moved <strong>in</strong>to a 201 square<br />
metre flat, Ljubomir Anđelković, Milivoje Pavlović, Mil<strong>an</strong> Karajović <strong>an</strong>d Božo<br />
Novak settled <strong>in</strong> 181 square metres apartments each, while Jugoslav<br />
Kodžopeljić moved <strong>in</strong>to a 279 square metre apartment. S<strong>in</strong>ce the size of those<br />
19 "Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry Generates Confuses", Blic, 23 July 2005.<br />
"When Was Colonel Krstic Retired ?", D<strong>an</strong>as, 22 July 2005.<br />
"Colonel Krstovic Denies His Retirement ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 23-24. July 2005.<br />
20 "Colonel Krstović Does Not Help Mladic ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 21 July 2005.<br />
21 "Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry Generates Confusion", Blic, 23 July 2005.<br />
"Colonel Krstović Denies His Retirement", D<strong>an</strong>as, 23-24 July 2005.<br />
22 "'Cvećara' Re-Sold", Politika,<br />
23 "Gratis Flats <strong>for</strong> Generals", Kurir, 3 August 2005.<br />
242<br />
243
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
flats was by far superior to the one allocated to generals under the <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
rules of procedure, <strong>an</strong>d the general public raised a hue <strong>an</strong>d cry, the Supreme<br />
Defence Council passed a decision that generals "must pay <strong>for</strong> the surplus<br />
square metres or hous<strong>in</strong>g space at market prices". 24<br />
Public op<strong>in</strong>ion of Serbia was shocked by that sc<strong>an</strong>dal <strong>in</strong> view of<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ual laments of the army over its underfund<strong>in</strong>g. Namely the army tended<br />
to emphasize that it had 15,000 both civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d military employees await<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the resolution of their hous<strong>in</strong>g problem, while on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> that<br />
respect, it was rather generous towards its generals. It is obvious that the<br />
authorities don’t have <strong>an</strong>y control over the army’s policy of flat-distribution.<br />
To make the th<strong>in</strong>gs even more absurd, among those who were given flats <strong>in</strong><br />
"Cvećara 2" there were two generals of Republika Srpska army. One of them<br />
was Radislav Krstić, <strong>an</strong>d it is noteworthy that the ICTY convicted Krstic of<br />
genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Bosniak population <strong>an</strong>d gross violations of war laws <strong>an</strong>d<br />
customs <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, <strong>an</strong>d consequently sentenced him to 35 years <strong>in</strong> prison. 25 At<br />
the same time civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d military authorities have been refus<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> 15 years<br />
to resolve the hous<strong>in</strong>g problem of General Vlada Trifunović, Comm<strong>an</strong>der of<br />
Varažd<strong>in</strong> Corps of the Yugoslav People’s Army <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>itial stages of war <strong>in</strong><br />
Croatia, only because he was br<strong>an</strong>ded a traitor by the Serb "patriotic block" <strong>for</strong><br />
refus<strong>in</strong>g to wage war <strong>for</strong> the Greater Serbia goals, to destroy Varazd<strong>in</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consequently <strong>for</strong> opt<strong>in</strong>g to pull out <strong>an</strong>d br<strong>in</strong>g back the young Serb soldiers,<br />
"the Serb children" to Serbia.<br />
A Metropolit<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Generals Play "War Games"<br />
Atop of the Mt. Rumija<br />
Installation of a t<strong>in</strong> church atop Rumija mounta<strong>in</strong>, on 21 June 2005 26 ,<br />
caused quite a stir <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. That church was placed there at <strong>an</strong> express<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d of Mitropolite of Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Coastal Belt, Amfilohija, with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
framework of his major project: unlawful construction of churches <strong>an</strong>d<br />
monasteries <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. Be<strong>for</strong>e that "event" Mitropolite Amfilohije<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eered the counstruction or renovation of over 200 SOC churches without<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d other permissions. 27 That is why that action was termed <strong>an</strong><br />
outrage both by pro-<strong>in</strong>depndence citizenry <strong>in</strong> Montenegro but also by<br />
democratic factions <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
24 "Officers Shall Have To Pay <strong>for</strong> Surplus Square Metres at a Market Price",<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 August 2005.<br />
25 "General Krstić <strong>an</strong>d General Trifunović", D<strong>an</strong>as, 6-7 August 2005.<br />
26 “Rumija", Ekonomist magaz<strong>in</strong>, 8 August 2005.<br />
27 "Ascension of Mitropolite Amfilohije Radović", Ekonomist magaz<strong>in</strong>, 29<br />
August 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The peak of Rumija mounta<strong>in</strong> has been <strong>an</strong> age-old gather<strong>in</strong>g place of<br />
all religious denom<strong>in</strong>ations. Mehmed Bardhi, leader of one of the two<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> parties <strong>in</strong> Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Montengr<strong>in</strong> MP <strong>in</strong> a parliamentary debate<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded the removal of that t<strong>in</strong> church <strong>an</strong>d stressed that "Rumija belongs to<br />
all peoples <strong>an</strong>d confessions", <strong>an</strong>d "that act of the Serb Orthodox Church aimed<br />
at provok<strong>in</strong>g Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s". 28<br />
The purpose of Amfilohije’s pl<strong>an</strong> (<strong>an</strong>d of his like-m<strong>in</strong>ded<br />
collaborators) was laid bare at "<strong>in</strong>auguration" of the church on 31 st July. Then<br />
among hundreds of faithfuls, were also spotted "devotees" of <strong>an</strong>other k<strong>in</strong>d,<br />
that is, m<strong>an</strong>y men donn<strong>in</strong>g T-shirts with images of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Ratko Mladić. In fact it was more a politick<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>an</strong> religious m<strong>an</strong>ifestation, <strong>in</strong><br />
which both Mitropolite Anfilohije <strong>an</strong>d Bishop of Zahum <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a,<br />
Grigorije, took part. 29<br />
Mitropolite Amfilohije m<strong>an</strong>aged to achieve his goal th<strong>an</strong>ks to the<br />
army help. Namely the army chopper tr<strong>an</strong>sported parts of a t<strong>in</strong> chuch to the<br />
top of mounta<strong>in</strong> Rumija. Although the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Chief of Staff<br />
tried to hush up the said army engagement, when the news of the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g<br />
leaked, the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> public op<strong>in</strong>ion assessed that "help" "as <strong>an</strong> unlawful<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement of the army, that is, its <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong>to affairs outside its<br />
prerogatives." Dur<strong>in</strong>g his late August visit to Wash<strong>in</strong>gton M<strong>in</strong>ister Dav<strong>in</strong>ić<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that "too much sensationalism was unnecessarily attached to army’s<br />
engagement <strong>in</strong> plac<strong>in</strong>g of the church atop Rumija. 30<br />
Vice president of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliament, Drag<strong>an</strong> Kujović, <strong>state</strong>d: "At<br />
play is not <strong>an</strong>y sensation but rather, a direct <strong>an</strong>d open army <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong>to<br />
relations between the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d church <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. In other words, the<br />
army has openly sided with political actions of the Serb Orthodox Church <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro." 31<br />
The then Head of Chief of Staff of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army,<br />
Colonel General Drag<strong>an</strong> Paskaš, who <strong>in</strong> the first place had approved the<br />
chopper support to Amfilohije’s operation, defended the whole project <strong>in</strong> the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>an</strong>ner: "What’s wrong about that support? The army has to date<br />
helped the church on m<strong>an</strong>y occasions." Due to such <strong>state</strong>ment Paskas was later<br />
sacked.<br />
"P<strong>an</strong>zer" Bash<strong>in</strong>g of M<strong>in</strong>ister Dav<strong>in</strong>ić<br />
Mile Dragic, <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terview to Vojska said: "Only few comp<strong>an</strong>ies of<br />
specific equipment have been as successful <strong>an</strong>d recognized as <strong>in</strong> South East<br />
28 "A D<strong>an</strong>gerous Circle ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 27-28 August 2005.<br />
29 "Rumija", Ekonomist magaz<strong>in</strong>, 8 August 2005.<br />
30 "A D<strong>an</strong>gerous Circle ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 27-28 August 2005.<br />
31 Idem<br />
244<br />
245
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Europe as Proizvodnja Mile Dragić of Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>. In bus<strong>in</strong>ess Balk<strong>an</strong>s circles, that<br />
producer from the city on river Begej, is considered a leader <strong>in</strong> a high-quality,<br />
diversified <strong>an</strong>d developed r<strong>an</strong>ge of products <strong>for</strong> defences <strong>for</strong>ces, police,<br />
gendarmerie <strong>an</strong>d civili<strong>an</strong> protection." 32 . Only few days later, on 19 J<strong>an</strong>uary a<br />
"20 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of successful work" of that comp<strong>an</strong>y was marked <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Guard House <strong>in</strong> Topčider. Dur<strong>in</strong>g celebrations director of comp<strong>an</strong>y, Mile<br />
Dragić, "h<strong>an</strong>ded special awards <strong>an</strong>d diplomas to several most successful<br />
partners of comp<strong>an</strong>ies, both <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals."<br />
Co-operation between the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army (earlier the FRY<br />
army) <strong>an</strong>d comp<strong>an</strong>y Proizvodnja Mile Dragić beg<strong>an</strong> about a decade ago. Hence<br />
the recipients of "special acknowledgements awards" were the Defense<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry, Chief of Staff, some prom<strong>in</strong>ent military dignitaries, four departments<br />
of Chief of Staff <strong>an</strong>d several <strong>in</strong>stitutions. On receiv<strong>in</strong>g the award on behalf of<br />
Chief of Staff, its Deputy Head, Vice Admiral, Mihailo Žarković, stressed that<br />
"products of comp<strong>an</strong>y Proizvodnja Mile Dragić are of a such high-quality that<br />
they deserve to be used by all the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> units. Their quality is<br />
equal to the ones with which the best armies <strong>in</strong> the world are equipped. " 33<br />
That co-operation was however severed by <strong>an</strong> apparently<br />
"eng<strong>in</strong>eered" affair, called "P<strong>an</strong>cir Affair" Key protagonists of that sc<strong>an</strong>dal,<br />
Mile Dragić, director of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned comp<strong>an</strong>y, <strong>an</strong>d the two Defence<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry officials, Major General Milun Kok<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Colonel Jovica<br />
Vučković, <strong>in</strong> early October were deta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> one month, on suspicion that<br />
"they have <strong>in</strong>curred heavy damage to the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro by their shady deal on purchase of ballistic <strong>an</strong>d protection<br />
equipment <strong>for</strong> the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army." "P<strong>an</strong>cir Affair" toppled the<br />
Defense M<strong>in</strong>ister, Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ic. That is under the government- <strong>an</strong>d mediaexerted<br />
he was compelled to h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> his resignation. 34<br />
Public at large has never been accurately <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med of the "worth" of<br />
the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned controversial deals between comp<strong>an</strong>y Proizvodnja Mile<br />
Dragić <strong>an</strong>d the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry: the pr<strong>in</strong>t media r<strong>an</strong> different figures, most<br />
frequently the one of – 300 million Euro. 35 That figure was disclosed by Mlađ<strong>an</strong><br />
D<strong>in</strong>kić, the F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal, official detractor of Prvoslav<br />
Dav<strong>in</strong>ic. But <strong>an</strong> expert, <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g team of magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, after a<br />
thorough <strong>an</strong>alysis of relev<strong>an</strong>t documents, established that those deals were<br />
worth "only" 175 milion Euro. 36 Regardless of the exact price of the purchased<br />
equipment, key protagonists of that sc<strong>an</strong>dal were subjected to judicial<br />
32 "Battle <strong>for</strong> Quality ", weekly Vojska, 13 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
33 "Twenty Succesful Years", Vojska, 27 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
34 "P<strong>an</strong>cir Affair", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 October 2005.<br />
35 "General Drag<strong>an</strong> Paskaš Requested Purchase of Equipment", Glas javnosti, 6<br />
September 2005.<br />
"Chief of Staff Knew Everyth<strong>in</strong>g ", Politika, 6 September 2005.<br />
36 "P<strong>an</strong>cir Affair", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 October 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigation, while the Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters of the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro repealed its decision, that is suspended the contract.<br />
If we trace back that affair, we shall discover that it was triggered off<br />
by a dispute between G17 plus party, that is its frontm<strong>an</strong>, Mlađ<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry headed by M<strong>in</strong>ister Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, a <strong>for</strong>mer member<br />
of that party. But one may claim with all certa<strong>in</strong>ty that the dispute was <strong>in</strong> fact<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>eered by the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d Democratic<br />
Party of Serbia. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g is also <strong>in</strong>dicated by the fact that Dav<strong>in</strong>ic’s<br />
successor at the top m<strong>in</strong>isterial post, was Kostunica’s "m<strong>an</strong>"-Dr. Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
St<strong>an</strong>kovic.<br />
Disagreements between M<strong>in</strong>isters D<strong>in</strong>kić <strong>an</strong>d Dav<strong>in</strong>ića were<br />
noticeable s<strong>in</strong>ce the time when D<strong>in</strong>kic, on behalf of the government of Serbia<br />
b<strong>an</strong>ned Dav<strong>in</strong>ic from sell<strong>in</strong>g so-called military property <strong>in</strong> territory of Serbia<br />
via the Military Re<strong>for</strong>m Fund. Throughout the spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d summer months,<br />
notably after a series of murders (suicides?) of soldiers, their relations soured<br />
so much that D<strong>in</strong>kic launched a veritable <strong>an</strong>ti-Dav<strong>in</strong>ic campaign. 37 After the<br />
media leaked the news of Dav<strong>in</strong>ic’s wrong <strong>an</strong>d costly (53 million Euro) lease of<br />
<strong>an</strong> Israeli satellite <strong>for</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g the L<strong>an</strong>d Security Zone <strong>in</strong> South Serbia,<br />
Dav<strong>in</strong>ic de facto lost his m<strong>in</strong>isterial position.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g summer G17 launched allegations that Dav<strong>in</strong>ic was not<br />
capable of runn<strong>in</strong>g the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d that "the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Chief of Staff are spend<strong>in</strong>g irrationally the budgetary funds" (the latter was<br />
partly true). Mlađ<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić even appo<strong>in</strong>ted a certa<strong>in</strong> Mr. Radović to the post<br />
of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial controller of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry, <strong>in</strong> a move designed to even<br />
more humiliate M<strong>in</strong>ister Dav<strong>in</strong>ic. Consequently, with the back<strong>in</strong>g of Labus <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Kostunica, the Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister tried to mount his defence by d<strong>in</strong>t of his two<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviews, <strong>in</strong> second half of August, to weekly Vojska.. 38 "P<strong>an</strong>cir Affair," which<br />
had a political background, deepened the army crisis though the newlyappo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister, Dr. Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković, pompously <strong>an</strong>nounced his<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention to "revive the old army glory."<br />
At Wayside<br />
In 2005 the headl<strong>in</strong>es were full of news relat<strong>in</strong>g to the army sc<strong>an</strong>dals.<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d the army <strong>an</strong>d defence system re<strong>for</strong>m 39 , <strong>in</strong> 1995, like <strong>in</strong> the<br />
past, was mediawise put on the back burner. The latter was due not only to<br />
37 "Army Is Steeped <strong>in</strong> Crim<strong>in</strong>ality ", Blic, 27 July 2005.<br />
"They Are Kill<strong>in</strong>g Our Army", Kurir, 4 August 2005.<br />
38 "Unfounded Criticism ", weekly Vojska, 18 August 2005.<br />
"I Am Sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> Example of Resolve", Vojska, 25 August 2005.<br />
39 In official communication the s<strong>in</strong>tagm "re<strong>for</strong>m of army <strong>an</strong>d defence" is most<br />
frequently used, though some k<strong>in</strong>d of achievements were reached only <strong>in</strong> the army<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m.<br />
246<br />
247
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Dav<strong>in</strong>ic’s assessment <strong>in</strong> the first issue of magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, "it is difficult to<br />
effect a thorough process of the army overhaul <strong>in</strong> complex social, economic <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
conditions," but primarly because as late as <strong>in</strong> 2005 the basic re<strong>for</strong>m-related<br />
preconditions have not been created. Furtermore no-one knows <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
about political, legal <strong>an</strong>d economic framework with<strong>in</strong> which the re<strong>for</strong>m is<br />
supposed to unfold, <strong>an</strong>d there is no consensus of political parties <strong>an</strong>d member<br />
<strong>state</strong>s on the course <strong>an</strong>d contents of that re<strong>for</strong>m. What is also miss<strong>in</strong>g are<br />
doctr<strong>in</strong>aire-<strong>security</strong> documentation, legal regulations <strong>an</strong>d general project of<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m.<br />
What is miss<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>an</strong>other import<strong>an</strong>t precondition <strong>for</strong> the army<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m, which Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way: "What is<br />
miss<strong>in</strong>g is a national consensus on the nature of developments <strong>in</strong> the 90’s, dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of Yugoslavia, on the role of armed <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> those events, <strong>an</strong>d notably<br />
on the responsibility of some <strong>in</strong>dividuals charged by the ICTY, <strong>an</strong>d justifiability of the<br />
NATO military campaign <strong>in</strong> 1999. 40<br />
This <strong>for</strong>mulation is import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> it <strong>in</strong>cludes the first-time appeal of a<br />
politici<strong>an</strong> to the rul<strong>in</strong>g structures of the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
to f<strong>in</strong>ally come out with the war bal<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alysis of the then role of armed<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces. Even if other conditions were met, the army re<strong>for</strong>m is not possible<br />
without fulfillment of that very specific condition.<br />
Similar <strong>state</strong>ment was made by Major General Zdravko Ponaš,<br />
Deputy Head of Chief of Staff <strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terview to magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, <strong>in</strong><br />
November 2005. When asked which issues would be tackled by Chief of Staff<br />
<strong>in</strong> the near future, he replied: "To <strong>an</strong>swer your question I must go back to the<br />
past…, <strong>for</strong> to know what we must do <strong>in</strong> the future, we must first know where we st<strong>an</strong>d<br />
now. Firstly, we must underst<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d recognize the fact that the army <strong>in</strong> the 90’s was<br />
very much misused" 41 …<br />
This was the first official <strong>an</strong>d public admission of the army misuse by<br />
a high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g officer of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army. Be<strong>for</strong>e that the army<br />
tended to <strong>in</strong>terpret its past role <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> recent wars <strong>in</strong> the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>an</strong>ner: "We fought <strong>for</strong> the survival of Yugoslavia", "We took part <strong>in</strong><br />
liberation of Serb people, firstly from Ustashi, then from Muslims <strong>an</strong>d<br />
mudjahed<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>ally from the NATO aggressor <strong>an</strong>d Shiptari terrorists."<br />
Perhaps the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned <strong>state</strong>ments herald a more realistic tack of<br />
military <strong>an</strong>d political structures to the national program, wars <strong>an</strong>d war crimes.<br />
Perhaps such <strong>state</strong>ments were prompted by realization that <strong>an</strong>y military<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m had to be preceded by a ch<strong>an</strong>ge of m<strong>in</strong>d-set, of military education, <strong>for</strong><br />
only a new generation of young, educated officers, could successfully carry out<br />
the army re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d thus take the army <strong>in</strong>to the NATO <strong>security</strong> fold. In<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
parallel the two, above <strong>state</strong>ments, were <strong>in</strong>dications of a possible direction of<br />
<strong>an</strong>y army re<strong>for</strong>m.<br />
Reorg<strong>an</strong>ization: A Substitute <strong>for</strong> Re<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
In the absence of a comprehensive army <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> union re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
project, the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army were left to fend<br />
<strong>for</strong> themselves, that is to attempt <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationally unprecedented, self-styled<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal project one of the goals of re<strong>for</strong>m "stems from<br />
politically <strong>an</strong>d publicly declared orientation of member-<strong>state</strong>s to accede to<br />
Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>security</strong> ones embodied <strong>in</strong><br />
Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace <strong>an</strong>d NATO". That circumst<strong>an</strong>ce gave rise to a need to<br />
first implement st<strong>an</strong>dardization of military org<strong>an</strong>ization with a view to<br />
achiev<strong>in</strong>g a high degree of compatibility, <strong>in</strong>ter-operability, <strong>an</strong>d establishment<br />
of a full-scale civili<strong>an</strong> control over the army, the elements considered<br />
preconditions <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g ally l<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>an</strong>d relations with the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned<br />
Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic org<strong>an</strong>izations. 42<br />
In l<strong>in</strong>e with the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> early April 2005, the then Head of Chief<br />
of Staff of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army, General Drag<strong>an</strong> Paskaš presented a<br />
new org<strong>an</strong>ization scheme of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army. 43 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that<br />
scheme, all corps other then Podgorica <strong>an</strong>d Novi Sad ones, were suspended<br />
<strong>an</strong>d replaced with: a) Operative <strong>for</strong>ces, b) Ground <strong>for</strong>ces, c) Air <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-air<br />
defence <strong>for</strong>ces, d) Naval <strong>for</strong>ces, e) Logistic units, f) Military academy. In other<br />
words, "a sector-style org<strong>an</strong>ization of Chief of Staff was replaced by a<br />
functional pr<strong>in</strong>ciple-based org<strong>an</strong>ization, <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with contemporary st<strong>an</strong>dards."<br />
Every a<strong>for</strong>ementioned segment has its comm<strong>an</strong>d controlled by Chief of Staff.<br />
Added to its Head, Chief of Staff has 4 deputies <strong>an</strong>d 7 departments (<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
resources; <strong>in</strong>telligence-surveill<strong>an</strong>ce, special <strong>an</strong>d electronic operations;<br />
operational affairs; logistics; development; <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d liaison; tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g).<br />
New org<strong>an</strong>izational structure of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>in</strong> 2005 is the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g 44 : Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d Deputy Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister; Chief of Staff with<br />
7 Departments; Defence Policy Sector with 3 directoriats; Secretariat with 2<br />
directoriats <strong>an</strong>d Operational Affairs Department; Hum<strong>an</strong> Resources<br />
Department with 4 directoriats; F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial Resources Sector with 7 directoriats;<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Intelligence-Security Sector <strong>for</strong>merly compris<strong>in</strong>g Military Intelligence<br />
Agency <strong>an</strong>d Military Security Agency. But the new Defence Secretary, Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
St<strong>an</strong>ković, <strong>in</strong> late 2005 (probably with the consent of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters) abolished the Intelligence-Security Sector, <strong>an</strong>d relived of<br />
his duties (allegedly because of his poor per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce), the then head of that<br />
40 “Achievements <strong>an</strong>d Challenges", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a<br />
, 1 October 2005.<br />
41 “On Issues of War <strong>an</strong>d Peace”, magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 November 2005.<br />
42 "Achievements <strong>an</strong>d Challenges", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 October 2005.<br />
43 "Completed Process", weekly Vojska, 14 April 2005.<br />
44 "Achievements <strong>an</strong>d Challenges", weekly Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 October 2005.<br />
248<br />
249
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
sector, retired general Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Dimitrijević (who <strong>in</strong> early 2005 had been<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted to that position by the then Defence Secretary, Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, <strong>in</strong><br />
l<strong>in</strong>e with the new org<strong>an</strong>izational scheme of the M<strong>in</strong>istry) 45 .<br />
Numerical Chaos<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro does not employ<br />
precise parameters <strong>for</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g both the peacetime <strong>an</strong>d wartime size of its<br />
army, <strong>in</strong> that area m<strong>an</strong>y r<strong>an</strong>dom figures are circulated. Hence the general<br />
public is oft presented diverse figures, depnd<strong>in</strong>g of politici<strong>an</strong>s or military<br />
officers choice of the size criteria. In those terms very illustrative is the st<strong>an</strong>d of<br />
the <strong>in</strong>cumbent Defence Secretary, Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković: "I enquired about the army<br />
projection <strong>an</strong>d its size, but reseived no reply. I heard some people mention<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the figure of 25,000 or even 30,000 people. Well then I c<strong>an</strong>not help but wonder<br />
how come that Sloveni<strong>an</strong>s who have 1,5 million <strong>in</strong>habit<strong>an</strong>ts pay 8,500<br />
professional soldiers, though they are a NAO member. Should we emulate that<br />
projtection? If we have 8 million citizens then how m<strong>an</strong>y soldiers we should<br />
have? Or why the Bulgaria, with the population approximately the size of<br />
ours, has 49,000 soldiers. " 46<br />
The m<strong>in</strong>ister’s st<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>dicates two th<strong>in</strong>gs: firstly, his pr<strong>in</strong>cipal<br />
criterion is the size of the army <strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g countries, <strong>an</strong>d that is a very<br />
simplified tack. Secondly, he prefers a more numerous or larger army, which is<br />
also urged by all generals <strong>an</strong>d politici<strong>an</strong>s belong<strong>in</strong>g to so-called patriotic block,<br />
or the most conservative prime movers <strong>in</strong> the Serb political <strong>an</strong>d military elite.<br />
Former Head of Chief of Staff, Drag<strong>an</strong> Paskaš, dur<strong>in</strong>g the public<br />
promotion of the new army org<strong>an</strong>ization, on 8 April, disclosed that the post-restructur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
size of the army-65,000 employees <strong>in</strong> peacetime <strong>an</strong>d 260,000 <strong>in</strong><br />
wartime, while previously those figures were 100,000 <strong>an</strong>d 360,000<br />
respectively". 47 It is difficult to believe that the army was downsized by 35,000<br />
servicemen <strong>in</strong> such a short period of time, <strong>in</strong> view of the uproar <strong>in</strong> the first half<br />
of 2005 caused by a reduction of 9,000 empoloyees (two thirds of whom were<br />
civili<strong>an</strong>s employed by the army).<br />
At a public discussion "Social Price of the Army Overhaul", held <strong>in</strong><br />
May 2005, <strong>for</strong>mer Defence Secretary Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić <strong>state</strong>d that the IMF<br />
conditions gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g of lo<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d writ<strong>in</strong>g off debts to "our country" with<br />
downsiz<strong>in</strong>g of military budget, <strong>an</strong>d ratio between military <strong>an</strong>d civili<strong>an</strong> army<br />
employees. He added that "the Rom<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> army has 90,000 military <strong>an</strong>d 16,000<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> employees, while that ratio <strong>in</strong> our country is 16,000 civili<strong>an</strong>s to 36, 000<br />
military professionals…plus we have a m<strong>in</strong>imum of 15,000 recruits.". 48<br />
Director of Centre <strong>for</strong> Civili<strong>an</strong>-Military Relations, Dr Miroslav Hadžić,<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that the army was 77,000-strong. 49 In circulation are also other figures<br />
related to the size of the army, but we shall not list them <strong>for</strong> they c<strong>an</strong> only<br />
contribute to further, numerical confusion.<br />
Two Armies <strong>in</strong> One<br />
Blagoje Grahovac, a retired general <strong>an</strong>d <strong>security</strong> adviser to R<strong>an</strong>ko<br />
Krivokapić, president of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament, <strong>in</strong>creased the current<br />
confusion by present<strong>in</strong>g his project of org<strong>an</strong>ization of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army 50 ,<br />
which presupposed <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro. That project was sharply<br />
criticized by Serbia.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> part of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army has currently a total<br />
of 3,470 high <strong>an</strong>d low-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g officers. To that figure should be added between<br />
1,600 <strong>an</strong>d 1,700 military conscripts, which br<strong>in</strong>gs the total number of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army employees to 5,000 people. General Grahovac th<strong>in</strong>ks that<br />
"such a large army" c<strong>an</strong>not be f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially supported by Montenegro. Hence his<br />
proposal that <strong>in</strong> the future the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> professional army be reduced to<br />
600- 1,000 people to be paid 500 Euro each.<br />
Military <strong>an</strong>alysts, notably Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Radić, th<strong>in</strong>ks that "at best we<br />
could talk about a k<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>for</strong>mation-<strong>an</strong>d not <strong>an</strong> armed <strong>for</strong>ce- <strong>for</strong> welcom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign delegations" <strong>an</strong>d adds: "One wonders about a mere survival of the <strong>state</strong><br />
with such <strong>an</strong> army". 51 Blagoje Grahovac, is however of a different op<strong>in</strong>ion: "All<br />
those stories that we need a large army <strong>for</strong> the sake of Kosovo, <strong>for</strong> the sake of<br />
South Serbia, stability of the country, lead the citizens astray, <strong>for</strong> our army<br />
shall never aga<strong>in</strong> resolve <strong>an</strong>y problem by d<strong>in</strong>t of –war. The <strong>state</strong> shall have<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter-<strong>state</strong> treaties, tied to the system of collective <strong>security</strong>." 52 Added to that,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to Grahovac, "the Serb economy may currently susta<strong>in</strong> at the most<br />
8,500 professional soldiers with <strong>an</strong> average salary of 500 Euro."<br />
Borislav Lalević, Head of Directoriat <strong>for</strong> Civili<strong>an</strong> Defence <strong>in</strong> the<br />
government of Montenegro, thus responded to claims that Grahovac "was<br />
break<strong>in</strong>g up the army <strong>an</strong>d the common <strong>state</strong>," : "the army has been already<br />
divided along the territorial pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, the military property has been divided,<br />
the army funds have been divided, recruits serve their military service <strong>in</strong> their<br />
45 "State Has the Army It Deserves", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 November 2005.<br />
"State Has the Army It Deserves" magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 November 2005.<br />
47 "Completed Process", weekly Vojska, 14 April 2005.<br />
48 "Re<strong>for</strong>m Is Dictated by Money ", weekly Vojska, 26 May 2005.<br />
49 "Hadžić: Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro C<strong>an</strong>not Susta<strong>in</strong> 77,000-thous<strong>an</strong>d Strong<br />
Army", D<strong>an</strong>as, 4 June 2005.<br />
50 "Montenegro Gets Its Own Army", Blic, 5 March 2005.<br />
51 Idem<br />
52 Idem<br />
250<br />
251
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>state</strong>s, every <strong>state</strong> has a separate recruit system…what is yet miss<strong>in</strong>g, is<br />
<strong>for</strong>malization of the factual <strong>state</strong>." 53<br />
Fetishization of Doctr<strong>in</strong>aire Documentation<br />
Although Defence Strategy was written as early as <strong>in</strong> 2004, that<br />
document was officially promoted only on 6 April 2005, together with the<br />
White Defence Book. 54 Promoters were President of Serbia Boris Tadić <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
then Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, who gave high marks to that<br />
strategic-doctr<strong>in</strong>ary document. M<strong>in</strong>ister Dav<strong>in</strong>ić then <strong>state</strong>d that the Defence<br />
Strategy "represents a k<strong>in</strong>d of comm<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> actions on <strong>in</strong>ternal pl<strong>an</strong>e", while<br />
the White Book "was geared towards both domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>eign public." He said<br />
that those "two, key documents met at the same time the fundamental<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards of democratic countries on tr<strong>an</strong>sparency <strong>in</strong> the realm of military,<br />
army <strong>an</strong>d defence issues, which are the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal prerequisities <strong>for</strong> our<br />
accession to <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>tegration processes. This is the first-time<br />
publication of the White Book document <strong>in</strong> the history of our armed <strong>for</strong>ces,<br />
which gives to that publish<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> political weight." 55<br />
White Defence Book "<strong>in</strong> contemporary terms represents a generally<br />
accepted name <strong>for</strong> the <strong>state</strong> document present<strong>in</strong>g to domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
public <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation relat<strong>in</strong>g to the most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>security</strong> <strong>an</strong>d defence issues<br />
of a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d resolution thereof." 56 But the most import<strong>an</strong>t question is<br />
to which extent that book is applicable to our conditions, or to which extent the<br />
White Book is compatible with the exist<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>dards of democratic countries, <strong>in</strong><br />
view of absence of public discussion of that book?! Participation of general<br />
public <strong>in</strong> a dialogue on military, defence <strong>an</strong>d <strong>security</strong> issues <strong>in</strong> general, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of that public on pert<strong>in</strong>ent decisions, presupposes a certa<strong>in</strong> level of<br />
general <strong>an</strong>d notably <strong>security</strong> culture, which does not exist <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro!<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d the local public is not <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med enough of those<br />
problems, <strong>an</strong>d moreover has no elementary knowledge thereof. Added to that<br />
the conservative m<strong>in</strong>d-set that "all th<strong>in</strong>gs military should never be called <strong>in</strong>to<br />
question" still prevails. That me<strong>an</strong>s that the relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions, notably<br />
the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry, as well as NGO sector have a major task ahead of them:<br />
to education general populace about the <strong>security</strong> issues <strong>an</strong>d import<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
doctr<strong>in</strong>aire documentation. That is a major prerequisite <strong>for</strong> participation of<br />
citizens <strong>in</strong> creation of the defence <strong>an</strong>d general <strong>security</strong> policy.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
In late 2005 the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>state</strong>d that the draft<strong>in</strong>g of Military<br />
Doctr<strong>in</strong>e was underway while Strategic Review of Defence was <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al stage<br />
of elaboration. 57 Although the Constitutional Charter is prioritized <strong>in</strong> the<br />
hierarchy of Strategy National Security, it <strong>in</strong>directly empowers each member<br />
<strong>state</strong> of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro to to create <strong>an</strong>d adopt that<br />
document. Thus on a strategic level, doctr<strong>in</strong>aire documentation would be<br />
completed.<br />
On legislative level the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry prepared three Bills: the first<br />
one is on the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army, the second on the Defence <strong>an</strong>d the third<br />
one on Security Services. Experts of Centre <strong>for</strong> Civili<strong>an</strong>-Military Relations also<br />
prepared draft laws on civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d democratic control of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army <strong>an</strong>d on the Supreme Defence Council, while Belgrade<br />
office of Europen Bureau <strong>for</strong> Conscientious Objectors designed the Draft Act on<br />
Civili<strong>an</strong> Service. 58 . Despite the absence of a broader public debate those drafts<br />
are slated <strong>for</strong> official adoption. But hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>an</strong>nounced referendum <strong>in</strong> Montenegro there<br />
is little ch<strong>an</strong>ce that <strong>an</strong>y of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned drafts would be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> a<br />
parliamentary pre-adoption debate agenda <strong>in</strong> the first half of 2006.<br />
Most responsible men of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d even of Chief of<br />
Staff are nearly turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a veritable fetish the military <strong>an</strong>d army-related<br />
doctr<strong>in</strong>aire documentation <strong>an</strong>d legislation. Even if adopted that<br />
documentation could not be properly implemented as long as the stability is<br />
not reached by the <strong>state</strong> union or the latter arr<strong>an</strong>ged as a legal <strong>state</strong>. But<br />
<strong>an</strong>other dilemma is lurk<strong>in</strong>g too: to which extent that documentation would<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> valid <strong>in</strong> case of <strong>in</strong>dependence of member-<strong>state</strong>s of the union.<br />
Representatives of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Chief of Staff by glorification of<br />
recently adopted documents (Defence Strategy <strong>an</strong>d White Defence Book) <strong>an</strong>d of<br />
those currently be<strong>in</strong>g prepared seem to be tell<strong>in</strong>g to a) Brussels that <strong>in</strong> that way<br />
they are also apply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace; b) domestic public op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />
that they-the military clerks-are do<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g. And f<strong>in</strong>ally one shouldn’t<br />
also reject the assumption that both import<strong>an</strong>t documents – despite awareness<br />
of their authors of the m<strong>in</strong>imum capacity <strong>for</strong> implementation thereof <strong>in</strong> the<br />
current <strong>state</strong> limbo- were adopted only to strengthen a weak l<strong>in</strong>k still hold<strong>in</strong>g<br />
together the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro– that is, the k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
common <strong>state</strong> so dear to the Serb nationalists.<br />
53 Idem<br />
54 "Our Europe<strong>an</strong> Striv<strong>in</strong>gs", weekly Vojska, 14 April 2005.<br />
55 "Achievements <strong>an</strong>d Challenges", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 October 2005.<br />
56 "Tr<strong>an</strong>sparent Document ", weekly Vojska, 10 March 2005.<br />
57 "Achievements <strong>an</strong>d Challenges ", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 October 2005.<br />
58 Idem<br />
252<br />
253
Even Serbs Are No Longer Gung-ho<br />
About the Military Service<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Parliament of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro on 22 October 2005 passed the<br />
Act on Army under which the m<strong>an</strong>datory military service was reduced from 9<br />
to six months, while the civili<strong>an</strong> service was reduced from 13 to 9 months. 59<br />
The State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro was the last of the Balk<strong>an</strong>s newlyemerged<br />
<strong>state</strong>s to cut down its military service to 6 months. Despite that<br />
decision, nearly the entire generals "choir" deemed it "too early" <strong>an</strong>d "not<br />
smart" 60 , whereby they defended that st<strong>an</strong>d of theirs most often by irrational,<br />
that is, tradition-m<strong>in</strong>ded arguments.<br />
It is most certa<strong>in</strong> that the military authorities were compelled to<br />
reduce the military service, <strong>for</strong> there is no evidence that their move resulted<br />
from the conclusion that the said reduction would be the most rational solution<br />
<strong>for</strong> the <strong>state</strong> union. Response of recruits to the call-up <strong>in</strong> 2005 <strong>in</strong>dicated that<br />
only <strong>in</strong> some parts of Serbia the tradition that "the males are moulded <strong>in</strong> the<br />
army", "real males do the regular military service, while the cowards opt <strong>for</strong> a<br />
civili<strong>an</strong> one" or "debt to homel<strong>an</strong>d may be re-paid only by rifle-tot<strong>in</strong>g"<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed a firmly entrenched tradition. 61 In other words Serbs are no longer<br />
gung-ho about their army, as <strong>in</strong>dicated by the 2005 data too: <strong>in</strong> March only<br />
62% of recruits responded to the call-up, while <strong>in</strong> June that percentage<br />
plummeted even further- 49.1%. . 62<br />
Various, both official <strong>an</strong>d unofficial commentaries list as the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal<br />
reason <strong>for</strong> such a low response the newly-<strong>in</strong>troduced civili<strong>an</strong> service <strong>an</strong>d<br />
plummet<strong>in</strong>g rat<strong>in</strong>gs of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army notably after a series of<br />
barracks murders (suicides) <strong>an</strong>d other sc<strong>an</strong>dals/affairs which rocked the<br />
Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Chief of Staff <strong>in</strong> 2005. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d military<br />
officials concluded that a low response to recruitment was due to a relatively<br />
long military service. Then they expla<strong>in</strong>ed the gist of problem to the Supreme<br />
Defence Council <strong>an</strong>d Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, who,<br />
consequently suggested to parliament of the <strong>state</strong> union to reduce the military<br />
service to 6 months. It turned out to be a good move: of pl<strong>an</strong>ned 10,185 recruits<br />
<strong>in</strong> September 85.03% turned up <strong>in</strong> the barracks. 63 But <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g autumn<br />
months of 2005 months the response of recruits was <strong>an</strong>ew very low. The<br />
<strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g was probably due to weaknesses <strong>an</strong>d shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs of the military<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
No Amnesty <strong>for</strong> "Deserters" <strong>an</strong>d Draft-dodgers<br />
Response of recruits could be further adversely affected by a threat of<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al prosecution of those youngsters who have not responded to the callup,<br />
or those draft-dodgers who, because of recent wars, had left the country a<br />
decade or so ago. After amnesty of all young males who <strong>in</strong> 27 April-7 October<br />
2001 period "were suspected of committ<strong>in</strong>g a crim<strong>in</strong>al offence aga<strong>in</strong>st their<br />
homel<strong>an</strong>d" under the FRY pert<strong>in</strong>ent law passed <strong>in</strong> 2001," 64 , it was expected that<br />
both Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro would adopt similar laws relat<strong>in</strong>g to "all those<br />
who have not per<strong>for</strong>med the sacred military duty towards their homel<strong>an</strong>d".<br />
But Serbia failed to do that, while the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament <strong>in</strong><br />
September 2004 under a new law amnestied all young males who did not<br />
respond to the call-up <strong>in</strong> 7 October 2001-10 August 2002 period. Subsequently<br />
the same parliament <strong>in</strong> November 2005 passsed the new Act on Amnesty<br />
"exempt<strong>in</strong>g from prosecution, jail sentence <strong>an</strong>d pecuniary penalty penalty all<br />
those who <strong>in</strong> 10 August 2004-1 September 2005 period failed to respond to the<br />
call-up." 65<br />
To meet the amnesty appeal of m<strong>an</strong>y émigré-"offenders" <strong>in</strong> late 2004<br />
the then Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister, Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić <strong>in</strong> agreement with members of the<br />
Serb army, passed a decree-as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim measure prior to adoption of<br />
expected law-"guar<strong>an</strong>tee<strong>in</strong>g" a non-prosecution or arrest of those young males<br />
resid<strong>in</strong>g abroad, upon their return or visit to their homel<strong>an</strong>d. 66<br />
But it was a weak guar<strong>an</strong>tee, <strong>for</strong> on 27 April 2005, at a border cross<strong>in</strong>g<br />
near Bačka Pal<strong>an</strong>ka, Mil<strong>an</strong> Vrsajkov, a cellist of <strong>in</strong>ternational repute, was<br />
arrested on grounds of draft-dodg<strong>in</strong>g. 67 In May 2005 M<strong>in</strong>ister Dav<strong>in</strong>ić<br />
requested <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g the Crim<strong>in</strong>al Department of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Public<br />
Prosecution to b<strong>an</strong> their municipal departments from persecut<strong>in</strong>g youngsters<br />
with unregulated military service. After receiv<strong>in</strong>g a negative response to his<br />
request, on 23 June 2005 Dav<strong>in</strong>ic publicly br<strong>an</strong>ded such arrests as "<strong>an</strong> outrage"<br />
<strong>an</strong>d went on to note: "It is a shame that the post of public prosecutor is<br />
occupied by a person who does not have the right feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the justice <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the <strong>state</strong> needs…" 68<br />
Spokesm<strong>an</strong> of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Public Prosecutor of Serbia publicly<br />
responded to Dav<strong>in</strong>ić that the RPP <strong>in</strong>tended to cont<strong>in</strong>ue with the arrest of<br />
army deserters. 69 It seems that the said response heralded <strong>an</strong> imm<strong>in</strong>ent end of<br />
Dav<strong>in</strong>ic’s political or rather, m<strong>in</strong>isterial career.<br />
59 "Six -months Military Service", Politika, 23 October 2005.<br />
60 "On Issues of War <strong>an</strong>d Peace", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 November 2005.<br />
61 "Debt to Homel<strong>an</strong>d C<strong>an</strong> Be Re-Paid Only by Rifle-Tot<strong>in</strong>g." weekly Vojska, 13<br />
June 2005.<br />
62 "Path of Lost Steps", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 October 2005.<br />
63 "Path of Lost Steps", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 October 2005.<br />
64 "Race aga<strong>in</strong>st the Time", D<strong>an</strong>as, 19 December 2005.<br />
65 Idem<br />
66 "Pardon<strong>in</strong>g Deserters Is Not the Simplest Solution", D<strong>an</strong>as, 24 April 2005.<br />
67 "Big Oversight ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 29 April 2005.<br />
68 "Arrest of Recruits from Diaspora is <strong>an</strong> Outrage ", D<strong>an</strong>as, 24 June 2005.<br />
69 "All Draft-Dodgers Must Face Crim<strong>in</strong>al Charges", D<strong>an</strong>as, 25-26 June 2005.<br />
254<br />
255
"The Region's Security Black Hole"<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Strategic-doctr<strong>in</strong>aire documentation (both the adopted one <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
one be<strong>in</strong>g prepared) spells out that the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> defence policy is<br />
based on pro-Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d pro-Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations orientations. It is<br />
also underscored that the second ma<strong>in</strong>stay of he defence policy is the <strong>state</strong><br />
resolve "to jo<strong>in</strong>, as a whole or via its member-<strong>state</strong>s, other <strong>state</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d subjects of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational relations <strong>in</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g of global, regional <strong>an</strong>d national <strong>security</strong>." 70<br />
A<strong>for</strong>ementioned orientation or guidel<strong>in</strong>e was taken from the<br />
Constitutional Charter. But the problem lies <strong>in</strong> the fact that the Constititutional<br />
Charter is violated <strong>in</strong> that very segment, which <strong>in</strong>dicates the lack of consensus<br />
on card<strong>in</strong>al issues of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> defence issues both on the level of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> union’s authorities, <strong>an</strong>d on the level of the two member-<strong>state</strong>s. Pl<strong>an</strong>s<br />
<strong>for</strong> a broader debate on defence policy <strong>in</strong> other segments of society are not<br />
afoot. Hence the uproar over the sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Agreement on Tr<strong>an</strong>sit<br />
Arr<strong>an</strong>gements In Support of Peace-keep<strong>in</strong>g Operations signed by Vuk Drašković,<br />
Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign Secretary <strong>an</strong>d Jap de Hop Shefer, NATO Secretary<br />
General on 18 July 2005. 71<br />
Serb Radical Party, that is, its leader, Tomislav Nikolić, made a<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> Parliament of Serbia: "We are ready to org<strong>an</strong>ize <strong>an</strong><br />
upris<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st that Agreement. We shall ask the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister to say<br />
whether he favours or opposes that agreement. By sign<strong>in</strong>g that Agreement,<br />
withouth ratification of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament, all differences<br />
between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Republika Srpska shall disappear…" Kosta Čavoški,<br />
professor of Belgrade Law Faculty, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, equalized the sign<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
that Agreement with -capitulation! 72 Though the Agreement was slow <strong>in</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d sign<strong>in</strong>g-due to a well-regulated procedure of preparations which<br />
lasted from November 2004 to July 2005, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> NATO-Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters talks m<strong>an</strong>y legal <strong>an</strong>d military experts as well<br />
as politici<strong>an</strong>s (representatives of the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istries of Defence, Foreign<br />
Affairs, Justice <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces) those ef<strong>for</strong>ts were not deemed sufficiently<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sparent <strong>for</strong> the general public <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Late July 2005 public op<strong>in</strong>ion poll<br />
conducted by agency Faktor plus, <strong>in</strong>dicated that as m<strong>an</strong>y as 42.1% of Serb<br />
respondents did not back the Agreement. 73<br />
Foreign Affairs M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>d Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry have not made<br />
concerted ef<strong>for</strong>ts to more reliably <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the citizenry of the signific<strong>an</strong>ce of that<br />
Agreement <strong>for</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. In view of lack of consensus on such <strong>an</strong><br />
import<strong>an</strong>t strategic issue on the level of prime political movers of Serbia, the<br />
70 Strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of Security Structure", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 October 2005.<br />
71 "For More Secure Balk<strong>an</strong>s", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1 October 2005.<br />
72 Idem<br />
73 Idem<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
whole process was completed far from the public eye. However, responses of<br />
citizens, whose op<strong>in</strong>ions are by <strong>an</strong>d large moulded by political propag<strong>an</strong>da,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicate their conservative st<strong>an</strong>d on Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
Dr. Boj<strong>an</strong> Dimitrijević, <strong>an</strong> aide to President Boris Tadić is of the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g op<strong>in</strong>ion: "As long as we th<strong>in</strong>k that that it is good <strong>for</strong> us to have <strong>an</strong><br />
"<strong>in</strong>dependent" defence system, <strong>an</strong>d we stick to our isolationist st<strong>an</strong>d, those<br />
who are not <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed towards us shall be able to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that our army is a<br />
treat to stability. In the light of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned our Defense Strategy, White<br />
Book, Doctr<strong>in</strong>e, etc, are futile <strong>an</strong>d useless. Contrary to that conservative st<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
if we tend to <strong>for</strong>ge close ties with other military alli<strong>an</strong>ces, our army, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
spirit of its best times, shall be a key ma<strong>in</strong>stay of regional <strong>security</strong>…." "…On<br />
the other h<strong>an</strong>d NATO does not need a <strong>security</strong> black hole <strong>in</strong> the region …" 74<br />
Public op<strong>in</strong>ion polls <strong>in</strong> late 2005 confirmed that the majority of citizens<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ged their st<strong>an</strong>ce, that is, that they now back accession to Partnership <strong>for</strong><br />
Peace program. That <strong>in</strong>dicates a genu<strong>in</strong>e schizophrenia: major part of political<br />
establishment <strong>an</strong>d majority of citizens favour accession to Partnership <strong>for</strong><br />
Peace (possibly out of lucrative reasons), but NATO-with<strong>in</strong> whose framework<br />
is Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace program – is still considered <strong>an</strong> enemy org<strong>an</strong>ization.<br />
In l<strong>in</strong>e with pro-Partnership orientation, a large number of military officers<br />
<strong>an</strong>d citizens from Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong> 2005 attended NATO orientation<br />
courses provid<strong>in</strong>g enrollees with elementary knowledge about Alli<strong>an</strong>ce,<br />
notably the modes of crisis situation-resolution, the mode of peace-support<br />
operations, co-operation between the civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d military sector, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
democratic control of armed <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro which is yet to<br />
be implemented.<br />
Re-shuffles at the Military Top<br />
In chronicles about the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army, the year 2005 shall be<br />
marked down as the one of frequent replacements of <strong>state</strong> officials <strong>an</strong>d top<br />
generals. At the helm of the Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry Boris Tadić was replaced by<br />
Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, who only after 18 months was replaced <strong>in</strong> late 2005 with<br />
Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković. Replacements of Head of Chief of Staff r<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
order: General Br<strong>an</strong>ko Krga was replaced by Drag<strong>an</strong> Paskaš <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d then only 10 months later, <strong>in</strong> October, Paskas, was replaced with General<br />
Ljubiša Jokić.<br />
Those frequent replacements <strong>in</strong>dicate the two conclusions: the first<strong>an</strong>d<br />
less import<strong>an</strong>t one-is that the political leadership of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro (primarily the top political leadership of Serbia) either lacks the<br />
acumen or the political will to comprehend the true causes of crisis <strong>in</strong> the<br />
military org<strong>an</strong>ization, <strong>an</strong>d consequently leaves the crisis open. The second<br />
74 "Rejection of Necessary Ch<strong>an</strong>ges", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 15 November 2005.<br />
256<br />
257
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
conclusion is that those replacements <strong>in</strong>dicate that the Serb political<br />
establishment does not w<strong>an</strong>t to yield its full control of the army, hence<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tments of Serbs, or Serbs from Montenegro –Ljubisa Jokic-to key<br />
military positions. Not only such moves are contrary to guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d spirit of<br />
the Constitutional Charter, but they also <strong>in</strong>dicate the possible scenarios related<br />
to Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum on <strong>in</strong>dependence. The a<strong>for</strong>ementioned hypothesis<br />
may be subst<strong>an</strong>tiated by the army-backed <strong>in</strong>stallation of <strong>an</strong> impromptu, t<strong>in</strong><br />
church atop Rumija mounta<strong>in</strong>, as eng<strong>in</strong>eered by General Paskas, political<br />
disqualification of Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić <strong>an</strong>d notably appo<strong>in</strong>tment of Dr. Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
St<strong>an</strong>kovic to the position of the Defence M<strong>in</strong>ister.<br />
Primary Criterion – Nationalistic M<strong>in</strong>dset<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Paskaš belongs to the generals with markedly "patriotic m<strong>in</strong>dset",<br />
but he masked well that prop<strong>in</strong>quity of his. His mimicry was successful<br />
until the <strong>in</strong>stallation of a t<strong>in</strong> church atop Rumija mounta<strong>in</strong>. Details of<br />
agreement or rather a deal between Mitropolite Amfilohija <strong>an</strong>d General Paskaš<br />
have not been disclosed, but it is widely known that the general gladly<br />
accepted the offer to help "its Church." On the other h<strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s could<br />
not turn a bl<strong>in</strong>d eye to General’s or rather army’s open <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the<br />
political life of Montenegro, there<strong>for</strong>e he had to leave the army r<strong>an</strong>ks: on 6 th<br />
October 2005 the Supreme Defence Council decided to retire him.<br />
Because of failure of Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić to meet the expectations of "the<br />
patriotic block" of Serbia, his political party, G17 plus, tried as early as <strong>in</strong><br />
spr<strong>in</strong>g 2005 to solve that problem by d<strong>in</strong>t of his political eut<strong>an</strong>asia. After that<br />
failed attempt, a more cruel pl<strong>an</strong>, the one of political liquidation- was put <strong>in</strong><br />
place. Then <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Dav<strong>in</strong>ic campaign was mounted by Radicals, Socialists,<br />
Kostunica’s Democrats <strong>an</strong>d Labusov Labus’s G17 plus. Dav<strong>in</strong>ic was accused of<br />
not controll<strong>in</strong>g enough the military budget, that is allow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> irrational<br />
spend<strong>in</strong>g thereof, of be<strong>in</strong>g unable to run the Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry, of misus<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Army-controlled Fund <strong>for</strong> the Army Overhaul. Added to that he <strong>an</strong>d Vuk<br />
Draskovic were blamed <strong>for</strong> sign<strong>in</strong>g the Agreement on the NATO troops tr<strong>an</strong>sit<br />
through the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> territory. Follow<strong>in</strong>g accusations were also<br />
leveled aga<strong>in</strong>st Dav<strong>in</strong>ic: wrongful sign<strong>in</strong>g of a damag<strong>in</strong>g contract on lease of<br />
satellite <strong>for</strong> control of South Serbia border with <strong>an</strong> Israeli comp<strong>an</strong>y, <strong>an</strong>d heavy<br />
<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the "P<strong>an</strong>cir" sc<strong>an</strong>dal.<br />
But Dav<strong>in</strong>ic was not criticized so much <strong>for</strong> previously mentioned<br />
murders of soldiers. Neither the authorities of opposition took him to task <strong>for</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g contradictory <strong>state</strong>ments about officers mak<strong>in</strong>g up a network of<br />
support <strong>for</strong> the war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictee Ratko Mladić. Hence it is easy to assume<br />
that Dav<strong>in</strong>ić was replaced because of his pro-NATO le<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d his<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>nel<strong>in</strong>g of the army <strong>in</strong> that direction. But it also bears mention<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
Belgrade headquarters of nationalistic camp did not trust enough Dav<strong>in</strong>ic, that<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
is, they thought he could be of little use <strong>for</strong> them <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
possibly dramatic time of <strong>an</strong>nounced Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum.<br />
Koštunica's Cadres<br />
At 21 October 2005 session of Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliament Prvoslav<br />
Dav<strong>in</strong>ic was compelled to h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> his resignation. The <strong>state</strong> union’s MPs by a<br />
slim majority then named a retired general, Dr. Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>kovic the new<br />
Defence Secretary. St<strong>an</strong>kovic is a <strong>for</strong>mer <strong>for</strong>ensic expert <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer head of the<br />
Military-Medical Academy. 75<br />
He expla<strong>in</strong>ed his motives <strong>for</strong> accept<strong>in</strong>g that high position <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terview to magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a: 76 "Firstly, I had a moral obligation towards<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica, because two years ago, Kostunica <strong>in</strong> his<br />
capacity of president of federal <strong>state</strong>, appo<strong>in</strong>ted me Head of the Military-<br />
Medical Academy <strong>an</strong>d suggested my promotion to the r<strong>an</strong>k of general …" By<br />
that public admission St<strong>an</strong>kovic confirmed his close ties with Kostunica, that<br />
is, his pro-Democratic Party of Serbia le<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gs. It is obvious that the ma<strong>in</strong><br />
reason <strong>for</strong> his promotion was his "patriotic" m<strong>in</strong>d-set. His closeness with the<br />
Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d DPS implies to a large extent his position on the army<br />
overhaul. There is a d<strong>an</strong>ger of a return to the party army <strong>an</strong>d suspension (<strong>an</strong>d<br />
there are h<strong>in</strong>ts thereof) of democratic control of the army, because of which<br />
civili<strong>an</strong>-military relations may be <strong>an</strong>ew thrown <strong>in</strong>to turmoil.<br />
In the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned <strong>in</strong>terview St<strong>an</strong>kovic also mentioned his reasons<br />
<strong>for</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce of the m<strong>in</strong>isterial post: "Secondly I th<strong>in</strong>k that I c<strong>an</strong> assist <strong>in</strong><br />
recover<strong>in</strong>g the old glory of the Army…" St<strong>an</strong>ković was <strong>in</strong> fact referr<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
army glory "from the times of famous Serb dukes, Mišić, Stepa, Putnik <strong>an</strong>d<br />
others". Notewothy is also the follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>ment of St<strong>an</strong>kovic: "But this army<br />
even <strong>in</strong> post-1945 period had brilli<strong>an</strong>t results….it spawned <strong>in</strong>ternationally<br />
recognized <strong>in</strong>stitutions, notably the Military-Technical Institute, Military-<br />
Medical Academy, Music Ensemble ‘St<strong>an</strong>islav B<strong>in</strong>ički’, etc. M<strong>an</strong>y people now<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t to dism<strong>an</strong>tle all that <strong>in</strong> the name of re<strong>for</strong>ms. But <strong>in</strong> the name of which<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m? Which re<strong>for</strong>m exacts dism<strong>an</strong>tl<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>stitutions of national repute?" 77<br />
Conclusions<br />
• Cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g sc<strong>an</strong>dals which marked the whole 2005, laid bare a<br />
moral crisis <strong>in</strong> which the army was mired. All those sc<strong>an</strong>dals <strong>an</strong>d affairs<br />
brought to light close ties between military structures <strong>an</strong>d numerous war<br />
75 "M<strong>in</strong>ister – Miracle -Maker", Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter, November-December 2005.<br />
76 "Character of State Determ<strong>in</strong>es the Character of Army", magaz<strong>in</strong>e Odbr<strong>an</strong>a, 1<br />
November 2005.<br />
77 Idem<br />
258<br />
259
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>als, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Ratko Mladić. Because of such close ties, fugitives from<br />
the Hague justice have been at large <strong>for</strong> over a decade.<br />
• Army implosion has adversely affect the myth about <strong>in</strong>fallibility<br />
of "our army", as reflected by public op<strong>in</strong>ion polls. Namely once first-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<br />
army, now occupies the third place, after the Serb Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Education, <strong>in</strong> the list of most trusted <strong>in</strong>stitutions. In other words its approval<br />
<strong>an</strong>d popularity rat<strong>in</strong>g is slowly decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.<br />
• S<strong>in</strong>ce the army <strong>in</strong> previous years was the strongest l<strong>in</strong>k between<br />
members of the <strong>state</strong> community, (Chief of Staff <strong>an</strong>d Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry have<br />
openly sided with the Serb side) Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>in</strong> 2005 agreed to<br />
fund 10% of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d hardware resources of the army stationed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
territory of Montenegro. Thus the Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro was de facto<br />
divided <strong>in</strong>to the two armies.<br />
• Serb side (together with Chief of Staff <strong>an</strong>d Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry) still<br />
tries to decisively exert <strong>in</strong>fluence on the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> part of armed <strong>for</strong>ces by<br />
hold<strong>in</strong>g/reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g all key positions <strong>in</strong> the army. The Serb rul<strong>in</strong>g elite sees the<br />
army as a key factor <strong>in</strong> "preservation of territories of Serb l<strong>an</strong>ds".<br />
• Despite new <strong>security</strong> challenges, risks <strong>an</strong>d threats-the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
military hardware-weaponry, though outdated <strong>an</strong>d much-used, has not been<br />
thrown on the scrap-heap. Army reckons that the shortage of contemporary<br />
weaponry may be compensated by the size of m<strong>an</strong>power, that is, a large<br />
number of servicemen <strong>an</strong>d their "courage."<br />
• Ma<strong>in</strong>stay of the army is still <strong>an</strong> age-old Serb military tradition.<br />
Hence it refusal to be <strong>for</strong>eward-look<strong>in</strong>g, that is, to turn towards re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, notably Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, STATE<br />
AND SOCIETY<br />
The Church <strong>an</strong>d Social Issues<br />
In March 2005, Serbi<strong>an</strong> President Boris Tadić <strong>state</strong>d that "even if the<br />
Church is not a part of the <strong>state</strong>, given the political context we live <strong>in</strong>, it is<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ly a part of the society <strong>an</strong>d should be asked about m<strong>an</strong>y vital issues<br />
relat<strong>in</strong>g both to <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d the society as a whole". 1 Tadić’s view that "the<br />
Church should be asked" caused a considerable controversy <strong>an</strong>d numerous<br />
reactions <strong>in</strong> public. Some public figures, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g both the <strong>for</strong>mer <strong>an</strong>d present<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister of Religious Affairs, agreed with him, while others (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
numerous non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations) protested such a <strong>state</strong>ment,<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g it as <strong>an</strong>other call <strong>for</strong> the clericalization of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society.<br />
Such a situation reflects the <strong>state</strong> of confusion which is typical of the<br />
post-socialist societies <strong>an</strong>d young democracies as regards the role <strong>an</strong>d status of<br />
religious communities <strong>in</strong> the new political circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g specifically<br />
the relationship between church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>. Naturally, unlike the period of<br />
socialism, the new role of religious communities <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>s also<br />
enables them to deal with various social issues. However, this new role of the<br />
church <strong>in</strong> society entails a number of other, more import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d more specific<br />
questions which are not so frequent <strong>in</strong> the similar context. For example, what<br />
social issues fall with<strong>in</strong> the jurisdiction of the church <strong>an</strong>d its constitutional<br />
framework <strong>an</strong>d restrictions? To what extent are the religious communities able<br />
to deal with those problems <strong>an</strong>d what capacity do they have <strong>in</strong> their solv<strong>in</strong>g?<br />
To what extent are the <strong>an</strong>swers provided by the church relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d topical<br />
when the current social problems are <strong>in</strong> question? What is the clerical vision of<br />
the modern society? What is the church’s relationship with civil society like: do<br />
religious communities see themselves as a part of civil society or not?<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the period of socialism, the <strong>state</strong> was unilaterally determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
the nature of its relationship with religious communities. In post-socialism, the<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>sion of religious rights <strong>an</strong>d freedoms also me<strong>an</strong>t the <strong>in</strong>creased<br />
responsibility of these communities <strong>in</strong> numerous areas. So, <strong>for</strong> example, if<br />
1 Cited accord<strong>in</strong>g to Blic Onl<strong>in</strong>e, 12 March 2005.<br />
260<br />
261
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Serbia’s aim is to accede to the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union, c<strong>an</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox<br />
Church (SOC), or some other religious community, promote <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
discourse, thus caus<strong>in</strong>g confusion <strong>an</strong>d divisions among the believers, that is,<br />
the citizens of that <strong>state</strong>?<br />
After 5 October 2000, the SOC beg<strong>an</strong> to provide a new ideological<br />
framework <strong>for</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions such as, <strong>for</strong> example, the army <strong>an</strong>d school,<br />
thus fill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> ideological vacuum that was created after the collapse of<br />
communism, on its own <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>an</strong>d on <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g scale. However, its<br />
social role, which is more import<strong>an</strong>t, is not clear at all. There is still much room<br />
<strong>for</strong> the activities of religious communities, which is provided <strong>for</strong> under the law<br />
(phil<strong>an</strong>thropy, endow<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>itari<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d social work, etc.). On the other<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, the church is very easily politicized or politically <strong>in</strong>strumentalized not<br />
only by conservative politici<strong>an</strong>s, but also by its own prelates, bishops <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other high priests who often express its views <strong>in</strong> public.<br />
However, <strong>an</strong> even greater problem is posed by the lack of real contact<br />
between the SOC <strong>an</strong>d the society <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g specifically civil society<br />
<strong>an</strong>d autonomous <strong>in</strong>dividuals with their rights, special <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>an</strong>d various<br />
identities which are created by life <strong>in</strong> the modern pluralistic world. It is<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that after 5 October 2000, the SOC established <strong>an</strong> enviable<br />
relationship with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> but, un<strong>for</strong>tunately, there is still no real<br />
contact with the (civil) society, as was done by the Rom<strong>an</strong> Catholic Church <strong>in</strong><br />
Pol<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>for</strong> example, even be<strong>for</strong>e the collapse of communism. The<br />
representatives of the SOC refer to people on a regular basis, but that is almost a<br />
metaphysical category, <strong>an</strong> undifferentiated group or "mass", which is, to tell<br />
the truth, the concept that is absolutely compatible with the ‘tribal’ character of<br />
the SOC (Rak, 2005), not to mention <strong>an</strong>y more positive view on their part on<br />
civil society <strong>an</strong>d its org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiatives, which are often demonized <strong>in</strong><br />
public. 2<br />
However, what are the real problems of a pluralistic society <strong>in</strong> Serbia,<br />
what <strong>in</strong>terests are represented, what are the political, social, economic <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cultural preferences of the citizens of this country? Such issues are not the<br />
subject of a coherent debate <strong>in</strong> the SOC, at least not officially. It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
note that <strong>in</strong> its official <strong>state</strong>ments there is almost no reference to the citizens of<br />
2 For example, on 24 November 2004, the In<strong>for</strong>mation Service of the SOC<br />
issued a <strong>state</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> response to the <strong>state</strong>ment of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia that “the <strong>in</strong>itiative of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d the President of<br />
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Koštunica, concern<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>troduction of<br />
religious education <strong>in</strong>to the educational system, represents a serious violation of the<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of a secular <strong>state</strong>”. In its response, <strong>in</strong> addition to us<strong>in</strong>g the archaic, medieval<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage, the SOC characterizes such <strong>state</strong>ments by civil society org<strong>an</strong>izations as “the<br />
fear of the Sat<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d his followers <strong>for</strong> the past six decades, m<strong>an</strong>ifested everywhere<br />
under the sky of the country which, only by its name, represented someth<strong>in</strong>g that the<br />
notion of Serbia implies <strong>in</strong> the full me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the word” (Novosti, 24 November 2000).<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Serbia or to its society <strong>in</strong> that sociological sense, but mostly, almost exclusively,<br />
to people. To some degree, it is the question of the Church’s <strong>in</strong>ability to cope<br />
with the new circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, which is characteristic of the post-socialist<br />
societies. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, one c<strong>an</strong> observe a certa<strong>in</strong> political philosophy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ideology of the SOC, which was <strong>in</strong> the background, <strong>in</strong> a specific "theatre of<br />
shadows" (M. Djordjević), <strong>for</strong> a long time due to the very fact that it was<br />
present very little <strong>in</strong> the public sphere dur<strong>in</strong>g the period of socialism.<br />
"Simphony" Between the SOC <strong>an</strong>d the State<br />
At the very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of democratic ch<strong>an</strong>ges, the SOC established<br />
contact very fast with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>, that is, the representatives of its<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions. However, the complexity of a modern society was much less<br />
understood. The concepts, such as citizenship <strong>an</strong>d civil society, hardly appear<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong>ments of the church representatives, its media <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation<br />
service, <strong>an</strong>d when they appear, that is almost always <strong>in</strong> a negative context.<br />
The <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the majority church <strong>in</strong> Serbia (SOC) established, almost<br />
overnight, the relationship that was unknown to them <strong>in</strong> the past. It was the<br />
question of the church’s experience with a democratic <strong>state</strong>. In the past, the<br />
SOC had to cope with <strong>an</strong> authoritari<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> (<strong>an</strong>d the "façade of democracy" of<br />
the Milošević type) <strong>an</strong>d, be<strong>for</strong>e that time, with the <strong>state</strong> based on a s<strong>in</strong>gle-party<br />
system, communism, where one ideology <strong>an</strong>d one political party had a<br />
structural monopoly over the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d society; f<strong>in</strong>ally, be<strong>for</strong>e the Second<br />
World War, <strong>in</strong> the monarchy the SOC, as its <strong>state</strong> church, lived with it <strong>in</strong> a<br />
relative symphony. What is new today – <strong>an</strong>d what the Church had a ch<strong>an</strong>ce to<br />
face only <strong>in</strong> the diaspora, <strong>in</strong> the democratic countries <strong>in</strong> which it had its<br />
dioceses – is a number of open questions, such as: what is a democratic <strong>state</strong>, <strong>in</strong><br />
general; what does the relationship between the church, that is, religious<br />
communities, <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> imply <strong>in</strong> the new circumst<strong>an</strong>ces; what is, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, happen<strong>in</strong>g with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society today? However, with the<br />
exp<strong>an</strong>sion of its rights <strong>in</strong> the most recent period, the Church also assumed<br />
greater responsibilities. But, how does it see these new responsibilities <strong>in</strong> the<br />
light of the new rights it acquired <strong>in</strong> the me<strong>an</strong>time?<br />
The SOC established direct contact with the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions as early<br />
as November 2000 through the request of the Holy Assembly of Bishops that<br />
religious education should be <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong>to <strong>state</strong> schools as a regular subject.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>troduction of religious education <strong>in</strong>to schools <strong>an</strong>d, at the end of that<br />
same year, gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g of approval <strong>for</strong> the presence of priests <strong>in</strong> the army<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions brought m<strong>an</strong>y other, more import<strong>an</strong>t problems to light. The<br />
question of <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g religious education <strong>in</strong>to <strong>state</strong> schools was not conf<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
to the model of religious education which was proposed <strong>for</strong> the new, liberated<br />
society, <strong>in</strong> which religious communities could "breathe" more freely, have<br />
greater scope <strong>for</strong> their activities <strong>an</strong>d establish much better <strong>an</strong>d more equitable<br />
262<br />
263
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
relations with the <strong>state</strong>. It immediately entailed a number of other questions<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g the religious rights <strong>an</strong>d freedoms <strong>in</strong> a more general sense.<br />
It is no accident that the 2001 decision on the <strong>in</strong>troduction of religious<br />
education, which was confirmed by the government decree, was brought very<br />
soon be<strong>for</strong>e the Constitutional Court of Serbia. A number of non-governmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d private lawyer’s offices lodged <strong>an</strong> appeal aga<strong>in</strong>st this<br />
decision question<strong>in</strong>g its constitutionality. 3 Namely, be<strong>for</strong>e the adoption of the<br />
new Serbi<strong>an</strong> constitution <strong>an</strong>d, probably, the law on religious org<strong>an</strong>izations, the<br />
decree on the status of seven traditional religious communities came <strong>in</strong>to <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
(this status was already def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> its preamble <strong>an</strong>d it was evidently aimed at<br />
establish<strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>uity with the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of Yugoslavia), although the<br />
status of those religious communities was not previously def<strong>in</strong>ed by legal acts<br />
of higher <strong>for</strong>ce. Consequently, someth<strong>in</strong>g affect<strong>in</strong>g religious freedoms <strong>an</strong>d<br />
relations between religious communities was prejudiced: <strong>for</strong> example, if only<br />
seven religious communities have the right to org<strong>an</strong>ize religious education <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>state</strong> schools, how c<strong>an</strong> it be claimed that religious communities are equal under<br />
the law <strong>an</strong>d the Constitution? If they are really equal, why only some of them<br />
c<strong>an</strong> realize these rights? Is that the question of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation as well as <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>justice done to those religious communities <strong>an</strong>d how will their status be<br />
regulated <strong>in</strong> the future? That is one of the problems. The other problem is the<br />
attitude towards secular <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions, such as the <strong>state</strong> school: are the<br />
schools <strong>in</strong> Serbia still secular <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> the tradition of enlightenment? Is<br />
<strong>state</strong> school space still "<strong>in</strong>violable" <strong>an</strong>d non-confessional; does it have some<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of autonomy, so that religious communities c<strong>an</strong>not participate <strong>in</strong> the<br />
educational process without certa<strong>in</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> the relev<strong>an</strong>t legislation?<br />
Those are only some of the questions <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>troduction of religious<br />
education certa<strong>in</strong>ly provided the motive to reflect on all that more seriously.<br />
Namely, m<strong>an</strong>y th<strong>in</strong>gs became evident as regards a general relationship<br />
between church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>. On the one h<strong>an</strong>d, the SOC succeeded <strong>in</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong> equal partner with the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> the educational process. The entry of the<br />
Theological Faculty <strong>in</strong>to the University was also problematic <strong>in</strong> terms of the<br />
academic criteria <strong>an</strong>d autonomy of the university, not to mention the<br />
observ<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, consider<strong>in</strong>g its enrolment policy accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
which only Orthodox students, with the bless<strong>in</strong>g of the appropriate bishop,<br />
c<strong>an</strong> enrol at this faculty of Belgrade University.<br />
The redef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of relations between <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d church is also observed<br />
through the new relationship between the SOC <strong>an</strong>d the Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro. At the end of December 2000 already, the Directorate of Morale of<br />
the General Staff of the then Army of Yugoslavia org<strong>an</strong>ized a round table at<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
which it supported the ‘<strong>in</strong>troduction of religion <strong>in</strong>to the Army’: "It is necessary<br />
to br<strong>in</strong>g military chapla<strong>in</strong>s of the Orthodox faith <strong>in</strong>to the Army of Yugoslavia",<br />
because "although they are equal be<strong>for</strong>e the law, the religions <strong>in</strong> our society are<br />
not equal when our national culture <strong>an</strong>d history are <strong>in</strong> question. In other<br />
words, they have not made <strong>an</strong> equal contribution to national culture <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
preservation of the national authenticity <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
people." In this regard, they also used the terms such as "historical <strong>an</strong>d cultural<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>ce" <strong>an</strong>d "cont<strong>in</strong>uity", that is, certa<strong>in</strong> categories which are both legal<br />
<strong>an</strong>d value ones. Be<strong>for</strong>e long, the bishop <strong>for</strong> a liaison with the army was<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted (Porfirije). In April 2002, he led the army delegation to Chil<strong>an</strong>dar. In<br />
2004, <strong>in</strong> the monastery dedicated to the Presentation of the Virg<strong>in</strong> near Čačak,<br />
the first collective baptism of officers <strong>an</strong>d soldiers of a military unit <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
was org<strong>an</strong>ized.<br />
The Army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro (which was – probably more<br />
th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>y other <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution - ideologically profiled <strong>in</strong> socialism) embraced<br />
Orthodoxy, one new ideology <strong>an</strong>d cultural <strong>an</strong>d historical mission almost<br />
overnight. It is clear that, immediately after the October ch<strong>an</strong>ges, a longer-term<br />
<strong>an</strong>d more stable relationship was established. Today, <strong>for</strong> example, <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terviews with the bishops of the SOC <strong>in</strong> some "national" journals, it is openly<br />
spoken about a "special war" which is waged aga<strong>in</strong>st the church <strong>an</strong>d the army<br />
by new "<strong>an</strong>ticlerical ideologists". 4<br />
At the same time, the SOC displays the amaz<strong>in</strong>g lack of sensitivity to<br />
the problems of modern society <strong>an</strong>d developments <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terreligious<br />
dialogue <strong>in</strong> today’s world, fail<strong>in</strong>g to dist<strong>in</strong>guish between the<br />
communist ideology <strong>an</strong>d modern <strong>for</strong>ms of secularization hav<strong>in</strong>g their orig<strong>in</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> enlightenment. The <strong>an</strong>ti-ecumenical st<strong>an</strong>d of a great number of<br />
church representatives, which was also reflected <strong>in</strong> the read<strong>in</strong>ess of the SOC to<br />
uphold the visit of the late Pope John Paul II to Belgrade, as well as rigid<br />
adherence to the fundamentals of their faith, which c<strong>an</strong>not be re<strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong><br />
the spirit of the new times, are only some examples of the present-day<br />
exclusivism of the SOC.<br />
The political <strong>in</strong>tention of the new Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government with Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica also became evident <strong>in</strong> the procedure of prepar<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Draft Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Religious Associations (<strong>in</strong> July 2004), under which the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>ticipated great<br />
concessions <strong>for</strong> the Church, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the immunity of the clergy be<strong>for</strong>e public<br />
authorities. However, after severe criticism <strong>in</strong> public, this Draft Law was<br />
withdrawn from the procedure. In that document, its author def<strong>in</strong>es the SOC<br />
euphemistically as primus <strong>in</strong>ter pares relative to other religious communities,<br />
3 Popović, Ljubomir <strong>an</strong>d Vitorović-Umićević, Zorica, “Referat za javnu<br />
raspravu (2003) u predmetima IU-177/01, IU-213/02 i IU-214/02”, Belgrade,<br />
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia.<br />
4 See, <strong>for</strong> example, the <strong>in</strong>terview of Bishop Porfirije entitled Narod žed<strong>an</strong><br />
Ist<strong>in</strong>itog Boga (The People Is Thirsty <strong>for</strong> the True God) <strong>in</strong> the journal Evropa nacija, No.<br />
925.<br />
264<br />
265
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
whereby it is clear that, <strong>in</strong> practice, the SOC would have the full authority to<br />
decide who has the right to worship God on its "centuries-long territory", with<br />
the logistic support of the <strong>state</strong>. Moreover, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Religious<br />
Affairs behaves almost like <strong>an</strong> external government "service" of the SOC. In<br />
fact, the difference between church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> this respect is becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly less clear. The political power structures are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly adjust<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the religious ones <strong>an</strong>d vice versa, thus pav<strong>in</strong>g the way <strong>for</strong> the clericalization<br />
of the society.<br />
It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that its discrim<strong>in</strong>atory <strong>in</strong>tention could be<br />
perceived from the very title of this Draft Law. Religious communities are<br />
classified <strong>in</strong>to three categories <strong>an</strong>d the text of this document shows clearly that<br />
they will not have equal rights even when they are registered. Naturally, the<br />
authors do not say <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g as to whether the future Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitution will<br />
be modified <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with their document (i.e. whether the Constitution<br />
will also <strong>state</strong> openly <strong>an</strong>d unambiguously that religious communities <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
are not equal be<strong>for</strong>e the law). Moreover, <strong>in</strong> the l<strong>an</strong>guage of the Draft Law one c<strong>an</strong><br />
recognize theological term<strong>in</strong>ology which is absolutely <strong>in</strong>appropriate <strong>for</strong><br />
modern legal acts. The words bogoslužbeni (God-serv<strong>in</strong>g), bogomolje (places of<br />
worship), sveštenoslužitelji (serv<strong>an</strong>ts of the church), verski dostoj<strong>an</strong>stvenici<br />
(religious dignitaries), žarišta duhovnosti (focal po<strong>in</strong>ts of spirituality), duhovna<br />
misija (spiritual mission), etc. come from the Orthodox vocabulary rather th<strong>an</strong><br />
from the civic one. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that legal document, the <strong>state</strong> is obliged to<br />
provide a number of guar<strong>an</strong>tees to churches (e.g. religious education <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
schools), while religious communities <strong>an</strong>d their officials are almost<br />
untouchable: they are exempted from pay<strong>in</strong>g tax <strong>an</strong>d are guar<strong>an</strong>teed immunity<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e public authorities. 5 The churches <strong>in</strong> Serbia hardly had such autonomy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d privileges <strong>in</strong> the k<strong>in</strong>gdom.<br />
Just as the attempts were made <strong>in</strong> the period of socialism to<br />
strengthen the process of secularization ideologically, the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the SOC<br />
are now mak<strong>in</strong>g concerted ef<strong>for</strong>ts to accelerate the process of de-secularization<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia, but <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> equally <strong>for</strong>ceful way, by mak<strong>in</strong>g quasi-theoretical <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ideological <strong>in</strong>terventions (even from the m<strong>in</strong>isterial level) <strong>in</strong> the fields of<br />
education <strong>an</strong>d culture, as well as <strong>in</strong> public life, <strong>in</strong> general. The private worldview<br />
of the <strong>for</strong>mer M<strong>in</strong>ister of Education, Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Čolić (now the President of<br />
the M<strong>an</strong>agement Board of Studio B), had to be imposed by a decree as the<br />
world-view of schoolchildren <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Namely, <strong>in</strong> the spirit of the<br />
fundamentalist refutation of the theory of evolution <strong>an</strong>d the affirmation of<br />
creationism, the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Education <strong>in</strong> the Vojislav Koštunica Government<br />
tried to elim<strong>in</strong>ate Darw<strong>in</strong>’s theory of evolution from the syllabi by a "private<br />
5 The full text of the 2004 Draft Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches,<br />
Religious Communities <strong>an</strong>d Religious Associations is accessible on the website:<br />
www.s<strong>an</strong>optikum.org.yu/drustvo/ o_nama/pravni_akti/zakon_o_slobodi_vere.htm.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
decree". At the same time, its office made a great ef<strong>for</strong>t to org<strong>an</strong>ize religious<br />
education <strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> schools at the expense of civic education, although both of<br />
them had <strong>an</strong> equal status as elective subjects until then. This k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
"theoretical decisions" <strong>in</strong> education rem<strong>in</strong>ds us especially of the period of<br />
communism. So much <strong>in</strong>terventionism <strong>in</strong> the field of education <strong>in</strong> Serbia was<br />
not recorded even under the regime of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević, whose<br />
government, to tell the truth, was not particularly <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> education <strong>an</strong>d<br />
science.<br />
To some extent, leniency <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>gratiation with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> church<br />
were also observed <strong>in</strong> the previous Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government (DOS). So, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, at the reception, which was hosted by the Holy Synod of Bishops on<br />
29 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2002, the then Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of Religious Affairs, Vojislav<br />
Milov<strong>an</strong>ović, "submitted the report on the Government’s activities dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
first year of its term to His Hol<strong>in</strong>ess the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Patriarch Pavle <strong>an</strong>d members<br />
of the Holy Synod of Bishops". At the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government’s reception given<br />
<strong>for</strong> members of the Holy Synod of Bishops on 15 May 2001, this M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
expressed "his satisfaction that a symphony between <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d church authority was<br />
established after so m<strong>an</strong>y years" (underl<strong>in</strong>ed by M.V.).<br />
One of the most recent examples of the Church’s <strong>in</strong>terference with the<br />
affairs of <strong>state</strong>, which resembled a cacophony rather th<strong>an</strong> a symphony, was<br />
certa<strong>in</strong>ly the appeal of the Holy Synod of Bishops to the public on 1 October<br />
2004, <strong>in</strong> which it was <strong>state</strong>d that "the Synod calls all political factors <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
not to dem<strong>an</strong>d from the Serbs <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija to participate <strong>in</strong> the<br />
elections <strong>for</strong> the government bodies there". That same month, Patriarch Pavle<br />
wrote to Serbi<strong>an</strong> President Boris Tadić <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav<br />
Koštunica appeal<strong>in</strong>g to them "not to dem<strong>an</strong>d from what rema<strong>in</strong>s of the<br />
persecuted <strong>an</strong>d martyred Serbi<strong>an</strong> people <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija to participate<br />
<strong>in</strong> their elections". Koštunica <strong>an</strong>swered positively to that appeal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med<br />
the Patriarch <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g that "he has no right as the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister to ask the<br />
Serbs to go to the polls", while Tadić still asked the Kosovo Serbs to vote on 5<br />
October 2004. That same day, Bishop Artemije of Raška <strong>an</strong>d Prizren sent <strong>an</strong><br />
open letter to President Tadić <strong>in</strong> which he qualified his act as "a treason<br />
committed by the President of our homel<strong>an</strong>d".<br />
Such <strong>in</strong>terference of the Church with the affairs of <strong>state</strong> was not<br />
recorded s<strong>in</strong>ce the establishment of democracy <strong>in</strong> Serbia. On the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side,<br />
the SOC is still one of the lead<strong>in</strong>g political actors <strong>in</strong> Kosovo. In the message of<br />
the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the SOC concern<strong>in</strong>g the Kosovo negotiations<br />
of November 2005, it is openly warned that "the act of seiz<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Metohija from Serbia, no matter how concealed, would have, <strong>in</strong> essence, the<br />
character of occupation". 6 Moreover, Bishop Artemije also criticized the head of<br />
UNMIK <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, Soeren Jessen Petersen, us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> unusually sharp <strong>an</strong>d<br />
6 D<strong>an</strong>as, 5-6 November 2005, p. 3.<br />
266<br />
267
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>in</strong>sult<strong>in</strong>g tone. It is evident that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government does not see <strong>an</strong>y<br />
problem <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terference of the SOC with the affairs of <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> such <strong>an</strong> active<br />
<strong>an</strong>d biased way.<br />
The New Law<br />
The already mentioned Draft Law on Religious Freedom <strong>an</strong>d Religious<br />
Org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d Associations of July 2004 was certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicator of this<br />
"reciprocal love" between church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>. After 2000, several drafts of those<br />
laws were placed on the agenda <strong>an</strong>d some of them also underwent<br />
parliamentary procedure. However, when the previous federal <strong>state</strong> (FRY) was<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>med, the first of those drafts lost its relev<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the new <strong>state</strong> union,<br />
so that the new republic<strong>an</strong> law on the freedom of religion <strong>an</strong>d religious<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations was drafted. Even this draft law, which became accessible to the<br />
public <strong>in</strong> the summer of 2004, was not the subject of <strong>an</strong>y special debate <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Religious Affairs itself, which had proposed it, did not <strong>in</strong>itiate <strong>an</strong>y<br />
more signific<strong>an</strong>t debate either. However, severe criticism came from<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations which saw <strong>in</strong><br />
this draft law a signific<strong>an</strong>t shift to the clericalization of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society. On<br />
this occasion, the <strong>state</strong>, that is, the relev<strong>an</strong>t M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>ticipated a number of<br />
concessions to the Church, which it actually did not ask <strong>for</strong>. Under this draft<br />
law, the <strong>state</strong> renounces m<strong>an</strong>y th<strong>in</strong>gs what a modern, secular liberaldemocratic<br />
<strong>state</strong> should not do <strong>an</strong>d what is not typical of it. It is the question of<br />
its st<strong>an</strong>d on the clergy’s immunity, which is without precedent <strong>in</strong> such legal<br />
documents, as well as of m<strong>an</strong>y other issues concern<strong>in</strong>g the Church’s newly<br />
acquired rights. The Church has suddenly become a public <strong>in</strong>stitution f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced<br />
from the government budget. This is go<strong>in</strong>g so far that one article of this draft<br />
law stipulates that local governments are obliged to call a referendum if so<br />
requested by a religious org<strong>an</strong>ization. Consequently, the difference between<br />
church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> here is becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly less clear. The political power<br />
structures are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly adjust<strong>in</strong>g to the ecclesiastical structure <strong>an</strong>d vice<br />
versa, thus open<strong>in</strong>g the path to the clericalization of the society.<br />
In the me<strong>an</strong>time, the draft law was revised to a degree, but it is not<br />
quite clear what is go<strong>in</strong>g to happen <strong>in</strong> the future. In Serbia there has been no<br />
such law s<strong>in</strong>ce 1993. In the period 1977-1993, there was the law on the legal<br />
status of religious communities, so that some more liberal experts argue that<br />
such a law is not necessary <strong>an</strong>d that the relationship between church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>,<br />
based on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of equality <strong>an</strong>d religious freedoms, c<strong>an</strong> simply be<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed by the constitution. In such a case, religious communities would f<strong>in</strong>d<br />
their place on the "religious market" by themselves. But, the mentioned draft<br />
law of 2004 was, <strong>in</strong> large measure, the <strong>in</strong>dicator of that new relationship<br />
between <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d church.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The post-October ch<strong>an</strong>ges, <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the new attitude of the <strong>state</strong><br />
towards religious communities <strong>an</strong>d, thus, towards the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox<br />
Church, are someth<strong>in</strong>g that has already been seen <strong>in</strong> other post-socialist <strong>state</strong>s<br />
<strong>an</strong>d societies. What was specific <strong>in</strong> our case, however, was a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> of<br />
confusion <strong>in</strong> the legal sphere, which was displayed both by the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
church. It seems that it was not sufficiently understood what was me<strong>an</strong>t by<br />
religious rights <strong>an</strong>d freedoms <strong>an</strong>d that they should imply, <strong>for</strong> example, both<br />
the right to believe <strong>an</strong>d the right not to believe. The contemporary underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of religious rights <strong>an</strong>d freedoms me<strong>an</strong>s that a citizen has the right to<br />
participate <strong>in</strong> a religious service, as well as the right not to participate <strong>in</strong> it.<br />
Someone’s children may or may not take religious <strong>in</strong>struction. Consequently,<br />
the modern concept of religious freedoms implies both aspects of religious<br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d freedoms: the freedom of religion <strong>an</strong>d freedom from religion. That<br />
was clearly <strong>state</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the First Amendment to the US Constitution as early as<br />
1971: "Congress shall make no law respect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> establishment of religion, or<br />
prohibit<strong>in</strong>g the free exercise thereof". However, that aspect of religious<br />
freedoms accord<strong>in</strong>g to which someone may not participate <strong>in</strong> religious activities<br />
is frequently neglected: children, <strong>for</strong> example, children do not have to be<br />
present dur<strong>in</strong>g a religious service even if it is the question of the school’s<br />
patron sa<strong>in</strong>t’s day. That right has not been adequately understood <strong>in</strong> Serbia or<br />
is deliberately disregarded, <strong>an</strong>d this issue should be clarified <strong>in</strong> full.<br />
If our situation is compared with that <strong>in</strong> other post-socialist countries,<br />
it will be realized that the adoption of the laws on religious freedoms <strong>in</strong> these<br />
countries preceded the discussion about the model of religious education that<br />
should be <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong>to <strong>state</strong> schools. Here the decree was adopted first <strong>an</strong>d<br />
then the appropriate law was drafted. Consequently, the sequence of steps was<br />
reverse <strong>an</strong>d all this is not just the matter of procedure, but is also a vital issue.<br />
In this regard, there must be some consensus <strong>an</strong>d public debate, say, with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
educational process. The particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> such a public debate should be<br />
students, teachers, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Education <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y other actors, that is,<br />
experts on this subject: sociologists, psychologists <strong>an</strong>d educators, who will help<br />
that all this is understood be<strong>for</strong>e mak<strong>in</strong>g a decision. It is also import<strong>an</strong>t to<br />
know the impact of that decision. What is, <strong>for</strong> example, its impact on the future<br />
status of the <strong>state</strong>; whether the <strong>state</strong> will be separated from the church or not.<br />
As <strong>for</strong> our draft laws, it was stipulated that "there is no <strong>state</strong> religion" only <strong>in</strong><br />
the 2002 version (Article 2). In other draft laws, up to the fourth version, such a<br />
status was not def<strong>in</strong>ed. 7 In all those drafts seven traditional religious<br />
communities were s<strong>in</strong>gled out <strong>an</strong>d their cont<strong>in</strong>uity relative to the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of<br />
Yugoslavia was confirmed. But, how m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>state</strong>s <strong>in</strong> this territory were<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ged after that K<strong>in</strong>gdom? And why the cont<strong>in</strong>uity should be established<br />
7 In the fourth version it was only <strong>state</strong>d that religious communities would be<br />
equal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dependent of the <strong>state</strong> (Article 5).<br />
268<br />
269
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
just with the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of Yugoslavia? Why one model, which was typical of<br />
the monarchy, that is, a different system of government, was selected? Or why<br />
just those seven religious communities were s<strong>in</strong>gled out? The K<strong>in</strong>gdom of<br />
Yugoslavia was the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> which the SOC enjoyed the status of a <strong>state</strong> church.<br />
Does that me<strong>an</strong> that the Republic of Serbia will also be constituted soon as the<br />
<strong>state</strong> with a <strong>state</strong> church? The very fact that this case was brought be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
Constitutional Court of Serbia speaks about the complexity of the whole<br />
problem.<br />
The fourth version of the Draft Law on the Legal Status of Religious<br />
Communities (2005) 8 c<strong>an</strong> be regarded as <strong>an</strong> improvement over the previous<br />
draft laws only to a degree. The quota set <strong>for</strong> the registration of a religious<br />
community (it was even 1000 <strong>in</strong> the 2004 draft law!) is omitted, while <strong>in</strong> Article<br />
5, as we have seen, it is stipulated <strong>for</strong> the first time that "religious communities<br />
shall be equal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dependent of the <strong>state</strong>". However, the new version also<br />
conta<strong>in</strong>s the discrim<strong>in</strong>atory classification of religious communities <strong>in</strong>to<br />
traditional churches, historical religious communities, confessional<br />
communities, etc. Under this Draft Law, the religions <strong>in</strong> Serbia would still be<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ated when they apply <strong>for</strong> registration 9 , while Article 24 stipulates<br />
once aga<strong>in</strong> that "<strong>in</strong> the per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce of religious activities, the clergy shall be<br />
guar<strong>an</strong>teed full freedom, autonomy <strong>an</strong>d immunity be<strong>for</strong>e public authorities".<br />
Article 46 still stipulates the call<strong>in</strong>g of a referendum at the local level if so<br />
requested by a religious community. Why the church or religious community<br />
should be above other <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> this respect? Why the same rights are not<br />
gr<strong>an</strong>ted to other, civic org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiatives?<br />
Insofar as value st<strong>an</strong>dards are concerned, it should be noted, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, that although a more general <strong>an</strong>d appropriate <strong>for</strong>mulation "religious,<br />
cultural <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>ist heritage" is given <strong>in</strong> the preamble to the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Constitution (without special emphasis on Christi<strong>an</strong> heritage), Article 11 of our<br />
Draft Law emphasizes traditional churches <strong>in</strong> Serbia as the "carriers of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Christi<strong>an</strong> culture". However, the contribution to Europe<strong>an</strong> culture by<br />
the Jewish <strong>an</strong>d Islamic Religious Communities is not emphasized (Article 15-<br />
17). In their case, the legislator only "establishes the cont<strong>in</strong>uity" 10 of the legal<br />
subjectivity acquired <strong>in</strong> the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of Yugoslavia.<br />
The fifth <strong>an</strong>d latest version of the Draft Law is still <strong>in</strong>accessible to the<br />
professional <strong>an</strong>d academic circles, as well as to the general public <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
Otherwise, the whole process concern<strong>in</strong>g the preparation of these draft laws is<br />
8 It is the question of the 2005 document, which is known as the Law on the<br />
Legal Status of Religious Communities (Draft).<br />
9 For example, nontraditional religious communities would have to submit a<br />
number of special documents <strong>for</strong> registration, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the evidence of the perm<strong>an</strong>ent<br />
source of <strong>in</strong>come (Article 60).<br />
10 Note the use of the archaic, Orthodox theological term vaspostaviti (establish)<br />
<strong>in</strong> the text of the Law.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
nontr<strong>an</strong>sparent. The new drafts are not posted on the website of the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
of Religious Affairs nor are they accessible <strong>in</strong> some other way. Moreover, there<br />
are <strong>in</strong>dications that the representatives of the SOC participate directly <strong>in</strong> the<br />
preparation of this latest, fifth version of the Law on the Legal Status of<br />
Religious Communities, although this is a legal document which is proposed<br />
<strong>an</strong>d adopted by <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
The Attitude Towards Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Secularization<br />
From a sociological viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, the late 1980s <strong>an</strong>d early 1990s <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
c<strong>an</strong> be regarded as the period of de-secularization of the society, whereby the<br />
de-secularization of society was understood primarily as a social process.<br />
However, <strong>in</strong> the most recent period, marked by the Koštunica Government,<br />
one c<strong>an</strong> observe a certa<strong>in</strong> shift to clericalization. Namely, the Church is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly present <strong>in</strong> the area of public policy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> affairs. On the one<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, the <strong>state</strong> has assumed a much more cooperative attitude towards the<br />
Church th<strong>an</strong> one might expect from a secular society, because secularization <strong>in</strong><br />
our country was not only imposed through <strong>an</strong> atheist, communist ideology;<br />
rather, it is a social process which Europe underwent a long time ago.<br />
In Serbia today, there is close political cooperation between <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
church, although its citizens would probably expect from the SOC to take a<br />
st<strong>an</strong>d on a number of social issues which are still burden<strong>in</strong>g Serbia. However,<br />
some more coherent st<strong>an</strong>d on social issues with<strong>in</strong> the SOC is still not <strong>in</strong> sight.<br />
Its relationship with a crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> the past has not been cleared up either.<br />
All th<strong>in</strong>gs considered, the SOC does not regard this as a special problem.<br />
Instead, its great problems are secularization, democratization of the society,<br />
civil sector <strong>an</strong>d non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations. When one looks at various<br />
<strong>state</strong>ments issued by the In<strong>for</strong>mation Service of the SOC, it c<strong>an</strong> be concluded<br />
that the Church regards secularization as some k<strong>in</strong>d of evil which was done to<br />
the society <strong>an</strong>d that it "reduced Serbia to poverty". At the same time, it does<br />
not consider the possibility that disastrous politics, war, destruction <strong>an</strong>d crime<br />
reduced Serbia to poverty, rather th<strong>an</strong> secularization. In those <strong>state</strong>ments, it is<br />
also said that "the disastrous effects of democracy are already felt on the body<br />
of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people". When those <strong>state</strong>ments are <strong>in</strong>dividually considered, it<br />
becomes clear that they conta<strong>in</strong> different views of the bishops <strong>an</strong>d other church<br />
representatives. At times, those <strong>state</strong>ments are ambiguous <strong>an</strong>d even<br />
contradictory. However, if one considers their cumulative effect, it c<strong>an</strong> be<br />
concluded that it is mostly the question of demoniz<strong>in</strong>g civil society <strong>an</strong>d small<br />
religious communities, as well as of a negative attitude towards<br />
democratization <strong>an</strong>d secularization. All that c<strong>an</strong> be found <strong>in</strong> the official, public<br />
discourse of the SOC. In fact, all that provides guid<strong>an</strong>ce as to how the Church<br />
views our society <strong>an</strong>d perceives the <strong>state</strong>, <strong>in</strong> general.<br />
270<br />
271
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Like other Orthodox churches, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church also<br />
<strong>in</strong>vokes the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of conciliarity as the key pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of its activities, but<br />
none of those local churches have held <strong>an</strong>y council of ecumenical signific<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce the 8 th century, that is, <strong>for</strong> more th<strong>an</strong> 1200 years. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Church has<br />
almost no <strong>an</strong>swers to the questions of the modern world, but responds mostly<br />
negatively to that world, which it hardly underst<strong>an</strong>ds, because it does not fit<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the dogmas from the time of Const<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>e or Nem<strong>an</strong>ja. For example,<br />
present-day Europe is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly more evidently return<strong>in</strong>g to its pre-<br />
Const<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>e, pluralist roots, while the SOC is still look<strong>in</strong>g at the Nem<strong>an</strong>jić<br />
<strong>state</strong>, or the Christi<strong>an</strong> church from the time of ecumenical councils as its<br />
model, like the followers of Islamic Selefism, who are turn<strong>in</strong>g to the orig<strong>in</strong>al<br />
caliphate.<br />
The Testamentary Pattern<br />
In Serbia today, one c<strong>an</strong> also observe among younger generations a<br />
rather evident ab<strong>an</strong>donment of the model of a pluralistic society, which is<br />
actually the product of enlightenment, as well as the shift to a monistic,<br />
archaic, "testamentary" pattern, which is probably best evidenced by the<br />
document of 15 February 2004, which is known as the Draft Načert<strong>an</strong>ije of the<br />
National Programme of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Youth <strong>for</strong> the 21 st Century. It is the question of<br />
the document which was proposed <strong>an</strong>d adopted by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Youth<br />
Assembly (on the Tr<strong>an</strong>sfiguration Day <strong>in</strong> 2004). One of the leaders of this<br />
Assembly, Br<strong>an</strong>imir Nešić, presented the Načert<strong>an</strong>ije at the Spiritual Academy<br />
entitled "What Will We Have to St<strong>an</strong>d up with Be<strong>for</strong>e Karadjordje…", which<br />
was held at the Trade Union Hall on the feast of the Presentation of the Virg<strong>in</strong>.<br />
The particip<strong>an</strong>ts were also the representatives of the SOC, Metropolit<strong>an</strong><br />
Amfilohije Radović <strong>an</strong>d retired Bishop At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić, together with the army<br />
representatives <strong>an</strong>d the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Srpska.<br />
The Draft Načert<strong>an</strong>ije has 13 po<strong>in</strong>ts 11 : "Item 1: Svetosavlje (the teach<strong>in</strong>gs of Sa<strong>in</strong>t<br />
Sava) must enter all pores of our be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d make it worthy that we c<strong>an</strong> call<br />
ourselves Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava’s descend<strong>an</strong>ts… Item 3: The Serbi<strong>an</strong> householder must be<br />
resurrected… Item 9: The well-org<strong>an</strong>ized parish shall have <strong>an</strong> unlimited<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence on social reality, up to political authority", etc. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this<br />
document, which is also supported by the SOC, the future of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
should be based on the "Svetosavlje, Kosovo testament, reassessment of the<br />
hitherto Serbi<strong>an</strong> culture, education <strong>an</strong>d history, relations with others, creation<br />
of the elite, preservation of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d Cyrillic alphabet,<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
restoration of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> village, patriarchal family, parish community,<br />
church-people’s assemblies, democracy <strong>an</strong>d monarchy". 12<br />
The ten-po<strong>in</strong>t Proclamation of the First Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Youth<br />
Assembly, which was held at the Belgrade University, on 6 December 2001,<br />
entitled The Testamentary Gate – the Position of the National Youth, was written <strong>in</strong><br />
a similar tone. In cont<strong>in</strong>uation, we give the full text of this document:<br />
1. The foundation of our entire endeavour is belief <strong>in</strong> God <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Testament is the way <strong>in</strong> which we act through that belief.<br />
2. The highest ideals of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Testament <strong>for</strong> us are, <strong>in</strong> addition<br />
to Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava, Sa<strong>in</strong>t Simeon the Myrrhflow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d Sa<strong>in</strong>t Pr<strong>in</strong>ce Lazar, Sa<strong>in</strong>t<br />
Nikolaj Žicki <strong>an</strong>d Sa<strong>in</strong>t Just<strong>in</strong> Ćelijski; all other sa<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d heroes from our past<br />
are here <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>in</strong>spire us <strong>an</strong>d encourage us <strong>in</strong> the defence of our<br />
Homel<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
3. Our aim is Elevated Serbia, which will be able to unite all Serbs<br />
wherever they are th<strong>an</strong>ks to its spiritual elevation; <strong>in</strong> our struggle <strong>for</strong> that aim<br />
we are only allowed to use the God-blessed me<strong>an</strong>s of love, justice <strong>an</strong>d chastity.<br />
4. We do not divide our national, <strong>an</strong>ticommunist <strong>an</strong>d monarchist<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces on the basis of the events from the Second World War; we pray <strong>for</strong> the<br />
peace of the souls of all those who gave their lives <strong>for</strong> the Homel<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> such a<br />
way as we are advised by Sa<strong>in</strong>t Nikolaj Žički.<br />
5. We propagate uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ticommunism <strong>an</strong>d recognize<br />
the communist skill <strong>in</strong> putt<strong>in</strong>g on new ideological-party masks.<br />
6. We do not depart from the spiritual vertical of Serbi<strong>an</strong> history:<br />
God-K<strong>in</strong>g-Householder, <strong>an</strong>d believe <strong>in</strong> the last<strong>in</strong>g value of the householder’s<br />
world-view.<br />
7. We do not hate other people, we love ours; we do not hate other<br />
faiths, we love ours; we do not despise <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g that is someone else’s, we<br />
cherish what is ours. Whatever is noble <strong>in</strong> others belongs to us, Christi<strong>an</strong>s –<br />
said Sa<strong>in</strong>t Just<strong>in</strong> the Philosopher as early as the 2 nd century.<br />
8. The defence of the faith <strong>an</strong>d nation is the defence of civil rights<br />
<strong>an</strong>d freedoms, the defence of each <strong>in</strong>dividual personality, because the "new<br />
world order", based on the worship of the "golden calf" <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ationality of the<br />
new globalistic elites, will be more totalitari<strong>an</strong> th<strong>an</strong> all other totalitari<strong>an</strong>isms<br />
taken as a whole, s<strong>in</strong>ce it will attack one’s personality <strong>an</strong>d the family by us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
all possible me<strong>an</strong>s – from media idiotization, through the propagation of the<br />
right to perversion, to totalitari<strong>an</strong> technotronic control over the life of each<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual.<br />
9. In contrast to the extra-testamentary history of the Serbs from<br />
Dositej Obradović <strong>an</strong>d Vuk Karadžić, through Svetozar Marković <strong>an</strong>d Jov<strong>an</strong><br />
Skerlić, to Dobrica Ćosić <strong>an</strong>d the New Age, we emphasize the cultural history<br />
of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Testament from Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava <strong>an</strong>d Sa<strong>in</strong>t Stef<strong>an</strong> the Tall, through<br />
8.<br />
11 For more detail see the article by Jelena Tasić <strong>in</strong> D<strong>an</strong>as, 16 February 2004, p.<br />
12 Ibid.<br />
272<br />
273
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Lukij<strong>an</strong> Mušicki <strong>an</strong>d Njegoš, to Sa<strong>in</strong>t Bishop Nikolaj Žički <strong>an</strong>d Sa<strong>in</strong>t Just<strong>in</strong><br />
Ćelijski.<br />
10. We do not trust our thoughts <strong>an</strong>d muscles, we trust the Liv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d True God, the God of Justice to Whom our national <strong>an</strong>them s<strong>in</strong>gs." 13<br />
At first gl<strong>an</strong>ce already one c<strong>an</strong> observe the eschatological-Messi<strong>an</strong>ic<br />
tone of this "Serbi<strong>an</strong> testament" <strong>in</strong> which, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> artificial <strong>an</strong>d archaic m<strong>an</strong>ner, a<br />
dualistic <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>an</strong>iche<strong>an</strong> division of Serbi<strong>an</strong> history <strong>in</strong>to testamentary <strong>an</strong>d<br />
extra-testamentary one has been made. Testamentary history <strong>in</strong>cludes all<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> sa<strong>in</strong>ts, from Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava, Sa<strong>in</strong>t Simeon <strong>an</strong>d Pr<strong>in</strong>ce Lazar to the holy<br />
Nikolaj Velimirović <strong>an</strong>d Just<strong>in</strong> Popović, while extra-testamentary history<br />
<strong>in</strong>cludes Serbi<strong>an</strong> enlighteners, such as Dositej Obradović <strong>an</strong>d Vuk Karadžić, as<br />
well as so-called "New Age ideologists", "new ideologists" or "new atheists",<br />
who are criticized <strong>in</strong> similar <strong>state</strong>ments on <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g scale. 14 In this<br />
proclamation of the national youth there is also no departure from "the<br />
spiritual vertical of Serbi<strong>an</strong> history", based on the God-K<strong>in</strong>g-Householder<br />
model, which has metaphysical-political connotations.<br />
In their public appear<strong>an</strong>ces, the representatives of the Srpski Sabor<br />
Dveri org<strong>an</strong>ization, which acts with the bless<strong>in</strong>g of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Patriarchate<br />
<strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izes public <strong>for</strong>ums at the Faculty of Mech<strong>an</strong>ical Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, with<br />
the support of the journal Pravoslavlje <strong>an</strong>d the In<strong>for</strong>mation Service of the SOC,<br />
advocate "the <strong>for</strong>mation of the Orthodox public op<strong>in</strong>ion". 15 Moreover, like onetime<br />
social realists, they also adv<strong>an</strong>ce ideological views on art: "To be<br />
me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gful, art must have the Orthodox dimension" (Lazić, 2005).<br />
The SOC vs. Religious Pluralism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Ecumenism<br />
The revival of a monistic testamentary pattern at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
21 st century, as well as the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of conciliarity, which is also observed by<br />
the current Koštunica Government (the term "concentration government" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the like correspond to such a concept of government) is the result of<br />
ab<strong>an</strong>don<strong>in</strong>g the modern pluralist model of society, which is the legacy of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> enlightenment. It is no accident that, <strong>in</strong> such a context, the most<br />
severe criticism is levelled just at Serbi<strong>an</strong> enlighteners, such as Dositej, or<br />
13 Source: www.dverisrpske.com/sabor/proglas.htm. Published <strong>in</strong>: Lukić-<br />
Vuković, 2005, pp. 214-215. The Second Letter to Haralampije, or the Studenica Declaration<br />
of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Youth Assembly, issued on 6 May 2003, was also written <strong>in</strong> a similar<br />
spirit (Lukić-Vuković, 2005, pp. 215-217).<br />
14 See, <strong>for</strong> example, the six-po<strong>in</strong>t Proclamation of Srpski Sabor Dveri of 5<br />
October 2005, which is the <strong>an</strong>swer to the appeal of a group of Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectuals, “For<br />
a New Political Action“, which was published on the eve of 5 October 2005.<br />
15 The First Orthodox Journalists’ Council at the Theological Faculty <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
pluralist <strong>an</strong>d Europe-oriented "new ideologists", "eurowh<strong>in</strong>ers", "New Agers",<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>in</strong>tellectuals <strong>an</strong>d activists <strong>in</strong> non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations. In a<br />
metaphysical <strong>an</strong>d apocalyptic tone, the views of those "New Agers" are<br />
rejected as non-Christi<strong>an</strong>, <strong>an</strong>ti-Christi<strong>an</strong>, globalistic, western <strong>an</strong>d even procommunist.<br />
There is no doubt that the concept of a pluralistic society which is,<br />
as opposed to the archaic notion of conciliarity, supported by those "<strong>an</strong>ticlerical<br />
ideologists", <strong>an</strong>ticipates political, social, cultural, as well as religious<br />
pluralism as the legacy of enlightenment <strong>an</strong>d a modern liberal-democratic<br />
<strong>state</strong>.<br />
Insofar as religion is concerned, it is necessary to dist<strong>in</strong>guish among<br />
theological religious pluralism (which refers to the views on the truthfulness<br />
<strong>an</strong>d authenticity of other religions), social religious pluralism (relations <strong>in</strong> the<br />
society with the religious "other") <strong>an</strong>d public religious pluralism (the attitude of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> towards religious diversity <strong>an</strong>d plurality, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the ways <strong>in</strong> which<br />
their presence <strong>in</strong> the public sphere is regulated). 16 Plurality, as the <strong>state</strong> of<br />
affairs, does not necessarily imply pluralism, as a positive attitude toward such<br />
a <strong>state</strong> of affairs. There are religiously plural societies <strong>in</strong> which the idea of<br />
religious pluralism is not widely supported. Moreover, there are plural<br />
societies which do not see <strong>an</strong>y problem <strong>in</strong> the theological <strong>an</strong>d social pluralism<br />
of religions, but the <strong>state</strong>s themselves impose legal restrictions under their<br />
laws on the freedom of religion <strong>an</strong>d status of religious org<strong>an</strong>izations. We have<br />
seen, <strong>for</strong> example, that all post-October draft laws on religious communities <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia recognize only seven religious org<strong>an</strong>izations as traditional or historical<br />
ones, while all others have to undergo the registration procedure. Such a policy<br />
towards religious communities is based on the tradition of the prewar<br />
monarchy <strong>an</strong>d the role <strong>an</strong>d place of the SOC as a <strong>state</strong> church <strong>in</strong> that political<br />
system. 17 Today, under the <strong>in</strong>fluence of the SOC <strong>an</strong>d its lobby<strong>in</strong>g with the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Religious Affairs, the democratic Republic of Serbia has accepted<br />
the cont<strong>in</strong>uity with <strong>an</strong> absolutely different <strong>state</strong> with <strong>an</strong> absolutely different<br />
system of government.<br />
The church <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> restrictions with respect to religious pluralism on<br />
the domestic pl<strong>an</strong>e are also accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by a negative attitude towards<br />
16 See: Moe, 2004.<br />
17 In Article 14 of the Draft Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches,<br />
Religious Communities <strong>an</strong>d Religious Associations (i.e. <strong>in</strong> its second version of July<br />
2004), <strong>for</strong> example, this cont<strong>in</strong>uity with the k<strong>in</strong>gdom is explicitly <strong>for</strong>mulated: “By<br />
establish<strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>uity of the legal subjectivity <strong>an</strong>d status acquired <strong>in</strong> the K<strong>in</strong>gdom<br />
of Yugoslavia under this Law, the status of church <strong>an</strong>d religious community as a public<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization shall be enjoyed by: the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious<br />
Community, the Catholic Church, the Jewish Religious Community, the Slovak<br />
Ev<strong>an</strong>gelical Church a.v., the Christi<strong>an</strong> Re<strong>for</strong>m Church <strong>an</strong>d the Ev<strong>an</strong>gelical Christi<strong>an</strong><br />
Church, a.v.“<br />
274<br />
275
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
ecumenism <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ter-religious dialogue at the regional <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
levels, <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.<br />
As early as 1995, <strong>for</strong> example, the Diocese of Raška <strong>an</strong>d Prizren of the<br />
SOC published the book of Hieromonk Sava J<strong>an</strong>jić Ekumenizam i vreme<br />
apostasije (Ecumenism <strong>an</strong>d the Age of Apostasy). 18 As his first motto, J<strong>an</strong>jić cites<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g passage from the epistle of the Basil the Great: "We are st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
up <strong>for</strong> our common Tradition, <strong>for</strong> the wealth of the healthy faith we have<br />
received from the Fathers", <strong>an</strong>d then, <strong>in</strong> the first sentence already, he presents<br />
quite <strong>an</strong> exclusivist view: "There is a small number of people <strong>in</strong> the world<br />
today who know <strong>an</strong>d believe that only the Orthodox Church has preserved the<br />
authentic image of the God-M<strong>an</strong> Christ <strong>an</strong>d the wealth of His teach<strong>in</strong>gs"<br />
(J<strong>an</strong>jić, 1995: 5, underl<strong>in</strong>ed by M.V.). In the next sentence he also says that "our<br />
Church, which is also called the One, Holy <strong>an</strong>d Catholic (conciliary) Church is<br />
the only one which has the right to call itself Orthodox" (ibid., underl<strong>in</strong>ed by<br />
M.V.). And then: "There is no doubt that the True <strong>an</strong>d Only Church founded by<br />
the Lord is just the one which is impeccably preserv<strong>in</strong>g Christ’s truth. In the<br />
turbulent history of Christ’s Church there were m<strong>an</strong>y attempts to adjust the<br />
word of the Gospel to the fallen, s<strong>in</strong>ned m<strong>an</strong>, to re<strong>in</strong>terpret the Gospel, but the<br />
Church has succeeded <strong>in</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g its chastity, unspoiled by the spirit of this<br />
world, <strong>an</strong>d it has always been <strong>an</strong>d will always be alien to this world <strong>an</strong>d this century.<br />
There<strong>for</strong>e, traditionalism, which has a rather negative connotation nowadays,<br />
is one of the most import<strong>an</strong>t attributes of the Orthodox Church (ibid.,<br />
underl<strong>in</strong>ed by M.V.).<br />
It is hard to imag<strong>in</strong>e that <strong>an</strong>y bishop of the SOC would now challenge<br />
the above mentioned view. It shows clearly the typical exclusivism of the SOC,<br />
which never questions its tradition <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>terpretation of that tradition,<br />
while at the same time challeng<strong>in</strong>g all alternative <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>in</strong><br />
Christi<strong>an</strong>ity. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> his polemics aga<strong>in</strong>st ecumenism, the author claims<br />
that "the basic aim of the ecumenical movement is the REINTERPRETATION<br />
OF CHRISTIANITY or, <strong>in</strong> other words, the total destruction of Orthodoxy"<br />
(J<strong>an</strong>jić, 1995: 95). Consequently, what is at work here is some k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
hermeneutic exclusivism <strong>an</strong>d hegemonism, which derives its strength from the<br />
belief that everyth<strong>in</strong>g that is not Orthodox is essentially wrong or, <strong>in</strong> other<br />
words, it is a heresy. And the greatest d<strong>an</strong>ger to the Orthodox Church comes,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to J<strong>an</strong>jić, from the "p<strong>an</strong>heresy of ecumenism". However, the author<br />
pits aga<strong>in</strong>st that "p<strong>an</strong>heresy" his view which is no less totalitari<strong>an</strong>: "the unity of<br />
all people is possible only <strong>in</strong> the Orthodox Church" (ibid.).<br />
18 Father Sava J<strong>an</strong>jić is a protosyncellus who is also well-known outside the<br />
ecclesiastical circles due to his religious as well as political activities <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, as one of<br />
the associates of Bishop Artemije. Due to his talent <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>matics, Father J<strong>an</strong>jić is also<br />
known among computer enthusiasts as a cybermonk.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
These views are based on the work of one of the two greatest modern<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox theologi<strong>an</strong>s whose legitimacy is never called <strong>in</strong>to question.<br />
That is Awa Just<strong>in</strong> Popović, who calls the lead<strong>in</strong>g ecumenical org<strong>an</strong>ization –<br />
the World Council of Churches – "a heretical, <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>istic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>thropolatric<br />
assembly consist<strong>in</strong>g of 263 heresies, each of which me<strong>an</strong>s spiritual death". He<br />
also holds that this org<strong>an</strong>ization is "noth<strong>in</strong>g else but the revival of godless<br />
idolatry" (J<strong>an</strong>jić, 1995: 16). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to J<strong>an</strong>jić, ecumenism re<strong>in</strong>terprets<br />
Christi<strong>an</strong>ity <strong>in</strong> the spirit of the "New Age" <strong>an</strong>d, "thus, opens the door of the<br />
Church to all other heresies <strong>an</strong>d novelties" (J<strong>an</strong>jić, 1995: 7). For this reason,<br />
apart from Europe <strong>an</strong>d the West, Eastern Const<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>ople has also "fallen <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the heresy of ecumenism" (J<strong>an</strong>jić, 1995: 87).<br />
In the SOC today, there are, <strong>in</strong> general, at least two dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t views on<br />
ecumenism. The first is this extremist view that ecumenism is "p<strong>an</strong>heresy" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that heresy is everyth<strong>in</strong>g that is not Orthodoxy, which could be related to the<br />
zealotic prevention of the Anglic<strong>an</strong> service <strong>in</strong> the chapel of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Patriarchate on Christmas <strong>in</strong> 2002. The second view holds that there is scope<br />
<strong>for</strong> the development of ecumenical relations with the Rom<strong>an</strong> Catholic Church<br />
<strong>an</strong>d, possibly, with some other traditional religious communities <strong>in</strong> Serbia (e.g.<br />
the Ev<strong>an</strong>gelical Church <strong>an</strong>d the Re<strong>for</strong>m Christi<strong>an</strong> Church). However, the<br />
openness to small religious communities is rare, almost non-existent, even <strong>in</strong><br />
the Church’s more liberal circles. Those are mostly ev<strong>an</strong>gelical protest<strong>an</strong>t<br />
denom<strong>in</strong>ations which are publicly discrim<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>an</strong>d proclaimed sects or a<br />
sat<strong>an</strong>ic <strong>in</strong>fluence from the West by the SOC <strong>an</strong>d, as of recently, by the <strong>state</strong>.<br />
Insofar as the Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Jews <strong>in</strong> Serbia are concerned, one c<strong>an</strong> also<br />
occasionally hear <strong>an</strong>ti-Jewish <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Islamic discourse from the extremist<br />
priests’ <strong>an</strong>d bishops’ circles. The non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>ization Civic<br />
Initiatives from Belgrade brought charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Bishop At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić due<br />
to his racist <strong>an</strong>ti-Islamic speech <strong>in</strong> Valjevo <strong>in</strong> the summer of 2004 19 . Let us<br />
mention one more example of <strong>an</strong>ti-Islamism <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Apart from losses <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> lives <strong>an</strong>d the new exodus of the Serbs from the prov<strong>in</strong>ce, ethnic<br />
violence <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, which broke out on 17 March 2004, resulted<br />
<strong>in</strong> the destruction of a great number of Orthodox churches <strong>an</strong>d other sacral<br />
build<strong>in</strong>gs of historical value. The next day (on 18 March), these tragic events <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo triggered <strong>an</strong> absolutely <strong>in</strong>appropriate, irrational <strong>an</strong>d violent <strong>an</strong>ti-<br />
Islamic reaction <strong>in</strong> several cities <strong>in</strong> Serbia. The first result of that retaliatory act<br />
was the burn<strong>in</strong>g of mosques <strong>an</strong>d other sacral build<strong>in</strong>gs of the Islamic Religious<br />
Community <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Niš <strong>an</strong>d Novi Sad. In addition to religious build<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
offices <strong>an</strong>d libraries of the Islamic Religious Community, <strong>in</strong>valuable cultural<br />
<strong>an</strong>d historical monuments were also destroyed. Moreover, a few days after the<br />
destruction of the Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Niš mosques, the m<strong>an</strong>agement of the Military<br />
19 This speech was published by Belgrade’s weekly Vreme <strong>in</strong> the article “Just<strong>in</strong><br />
je f<strong>in</strong>o mirisao“ (Just<strong>in</strong> Smelled F<strong>in</strong>e), 15 April 2004, pp. 24-25.<br />
276<br />
277
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Museum <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, on Kalemegd<strong>an</strong>, ordered the destruction of niš<strong>an</strong>s from<br />
the 15 th <strong>an</strong>d 16 th centuries, authentic <strong>an</strong>d very rare tombstones <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s<br />
which date from the Turkish period. Consequently, one military <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro also participated <strong>in</strong> the v<strong>an</strong>dalistic acts of a group of<br />
destructive, mostly younger citizens <strong>in</strong> Niš <strong>an</strong>d Belgrade.<br />
In this case, it was not only the question of <strong>in</strong>ter-religious <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
but, <strong>in</strong> particular, of the <strong>in</strong>different attitude of the <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
judiciary towards the acts of <strong>in</strong>ter-religious hatred <strong>an</strong>d violence. After the<br />
burn<strong>in</strong>g of the Islam-Aga mosque <strong>in</strong> Niš there was no hear<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
competent court <strong>for</strong> 15 months. Out of eleven <strong>in</strong>dicted five did not appear at<br />
the fifth <strong>an</strong>d last hear<strong>in</strong>g. Their lawyer expla<strong>in</strong>ed that those were young people<br />
who had to sleep a little longer <strong>in</strong> the morn<strong>in</strong>g, so that the court should have<br />
taken this <strong>in</strong>to account when schedul<strong>in</strong>g the morn<strong>in</strong>g sessions. What we have<br />
here is the total disregard of the <strong>in</strong>stitution of court, as well as the proverbial<br />
<strong>in</strong>efficiency of our judiciary. In the me<strong>an</strong>time, the trial was f<strong>in</strong>ished, but the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicted were not punished as they deserved: eight of them were sentenced to<br />
3-5 month imprisonment <strong>an</strong>d two were acquitted. There<strong>for</strong>e, it is no wonder<br />
that, after the pronouncement of the verdict, the <strong>in</strong>dicted were s<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g: "Death<br />
to Muslims!" 20 As <strong>for</strong> the Director of the Military Museum, it is only known<br />
that he was removed from that position, but it is not known whether a crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
or discipl<strong>in</strong>ary action aga<strong>in</strong>st him was <strong>in</strong>itiated.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, such a conduct of the competent <strong>in</strong>stitutions is <strong>in</strong><br />
con<strong>for</strong>mity with the general condition of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
ethnocentrism <strong>an</strong>d a great social dist<strong>an</strong>ce vis-à-vis other national <strong>an</strong>d religious<br />
communities. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the latest UNDP Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report <strong>for</strong><br />
Serbia 21 , the greatest social dist<strong>an</strong>ce is kept vis-à-vis the Muslims/Bosniaks<br />
(31.3%) <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s (41.4%). In 2004, even 46% of the <strong>in</strong>habit<strong>an</strong>ts of Serbia<br />
would not agree to the build<strong>in</strong>g of a mosque <strong>in</strong> their place of residence, while<br />
23% had <strong>an</strong> ambivalent attitude towards this. Consequently, only 30% would<br />
agree to have a mosque <strong>in</strong> their city. 22 Ethnocentrism is especially pronounced<br />
among the young people aged 20-23. It is symptomatic that the dist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
towards atheists is also unusually high: even 30% of citizens would be aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the marriage with <strong>an</strong> atheist; 25% does not w<strong>an</strong>t atheists to educate their<br />
children, while 15% would not associate with them!<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1990s as well as today, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism <strong>in</strong> Serbia was<br />
especially evident at the public <strong>for</strong>ums <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the proclamations issued by<br />
paraecclesiastical org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d some political parties, <strong>in</strong> private<br />
publish<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>state</strong>ments made by some priests <strong>an</strong>d bishops, as well as through<br />
20 D<strong>an</strong>as, 27 July 2005, p. 3.<br />
21 The results of this research were published <strong>in</strong> the daily D<strong>an</strong>as, 3-4 October<br />
2005, p. 16.<br />
22 Ibid.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the concrete activities of hoolig<strong>an</strong>s who write <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic graffiti or desecrate<br />
Jewish graveyards <strong>an</strong>d other build<strong>in</strong>gs of religious <strong>an</strong>d cultural signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia. However, <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad, <strong>in</strong> November 2005, <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d violence were<br />
also provoked by the org<strong>an</strong>ized neo-Nazi group National Guard (Nacionalni<br />
stroj). The authorities responded rather quickly <strong>in</strong> the case of their <strong>in</strong>trusion<br />
<strong>an</strong>d violence at the Philosophical Faculty <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d at the concert of KC<br />
Gradilište, but the pronounced sentences were just symbolic once aga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
Namely, their violence was not qualified as a crim<strong>in</strong>al offence, but as a<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>ary one. They even received <strong>in</strong>direct support from Milorad Mirčić, <strong>an</strong><br />
official of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party <strong>an</strong>d the President of the Republic<strong>an</strong><br />
Assembly Security <strong>Committee</strong>. Namely, <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>trusion of 25 neo-Nazis <strong>in</strong>to<br />
the Philosophical Faculty, he condemned, <strong>in</strong> the first place, Professor Milenko<br />
Perović who org<strong>an</strong>ized that <strong>an</strong>ti-fascist <strong>for</strong>um.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the early 1990s, under conditions of war <strong>an</strong>d nationalist<br />
euphoria <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism was first revived <strong>in</strong> some political <strong>an</strong>d<br />
religious circles. It was the question of the so-called "new left <strong>an</strong>d right" (JUL,<br />
Radicals), as well as the clero-nationalist, Ljotić <strong>an</strong>d Nedić movements <strong>in</strong><br />
present-day Serbia. The <strong>for</strong>mer were the loudest as regards "the world<br />
conspiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serbs" <strong>an</strong>d hegemony of the new world order (TV<br />
Palma, Velika Srbija), while the latter are known <strong>for</strong> a number of articles <strong>in</strong> the<br />
journals such as Logos <strong>an</strong>d Pravoslavlje. So, <strong>for</strong> example, <strong>in</strong> its issue No.<br />
16/1994, Šešelj’s Velika Srbija published The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, while<br />
on TV Palma the Jews were accused of be<strong>in</strong>g "murderers <strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>als"<br />
(David, 2000: 33). Those TV programmes propagated "theories" that presentday<br />
Jews (Ashkenazi) are actually "false Jews" <strong>an</strong>d descend<strong>an</strong>ts of the Khazars,<br />
a Turkish tribe which converted to Judaism, while the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Jews were<br />
requested to apologize <strong>for</strong> the actions of the US Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
bomb<strong>in</strong>g of Yugoslavia (David, 2000: 33)! The De<strong>an</strong> of the Philological Faculty<br />
<strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Professor Radmilo Marojević, even wrote that "<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> culture<br />
<strong>an</strong>d science there is the fifth column of the world’s Judeo-Masonic project". In<br />
Logos, the journal published by students of the Theological Faculty of the SOC,<br />
it was claimed that there was "a pl<strong>an</strong>etary Jewish conspiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st Christi<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodoxy, especially aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people <strong>an</strong>d Russia" (David, 2000: 33).<br />
In one issue of Pravoslavlje <strong>in</strong> 1994, a member of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> National Renewal<br />
called the Jews "the worst people that deserves despise" <strong>an</strong>d regretted that<br />
there was no <strong>in</strong>quisition <strong>an</strong>y more (Gredelj, 1999: 161). After publish<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
article Jevreji ponovo razap<strong>in</strong>ju Hrista (The Jews Are Crucify<strong>in</strong>g Christ Aga<strong>in</strong>),<br />
the editor of this journal was removed from that position. However, this did<br />
not prevent hoolig<strong>an</strong>s to write graffiti at the Jewish cemetery <strong>an</strong>d on the<br />
synagogue, such as: "Death to Jews!" <strong>an</strong>d "Long Live Adolf Hitler!" (David,<br />
2000: 33). A long time ago, researchers observed a correlation between <strong>an</strong>ti-<br />
Semitism <strong>an</strong>d one’s authoritari<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>tidemocratic political orientation<br />
(Mihailović <strong>an</strong>d Mihailović, 1969: 257), which was especially suitable <strong>for</strong> the<br />
278<br />
279
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
creation or revival of various pseudomyths, as well as <strong>for</strong> ethnic, racial <strong>an</strong>d<br />
religious <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> Milošević’s Serbia.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, <strong>in</strong> Belgrade’s book shops one c<strong>an</strong> still f<strong>in</strong>d copies of the<br />
new editions of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (2001), while <strong>in</strong> some of those<br />
book shops <strong>in</strong> the centre of the city the paraecclesiastical publisher Dr Ratibor<br />
Djurdjević distributes <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic pamphlets from his edition Judaica. Some of<br />
those pamphlets are entitled Centuries-Old Malice: How Is Brita<strong>in</strong> Secretly<br />
Governed by Jude<strong>an</strong>s; The Conspiracy of Conspiracies: The Protocols of the Elders of<br />
Zion Be<strong>for</strong>e the Court <strong>in</strong> Berne; Enemies of M<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>d: The Hidden History of Jude<strong>an</strong><br />
Crim<strong>in</strong>als; Holocaust: The Dogma of Judaism <strong>an</strong>d the like. Over 140 titles of this<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d were recorded only <strong>in</strong> Belgrade. 23 It is not known whether the SOC ever<br />
condemned the publish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d distribution of this literature <strong>in</strong> which the<br />
identity <strong>an</strong>d historical memories of members of a "traditional" religious<br />
community <strong>in</strong> Serbia are aga<strong>in</strong> attacked <strong>in</strong> the most morbid <strong>an</strong>d monstrous<br />
way, <strong>in</strong> the Ljotić style.<br />
The Attitude Towards Europe <strong>an</strong>d the West<br />
Apart from pronounced <strong>an</strong>ti-ecumenism, as well as <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st small religious communities, the SOC also emphasizes the fear of the<br />
destruction of the "true faith" through open resist<strong>an</strong>ce to the secularization of<br />
the modern world, especially the western one. Instead of <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g a dialogue<br />
with that world, the SOC decides <strong>for</strong> the official condemnation of<br />
secularization. So, <strong>for</strong> example, the programme of de-secularization of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> society has recently been <strong>an</strong>nounced from a high position <strong>in</strong> the<br />
hierarchy of the SOC – the Metropolit<strong>an</strong>ate of Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d the Littoral.<br />
Moreover, <strong>in</strong> November 2000, the In<strong>for</strong>mation Service of the SOC <strong>an</strong>nounced<br />
that "secularization reduced Serbia <strong>an</strong>d its people to poverty… As <strong>for</strong> the<br />
democratic system, its bruises on the body of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people are only now<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g evident". Consequently, the SOC does not see <strong>an</strong>y problem <strong>in</strong><br />
destructive <strong>an</strong>d suicidal politics, which it also supported wholeheartedly<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the war years. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, the imposition of a certa<strong>in</strong> programme<br />
of de-secularization as a new political ideology, with the government’s<br />
assist<strong>an</strong>ce, resembles very much the period of communism <strong>an</strong>d its utopia that<br />
secularization <strong>an</strong>d atheism could be imposed.<br />
The views of Nikolaj Velimirović <strong>an</strong>d Just<strong>in</strong> Popović on the secular<br />
<strong>an</strong>d "de-christi<strong>an</strong>ized" West <strong>an</strong>d Europe are well known <strong>an</strong>d are often cited by<br />
histori<strong>an</strong>s. Today, however, those views are uncritically repeated <strong>in</strong> the books<br />
<strong>an</strong>d at the public <strong>for</strong>ums of the lead<strong>in</strong>g bishops of the SOC, such as At<strong>an</strong>asije<br />
Jevtić, Artemije Radosavljević <strong>an</strong>d Amfilohije Radović. Even more moderate<br />
23 The <strong>in</strong>terview of Filip David <strong>for</strong> the radio broadcast Pešč<strong>an</strong>ik on Radio B92, 11<br />
November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
bishops also tend to such exclusivism relative to the West. In his book<br />
Savremeni svet i Pravoslavna crkva (The Modern World <strong>an</strong>d the Orthodox<br />
Church), published <strong>in</strong> 1993, Bishop Ignjatije Midić says with resignation that<br />
"Christi<strong>an</strong>ity <strong>in</strong> the West ceased to exist as the Church: it has become <strong>an</strong><br />
ideology, a set of ethical laws". And <strong>in</strong> "Pravoslavlje i Evropa" (Orthodoxy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Europe), the Bishop says that "the real reason why the Orthodox people should<br />
aspire to <strong>in</strong>tegrated Europe" is, neither more nor less, the possibility "to<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence a ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> the modern Europe<strong>an</strong> world-view. All of us are aware<br />
(underl<strong>in</strong>ed by M.V.) that Europe, that is, the modern western civilization<br />
founded by Europe <strong>in</strong> which all of us, the Orthodox <strong>an</strong>d others, participate, is<br />
undergo<strong>in</strong>g a severe crisis" (Midić, 2003: 39). Midić gives several reasons why,<br />
<strong>in</strong> his op<strong>in</strong>ion, Europe is <strong>in</strong> a crisis <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>s that the crux of the problem, at<br />
least <strong>in</strong> the spiritual sphere, lies <strong>in</strong> "the appear<strong>an</strong>ce of nihilism <strong>in</strong> Western<br />
philosophy". The other problem lies, believe it or not, "<strong>in</strong> the exp<strong>an</strong>sion of the<br />
freedom of personality" (Midić, 2003: 46)! Here is how that is expla<strong>in</strong>ed by this<br />
contemporary Serbi<strong>an</strong> theologi<strong>an</strong>:<br />
"Nihilism is becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> unavoidable comp<strong>an</strong>ion of freedom which is<br />
often <strong>for</strong>ced to renounce itself, so that we c<strong>an</strong> release ourselves from its fatal<br />
embrace (accord<strong>in</strong>g to J. Ziziulas). On the social pl<strong>an</strong>e, the uncontrollable<br />
freedom of the other is becom<strong>in</strong>g d<strong>an</strong>gerous <strong>for</strong> society, <strong>for</strong> community,<br />
because freedom is <strong>in</strong>evitably threaten<strong>in</strong>g the existence of the other by its<br />
contents. Beh<strong>in</strong>d the aspiration of the West to control the entire world lies the<br />
fear of the other <strong>an</strong>d his freedom" (ibid.). Here is the way out <strong>an</strong>d remedy <strong>for</strong><br />
that "illness of the West": "For the recovery of the modern society, it is<br />
necessary to po<strong>in</strong>t to the orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the eschaton, that is, the<br />
authentic Christi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of eschatology, s<strong>in</strong>ce Christi<strong>an</strong> ontology<br />
orig<strong>in</strong>ates from it. We have no more reliable guide <strong>for</strong> this th<strong>an</strong> the Liturgy of the<br />
Eastern, Orthodox Church" (ibid., underl<strong>in</strong>ed by M.V.).<br />
In the same collection of papers <strong>in</strong> which Ignjatije’s text was published<br />
(Hrišć<strong>an</strong>stvo i evropske <strong>in</strong>tegracije), the theologi<strong>an</strong> Vlad<strong>an</strong> Perišić poses the<br />
question: "Does Europe need Christi<strong>an</strong>ity?", <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>swers: "Let us elim<strong>in</strong>ate<br />
everyth<strong>in</strong>g that is Christi<strong>an</strong> from Europe <strong>an</strong>d then take a look at the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
poetry, literature, architecture, pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, music, philosophy <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
culture <strong>an</strong>d civilization, <strong>in</strong> general. What will we see? Only: a) brutal<br />
barbarism, or b) arrog<strong>an</strong>t egotism or, probably, a miserable union of these two<br />
(Perišić, 2003: 123). Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, there is noth<strong>in</strong>g left from <strong>an</strong>cient Greece <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Rome, the Islamic <strong>an</strong>d Jewish civilizations <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d their poetry,<br />
philosophy <strong>an</strong>d architecture, not to mention the legacy of enlightenment,<br />
which has been largely profiled as <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ticlerical view.<br />
The term ecclesiastical fundamentalism could probably be the most<br />
appropriate <strong>for</strong> describ<strong>in</strong>g the view of this author, which is expressed <strong>in</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uation: "Even those who do not like to hear this must be <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med that<br />
Europe is not the measure of Christi<strong>an</strong>ity, that is, the Church (which is the same<br />
280<br />
281
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
because, let us not <strong>for</strong>get – Christi<strong>an</strong>ity exists only as the Church); on the<br />
contrary, the Church is the criterion of Europe. Whether Europe <strong>an</strong>d the so-called<br />
‘Europe<strong>an</strong> values’ will survive not only <strong>in</strong> history, but will also be extended<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the eternity… depends on whether they will con<strong>for</strong>m to the Church"<br />
(Perišić, 2003: 124). Consequently, Perišić views Europe only as ecclesiastical<br />
Europe, while the values that have been embodied <strong>in</strong> its Constitution by the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> legislators (<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>ist <strong>an</strong>d cultural heritage, as well as the heritage of<br />
other, non-Christi<strong>an</strong> religions) should probably refer to those "so-called<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> values", which the author calls <strong>in</strong>to question <strong>in</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
Bishop Grigorije of Zahumlje <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, the successor to the<br />
"throne" of Bishop At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić, holds that the West <strong>an</strong>d Europe request<br />
from the Serbs to renounce their identity: "The people from the West expect us<br />
to be pragmatic <strong>an</strong>d lose our identity or say that we are Bosniaks <strong>for</strong> clothes,<br />
shoes <strong>an</strong>d food. But, such expectations are <strong>an</strong> absolute illusion" (Vučetić, 2005:<br />
13). This is also followed by the usual lament of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> bishops, enh<strong>an</strong>ced<br />
by the recognizable "Masada complex" when the fate of one’s own people is <strong>in</strong><br />
question: "We are aga<strong>in</strong> threatened as the people, because we feel that we are<br />
requested to renounce ourselves. As if it was told to us: ‘Give up yourselves –<br />
your identity, history <strong>an</strong>d culture <strong>an</strong>d we will then consider whether we will<br />
accept you or not" (ibid.).<br />
In that latest resist<strong>an</strong>ce of the SOC to Europe, secularization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
democracy, some authors <strong>in</strong> Serbia also tend to recognize its step towards the<br />
establishment of a <strong>state</strong> church. It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that very soon after the<br />
October ch<strong>an</strong>ges the representatives of the Office <strong>for</strong> Religious Education<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Patriarchate <strong>state</strong>d that "the <strong>state</strong> should protect its<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d the nation <strong>an</strong>d, to that end, it should proclaim Orthodoxy a <strong>state</strong><br />
religion or, <strong>in</strong> other words, our <strong>state</strong> should be verified as <strong>an</strong> Orthodox <strong>state</strong>"<br />
(Brkić, 2000: 8). As <strong>for</strong> other religions, they would have the right to exist, but<br />
would not have the same r<strong>an</strong>k as Orthodoxy <strong>an</strong>d would be registered only if<br />
"they are not sat<strong>an</strong>ic" <strong>in</strong> the view of the SOC (ibid.).<br />
In Serbia today, there is a very pronounced tendency towards the<br />
clericalization of the society both <strong>in</strong> the ecclesiastical <strong>an</strong>d some political circles.<br />
At the same time, that is also resist<strong>an</strong>ce to democratization <strong>an</strong>d, naturally, to<br />
Europe, which is often m<strong>an</strong>ifested by emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> view,<br />
from that of Nikolaj Velimirović to that of At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić, who speaks, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, about our "eurowh<strong>in</strong>ers" (i.e. those who strive <strong>for</strong> Europe) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
always w<strong>in</strong>s applause <strong>for</strong> that at his <strong>for</strong>ums (By<strong>for</strong>d 2005: 18).<br />
At the same time, civil society <strong>an</strong>d non-governmental org<strong>an</strong>izations,<br />
as well as ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizens wish<strong>in</strong>g to be a part of present-day Europe are<br />
severely criticized <strong>an</strong>d demonized:<br />
"Here the Church opts <strong>for</strong> a monistic pattern which rem<strong>in</strong>ds us<br />
strongly of the time of communism <strong>an</strong>d - regardless of the fierce condemnation<br />
of that communist legacy <strong>in</strong> the ecclesiastical circles – that is the same<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
authoritari<strong>an</strong> pattern <strong>an</strong>d model, only the ideology is different. In fact, the<br />
priests, like retired Bishop Jevtić, face the believers, that is, ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizens,<br />
with a senseless <strong>an</strong>d harmful dilemma – whether to be Orthodox or a<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Serb, thus <strong>for</strong>bidd<strong>in</strong>g them to m<strong>an</strong>ifest the multitude of their<br />
identities. Moreover, these priests present Orthodoxy <strong>in</strong> the wrong way, <strong>in</strong><br />
some autarchic <strong>an</strong>d primitive <strong>for</strong>m, thus betray<strong>in</strong>g their spiritual mission <strong>in</strong><br />
the modern society <strong>an</strong>d demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g that they are not up to their task. In<br />
such discourse, <strong>for</strong> example, the struggle with Europe is often reduced to the<br />
primordial struggle between God <strong>an</strong>d Devil which is <strong>for</strong> Mr. At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić,<br />
judg<strong>in</strong>g by his <strong>for</strong>ums, the most decisive battle of our times" (Vukom<strong>an</strong>ović,<br />
2005: 25).<br />
At the <strong>for</strong>um, which was org<strong>an</strong>ized at the Faculty of Mech<strong>an</strong>ical<br />
Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g of the Belgrade University, on 2 December 2004, by the<br />
paraecclesiastical org<strong>an</strong>ization Srpski Sabor Dveri, which has been act<strong>in</strong>g as of<br />
late under the auspices of the journal Pravoslavlje <strong>an</strong>d the In<strong>for</strong>mation Service<br />
of the SOC, Jevtić presented the "Serbi<strong>an</strong> problem" with Europe <strong>in</strong> the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g way:<br />
"That what they serve to us as a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-,<br />
multi-society… As if we are crazy, as if they underestimate us <strong>an</strong>d th<strong>in</strong>k that<br />
we are stupid. Well, that underestimation of common sense by that which is<br />
called modern Europe is <strong>in</strong>tolerable. When they tell us: choose between<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Brussels – gentlemen, I am return<strong>in</strong>g you the tickets <strong>for</strong> your<br />
Brussels, leave us <strong>in</strong> our mud to drown ourselves, but leave us alone" (Forum,<br />
2004).<br />
Bishop Filaret of Mileševa was also speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the similar spirit at the<br />
consecration of the foundation <strong>for</strong> the church dedicated to St Mar<strong>in</strong>a the Great<br />
Martyr <strong>in</strong> Lazarevo near Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>:<br />
"We had <strong>an</strong>d still have the best presidents. We have the best generals<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the best people with the heart, spirit <strong>an</strong>d faith. There<strong>for</strong>e, I, the Bishop of<br />
Mileševa, also believe that you will build this church <strong>in</strong> a year <strong>an</strong>d that you<br />
will not allow that its build<strong>in</strong>g lasts longer th<strong>an</strong> a year. For you have faith <strong>an</strong>d<br />
you have the face, courage <strong>an</strong>d bravery which m<strong>an</strong>y of them wish to destroy,<br />
but c<strong>an</strong>not kill Christ, God <strong>an</strong>d Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava <strong>in</strong> us. I promise you, as the Bishop<br />
of Mileševa, fifteen tons of cement <strong>for</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g this holy temple. I appeal to the<br />
deputies to buy cement… we are follow<strong>in</strong>g Christ <strong>an</strong>d Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava, our sa<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
<strong>an</strong>d enlighteners, <strong>an</strong>d not the Serbi<strong>an</strong> sw<strong>in</strong>dlers <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> traitors who<br />
betray us today on every corner. And what will we do <strong>in</strong> Europe? My White<br />
Angel was <strong>in</strong> Europe a long time ago. America is about two hundred years old<br />
<strong>an</strong>d my <strong>an</strong>gel is from the 13 th century. This is why we have been driven <strong>in</strong>to a<br />
corner… because we believed every trash from the West, as well as domestic<br />
one that appear as the true saviour of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people, but that was not so.<br />
The true saviour of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people is the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Church" (Pudar 2005: 16).<br />
282<br />
283
The SOC <strong>an</strong>d War Crimes<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the period of five years, which passed after the 5 October<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ges, it was expected that the Church would m<strong>an</strong>ifest its ethical position on<br />
the immediate past to a much greater extent, consider<strong>in</strong>g the political weight<br />
that was undeserv<strong>in</strong>gly attached to it, as well as the fact that this is just the<br />
field <strong>in</strong> which religious communities are the most competent <strong>an</strong>d, thus, are<br />
expected to voice their op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> public. The central problem here is the<br />
attitude towards war crimes <strong>an</strong>d the crim<strong>in</strong>al legacy of the Milošević regime.<br />
In view of the fact that one unjust society was <strong>in</strong>herited, this had to be of<br />
special signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the Church, because it is the question not only of a legal<br />
dilemma, but also of a serious moral one. What is, <strong>for</strong> example, its position on<br />
<strong>in</strong>justice <strong>in</strong> the society <strong>an</strong>d the fact that m<strong>an</strong>y people became rich under<br />
suspicious circumst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d that they profited from the war? That is one of<br />
the questions which every religious org<strong>an</strong>ization should <strong>an</strong>swer. However, the<br />
Church keeps silent. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, there is much talk as to what should<br />
be recommended to the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister or President concern<strong>in</strong>g the Kosovo<br />
elections, how Serbia should look like <strong>in</strong> the future, on what pr<strong>in</strong>ciples it<br />
should be based.<br />
The role of the SOC <strong>in</strong> the wars of 1990s was very controversial, to say<br />
the least. That is probably best seen from various official <strong>an</strong>d semiofficial<br />
<strong>state</strong>ments issued by the Church at that time. On the one side, there were<br />
appeals <strong>for</strong> reconciliation, prayer <strong>an</strong>d the term<strong>in</strong>ation of the war <strong>an</strong>d conflicts.<br />
In 1991, when the war <strong>in</strong> Croatia was already waged, Patriarch Pavle, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, met twice with Card<strong>in</strong>al Kuharić. In 1992, all three lead<strong>in</strong>g religious<br />
communities <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a (the SOC, the Rom<strong>an</strong> Catholic Church<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Islamic Religious Community) issued <strong>an</strong> official <strong>state</strong>ment, that is, <strong>an</strong><br />
appeal <strong>for</strong> reconciliation. Some <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>an</strong>alysts say that this is someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
without precedent <strong>in</strong> the history of relations between religious communities,<br />
that there are not m<strong>an</strong>y examples that the representatives <strong>an</strong>d leaders of<br />
religious communities established <strong>an</strong>y contact dur<strong>in</strong>g the war, let alone that<br />
they officially called the faithful <strong>for</strong> prayer <strong>an</strong>d reconciliation, that is, <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong>giv<strong>in</strong>g which is, after all, the church mission.<br />
However, there was also a number of different official <strong>state</strong>ments (e.g.<br />
at the level of bishops’ conferences), especially <strong>in</strong> 1993 <strong>an</strong>d 1994, when the war<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bosnia was well underway. In these <strong>state</strong>ments one could recognize <strong>an</strong><br />
attempt at cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g the war <strong>an</strong>d keep<strong>in</strong>g the conquered territories <strong>an</strong>d<br />
towns, as well as see the resist<strong>an</strong>ce to peace pl<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>in</strong> addition to some other<br />
particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> this conflict. That was the case with the V<strong>an</strong>ce-Owen Pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
1993 <strong>an</strong>d the pl<strong>an</strong> of the Contact Group <strong>for</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> 1994,<br />
when the Bishops’ Conference of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church issued a<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment from which it was clear that the conquered territory was treated like<br />
some k<strong>in</strong>d of patrimony. There should be no withdrawal from that territory<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d when even the deputies of the Republic of Srpska were also prepared to<br />
do so, one could observe the Church’s much more milit<strong>an</strong>t position. Thus, all<br />
previous appeals <strong>for</strong> peace <strong>an</strong>d the cessation of hostilities were overshadowed<br />
by the <strong>state</strong>ments which were de facto try<strong>in</strong>g to block the peace process.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g 1993 <strong>an</strong>d 1994, the persons who were <strong>in</strong>dicted or already<br />
sentenced by the Hague Tribunal, such as, <strong>for</strong> example, Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Plavšić, were<br />
mentioned by high representatives of the SOC <strong>in</strong> superlatives. So,<br />
Metropolit<strong>an</strong> Amfilohije called Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Plavšić "the new Kosovo maiden", while<br />
Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić was also referred to as some hero. Even <strong>in</strong> 2005, he still<br />
persisted <strong>in</strong> his view that the late mother of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić, Jov<strong>an</strong>ka, was<br />
"Mother Jevrosima <strong>an</strong>d the mother of the n<strong>in</strong>e Jugović brothers" (Tasić, 2005).<br />
Consequently, those are, at least <strong>for</strong> some representatives of the SOC,<br />
the persons of great signific<strong>an</strong>ce. At that time, the Church was more <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
towards the Republic of Srpska, because it was evidently disappo<strong>in</strong>ted by<br />
Milošević’s defeatism. The Republic of Srpska was glorified as the "new<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Piedmont" <strong>an</strong>d Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Bilj<strong>an</strong>a Plavšić as those who<br />
were follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> "the footsteps of Sa<strong>in</strong>t Lazar", as it was put pathetically. That<br />
was a consistent policy which resulted <strong>in</strong> horrible crimes <strong>an</strong>d ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
so that after the war there was not one mosque left <strong>in</strong> the territory of the<br />
Republic of Srpska. And when <strong>an</strong> attempt was made to rebuild such <strong>an</strong><br />
import<strong>an</strong>t mosque as the Ferhadija <strong>in</strong> B<strong>an</strong>jaluka <strong>in</strong> 2001, there were <strong>in</strong>cidents<br />
<strong>an</strong>d sc<strong>an</strong>dals, which were not condemned by the Church. Consequently, one<br />
could observe here that the conduct of the SOC was rather consistent.<br />
The SOC "sobered up" to a degree <strong>in</strong> 1996, after it was realized that the<br />
<strong>state</strong> jurisdiction over a certa<strong>in</strong> territory did not have to co<strong>in</strong>cide with that of<br />
the church <strong>an</strong>d that the church jurisdiction could be reta<strong>in</strong>ed even if the <strong>state</strong><br />
had no jurisdiction over that territory. Those territorial claims, which are<br />
usually characteristic of the armies <strong>in</strong> conflict, were also displayed by the SOC<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the war. At the time the Patriarch met with Card<strong>in</strong>al Kuharić <strong>an</strong>d called<br />
<strong>for</strong> reconciliation, he also wrote to Lord Carr<strong>in</strong>gton ask<strong>in</strong>g that a part of the<br />
territory of the Republic of Croatia should be united with the homel<strong>an</strong>d, that<br />
is, with the Republic of Serbia, because it was populated by the Serbs. That<br />
territorialistic orientation of the SOC was certa<strong>in</strong>ly the result of its org<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
which is based on the territorial pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, although it is also a national church.<br />
The dioceses behave like fiefs over which the bishops exercise sovereign<br />
authority <strong>an</strong>d if such a fief f<strong>in</strong>ds itself <strong>in</strong> the territory of a new <strong>state</strong>, which was<br />
recognized by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>in</strong> the me<strong>an</strong>time, then this turns<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the world’s historical question. At the same time, the fact that the<br />
monastery of Chil<strong>an</strong>dar is located <strong>in</strong> the territory of <strong>an</strong>other <strong>state</strong>, Greece,<br />
which was not a part of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia, has never posed a problem.<br />
Here mention should also be made of the views that came to<br />
expression <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> texts. In the collection of papers entitled The Lamb of God<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Beast from the Bottomless Pit, At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić poses the question as to the<br />
284<br />
285
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
character of the war waged <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d then says that it<br />
was the worst of all possible wars <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> the next few sentences, expounds his<br />
theory on this subject. He concludes that it was the defence war <strong>for</strong> the Serbs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d then, <strong>in</strong> the next sentence, that it was actually a heroic war from the<br />
viewpo<strong>in</strong>t of the Republic of Srpska. However, it is clear that these two<br />
<strong>state</strong>ments are not compatible <strong>an</strong>d that the dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t view is the one that<br />
justifies the war, without enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the genesis of war crimes, as well as<br />
other crimes <strong>an</strong>d consequences of the war which are still felt.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, such concern shown by the Church <strong>in</strong> the case of<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>in</strong> Scheven<strong>in</strong>gen, General Lazarević or the late mother of<br />
Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić c<strong>an</strong>not be seen when m<strong>an</strong>y other import<strong>an</strong>t issues <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
are <strong>in</strong> question. It is clear that <strong>in</strong> the circles of the SOC, the Hague Tribunal is<br />
regarded as <strong>an</strong> evil, as someth<strong>in</strong>g directed aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people. In fact, it<br />
is the question of the total ignor<strong>an</strong>ce of its signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the punishment of<br />
war crimes.<br />
One of the latest examples of the controversial role of the SOC <strong>in</strong> the<br />
past wars was the case of Hieromonk Gavrilo from Šid. Where makes some<br />
priests to bless the warriors wear<strong>in</strong>g uni<strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d weapons? Isn’t the church<br />
the place where every faithful soul meets <strong>in</strong> private, without the Kalashnikov<br />
over his shoulder, with his spiritual shepherd, confesses to him <strong>an</strong>d asks him<br />
<strong>for</strong> a bless<strong>in</strong>g? That would be a more appropriate way <strong>in</strong> which a soldier may<br />
ask his spiritual shepherd <strong>for</strong> advice be<strong>for</strong>e go<strong>in</strong>g off to war, while the latter –<br />
when provid<strong>in</strong>g him with spiritual guid<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d bless<strong>in</strong>g him – should<br />
dissuade him, <strong>in</strong> the Christi<strong>an</strong> way, from do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y evil. However, this is not<br />
what the entire world could see <strong>an</strong>d hear on the video record<strong>in</strong>g which was<br />
shown at the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d then <strong>in</strong> the domestic <strong>an</strong>d world media. The<br />
members of the Scorpio unit, who were blessed by Hieromonk Gavrilo from<br />
the Priv<strong>in</strong>a glava monastery on that video record<strong>in</strong>g, committed a war crime<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the Muslims captured near Srebrenica soon afterwards. What is also<br />
disturb<strong>in</strong>g here is the fact that the Church did not f<strong>in</strong>d it necessary to<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounce itself on this occasion <strong>for</strong> a longer period. With the greater rights <strong>in</strong><br />
the post-socialist period the church’s responsibilities are also greater. The SOC<br />
issued its official <strong>state</strong>ment only after more th<strong>an</strong> ten days": "Lord, do not let it<br />
happen aga<strong>in</strong>!", whereby it soothed, only <strong>in</strong> part <strong>an</strong>d too late, the resignation of<br />
all those who had seen that mov<strong>in</strong>g video record<strong>in</strong>g of the execution of<br />
Muslims <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d had asked themselves what connection the SOC<br />
could have with the crime. As a rule, the representatives of the SOC do not<br />
comment <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terpret their official <strong>state</strong>ments from the assemblies, that is,<br />
their public <strong>state</strong>ment, thus putt<strong>in</strong>g the citizens <strong>an</strong>d believers <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
absolutely passive position.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Fundamentalism <strong>in</strong> the SOC?<br />
Even outside its Balk<strong>an</strong> context, Orthodoxy has always <strong>in</strong>sisted on the<br />
view that was <strong>for</strong>mulated by John of Damascus as early as the 8 th century: "We<br />
do not ch<strong>an</strong>ge the everlast<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>an</strong>dmarks which our fathers have set, but<br />
cherish the tradition just as it has been h<strong>an</strong>ded down to us" (On Holy Images,<br />
11, 12). This return to the Tradition (with the capital T), the conciliary orig<strong>in</strong> of<br />
Christi<strong>an</strong>ity with which the unbroken cont<strong>in</strong>uity is established, represents one<br />
of the major pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, as well as of other<br />
Orthodox churches <strong>in</strong> the world. This is where the traditionalism of the SOC is<br />
reflected the most.<br />
However, one should also add quite a specific characteristic of Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodoxy – one imag<strong>in</strong>ary concept of Svetosavlje, which was framed <strong>in</strong> more<br />
recent time <strong>an</strong>d became the ideology of the lead<strong>in</strong>g Serbi<strong>an</strong> theologi<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Church as late as the 20 th century. The projection of some golden Christi<strong>an</strong><br />
past be<strong>for</strong>e the schism, the "Kosovo testament" <strong>an</strong>d the myth of Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava,<br />
accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by the myth of Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava, resemble, on the one side, Sunni<br />
Selefism <strong>an</strong>d, on the other, the Shiite cult of Caliph Ali <strong>an</strong>d the myth of<br />
Karbala, i.e. the historical defeat that turned <strong>in</strong>to heavenly triumph <strong>in</strong> the<br />
religious tradition (Dejz<strong>in</strong>gs, 2005, pp. 221-234). In this context, it should also<br />
be noted that, at the end of the last century, both br<strong>an</strong>ches of Islam displayed<br />
pronounced fundamentalist tendencies.<br />
Let us turn our attention to several typical characteristics of<br />
fundamentalism which are mentioned <strong>in</strong> modern literature about this<br />
phenomenon:<br />
1. The return to the fundamental pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, to the orig<strong>in</strong>, to someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that was <strong>in</strong> the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d was corrupted later on.<br />
2. Hegemonism <strong>an</strong>d exclusivism <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation: fundamentalism is<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st hermeneutic pluralism, because it leads to cognitive <strong>an</strong>d value<br />
relativism; <strong>in</strong>stead, fundamentalism perseveres <strong>in</strong> dualistic rhetoric <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
philosophy of M<strong>an</strong>icheism (We-They, God-Devil, Friends-Enemies, etc.).<br />
The essential feature of fundamentalism is its resist<strong>an</strong>ce to the<br />
pluralism of <strong>in</strong>terpretation, regardless of whether religious or non-religious<br />
phenomena are <strong>in</strong> question. Hermeneutic monism appears as the path to<br />
sectari<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrism <strong>an</strong>d exclusivism. However, rigid adherence to only one<br />
possible <strong>in</strong>terpretation of a phenomenon, regardless of whether it is the<br />
question of religion, politics, history, science or some other sphere of the<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> spirit, may turn a certa<strong>in</strong> hermeneutic problem, under specified<br />
conditions, <strong>in</strong>to a serious political, police or military problem (Vukom<strong>an</strong>ović,<br />
2001: 127-139).<br />
3. Resist<strong>an</strong>ce to secularization <strong>an</strong>d the rejection of a secular worldview;<br />
<strong>in</strong> that sense, the tradition of enlightenment poses a special challenge to<br />
286<br />
287
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d is the enemy of <strong>an</strong>y fundamentalism; fundamentalism also gives its<br />
response to the challenges of modernism.<br />
4. Fundamentalism is the product of a political, social <strong>an</strong>d economic<br />
crisis, or a response to a crisis situation.<br />
5. In <strong>an</strong> ideological sense, the fundamentalist ideas are directed<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st science, although, <strong>in</strong> a practical sense, fundamentalism often takes<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>tage of modern science <strong>an</strong>d technology.<br />
6. The spirit of ecumenism, dialogue <strong>an</strong>d toler<strong>an</strong>ce are alien to<br />
fundamentalism <strong>an</strong>d are usually its greatest enemies.<br />
In his paper "Fundamentalizam – cilj ili sredstvo" (Fundamentalism –<br />
the Aim or the Me<strong>an</strong>s), <strong>in</strong> which he lists a greater number of those<br />
characteristics, Ljubiša Rajić emphasizes one more import<strong>an</strong>t characteristic of<br />
religious fundamentalism: "the political programme based on religion, whose<br />
true aims are outside of it" (Rajić 2003: 55).<br />
Resist<strong>an</strong>ce to secularization, enlightenment, ecumenism, religious <strong>an</strong>d<br />
social pluralism, as well as the more recent attempts to impose the SOC as<br />
authority <strong>in</strong> the field of science represent, as we c<strong>an</strong> see, some of the<br />
recognizable characteristics of religious fundamentalism. Truly, <strong>in</strong> this respect<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Church is not lagg<strong>in</strong>g very much beh<strong>in</strong>d the New Christi<strong>an</strong> Right<br />
<strong>in</strong> the United States, its creationism <strong>an</strong>d literal <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Bible. On<br />
the other h<strong>an</strong>d, the role of moral m<strong>in</strong>d-guards <strong>in</strong> Serbia is now be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly per<strong>for</strong>med by various paraecclesiastical org<strong>an</strong>izations, under the<br />
auspices of <strong>an</strong>d with the bless<strong>in</strong>g of the SOC, such as Obraz, St Just<strong>in</strong> the<br />
Philosopher <strong>an</strong>d Srpski Sabor Dveri, <strong>in</strong> addition to the young followers of the<br />
priest Žarko Gavrilović, who beat up peaceful protesters, advocates of<br />
homosexual rights, <strong>in</strong> Belgrade’s streets <strong>an</strong>d squares. At the same time, there is<br />
still the vow of silence <strong>in</strong> the SOC as regards child abuse charges.<br />
Apart from the West, secularization <strong>an</strong>d modernization, the problem<br />
<strong>for</strong> some theologi<strong>an</strong>s of the SOC is also posed by the adv<strong>an</strong>cement of science,<br />
especially of social sciences deal<strong>in</strong>g with religion. In his book Isus Hristos u<br />
mraku istorijske kritike (Jesus Christ <strong>in</strong> the Darkness of Historical Criticism), the<br />
Orthodox theologi<strong>an</strong> from Chicago, Predrag Samardžić, calls, <strong>for</strong> example, our<br />
sociology of religion "one of the affiliations, sections, that is, sects" of the<br />
Marxist-atheistic ideology <strong>an</strong>d says: "In the conclusion of this reflection it c<strong>an</strong><br />
be <strong>state</strong>d that we have the university sect at the <strong>state</strong> university <strong>in</strong> whose<br />
survival it is <strong>in</strong>vested mostly by those who act aga<strong>in</strong>st it. In whose name the<br />
<strong>state</strong> university of a democratic <strong>state</strong> supports the propagation of a sect that is<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itely <strong>an</strong>ti-Christi<strong>an</strong>?" (Samardžić, 2004: 2005).<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Such a view is met with approval by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> bishops, such as<br />
Ir<strong>in</strong>ej Bulović <strong>an</strong>d At<strong>an</strong>asije Jevtić, who spoke very affirmatively about<br />
Samardžić <strong>an</strong>d his book at one of their <strong>for</strong>ums held at the end of 2004. 24<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, that new fundamentalism of the SOC could also be viewed as<br />
the product of the crisis, or its response to the crisis situation that was created<br />
after the suspension of the re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d political <strong>an</strong>d economic tr<strong>an</strong>sition of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> society, which was <strong>in</strong>itiated by the Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djić Government. After<br />
the tragic wars of the 1990s, the Church m<strong>an</strong>ifested aga<strong>in</strong> its milit<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d<br />
philetistic position, r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from the sc<strong>an</strong>dalous speech of Metropolit<strong>an</strong><br />
Amfilohije at Dj<strong>in</strong>djić’s funeral to the direct public defence of the <strong>in</strong>dicted of<br />
war crimes (who are, at least <strong>in</strong> some clerical circles, still treated as patriots <strong>an</strong>d<br />
heroes). Here mention should also be made of the Church’s phobia of fac<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the question of responsibility <strong>for</strong> war crimes (which makes it abhor<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions, such as the Hague Tribunal, to <strong>an</strong> even greater<br />
extent), as well as its proverbial reservation <strong>an</strong>d unread<strong>in</strong>ess to <strong>in</strong>itiate a more<br />
productive dialogue <strong>an</strong>d reconciliation with other religious communities <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Balk<strong>an</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> various ecumenical org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiatives that<br />
encourage such meet<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
24 This <strong>for</strong>um was held at the Faculty of Mech<strong>an</strong>ical Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g of Belgrade<br />
University on 25 November 2004.<br />
288<br />
289
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
THE MEDIA:<br />
AN UNREGULATED SPHERE<br />
Although the media laws were completed between 5 October 2000 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2005, a number of their provisions were still not en<strong>for</strong>ced; this omission had<br />
serious consequences <strong>in</strong> the media sector, enabl<strong>in</strong>g a great m<strong>an</strong>y outlets to<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ue their <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>m course as well as prevent<strong>in</strong>g most from operat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
normally. This was particularly true of the <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
telecommunications laws <strong>in</strong> relation to media privatization, frequency<br />
allocation <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g Radiotelevizija Srbije (Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radio <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Television - RTS) <strong>in</strong>to a public service org<strong>an</strong>ization. Every deadl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong><br />
complet<strong>in</strong>g these processes had been missed <strong>an</strong>d extended by several months<br />
or even years. A comparative study of 20 Europe<strong>an</strong> countries by the Open<br />
Society Institute <strong>in</strong> Budapest found that Serbia’s media sector was one of the<br />
worst-regulated on the cont<strong>in</strong>ent, above all ow<strong>in</strong>g to decades-long destruction<br />
<strong>an</strong>d slow re<strong>for</strong>ms after democratic ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> 2000. Sort<strong>in</strong>g out broadcast<strong>in</strong>g<br />
problems is a condition <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Union membership.<br />
Media Privatization<br />
Under the In<strong>for</strong>mation Law of April 2003, the pr<strong>in</strong>t media ought to<br />
have been privatized by 22 April 2005 at the latest. However, the deadl<strong>in</strong>e was<br />
extended until April 2006, necessitat<strong>in</strong>g amendment of the In<strong>for</strong>mation Law.<br />
The outlets which are not privatized by this new deadl<strong>in</strong>e will be shut down.<br />
The deadl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> the privatization of electronic media outlets, which are of far<br />
greater import<strong>an</strong>ce ow<strong>in</strong>g to their <strong>in</strong>fluence on public op<strong>in</strong>ion, was extended<br />
until 31 December 2007, 1 me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g that radio <strong>an</strong>d TV stations will rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
municipal ownership pend<strong>in</strong>g the next local elections. Although the<br />
privatization rules were adopted <strong>in</strong> June 2005 – their absence hav<strong>in</strong>g been the<br />
cause of the delay – ownership tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation only started at the end of the<br />
year, affect<strong>in</strong>g only 10 or so public media outlets at that. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
records of the Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Agency, none of the 113 radio <strong>an</strong>d TV stations<br />
founded by a municipality had been privatized <strong>for</strong> three years.<br />
Indications abound that there is no political will to privatize these<br />
outlets be<strong>for</strong>e the local elections because the local media c<strong>an</strong> be used to<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>tage once aga<strong>in</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g electioneer<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The controversy surround<strong>in</strong>g the privatization of RTV Kragujevac<br />
(RTK) is the clearest example of the extent of resist<strong>an</strong>ce to municipal media<br />
privatization. The mayor of Kragujevac, Veroljub Stev<strong>an</strong>ović, <strong>an</strong>d his<br />
associates opposed <strong>an</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>t to privatize the establishment after the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
government had given the go-ahead <strong>for</strong> its ownership tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation. The<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiative to start privatization proceed<strong>in</strong>gs had been made by the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agement which r<strong>an</strong> RTK under the rul<strong>in</strong>g Democratic Opposition of Serbia<br />
(DOS). The town adm<strong>in</strong>istration approached Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav<br />
Koštunica ask<strong>in</strong>g him to shelve his government’s privatization approval ‘until<br />
such time as the conditions are created <strong>for</strong> a correct <strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>sparent<br />
privatization of RTK’. The trade unions <strong>an</strong>d RTK employees also called <strong>for</strong> a<br />
suspension of the privatization proceed<strong>in</strong>gs on the grounds that a ‘sell-off of<br />
the town media establishment at a time when frequencies have not yet been<br />
allocated <strong>an</strong>d when judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are under way over damag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
contracts exceed<strong>in</strong>g several million euro raises the risk of someone<br />
unconnected with the media acquir<strong>in</strong>g RTK <strong>for</strong> little money’. 2 However, the<br />
representative of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS)<br />
on the work<strong>in</strong>g group entrusted with prepar<strong>in</strong>g a strategy <strong>for</strong> the development<br />
of broadcast<strong>in</strong>g, Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Milošević, said that while this might be a valid<br />
reason, ‘there is a r<strong>an</strong>ge of legal <strong>an</strong>d market mech<strong>an</strong>isms which cast doubt on<br />
what has been said <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac’. 3<br />
Because frequency <strong>an</strong>d broadcast<strong>in</strong>g permits are not the only assets of<br />
a media outlet that is put up <strong>for</strong> sale, they are not essential to its privatization.<br />
‘It should be borne <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> a privatization <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestor is buy<strong>in</strong>g above<br />
all potential <strong>for</strong> profit, <strong>an</strong>d that frequency, build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d equipment are but a<br />
me<strong>an</strong>s to <strong>an</strong> end. While a frequency <strong>an</strong>d a broadcast<strong>in</strong>g permit may <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
the value of a comp<strong>an</strong>y, they are no guar<strong>an</strong>tee that the comp<strong>an</strong>y will operate<br />
successfully,’ Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Milošević said.<br />
Buy<strong>in</strong>g a TV station be<strong>for</strong>e it is allocated a frequency also carries a risk<br />
<strong>for</strong> the potential buyer <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>vestor. If he buys a station after it is allocated a<br />
frequency, he is required to take over the concept <strong>an</strong>d operat<strong>in</strong>g pl<strong>an</strong> of the<br />
present m<strong>an</strong>agement although it has no market experience. ‘He will <strong>in</strong>herit not<br />
only <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>efficient org<strong>an</strong>ization ow<strong>in</strong>g money due to its poor per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce, one<br />
with a low-skill or unqualified personnel structure, but also a future charted by<br />
the development pl<strong>an</strong> worked out by the same people. Once a permit is<br />
2006.<br />
1 The orig<strong>in</strong>al deadl<strong>in</strong>e, set by the law adopted <strong>in</strong> July 2002, was the end of<br />
2 Blic, 2 November 2005.<br />
3 ‘Šta je starije: frekvencije ili privatizacija’, NUNS Dossier, no. 17.<br />
290<br />
291
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
obta<strong>in</strong>ed, the development pl<strong>an</strong> will have to be adhered to. The new owner<br />
will not be allowed to alter the programme orientation subst<strong>an</strong>tially even if it<br />
is established that it will br<strong>in</strong>g considerable losses,’ the NUNS says <strong>in</strong> its Dosije<br />
(Dossier). 4<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, given that municipal outlays on media have<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>ed steadily dur<strong>in</strong>g the last five years, depend<strong>in</strong>g on municipal budgets is<br />
no longer <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests of the media outlets themselves.<br />
NUNS po<strong>in</strong>ts out that RTK Director Slavica Trifunović was dismissed<br />
<strong>in</strong> a political purge of public comp<strong>an</strong>ies carried by the Kragujevac City<br />
Assembly. Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Milošević says that the experience of various local media<br />
outlets across Serbia <strong>in</strong>dicates that frequent ch<strong>an</strong>ges of m<strong>an</strong>agement do not<br />
make <strong>for</strong> the stability of operation. Trade union official also allege that each<br />
new local government <strong>in</strong>creases the number of fictitiously employed <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
this is the ma<strong>in</strong> threat to the survival of local radio-TV establishments. 5<br />
The Privatization Rules <strong>in</strong>clude provisions enabl<strong>in</strong>g electronic media<br />
outlets to be privatized without be<strong>in</strong>g allocated frequencies, giv<strong>in</strong>g local rundown<br />
outlets <strong>an</strong> opportunity to replenish their equipment <strong>an</strong>d resources with<br />
fresh privatization capital <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e to improve their ch<strong>an</strong>ces of be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
allocated a frequency at the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g competition. S<strong>in</strong>ce the new owner<br />
must ensure cont<strong>in</strong>uation of production <strong>an</strong>d broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> at least five<br />
years, the concerns that the owner will ch<strong>an</strong>ge the ma<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e of bus<strong>in</strong>ess are<br />
unfounded. The new owner c<strong>an</strong> do this only if he or she is not allocated a<br />
broadcast<strong>in</strong>g frequency at a competition. Furthermore, only persons engaged<br />
<strong>in</strong> publish<strong>in</strong>g or radio-television broadcast<strong>in</strong>g are eligible to participate <strong>in</strong><br />
media auctions.<br />
The records of the Privatization Agency show that there are 141 media<br />
outlets <strong>in</strong> Serbia await<strong>in</strong>g privatization, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 14 local newspapers <strong>an</strong>d 23<br />
newspapers operat<strong>in</strong>g as part of mixed comp<strong>an</strong>ies also ow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> electronic<br />
media outlet. Mixed comp<strong>an</strong>ies are given the choice of embark<strong>in</strong>g upon<br />
privatization as a whole or as two comp<strong>an</strong>ies after carry<strong>in</strong>g out status ch<strong>an</strong>ges<br />
<strong>an</strong>d splitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a pr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> electronic establishment.<br />
US Ambassador Michael Polt <strong>an</strong>d OSCE Deputy Head of Mission<br />
Douglas Wake, at a round table meet<strong>in</strong>g held by IREX, warned the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
authorities that media privatization was a precondition of their<br />
professionalization <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration. Polt said that it was import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
to br<strong>in</strong>g the job to a close on time, add<strong>in</strong>g that quite fr<strong>an</strong>kly even yesterday<br />
was too late; Wake also said that Serbia must no longer delay.<br />
In 2005 <strong>an</strong> agreement was reached to privatize the media owned by<br />
the State Union which have been operat<strong>in</strong>g poorly <strong>for</strong> years. These media will<br />
be privatized accord<strong>in</strong>g to legislation <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> their home republic. Among<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
them are T<strong>an</strong>jug news agency, the newspaper publish<strong>in</strong>g house Borba, Radio<br />
Jugoslavija, TV JU Info, Filmske novosti <strong>an</strong>d Jugoslovenski pregled. Serbia will<br />
receive 93.3 per cent of the privatization proceeds <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro 6.7 per<br />
cent.<br />
The privatization of the daily Večernje novosti, which is 30 per cent<br />
owned by the State Union, has given rise to most disputes so far. Opposition to<br />
privatiz<strong>in</strong>g this daily with <strong>an</strong> editorial policy favour<strong>in</strong>g the right-w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
nationalistic <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Serbia is considerable because it is the largest circulation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e the most <strong>in</strong>fluential outlet <strong>in</strong> the country. Academic Nikola<br />
Milošević suggests that there are political reasons beh<strong>in</strong>d the moves to sell the<br />
daily to the Germ<strong>an</strong> concern WAZ <strong>an</strong>d that the outcome ‘might have political<br />
implications with serious <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> cases, long-term consequences on<br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d national <strong>in</strong>terests’. ‘There<strong>for</strong>e M<strong>an</strong>ojlo Vukotić [the daily’s editor-<strong>in</strong>chief]<br />
is right <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g that the battle Večernje novosti is fight<strong>in</strong>g with that<br />
Germ<strong>an</strong> concern is not only a battle <strong>for</strong> the paper. It is a battle <strong>for</strong> Serbia. And<br />
if that battle is lost – on this po<strong>in</strong>t Mr Vukotić is right aga<strong>in</strong> – then it will be lost<br />
not only <strong>for</strong> Večernje novosti but <strong>for</strong> this country <strong>in</strong> which we all live,’ Milošević<br />
said. 6<br />
Distribution of Frequencies <strong>an</strong>d RTS<br />
The Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Law has been the most widely obstructed piece of<br />
legislation <strong>in</strong> the media sphere. Because it regulates the allocation of<br />
frequencies to electronic media outlets <strong>an</strong>d the tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of RTS <strong>in</strong>to a<br />
public service establishment it is of exceptional import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> general re<strong>for</strong>ms<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia. Although it was adopted as far back as July 2002, its en<strong>for</strong>cement<br />
was stalled by controversies up until August 2005. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first two years,<br />
at the time of the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić <strong>an</strong>d Živković governments, most criticism came from<br />
the media <strong>an</strong>d the then opposition circles, imped<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d slow<strong>in</strong>g the election<br />
of members of the Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Council 7 <strong>an</strong>d putt<strong>in</strong>g off the start of its work.<br />
The Council was not established be<strong>for</strong>e February 2005 <strong>an</strong>d implementation of<br />
the law cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be delayed. The Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Law was amended <strong>in</strong><br />
August 2005, putt<strong>in</strong>g off the electronic media privatization deadl<strong>in</strong>e until 31<br />
December 2007 <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>for</strong>mation of the public service org<strong>an</strong>ization until April<br />
2006.<br />
As well as postpon<strong>in</strong>g tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation, the government succeeded <strong>in</strong><br />
gett<strong>in</strong>g the Assembly to amend the Law <strong>in</strong> order to ensure that RTS will be<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced from TV subscription pend<strong>in</strong>g its tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation. In this way the<br />
government reta<strong>in</strong>ed control of RTS <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>ced citizens to pay TV subscription.<br />
In March 2004 the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government dismissed Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Crkvenjakov as<br />
4 Ibid.<br />
5 Ibid.<br />
6 ‘Udar na Novosti’, Svedok, 1 February 2005.<br />
7 For more detail see the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> report <strong>for</strong> 2003.<br />
292<br />
293
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
RTS general director <strong>an</strong>d appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> his place Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Tij<strong>an</strong>ić (onetime<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation m<strong>in</strong>ister under Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>an</strong>d author of numerous<br />
articles spread<strong>in</strong>g hate speech aga<strong>in</strong>st certa<strong>in</strong> public personages), <strong>in</strong> clear<br />
violation of the Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Law which provides that the director is elected<br />
by the RTS Govern<strong>in</strong>g Board. Tij<strong>an</strong>ić was appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with the<br />
Public Comp<strong>an</strong>ies Law. The RTS Govern<strong>in</strong>g Board, which had been set up by<br />
the Đ<strong>in</strong>đić government, resigned <strong>in</strong> protest aga<strong>in</strong>st Tij<strong>an</strong>ić’s appo<strong>in</strong>tment,<br />
<strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that the move was contrary to both the Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Law <strong>an</strong>d the RTS<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal rules. The new Govern<strong>in</strong>g Board was also <strong>in</strong>stalled by the Koštunica<br />
government.<br />
Tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g RTS will necessitate divid<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>to two public service<br />
establishments to serve Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia respectively. Be<strong>for</strong>e RTS <strong>an</strong>d TV<br />
Novi Sad are separated their assets <strong>an</strong>d liabilities will have to be divided, but<br />
this process has also been delayed: while the prov<strong>in</strong>cial government appo<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
the members of its commission at the end of September 2005, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
government failed to follow suit. RTV Novi Sad Director Dragomir Grnja says<br />
that a division of assets <strong>an</strong>d liabilities was agreed upon under the Živković<br />
government but that the government’s fall prevented its completion <strong>an</strong>d<br />
verification.<br />
Special concerns have been raised by the August 2005 amendment<br />
depriv<strong>in</strong>g the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a member of the Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Council of the right to<br />
veto decisions concern<strong>in</strong>g the development of broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong><br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gement curb<strong>in</strong>g Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy.<br />
The Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Council prepared a broadcast<strong>in</strong>g development<br />
strategy until 2013 after what was effectively a three-year delay. Nonetheless,<br />
not all the preconditions had been created <strong>for</strong> the allocation of frequencies, nor<br />
did the political elite appear will<strong>in</strong>g to speed up the process. Be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
frequencies c<strong>an</strong> be allocated, the M<strong>an</strong>ag<strong>in</strong>g Board of the Telecommunications<br />
Agency must render its op<strong>in</strong>ion on the broadcast<strong>in</strong>g frequency allocation pl<strong>an</strong>.<br />
Under the relev<strong>an</strong>t law, the Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Council <strong>an</strong>nounces a public<br />
competition <strong>for</strong> applic<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> broadcast<strong>in</strong>g licences; the licences will be<br />
gr<strong>an</strong>ted subject to <strong>an</strong> Allocation Pl<strong>an</strong> to be prepared by the<br />
Telecommunications Agency. The Allocation Pl<strong>an</strong> should conta<strong>in</strong> all the<br />
necessary basic technical parameters (tr<strong>an</strong>smitter location, effective frequency<br />
r<strong>an</strong>ge, coverage zone, etc.).<br />
The attempts to f<strong>in</strong>d a plausible excuse <strong>for</strong> the delay created a new<br />
confusion <strong>in</strong> the public as to who was responsible <strong>for</strong> produc<strong>in</strong>g such a pl<strong>an</strong>,<br />
this on top of a conflict simmer<strong>in</strong>g between the two regional frequency<br />
allocation bodies. The Telecommunications Agency, which failed to come up<br />
with a pl<strong>an</strong> by year’s end <strong>in</strong> spite of hav<strong>in</strong>g been founded <strong>in</strong> May, blamed this<br />
on the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Telecommunications, say<strong>in</strong>g its had ‘withheld from it<br />
necessary computer equipment’. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, members of the<br />
Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Council accused the Telecommunications Agency of obstruct<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the allocation of frequencies; they said that the delay had noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with<br />
<strong>an</strong>y computer equipment <strong>an</strong>d that the conditions were <strong>in</strong> place <strong>for</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
of Telecommunications to take over temporarily from the Agency.<br />
The broadcast<strong>in</strong>g development strategy provides <strong>for</strong> national<br />
frequency permits be<strong>in</strong>g gr<strong>an</strong>ted to five commercial TV ch<strong>an</strong>nels <strong>an</strong>d four<br />
commercial radio stations. National frequencies will also be allocated to the<br />
republic <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a public service establishments. Forty regional television<br />
<strong>an</strong>d as m<strong>an</strong>y regional radio frequencies will be allocated, as well as gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g<br />
local broadcast<strong>in</strong>g permits to some 160 television <strong>an</strong>d about 200 radio stations.<br />
Under the strategy, the number of broadcasters, which reached 755 <strong>in</strong> June<br />
2005 <strong>an</strong>d kept ris<strong>in</strong>g, will nearly be halved.<br />
The Media under Pressure<br />
An <strong>an</strong>alysis of the <strong>in</strong>cidents that occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005 <strong>in</strong>dicates that<br />
media outlets were targeted <strong>for</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g on war crimes, promot<strong>in</strong>g<br />
cooperation with the Hague tribunal or blam<strong>in</strong>g Serbi<strong>an</strong> politics <strong>for</strong> the wars <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. Individual politici<strong>an</strong>s cont<strong>in</strong>ued to accuse media of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb. In a country like Serbia where war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees are still<br />
glorified <strong>an</strong>d where no ch<strong>an</strong>ge of heart has taken place, such political messages<br />
are very d<strong>an</strong>gerous: they c<strong>an</strong> be taken by some as me<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g that the outlet <strong>in</strong><br />
question may be attacked with impunity.<br />
The daily D<strong>an</strong>as <strong>an</strong>d RTV B92 received <strong>an</strong>onymous bomb threats on<br />
several occasions. The police <strong>in</strong>vestigated the <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>an</strong>d found that the<br />
alarms were false but failed to discover the culprits.<br />
In July, B92 received two <strong>an</strong>onymous telephone calls with<strong>in</strong> three<br />
days say<strong>in</strong>g a bomb had been pl<strong>an</strong>ted on the premises ‘because of the <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb<br />
campaign be<strong>in</strong>g conducted by the outlet’, as the caller put it. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to B92<br />
staff, the bomb threats were merely part of a daily <strong>in</strong>timidation rout<strong>in</strong>e aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the establishment. The pressure on B92 <strong>in</strong>creased after Nataša K<strong>an</strong>dić<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced the existence of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal evidence l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g the deputy president of<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party (SRS), Tomislav Nikolić, with the kill<strong>in</strong>g of civili<strong>an</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Croati<strong>an</strong> village of Ant<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1991.<br />
On 11 June <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>onymous m<strong>an</strong> who <strong>in</strong>troduced himself as ‘personal<br />
<strong>security</strong> of General Ratko Mladić’ r<strong>an</strong>g up D<strong>an</strong>as to say that the daily’s editor<strong>in</strong>-chief<br />
<strong>an</strong>d executive editor Grujica Spasović would be ‘killed’. The daily<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ked the call to the publication two days previously of <strong>an</strong> article <strong>an</strong>nounc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that the whereabouts of the Hague tribunal <strong>in</strong>dictee Ratko Mladić had been<br />
identified. Although the daily’s director urged M<strong>in</strong>ister of Internal Affairs<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić to take every measure to protect Spasović <strong>an</strong>d his family,<br />
Spasović was <strong>in</strong>terviewed by the police only several days later, after <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tervention by the US ambassador. Spasović was later told by the police that<br />
294<br />
295
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
while they could not trace the caller’s number they believed that the call had<br />
been made via satellite.<br />
TV P<strong>an</strong>čevo went through a similar ordeal after broadcast<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
programme commemorat<strong>in</strong>g the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Srebrenica massacre.<br />
In June it received <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>onymous written message say<strong>in</strong>g it was go<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
suffer deserved punishment <strong>for</strong> ‘commemorat<strong>in</strong>g’ the event. The message,<br />
written on the back of <strong>an</strong> old SRS leaflet advertis<strong>in</strong>g the party’s 2002 P<strong>an</strong>čevo<br />
rally, read: ‘Just as you’re celebrat<strong>in</strong>g the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of be<strong>in</strong>g launched<br />
by Soros, you’re <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong> the punishment you deserve - you’re go<strong>in</strong>g to be<br />
auctioned off <strong>for</strong> a song to that very Soros’. The high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g SRS official from<br />
P<strong>an</strong>čevo, Serbi<strong>an</strong> deputy <strong>an</strong>d local councillor, Božidar Koprivica, denied <strong>an</strong>y<br />
SRS <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the affair. All the same, speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the local assembly, he<br />
accused TV P<strong>an</strong>čevo of be<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>an</strong>ti-Serb’ <strong>for</strong> commemorat<strong>in</strong>g the tenth<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of the Srebrenica crime while refus<strong>in</strong>g to run the documentary<br />
about the crimes committed aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs dur<strong>in</strong>g the wars <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia screened by the Radicals <strong>in</strong> Belgrade’s Sava Centre. In this way,<br />
rather th<strong>an</strong> condemn<strong>in</strong>g the threat made to TV P<strong>an</strong>čevo, the SRS official<br />
encouraged others to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>.<br />
Local officials <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac tried to exert subtle pressure on RTV<br />
Kragujevac, which is f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced from the municipal budget, to stop it runn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the B92 serial ‘Why People Talk Low <strong>in</strong> Church’, which criticizes the role of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church (SPC) <strong>in</strong> the wars <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. After<br />
RTV Kragujevac r<strong>an</strong> the first <strong>in</strong>stalment, Kragujevac Deputy Mayor Saša<br />
Milenić made <strong>an</strong> apology to the Bishop of Šumadija, Jov<strong>an</strong>. Milenić said that<br />
the ‘religious feel<strong>in</strong>gs of the members of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consequently the open society values guar<strong>an</strong>teed by the Constitution, were<br />
grossly violated <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> irresponsible, unprofessional <strong>an</strong>d, probably, politically<br />
tendentious m<strong>an</strong>ner’. But the editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief, Gord<strong>an</strong>a Mirović, stood her<br />
ground <strong>an</strong>d showed the rest, not<strong>in</strong>g afterwards that ‘after the tr<strong>an</strong>smission of<br />
the first <strong>in</strong>stalment there were no negative reactions’. 8<br />
The M<strong>in</strong>ister of Capital Investments, Velimir Ilić, cont<strong>in</strong>ued to attack<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sult journalists throughout 2005. When a B92 journalist asked him a<br />
question about Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević’s son Marko, he replied: ‘You’re sick,<br />
you’re ripe <strong>for</strong> psychiatric cl<strong>in</strong>ic, you ought to be receiv<strong>in</strong>g treatment<br />
collectively...All you talk about is Marko. Forget about Marko.’ Ilić said this <strong>in</strong><br />
front of a local audience, dur<strong>in</strong>g the open<strong>in</strong>g of a ski-lift on Mount Kopaonik<br />
on 15 August 2005.<br />
NUNS associate Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Kal<strong>in</strong>ić says that journalists <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces<br />
are targets of direct or <strong>an</strong>onymous threats, cautions, ‘well-wish<strong>in</strong>g advice’ <strong>an</strong>d<br />
often physical attacks convey<strong>in</strong>g the same message – Leave off! Journalists<br />
were targeted not only by local politici<strong>an</strong>s but also by people with crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
8 www.nuns.org.yu, Dossier No. 17.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
connections <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly, tycoons. Every three months there was a case of<br />
a journalist be<strong>in</strong>g beaten up, as well as receiv<strong>in</strong>g daily threats. Kal<strong>in</strong>ić said that<br />
journalists on local media outlets <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces were often ‘left to their own<br />
devices, unprotected by their desks <strong>an</strong>d poorly org<strong>an</strong>ized. Besides, the police<br />
<strong>an</strong>d judiciary have failed where attacks on journalists are concerned, so it’s<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ly "take care of yourself" or "God help you"’. 9 NUNS has recorded every<br />
threat or attack aga<strong>in</strong>st journalists s<strong>in</strong>ce 2004. 10<br />
In September 2005 the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly passed a Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code<br />
which provides <strong>for</strong> no custodial penalty <strong>for</strong> defamation, as <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>in</strong>tended<br />
<strong>an</strong>d entered <strong>in</strong> the draft. The new Crim<strong>in</strong>al Code <strong>in</strong>stead envisages f<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong><br />
those found guilty of defamation; the amount of these f<strong>in</strong>es could be a problem<br />
<strong>for</strong> journalists not employed by the mass-circulation sensationalist tabloids. A<br />
f<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> sl<strong>an</strong>der r<strong>an</strong>ges from 460 to 5,200 euro <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> libel from 1,150 to 11,500<br />
euro. Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong>stituted only subject to a civil action <strong>for</strong> sl<strong>an</strong>der or<br />
libel. The law took effect <strong>in</strong> December 2005.<br />
Media Responsibility<br />
In post-October 2000 Serbia, the matter of media professional ethics<br />
was raised after the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić, with certa<strong>in</strong><br />
circles alleg<strong>in</strong>g publicly that certa<strong>in</strong> journalists <strong>an</strong>d outlets had been assigned<br />
the role of prepar<strong>in</strong>g the public <strong>for</strong> the assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d later of present<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
murder as a mafia hit. Nonetheless, long after the assass<strong>in</strong>ation allegations of<br />
media responsibility <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alyses of relev<strong>an</strong>t texts kept be<strong>in</strong>g dismissed by<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> media <strong>an</strong>d political circles; furthermore, those who criticized the media<br />
outlets <strong>in</strong> question, po<strong>in</strong>ted out breaches of the code of professional ethics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
denounced political <strong>in</strong>fluence on the media were accused of suppress<strong>in</strong>g free<br />
speech.<br />
For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, Kurir <strong>an</strong>d Nacional launched a smear campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
B92 journalist <strong>an</strong>d Insajder programme author Br<strong>an</strong>kica St<strong>an</strong>ković after she<br />
raised the question of media responsibility.<br />
It was only <strong>in</strong> 2005 that the subject was raised with<strong>in</strong> the profession<br />
itself: a Press Council, made up of journalists on various editorial staffs, was<br />
9 ‘Ne piši ili bijemo!’, Večernje novosti, 19 September 2005.<br />
10 Večernje novosti’s correspondent from Loznica Vladimir Mitrić, who reported<br />
mostly on economic <strong>an</strong>d classic crime <strong>in</strong> the Dr<strong>in</strong>a valley, was beaten up <strong>in</strong> October<br />
2005. Also, a retired colonel knocked out the Kruševac correspondent of Glas javnosti,<br />
Radojica Barjaktarević, because he did not like <strong>an</strong> article Barjaktarević had written.<br />
Biserka Milosavljević, the Blic correspondent from Parać<strong>in</strong>, received threats <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
days <strong>in</strong> connection with a trial she was cover<strong>in</strong>g. Politika’s correspondent from<br />
Kruševac, Miroljub Dugalić, was assaulted <strong>in</strong> 2004 over a series of articles about the<br />
mach<strong>in</strong>ations of a property Mafia: he was attacked by a m<strong>an</strong> featured <strong>in</strong> his texts <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the police categorized the <strong>in</strong>cident as a breach of the peace.<br />
296<br />
297
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
attached to the Media Centre, publish<strong>in</strong>g monthly reports on respect <strong>for</strong> the<br />
code of professional ethics on the part of the pr<strong>in</strong>t media.<br />
On the basis of <strong>an</strong>alyses of pr<strong>in</strong>t media coverage, the Council warned<br />
on several occasions that ‘half-truths, campaigns target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividuals or<br />
political or other groups based on half-truths, har<strong>an</strong>gues aga<strong>in</strong>st political<br />
dissentients, imprecations <strong>an</strong>d untruths - are a characteristic of a segment of<br />
the press’. As <strong>an</strong> example of a breach of journalism ethics the Council cited the<br />
case of Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović (April 2005): after Jov<strong>an</strong>ović gave evidence be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
the Special Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime Court a number of tabloids beg<strong>an</strong> publish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
‘verbatim records’ of a conversation he was alleged to have had with Duš<strong>an</strong><br />
Spasojević, a suspect <strong>in</strong> connection with Đ<strong>in</strong>đić’s assass<strong>in</strong>ation. None of the<br />
tabloids bothered to check the accuracy of the material <strong>in</strong> spite of denials <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Kurir went on publish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stalments regardless, say<strong>in</strong>g it had obta<strong>in</strong>ed the<br />
records from telephone surveill<strong>an</strong>ce services. The <strong>state</strong> authorities, however,<br />
did not dissociate themselves from such alleged public leakage or react <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y<br />
other way.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Council’s <strong>an</strong>alyses the public prosecutor ought to<br />
have reacted a number of times. There was, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, no timely action from<br />
the judicial authorities <strong>in</strong> connection with Tabloid, which conducted from one<br />
issue to the next smear campaigns aga<strong>in</strong>st certa<strong>in</strong> public figures; the<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation it published, believed to have been culled from secret police files,<br />
was unverified <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tended to discredit the victims so as to lay them open to<br />
<strong>an</strong>y attack.<br />
The most frequent breaches <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gement of the right to<br />
privacy, disclos<strong>in</strong>g the names of m<strong>in</strong>ors, <strong>in</strong>sensitivity to the fates of ord<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
people, sensationalism. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Council, the tabloids were the ma<strong>in</strong><br />
culprits although others were not entirely free from blame. ‘The totally<br />
uncontrolled publication of unverified <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation concern<strong>in</strong>g politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ary people, which could affect their lives <strong>in</strong> this or that way, poses a big<br />
problem. The topics are approached from a sensationalist po<strong>in</strong>t of view, a<br />
political model is followed which is rather clumsy <strong>an</strong>d boils down to <strong>in</strong>terparty<br />
confrontation. The tabloids that often publish fabricated material <strong>an</strong>d go<br />
<strong>for</strong> the jugular are particularly troublesome,’ said Drag<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>jić, a member of<br />
the Council. 11<br />
The Council noted <strong>in</strong> a Declaration that ‘politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d big<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>essmen abuse the existence of a free press...<strong>in</strong> order to accuse each other<br />
of various crimes <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Đ<strong>in</strong>đić’. ‘This<br />
atmosphere, <strong>in</strong> which crime goes unpunished, is additionally burdened by<br />
racism, chauv<strong>in</strong>ism, far-right nationalism, xenophobia, par<strong>an</strong>oia, conspiracy<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
theories <strong>an</strong>d pornography, which are today a component part of the press <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia.’ 12<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the problems were<br />
augmented by non-tr<strong>an</strong>sparent media ownership. At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 2006, <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, the YU Info TV ch<strong>an</strong>nel was privatized without the public hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
been told <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g about the identity of the buyer. The tender was submitted<br />
by the buyer’s agent who decl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>y comment on the grounds that he was<br />
not authorized to do so. It was not known what exactly was sold either, given<br />
that the ch<strong>an</strong>nel had not been broadcast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> some time <strong>an</strong>d was <strong>in</strong> debt.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the last five years m<strong>an</strong>y new media outlets have sprung up<br />
only to disappear after a short life. In view of the huge number of pr<strong>in</strong>t media<br />
already on the market <strong>an</strong>d the small non-pay<strong>in</strong>g circulations of most of them,<br />
their purpose may well be to publicize particular election campaigns that suit<br />
their proprietors at a particular time. Balk<strong>an</strong>, which stopped publish<strong>in</strong>g on 7<br />
February 2005, was a case <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t; there was a rumour among journalists that<br />
the newspaper was owned by Bogoljub Karić <strong>an</strong>d existed to boost his election<br />
campaign. Balk<strong>an</strong> was owned by the comp<strong>an</strong>y Generalpublik until 13 April<br />
2004, when the majority stake <strong>in</strong> the comp<strong>an</strong>y was acquired by BNN Ltd from<br />
Cyprus whose owner was unknown. After Balk<strong>an</strong> stopped publish<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
Generalpublik Director Mirj<strong>an</strong>a Gogoljević told the employees that she was<br />
unable to contact the paper’s founder BNN Ltd. Balk<strong>an</strong>’s editor Milka Ljubičić<br />
wrote to the Republic Labour Inspectorate on behalf of the employees, say<strong>in</strong>g<br />
she had talked with Bogoljub Karić (about the pay arrears) who ‘promised <strong>in</strong><br />
the name of the Generalpublik majority owner, namely the firm of BNN Ltd, as<br />
well as by reason of hav<strong>in</strong>g exerted <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence on the editorial policy, to<br />
procure the wages <strong>an</strong>d fees’. ‘In this connection, he referred me to his lawyer<br />
Vesna Čabarkapa <strong>an</strong>d to Gor<strong>an</strong> Milić (of Astra Simit Group) who were<br />
supposed to solve the problem,’ she wrote. 13<br />
Politika Personnel Ch<strong>an</strong>ges<br />
October 2005 saw ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>an</strong>agement of the daily Politika,<br />
signall<strong>in</strong>g the outlet’s closer support <strong>for</strong> the policy of the rul<strong>in</strong>g Democratic<br />
Party of Serbia (DSS). (Although Politika had always been a newspaper under<br />
strong government <strong>in</strong>fluence, particularly under Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević, it had<br />
been hoped that its ownership tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation would lead to a modified<br />
editorial policy. The daily has a long tradition <strong>an</strong>d great <strong>in</strong>fluence on public<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ion.) The new editorial staff appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> October by Editor-<strong>in</strong> -Chief <strong>an</strong>d<br />
11 ‘Kodeks i kazne’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 October 2005.<br />
12 ‘Nov<strong>in</strong>e ugrožavaju dostoj<strong>an</strong>stvo’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 8 October 2005.<br />
13 ‘Balk<strong>an</strong>ski s<strong>in</strong>drom’, Vreme, 24 March 2005.<br />
298<br />
299
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Executive Editor Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Smajlović 14 made a number of personnel ch<strong>an</strong>ges, also<br />
quietly discont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g the Sunday column of journalist Iv<strong>an</strong> Torov, a critic of<br />
the work of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government. He was first stopped writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the<br />
central Sunday issue, someth<strong>in</strong>g he had been do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> two years, then he<br />
himself refused to write a column to be published on a weekday. The ch<strong>an</strong>ges<br />
took place on the eve of the Kosovo talks <strong>an</strong>d the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum,<br />
developments <strong>in</strong> respect of which the government will w<strong>an</strong>t to exercise<br />
considerable control of the media.<br />
The very selection of the Politika Govern<strong>in</strong>g Board members <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />
a relapse <strong>in</strong>to the nationalistic model developed by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> elites,<br />
particularly the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Academy of Sciences <strong>an</strong>d Arts, which the daily<br />
furthered under the Milošević regime. The film director Emir Kusturica was<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted president of the Govern<strong>in</strong>g Board. The Board also <strong>in</strong>cludes Matija<br />
Bećković, the academic who made his mark dur<strong>in</strong>g the nationalistic campaigns<br />
<strong>in</strong> the 1980s <strong>an</strong>d 1990s <strong>an</strong>d a chief opponent of Montenegro’s <strong>in</strong>dependence,<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> prime m<strong>in</strong>ister’s adviser Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Simić, <strong>an</strong>d the Komercijalna<br />
b<strong>an</strong>ka Vice-President Predrag Mihajlović. The old Govern<strong>in</strong>g Board was<br />
dismissed dur<strong>in</strong>g the summer, of which the <strong>for</strong>mer director Darko Ribnikar<br />
was <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med after all was over.<br />
Kusturica said on his appo<strong>in</strong>tment that Serbia’s oldest daily should be<br />
‘made up <strong>in</strong> a Serb not a Germ<strong>an</strong> head’. ‘It ought to be made up <strong>in</strong> our not a<br />
<strong>for</strong>eign head given that the people who live on this territory are its market. I<br />
wish to help Politika to be the good old Politika, whose pr<strong>in</strong>cipal market should<br />
be, quite naturally, its own people. I am go<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>sist on its traditional good<br />
<strong>an</strong>d tried values, because I do believe that Politika is not the same as Blic or B92.<br />
And there are <strong>in</strong>deed tendencies to that effect,’ he said.<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce all the legal preconditions are <strong>in</strong> place <strong>for</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Radiotelevizija Srbije <strong>in</strong>to a public service comp<strong>an</strong>y, the process must be<br />
accelerated <strong>an</strong>d a new m<strong>an</strong>agement elected <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with the media<br />
legislation.<br />
Media ownership must be made tr<strong>an</strong>sparent to help the citizens<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guish between bullet<strong>in</strong>s of political parties, economic barons, secret<br />
services <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>fluential groups on the one h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d professional media<br />
on the other.<br />
14 Smajlović was previously a colimnist on the highly <strong>in</strong>fluential weekly NIN.<br />
The weekly is one of the stablishments which have never made a cle<strong>an</strong> break with the<br />
nationalistic policy of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>an</strong>d denounced the responsibility of Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
politics <strong>for</strong> the wars <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
EDUCATION:<br />
ANOTHER WASTED YEAR<br />
Despite declarative advocacy of "educational system f<strong>in</strong>e-tun<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards" vocally <strong>an</strong>nounced by the newly-appo<strong>in</strong>ted (October<br />
2004) Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports M<strong>in</strong>ister, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vuks<strong>an</strong>ović, he did his best, a<br />
year on, to keep the Serb educational system as far from the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
educational system as it was possible. His re<strong>for</strong>m per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the field of<br />
education, mostly exacted under public pressure, was reduced to the<br />
correction of lethal conservative moves of his predecessor, Education M<strong>in</strong>ister,<br />
Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Čolić. In other words, dur<strong>in</strong>g the first year of his m<strong>an</strong>date, <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage classes were re<strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the first-grades of primary schools, as<br />
were the subject-matter "From Games to Computers", <strong>an</strong>d martial arts <strong>in</strong><br />
physical education classes.<br />
In "school re<strong>for</strong>m" the <strong>in</strong>cumbent m<strong>in</strong>ister went even further: namely<br />
he compelled Belgrade primary school pupils to go gratis to c<strong>in</strong>ema every<br />
Thursday, <strong>in</strong>stead of go<strong>in</strong>g to school. Films were selected by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports 1 . Instead of deal<strong>in</strong>g with modernization of teach<strong>in</strong>g<br />
methods, entire teams of Education M<strong>in</strong>istry officials engaged <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g lists<br />
of schools dest<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong> c<strong>in</strong>ema attend<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
Non-start of a comprehensive re<strong>for</strong>m of educational system could<br />
exact a heavy price on Serbia, that is, slow down its accession to Europe <strong>an</strong>d<br />
recognition of our diplomas <strong>in</strong> the world. Added to that such a <strong>state</strong> of affairs<br />
helps the preservation of a near-retrograde m<strong>in</strong>d-set (entrenched nationalism,<br />
quasi-traditional values, theory of self-sufficiency, resist<strong>an</strong>ce to new<br />
knowledge <strong>an</strong>d modern world, reluct<strong>an</strong>ce to accept new values), notably<br />
among the young population already badly affected by a long-isolation from<br />
the world, wars <strong>an</strong>d across-the-board pauperization.<br />
A humiliat<strong>in</strong>g fact that nearly half of population of Serbia-45.8%- has<br />
completed only one grade of primary school or primary school, fits <strong>in</strong>to a<br />
bigger, <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>m picture of Serbia. As regards the total number of illiterate<br />
(3.45% of total population) Serbia is at the very bottom of the educational<br />
ladder of Europe. 2 The 2003 expert team <strong>for</strong> education <strong>an</strong>d curb<strong>in</strong>g of illiteracy<br />
1 Politika, 31 March 2005<br />
2 Blic, September 2005<br />
300<br />
301
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
has been disb<strong>an</strong>ded. Allegedly the Secondary Education Department has <strong>an</strong><br />
expert team deal<strong>in</strong>g with education of adults, but concrete data on its activities<br />
are not available.<br />
The best <strong>in</strong>dicator of the <strong>state</strong>'s dis<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> education are<br />
catastrophic conditions <strong>in</strong> which children are be<strong>in</strong>g taught. F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the<br />
UNICEF survey conducted three years ago by educational <strong>for</strong>mum,<br />
"Optimization of school network <strong>in</strong> Serbia", <strong>an</strong>d which was resumed <strong>in</strong> 2005,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated the worsen<strong>in</strong>g of elementary hygiene <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>in</strong> some urb<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d rural municipalities <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Over 55% of rural schools have only<br />
outdoor WC facilities. The same holds true of 78 city schools. Most of themnotably<br />
the one <strong>in</strong> a Belgrade suburb of Zeleznik- have poor access to water,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d some are even without electricity. Garbage b<strong>in</strong>s, toillet paper <strong>an</strong>d soaps<br />
are a rarity <strong>in</strong> Serb schools. In spr<strong>in</strong>g 2005 only <strong>in</strong> Belgrade schools three cases<br />
of jaundice were reported. 3 It also bears mention<strong>in</strong>g out-of-date teach<strong>in</strong>g aids<br />
<strong>an</strong>d equipment, old <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>an</strong>d outdated teach<strong>in</strong>g methods.<br />
Re<strong>for</strong>m of Primary <strong>an</strong>d Secondary Education:<br />
Without a Clear Strategy <strong>an</strong>d Responsibility<br />
Dism<strong>an</strong>tl<strong>in</strong>g of achievements of <strong>for</strong>mer governments led by Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Dj<strong>in</strong>dić <strong>an</strong>d Zor<strong>an</strong> Živković, at the h<strong>an</strong>ds of Koštunica-led government, is also<br />
evident <strong>in</strong> the field of educational re<strong>for</strong>ms. In a follow-up to the work done by<br />
his predecessor Lj. Colic, Education M<strong>in</strong>ister, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vuks<strong>an</strong>ović effected a<br />
systematic overhaul of his m<strong>in</strong>istry, that is, replaced all particip<strong>an</strong>ts, creators<br />
<strong>an</strong>d advocates of a comprehensive educational re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong> 2001, by his<br />
own appo<strong>in</strong>tees.<br />
Thus a teacher of physical education, with no experience whatsoever<br />
of the re<strong>for</strong>m process, was appo<strong>in</strong>ted to the post of director of the Institute <strong>for</strong><br />
Evaluation of St<strong>an</strong>dards, one of the most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>for</strong> the future<br />
of education <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
Under a new job sistematization scheme, the M<strong>in</strong>istry's Department<br />
<strong>for</strong> Democratization of Education, was dism<strong>an</strong>tled. This could be a bad<br />
message <strong>for</strong> Europe, <strong>in</strong> view of the fact that Council of Europe, <strong>an</strong>d Serbia is its<br />
member, proclaimed the year 2005 as the year of development of civil society<br />
through education. 4<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce National Educational Council, designed as the highest <strong>for</strong>m of<br />
social control <strong>in</strong> the entire educational system-from primary schools to<br />
universities-has not yet been put <strong>in</strong> place, (it was to be <strong>for</strong>med two years ago!)<br />
the <strong>in</strong>cumbent M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vuks<strong>an</strong>ovic, has<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
all the prerogatives, from the re<strong>for</strong>m-related ones to the personnel<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tments.<br />
Newly-<strong>for</strong>med commissions <strong>for</strong> the re<strong>for</strong>m of primary school<br />
education have done very little, barr<strong>in</strong>g the adoption of a dubious program <strong>for</strong><br />
the fourth grade. In absence of the National Council, that program was<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> schools without a previous expert certification, <strong>an</strong>d only th<strong>an</strong>ks<br />
to M<strong>in</strong>ister's approval.<br />
In l<strong>in</strong>e with the populism-m<strong>in</strong>ded policy of the <strong>in</strong>cumbent Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister, Vojislav Kostunica, <strong>in</strong>stead of a high quality re<strong>for</strong>m, the Education<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>nounced plac<strong>in</strong>g of basketball facilities <strong>in</strong> all schools, presence of<br />
parents at the entry exams fro secondary schools, purchase of new computers,<br />
a 30% reduction of m<strong>an</strong>datory programs <strong>in</strong> primary schools, <strong>in</strong> order to make<br />
"the children more joyous."<br />
On such a "joyous" note the Serb Education M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong><br />
early 2005 the start-up of a public debate on the Natonal Strategy of Education <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia from 2005 to 2010 god<strong>in</strong>e, with a pr<strong>in</strong>cipal slog<strong>an</strong>: "Swifter <strong>in</strong>tegration of<br />
education <strong>in</strong>to a contemporary Europe<strong>an</strong> educational space". But even a<br />
cursory gl<strong>an</strong>ce at the document may lead us to conclude that re<strong>for</strong>ms are a<br />
non-starter, <strong>an</strong>d that the said Strategy is only a list of nice wishes. Instead of<br />
focus<strong>in</strong>g on pupils, as it was done by the 2001 national educational strategy<br />
devised by Dj<strong>in</strong>djić-led government, the new strategy focuses on-teachers. The<br />
new national document envisages re-vamp<strong>in</strong>g of schools, equipp<strong>in</strong>g of gyms,<br />
computer network<strong>in</strong>g of schools, plac<strong>in</strong>g of policemen <strong>in</strong> front of every school,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d also <strong>an</strong>nounces cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g expert capacitation <strong>an</strong>d tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of teachers,<br />
promises adoption of more modern teach<strong>in</strong>g sullabyses <strong>an</strong>d texbooks, backs<br />
bi-l<strong>in</strong>gual classes (under our school programs part of classes must be held <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong>eign l<strong>an</strong>guage), <strong>in</strong>troduction of new educational profiles <strong>in</strong> secondary<br />
vocational schools, etc. 5<br />
Committments, like the Sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>for</strong> Education of Professors, <strong>for</strong> which<br />
Council of Europe earmarked donations dur<strong>in</strong>g the Dj<strong>in</strong>jdic-lead government,<br />
are hardly met. In fact they rather resemble rallies then expert tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The job<br />
is completed by rally<strong>in</strong>g of several thous<strong>an</strong>d of educational professionals <strong>in</strong><br />
Sava Centre to listen to lectures <strong>an</strong>d then return to their homeplaces. And that<br />
is all. Teachers of Serbia by d<strong>in</strong>t of their Association proposed <strong>in</strong> mid-2005 as<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y as 11 serious topics <strong>for</strong> expert tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, notably professionalism <strong>in</strong> the<br />
teachers' work, <strong>in</strong>itial read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d writ<strong>in</strong>g, pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of optional subjectmatters,<br />
work with children with special problems, work <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d<br />
undivided classes. M<strong>in</strong>ister Čolić's b<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of accredited sem<strong>in</strong>ars, deprived<br />
educational professionals of a possibility <strong>for</strong> further education. And mass<br />
rallies <strong>in</strong> Sava Center c<strong>an</strong>not surely replace that k<strong>in</strong>d of education.<br />
3 Glas, 26 October 2005.<br />
4 D<strong>an</strong>as, 13 April 2005<br />
5 D<strong>an</strong>as, 31 March 2005.<br />
302<br />
303
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Sem<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign l<strong>an</strong>guages professors have barely survived the<br />
suspension of the re<strong>for</strong>m process, first by the repeal of the pert<strong>in</strong>ent law, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
then by subsequent, personnel ch<strong>an</strong>ges. The only ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> that regard was the<br />
British Council's take-over of tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the English l<strong>an</strong>guage professors.<br />
Aside from technically org<strong>an</strong>iz<strong>in</strong>g groups of attendees, the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports has no <strong>in</strong>sight whatsoever <strong>in</strong>to the BC-run tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
programs <strong>an</strong>d results. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d the British Council is not duty-bound<br />
to submit to the Serb Education M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>an</strong>y sem<strong>in</strong>ar-related reports.<br />
It became m<strong>an</strong>ifest <strong>in</strong> 2005 that teachers of religion, that is graduates<br />
from Theological Faculty, who four years ago had officially become part of<br />
educational system (the religious education alongside the civil education is <strong>an</strong><br />
optional subject-matter <strong>in</strong> primary <strong>an</strong>d secondary schools), were totally<br />
ignor<strong>an</strong>t of basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of pedagogy <strong>an</strong>d methodology. The pert<strong>in</strong>ent<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istry then prepared education programs <strong>for</strong> 2,000 religious education<br />
teachers. As <strong>an</strong> active particip<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> destruction of educational system re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
<strong>an</strong>d advocate of national education the Serb Orthodox Church cont<strong>in</strong>ued its<br />
aggressive impact on the Serb educational system. Backed by educational<br />
cadres, Kostuncica loyalists, <strong>in</strong> that regard SOC has been given a free h<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
The round table org<strong>an</strong>ized by the Textbook Institute, <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution which has<br />
rega<strong>in</strong>ed primacy <strong>in</strong> textbok-publish<strong>in</strong>g (all other publishers, Kreativni centar,<br />
Narodna knjiga... have been long sidel<strong>in</strong>ed) tackled the issue of religious<br />
education pl<strong>an</strong>s, syllabuses <strong>an</strong>d textbooks. 6 At that round-table the SOC <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>state</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>tly <strong>an</strong>d unreservedly backed the regilious education classes. M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Vuks<strong>an</strong>ović went as far as to assert that "Serbia is ahead of Europe <strong>in</strong> the field<br />
of religious education", "children respond wonderfully to religious education"<br />
"which should be open <strong>an</strong>d light <strong>an</strong>d not confronted to the civil education".<br />
Member of the SOC hard-l<strong>in</strong>e faction, Bishop Ir<strong>in</strong>ej Bulović reiterated the thesis<br />
of a great need <strong>for</strong> a larger presence of the church <strong>an</strong>d religious communities<br />
<strong>in</strong> design<strong>in</strong>g the religious education classes, <strong>for</strong> their authenticity may solely<br />
be guar<strong>an</strong>teed by the top church bra<strong>in</strong>s". His st<strong>an</strong>d was backed by Mevlud<strong>in</strong><br />
Duduć from the Islamic Community of S<strong>an</strong>džak, 7 who took to task the narrowm<strong>in</strong>ded<br />
character of education "which imparts knowledge/<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>ms without<br />
educat<strong>in</strong>g, while religious education deals both with education <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation".<br />
Pedagogical faculties have also <strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong>troduction of religious<br />
education classes, as <strong>an</strong> optional subject-matter <strong>for</strong> future teachers of <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guages, ecology, civil education. Be<strong>for</strong>e lay<strong>in</strong>g the groundwork <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>troduction of religious education <strong>in</strong>to its curricula, the faculty leadership<br />
obta<strong>in</strong>ed the SOC Synod consent <strong>for</strong> that measure.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Barr<strong>in</strong>g the attemtp to modernized the system of expert education <strong>in</strong><br />
secondary schools-<strong>for</strong> which the Serb Education M<strong>in</strong>istry proposed a draft<br />
strategy full of nice words "education should be attractive <strong>an</strong>d accessible to all,<br />
it should meet the labour market dem<strong>an</strong>ds, lay the groundwork <strong>for</strong> a life-long<br />
learn<strong>in</strong>g rocess, be flexible..." <strong>an</strong>d devoid of <strong>an</strong>y implementation pl<strong>an</strong>s, the<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m process <strong>in</strong> the secondary school education, notably, lycees, is not<br />
mentioned at all. Salient problems of educational system shall disappear only<br />
when pupils of outdated secondary school face a totally new system of<br />
study<strong>in</strong>g at the Serb universities.<br />
School<strong>in</strong>g system is <strong>in</strong> a total disarray: new programs, old textbooks,<br />
b<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d then re-<strong>in</strong>troduction of subject-matters, uneducated<br />
"professionals", are only some of the features of the system under which the<br />
younger generations are educated <strong>in</strong> the 21st century <strong>in</strong> Serbia. To realize the<br />
extent of mental torture to which the children <strong>in</strong> the present-day Serbia are<br />
exposed, it suffices to look <strong>in</strong>to the latest Collection of the Serb L<strong>an</strong>guage Tests<br />
<strong>for</strong> the Secondary School Entry Exam (2006), published by the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry of<br />
Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports.<br />
In their <strong>an</strong>alysis of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned Collection, Dr Savica Tome<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Dr Željko Djurić, professors of Itali<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Germ<strong>an</strong> Literature respectively,<br />
draw their attention to the fact that <strong>in</strong> tests <strong>for</strong> the entry exams archaic<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage was used profusely. They underscored that preference was given to<br />
rural l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d term<strong>in</strong>ology, <strong>in</strong>stead to the urb<strong>an</strong> one. In m<strong>an</strong>y tests<br />
patriarchal life-style was extolled. The two <strong>an</strong>alysts also warned that authors<br />
of the Collection not only disregarded achievements of em<strong>an</strong>cipation of sexes,<br />
but openly <strong>in</strong>sulted other peoples, <strong>for</strong> example, Rom<strong>an</strong>y. The Collection of full<br />
of examples of "oaths to death", <strong>an</strong>d "of brave hearts ready <strong>for</strong> a battle." 8 The<br />
concept of the Collection is such that pupils are <strong>in</strong>duced only to memoriz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
everyth<strong>in</strong>g or learn<strong>in</strong>g by heart <strong>in</strong>stead of engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> active th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g process.<br />
The a<strong>for</strong>ementioned <strong>an</strong>alysts stressed that <strong>in</strong> some tests from the<br />
Collection of Serb L<strong>an</strong>guage tests, notably "Letters from Italy" <strong>an</strong>d Njegoš's<br />
objections to the then Europe, examples from history of literature acquired the<br />
character of fakes, <strong>for</strong> they were ideologically misused to allude to the<br />
contemporary political <strong>an</strong>d ideological situation <strong>in</strong> our country. Thus pupils<br />
are compelled to store a multitude of "patriotic", or rather ideologically bl<strong>in</strong>ded<br />
replies <strong>in</strong> the part of memory, which is often called a short-term one." 9<br />
Most symptomatic example of negligence of educational authorities<br />
are textbooks. Judg<strong>in</strong>g by history textbooks, the competent bodies endeavour to<br />
hide from the children the fact that the new century has been ushered <strong>in</strong>, that<br />
Milosevic regime belongs to the past, <strong>an</strong>d that Serbia, <strong>in</strong> one way or <strong>an</strong>other,<br />
has embarked upon a new road. Contemporary history textbook <strong>for</strong> the second<br />
6 Večernje novosti, 16 March 2005.<br />
7 D<strong>an</strong>as, 16 March 2005<br />
8 Vreme, 19 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
9 Idem<br />
304<br />
305
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
grade of vocational, secondary schools, which first appeared 14 years ago, was<br />
re-issued by the Texbook Institute <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>an</strong>d approved <strong>for</strong> use by the Serb<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports. For authors <strong>an</strong>d publishers of that textbook<br />
history stopped on 5 October 2000. Thus, pupils are imparted the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
"truths": "we still live <strong>in</strong> the FRY", "Yugoslavia was broken by a vicious policy<br />
of the US <strong>an</strong>d Germ<strong>an</strong>y whose politici<strong>an</strong>s decided to make several new <strong>state</strong>s<br />
from our country." 10<br />
The a<strong>for</strong>ementioned textbook dates back to the post-SFRY<br />
dis<strong>in</strong>tegration period, when history <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> newly-emerged <strong>state</strong>s<br />
took on <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t role of educator <strong>in</strong> extoll<strong>in</strong>g the magnitude of respective<br />
nations. "Rais<strong>in</strong>g awareness of the people" through strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
nationalism <strong>an</strong>d chauv<strong>in</strong>ism was necessary <strong>for</strong> mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g the nation <strong>for</strong><br />
Milosevic's lethal policy. Re-issue of that textbook only demonstrates that<br />
retrograde <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Serbia are still strong <strong>an</strong>d bent on keep<strong>in</strong>g up momentum<br />
<strong>in</strong> their <strong>an</strong>ti-Western <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> education of pupils <strong>in</strong> Serb schools.<br />
Later-day re<strong>for</strong>mers obviously did not have the time to modernize textbooks.<br />
Em<strong>in</strong>a St<strong>an</strong>ković, a histori<strong>an</strong>, sys that "<strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s textbooks still serve <strong>for</strong><br />
the national settl<strong>in</strong>g of old scores. In Europe such books offer historical soruces<br />
<strong>an</strong>d questions which <strong>in</strong>duce you to draw your own conclusions. Such a way of<br />
presentation excludes the possibility of a whole class draw<strong>in</strong>g a collective<br />
conclusion <strong>an</strong>d a uni<strong>for</strong>m op<strong>in</strong>ion be<strong>in</strong>g imposed to a nation". 11<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Association of Teachers "Euroklio" suggested to teachers <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia, Federation of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, Republika Srpska <strong>an</strong>d Croatia<br />
to write historical textbooks which would present the contemporary history <strong>in</strong><br />
a different way. With justification that time was not ripe <strong>for</strong> such a move, they<br />
all refused to deal with the post-1990 history <strong>an</strong>d decided to "research<br />
everyday life of the SFRY from 1945 to 1990." The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal donor, the D<strong>an</strong>ish<br />
Foreign M<strong>in</strong>istry, gave them three years to collect the material <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>e-tune<br />
their st<strong>an</strong>ds.<br />
Another <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>for</strong> the ch<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>an</strong>d perception of<br />
history <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s, this time around by the Greek Centre <strong>for</strong> Democratization<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation <strong>in</strong> South-East Europe, bore fruit. Namely the first of four books<br />
(60 authors from 11 countries – from Slovenia to Cyprus) under the jo<strong>in</strong>t title<br />
"Classes of Modern History of South East Europe" was promoted <strong>in</strong> Belgrade<br />
on 1 December 2005. Books were <strong>in</strong>tended to history teachers as a<br />
supplementary material <strong>for</strong> classes. Along with the assessment that education<br />
plays a mjor role <strong>in</strong> the process of reconciliation <strong>an</strong>d strenghthen<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the region, each book dealt with one of four historical periods<br />
which are common <strong>for</strong> all regional historical curricula: the Ottom<strong>an</strong> empire,<br />
Emergence of States <strong>an</strong>d Nations, the Balk<strong>an</strong>s Wars, <strong>an</strong>d WW2. Events were<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
presented through historical documents of all the countries. Editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief,<br />
Krist<strong>in</strong>a Kuluri, <strong>state</strong>d that "textbooks are a k<strong>in</strong>d of response to those who see<br />
our region as a synonim <strong>for</strong> brutality, violence <strong>an</strong>d bloodshed.". 12<br />
For <strong>in</strong>terested teachers <strong>in</strong> Serbia sem<strong>in</strong>ars <strong>in</strong>tended to teach them how<br />
to easily use the books are <strong>in</strong> the off<strong>in</strong>g. The project was backed by the Serb<br />
Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports M<strong>in</strong>istry. Publishers of the Serb edition are are Prosvetni<br />
pregled <strong>an</strong>d Centre <strong>for</strong> Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Reconciliation <strong>in</strong> South East Europe.<br />
The book was tr<strong>an</strong>slated <strong>in</strong>to English <strong>an</strong>d Serb. The follow<strong>in</strong>g question<br />
obviously must be raised: what will happen when <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation from that<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ual clashes with "educational" history textbooks pr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> early 90's, but<br />
which still serve as the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal sources of knowledge <strong>in</strong> our schools.<br />
Bosniak L<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak Schools:<br />
An Optional Course<br />
Decision of Education M<strong>in</strong>ister, S.Vuks<strong>an</strong>ović, to <strong>in</strong>troduce Bosniak<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage with elements of national culture <strong>in</strong>to curricula of the first <strong>an</strong>d<br />
second grade of primary schools <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak was sharply contested by<br />
members of the Educational <strong>Committee</strong> of Serb Parliament, from the r<strong>an</strong>ks of the<br />
Serb Radical Party <strong>an</strong>d the Socialist Party of Serbia. They even dem<strong>an</strong>ded him<br />
to do away with that decision, <strong>for</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to them "such matters should be<br />
regulated by the law."<br />
In the International Crisis Group last report, <strong>in</strong> the chapter titled<br />
"L<strong>in</strong>gustic Apartheid" <strong>in</strong>troduction of Bosniak l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>in</strong>to the S<strong>an</strong>dzak<br />
school curricula was assessed as the most d<strong>an</strong>gerous political move after<br />
Milosevic's S<strong>an</strong>dzak policy. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the ICG "that move nearly destroyed<br />
four-year long impromement of national relations." Namely that org<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
fears that <strong>in</strong>troduction of Bosniak l<strong>an</strong>guage could lead to division of pupils on<br />
national grounds. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g could furthermore result <strong>in</strong> polarization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
self-imposed, ethnic apartheid if Serbs cont<strong>in</strong>ued to attend one k<strong>in</strong>d of classes,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Bosniaks the other". The ICG accused the Bosniak National Council of<br />
S<strong>an</strong>dzak of <strong>for</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the government's h<strong>an</strong>d to make that move, that is, "of<br />
underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g peaceful co-existence by its <strong>in</strong>sistence on <strong>in</strong>troduction of<br />
textbooks written <strong>in</strong> dialects spoken by no-one <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>dzak.". 13<br />
Insistence on Bosniak l<strong>an</strong>guage as the second, official l<strong>an</strong>guage has<br />
been long-runn<strong>in</strong>g. The BNCS as early as dur<strong>in</strong>g the 2002 census asked<br />
Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak to declare that their mother tongue was Bosni<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d not<br />
Bosniak. S<strong>in</strong>ce then three S<strong>an</strong>džak municipalities have <strong>in</strong>troduced Bosniak as<br />
<strong>an</strong> official l<strong>an</strong>guages alongside Serbi<strong>an</strong>.<br />
10 Glas javnostii, 22 May 2005.<br />
11 Glas javnosti, 22 May 2005.<br />
12 D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 December 2005.<br />
13 Večernje novosti, 17 May 2005.<br />
306<br />
307
Teachers <strong>an</strong>d Students:<br />
Strikes <strong>an</strong>d Violence <strong>in</strong> Schools<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Prime movers of educational system-teachers <strong>an</strong>d pupils alike-feel<br />
disgrunteled. Teachers m<strong>an</strong>ifest their discontent by sporadic strikes (mostly on<br />
ground of low pays), <strong>an</strong>d pupils by aggression <strong>an</strong>d violence.<br />
This school-year -1 September 2005-also beg<strong>an</strong> by a pay rise-related<br />
strike by 80,000 educational workers <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Instead of a dialogue, the<br />
authorities, like <strong>in</strong> the past, responded by threats related to possible lay offs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d blackmails. This time around educational professionals also rema<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
empty-h<strong>an</strong>ded. They went back to their teach<strong>in</strong>g posts, where they are the<br />
safest, <strong>for</strong> the authorities are not <strong>in</strong> the least <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> how they educate<br />
children. The most import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>in</strong>g is that they don't rock the boat.<br />
Schools <strong>in</strong> Serbia employ a total of 101,676 educational <strong>an</strong>d noneducational<br />
staff. Some comparisons with Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>in</strong>dicate that<br />
our teachers have smaller number of classes th<strong>an</strong> those <strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> countries,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> Serbia 1 teacher covers 10 pupil, whereas <strong>in</strong> EU that ratio is 1:18.<br />
In <strong>an</strong> aggressive, frustrated <strong>an</strong>d poor society, children are conflictprone,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that may result <strong>in</strong> dire consequences. Only <strong>in</strong> the first 3 months of<br />
2005 the bal<strong>an</strong>ce of aggression <strong>an</strong>d violence of school-age children was the<br />
death of three youths <strong>an</strong>d of one 11-year boy. The first boy was beaten to death<br />
<strong>in</strong> a Belgrade secondary school, dur<strong>in</strong>g a break. The second one was killed by<br />
his peers just because he wore the shawl of a rival football club. The third one<br />
was thrown out of tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Batajnica. The fourth victim, <strong>an</strong> 11-year boy, was<br />
thrown off the Sava bridge by a group of older boys.<br />
Aggressiveness of our pupils was felt also by our neighbours,<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. Namely a group of Belgrade secondary school pupils dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
October excursion to Budapest, had a fight with the <strong>security</strong> team of a disco.<br />
Some of those boys were deta<strong>in</strong>ed by the Hungari<strong>an</strong> police.<br />
All expert research <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> violence among the young<br />
<strong>in</strong> the last 15 years, but to date no serious measures have been taken to curb<br />
that violence. Children are permeated with the ideas <strong>an</strong>d mood offered by<br />
their milieu: highly politicized society, war crim<strong>in</strong>als glorified as national<br />
heroes, rich parvenus of shady past, <strong>an</strong>d folk s<strong>in</strong>gers. Underestimated <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sidel<strong>in</strong>ed school offers them disgruntled, nervous <strong>an</strong>d underappreciated<br />
professors, which pupils c<strong>an</strong> see only on TV, once the big school sc<strong>an</strong>dals<br />
erupt.<br />
Step-by-step pupils aggression prevention program funded by the<br />
F<strong>in</strong>nish government was adopted only by Pedagogical Faculty <strong>in</strong> Jagod<strong>in</strong>a. 14<br />
That <strong>an</strong>d similar programs are yet to be approved by the Serb Education<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry. It bears mention<strong>in</strong>g that children usually get mad dur<strong>in</strong>g classes.<br />
Then the quarrel ensues. And that quarrel usually ends up with a fight <strong>in</strong> the<br />
school-yard or corridor. Pupils' <strong>an</strong>ger is usually provoked by furious or drunk<br />
teachers, listen<strong>in</strong>g to lectures which they don't underst<strong>an</strong>d, noncommunication<br />
of their marks, disrespect of pupils'op<strong>in</strong>ions or lower marks<br />
th<strong>an</strong> deserved. 15<br />
Education M<strong>in</strong>istry responded to those brutal <strong>in</strong>cidents by a host of<br />
repressive proposals: m<strong>an</strong>datory pupils' stay-at-home -after –midnight<br />
measure <strong>an</strong>d b<strong>an</strong> on sale of alchocolic beverages <strong>in</strong> the vic<strong>in</strong>ity of schools.<br />
After the murder of a Belgrade secondary school pupil, the M<strong>in</strong>ister called on<br />
pupils to jo<strong>in</strong> him <strong>in</strong> a prayer-walk to Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava church. Defectologist<br />
Nadežda Milenković said that M<strong>in</strong>ister Vuks<strong>an</strong>ovic "seriously <strong>in</strong>vited pupils<br />
<strong>an</strong>d their parents <strong>an</strong>d professors to protest aga<strong>in</strong>st violence, <strong>an</strong>d not to pray <strong>for</strong><br />
its non-emergence. " 16 Un<strong>for</strong>tunately the young are only emulat<strong>in</strong>g the conduct<br />
of their elders, which was shaped as such dur<strong>in</strong>g the Milosevic nationalistic<br />
populism era.<br />
University Re<strong>for</strong>m: Fear of Loss of Privileges<br />
Two <strong>an</strong>d a half years on from Serbia's accession to the Bologna Process<br />
(September 2003) under which by the year 2010 the EU high-school system<br />
should establish a uni<strong>for</strong>m educational system at the Belgrade University,<br />
those <strong>in</strong> charge of education are still shilly-shally<strong>in</strong>g: high-quality mode of<br />
study<strong>in</strong>g is declaratively backed, <strong>an</strong>d essentially denied.<br />
Act on High-Schools which <strong>for</strong>mally enables faculties to re<strong>for</strong>m, was<br />
belatedly adopted <strong>in</strong> September 2005. That document should have been<br />
discussed by the Serb Parliament MPs <strong>in</strong> February or <strong>in</strong> early March, but the<br />
Serb government failed to propose it <strong>for</strong> discussion to parliament. At the<br />
regular spr<strong>in</strong>g parliamentary session MPs were more <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
60-year old dilemma of Chetnics or Partis<strong>an</strong>s, then <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with the future of<br />
our universities. On the eve of the major education m<strong>in</strong>isters summit <strong>in</strong><br />
Bergen, on 15 May, at which M<strong>in</strong>ister Vuks<strong>an</strong>ovic was to submit the official<br />
report on Serbia's per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> education field <strong>in</strong> the past 2 years, the Serb<br />
Parliament discused the Bill on Government.<br />
Act on High-School Education was a pre-condition <strong>for</strong> further re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
moves. In l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>in</strong>ternational obligations, <strong>in</strong> 2003-2005 period Serbia had to<br />
adopt that law, <strong>in</strong>troduce a two-tier system of studies, adopt national<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>for</strong> quality control <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>e-tune them to Europe<strong>an</strong> ones, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2005.<br />
14 Author Br<strong>an</strong>ka Savović, Institute <strong>for</strong> Pedagogical Research, NIN, 31 March<br />
15 NIN, 31 March 2005.<br />
16 NIN, 31 March 2005.<br />
308<br />
309
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
establish a procedure <strong>for</strong> adoption of qualifications <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the Lisbon<br />
Convention. 17<br />
Education M<strong>in</strong>ister went to Bergen without <strong>an</strong>y of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned<br />
committments fulfilled, but he came back <strong>in</strong> a gloat<strong>in</strong>g mood. Allegedly, "our<br />
school<strong>in</strong>g system <strong>in</strong> Bergen was well-received <strong>an</strong>d praised", "Serbia occupies a<br />
high place <strong>in</strong> the Europe<strong>an</strong> academic family" <strong>an</strong>d "no-one raised the issue of<br />
our belated adoption of the High-School Act." Then the Serb Education<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry posted the follow<strong>in</strong>g, Bergen-related message on its web site: "the<br />
Bergen meet<strong>in</strong>g also dealt with the contents of the Act on Students'<br />
Org<strong>an</strong>ization". And though no-one knows the date of adoption of that act by<br />
the Serb Parliament, the Serb Education M<strong>in</strong>ister nonetheless assessed that<br />
"when that act is promulgated, Serbia shall be <strong>in</strong> the v<strong>an</strong>guard of Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
countries <strong>an</strong>d the Act shall be a unique one <strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> territory."<br />
Dr Srbij<strong>an</strong>ka Turajlić, UNESCO, Head of M<strong>an</strong>agement Department of<br />
AAOM, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the M<strong>in</strong>ister's words of praise were not wellgrounded,<br />
"<strong>for</strong> Serbia shall have to pass <strong>an</strong> additional exam <strong>in</strong> 2007, at the new<br />
conference of Europe<strong>an</strong> Educational M<strong>in</strong>isters." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Bergen<br />
communique, Serbia shall pass satisfactorily that additional exam, if that<br />
country, by 2007, en<strong>for</strong>ces the newly-adopted Act on High Schools, constitutes<br />
the national council <strong>an</strong>d commissions <strong>for</strong> accreditation <strong>an</strong>d check<strong>in</strong>g of quality<br />
of studies <strong>an</strong>d faculties. Added to that the Bergen Meet<strong>in</strong>g report related to<br />
fulfillment of obligations (criteria: quality of studies, length of studies <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
scope of recognition of diplomas), <strong>in</strong>dicated that "of 43 countries, Serbia with<br />
<strong>an</strong> average mark of 2.2 occupies the 41st place, beh<strong>in</strong>d Serbia are only Bosnia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Andorra. All other countries from the region, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Montenegro recived higher, above 3, mark". 18<br />
Opponents of Bologna re<strong>for</strong>ms at the university <strong>an</strong>d also <strong>in</strong> broader<br />
society (conservative advocates of traditional school, who th<strong>in</strong>k that Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
criteria destroy the national identity of our university,) feel relieved because a<br />
more rational <strong>an</strong>d high-quality future of high-school system is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
postponed. Of course they are totally unconcerned about the follow<strong>in</strong>g hard<br />
facts: only 11% of enrolled students graduates with<strong>in</strong> four –years time, 70% of<br />
enrolled students never get their diplomas, students have to attend classes of<br />
one subject-matter <strong>for</strong> four years prior to pass<strong>in</strong>g the pert<strong>in</strong>ent exam, students<br />
have to learn from outdated textbooks, students meet their professors only at<br />
exams, <strong>an</strong>d professors' obligations towards students are reduced to only two<br />
or four hours every week.<br />
Though be<strong>for</strong>e the adoption of the Act on High Schools, 15 of a total of<br />
31 faculties mak<strong>in</strong>g up Belgrade University seriously embarked upon the<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m path (by ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g the curricula <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g active teach<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
methods), a large number of professors <strong>an</strong>d their collaborators still don't know<br />
what should be done <strong>an</strong>d ch<strong>an</strong>ged at the university. Some espouse the thesis<br />
that we should let Europe do that, <strong>an</strong>d then emulate its work, <strong>an</strong>d some even<br />
don't care if they impart to students the obsolete facts taken from old<br />
textbooks. Of special concern is the fact that professors <strong>an</strong>d their collaborators<br />
place the need <strong>for</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges at the university <strong>in</strong> the context of "the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
conspiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs" aimed at "abolish<strong>in</strong>g our tradition <strong>an</strong>d values." Those<br />
<strong>in</strong> the know ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that the division <strong>in</strong>to the pro <strong>an</strong>d aga<strong>in</strong>st re<strong>for</strong>ms camps<br />
is not of a generational character, but rather a result of fear of ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
wish to reta<strong>in</strong> positions. A decade-long isolation of the country, sidel<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
universities, bra<strong>in</strong>-dra<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d poverty play also their part <strong>in</strong> the <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ces. 19<br />
On two grounds the weakest l<strong>in</strong>k of the re<strong>for</strong>m is the very Serb<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports. Firstly, that m<strong>in</strong>istry is devoid of awareness<br />
that high-education is the focal po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>for</strong> enh<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the quality of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
resources <strong>an</strong>d pull<strong>in</strong>g the country out of crisis. Dr. Slobod<strong>an</strong> Cvejić, de<strong>an</strong> of the<br />
Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy, cautions that the key officials of that m<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
tend to harbour <strong>an</strong>d spread illusions that "We are very clever people, just<br />
because 5,10, or 100 Serbs teach at prom<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong>ternational unviersities. At<br />
each, more prom<strong>in</strong>ent, US university you may f<strong>in</strong>d three men from Serbia, or<br />
three from Gu<strong>in</strong>ea Bisao". 20 Secondly: Education M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>state</strong> of<br />
re<strong>for</strong>ms did not render a genu<strong>in</strong>e support to faculties. It is not even able to stop<br />
unlawful open<strong>in</strong>g of private faculties, let alone assist <strong>state</strong> faculties <strong>in</strong><br />
elementary matters, such as, provision of decent premises <strong>an</strong>d of decent pays<br />
<strong>for</strong> professors <strong>an</strong>d their collaborators, whose further education is not even<br />
mentioned at the <strong>state</strong> level. University is <strong>in</strong> the spotlight only on the eve of<br />
momentous events, notably, general or other elections or outbursts of<br />
discontent or strikes which threaten to underm<strong>in</strong>e someone's position.<br />
Indiscrim<strong>in</strong>ate Open<strong>in</strong>g of New Universities<br />
Along with one fourth of illiterate or semi-literate population, Serbia<br />
has five <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d six private universities with 150,000 students or 7% of<br />
population. Bologna Documents envisage that by the end of 2010 20% of<br />
population of each Europe<strong>an</strong> country should have university education.<br />
Chaotic development of high-school education is not only a tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
phenomenon. It has always been characteristic of Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d ga<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
momentum <strong>in</strong> 2005. On the eve of adoption of the Act on High Schools, which<br />
envisages more str<strong>in</strong>gent conditions <strong>for</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g of new faculties <strong>an</strong>d<br />
universities, the Republic<strong>an</strong> Council <strong>for</strong> Development of High School<br />
17 NIN, 26 May 2005.<br />
18 NIN, 26 May 2005.<br />
19 Vreme, November 2005<br />
20 Idem<br />
310<br />
311
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Education faced as m<strong>an</strong>y as 25 applications <strong>for</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g of new faculties. In<br />
June that body greenlighted open<strong>in</strong>g of 10 new faculties, but at its September<br />
session representatives of the <strong>state</strong> universities opposed further moves of the<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d. Though private faculties are still devoid of official operat<strong>in</strong>g licences, a<br />
large number of new students enrolled at them. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d no-one<br />
knows the exact number of departments opened by <strong>state</strong> faculties Serbia-wide.<br />
No-one knows <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g about their work conditions, the number of full-time<br />
professors, <strong>an</strong>d their diploma-acquir<strong>in</strong>g procedure.<br />
The most drastic example of a reign<strong>in</strong>g chaos <strong>in</strong> the high-school<br />
system is open<strong>in</strong>g of a bevy of law faculties. The Belgrade Law faculty warns<br />
that <strong>in</strong> Serbia there are over 100 <strong>state</strong>- <strong>an</strong>d privately-run law faculties <strong>an</strong>d their<br />
departments. Furthermore their work is not controlled <strong>an</strong>d classes thereof are a<br />
throwback to night schools <strong>an</strong>d mass literacy schools <strong>in</strong> the immediate post-<br />
WW2 period. In the past three years the oldest law faculty <strong>in</strong> the country, the<br />
Belgrade Law Faculty (was founded 160 years ago), "lost" about 2,000 students<br />
which <strong>in</strong> pursuit of <strong>an</strong> easier diploma enrolled at the newly-opened private<br />
faculties <strong>an</strong>d their departments.<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g "mut<strong>in</strong>y" of representatives of the <strong>state</strong>-run universities <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Council <strong>for</strong> Development of High-School Education, who righfully tried to foil<br />
r<strong>an</strong>dom found<strong>in</strong>g of private faculties, the problem of shortage of university<br />
professional able to cover classes on so m<strong>an</strong>y faculties was barely mentioned.<br />
Large part of prom<strong>in</strong>ent professors of <strong>state</strong> universities have found a f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
refuge <strong>in</strong> so-much contested, private universities. 146 professors from m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
Serb medical faculties, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 44 from the Belgrade faculty of Medic<strong>in</strong>e<br />
applied <strong>for</strong> jobs <strong>in</strong> the newly-<strong>for</strong>med Medical Academy, to hold its classes <strong>in</strong><br />
the Sports Centre "25 Maj" premises. 21<br />
Representatives of private law faculties th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>state</strong> faculties w<strong>an</strong>t<br />
to hold on to their monopoly <strong>in</strong> faculty education, that they fear competition,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d bra<strong>in</strong>-dra<strong>in</strong> of professors. Essentially both k<strong>in</strong>ds of faculties are more<br />
<strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> their own <strong>in</strong>terests th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> students or <strong>in</strong> the facts that only one<br />
third of enrolled students f<strong>in</strong>ishes their studies <strong>an</strong>d that Serbia r<strong>an</strong>ks the first<br />
<strong>in</strong> the category of duration of studies <strong>in</strong> Europe.<br />
What has emerged so far is the fact that mostly poor pupils of well-off<br />
parents tend to seek refuge <strong>in</strong> private faculties, recognized or unrecognized by<br />
Education M<strong>in</strong>istry. Hefty fees or even kickbacks are guar<strong>an</strong>tees that such<br />
pupils shalls get their diplomas. The only ch<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> putt<strong>in</strong>g some order <strong>in</strong> the<br />
uncontrolled spread<strong>in</strong>g of network of high schools are the new provisions of<br />
the Act on High-School Education. Namely those provisions spell out that both<br />
old <strong>an</strong>d new faculties shall not be able to operate without licences, to be<br />
acquired only by a thorough test<strong>in</strong>g of employment <strong>an</strong>d equipp<strong>in</strong>g policy. As<br />
regards the re<strong>for</strong>m, faculties were given a deadl<strong>in</strong>e of the next three years to<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
f<strong>in</strong>e-tune their studies to the Europe<strong>an</strong> ones, to which, Serbia, declaratively<br />
strives. What lies ahead of Serbia, along with the <strong>an</strong>nnounced rationalizaiton<br />
of educational system, is a genu<strong>in</strong>e re<strong>for</strong>m of the high-school system.<br />
Universities Steeped <strong>in</strong> Corruption<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Students' Union of Serbia research on corruption <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>state</strong> universities, published on 18 May 2005, "students <strong>an</strong>d professors are<br />
equally corrupt." The top of the corruption list is occupied by medical faculties.<br />
Of a total number of respondents-students, 72% were of op<strong>in</strong>ion that<br />
corruption was mostly felt dur<strong>in</strong>g entry exams <strong>an</strong>d regular exams. Over 95% of<br />
respondents <strong>state</strong>d that they had a close encounter with corruption. However,<br />
what concerns most is the fact that as m<strong>an</strong>y as 57% of respondents <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
they would never report corruption.<br />
Law Faculty <strong>in</strong> Belgrade: What Are Law Students<br />
Be<strong>in</strong>g Taught <strong>an</strong>d "The Truth about Srebrenica"<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the 1998 <strong>for</strong>ced departure of a group of Belgrade Law Faculty<br />
professors opponents of Milosevic regime, from that prom<strong>in</strong>ent high school,<br />
that <strong>in</strong>stitution has not recovered. It is still a stronghold of hard-l<strong>in</strong>e Milosevic<br />
backers, spearheaded by the De<strong>an</strong>, professor Oliver Antic. He even ventured to<br />
employ Vojislav Šešelj <strong>in</strong> the capacity of professor, after the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned<br />
group of professors had left the faculty. Some Belgrade Law faculty professors<br />
are members of the Council of University Professors of the Serb Radical Party<br />
<strong>an</strong>d are the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal advocates of the <strong>an</strong>ti-Hague lobby.<br />
Vladimir Milov<strong>an</strong>ović, graduate of the Belgrade Law Faculty, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
text titled "I am the student of Belgrade University" 22 warned the general<br />
public that "at the Law Faculty social phenomena are viewed from the <strong>an</strong>gle of<br />
a scientific discipl<strong>in</strong>e characterized by a high degree of dogmatism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectual narrow-m<strong>in</strong>dedness. Study<strong>in</strong>g at that faculty may be best described<br />
as a voluntary <strong>in</strong>doctr<strong>in</strong>ation.". He rem<strong>in</strong>ded the general public that "students<br />
have to prepare the <strong>in</strong>ternational law exam on the basis of textbook written by<br />
professor Smilja Avramov, the first defence witness of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milosevic <strong>in</strong><br />
the Hague Tribunal." Milov<strong>an</strong>ovic then added: "Of a total of 576 foot-notes <strong>in</strong><br />
that textbook 134 are related to books written more th<strong>an</strong> 50 years ago. S<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
professor Voj<strong>in</strong> Dimitrijević was removed from the faculty, textbooks relat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to subject-matters of International Relations <strong>an</strong>d International Org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
have not been published. There<strong>for</strong>e students have to study <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
21 Vreme, 3 November 2005.<br />
22 D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 May 2005.<br />
312<br />
313
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
relations from the Cold War era. At the pert<strong>in</strong>ent exam we are questioned by<br />
professor Br<strong>an</strong>ko Rakić, legal aide of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević."<br />
Milov<strong>an</strong>ović furthermore ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "students have not been<br />
told that the <strong>in</strong>ternational law is familiar with <strong>in</strong>ternational crim<strong>in</strong>al offences<br />
covered by multilateral treaties, <strong>an</strong>d that future jurists are stripped of<br />
possibility to learn someth<strong>in</strong>g about positions of those writers whose value<br />
judgements <strong>an</strong>d ideological le<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>gs are contrary to those espoused by the the<br />
authors of current textbooks. An additional problem is educational sustem<br />
based on dogmatic rules <strong>an</strong>d absence of critical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g." He cautioned that<br />
"xenophobia <strong>an</strong>d national frustrations <strong>in</strong> Serbia are enlist<strong>in</strong>g new followers<br />
among the Law Faculty students.". Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Milov<strong>an</strong>ovic: "the<br />
consequence thereof is the <strong>an</strong>ti-Hague lobby <strong>an</strong>d the fact that w<strong>in</strong>ners of<br />
competitions <strong>in</strong> oratorical skills are those particip<strong>an</strong>ts whose oratorical<br />
speeches sum up the totality of national furstrations <strong>an</strong>d phobias". 23<br />
Barr<strong>in</strong>g Radical Party rallies dedicated mostly to criticism <strong>an</strong>d denial<br />
of the Hague Tribunal under the slog<strong>an</strong> "Defence of Vojislav Šešelj", the<br />
strongest outburst of racial, religious <strong>an</strong>d national <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce happened on 17<br />
May, at the Belgrade Law Faculty p<strong>an</strong>el discussion: "The Truth about<br />
Srebrenica". That p<strong>an</strong>el discussion was org<strong>an</strong>ized on the eve "of the 10th<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of liberation of Srebrenica.". Without <strong>an</strong>y opposition of the faculty<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agement, the p<strong>an</strong>el discussion was staged by Association of Students,<br />
"Nomok<strong>an</strong>on", one of the most milit<strong>an</strong>t, right-w<strong>in</strong>g NGOs, regularly registered<br />
by the Federal Justice M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>in</strong> 2002 as "association of citizens propos<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
promote classes at the Belgrade Law Faculty."<br />
The meet<strong>in</strong>g was approved by the Students' Parliament <strong>an</strong>d its De<strong>an</strong>,<br />
Dr Mirko Vasiljević who then said the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "I personally th<strong>in</strong>k that the<br />
time of b<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g p<strong>an</strong>el discussions <strong>an</strong>d punish<strong>in</strong>g words spoken at them, has<br />
passed. Everyone should assume responsibility <strong>for</strong> what he or she says."<br />
Aside from a milit<strong>an</strong>t attempt at lynch<strong>in</strong>g several NGO<br />
representatives, <strong>in</strong>sulted, booed <strong>an</strong>d threatened "to be expelled to Croatia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Turkey", all those <strong>in</strong> attend<strong>an</strong>ce cheered on "Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Ratko<br />
Mladić". 24 Because of the police <strong>in</strong>tervention students donn<strong>in</strong>g T-shirts with<br />
<strong>in</strong>scriptions "Serbia is <strong>in</strong> a hurry" or pictures of the then leader of Liberal-<br />
Democratic Fraction, Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović were ordered to leave the faculty. On<br />
the other side, <strong>in</strong> attend<strong>an</strong>ce rema<strong>in</strong>ed members of "Obraz" <strong>an</strong>d of other rightw<strong>in</strong>g<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations, the Serb Radical Party, <strong>an</strong>d even a youth donn<strong>in</strong>g a T-shirt<br />
of the disb<strong>an</strong>ded Unit <strong>for</strong> Special Operations. 25<br />
Those <strong>in</strong> attend<strong>an</strong>ce frenetically applauded the follow<strong>in</strong>g words of<br />
journalist Ljilj<strong>an</strong>a Bulatović: "In July 1995 Srebrenica was liberated, the Serb<br />
23 Idem<br />
24 D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 May 2005.<br />
25 Idem<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
people were liberated from Naser Orić <strong>an</strong>d similar b<strong>an</strong>dits. They conquered<br />
Republika Srpska - Potočare to bury the alleged victims of Ratko Madić. We<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t them to relocate their graves to their territory, <strong>for</strong> on ours they are not<br />
welcome." 26 Another particip<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the round-table, retired general Radov<strong>an</strong><br />
Rad<strong>in</strong>ović, Milošević's witness at the Hague Trial, <strong>state</strong>d that he was conv<strong>in</strong>ced<br />
that genocide did not take place <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica. But he added that crimes were<br />
committed <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica, <strong>an</strong>d that the number of casualties might have been -<br />
two, three or even- eight thous<strong>an</strong>d people. Other particip<strong>an</strong>ts also glorified the<br />
mass kill<strong>in</strong>g of Muslims as a patriotic act. All <strong>in</strong> all, particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the debate,<br />
lecturers <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izers agreed that the kill<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>nocent civili<strong>an</strong>s did not<br />
take place-<strong>an</strong>d even if it did, it was-necessary.<br />
A group of professors of the Belgrade Law Faculty thus responded to<br />
a disgraceful p<strong>an</strong>el duscussion held under the auspicies of the faculty: "Those<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> stag<strong>in</strong>g that p<strong>an</strong>el discussion should be punished." 27 They<br />
appealed to the academic community <strong>an</strong>d public at large to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> their protest<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the trend of cover<strong>in</strong>g-up committed crimes. Legal Forum called on all<br />
expert, professional <strong>an</strong>d students' org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d political parties to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
the civil <strong>in</strong>tiatiative aimed at "liberation of Law Faculty <strong>an</strong>d fir<strong>in</strong>g of De<strong>an</strong><br />
Vasiljević <strong>for</strong> breach<strong>in</strong>g the university autonomy." Its communique read: "Let<br />
us not <strong>for</strong>get that Vasiljevic is a <strong>for</strong>mer activist of the Associated Yugoslav<br />
Left" <strong>an</strong>d "it is necessary to effect the re<strong>for</strong>m of program <strong>an</strong>d personnel policy<br />
of Law Faculty." 28 YUCOM dem<strong>an</strong>ded resignation of Education M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vuks<strong>an</strong>ovic because of his post-discussion <strong>state</strong>ment: "Thoug lot of<br />
people are sick <strong>an</strong>d tired of that topic....I am full of underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> people<br />
who need more time to be rid of such memories." 29<br />
Popular Movement 5 October condemned fascization of the country <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that "the Law Faculty p<strong>an</strong>el discussion was a p<strong>an</strong>el discussion of<br />
Nazis <strong>an</strong>d Fascists." That event was also sharply condemned by the Social-<br />
Democratic Union, the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia, League of Social-Democrats of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong>d NGOs.<br />
P<strong>an</strong>el discussion on Srebrenica shed light on a deep crisis of the<br />
Belgrade University. It <strong>in</strong>dicated the malaise of Law faculty, whose professors,<br />
by their testimonies <strong>in</strong> the Hague Tribunal, defended Milosevic's policy. At<br />
home they poison the m<strong>in</strong>ds of students, future lawyers, judges <strong>an</strong>d jurists,<br />
with stories about alleged <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb conspiracies, <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>just position of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational law, embodied <strong>in</strong> the ICTY, on Serbia. Discussion on Srebrenica<br />
at the Belgrade Law faculty is yet <strong>an</strong>other proof that Serbia shall need a lot of<br />
time to own up to the crimes committed by its citizens <strong>in</strong> recent wars.<br />
26 D<strong>an</strong>as, 22 May 2005.<br />
27 D<strong>an</strong>as, 20 May 2005.<br />
28 Idem<br />
29 Idem<br />
314<br />
315
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Re<strong>for</strong>m of educational system, notably of primary <strong>an</strong>d secondary<br />
schools has been stalled, but no-one responds to that fact. Only <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
educational experts of Dj<strong>in</strong>djic-led government, those who had ambitiously<br />
launched the overhaul of educational system <strong>in</strong> 2000, keep warn<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> education are very belated. Thus, <strong>for</strong> example, <strong>for</strong>mer Education<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister, Dr. Gaša Knežević, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview to magaz<strong>in</strong>e "Education <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development" <strong>state</strong>d that the team tasked by Education M<strong>in</strong>istry to effect<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ges, "fears all that is <strong>for</strong>eign."<br />
What dom<strong>in</strong>ates is the wish to restore the mood of self-sufficiency,<br />
self-isolation, along with <strong>in</strong>accurate <strong>an</strong>d awkward def<strong>in</strong>ition of traditional<br />
values allegedly justify<strong>in</strong>g such moves. 30 All criticism was rebuffed by the<br />
<strong>in</strong>cumbent Education M<strong>in</strong>ister, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vuks<strong>an</strong>ovic, who, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview,<br />
called their authors "Bologna Declaration profiteers." 31<br />
To date there has been no official debate on <strong>an</strong>y educational issue, no<br />
official, pert<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>state</strong>ments either by the authorities or opposition, barr<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
mild-toned parliamentary discussion on the Act on High Schools. No-one<br />
seems to be concerned about the follow<strong>in</strong>g issues: schools which are educat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
experts whose diplomas are not recognized <strong>in</strong> the world, the <strong>state</strong> subsidies to<br />
non-functional <strong>an</strong>d unefficient school<strong>in</strong>g system, cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g "poison<strong>in</strong>g" of<br />
pupils' m<strong>in</strong>ds with outdated textbooks extoll<strong>in</strong>g "the virtues of heavenly<br />
people" <strong>an</strong>d highlight<strong>in</strong>g a host of "<strong>an</strong>ti-Serb conspiracies", the m<strong>an</strong>ifest<br />
ignor<strong>an</strong>ce of pupils who when polled at the last Belgrade Book Fair did not<br />
know who Ivo Andric was, let alone that he was the only Yugoslav author to<br />
receive the Nobel Award. 32<br />
It is quite clear that a more serious educational system turnaround or<br />
rather <strong>an</strong> U turn towards a modern, Europe<strong>an</strong> school<strong>in</strong>g system c<strong>an</strong>not be<br />
made with educational cadres taken under Kostunica government w<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>an</strong>d<br />
also impacted by its coalition partner, the Socialist Party of Serbia) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
exposed to <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>fluence of the SOC, which opposes the<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduction of a new set of values <strong>in</strong> our schools.<br />
The rul<strong>in</strong>g school structures don't w<strong>an</strong>t ch<strong>an</strong>ges, notably because of a<br />
possible conflict with their conservative loyalits (monopolistic centres like<br />
publishers, university professors, various quasi-expert professional<br />
associations, employees of the Serb Education M<strong>in</strong>istry) which are bastions of<br />
conservatism advocacy.<br />
Only the Serb universities have a ch<strong>an</strong>ce of mov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ward, th<strong>an</strong>ks to<br />
the Act on High Schools, under which faculties were gr<strong>an</strong>ted a higher degree<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
of autonomy. The latter poses a challenge to part of professors, re<strong>for</strong>m-backers,<br />
to try to more aggressively <strong>in</strong>troduce ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong>to the university system. But<br />
on that road they face the follow<strong>in</strong>g, not negligible hurdles: lack of funds <strong>an</strong>d<br />
poor -quality educational cadres fearsome of re<strong>for</strong>ms, that is, of the loss of their<br />
currrent privileges.<br />
30 D<strong>an</strong>as, 19 February 2005.<br />
31 Večernje novosti, 31 May 2005.<br />
32 October 2005 public op<strong>in</strong>ion poll conducted by B92. www.b92.net<br />
316<br />
317
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
V<br />
MINORITIES<br />
IN SERBIA<br />
318<br />
319
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
UNCHANGED MATRIX<br />
In the course of 2005 the Serb elite on several occasions realized the<br />
import<strong>an</strong>ce of the m<strong>in</strong>ority issue. Firstly, it happened <strong>in</strong> early 2005, dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
EU Parliament commission visit to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a aimed at collect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation<br />
on the status of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d nature of <strong>in</strong>cidents which had so strongly<br />
marked the previous year 2004. 1 Accord<strong>in</strong>g Žolt Bečei the commission's report<br />
" as <strong>an</strong> official document of Europe<strong>an</strong> parliament shall make part of the Serbia<br />
file" <strong>an</strong>d "shall be taken <strong>in</strong>to consideration dur<strong>in</strong>g deliberations on accession of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro to Europe." 2 Secondly, <strong>in</strong> its Resolution on the<br />
Protection of Multiethnicity <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament made it clear<br />
that "the respect of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d fundamental freedoms" is a precondition<br />
not only <strong>for</strong> "accept<strong>an</strong>ce of Europe<strong>an</strong> parliament to conclude the Agreement on<br />
Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro," but also "<strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y<br />
future partnership with EU <strong>in</strong> general." And f<strong>in</strong>ally, Olli Ren, EU<br />
Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Association, draw attention to the import<strong>an</strong>ce of the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority issue <strong>in</strong> the first half of October. In his address to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a MPs he<br />
underscored that the respect of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d protection of national m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
rights constituted one of the most import<strong>an</strong>t political criteria of EU.<br />
Furthermore he tried to get the follow<strong>in</strong>g message across: the Agreement on<br />
Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association could be suspended if the said rights are violated<br />
<strong>an</strong>ew. 3<br />
Those repeated warn<strong>in</strong>gs, uttered by various bodies <strong>an</strong>d<br />
representatvies of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, have not always been<br />
adequately met or responded to by the Serb public <strong>an</strong>d political elite. Instead<br />
of be<strong>in</strong>g prioritized, from the st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t of strategic <strong>in</strong>terests, as <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d developmental resource, the m<strong>in</strong>ority issue is const<strong>an</strong>tly<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d due to such sidel<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g thereof it has become a<br />
1Commission was led by Doris Pack, <strong>an</strong>d its members were Joh<strong>an</strong>es Svoboda,<br />
Jelko Kac<strong>in</strong>, Đura Heđi <strong>an</strong>d Žolt Bečei.<br />
2 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 29/30 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
3 "Europe<strong>an</strong> Union shall monitor the status of national m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro, notably of Rom<strong>an</strong>y, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> case of reported violations of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, under a clause of the Agreement on Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association, it<br />
could suspend entry <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce thereof. " Dnevnik 12 October 2005.<br />
320<br />
321
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
major <strong>security</strong> issue 4 <strong>an</strong>d the one which is const<strong>an</strong>tly monitored by the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community as its primary concern. Instead of us<strong>in</strong>g that issue <strong>for</strong><br />
a more accelerated <strong>an</strong>d easier <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to supra-national structures, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
first place <strong>in</strong>to EU, the Serb political elite position on m<strong>in</strong>orities is still steeped<br />
<strong>in</strong> Milosevic era political rhetoric which tends to see <strong>in</strong> a pronounced <strong>in</strong>terest<br />
<strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>orities status "evil <strong>in</strong>tentions <strong>an</strong>d a deft eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g." 5 Nervous<br />
reactions which followed <strong>in</strong>ternationalization of the m<strong>in</strong>ority issue 6 <strong>in</strong>dicated<br />
that <strong>in</strong> the Serb political agenda it was accorded a second-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g status.<br />
Attempts of national m<strong>in</strong>orities, notably of the Hungari<strong>an</strong>s to draw attention<br />
of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community to its position, not only call <strong>in</strong>to question <strong>an</strong><br />
already impaired credibility of the Serb authorities, but also its committment to<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> values. Recent makever of public rhetoric <strong>an</strong>d its stilted pro-<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> tones, c<strong>an</strong> hardly cover up the <strong>in</strong>ability to make a cle<strong>an</strong> break with<br />
the past <strong>state</strong> of affairs <strong>in</strong> the field of national m<strong>in</strong>orities status. Several<br />
<strong>in</strong>cident <strong>an</strong>d sc<strong>an</strong>dals which happened <strong>in</strong> 2005, led to a bleak conclusion that<br />
Serbia was still <strong>in</strong> a vicious circle, that is, mov<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the same ideological<br />
framework which fueled the war <strong>in</strong> the first place. 7 Aga<strong>in</strong>st such a backdrop it<br />
should be emphasized that the number of <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> 2005 was reduced with<br />
respect to 2004. However that fact should not illude us, <strong>for</strong> at work are still all<br />
those factors which contribute to escalation of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations, 8 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
4 See Resolution of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament, po<strong>in</strong>t 7.<br />
5 Milorad Mirčić, high official of the Serb Radical Party, <strong>in</strong> his <strong>state</strong>ment to<br />
"Dnevnik" assessed that "some parties are aga<strong>in</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g the issue of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d if the<br />
Resolution is adopted, that will only exacerbate the whole situation, not only <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, but <strong>in</strong> Serbia too." Mirčić also stressed that "EU is directly <strong>in</strong>terfer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal political issues of a <strong>state</strong>". Dnevnik, 17 October 2005.<br />
6 In his <strong>in</strong>terview to "Dnevnik", Petar Lađević, Secretary of the Serb Council <strong>for</strong><br />
National M<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>state</strong>d that "every <strong>in</strong>ternationalization of the m<strong>in</strong>ority issue <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia was unnecessary" <strong>an</strong>d "utterly ill-<strong>in</strong>tentioned", <strong>for</strong>, "globally speak<strong>in</strong>g, the rights<br />
of national m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> the Republic of Serbia are fully respected", Dnevnik, 4<br />
November 2005.<br />
7 Currently <strong>in</strong> Serbia there is no will <strong>for</strong> a political showdown with the Serb<br />
nationalism. Nationalists have consolidated their positions, <strong>an</strong>d milit<strong>an</strong>ts from their<br />
r<strong>an</strong>ks are act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly arrog<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d aggressive way. War crime <strong>in</strong>dictees are<br />
publicly glorified, <strong>an</strong>d genocide is <strong>in</strong>terpreted as-liberation. The Serb Orthodox Church<br />
is us<strong>in</strong>g the identity crisis of the majority nation <strong>an</strong>d the fact that the <strong>state</strong> is weak <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>efficient, to impose itself as a political arbiter <strong>an</strong>d the only <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g prime mover.<br />
Anti-Semitic documents <strong>an</strong>d books are freely repr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>an</strong>d distributed, <strong>an</strong>d church<br />
dignitaries who glorified Hitelr are now c<strong>an</strong>onized. Public squares are named after<br />
Fascist ideologues <strong>an</strong>d Nazi collaborators, <strong>an</strong>d national reconciliation is recommended<br />
as a condition <strong>for</strong> survivala <strong>an</strong>d progress of the nation. All this is happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a postwar<br />
ambience, amid highly pauperized <strong>an</strong>d traumatized society. Such <strong>an</strong> ambience is<br />
conflict-prone, especially to conflicts on ethnic grounds.<br />
8 Laslo Joža, President of the National Council of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>state</strong>d that a<br />
lesser problem is a decrease <strong>in</strong> the number of <strong>in</strong>cidence, <strong>an</strong>d the bigger one a poor <strong>in</strong>ter-<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
whose potential <strong>for</strong> conflict, without assisst<strong>an</strong>ce of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community c<strong>an</strong>not be either pacified or removed.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>ternational community responded differently to problems <strong>in</strong><br />
multi-ethnic relations: - by monitor<strong>in</strong>g, 9 by a discussion on situation <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d on status of national m<strong>in</strong>orities held <strong>in</strong> Brussels 10 <strong>in</strong> the first<br />
personal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ter-etnic mood <strong>in</strong> the soceity <strong>for</strong> it leads to <strong>in</strong>cidents. Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 12<br />
October 2005.<br />
9 Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament commission toured Serbia, <strong>in</strong> early 2005, with a view to<br />
collect<strong>in</strong>g facts <strong>an</strong>d figures on the status of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d nature of <strong>in</strong>cidents which so<br />
strongly marked the year 2004. Dur<strong>in</strong>g their visit the commission members toured<br />
several towns <strong>an</strong>d had talks with representatives of m<strong>in</strong>orities, NGOs, media, parties,<br />
religious communities, <strong>an</strong>d different local, prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> officials.<br />
Doris Pack then <strong>state</strong>d: " All officials, our <strong>in</strong>terlocutors, gave us their<br />
assur<strong>an</strong>ces that they were committed to multiethnicity, that they were concerned about<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents, <strong>an</strong>d that they were resolved to prevent their repeat." Without go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<br />
details of the causes of <strong>in</strong>cidents, she mentioned a bad economic situation <strong>an</strong>d a high<br />
unemployment rate as the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal causes, <strong>an</strong>d also po<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
vehicle <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident prevention was a more <strong>in</strong>tegrative educational system <strong>an</strong>d higher<br />
prerogatives of the local <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities. Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d a large number of<br />
refugees <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, "who, though Serbs, are obviously not accustomed to the life <strong>in</strong> a<br />
multi-ethnic milieu", Doris Pack underscored that "via education refugess may get used<br />
to the idea of Europe<strong>an</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a", <strong>an</strong>d "familiarize with characteristics of their new<br />
milieu". That <strong>state</strong>ment of Doris Pack promted the follow<strong>in</strong>g reaction by the Regional<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Aid to Refugees <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a: "her words are <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>sult to refugees from<br />
Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a."<br />
One of the most import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>sights of the commission was the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "The<br />
whole <strong>state</strong> c<strong>an</strong>not be blamed <strong>for</strong> recent multi-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. We were<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>ced that those <strong>in</strong>cidents were acts of <strong>in</strong>dividuals, but what rema<strong>in</strong>s to be explored<br />
are the whys <strong>an</strong>d where<strong>for</strong>es of the mass character of those <strong>in</strong>cidents.". D<strong>an</strong>as, 31<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
10 10 Discussion <strong>in</strong> Brussels was convened after the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament<br />
adoption of the Resolution on Protection of Multiethnicity <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. Particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong><br />
the discussion were representatives of the <strong>state</strong> bodies of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro,<br />
national councils of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Croats, <strong>an</strong>d NGOs. Be<strong>for</strong>e the Brussels<br />
discussion, <strong>Committee</strong>s <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Integration <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>orities Rights of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliament, adopted their conclusions assess<strong>in</strong>g that "m<strong>in</strong>orities-related<br />
allegations <strong>in</strong> the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament Resolution on the status of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a are-exaggerated <strong>an</strong>d totally ungrounded."<br />
Josip Pek<strong>an</strong>ović, President of the National Council of Croats <strong>an</strong>d one of the<br />
particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the discussion, assessed that <strong>in</strong> the course of the Brussels discussion<br />
emerged conspicuous differences <strong>in</strong> positions of Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
representatives, <strong>for</strong> the Belgrade authorities tried to downsclale the problems <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terethnic<br />
relations, <strong>an</strong>d also showed their reservations with respect to autonomy. Rasim<br />
Ljajić, M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>orities Rights of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, after<br />
discussion <strong>state</strong>d that he was surprised by the sharp-toned exposes of political<br />
representatives of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Croats <strong>an</strong>d Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, which "could play <strong>in</strong>to the h<strong>an</strong>ds<br />
322<br />
323
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
half of October, <strong>an</strong>d by the Resolution on Multiethnicity of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a adopted<br />
<strong>in</strong> late September 2005. Other <strong>in</strong>stitutions, notably the Council of Europe, High<br />
OSCE Commissioner <strong>for</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights, EU countries ambassadors, also<br />
showed their concern <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> developments related to <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic<br />
relations.<br />
Driven by the <strong>in</strong>tention to use the <strong>in</strong>terest of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community <strong>in</strong> stabilization of Serbia <strong>for</strong> improvement of position of their own<br />
communitites, various ethnic prime movers endeavoured to keep the m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
issue open. 11 Thus, the three political parties of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s 12 –<br />
of nationalists both among the majority <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ority people." Petar Lađević, Secretary<br />
of the Serb Council <strong>for</strong> National M<strong>in</strong>orities, assessed the discussion as "<strong>an</strong> attempt to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationalize the issue of autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d territorial order of Serbia,<br />
which, is entirely the matter of every soverign <strong>state</strong>, even of Serbia."<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the pert<strong>in</strong>ent press coverage, the <strong>state</strong> delegation was especially<br />
revolted by the expose of Sonja Biserko, Chair of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights. She stressed that despite the ef<strong>for</strong>ts made so far, the negative st<strong>an</strong>ce on<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d overall <strong>an</strong>imosity-rife mood towards them <strong>in</strong> the society has not<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ged. She added that the ethnic concept of the <strong>state</strong> was still prioritized though<br />
with<strong>in</strong> that concept the issue of m<strong>in</strong>orities c<strong>an</strong>not be solved. She said that <strong>in</strong> a response<br />
to such a concept, m<strong>in</strong>orities dem<strong>an</strong>d special arr<strong>an</strong>gments <strong>an</strong>d statuses, which then cast<br />
doubt on their loyalty.<br />
In her expose Sonja Biserko po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ually monitored the issue of m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>an</strong>d consequently <strong>for</strong>warded its relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
reports/f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs to competent domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>an</strong>d that "the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>in</strong>sists on the need <strong>for</strong> the fac<strong>in</strong>g up to the past, which made that<br />
NGO a target of attacks, <strong>an</strong>d its representatives a target of the public lynch." Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to her op<strong>in</strong>ion, <strong>in</strong> Serbia room shold be made <strong>for</strong> the civili<strong>an</strong> society, notably<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights. Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d such a goal, <strong>in</strong> the last 2 years<br />
the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> activites focused on <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>orities rights education of<br />
secondary school pupils <strong>an</strong>d students with a view to equipp<strong>in</strong>g them with knowledge to<br />
contribute actively to decomposition of the predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t ethnic model. She advocated<br />
constitutional <strong>in</strong>dependence of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d stressed that imposition of the ethnic<br />
model on Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a would be a d<strong>an</strong>gerous precedent, <strong>an</strong>d not only <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the region.<br />
11 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to "D<strong>an</strong>as" coverage, the thirteen MPs of Council of Europe from<br />
10 countries, at the proposal of a Moldavi<strong>an</strong> MP, dem<strong>an</strong>ded a resolution on violations of<br />
the rights of Rom<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Rasim Ljajic, M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, <strong>state</strong>d that the declaration was still under<br />
discussion on various levels of different committees of Parliamentary Assembly of<br />
Council of Europe, <strong>an</strong>d that it was highly likely that the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> delegation <strong>in</strong><br />
that body would prevent the adoption of that declaration, D<strong>an</strong>as, 4 November 2005.<br />
12 Leaders of those parties <strong>in</strong> mid-December 2005 sent their proposal on the<br />
start-up of talks on autonomy of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d other m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> the country to<br />
President of Serbia Boris Tadić, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, Vojislav Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign Secretary Vuk Drašković, <strong>in</strong> view of their assessment that<br />
"preparations <strong>for</strong> negotiations on Kosovo are <strong>an</strong> ideal moment <strong>for</strong> a discussion on<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Democratic Party of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (DPVH), Democratic Community<br />
of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (DCVH) <strong>an</strong>d the Civil Party of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (CPVH) decided to <strong>for</strong>ward their proposals 13 on a desirable model<br />
of autonomy <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s to Marti Ahtisari, the UN envoy to<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, <strong>an</strong>d Stephen Lene, EU representative, <strong>an</strong>d ask <strong>for</strong> their<br />
assisst<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the realization of the project. 14<br />
In mid-December the three Bosniak parties – National Movement of<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak, S<strong>an</strong>džak Alternative <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>džak Democratic Union-have def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
"Initial guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>for</strong> the resolution of status of S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>an</strong>d<br />
status of Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." In view of their assessment that<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>orities rights of Bosniaks are violated, <strong>an</strong>d that the status issue<br />
of S<strong>an</strong>džak is neglected, the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned parties th<strong>in</strong>k that the State Union<br />
of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro "should be adm<strong>in</strong>istratively <strong>an</strong>d territorially rearr<strong>an</strong>ged<br />
<strong>an</strong>d tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong>to a democratic community of equal peoples," <strong>in</strong><br />
which S<strong>an</strong>džak would be arr<strong>an</strong>ged/def<strong>in</strong>ed "as a whole political-territorial<br />
unit with<strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." The document furthermore underscored<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "In case of separation between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, citizens<br />
of S<strong>an</strong>džak would decide <strong>in</strong> a referendum with which <strong>state</strong> they would unite<br />
their the whole teritory ." The three Bosniak parties also called on all the <strong>state</strong><br />
bodies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions to back their "Initial Guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>an</strong>d Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples," <strong>in</strong><br />
order to resolve the issue of status of the Bosniak people <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>džak.<br />
And f<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> late October 2005, Presidency of the Democratic<br />
Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Croats (DAVC) put <strong>for</strong>ward its "Declaration on Status of the Croat<br />
People <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a". That Declaration stressed that members of the Croat<br />
community were <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>equitable position with respect to the majority people,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d also with respect to the other m<strong>in</strong>orities. Declaration listed the biggest<br />
problems: discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, non-implementation of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of proportionate<br />
representation, <strong>an</strong>d lack<strong>in</strong>g provision on the official use of the Croat l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
<strong>an</strong>d alphabet. Declaration po<strong>in</strong>ted out that a special problem was <strong>an</strong> active<br />
possible <strong>for</strong>ms of autonomy." Those leaders stressed that "problems should be solved <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia, but we noticed that the authorities lack the will <strong>an</strong>d courage to start dialogue<br />
with the Hungari<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority, <strong>for</strong> authorities <strong>in</strong> some countries who thought that the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority issue would be resolved by appo<strong>in</strong>tment of "some representatives of m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
to positions of Vice Prime M<strong>in</strong>isters or M<strong>in</strong>isters <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights", were<br />
terribly wrong, <strong>for</strong> those appo<strong>in</strong>tees were guided more by their self-<strong>in</strong>terests th<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of their community. Dnevnik, 15 December 2005.<br />
13 At their Novi Bečej meet<strong>in</strong>g the three parties failed to agree on one model of<br />
autonomy. Instead they decided to <strong>for</strong>ward to the domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational addresses<br />
"three ideas on the paper" – DPVH urges personal autonomy, DCVH proposal consists<br />
of elements of personal <strong>an</strong>d territorial autonomy, while CAVH opts <strong>for</strong> a territorial<br />
autonomy.<br />
14 Laslo Rac Sabo, leader of CPVH, <strong>state</strong>d: "We have not <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Parliament of our proposals, s<strong>in</strong>ce that body c<strong>an</strong>not take pert<strong>in</strong>ent decisions." Građ<strong>an</strong>ski<br />
list, 23 November 2005.<br />
324<br />
325
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
policy of division of the Croat community <strong>in</strong>to Croats <strong>an</strong>d Bunjevci, with the<br />
goal of assimilation of Croats. In the f<strong>in</strong>al part of its document DAVC stressed<br />
that " all the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned problems shall be reported to the competent<br />
domestic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations, notably to Council of Europe,<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament <strong>an</strong>d High Envoy <strong>for</strong> National M<strong>in</strong>orities."<br />
All the three a<strong>for</strong>ementioned attempts to <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions of the issue of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d consequently prompt them to proactively<br />
tackle that issue, were met with negative public responses. M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
<strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights opposed <strong>in</strong>ternationalization of S<strong>an</strong>džak-<br />
Bosniak issue, <strong>for</strong> "m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>in</strong> all the previous cases, had experienced more<br />
harm th<strong>an</strong> benefit from <strong>in</strong>ternationalization. And, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ljajic, it would<br />
be especially harmful now when negotiations on Kosovo are to start, because<br />
possible tackl<strong>in</strong>g of S<strong>an</strong>dzak-Bosniak issue would be understood by the<br />
Bosniak people, as a m<strong>in</strong>ority conspiration aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs <strong>an</strong>d their <strong>state</strong>". 15<br />
Ljajic also had a negative st<strong>an</strong>ce on the Declaration on Status of Croats, <strong>for</strong>,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to him "it was awash with ungrounded assessments <strong>an</strong>d<br />
accusations". 16 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Petar Lađević, Secretary of the government-run<br />
Council <strong>for</strong> National M<strong>in</strong>orities, DAVH <strong>in</strong> its declaration "espoused a series of<br />
lies", while Oliver Dulić, official of Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d President of the Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Integrations assessed that the "DAVH<br />
document was out of sync with reality." 17<br />
In contrast to the previous two, the proposals <strong>an</strong>d "papers" of the<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> political protagonists, attracted great attention. M<strong>an</strong>date of special<br />
envoy <strong>for</strong> negotiations on status of Kosovo, Marti Ahtisari, was considered to<br />
broad, <strong>an</strong>d accord<strong>in</strong>g to Duš<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>jić, Director of Forum of Ethnic Relations, "it<br />
is likely to cover Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, though no symmetry c<strong>an</strong> be drawn between<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a." 18 Social-Democratic Party MP, Meho Omerović,<br />
criticized leaders of Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties because of their dem<strong>an</strong>d that<br />
negotiations on autonomy of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s start <strong>in</strong> parallel with negotiations on<br />
Kosovo: "Equalization of status of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbs <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other non-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Kosovo is totally <strong>in</strong>adequate, totally irresponsible,<br />
harmful <strong>an</strong>d very d<strong>an</strong>gerous." In Omerovic's m<strong>in</strong>d by mak<strong>in</strong>g such dem<strong>an</strong>ds<br />
leaders of Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties "jo<strong>in</strong>ed the r<strong>an</strong>ks of those bent on weaken<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational position of Serbia". 19 Borislav Novaković, Vice President of<br />
Assembly of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, criticized Andraš Agošton, Š<strong>an</strong>dor Pal <strong>an</strong>d Laslo Rac<br />
Sabo, <strong>for</strong> bypas<strong>in</strong>g the prov<strong>in</strong>cial bodies <strong>in</strong> their campaign to enlist support <strong>for</strong><br />
15 D<strong>an</strong>as, 28 November 2005<br />
16 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 26 October 2005<br />
17 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 26 October 2005<br />
18 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 5 December 2005<br />
19 Dnevnik, 16 December 2005<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
their dem<strong>an</strong>ds. 20 In his m<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>itiative of the three Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties is<br />
"extremely detrimental to the preservation of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of multiethnicity of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a." 21 Proposals of Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties were opposed by the Social<br />
Democratic Party of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. In its communique the latter underscored that<br />
"carv<strong>in</strong>g up of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a on ethnic basis is impossible, <strong>an</strong>d that discussion<br />
about such project is harmful, <strong>for</strong> its fuels tensions <strong>an</strong>d plays <strong>in</strong>to the h<strong>an</strong>ds of<br />
nationalists." Dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> simult<strong>an</strong>eous negotiations was also assessed as<br />
unacceptable by Rasim Ljajić, 22 <strong>an</strong>d criticized by the Vrbas municipal<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> of Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. In its<br />
communique the Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s thus responded to the<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiative of its political opponents: "the F<strong>in</strong>nish diplomat does not have a<br />
m<strong>an</strong>date to take <strong>an</strong>y decisions relat<strong>in</strong>g to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. 23<br />
Noteworthy are two elements <strong>in</strong> the AVH communique. In contrast to<br />
DAVH <strong>an</strong>d CAVH that is, Š<strong>an</strong>dora Pal <strong>an</strong>d Laslo Rac Sabo, 24 who th<strong>in</strong>k that<br />
the issue of autonomy is the Serb matter, AVH stresses that from the viewpo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
of suprvival of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d their equality, broader autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
is import<strong>an</strong>t, <strong>for</strong> it creates or has created more favourable framework <strong>for</strong><br />
atta<strong>in</strong>ment of Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests. It is however also underscored <strong>in</strong> the<br />
communique that "<strong>in</strong> addition to personal, the regional Hungari<strong>an</strong> territorial<br />
self-rule is also import<strong>an</strong>t." 25 However, the dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> the regional territorial<br />
20 "Address <strong>for</strong> resolution of the m<strong>in</strong>ority issues is neither Strasbourg or<br />
Brussels. The right address is Novi Sad. If someone resorts to Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions,<br />
then it is a clear message that this society <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> don't have a democratic potential to<br />
solve their problems with<strong>in</strong> the framework of their own <strong>in</strong>stitutions. And that is not<br />
correct. " Dnevnik, 24 November 2005<br />
21 Dnevnik, 24 November 2005<br />
22 Initiative of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties was assessed by Rasim Ljajić as their<br />
attempt to impose themselves onto the Hungari<strong>an</strong> community as its sole political<br />
representatives. D<strong>an</strong>as, 24 November 2005<br />
23 Dnevnik, 26 November 2005<br />
24 Laslo Rac Sabo thus expla<strong>in</strong>ed his advocacy of the territorial autonomy of<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s: "We back autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, but it c<strong>an</strong>not solve, <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents, re-distribution of goods <strong>in</strong> which Hungari<strong>an</strong>s don't<br />
participate, high unemployment among Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, or consistent en<strong>for</strong>cement of laws.<br />
It is up to the Serbs to settle the issue of autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, but if Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a were<br />
gr<strong>an</strong>ted autonomy similar to the one it had <strong>in</strong> the pre-90's period, it would not improve<br />
the status of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s because the present-day Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is different from the pre-<br />
90's one." Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 23 November 2005.<br />
25 Dnevnik, 26 November 2005, The AVH communique <strong>in</strong>cludes the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ce: "Autonomy is not a magic w<strong>an</strong>d which could resolve all the worries <strong>an</strong>d troubles<br />
of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. We need <strong>an</strong> economic <strong>an</strong>d political revival of Serbia, its<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration, creation of a decentralized legal <strong>state</strong>, of new jobs <strong>an</strong>d legal<br />
<strong>security</strong>, <strong>in</strong> order to make it possible <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungara<strong>in</strong>s to live equitably, freely<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> prosperity."<br />
326<br />
327
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
self-rule 26 was also met with criticism. Position of Democratic Party, a coalition<br />
partner of AVH <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>cial government was espoused by head of the MP<br />
club <strong>an</strong>d vice prime m<strong>in</strong>ster of prov<strong>in</strong>cial government, Dragoslav Petrović :<br />
"Introduction <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mation of territorial autonomy on national basis is not <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>in</strong>terest of citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the area claim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>depndence, as it is not <strong>in</strong><br />
the <strong>in</strong>terest of the m<strong>in</strong>ority collective, or <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of development of<br />
autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> general...<strong>for</strong> if the AVH idea were tr<strong>an</strong>slated <strong>in</strong>to<br />
reality about 120,000 Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, that is over 40% of Hungari<strong>an</strong> population,<br />
would rema<strong>in</strong> outside the imag<strong>in</strong>ed area of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> regional autonomy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d then, <strong>in</strong> the face of the mood of pressure <strong>an</strong>d hatred they would tend to<br />
concentrate <strong>in</strong> the autonomous area, <strong>an</strong>d that, by extension, would lead up to<br />
new escalations. 27 In expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g his opposition to the AVH proposal, Rasim<br />
Ljajic, the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights, stressed that<br />
ethnically-based autonomies are not a solution <strong>for</strong> they lead to tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
of Serbia <strong>in</strong>to a confederation of ethnic autonomies. He also warned that "the<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs then could easily get out of h<strong>an</strong>d, that is, other m<strong>in</strong>orities could as well<br />
lay claim to ethnic autonomies." 28 Similar criticism was voiced by Đorđe Bašić,<br />
Vice President of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament: "That k<strong>in</strong>d of ethnic region would not<br />
be good <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>yone. Tomorrow Slovaks, Rom<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Rhuteni<strong>an</strong>s<br />
could place similar dem<strong>an</strong>ds. And then, should we make the ghettoes?" 29<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Criticism of the Serb establishment was both directed at domestic,<br />
political protagonists, <strong>an</strong>d at <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions acts. In late September,<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament adopted the Resolution on Protection of Multiethnicity <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, 30 which, <strong>in</strong> view of cont<strong>in</strong>ued violations of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights, 31 called on authorities <strong>in</strong> the Republic of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the State Union of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, to legally recognize as crim<strong>in</strong>al offences acts target<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d their rights, <strong>an</strong>d to act successfully <strong>in</strong> order to prevent their<br />
repeat <strong>in</strong> the future. By po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out "a high <strong>security</strong> risk of <strong>in</strong>timidation of<br />
national m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a" Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament dem<strong>an</strong>ded the<br />
Commission, Council, <strong>an</strong>d High Representative <strong>for</strong> Foreign <strong>an</strong>d Security<br />
Policy to cont<strong>in</strong>ue to monitor the situation <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong>d to send EU<br />
observers to the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. 32<br />
There were different responses to the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament document.<br />
Smaller part of the political elite, notably Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, President of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Assembly, responded <strong>in</strong> a restra<strong>in</strong>ed fashion, by say<strong>in</strong>g that the Resolution is a<br />
clear message <strong>an</strong>d a serious warn<strong>in</strong>g to the Belgrade authorities that<br />
worsen<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a 33 would no longer be<br />
tolerated. The second <strong>an</strong>d more numerous part of the Serb elite 34 cont<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
26 That dem<strong>an</strong>d was present <strong>in</strong> the "New Serb Constitution-related Plat<strong>for</strong>m of<br />
AVH": "<strong>in</strong> the areas traditionally <strong>in</strong>habited by national m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> which they<br />
make the majority population, multi-national territorial self-rule (MTS) may be<br />
<strong>for</strong>med...to <strong>in</strong>clude the territory of at least 5 units of local self-rule. Decision on<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation of MTS is taken by bodies of local self-rule <strong>an</strong>d confirmed by citizens <strong>in</strong> a<br />
referendum. MTS guar<strong>an</strong>tees full equality of the Serb l<strong>an</strong>guge <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guage of the<br />
pert<strong>in</strong>ent national m<strong>in</strong>ority. Officials <strong>an</strong>d employees, barr<strong>in</strong>g those elected <strong>in</strong> direct<br />
elections, are duty-bound to know both official l<strong>an</strong>guages, while local bodies,<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d public services are duty-bound to proportionally employ members of<br />
national m<strong>in</strong>orities. MTS has f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial prerogatives <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ages f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces to the extent it<br />
was entrusted to do by the units of local self-rule. Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d Republics also may<br />
entrust MTS with certa<strong>in</strong> prerogatives <strong>an</strong>d some f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces <strong>for</strong> the exercise thereof.<br />
27 Dnevnik, 5 November 2005<br />
28 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1 November 2005<br />
29 Jozef Kasa thus responded to criticism that territorial autonomy claims led to<br />
ghettoization of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s: "no-one has the right to prescribe to us recepies <strong>for</strong> our<br />
better life. We, Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, we all who live here, we are the ones who<br />
should say wheteher our claims would lead to ghettoization or not. Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s is not tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>yone how to resolve problems <strong>in</strong> their entities."<br />
Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 8 November 2005<br />
Andraš Agošton, a political rival of Jožef Kasa, also availed himself of the<br />
opportunity to float his st<strong>an</strong>d: "There are no genu<strong>in</strong>e prospects or need <strong>for</strong><br />
establishment of territorial autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s...Ideal solution is a<br />
personal autonomy, <strong>for</strong> it does not entail <strong>an</strong>y demarcation, but only creation of areas of<br />
import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> preservation of identity <strong>an</strong>d their runn<strong>in</strong>g by m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> question. "<br />
Dnevnik, 2 April 2005.<br />
30 Resolution was adopted by 88 votes. There were no aga<strong>in</strong>st votes <strong>an</strong>d only<br />
two abstention ones.<br />
31 Not a s<strong>in</strong>gle Serb <strong>in</strong>stitution, governmental or governmental, has the<br />
accurate figure of ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents. None of the disclosed facts <strong>an</strong>d figures were correct.<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> was led to make such a conslusion, after its activists' conducted<br />
<strong>in</strong>terviews with representatives of Hungari<strong>an</strong> NGOs <strong>in</strong> Subotica. There we were told<br />
that some families did not w<strong>an</strong>t to report cases of physical <strong>an</strong>d verbal harassment of<br />
their members, <strong>in</strong> order to avoid additional troubles.<br />
32 In its Resolution Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament confirmed "its read<strong>in</strong>ess to exercise all<br />
its budgetary prerogatives <strong>in</strong> order to br<strong>in</strong>g pressure to bear on Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
to respect fundamental <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>an</strong>d liberties, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the rights of national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities, but also to encourage them to do that <strong>an</strong>d assist them <strong>in</strong> that endeavour. "<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament also backed the <strong>in</strong>itiative of the Inter-Parliamentary Delegation <strong>for</strong><br />
Relations with South East Europe countries to org<strong>an</strong>ize a public debate on the political<br />
situation <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d on problems of national m<strong>in</strong>orities. Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d domestic<br />
responses, one element of the Resolution is also noteworthy. Namely, <strong>in</strong> its po<strong>in</strong>t 6<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament calls on authorities <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro to re-establish <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a the autonomy which the prov<strong>in</strong>ce had enjoyed<br />
until the year 1990.<br />
33 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 2 October 2005<br />
34 It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that the criticism of resolution helped homogenize<br />
diverse ideological elements, start<strong>in</strong>g from the Socialist Party of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the Serb<br />
Radical Party to Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d G 17 plus.<br />
328<br />
329
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
relativize the import<strong>an</strong>ce of Strasbourg-adopted document, 35 even by say<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that it was not grounded <strong>in</strong> real facts. Public <strong>state</strong>ments varied, some said that<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulations <strong>in</strong> the Resolution were overemphasized <strong>an</strong>d ungrounded <strong>in</strong><br />
reality, 36 some asserted that the resolution was of a political character <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs contrary to the status of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations on the ground, 37 others<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that it was utterly ill-<strong>in</strong>tentioned <strong>an</strong>d contrary to foster<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, 38 some that it was <strong>in</strong>correct <strong>an</strong>d false, 39 or too sharp-toned, 40 or<br />
35 Several sides repeatedly dem<strong>an</strong>ded discussion on positions expressed <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Resolution. Thus MP group of the Serb Radical Party <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>an</strong> emergency session of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial parliament to discuss the Resolution;<br />
Radicals suggested the text of their own resolution reject<strong>in</strong>g the controversial positions<br />
of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament. <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> International Co-operation <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Integrations suggested to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament to set up a committee to probe <strong>in</strong>to<br />
allegations of the Resolution. At the republic<strong>an</strong> level Meho Omerović, member of<br />
parliamentary <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Inter-ethnic Relations asked the president of<br />
parliamentary- Esad Džudžević had been relieved of his duties-to urgently convene a<br />
session which would discuss the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned document of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament. At<br />
a session held <strong>in</strong> late October, <strong>in</strong>ternational community was, <strong>in</strong>ter alia, accused of us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
double st<strong>an</strong>dards, disregard<strong>in</strong>g the status of Serbs <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, of trespass<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
prerogatives <strong>for</strong> the Resolution of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament dealt with constitututional<br />
order of Serbia. Added to that Hungary was accused of misus<strong>in</strong>g that issue <strong>for</strong> its dayto-day<br />
politics. (D<strong>an</strong>as, 27 October 2005.) At the jo<strong>in</strong>t session of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
Parliamentary <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Integrations <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>orities' Rights, members of<br />
those committees assessed the Resolution's positions as exaggerated, <strong>an</strong>d out of sync<br />
with the reality of multi-ethnic Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a on the ground.<br />
36 Oliver Dulić i Asim Dizdarević, presidents of the <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Integrations <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliament,<br />
without cast<strong>in</strong>g doubt on good <strong>in</strong>tentions of MPs of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament, told<br />
"Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list" that "positions espoused <strong>in</strong> the Resolution could backfire, that is make<br />
more difficult life of all citizens <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, <strong>an</strong>d even of national<br />
communities, <strong>an</strong>d consequently destroy very fragile democratic structures <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> our society." Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 11. October 2005.<br />
37 Momčilo Grubač, D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 October 2005. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to professor Grubač, the<br />
most import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>in</strong>g is that violations of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, which exist, are no longer,<br />
tacitly enouraged by the <strong>state</strong>.<br />
38 Petar Lađević, Secretary of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Council <strong>for</strong> National M<strong>in</strong>orities,<br />
Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 27 October 2005. Lađević <strong>state</strong>d that the word<strong>in</strong>g of the Resolution<br />
rem<strong>in</strong>ded him of police l<strong>in</strong>go, <strong>an</strong>d that its goal was not <strong>in</strong>ternationalization of the issue<br />
of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, but <strong>an</strong> attempt to impact the contents of the future constitution.<br />
Dnevnik, 27 October 2005.<br />
39 The Resolution was qualified as false <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>accurate by Željko Tomić,<br />
member of the <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Inter-Ethnic Relations of Assembly of Serbia. He added<br />
that the Resolution should be l<strong>in</strong>ked to activities of Jožef Kasa, leader of the AVH, "who<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead of calm<strong>in</strong>g the spiritis, is fuell<strong>in</strong>g passions."Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1/2. October<br />
2005.Contrary to Tomić, Jožef Kasa, <strong>state</strong>d that he agreed with the appraisal of the<br />
Resolution. Kasa's rival from the DAVH, Andraš Agošton, assessed the resolution as<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
that it was provoked, but not justifiable, 41 that it was full of doctored elements<br />
written on the basis of actions of lobbies <strong>an</strong>d ill-<strong>in</strong>tentioned reports of some,<br />
domestic NGOs, 42 that the Resolution conta<strong>in</strong>ed political assessments <strong>an</strong>d<br />
enabled <strong>in</strong>terference <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>ternal affairs of a <strong>state</strong>, 43 - <strong>an</strong>d there were also<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ds that Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament should <strong>in</strong>stead tackle violations of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
rights of Serbs <strong>in</strong> Kosovo. 44<br />
Respond<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that way to not- at- all- laudatory assessments of the<br />
Resolution, parts of the political elite only emulated the very conduct which <strong>in</strong><br />
the first place had made the status of m<strong>in</strong>orities attract the attention of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d compelled m<strong>in</strong>orities proper to seek allies <strong>an</strong>d<br />
assit<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> resolution of their problems outside Serbia. Instead of recogniz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
political <strong>an</strong>d economic <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>for</strong> stabilization of situation <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong><br />
activities of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament <strong>an</strong>d those of other <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions,<br />
the fear was expressed that <strong>in</strong>ternationalization <strong>an</strong>d open debate would be<br />
conducive to further radicalization. 45 Despite that m<strong>an</strong>ifest <strong>an</strong>d repeated fear,<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationalization proved to be a useful <strong>an</strong>d adequate vehicle, <strong>for</strong> it primarily<br />
led to the fall <strong>in</strong> the number of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. 46<br />
Smaller number of <strong>in</strong>cidents is one of the positive sp<strong>in</strong> offs of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationalization, but the public attention should be drawn also to <strong>an</strong><br />
import<strong>an</strong>t aspect of that problem, namely that <strong>in</strong>cidents are a tell-tale sign or<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about developments <strong>in</strong> the depth of the society. In addition to<br />
justified, <strong>an</strong>d underscored that <strong>an</strong>y pressure aim<strong>in</strong>g at betterment of situation, was most<br />
welcome. D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 October 2005.<br />
40 That was the op<strong>in</strong>ion of president of prov<strong>in</strong>cial government, Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtić<br />
(Dnevnik, 12 October 2005), president of prov<strong>in</strong>cial committee of G17 plus Gor<strong>an</strong><br />
Anđelić (Dnevnik, 13 October 2005), members of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliamentary<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Integrations <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights (Dnevnik, 12 October 2005).<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ksenija Milivojević, president of the Serb Parliamentary <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Integrations, "the Resolution is rather a result of very good lobby<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>an</strong> a<br />
reflection of a situation on the ground. ". Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1/2 October 2005<br />
41 Duš<strong>an</strong> J<strong>an</strong>jić, Co-ord<strong>in</strong>ator of Forum <strong>for</strong> Ethnic Relations, D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 October<br />
2005.<br />
42 Milorad Mirčić, high official of the Serb Radical Party, Dnevnik, 15 October<br />
2005.<br />
43 Statement of Milorad Mirčić, President of the Security <strong>Committee</strong> of the Serb<br />
Parliament, Dnevnik, 17 October 2005.<br />
44 Vuk Drašković, Foreign Secretary of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, asked the<br />
president of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament "to f<strong>in</strong>ally deal with the most gross trampl<strong>in</strong>g upon<br />
national <strong>an</strong>d civil rights of Serbs <strong>an</strong>d other non-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija".<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 October 2005.<br />
45 The st<strong>an</strong>d that <strong>in</strong>ternationalization <strong>in</strong> recent cases was more harmful th<strong>an</strong><br />
beneficial <strong>for</strong> members of m<strong>in</strong>orities was repeatedly floated <strong>in</strong> public.<br />
46 The fall <strong>in</strong> the number of <strong>in</strong>cidents was publicly expla<strong>in</strong>ed both by<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationalization <strong>an</strong>d more efficient police work. Judg<strong>in</strong>g by all appear<strong>an</strong>ces, the<br />
more active police work resulted from the <strong>in</strong>ternational community pressure.<br />
330<br />
331
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
lay<strong>in</strong>g bare the fact that some import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions were malfunction<strong>in</strong>g, 47<br />
recent <strong>in</strong>cidents also po<strong>in</strong>ted at the problem of ethnic divisions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
segregation. Causes of that phenomenon may be found <strong>in</strong> the policy which<br />
Serbia pursued <strong>in</strong> late 20th century <strong>an</strong>d its deep impact on <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic<br />
relations. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the UNDP survey on <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>e development <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong><br />
2005, over half of respondents – 50.5%-th<strong>in</strong>k that ethnic <strong>an</strong>d cultural<br />
differences <strong>in</strong>vetiably lead to tensions <strong>an</strong>d that countries without national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities are <strong>in</strong> a better position. 85.4% of m<strong>in</strong>orities members, with respect to<br />
56.8% of Serbs, have a positive attitude on those differences. The biggest<br />
degree of ethnic dist<strong>an</strong>ce expressed was the one towards Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, 48 <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
highest degree of ethnic- centrism was registered among the youngest<br />
population ( 20 to 23 years of age). They are the people, 49 who were born, who<br />
grew up <strong>an</strong>d were socialized <strong>in</strong> the society deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the war, <strong>in</strong><br />
which <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce, hatred <strong>an</strong>d ethnically motivated violence, represented a<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of patriotic duty. Big ethnic dist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d lack of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic<br />
familiarization not only lead to national divisions <strong>an</strong>d parallel lives of<br />
members of various ethnic communities, the phenomenon registered <strong>in</strong> several<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a municipalities, (K<strong>an</strong>jiža, Senta, Temer<strong>in</strong>), but by th<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terethnic<br />
communication, they create <strong>an</strong> empty social space, which, <strong>in</strong> absence of<br />
<strong>an</strong> adequate <strong>state</strong> reactions, is filled by violence aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>orities perpetrated<br />
by various nationalists <strong>an</strong>d milit<strong>an</strong>ts. Traces of their presence were seen<br />
throughout 2005 on facades of public <strong>in</strong>stitutions, schools, religious <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
build<strong>in</strong>gs. 50 Intoler<strong>an</strong>ce was not only expressed by sprays, but also by assaults<br />
47 This is a reference to the police, prosecution <strong>an</strong>d courts of law. The list could<br />
be exp<strong>an</strong>ded, <strong>for</strong> the Serb public op<strong>in</strong>ion also ignores the import<strong>an</strong>ce of the m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
issue.<br />
48 Over one quarter of citizens of Serbia are aga<strong>in</strong>st Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s becom<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
citizens of Serbia (25.5%), 30.4% of them don't w<strong>an</strong>t Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s as neighbours, <strong>an</strong>d 44.4%<br />
of them don't w<strong>an</strong>t Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> superiors <strong>in</strong> theri workplaces. 65.5% of respondents<br />
oppose marriages between their family members <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 October 2005.<br />
49 The survey conducted <strong>in</strong> 2003 by the Centre <strong>for</strong> Study of Alternatives<br />
established that "every fourth respondent, if empowered to do so, would <strong>in</strong>troduce<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> employment policy, every fifth respondent believes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual<br />
superiority of his own nation, <strong>an</strong>d every seventh respondent opposes ethnically mixed<br />
marriages". Hrvatska riječ, 8 April 2005.<br />
50 In March graffiti <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic <strong>an</strong>d chauv<strong>in</strong>istic posters appeared on<br />
entr<strong>an</strong>ces to premises of NGOs , the Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law Fund <strong>an</strong>d the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights. Sonja Biserko, chair of HC, was br<strong>an</strong>ded as "the Jewish<br />
stooge-<strong>an</strong> obedient serv<strong>an</strong>t of the Jewish World Order. " On the wall of the Jewish<br />
cemetery the follow<strong>in</strong>g message was sprayed: "We must put up resist<strong>an</strong>ce to the<br />
Zionistic-5 October occupation of Serbia. B92- Jewish TV. Out with Jews, parasites. We<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t freedom <strong>an</strong>d not the Jewish occupation. Serbia belongs to Serbs." On posters<br />
signed by the National Squad, the follow<strong>in</strong>g was dem<strong>an</strong>ded: "We should boycott B92<br />
because of its : <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb activities, lethal <strong>in</strong>fluence on the Serb youth, support to<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
on members of m<strong>in</strong>orities, their property <strong>an</strong>d symbols, with metal rods, or<br />
Molotov cocktails. Unidentified persons attacked on 7 J<strong>an</strong>uary the seat of the<br />
Bosniak National Council <strong>an</strong>d damaged the Bosniak flag <strong>an</strong>d the ones of EU<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Serbia. 51 Several days be<strong>for</strong>e arrival of the commission of Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Parliament w<strong>in</strong>dows on houses <strong>an</strong>d the v<strong>an</strong> w<strong>in</strong>dshield of two Futog locals, of<br />
Rom<strong>an</strong>y ethnicity, were broken. 52 The last day <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary <strong>in</strong> Subotica was<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, support to spread<strong>in</strong>g of drug-addiction,<br />
homosexuality <strong>an</strong>d other diseases imported from the West, support to the multi-racial<br />
New World Order." On facades of m<strong>an</strong>y schools, comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d monuments the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g messages were sprayed: "Serbia belongs to Serbs", "For White future, <strong>for</strong> race<br />
<strong>an</strong>d nation" with crossed-out Star of David "Out with Shiptari", "General Mladic th<strong>an</strong>k<br />
you <strong>for</strong> the Serb Srebrenica", "On your knees be<strong>for</strong>e Serbs", "Crystal-clear 11. 11.",<br />
"Equality between races is a Jewish trap"; graffiti were written <strong>in</strong> Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> too: "Have<br />
healthy white children, <strong>an</strong>d not homosexuals", "Serb Orthodox religion or death" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
"Here devils serve", "White power" <strong>an</strong>d "Yelow scum". Graffiti aga<strong>in</strong>st Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />
appeared <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad: "Out with Yellow scum. Serbia belongs to Serbs." <strong>an</strong>d also graffiti<br />
"Knife <strong>an</strong>d wire make Srebrenica", "General, th<strong>an</strong>k you <strong>for</strong> liberation of Srebrenica. 1995<br />
– 2005. National Squad", "Less Negroes, less racism", "Don't wait <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> upris<strong>in</strong>g, wake<br />
up, we butcher Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. Serb children", "Your rebellion, our revenge", "Slobo, Serb,<br />
come back". Subotica was the scene of <strong>an</strong>ti-Croat graffiti: "Croats, you are lesser be<strong>in</strong>gs",<br />
"Ustashi we shall slaughter you", <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb ones: "Kill a Serb" <strong>an</strong>d "Hungary =<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a". On several build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Nis Nazi swastikas <strong>an</strong>d graffiti appeared: "Nataša<br />
K<strong>an</strong>dić, the Muslim of the 21 century", "Death to serv<strong>an</strong>ts of Zionism", "Serbia belongs<br />
to Serbs, out with Turks", "Ratko Mladić th<strong>an</strong>k you <strong>for</strong> Srebrenica", Ratko Mladić, the<br />
Serb hero", "Knife <strong>an</strong>d wire make Srebrenica". In Nis, the group convicted of torch<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the mosque <strong>in</strong> front of a municipal court s<strong>an</strong>g: "After m<strong>an</strong>y years spent <strong>in</strong> prison<br />
because of torch<strong>in</strong>g of Islam Aga-mosque I am s<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong> – Death to Muslims". In<br />
Novi Sad on 15 October w<strong>in</strong>dows of the Christi<strong>an</strong> Adventist Church were broken, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
two months later the two upper w<strong>in</strong>gs of its entry gate were demolished <strong>an</strong>d two sound<br />
boxes <strong>an</strong>d a cassette-player were taken from the church. Graffiti "Knife <strong>an</strong>d wire make<br />
Srebrenica"were written <strong>in</strong> Sivac, Novi Pazar, Belgrade, Niš, Sremska Mitrovica <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
other towns. Posters with the same message appeared dur<strong>in</strong>g the football match<br />
between Serbia-Montengro <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. In Temer<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage were written graffiti with <strong>in</strong>sult<strong>in</strong>g contents, <strong>an</strong>d double cross <strong>an</strong>d the coat of<br />
arms of the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of Hungary. In Temer<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic graffiti also appeared, while<br />
graffiti: "Shiptari bitches", "For killers of Serbhood, a bullet <strong>an</strong>ytime –National Pride",<br />
were found <strong>in</strong> Odzaci, etc.<br />
One detail is noteworthy: Djordje Mamula (DPS), member of the Defence <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Security <strong>Committee</strong> of Parliament of Serbia, asked: "Have you recently seen the graffiti<br />
with messages <strong>in</strong>stigat<strong>in</strong>g national hatred"? Mamula asked that question <strong>in</strong> response to<br />
claims made by Jožef Kasa that <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations have worsened. D<strong>an</strong>as, 21<br />
September 2005.<br />
51 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 10 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
52 Charges were filed aga<strong>in</strong>st under-age B. M. For <strong>in</strong>stigation of racial, religious<br />
<strong>an</strong>d national hatred. B.M admitted that he was promted to commit his misdeed by his<br />
332<br />
333
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
assaulted Lor<strong>an</strong>t Hevera, a local correspondent of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> radio. 53<br />
In mid-February three sk<strong>in</strong>heads beat up at Nis <strong>for</strong>tress two young Rom<strong>an</strong>y . 54<br />
On the facade of Dimitri P<strong>in</strong>ku's house the graffiti "KLA" was written, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e that he received phone threats. 55 A group of 10 hoolig<strong>an</strong>s attacked<br />
locals of the Rom<strong>an</strong>y sh<strong>an</strong>tytown <strong>in</strong> Vršac. Rom<strong>an</strong>y were <strong>in</strong>sulted on racial<br />
<strong>an</strong>d national grounds, <strong>an</strong>d one of was repeatedly stabbed. 56 On the first of<br />
March a group of Serb pupils beat up S.A. while he was wait<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a Novi<br />
Pazar spa bus. 57 In downtown Senta <strong>in</strong> front of the fire brigade headquarters<br />
on 13 March the Serb flag was burnt, <strong>an</strong>d three months later two soldiers beat<br />
up <strong>an</strong>other soldier, Maćaš Kovač, who allegedly commited that offence. 58 A<br />
group of soldiers <strong>in</strong> May, around 22.30 hours raided the Pozarevac garrison<br />
dormitory <strong>an</strong>d beat up soldier Anis Mašović, who thus susta<strong>in</strong>ed lighter bodily<br />
<strong>in</strong>juries. 59 In Stara Moravica Jožef Mike (23) was beaten up by a refugee, who<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that „Hungari<strong>an</strong>s should be re-settled <strong>in</strong> order to make the village<br />
totally Serb." Mike susta<strong>in</strong>ed grave head <strong>in</strong>juries. In early June <strong>in</strong> Bor<br />
unidentified persons broke w<strong>in</strong>dows of the Vlashs-Rom<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Cultural Society,<br />
"Arijadne filum". 60 In Novi Sad Klisacka street, upon leav<strong>in</strong>g the cafe "Bela<br />
lađa" two Hungari<strong>an</strong> youths were beaten up <strong>for</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong>. 61 In<br />
settlement Toš<strong>in</strong> bunar unidentified youths threw several Molotov cocktails on<br />
Rom<strong>an</strong>y houses, <strong>an</strong>d similar <strong>in</strong>cident was reported <strong>in</strong> a Rom<strong>an</strong>y settlement <strong>in</strong><br />
Bež<strong>an</strong>ijska kosa. 62 In late August unidentified youths threw two Molotov<br />
cocktails on Rom<strong>an</strong>y-<strong>in</strong>habited barracks <strong>in</strong> Sumatovacka street. 63 Murder of<br />
one <strong>an</strong>d wound<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong>other youth by <strong>an</strong> underage Rom<strong>an</strong>y contributed to<br />
escalation of <strong>an</strong>ti-Rom<strong>an</strong>y mood <strong>in</strong> Sivac. At the protest rally of citizens held<br />
membership of Sk<strong>in</strong>heads, <strong>an</strong>d nationality of the damaged party. v nedela M. B. je<br />
naveo nacionalnost oštećenih i svoju pripadnost "Sk<strong>in</strong>hedsima".<br />
53 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 31 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005. Hevera said that the attackers, three or four<br />
persons, probably heard him speak Hungari<strong>an</strong>, that they asked him <strong>for</strong> money, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>sulted him on national grounds.<br />
54 Robert Dimić susta<strong>in</strong>ed lighter bodily <strong>in</strong>juries. D<strong>an</strong>as, 23 February 2005.<br />
55 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 22 February 2005.<br />
56 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 23 March 2005.<br />
57 That case was reported to S<strong>an</strong>džak Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> by the boy's father,<br />
Nevzat Alomerović. He <strong>state</strong>d that a group of pupils while beat<strong>in</strong>g his son was shout<strong>in</strong>g<br />
"Chetniks, get ready, get ready".<br />
58 Kovač susta<strong>in</strong>ed grave bodily <strong>in</strong>juries, <strong>an</strong>d doctors had to remove his spleen.<br />
59 Initiative of the Young <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights filed charges aga<strong>in</strong>st a group of<br />
soldier <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stigat<strong>in</strong>g racial, religious <strong>an</strong>d national hatred, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19 August 2005.<br />
60 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 7 June 2005.<br />
61 The jaw of one of them was broken, while the other lost consciousness.<br />
62 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to communique of the Centre <strong>for</strong> M<strong>in</strong>orities Rights, the first<br />
<strong>in</strong>cident took place on 30 July at 21 hours, while the second one happened on the 1st of<br />
August. There were no <strong>in</strong>jured persons.<br />
63 Municipality Vračar condemned attacks on Rom<strong>an</strong>y.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
on 30 August <strong>in</strong> the build<strong>in</strong>g of municipal assembly of Kula the authorities<br />
were given a deadl<strong>in</strong>e to re-settle all Rom<strong>an</strong>y from Sivac by 20 October, the<br />
Liberation Day of that town. Some citizens suggested that the Rom<strong>an</strong>y<br />
Cultural Centre "O đila" be destroyed by Molotov cocktails, <strong>an</strong>d when<br />
someone remarked that Rom<strong>an</strong>y were not second-class citizens, a group of<br />
citizens shouted out: " Of course they are! We w<strong>an</strong>t Hilter!" 64 In fear of<br />
retaliation, all six Rom<strong>an</strong>y families with a total of 27 members left the<br />
settlement. 65<br />
Intoler<strong>an</strong>ce towards Rom<strong>an</strong>y was also m<strong>an</strong>ifested by denizens of<br />
New Belgrade settlement Dr Iv<strong>an</strong> Ribar. At protest rallies aga<strong>in</strong>st the city<br />
authorities decision that conta<strong>in</strong>ers be placed to temporarily accommodate<br />
Rom<strong>an</strong>y, citizens yelled "We don't w<strong>an</strong>t Rom<strong>an</strong>y", <strong>an</strong>d "Mayor Radmila<br />
Hrust<strong>an</strong>ović go back to your native Sarajevo". 66 At dawn, on 30 August, a<br />
bomb was thrown <strong>in</strong> front of the family house of Jožef Kasa, the AVH leader. 67<br />
In late night hours of 18 September <strong>in</strong> Novi Itebej signposts with Hungari<strong>an</strong><br />
names of locality were re-pa<strong>in</strong>ted. 68 In Srbobr<strong>an</strong> was repa<strong>in</strong>ted the traditional<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> name <strong>for</strong> that locality, Sentomaš, 69 <strong>an</strong>d be<strong>for</strong>e that the cyrillic name<br />
of locality was repa<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>an</strong>d the date J<strong>an</strong>uary 1942 was added. 70 In late<br />
October several drunk youths stoned a group of Rom<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong> a park<strong>in</strong>g place<br />
beh<strong>in</strong>d Najlon market <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad. 71 Youths with crew-cuts, donn<strong>in</strong>g black<br />
leather jackets, <strong>an</strong>d armed with metal rods <strong>an</strong>d wooden batons, <strong>in</strong> the course<br />
of November, demolished a Rom<strong>an</strong>y sh<strong>an</strong>tytown <strong>in</strong> the vic<strong>in</strong>ity of the Old<br />
Fairgrounds, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sulted its <strong>in</strong>habit<strong>an</strong>ts on racial grounds. 72 On Christmas<br />
64 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1 September 2005.<br />
65 Th<strong>an</strong>ks to mediation of Tamaš Korhec, the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong><br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, Regulations <strong>an</strong>d National M<strong>in</strong>orities, that is, his appeals to the police<br />
<strong>an</strong>d prosecution to "prevent cruel, <strong>in</strong><strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>e <strong>an</strong>d irrational" treatment of Rom<strong>an</strong>y, <strong>in</strong><br />
early September all Rom<strong>an</strong>y returned to Sivac. But all w<strong>in</strong>dows of the Rom<strong>an</strong>y Cultural<br />
Centre had been broken.<br />
66 As regards Rom<strong>an</strong>y, it is worth mention<strong>in</strong>g that the Centre <strong>for</strong> M<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
Rights <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary-September period reported 121 cases of unlawful police conduct <strong>an</strong>d<br />
violence <strong>an</strong>d discrim<strong>in</strong>ation aga<strong>in</strong>st Rom<strong>an</strong>y committed by private persons.<br />
67 Kasa <strong>state</strong>d that he did not w<strong>an</strong>t to qualify the bomb<strong>in</strong>g attack as <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>cident be<strong>for</strong>e the f<strong>in</strong>al police report. He added that he was <strong>in</strong> the house<br />
with his family when the bomb was thrown, <strong>an</strong>d that they were woken up by the<br />
explosion. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him the police swiftly appeared on the scene to conduct <strong>in</strong>quiry<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Interior Secretary Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić, <strong>an</strong>d President of Serbia Boris Tadić phoned him.<br />
Vojislav Koštunica, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia assessed that the attack on Kasa was<br />
t<strong>an</strong>tamount to <strong>an</strong> attack on the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia. Dnevnik, 31 August 2005.<br />
68 D<strong>an</strong>as, 20 September 2005<br />
69 D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 November 2005.<br />
70 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 10 November 2005<br />
71 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 25 October 2005.<br />
72 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 19/20 November 2005.<br />
334<br />
335
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Eve <strong>in</strong> B<strong>an</strong>atski Dvor, Stoj<strong>an</strong> Novković <strong>an</strong>d his peer Br<strong>an</strong>ko Stev<strong>an</strong>dić<br />
physically assaulted J<strong>an</strong>os Drob<strong>in</strong>a from Sombor <strong>an</strong>d Tibor Belovaija from<br />
Novi Bečej <strong>an</strong>d compelled them to shout out "I am Serb" <strong>an</strong>d recite the Serb<br />
Orthodox lit<strong>an</strong>y.<br />
73<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the Catholic Christmas <strong>in</strong> village Torda,<br />
municipality of Žitište, a group of youths from a nearby village Cestereg,<br />
barged <strong>in</strong>to the local disco <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>ded that DJ played Serb songs <strong>in</strong>stead of<br />
the English <strong>an</strong>d Hungari<strong>an</strong> ones. After that they started shout<strong>in</strong>g out "This is<br />
Serbia". The police removed the youths from disco, but they cont<strong>in</strong>ued to shout<br />
nationalistic slog<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> front of the church. 74<br />
In some cases it is very difficult, due to contradictory <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, to<br />
establish the nature of <strong>in</strong>cidents, 75 <strong>an</strong>d sometimes, by wrong qualifications, the<br />
nature of <strong>in</strong>cidents is ch<strong>an</strong>ged. Thus the police reported the Torda <strong>in</strong>cident as<br />
"disturb<strong>an</strong>ce of public peace <strong>an</strong>d order" <strong>an</strong>d not as a nationalistic <strong>in</strong>cident.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Jožef Kasa, AVH leader, "that is yet <strong>an</strong>other proof that the police<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia is not actively engaged <strong>in</strong> clarification of cases of nationalistic<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents." 76 Kasa has repeatedly criticized the police work. In late March, he<br />
expressed his satisfaction with a quick arrest of persons who <strong>in</strong> Belgrade had<br />
affixed <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic posters, but took the police to task <strong>for</strong> "fail<strong>in</strong>g to act as<br />
efficiently <strong>in</strong> identification of authors of most strident chauv<strong>in</strong>istic graffitti ".<br />
He then posed the follow<strong>in</strong>g question: "Why the police has not yet found those<br />
who have attacked family Šetet? Why there is no progress <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
why the police keeps mum about the brutal murder <strong>in</strong> Horgoš?". After<br />
accus<strong>in</strong>g the police of be<strong>in</strong>g a political <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>an</strong>d of us<strong>in</strong>g double<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>in</strong> clarificaiton of crimes, Kasa cautioned that "Concrete steps aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
perpetrators are made only when the political will exists". 77<br />
Various <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izations repeatedly expressed their<br />
discontent with the police <strong>an</strong>d judiciary work <strong>in</strong> clarification <strong>an</strong>d punishment<br />
of perpetrators of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents. In mid-October, NGO "Civili<strong>an</strong><br />
Movement", disgruntled with the police work, staged a public protest <strong>in</strong><br />
Subotica. 78 Pal S<strong>an</strong>dor told a 200-strong crowd: "Representatives of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the past 15 years have resorted to all <strong>in</strong>stitutional recourses <strong>in</strong><br />
order to resolve their problems, but they have not succeeed <strong>in</strong> their <strong>in</strong>tent. That<br />
is why this time around we opted <strong>for</strong> a public demonstration." Pal then<br />
accused the Interior Secretary Drag<strong>an</strong> Jocic <strong>an</strong>d the Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Stojković of "wag<strong>in</strong>g a psychological war aga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>orities" <strong>an</strong>d "<strong>for</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
timely schedule trials of perpetrators of <strong>an</strong>ti-Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents." After<br />
mention<strong>in</strong>g the Temer<strong>in</strong> case, he <strong>state</strong>d that "<strong>an</strong> equitable treatment of cases of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents does not exist." 79<br />
Now we should po<strong>in</strong>t out some facts. Though the Temer<strong>in</strong> case was<br />
judicially f<strong>in</strong>alized, it is still 'alive' <strong>in</strong> political terms. It was a case of brutal<br />
violence. Namely <strong>in</strong> mid-2004 5 youths <strong>in</strong>flicted grave, life-threaten<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>juries<br />
73 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 28 December 2005.<br />
74 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 28 December 2005. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Š<strong>an</strong>dor Sič, owner of the club,<br />
a group of youths from B<strong>an</strong>atski dvor <strong>an</strong>d Čestereg occasionally comes to Torda to<br />
cause trouble. Sič ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that m<strong>in</strong>orities-Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, Slovaks, <strong>an</strong>d Rom<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s-<strong>in</strong><br />
villages belong<strong>in</strong>g to Zitiste municipality, feel threatened <strong>an</strong>d object to the work local<br />
policemen, that is, accuse them of not us<strong>in</strong>g the same st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>for</strong> Serbs <strong>an</strong>d members<br />
of m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
75 Restaur<strong>an</strong>t "Mala gostiona" at Palic <strong>in</strong> May was the scene of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident. 75<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Albert Boroš, the <strong>in</strong>cident started when he <strong>an</strong>d his friend were approached<br />
by a girl who then criticized them <strong>for</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d moreover told them: "Go<br />
to Hungary, this is Serbia". Soon the two youths turned up <strong>an</strong>d started provok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cuss<strong>in</strong>g them. Then the physical brawl ensued. Hungari<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Ferenc<br />
Đurč<strong>an</strong>j, <strong>in</strong> his response to the <strong>in</strong>cident, dem<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>an</strong> energetic action of the Serb<br />
authorities aga<strong>in</strong>st the perpetrators. Tamaš Korhec, Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong><br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, Regulations <strong>an</strong>d National M<strong>in</strong>orities, then <strong>state</strong>d that the Hungari<strong>an</strong><br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister was not sufficiently <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med of the case, <strong>for</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>g to "the police<br />
head <strong>in</strong> Subotica the brawl between the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Hungari<strong>an</strong> youths was not nationally<br />
motivated." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the police communique, Boroš <strong>an</strong>d his pals, who were sitt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
on the bench <strong>in</strong> front of the restaur<strong>an</strong>t, started mak<strong>in</strong>g passes at the girls sitt<strong>in</strong>g nearby.<br />
Revolted by his conduct, Cvij<strong>an</strong>ović (the youth who took part <strong>in</strong> the brawl) took his girl<br />
<strong>in</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d then came out <strong>for</strong> a showdown with Boroš. Then Cvij<strong>an</strong>ović hit Boros several<br />
times <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>flicted on him lighter bodily <strong>in</strong>juries. Aga<strong>in</strong>st Cvij<strong>an</strong>ović were filed<br />
misdeme<strong>an</strong>our charges. Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1 June 2005.<br />
76 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 29 December 2005.<br />
77 Dnevnik, 26 March 2005. Presidency of the AVH <strong>in</strong>terpreted charges aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the party's frontmen as "political persecution <strong>an</strong>d a covert attack on Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s". AVH <strong>an</strong>nounced that it would ask the <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>for</strong>a to protect its<br />
president, officials <strong>an</strong>d membership from "a dishonest campaign target<strong>in</strong>g protectors of<br />
a national community." The AVH communique also stressed that "it was only question<br />
of time when the Serb police would resort <strong>an</strong>ew to covert attacks on Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, that is, its President Jožef Kasa, Vice President Imre Kern <strong>an</strong>d Zolt<strong>an</strong><br />
Bunjik." Dnevnik, 4 June 2005.<br />
78 Speakers at the rally were Andraš Agošton (DAVH), Pal Š<strong>an</strong>dor (DCVH),<br />
Laslo Rac Sabo (CAVH), Tibor Sabo (<strong>for</strong>mer President of Department <strong>for</strong> Diaspora<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s of the Republic of Hungary), <strong>an</strong>d Agota Gubaš (NGO Arač). Protest <strong>in</strong><br />
Subotica was assessed as a badly staged per<strong>for</strong>m<strong>an</strong>ce (Meho Omerović, SD), as a protest<br />
of milit<strong>an</strong>ts, <strong>an</strong>d not Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (Oliver Dulić, DP), as m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of<br />
young people (Tihomir Simić, PSS), as <strong>an</strong> attempt of marg<strong>in</strong>al politici<strong>an</strong>s to stage their<br />
political comeback (Velibor Radus<strong>in</strong>ović, DPS). M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Rights, Rasim Ljajić, <strong>in</strong>terpreted the protest as -<strong>an</strong> expected response: "I have <strong>an</strong>nounced<br />
<strong>in</strong> Brussels <strong>an</strong> imm<strong>in</strong>ent power struggle with<strong>in</strong> the Hungari<strong>an</strong> community, <strong>an</strong>d also<br />
with<strong>in</strong> other m<strong>in</strong>orities' communities. Namely, now every m<strong>in</strong>ority politici<strong>an</strong> shall try<br />
to prove that he is the best protector <strong>an</strong>d guardi<strong>an</strong> of <strong>in</strong>terests of his community." Jelica<br />
Rajačić Čapaković, president of Democratic Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, told a press conference that<br />
"there are evident threats to the rights of Hungari<strong>an</strong> national m<strong>in</strong>ority....tensions <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a additionally escalated because of relocation of Mađar so to Subotica, <strong>an</strong>d trials<br />
of Đerđ Ozer, Zolt<strong>an</strong> Bunjik <strong>an</strong>d Jožef Kasa. Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 18 October 2005.<br />
79 Dnevnik, 16 October 2005.<br />
336<br />
337
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
to a denizen of Novi Sad, Zor<strong>an</strong>u Petrović. 80 For that crime, the five youths of<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> nationality were sentenced to a total prison term of 61 years. Local<br />
public op<strong>in</strong>ion assessed that sentence as a "draconi<strong>an</strong> one", <strong>an</strong>d also as "<strong>an</strong><br />
example of unequitable law en<strong>for</strong>cement, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong> similar cases, perpetrators of<br />
Serb nationality, have not been passed such harsh sentences." As <strong>an</strong> example of<br />
double st<strong>an</strong>dards was also quoted the case of soldier Maćaš Kovač. 81 Namely<br />
the two soldiers who beat up Kovač <strong>an</strong>d gravely <strong>in</strong>jured him, were sentenced<br />
to a total of 2 years <strong>an</strong>d 4 months <strong>in</strong> jail. 82<br />
In cases of <strong>in</strong>equitable en<strong>for</strong>cement of legal provisions <strong>in</strong> sentenc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
procedure it is difficult to prove ethnic bias, but reactions of public op<strong>in</strong>ion to<br />
differences <strong>in</strong> prison terms should not be ignored. Hence we would like to<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t out <strong>in</strong> this report that public op<strong>in</strong>ion tends to <strong>in</strong>terpret such sentenc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as steeped <strong>in</strong> ethnic bias, which could potentially represent a major problem <strong>in</strong><br />
recovery of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>for</strong> such <strong>in</strong>terpretations impact the <strong>for</strong>mation<br />
of positions <strong>an</strong>d conduct of people <strong>an</strong>d may represent <strong>an</strong> additional element of<br />
radicalization.<br />
As regards the police, it is noteworthy that public attention was<br />
focused on lack of efficiency <strong>in</strong> its work, <strong>an</strong>d on the national composition, that<br />
is, prerogatives of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a adm<strong>in</strong>istration. After assess<strong>in</strong>g that members of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities are underrepresented <strong>in</strong> police <strong>for</strong>ces, prov<strong>in</strong>cial government asked<br />
the republic<strong>an</strong> bodies to prepare measures <strong>for</strong> remov<strong>in</strong>g that disproportion, 83<br />
<strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>e-tune the national police structure to the population structure. On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d, worsen<strong>in</strong>g of of multi-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong>dicated that, at least <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, the police had its h<strong>an</strong>ds tied. Namely the police are still a very<br />
centralized org<strong>an</strong>ization, over which the prov<strong>in</strong>cial govenrment has no power<br />
or control. Dem<strong>an</strong>d of Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostreš, President of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a assembly, that the<br />
police adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a be <strong>for</strong>med, was rebuffed. Kostres <strong>state</strong>d:<br />
"While we had our police there were no <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic tensions...<strong>in</strong>habit<strong>an</strong>ts of<br />
municipalities, the scene of <strong>in</strong>cidents, are conv<strong>in</strong>ced that <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic police<br />
would protect them more efficiently. 84<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Republic<strong>an</strong> authorities took a very hard l<strong>in</strong>e on problems which<br />
marked the year 2005, namely they treated them only as-<strong>in</strong>cidents. 85 They<br />
<strong>in</strong>sisted on that position even when <strong>in</strong>cidents spread horizontally <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>volved<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly large number of m<strong>in</strong>orities members. By sheer politick<strong>in</strong>g they<br />
tried to relocate the problem from Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to the neighbour<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Hungary <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terpret it as a reflection of <strong>in</strong>ternal political strife <strong>in</strong> that<br />
country. The basic underly<strong>in</strong>g reason <strong>for</strong> such a rigid st<strong>an</strong>ce of the Serb<br />
political elite should be seen <strong>in</strong> preparations <strong>for</strong> negotiations on the f<strong>in</strong>al status<br />
of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d the elite's assessment that open<strong>in</strong>g of the m<strong>in</strong>ority issue would<br />
present <strong>an</strong> additional burden <strong>for</strong> them <strong>an</strong>d make more difficult its negotiat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
position. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to some assessments more efficient work of the police <strong>in</strong><br />
2005 was not accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by <strong>an</strong> efficient work of the judiciary, despite<br />
resolute <strong>state</strong>ments of politici<strong>an</strong>s that "the Serb <strong>state</strong> would do its best to<br />
punish all perpetrators of <strong>in</strong>cidents." 86 The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g may be <strong>in</strong>terpreted by the<br />
need to reduce pressure on the government <strong>in</strong> order to enable it to devote its<br />
full attention to Kosovo-related negotiations th<strong>an</strong>ks to a "pacified" issue of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Kosovo issue is present <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> several ways-as <strong>an</strong><br />
element of radicalization, as <strong>an</strong> element of pacification, <strong>an</strong>d as a factor<br />
impact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>mulation of claims laid by ethnic protagonists. 87 There is a<br />
palpable public fear that if settlement of Kosovo issue results contrary to<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of Serbia, radicalization <strong>an</strong>d a major pressure of nationalists 88 on<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities would ensue. A direct sp<strong>in</strong> off of such radicalization would be<br />
direct violence aga<strong>in</strong>st some m<strong>in</strong>orities, notably Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, Rom<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Ashkali, which their fellow-citizens liken to Kosovo Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d a major<br />
pressure on autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. However, <strong>in</strong> that regard op<strong>in</strong>ions varied.<br />
In his <strong>in</strong>terview to Novi Sad daily Dnevnik, Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtic, Vice Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>state</strong>d that open<strong>in</strong>g of discussion on Kosovo, despite negative<br />
reflections which had been felt after the March 2004 violence <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, should<br />
not lead to new escalation of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic tensions <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
80 After beat<strong>in</strong>g up Petrović, the youth started fir<strong>in</strong>g up matches on his body,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong>ally pushed a br<strong>an</strong>ch <strong>in</strong>to his <strong>an</strong>us.<br />
81 Kovač had his spleen removed by doctors.<br />
82 Atila Juhas, Mayor of Senta, told journalists that the conviction was to mild,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>comparable to the one meted <strong>in</strong> the cas of Temer<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident. Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 26/27<br />
November 2005. The youth's parents compla<strong>in</strong>ed of be<strong>in</strong>g b<strong>an</strong>ned from speak<strong>in</strong>g to him<br />
<strong>in</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d of be<strong>in</strong>g beaten up after arrest. Jožef Kasa, leader of the AVH, <strong>state</strong>d<br />
that he would dem<strong>an</strong>d repeat of trial <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m of the case <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
83 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 22 April 2005.<br />
84 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 17/18 December 2005.<br />
85 In Dictionary of Foreign Words <strong>an</strong>d Expression, written by Radomir Aleksić,<br />
Prosveta, Beograd, 1978, page 313, <strong>in</strong>cident is <strong>in</strong>terpreted as 1. <strong>an</strong> unexpected,<br />
unpleas<strong>an</strong>t event 2. a small –scale conflict, a skirmish (cross-border <strong>in</strong>cident)<br />
86 Dur<strong>in</strong>g his visit to Budapest, President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
"protection of m<strong>in</strong>orities is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t, civilization-wise, issue <strong>for</strong> every society" <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that "the Serb <strong>state</strong> would do its utmost to punish those who have provoked <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a", D<strong>an</strong>as, 4 October 2005.<br />
87 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Andraš Agošton, Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a should have the<br />
same autonomy be<strong>in</strong>g urged <strong>for</strong> Serbs <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
88 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Vladimir Ilić from the Centre <strong>for</strong> Development of Civili<strong>an</strong><br />
Society, unfavourable developments <strong>in</strong> Kosovo could affect <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, frustrate the majority population <strong>an</strong>d lower the threshold of toler<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
towards ethnic communities. Dnevnik, 24 June 2005.<br />
338<br />
339
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
That <strong>in</strong>terview was particularly <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g from the <strong>an</strong>gle of<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> worsen<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations. In deny<strong>in</strong>g the prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration responsibility, Pajtić po<strong>in</strong>ted out that "the graffiti, physical<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents, underrepresentation of members of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> the police <strong>an</strong>d<br />
judiciary belong to competence of the republic<strong>an</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d not prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration". 89 The issue of responsibility was raised <strong>in</strong> October, after<br />
appear<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>an</strong>ti-Hungari<strong>an</strong> graffiti <strong>in</strong> the Novi Sad suburb of Telep. Then<br />
the Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s dem<strong>an</strong>ded resignation of Rasim Ljajic,<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights. Ljajić thus responded to that<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d: „Insistence on my resignation is t<strong>an</strong>tamount to politization of current<br />
developments <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. By the way if the issue of someone's responsibility<br />
is raised, then we should bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that Tamas Korhec, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
secretary <strong>for</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>an</strong>d member of the AVH, has larger prerogatives<br />
th<strong>an</strong> I do, which practically me<strong>an</strong>s that he should assume responsibility <strong>for</strong> the<br />
status of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a." 90<br />
In contrast to the republic<strong>an</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istration, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial one<br />
demonstrated a higher degree of sensitivity to problems which had arisen <strong>in</strong><br />
the field of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations. In early March, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities<br />
adopted a project "Affirmation of multiculturalism <strong>an</strong>d toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a" 91 with a view to present<strong>in</strong>g to secondary school pupils l<strong>in</strong>guistic,<br />
cultural <strong>an</strong>d religious diversity as a value, adv<strong>an</strong>tage <strong>an</strong>d prospect. 92 In<br />
present<strong>in</strong>g the project, Tamaš Korhec, Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong> Adm<strong>in</strong>istration,<br />
Regulations <strong>an</strong>d National M<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>state</strong>d that preservation of good <strong>in</strong>terethnic<br />
relations is one of the priorities of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial government, <strong>an</strong>d as<br />
such a condition of stability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tegration of the country <strong>in</strong>to the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
structures. 93 In his m<strong>in</strong>d "we don't only need responses by the judiciary <strong>an</strong>d<br />
police...that is, we <strong>in</strong> fact need preventive actions, that is curb<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
phenomena which lead to upsett<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations." 94 He added:<br />
"The exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic toler<strong>an</strong>ce stems from prejudices <strong>an</strong>d ignor<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the goal of this program is education <strong>an</strong>d revival of a multi-l<strong>in</strong>gual system<br />
conducive to strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic confidence." 95<br />
89 Dnevnik, 2 November 2005<br />
90 Dnevnik, 28 October 2005<br />
91 The project was backed by the Hungari<strong>an</strong> government, the US embassy <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the OSCE mission <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, <strong>an</strong>d comp<strong>an</strong>y "Bambi" of Požarevac.<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 27 September 2005.<br />
92 The project would be realized via sports competitions, exhibitions, quizzes,<br />
distribution of educational ethnic tradition-themed publications, <strong>an</strong>d other activities.<br />
93 Dnevnik, 4 March 2005.<br />
94 D<strong>an</strong>as, 4 March 2005.<br />
95 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 27 September 2005. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Korhec, all actions which<br />
shall be realized with<strong>in</strong> the project shall be accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by educational publications,<br />
which <strong>in</strong> near future could become part of the school syllabus.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
We should mention the Youth Camp of Toler<strong>an</strong>ce, org<strong>an</strong>ized at Palic<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>tly by the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Hungari<strong>an</strong> Parliament, 96 as <strong>an</strong> example of good<br />
practice, that is <strong>an</strong> attempt to relax <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic tensions <strong>an</strong>d to affirm<br />
multiculturalism <strong>an</strong>d toler<strong>an</strong>ce. The same holds true of a series of <strong>in</strong>itiatives<br />
taken by civili<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izations 97 or <strong>an</strong>nounced by the officials. Thus, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial government showed its read<strong>in</strong>ess to create, as of 2006,<br />
all the necessary conditions <strong>for</strong> education of members of Macedoni<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
<strong>in</strong> their mother tongue, <strong>in</strong> municipalities of Pl<strong>an</strong>diste <strong>an</strong>d P<strong>an</strong>cevo, <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce Macedoni<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage newspapers. As regards <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities, it bears not<strong>in</strong>g that after 64 years the Ukra<strong>in</strong>i<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage daily<br />
"Ridne Slovo" was re-launched. Its publish<strong>in</strong>g shall be funded from the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial budget.<br />
Two more events are noteworthy. At the meet<strong>in</strong>g between the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial prime m<strong>in</strong>ster <strong>an</strong>d representatives of national councils the lack of a<br />
consistent <strong>state</strong> strategy <strong>for</strong> promotion of status of national m<strong>in</strong>orities was<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated. It was also established that a new democratic plat<strong>for</strong>m aimed at<br />
improv<strong>in</strong>g that status, should be also drawn up. All particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the meet<strong>in</strong>g<br />
agreed that the said plat<strong>for</strong>m should <strong>in</strong>clude the strategy on the m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
policy <strong>in</strong> the fields of the official use of l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d alphabet, culture,<br />
education <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, as well as prevention, that is the penalty policy<br />
towards perpetrators of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents. 98 The second import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
devleopment was a rapid reaction of the <strong>state</strong> bodies to the 9 November<br />
<strong>in</strong>cident at the Novi Sad Faculty of Philosophy. Namely, <strong>in</strong> order to mark the<br />
International Day of Struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st Fascism, Anti-Semitism <strong>an</strong>d Racism, the<br />
p<strong>an</strong>el discussion was staged. The said discussion was <strong>in</strong>terrupted by a group<br />
of neo-Nazis who <strong>in</strong>sulted the particip<strong>an</strong>ts. Public op<strong>in</strong>ion responded by sharp<br />
condemnation of that <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>an</strong>d a dem<strong>an</strong>d that all neo-Nazi org<strong>an</strong>isations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d groups be outlawed <strong>an</strong>d b<strong>an</strong>ned. Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a parliament then also<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded that the Serb government <strong>an</strong>d other competent <strong>in</strong>stitutions did<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to prevent actions <strong>an</strong>d activities of sk<strong>in</strong>heads <strong>an</strong>d<br />
96 The Camp was <strong>in</strong>augurated by Katal<strong>in</strong> Sili, President of the Hungari<strong>an</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Predrag Marković, President of the Serb parliament. In early February they signed <strong>an</strong><br />
agreement on toller<strong>an</strong>ce, of which the hold<strong>in</strong>g of the a<strong>for</strong>mentioned Camp made part.<br />
The agreement also envisaged development of economic ties, <strong>for</strong> toler<strong>an</strong>ce, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the president of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> parliament, is possible only if followed by economic<br />
support <strong>an</strong>d regional development. Dnevnik, 27 May 2005.<br />
97 As <strong>an</strong> example of good practice we should mention the re-pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g grafftti<br />
action taken by a group "Reaguj" <strong>in</strong> several towns of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia. The pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g<br />
brush was used throughout 2005 by members of the Council of Local Community South<br />
Telep, as well as members of the establishment, -Rasim Ljajić i Tamaš Korhec.<br />
98 As <strong>an</strong>nounced the work<strong>in</strong>g group, made up of representatives of the<br />
Executive Council <strong>an</strong>d national councils, should start its work with<strong>in</strong> 10 days. Dnevnik,<br />
11 November 2005.<br />
340<br />
341
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations "National Squad", "Blood <strong>an</strong>d Honour" <strong>an</strong>d "Racial Nationalists",<br />
<strong>an</strong>d b<strong>an</strong>ned activities of the political movement "Cheek", <strong>an</strong>d those of<br />
Movement of 64 Districts, which harmed <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the Republic of Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sulted national feel<strong>in</strong>gs of citizens. 99<br />
And f<strong>in</strong>ally it should be mentioned that <strong>in</strong> a series of municipalities,<br />
on the basis of the Act on Local Self-Rule, Councils <strong>for</strong> Inter-Ethnic Relations<br />
were set up. From the st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t of exercise of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights those councils<br />
are import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> they more or less <strong>in</strong>directly <strong>in</strong>dicate the status of some<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the unofficial data, Rom<strong>an</strong>y are the most numerous<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority, but a very dispersive one, which strips them of some import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
collective rights. Due to their territorial non-concentration <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong><br />
percentages <strong>in</strong> municipalities <strong>in</strong> which they live, participation of<br />
representatives of that m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> constitut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d work of their pert<strong>in</strong>ent<br />
Council is not envisaged. 100 Other m<strong>in</strong>orities, notably Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s,<br />
Yugoslavs, or Vojvod<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>s, are <strong>in</strong> a similar situation. Though they, <strong>in</strong> contrast<br />
to Rom<strong>an</strong>y, are represented <strong>in</strong> the envisaged percentage <strong>in</strong> the structure of<br />
Novi Sad population, representatives of those m<strong>in</strong>orities are not legally<br />
entitled to membership or positions <strong>in</strong> that Council. Such a nihilistic position<br />
on Yugoslavs <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong>dicates a repressed chauv<strong>in</strong>istic nature of the<br />
majority, Serb nationalism. Attitude towards Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s is even more<br />
complicated, because it is mediated by the Serb Orthodox Church. Namely <strong>in</strong><br />
order to improve its status, the Association of Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s of Serbia, "Krstaš"<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational conference on the status <strong>an</strong>d rights of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Nenad Stevovic, president of "Krstas" said: "We shall<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g pressure to bear on the political elite <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong> order to make it<br />
improve the status <strong>an</strong>d position of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> ethnic community, that is,<br />
to effect its equalization with all other national m<strong>in</strong>orities." He assessed that<br />
"the rights of Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia are now very threatened, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
right to freedom of religious expression, the right to their mother tongue <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the right to political activities." The Association pl<strong>an</strong>s to build <strong>in</strong> Lovcenac the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Orthodox church, but the Serb Orthodox Church opposes that<br />
pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> view of fact that its own church is be<strong>in</strong>g built there. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
99 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 21 December 2005.<br />
100 Dur<strong>in</strong>g constitution of the Council <strong>for</strong> Inter-Ethnic Relations <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g question emerged: should a representative of Rom<strong>an</strong>y take part <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Council's work. Under the law the Council members should be only representatives of<br />
those m<strong>in</strong>orities which account <strong>for</strong> 1% of population structure, <strong>an</strong>d that is not the case<br />
with the Rom<strong>an</strong>y m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad. Some MPs of the city assembly criticized the<br />
proposed composition of the Council <strong>an</strong>d asked <strong>for</strong> amendments relat<strong>in</strong>g to the scope of<br />
work, composition <strong>an</strong>d mode of work of the Council. Subotica municipality was faced<br />
with the same problem, but it was resolved <strong>in</strong> "<strong>an</strong> eleg<strong>an</strong>t way." Th<strong>an</strong>ks to the proposal<br />
of Mayor Geza Kučera a Rom<strong>an</strong>y representative made part of the Council, but without<br />
the vot<strong>in</strong>g right.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Ljubomir Perovic, most people who back construction of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
orthodox church are vexed by the fact that the Serb Orthodox Church refuses<br />
to enter <strong>in</strong>to the churh registry their new-born children as Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s.<br />
Perović added that people were hurt by the Christmas message of Bishop Ir<strong>in</strong>ej<br />
Bulović <strong>in</strong> which he said that people who were build<strong>in</strong>g the Serb Orthodox<br />
church were entrusted by God himself with a holy mission of serbiz<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
area. 101 It should be stressed that the Association asked M<strong>in</strong>ister Ljajic to<br />
protect the <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d civil rights of Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s by return<strong>in</strong>g to the country<br />
<strong>an</strong>d publicly destroy<strong>in</strong>g the list with names of Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia, which had<br />
been h<strong>an</strong>ded to the EU representatives by the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav<br />
Koštunica. If a response to that dem<strong>an</strong>d fails to materialize then Association<br />
"Krstaš" <strong>in</strong>tends to <strong>in</strong>ternationalize the issue of violations of the rights of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> national m<strong>in</strong>ority. 102<br />
Problems <strong>in</strong> atta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>an</strong>d exercise of the m<strong>in</strong>ority rights may be<br />
registered <strong>an</strong>d monitored <strong>in</strong> several areas: <strong>in</strong> relations between the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>in</strong> relations between the majority <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ority, <strong>in</strong> relations<br />
between m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-m<strong>in</strong>ority relations. Public attention is usually<br />
focused on the first two areas. The <strong>state</strong> is expected to protect <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights, <strong>an</strong>d not to call them <strong>in</strong>to question by its decisions or moves. 103<br />
However the exist<strong>in</strong>g problems c<strong>an</strong>not be reduced only to the first two areas,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d public attention should also be focused on <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tra-m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
relations. In those terms we should list problems which exist between<br />
members of Croat <strong>an</strong>d Bunjevci M<strong>in</strong>ority, partly because of their long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
nature. As it has been earlier mentioned <strong>in</strong> this report, Presidency of<br />
Democratic Community of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Croats, <strong>in</strong> its Declaration listed as a<br />
special problem, "<strong>an</strong> active, <strong>state</strong> action aimed at divid<strong>in</strong>g the Croat m<strong>in</strong>ority"<br />
101 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 11 August 2005.<br />
102 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 13 July 2005.<br />
103 On 11 April the municipal assembly of Šid abolished the official use of<br />
Slovak <strong>an</strong>d Rutheni<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d Lat<strong>in</strong> alphabet <strong>in</strong> the municipal territory. National<br />
Councils of Slovaks <strong>an</strong>d Rutheni<strong>an</strong>s criticized that decision, while the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Secretariat <strong>for</strong> Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, Regulations <strong>an</strong>d National M<strong>in</strong>orities, warned that <strong>in</strong> case<br />
of its en<strong>for</strong>cement, they would ask the Constitutional Court to <strong>in</strong>stitute proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>for</strong><br />
the apprasal of constitutionality <strong>an</strong>d legality of that decision. With only one aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
vote, assembly MPs then repealed their decision. In other cases the right to the official<br />
use of l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d alphabet because of <strong>in</strong>dolence or resit<strong>an</strong>ce of (local) authorities is<br />
not fully exercised. The most salient example thereof was the opposition of local<br />
authorities <strong>in</strong> Srbobr<strong>an</strong> to en<strong>for</strong>ce the decision of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretariar <strong>for</strong><br />
M<strong>in</strong>orities to add the traditional Hungari<strong>an</strong> name Szenttamas to official signboards <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>scriptions. 103<br />
Problems with which members of Rom<strong>an</strong>y m<strong>in</strong>ority are faced, are best<br />
illustrated by the follow<strong>in</strong>g figure of the Centre <strong>for</strong> M<strong>in</strong>orities' Rights: <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary –<br />
September 2005 period 121 cases of unlawufl police actions, violence <strong>an</strong>d discim<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
by private persons were reported.<br />
342<br />
343
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d "ef<strong>for</strong>ts to artificially morph a regional Croat ethnic group (Bunjevci)<br />
speak<strong>in</strong>g one of the Croat dialects (ikavica), <strong>in</strong>to a new ethnic group under a<br />
regional name <strong>an</strong>d to confront it with the Croat community." The goal of that<br />
campaign is "to facilitate assimilation of the Croat community.". DCVC <strong>in</strong> early<br />
2005 sharply reacted to the <strong>an</strong>noucement of the National Council of Bunjevci<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority that Bunjevci l<strong>an</strong>guage from the start of the new school-year would<br />
be studied <strong>in</strong> primary schools. The follow-up was <strong>an</strong> open letter of 50 Croat<br />
Bunjevci from Serbia, Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Hungary to the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Croat authorities,<br />
<strong>in</strong> which they asked <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> end "to the process of division of the Croat ethnic<br />
community <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong>to Croats <strong>an</strong>d Bunjevci." 104<br />
And then there were responses by the other side. In assess<strong>in</strong>g that the<br />
a<strong>for</strong>ementioned Declaration confirmed the existence of serious <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic<br />
problmes <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, Bunjevci Party dedicated special attention to the<br />
position that the <strong>state</strong> was encourag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> artificial division <strong>in</strong> the midst of the<br />
Croat community, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>d that such claim was t<strong>an</strong>tamount to a classical<br />
misplacement of thesis <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> attempt to assimilate Bunjevci. 105 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Mirko Bajić, prov<strong>in</strong>cial MP <strong>an</strong>d member of the <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Inter-Ethnic<br />
Relations of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament: "It is not right <strong>an</strong>d legal <strong>for</strong> the national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority or its political representatives to contest the right of other national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority to existence, <strong>an</strong>d to other rights which it lay claims to." 106 He asked<br />
the <strong>state</strong> bodies to protect Bunjevci rights <strong>an</strong>d condemn "unfair <strong>an</strong>d<br />
unargumented attacks aim<strong>in</strong>g to facilitate assimilation of Bunjevci by the Croat<br />
national community." 107 Darko Babić, President of Bunjevci Party, <strong>state</strong>d that a<br />
letter was sent to the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica, <strong>an</strong>d that President of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d representatives of competent committees <strong>in</strong> the republic<strong>an</strong><br />
parliament were familiar with contents thereof. He added that charges were<br />
filed aga<strong>in</strong>st President of DCCV <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>stigat<strong>in</strong>g racial, religious <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic<br />
hatred. 108 Davor Vidis, Consul General of the Republic of Croatia <strong>in</strong> Serbia,<br />
also spoke about exist<strong>in</strong>g problems between Croats <strong>an</strong>d Bunjevci. Namely he<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that "the Republic Croatia considered Bunjevci <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a as a sub-<br />
104 Dnevnik, 26 February 2005.<br />
105 Dnevnik, 27 October 2005.<br />
106 Dnevnik, 28 October 2005. Petar Ladjevic, Secretary of the Council <strong>for</strong><br />
National M<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>state</strong>d that the appraisal that the <strong>state</strong> backed Bunjevci, <strong>an</strong>d not the<br />
Croat National Council, was very cynical. He added that "<strong>in</strong> the near future we shall<br />
stage <strong>an</strong> expert meet<strong>in</strong>g dedicated to the official use of Bunjevci l<strong>an</strong>guage. Experts of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Academy of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Sciences alongside representatives of Bunjevci m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
would also take part <strong>in</strong> that meet<strong>in</strong>g." Petar Kuntić, president of DAVC, said that <strong>in</strong><br />
regard to that issue his org<strong>an</strong>ization has already contacted the Serb, the Croat, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial academies, <strong>an</strong>d that their positions were different. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him only the<br />
Serb Academy of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Sciences th<strong>in</strong>ks that <strong>in</strong>troduction of Bunjevci l<strong>an</strong>gauge<br />
should be approved. Dnevnik, 8 November 2005.<br />
107 Dnevnik, 28 October 2005.<br />
108 Dnevnik, 27 October 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
ethnic group which clearly belongs to the Croat national body." 109 In<br />
underscor<strong>in</strong>g that such a position was based on scientific <strong>an</strong>d objective facts,<br />
Davor Vidiš added: "if part of that community does not consider itself as<br />
members of the Croat people, <strong>an</strong>d ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that it it is a dist<strong>in</strong>ct enhnicity,<br />
they are entitled to do so, <strong>for</strong> nationality is a subjective feel<strong>in</strong>g." 110<br />
And f<strong>in</strong>ally attention should be paid to the follow<strong>in</strong>g fact: m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
are not homogenous communities, all m<strong>in</strong>ority members don't have equally<br />
developed national awareness, nor they all are equally ready to engage<br />
temselves <strong>for</strong> the sake of atta<strong>in</strong>ment of community's goals, <strong>an</strong>d not all<br />
members of pert<strong>in</strong>ent m<strong>in</strong>ority agree on measures which should best serve the<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of their community <strong>in</strong> the given case. For example the decision of the<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> National Council to resort to overhaul of popular Hungari<strong>an</strong><br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage daily "Madjar so" 111 was strongly contested by part of (non-party<br />
members) of the Council, 112 journalists , 113 but also by members of the<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> community proper. 114 That decision was publicly <strong>in</strong>terpreted as <strong>an</strong><br />
attempt of the Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s to establish a full control over<br />
the newspaper <strong>an</strong>d also as a signal to Hungari<strong>an</strong>s to relocate to North<br />
109 Dnevnik, 16 February 2005.<br />
110 Dnevnik, 16 February 2005.<br />
111 That overhaul <strong>in</strong>cludes above all downsiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d relocation of<br />
desk <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal affairs <strong>an</strong>d cultural affairs column-writers to Subotica.<br />
112 On its 23 September session by the majority vote ( 22 votes) the National<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> Council approved the newspaper's overhaul. One of members of the council<br />
who opposed that decision, Dr Laslo Gerold, <strong>state</strong>d that the decision on relocation had<br />
been taken long time ago, even be<strong>for</strong>e "Altis", a consult<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>y of <strong>for</strong>mer F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Božidar Đelić, came out with its <strong>an</strong>alysis. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to "Altis" <strong>an</strong>alysis "Mađar<br />
so" was <strong>in</strong> dire f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial straits, hence the suggestion to downsize its Novi Sad office <strong>an</strong>d<br />
relocate its seat to Subotica. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Đelić, readers w<strong>an</strong>t mostly local <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d they are best covered <strong>an</strong>d found by local journalists, "which me<strong>an</strong>s that br<strong>an</strong>ch<br />
offices <strong>in</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong> milieus <strong>in</strong> North Backa <strong>an</strong>d B<strong>an</strong>at should be enlarged, at the<br />
expense of Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> ones." Dnevnik, 30 August 2005.<br />
113 Journalists did not contest the need <strong>for</strong> overhaul, but they thought that it<br />
would be best dealt with by a consult<strong>in</strong>g house, <strong>an</strong>d not by <strong>an</strong> expert body. It bears<br />
mention<strong>in</strong>g that the conflict between journalists <strong>an</strong>d the publish<strong>in</strong>g house leadership is<br />
a long-runn<strong>in</strong>g one. The official celebrations of the 60-<strong>an</strong>niversary of the newspaper<br />
were not attended by journalists. They org<strong>an</strong>ized their own modest celebrations. Ferenc<br />
Čik Nađ, journalist, was fired because he allowed a photo-reporter of "Dnevnika" to take<br />
shots of the journalistic celebrations of the jubilee, without authorization of "Madjar so"<br />
editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief.<br />
114 Be<strong>for</strong>e a large audience <strong>in</strong> the hall of cultural association "Š<strong>an</strong>dor Petefi" a<br />
rally discuss<strong>in</strong>g relocation of "Mađar so" to Subotica was held. Most citizens opposed reorg<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
of the newspaper, deem<strong>in</strong>g it a take over attempt by the AVH. Marton<br />
Matuska, a retired journalist of "Madjar so" then <strong>state</strong>d: "We faced such a large audience<br />
<strong>in</strong> this hall the last time 15 years ago when the then Democratic Community of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s w<strong>an</strong>ted to take over "Mađar". Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 21 September 2005.<br />
344<br />
345
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, 115 that is as a bad sign 116 <strong>for</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> South Backa that other<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions would be relocated to Subotica too. 117 Responses to the decision of<br />
the Council also reflect dist<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>in</strong>terests of some regions <strong>in</strong> which members of<br />
the Hungari<strong>an</strong> Community live. Interests of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad differ<br />
from <strong>in</strong>terest of Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> other parts of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong>d the ability of Novi<br />
Sad to harmonize various <strong>in</strong>terests impacts its authority. Regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
<strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g it should be stressed that legitimacy of the National Council of<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s has been contested s<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>in</strong>ception. Some Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties<br />
<strong>an</strong>d renowned <strong>in</strong>tellectuals 118 th<strong>in</strong>k that the NCH was <strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong> a legal, but<br />
not <strong>in</strong> a legitimate way, <strong>an</strong>d that it represents <strong>in</strong>terests of the strongest party,<br />
AVH, <strong>in</strong>stead of represent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests of the national community. In mid-<br />
September a group of Hungari<strong>an</strong> citizens disgruntled with the work of the<br />
NCH launched <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative, that is sent a proposal on <strong>for</strong>mation of a new<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization more legitimately represent<strong>in</strong>g the community <strong>in</strong>terests to 400<br />
addresses. Other ethnic communities have also m<strong>an</strong>ifested their discontent<br />
with the work of national councils. In early May 7 Bosniak parties launched <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>for</strong> conven<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>ary electors assembly. In their op<strong>in</strong>ion<br />
the NC currently does not have the legitimacy to represent <strong>in</strong>terests of<br />
115 Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 15 August 2005.<br />
116 "That is a bad sign <strong>for</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> South Backa, I fear that a similar fate<br />
awaits other <strong>in</strong>stitutions of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. I fear that <strong>in</strong> 2-3 years time it shall be<br />
assessed that the editorial staff c<strong>an</strong>not function <strong>in</strong> three places, <strong>an</strong>d then it will be<br />
decided that the newspaper would be pr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> Subotica, which <strong>in</strong> turn would me<strong>an</strong> a<br />
loss of job <strong>for</strong> the pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g facilities of Forum." D<strong>an</strong>as, 27 September 2005.<br />
117 Zolt<strong>an</strong> Siflis, member of the National Council <strong>state</strong>d: "This hue <strong>an</strong>d cry<br />
should not postpone reorg<strong>an</strong>ization of the paper, <strong>for</strong> then we would face <strong>an</strong> even<br />
greater outcry when we beg<strong>in</strong> reorg<strong>an</strong>ization of other Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions." He also<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that because of those words of his "I was attacked by my colleague Laslo<br />
Galamboš, who accused me that we were also pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to relocate from Novi Sad the<br />
radio, theatre, Act<strong>in</strong>g Department <strong>in</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage of the Dramatic Arts<br />
Academy, <strong>an</strong>d publish<strong>in</strong>g houses. But we have not discussed that <strong>in</strong> the council <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
the party. Though we should discuss re-org<strong>an</strong>ization of publish<strong>in</strong>g activities <strong>in</strong><br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage." Šifliš then went on to expla<strong>in</strong> that he was referr<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
reorg<strong>an</strong>ization of the Cultural Institute of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Senta, founded by<br />
the National Council. The Institute pl<strong>an</strong>s to make a database of cultural heritage of the<br />
local Hungara<strong>in</strong>s, while <strong>in</strong> his m<strong>in</strong>d, old pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gs, photographs, books, documents,<br />
films from various museums <strong>an</strong>d localities <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a should be all collected <strong>an</strong>d kept<br />
<strong>in</strong> Senta. Građ<strong>an</strong>ski list, 29 September 2005.<br />
Laslo Galamboš <strong>state</strong>d that <strong>for</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong>s physical presence of "Mađar so" <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Sad was very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d that old <strong>in</strong>stitutions of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> Community<br />
should rema<strong>in</strong> where they are, <strong>an</strong>d that Subotica could become a seat of the new ones.<br />
Dnevnik, 27 September 2005.<br />
118 That <strong>in</strong>itiative was launcehd by academici<strong>an</strong> Dr Bela Ribar, histori<strong>an</strong> Đerđ<br />
Gal, Geze Nemet, Antal Bozoki, Margit Nađ, Julija <strong>an</strong>d Josip Orovec, Marija Matuska<br />
<strong>an</strong>d others.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Bosniaks, <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>fluence of List of S<strong>an</strong>dzak on the electorate has w<strong>an</strong>ed.<br />
Interests of the two conflicted political group<strong>in</strong>gs with<strong>in</strong> the Bosniak<br />
community were m<strong>an</strong>ifested <strong>in</strong> conflicts between the executive <strong>an</strong>d<br />
representative bodies <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar, their mutual accusations <strong>an</strong>d a series of<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al charges.<br />
119<br />
Conflict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests among the Rom<strong>an</strong>y m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
culm<strong>in</strong>ated with a dem<strong>an</strong>d that the National Council be be replaced, that is,<br />
b<strong>an</strong>ned. 120<br />
Faced with a deficit of legitimacy national councils are one of the<br />
elements contribut<strong>in</strong>g to escalation of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations. Indirect,<br />
undemocratic election of councils via electronic assemblies proved to be a bad<br />
solution. Thus party fractions of national elites were favoured, members of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities were stripped of their <strong>in</strong>fluence, <strong>an</strong>d the very idea of m<strong>in</strong>ority selfrule<br />
was called <strong>in</strong>to question. It was repeatedly <strong>state</strong>d that the act spell<strong>in</strong>g out<br />
more precisely m<strong>an</strong>ner of the council's election, mode of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
prerogatives, should be urgently adopted. In early 2005 round-table held <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Sad it was po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the process of adoption of the m<strong>in</strong>orityrelated<br />
legislation was slowed-down, <strong>an</strong>d the legal framework, with<strong>in</strong> which<br />
the m<strong>in</strong>orities should exercise their rights, was <strong>in</strong>complete <strong>an</strong>d contradictory.<br />
Conclusion<br />
The Serb authorities did not respond adequately to the 2005 escalation<br />
of <strong>in</strong>ther-ethnic relations. Instead of fac<strong>in</strong>g the problem, they decided to<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imize it. Disgruntled with such a tack of the authorities, political<br />
representatives of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority decided to attract <strong>in</strong>terest of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>for</strong>a, <strong>for</strong> their <strong>an</strong>d other m<strong>in</strong>orities status <strong>an</strong>d problems.<br />
Internationalization of the probelm proved to be <strong>an</strong> efficient vehicle,<br />
<strong>for</strong> it led to reduction of <strong>in</strong>cidents. It additionally showed that the Serb<br />
problems with m<strong>in</strong>orities were <strong>in</strong> fact problems with Europe<strong>an</strong> Union.<br />
119 Soured relations between Bosniak parties became m<strong>an</strong>ifest dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>auguration of a bridge <strong>in</strong> locality Lug. Buld<strong>in</strong>g of that bridge "was funded by Novi<br />
Pazar <strong>an</strong>d Americ<strong>an</strong> people", <strong>an</strong>d the bridge was <strong>in</strong>augurated by US Ambassador<br />
Michael Polt, municipal president Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d president of the municipal<br />
assembly Azem Hajdarević. Arrival of Hajdarević with his collaborators, was loudly<br />
boed by Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>'s followers. Shocked by such conduct Ambassador Polt discreetly<br />
threatened that he would leave if the public did not quieten now. " D<strong>an</strong>as, 10 October<br />
2005.<br />
120 It was said that the current Council should be disb<strong>an</strong>ded on ground of its<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial mish<strong>an</strong>dl<strong>in</strong>g, status misuses, breaches of legal provisions, division of Rom<strong>an</strong>y<br />
on religious basis, etc.<br />
346<br />
347
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
In 2005 the number of <strong>in</strong>cidents fell, but ethnic <strong>an</strong>d cultural rifts <strong>in</strong> the<br />
society cont<strong>in</strong>ued to deepen. Initiatives to straddle those rifts were met by a<br />
strong autism of the <strong>in</strong>cumbent authorities. 121<br />
Inability of the political elite to make a U turn <strong>an</strong>d constitutionally<br />
(re)def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e identity of Serbia, effect comprehensive decentralization, broaden<br />
prerogatives of local self-rules, has a frustrat<strong>in</strong>g effect <strong>an</strong>d tends to radicalize<br />
the m<strong>in</strong>orities. Faced with a moral <strong>in</strong>sensivity of the majority, cultural racism,<br />
economic marg<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d political repression-the current Serb parliament<br />
has less m<strong>in</strong>ority parties MPs th<strong>an</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Milosevic regime-m<strong>in</strong>orities are<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly look<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a way out <strong>in</strong> the shape of –special arr<strong>an</strong>gements.<br />
In current circumst<strong>an</strong>ces most attractive are the solutions which <strong>in</strong> the<br />
case of a well thought-out (not only) m<strong>in</strong>ority policy would enjoy a marg<strong>in</strong>al<br />
back<strong>in</strong>g. In absence of comprehensive re<strong>for</strong>ms the assertion that the claim to<br />
territorial autonomy is rather <strong>an</strong> efficient me<strong>an</strong>s of isolation of m<strong>in</strong>orities, th<strong>an</strong><br />
a successful vehicle <strong>for</strong> problem resolution, is becom<strong>in</strong>g less conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Aside from the Hungari<strong>an</strong>, other m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce don't have<br />
resources to impose themselves as <strong>in</strong>fluential political protagonists. Added to<br />
that they don't do <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g to become more <strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>in</strong> order to prevent<br />
down-scal<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations to the two, <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, most numerous<br />
ethnic communities.<br />
Deeply <strong>in</strong>gra<strong>in</strong>ed prejudices <strong>an</strong>d stereotypes c<strong>an</strong>not be removed by<br />
limited affirmative actions. That task should be taken on by social sub-systems,<br />
like educational ones, <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mative one, cultural one, etc.<br />
The fact that m<strong>in</strong>orities are <strong>for</strong>mally recognized <strong>an</strong>d legally<br />
guar<strong>an</strong>teed the rights with bear<strong>in</strong>g on preservation of their identity, c<strong>an</strong> barely<br />
conceal the prevail<strong>in</strong>g conviction that m<strong>in</strong>orities are still "a burden", <strong>an</strong>d not<br />
"<strong>an</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>tage, value or prospect."<br />
121 Ljubica Kiselički (DP, Subotica) submitted <strong>an</strong> official request to the<br />
Pedagogical Institute of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to launch <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative regard<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>troduction of<br />
m<strong>an</strong>datory classes of the l<strong>an</strong>guage of social milieu (until 1992 such l<strong>an</strong>guage classes<br />
were <strong>an</strong> optional subject-matter). Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretariat <strong>for</strong> Education also launched a<br />
similar <strong>in</strong>itiative. But the f<strong>in</strong>al decision on that matter is to be taken by the Republic<strong>an</strong><br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Education <strong>an</strong>d Sports. Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vuks<strong>an</strong>ović, the Serb Education Secretary,<br />
th<strong>in</strong>ks that "to implement that <strong>in</strong>itiative would be t<strong>an</strong>tamount to do<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g by<br />
<strong>for</strong>ce. We believe <strong>in</strong> the freedom of choice of children ...so I don't see why we should<br />
compel someone to learn l<strong>an</strong>guages, <strong>for</strong> they now live <strong>an</strong>d fraternize together. "<br />
Vuks<strong>an</strong>ović added: "Dem<strong>an</strong>d of a municipal committee of a party is the least import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
one. If such a dem<strong>an</strong>d is prompted by a wish to attract voters of Hungari<strong>an</strong> parties <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, I, as a politici<strong>an</strong>, c<strong>an</strong> underst<strong>an</strong>d that. I c<strong>an</strong> even underst<strong>an</strong>d if such a<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d is prompted by elections <strong>in</strong> Hungary. But that dem<strong>an</strong>d is totally unrelated to<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of children." Dnevnik, 20 October 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Recommendations<br />
• Interest of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia should be used <strong>for</strong> further promotion of status of m<strong>in</strong>orities;<br />
• In the <strong>in</strong>stitutional respect it is very import<strong>an</strong>t to set up on the<br />
republic<strong>an</strong> level the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights, to pass a law on<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d all the accomp<strong>an</strong>y<strong>in</strong>g provisions <strong>an</strong>d regulations;<br />
• An <strong>an</strong>ti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation law should be passed;<br />
• Autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a should be re-affirmed <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
prerogatives exp<strong>an</strong>ded to the police; a special Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a police adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
should be also <strong>for</strong>med;<br />
• National set-up of the police <strong>an</strong>d judiciary should be overhauled<br />
to reflect the national population structure;<br />
• Work of police, prosecution <strong>an</strong>d judiciary should be made more<br />
efficient;<br />
• Media should be encouraged to more sistematically cover the<br />
issue of m<strong>in</strong>orities;<br />
• Educational programs should <strong>in</strong>clude contents promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terculturality<br />
<strong>an</strong>d encourag<strong>in</strong>g familiarization between different ethnic<br />
communities;<br />
• Dem<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction of l<strong>an</strong>guage of the social milieu as a<br />
m<strong>an</strong>datory school subject-matter should be backed;<br />
• Work of NGOs deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ority rights should<br />
be backed;<br />
• Systematic actions aimed at improvement of the status of Rom<strong>an</strong>y<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority should be taken, <strong>in</strong> view of the April 2005 start up of implementation<br />
of a decade-long project "Decade of Rom<strong>an</strong>y" <strong>in</strong> which the State Union of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro also takes part;<br />
• Formation of the Council <strong>for</strong> Inter-Ethnic Relations should be<br />
accelerated <strong>an</strong>d its composition exp<strong>an</strong>ded by representatives of all groups<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g the legally prescribed conditions (Yugoslavs, Vojvod<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>s,<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s...);<br />
• Process of adoption of the m<strong>in</strong>ority-related legislation should be<br />
accelerated. A law regulat<strong>in</strong>g the issues of election, prerogatives <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of national councils should be passed;<br />
• Representatives of m<strong>in</strong>orities should be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the process of<br />
adoption of the new constitution.<br />
348<br />
349
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
VI<br />
SERBIA AND<br />
DECENTRALIZATION<br />
350<br />
351
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
VOJVODINA:<br />
EUROPEAN INITIATIVES<br />
AND THEIR OPPONENTS<br />
"The old idea about rich Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a has not been true <strong>for</strong> a long time",<br />
said Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Primer M<strong>in</strong>ister Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtic at the end of the year. While<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g the citizens of the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce about the activities <strong>an</strong>d the results<br />
achieved by the Executive Council of the Autonomous Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
<strong>in</strong> 2005, he illustrated his view by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out that "even 19 municipalities <strong>in</strong><br />
the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce are <strong>in</strong>sufficiently developed <strong>an</strong>d that among the first ten aboveaverage<br />
developed municipalities <strong>in</strong> Serbia – only two are from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a."<br />
The Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister expla<strong>in</strong>ed the runn<strong>in</strong>g of the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce by the<br />
fact that "dur<strong>in</strong>g the most difficult decade, under the Milosevic regime,<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a carried the heaviest burden of the country’s survival… But now", he<br />
emphasized, "we must pull ourselves together <strong>an</strong>d recover as soon as<br />
possible". 1<br />
In Pajtic’s view, there are two factors of utmost signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s economic recovery: the first is <strong>in</strong>vestments: "Without new <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestments there will be no economic development <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia.<br />
There<strong>for</strong>e, we are do<strong>in</strong>g our best to expla<strong>in</strong> to the world how much <strong>an</strong>d how<br />
c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. Today, the Russi<strong>an</strong>s, the Americ<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong>s share the op<strong>in</strong>ion that Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is the most attractive <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
region <strong>in</strong> South-Eastern Europe. That is a ch<strong>an</strong>ce we won’t miss." 2 The second<br />
factor is that the "prov<strong>in</strong>cial bodies have more competences". Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Pajtic, if Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a wishes to be a modern Europe<strong>an</strong> region <strong>an</strong>d a bridge<br />
between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Europe, it must have "constitutionally guar<strong>an</strong>teed<br />
economic autonomy <strong>an</strong>d property, <strong>in</strong> addition to the necessary legislative,<br />
executive <strong>an</strong>d partial judicial authority". 3<br />
1 Dnevnik, 27 December 2005.<br />
2 Dnevnik, 27 December 2005. As <strong>state</strong>d by the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, the<br />
com<strong>in</strong>g year, 2006, will be devoted to the follow<strong>in</strong>g aim: more <strong>in</strong>vestments, more work,<br />
higher pay.<br />
3 Dnevnik, 27 December 2005.<br />
352<br />
353
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
In <strong>an</strong> attempt to acqua<strong>in</strong>t as m<strong>an</strong>y Europe<strong>an</strong> countries <strong>an</strong>d their firms<br />
with its potentials, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a 4 undertook certa<strong>in</strong> activities dur<strong>in</strong>g the year. So,<br />
<strong>in</strong> the middle of the year, it opened <strong>in</strong> Paris the Centre <strong>for</strong> the Promotion <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Strategic Development of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a (or the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Centre – VBC <strong>for</strong><br />
short) as Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s first representative office <strong>in</strong> Europe. The Centre was<br />
established with the aim of promot<strong>in</strong>g Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, its economy <strong>an</strong>d culture,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g French <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a bus<strong>in</strong>essmen, while Paris was selected <strong>for</strong><br />
its seat due to its reputation as one of the world’s most import<strong>an</strong>t bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cultural centres. 5 In addition to the VBC, the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced the open<strong>in</strong>g of the Office <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Affairs, which should<br />
contribute to the promotion of the Europe<strong>an</strong> values <strong>an</strong>d Serbia’s <strong>in</strong>tegration<br />
<strong>in</strong>to Europe. 6<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a also sees a ch<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> its own <strong>an</strong>d Serbia’s Europe<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
<strong>an</strong>d development <strong>in</strong> the closest possible cross-border cooperation with the<br />
regions <strong>in</strong> Hungary, Rom<strong>an</strong>ia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia. In addition to Europe<strong>an</strong>ized<br />
Hungary, Rom<strong>an</strong>ia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia could also become EU members which,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to Predrag Grgic, Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong> Regional <strong>an</strong>d International<br />
Cooperation, would also be good <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a: "Our ch<strong>an</strong>ce lies <strong>in</strong> the<br />
D<strong>an</strong>ube-Kris-Moris-Tisa (DKMT) Euro-region, but it is not just a question of<br />
money that will be obta<strong>in</strong>ed from one programme or <strong>an</strong>other. The po<strong>in</strong>t is that<br />
this region will soon become the only l<strong>in</strong>k with Europe… The region c<strong>an</strong> be the<br />
eng<strong>in</strong>e that will push Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia… towards Europe". 7 In addition to<br />
4 Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a has been elected the Europe<strong>an</strong> Region of the Year (2006). This title<br />
has been gr<strong>an</strong>ted s<strong>in</strong>ce 2003 <strong>an</strong>d so far six regions from Portugal, Spa<strong>in</strong>, Russia, Ukra<strong>in</strong>e,<br />
Belgium <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a have been elected. This provides <strong>an</strong> opportunity<br />
<strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s recognition <strong>an</strong>d the promotion of its resources.<br />
5 The Centre was jo<strong>in</strong>tly set up by the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly <strong>an</strong>d the Agency <strong>for</strong><br />
Euro-Regional Integration from Paris. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first six months, promotional activities<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Centre will be f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced by French partners <strong>an</strong>d thereafter,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, by particip<strong>an</strong>ts, that is, firms from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia. At<br />
the open<strong>in</strong>g of the VBC, Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtic said that this was only the first activity with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
promotion of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a as the most attractive <strong>in</strong>vestment area <strong>in</strong> the region. Pajtic<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced that the VBC would also be opened <strong>in</strong> the heart of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union, <strong>in</strong><br />
Brussels. Dnevnik, 18 May 2005.<br />
6 In <strong>an</strong> attempt to be a bridge between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Europe, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a will take<br />
the fraternized Istri<strong>an</strong> region, which played a great role <strong>in</strong> Croatia’s Euro-<strong>in</strong>tegration, as<br />
its model.<br />
7 Dnevnik, 3 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005. A similar view is held by the <strong>for</strong>mer f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister, Bozidar Djelic. He said <strong>for</strong> Dnevnik that “Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a has the potential <strong>for</strong><br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g the most adv<strong>an</strong>ced <strong>an</strong>d richest part of Serbia, especially because it will be<br />
surrounded by the EU members with<strong>in</strong> less th<strong>an</strong> four years”. Djelic also said that the<br />
“privatization of domestic b<strong>an</strong>ks provides a great opportunity <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, s<strong>in</strong>ce Novi<br />
Sad c<strong>an</strong> develop <strong>in</strong>to a large <strong>an</strong>d strong f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial centre. The entry of powerful f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong>to Kont<strong>in</strong>ental b<strong>an</strong>ka, Novosadska b<strong>an</strong>ka, P<strong>an</strong>onska b<strong>an</strong>ka, Vojvođ<strong>an</strong>ska<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
cooperation with the neighbours <strong>an</strong>d home countries of the national m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, the <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> Integration <strong>an</strong>d International<br />
Cooperation identified Euro-regional <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d the Assembly of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Regions as its strategic directions. 8<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, President of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly, to<br />
be able to assume the desired lead<strong>in</strong>g position on the road to Europe <strong>an</strong>d<br />
promote cross-border cooperation, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a must be given back its<br />
competences. 9 At the conference devoted to regionalism, which was org<strong>an</strong>ized<br />
<strong>in</strong> Novi Sad by the Assembly of Europe<strong>an</strong> Regions <strong>an</strong>d the Autonomous<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, 10 he <strong>state</strong>d that Serbia’s road to the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union<br />
leads through Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d that its development must not be h<strong>in</strong>dered. 11 The<br />
Novi Sad conference was org<strong>an</strong>ized so as to provide a dual impetus – to<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> realiz<strong>in</strong>g its right to autonomy, as well as to regionalization <strong>in</strong><br />
Europe <strong>in</strong> general. 12 At the end of April, at its session <strong>in</strong> Dubrovnik, the<br />
Assembly of Europe<strong>an</strong> Regions adopted the conclusions of the Novi Sad<br />
Conference, whereby it practically sent the message to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities<br />
b<strong>an</strong>ka <strong>an</strong>d Meridi<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>k, as well as <strong>in</strong>to Metals b<strong>an</strong>ka <strong>an</strong>d some other b<strong>an</strong>ks<br />
tomorrow, not to mention DDOR Novi Sad, will be a crucial moment <strong>for</strong> the city <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
region. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Djelic, the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d the city must request from the future<br />
strategic partners of domestic b<strong>an</strong>ks not to move their seats to Belgrade, because their<br />
keys <strong>an</strong>d safe-boxes must rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad. Namely, the centre of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial services<br />
br<strong>in</strong>gs a lot: not only value added, but also well-paid jobs which will keep young <strong>an</strong>d<br />
qualified people from go<strong>in</strong>g away. It should also be taken <strong>in</strong>to account that b<strong>an</strong>ks<br />
especially depend on <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>matics, so that they spend more money on it th<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>yone<br />
else, <strong>an</strong>d this opens up prospects <strong>for</strong> Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to develop <strong>in</strong>to powerful<br />
centres <strong>in</strong> that sector as well. Fresh capital will also give a signific<strong>an</strong>t impetus to the<br />
development of agribus<strong>in</strong>ess, while the arrival of big players should also be used to<br />
promote tourism <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a…”, Dnevnik, 21 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
8 Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a signed the Protocol on Cooperation with five Europe<strong>an</strong> regions –<br />
Friuli-Venezia Giulia <strong>in</strong> Italy, the Austri<strong>an</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Styria, Olomouc <strong>in</strong> the Czech<br />
Republic, Trnava <strong>in</strong> Slovakia <strong>an</strong>d the Dutchy of Lodz <strong>in</strong> Pol<strong>an</strong>d. Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a participates<br />
<strong>in</strong> the activities relat<strong>in</strong>g to the Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiatives, such as the Central Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Initiative <strong>an</strong>d the Stability Pact, <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce 2002 it has also been a member of the<br />
Assembly of Europe<strong>an</strong> Regions.<br />
9 D<strong>an</strong>as, 23 February 2005.<br />
10 The conference was sponsored by the Council of Europe, UNDP <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
CSCE. There were no representatives of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government at the conference.<br />
11 Dnevnik, 1 March 2005.<br />
12 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the two-day debate, it was po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the “best solution would<br />
be to vest the region with the highest possible authority, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g legislative one. “We<br />
also concluded that there are m<strong>an</strong>y ways of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the regional authorities. However,<br />
the most efficient way is probably to have each region participate <strong>in</strong> revenues or, <strong>in</strong><br />
other words, that it reta<strong>in</strong>s the revenues from fees <strong>an</strong>d taxes collected <strong>in</strong> its territory”,<br />
said Riccardo Illi, President of the Assembly of Europe<strong>an</strong> Regions <strong>an</strong>d the Region of<br />
Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 3 March 2005.<br />
354<br />
355
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
that Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a should acquire the appropriate status under the new<br />
Constitution, <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of decentralization, autonomy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d regionalism. The op<strong>in</strong>ion prevails <strong>in</strong> these conclusions that "under the new<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitution, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a must have the clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed legislative <strong>an</strong>d<br />
executive autonomy, <strong>in</strong> addition to its participation <strong>in</strong> exercis<strong>in</strong>g judiciary<br />
authority". In addition, the Assembly of Europe<strong>an</strong> Regions <strong>in</strong>sists on the active<br />
participation of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s legitimate representatives <strong>in</strong> the draft<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
Serbia’s basic law, which should also be <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized. 13<br />
In view of the fact that the new Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitution c<strong>an</strong>not be<br />
legitimately adopted without cooperation with the prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities,<br />
Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtic said early <strong>in</strong> February that the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government would<br />
prepare its own plat<strong>for</strong>m concern<strong>in</strong>g the status of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a under the new<br />
Constitution. 14 This <strong>an</strong>nouncement of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government was<br />
commented by Milos Aligrudic, leader of the DSS deputies group <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Republic<strong>an</strong> Parliament: "If that proposal is based on the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the<br />
Republic of Serbia, on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of a unitary <strong>state</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d if the autonomies are<br />
not def<strong>in</strong>ed as federal units, we will be ready to discuss all <strong>for</strong>ms of territorial<br />
decentralization". Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Aligrudic, <strong>in</strong> addition to the mentioned<br />
conditions, the position on the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Government’s proposal will also<br />
depend on the position taken by other parliamentary parties. "In <strong>an</strong>y case",<br />
said he, "we will see when we receive that proposal… whether it is the<br />
question of a realistic proposal that will contribute to reach<strong>in</strong>g a consensus, or<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g that complicates the political agreement on the new Constitution". 15<br />
In contrast to Pajtic, Milorad Mircic, leader of the SRS deputies group <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly, requested that the proposal relat<strong>in</strong>g to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s<br />
future constitutional status should be shaped through a parliamentary debate,<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce everyth<strong>in</strong>g else will lead to the destabilization of the political situation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d chaos. At the press conference, Mircic said that some people from the<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government, with the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of their <strong>in</strong>ternational sponsors,<br />
abuse the question of the future constitutional status of the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce just at the<br />
moment when the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> separatists <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija are launch<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a broader campaign with the aim of w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependence. 16<br />
In contrast to such views of their political opponents, the coalition<br />
partners <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government reconciled their views <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> the first<br />
half of March, the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government adopted the Plat<strong>for</strong>m 17 on<br />
13 Dnevnik, 30 April 2005.<br />
14 Dnevnik, 4 February 2005.<br />
15 Dnevnik, 16 February 2005.<br />
16 Dnevnik, 22 February 2005.<br />
17 Its basic provisions stipulate that the prov<strong>in</strong>ces should enjoy political, legal<br />
<strong>an</strong>d economic autonomy <strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with their specifics. The supreme legal act of the<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce is the basic law which is passed by the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly. It stipulates the<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s competences, as well as the election <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ization of its bodies of<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s status under the new Constitution. The essence of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Plat<strong>for</strong>m lies <strong>in</strong> the request <strong>for</strong> the constitutional guar<strong>an</strong>tees <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s<br />
legislative, executive <strong>an</strong>d partial judicial autonomy, 18 as well as the right to<br />
have its own property 19 <strong>an</strong>d sources of public revenues. 20 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Tamas<br />
Korhecz, Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong> Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, Regulations <strong>an</strong>d National<br />
M<strong>in</strong>orities, the Plat<strong>for</strong>m is not a "dictate or <strong>an</strong> ultimatum", but a specific<br />
reaction of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s legitimate representatives to the fact that among the<br />
authors of the Constitution there are no representatives of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. Korhecz<br />
also po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the "Plat<strong>for</strong>m conta<strong>in</strong>s the solutions only <strong>for</strong> the part<br />
where we th<strong>in</strong>k that our word should be respected". 21 The mentioned<br />
document was submitted to the leaders of all political parties <strong>in</strong> the Republic<strong>an</strong><br />
Parliament, with the note of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister that its aim is not a<br />
confrontation with Belgrade, but its <strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>in</strong>to the new Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Constitution. 22 On that occasion, Pajtic also expressed his hope that the<br />
government. By its laws, the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce would regulate the areas of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, health<br />
care <strong>an</strong>d social <strong>security</strong>, culture, education, agriculture, tr<strong>an</strong>sport, official records, town<br />
<strong>an</strong>d physical pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, etc.<br />
18 The Supreme Court of Serbia would set up its department <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. In<br />
addition, the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Executive Council accepted President Tadic’s constitutional<br />
proposal <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>clusion of judges, prosecutors <strong>an</strong>d lawyers from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> the<br />
High Judicial Council. The constitutionality of republic<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d prov<strong>in</strong>cial laws would be<br />
verified by the Constitutional Court of Serbia.<br />
19 The property of the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce would <strong>in</strong>clude all public property <strong>in</strong> its<br />
territory, exclud<strong>in</strong>g the property owned by local self-governments <strong>an</strong>d the, army, as<br />
well as the property used by the republic<strong>an</strong> bodies.<br />
20 The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce would autonomously levy <strong>an</strong>d collect taxes, fees <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
public revenues, whose larger portion would be disposed by the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d local selfgovernments<br />
<strong>in</strong> its territory.<br />
21 Dnevnik, 11 March 2005.<br />
22 In mid-March, the Faculty of Political Science <strong>in</strong> Belgrade org<strong>an</strong>ized the<br />
debate devoted to constitutional ch<strong>an</strong>ges. It was emphasized that, at present, the<br />
adoption of the Constitution would not be quite appropriate, because the <strong>state</strong> borders<br />
are not known <strong>an</strong>d the political assumptions are not favourable either. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Vukas<strong>in</strong> Pavlovic, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, the most favourable<br />
moment <strong>for</strong> the adoption of the Constitution has been let slip: “The clos<strong>in</strong>g of that door<br />
beg<strong>an</strong> as early as 6 October when the old regime bought time by participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />
tripartite government. Today, we are witness<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tensive process of restoration of<br />
the old regime, whose exponents use two strategies: to break the democratic bloc <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
opt <strong>for</strong> moderate nationalism.” (Dnevnik, 14 March 2005). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Dus<strong>an</strong> Pavlovic,<br />
<strong>an</strong> associate of the Social Science Institute, the people that should def<strong>in</strong>e the new<br />
identity of Serbia are afraid, due to which, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, they shy away from<br />
enabl<strong>in</strong>g the citizens to assume a dom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t position relative to political authority, as<br />
well as from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s subst<strong>an</strong>tive autonomy. A similar view is held by Professor<br />
Grubac. He said <strong>for</strong> the Novi Sad Dnevnik that “the adoption of the new Constitution<br />
does not suit <strong>an</strong>ybody, neither the political parties, nor <strong>in</strong>dividuals, nor deputies”,<br />
356<br />
357
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
B<strong>an</strong>ov<strong>in</strong>a document would not be rejected by <strong>an</strong>y pro-Europe<strong>an</strong> party <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia, s<strong>in</strong>ce the requested degree of autonomy is <strong>in</strong> full compli<strong>an</strong>ce with the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards.<br />
As it could be expected, the Plat<strong>for</strong>m of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government<br />
was met with criticism. So, Gor<strong>an</strong> Andjelic, President of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Board<br />
of G17 Plus, called the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government’s <strong>state</strong>ment that the Plat<strong>for</strong>m<br />
reflects the <strong>in</strong>terests of most citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a "political demagoguery":<br />
"The way <strong>in</strong> which the Plat<strong>for</strong>m was prepared is not politically correct <strong>an</strong>d<br />
politically responsible from our viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, because it does not reflect the<br />
common st<strong>an</strong>d of the people of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a on these issues". In Andjelic’s view,<br />
"the fact that nobody outside the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a political establishment was <strong>in</strong> a<br />
position to give his op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>an</strong>d suggestions dur<strong>in</strong>g the preparation of that<br />
plat<strong>for</strong>m" is also disputable. 23 Similar criticism was also expressed by the<br />
Socialists. Reproach<strong>in</strong>g the rul<strong>in</strong>g parties <strong>for</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>clude all relev<strong>an</strong>t<br />
political parties <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Parliament <strong>in</strong> its preparation, Dus<strong>an</strong><br />
Bajatovic, Vice-President of the SPS, <strong>state</strong>d that "this document was not<br />
prepared <strong>in</strong> a serious m<strong>an</strong>ner but ad hoc" <strong>an</strong>d that "the Plat<strong>for</strong>m bears the<br />
autonomist signature with a tendency towards the exclusion of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>state</strong> from the story about autonomy". As its major deficiencies, Bajatovic<br />
mentioned the lack of provisions on the status <strong>an</strong>d rights of m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
communities, as well as the lack of government control over the work of the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial bodies. 24 Argu<strong>in</strong>g that the Plat<strong>for</strong>m "does not conta<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g new"<br />
relative to the solutions on territorial autonomy which are already conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong><br />
the Draft Constitution of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Government, Arsen Kurjacki,<br />
President of the District Executive Board of the DSS, described the preparation<br />
of the Plat<strong>for</strong>m as a "market<strong>in</strong>g move of the Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d its satellites<br />
because “the new Constitution will also br<strong>in</strong>g new elections <strong>an</strong>d, thus, the term<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
of their functions… Simply, there are too m<strong>an</strong>y factors which do not favour the new<br />
Constitution”. (Dnevnik, 25 April 2005). In mid-November, Todor Gaj<strong>in</strong>ov, <strong>an</strong> advisor to<br />
the President of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly, po<strong>in</strong>ted to yet <strong>an</strong>other factor which could<br />
prevent Serbia from obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the new Constitution. Namely, Gaj<strong>in</strong>ov said that the<br />
“citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a could prevent the adoption of the new Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitution by<br />
not go<strong>in</strong>g to vote <strong>for</strong> it at a referendum, should the fundamental legal act of the country<br />
still favour a centralist system <strong>an</strong>d fail to provide <strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s fiscal autonomy, <strong>in</strong><br />
particular.” (Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 18 November 2005).<br />
23 Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 21 March 2005. As <strong>for</strong> the future constitutional status of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, Andjelic holds that all political parties <strong>in</strong> the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament should<br />
reach a consensus, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those which did not cross the electoral threshold at the<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>cial elections, as well as all other relev<strong>an</strong>t factors <strong>in</strong> various spheres of social life.<br />
24 Dnevnik, 29 March 2005. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Bajatovic, “the question of the<br />
autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d the question of the autonomy of Kosovo c<strong>an</strong>not be related<br />
to each other either historically or politically. In Kosovo, the talks are held with the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, while Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is the Serb-Serb question<br />
<strong>an</strong>d not the m<strong>in</strong>ority one.”<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
from the League of Social Democrats of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a (LSV) <strong>an</strong>d the Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (SVM)". 25 His op<strong>in</strong>ion about the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Government’s proposal was also expressed by Predrag Markovic, Republic<strong>an</strong><br />
Parliament Speaker. He said that the proposal would be taken <strong>in</strong>to<br />
consideration "although it is asked much less th<strong>an</strong> that which is proposed by<br />
the majority <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Constitutional Affairs". 26 Tamas Korhecz,<br />
one of the authors of the Plat<strong>for</strong>m, objected to such a view <strong>an</strong>d po<strong>in</strong>ted to the<br />
deficiencies of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Government’s proposal, both with respect to<br />
def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s property rights, as well as with respect to its tax<br />
autonomy. 27 F<strong>in</strong>ally, Dej<strong>an</strong> Mikavica, a member of the Subcommittee of the<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Constitutional Affairs, said <strong>in</strong> November that "if the solutions<br />
proposed by the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Executive Council were un<strong>for</strong>tunately adopted, the<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>ce would be def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the new Constitution as a <strong>state</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>state</strong>". 28<br />
In the above mentioned reactions to the proposal made by the<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Government one c<strong>an</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d the traces of centralist, ethnocentric <strong>an</strong>d<br />
conservative legacy. In addition to their pragmatic results, <strong>in</strong>sistence on the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d regionalization, as well as the orientation towards<br />
cooperation with the neighbours <strong>an</strong>d l<strong>in</strong>ks with the Europe<strong>an</strong> regions could be<br />
25 Dnevnik, 2 April 2005. “I am afraid”, said Kurjacki, “that the authors of the<br />
Plat<strong>for</strong>m are nervous because the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government is successfully f<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
cooperation with the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d because we are successfully approach<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
positive assessment of the feasibility study, so that the citizens now recognize them as<br />
those wish<strong>in</strong>g to sell them a pig <strong>in</strong> a pike. They had three years at their disposal to adopt<br />
the new Constitution <strong>an</strong>d def<strong>in</strong>e the status of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, but they did not do that”.<br />
The Secretary of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government, Dragoslav Petrovic, dismissed the<br />
idea that the preparation of the Plat<strong>for</strong>m was a “market<strong>in</strong>g move”. He said that it is<br />
“absolutely senseless” to deny the prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities their legitimate participation <strong>in</strong><br />
the public debate that should contribute to the reach<strong>in</strong>g of a constitutional consensus.<br />
Dnevnik, 5 April 2005.<br />
26 “The <strong>Committee</strong> proposes”, said Markovic, ”that the def<strong>in</strong>itions of<br />
constitutional competences should be <strong>in</strong> charge of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament <strong>an</strong>d that it<br />
should bear responsibility <strong>for</strong> them, as well as adopt the law on these competences.<br />
However, the proposal of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Government <strong>an</strong>ticipates that the Republic<strong>an</strong><br />
Assembly stipulates, def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d, thus, limit the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s competences”. Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list,<br />
No. 7, 8 May 2005.<br />
27 “The Government’s proposal does not def<strong>in</strong>e the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s property rights.<br />
It only guar<strong>an</strong>tees the possibility of hav<strong>in</strong>g one’s own property. Truly, the<br />
Government’s proposal guar<strong>an</strong>tees the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce’s own sources of revenue, but the<br />
amount <strong>an</strong>d quality will be specified by law”. D<strong>an</strong>as, 10 May 2005.<br />
28 Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 3 November 2005. Mikavica also said that it would be logical<br />
that, should it ever resume its work on the new Constitution, the DS would dist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
itself from the proposals conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the Plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>in</strong> some way. In his view, the<br />
Plat<strong>for</strong>m of the Executive Council of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is very close to the ideological solutions<br />
<strong>an</strong>d postulates of the liberal-democratic faction with<strong>in</strong> the DS.<br />
358<br />
359
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
also <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t asset of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>in</strong> ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g support <strong>for</strong><br />
its requests from the <strong>in</strong>ternational community. It was emphasized on several<br />
occasions <strong>in</strong> public that the status of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> the new Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Constitution depends more on pressure from the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union th<strong>an</strong> on the<br />
position of the rul<strong>in</strong>g political elite <strong>in</strong> Serbia. 29 After all, by its Resolution on<br />
the Protection of Multiethnicity <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament called<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities to restore Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy, which it enjoyed until<br />
1990. Truly, some different views were also presented. So, Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list<br />
published the op<strong>in</strong>ion of <strong>an</strong> unnamed "senior EU diplomat", who said <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Beta news agency that "the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union regards the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a question<br />
from the aspect of adherence to the Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards relat<strong>in</strong>g to m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d that the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce is Serbia’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal problem". A similar view is held by the renowned Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a journalist<br />
Dimitrije Boarov: "Europe has no <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with the problem relat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the economic basis of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy <strong>in</strong> greater detail, so that I do<br />
not believe that there will be <strong>an</strong>y stronger outside pressure on the Belgrade<br />
authorities <strong>in</strong> that respect". 30<br />
A certa<strong>in</strong> problem <strong>for</strong> the supporters of autonomy is (or could be)<br />
posed by the fact that support <strong>for</strong> autonomy is decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 31 or, <strong>in</strong> other words, it<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ges with the general political <strong>an</strong>d social trends. 32 "When the Kosovo<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s attacked the Serbs last March, support <strong>for</strong> the autonomy of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a beg<strong>an</strong> abruptly to decl<strong>in</strong>e". 33 In addition to the events <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, the<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>e of support <strong>for</strong> autonomy is also <strong>in</strong>fluenced by other factors – from the<br />
discredit<strong>in</strong>g of most political parties advocat<strong>in</strong>g autonomy, 34 through a ch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
29 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Popov, Dnevnik, 10 October 2005.<br />
30 Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 9/10 April 2005.<br />
31 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the data of SCAN Agency, which were published <strong>in</strong> October,<br />
the current status of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is the most acceptable <strong>for</strong> 40 per cent of the citizens of<br />
Novi Sad; 19.2 per cent of the respondents holds that the right solution is a higher<br />
degree of autonomy th<strong>an</strong> at present, but a lesser one th<strong>an</strong> under the 1974 Constitution,<br />
while 21.1 per cent of the respondents holds that the most appropriate constitutional<br />
solution is the one adopted 30 years ago; 1.8 per cent of the respondents opts <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d 7.6 per cent supports the abrogation of <strong>an</strong>y<br />
autonomy. Dnevnik, 19 October 2005.<br />
32 Dnevnik, 9 August 2005.<br />
33 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Milka Puzigaca, Director of SCAN Agency, Dnevnik, 9 August<br />
2005.<br />
34 Dnevnik, 9 August 2005. At the end of J<strong>an</strong>uary, D<strong>an</strong>as published Mihal<br />
Ramac’s commentary <strong>in</strong> which, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, he says that “the so-called<br />
autonomists have been discredited <strong>an</strong>d politically used up; the political representatives<br />
of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority are satisfied with decentralization or regionalization; the<br />
Democratic Party is try<strong>in</strong>g to preserve what it c<strong>an</strong>, while the Democratic Party of Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Radicals are wait<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a ch<strong>an</strong>ce to reduce economically exhausted Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to a<br />
district”. D<strong>an</strong>as, 29/30 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>in</strong> the ethnic composition of the population <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, to hesit<strong>an</strong>cy about<br />
com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to conflict with Belgrade. As <strong>for</strong> the second reason, it should be<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted out that, <strong>in</strong> the case of the tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of NIS (Oil Industry of<br />
Serbia), the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a political establishment showed its resolve to defend<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s <strong>in</strong>terests even at the cost of com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a serious political conflict<br />
with Belgrade. 35<br />
Namely, the Executive Council of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a requested from the<br />
Republic<strong>an</strong> Government to remove from the agenda of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly<br />
the Draft Law on Repeal<strong>in</strong>g the Law on the Establishment of the Oil Industry<br />
of Serbia, as well as to revoke the decisions on the tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of NIS <strong>in</strong>to<br />
two public enterprises <strong>an</strong>d the Jo<strong>in</strong>t-Stock Comp<strong>an</strong>y. 36 In addition, the<br />
Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Executive Council requested from the Republic<strong>an</strong> Government to<br />
work out the NIS privatization <strong>an</strong>d restructur<strong>in</strong>g strategy, <strong>an</strong>d enable the<br />
authorized representative of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government to participate <strong>in</strong> it. 37<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the Republic<strong>an</strong> Government turned a deaf ear to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s requests,<br />
especially to the request that Tr<strong>an</strong>snafta should have its headquarters <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d not <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities threatened to take all<br />
measures so as to protect Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s <strong>in</strong>terests – from <strong>in</strong>stitut<strong>in</strong>g<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e the Supreme Court of Serbia, 38 through civil<br />
disobedience <strong>an</strong>d protests, 39 to a referendum. 40 "We c<strong>an</strong>not allow that the<br />
35 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, if Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a has no right to its resources <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their economic exploitation, that will br<strong>in</strong>g not only its political autonomy <strong>in</strong>to question,<br />
but also the very essence of its orig<strong>in</strong>ality <strong>an</strong>d its right to diversity. Dnevnik, 26 August<br />
2005.<br />
36 Pursu<strong>an</strong>t to the decision of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government, the national oil<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>y would be divided <strong>in</strong>to three enterprises: Srbijagas, Tr<strong>an</strong>snafta <strong>an</strong>d NIS Jo<strong>in</strong>t-<br />
Stock Comp<strong>an</strong>y. It was <strong>an</strong>ticipated that two comp<strong>an</strong>ies should be headquartered <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d Tr<strong>an</strong>snafta <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
37 In the territory of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a NIS has 90 per cent of its energy resources <strong>an</strong>d<br />
related facilities. “Those below the Sava <strong>an</strong>d the D<strong>an</strong>ube c<strong>an</strong>not decide all the time what<br />
we <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a should do”, said Drag<strong>an</strong> Surducki, Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong> Energy. On<br />
26 September, Surducki was attacked <strong>in</strong> front of his house <strong>in</strong> the centre of Novi Sad by a<br />
group of young men. They broke his nose with brass knuckles shout<strong>in</strong>g: “You Karic’s<br />
shit”. “I know who st<strong>an</strong>ds beh<strong>in</strong>d this attack, but I am afraid to say, because I do not<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t that someth<strong>in</strong>g worse happens to me or, better said, to my children. That mafia<br />
which governs Serbia as if we live <strong>in</strong> Colombia”, said Surducki <strong>for</strong> Dnevnik (29<br />
September 2005). He also noted: “If they move everyth<strong>in</strong>g to Belgrade, then good-bye,<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a will cultivate corn <strong>for</strong>ever”. Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 28 September 2005.<br />
38 The Executive Council of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>an</strong>d then withdrew the action<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government be<strong>for</strong>e the Supreme Court of Serbia <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>validation<br />
of its decision to restructure NIS. The action was withdrawn after the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government had brought the decision to set up the headquarters of Tr<strong>an</strong>snafta <strong>in</strong><br />
P<strong>an</strong>cevo <strong>an</strong>d not <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
39 Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtic said that the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Executive Council would call the citizens<br />
to go out <strong>in</strong>to the streets should <strong>in</strong>stitutional pressure on the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government fail<br />
360<br />
361
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
enormous funds of the Oil Industry of Serbia are tr<strong>an</strong>sferred from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to<br />
Serbia", said Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres <strong>an</strong>d emphasized: "This is one of the decisive battles<br />
<strong>for</strong> the autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d the moment when the prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration does not wish to tolerate Serbia’s stepmotherly attitude<br />
towards it <strong>an</strong>y more". 41<br />
The tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation of NIS is not the only case when the Belgrade<br />
authorities demonstrated their ignor<strong>an</strong>ce about Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. 42 Despite<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s resist<strong>an</strong>ce, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Parliament adopted the proposal of the<br />
Republic<strong>an</strong> Government <strong>for</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g a concession <strong>for</strong> the construction of a<br />
<strong>an</strong>d should the Government stick to its decision to set up the headquarters of Tr<strong>an</strong>snafta<br />
<strong>in</strong> Belgrade. Dnevnik, 24 September 2005.<br />
“They c<strong>an</strong> call the people to go out <strong>in</strong>to the streets, because they have no other<br />
fish to fry”, said Dej<strong>an</strong> Mikavica from the DSS. “I don’t th<strong>in</strong>k that the citizens will<br />
respond to those calls, nor do I see that Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a will lose <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g”. Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list,<br />
24/25 September 2005.<br />
40 Dragoslav Petrovic, leader of the DS deputies club <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Assembly, <strong>state</strong>d that at the meet<strong>in</strong>g of the leaders of the deputies clubs of Democratic<br />
Party, League of Social Democrats of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Power of Serbia Movement (DS, LSV, SVM <strong>an</strong>d PSS), there was talk about hold<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
referendum at which the citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a would express their op<strong>in</strong>ion on the<br />
requests of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial adm<strong>in</strong>istration. However, this idea was dismissed, because it<br />
was concluded that the referendum would not be efficient under the given<br />
circumst<strong>an</strong>ces, that it would last too long <strong>an</strong>d that it would not be appropriate <strong>in</strong> the<br />
current situation. Dnevnik, 28 September 2005.<br />
41 The Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Board of G17 Plus accused Kostres try<strong>in</strong>g to m<strong>an</strong>ipulate the<br />
citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a with his malicious <strong>an</strong>d demagogic <strong>state</strong>ments. In its <strong>state</strong>ment,<br />
Kostres is asked to expla<strong>in</strong> the citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a why the revocation of the Law on<br />
NIS <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>an</strong>nounced restructur<strong>in</strong>g of NIS are not <strong>in</strong> their <strong>in</strong>terest. Dnevnik, 25 August<br />
2005; Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 25 August 2005.<br />
In the op<strong>in</strong>ion of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities, if the headquarters of Tr<strong>an</strong>snafta<br />
are moved out of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce will lose at least one billion euros <strong>in</strong> the future<br />
privatization process, s<strong>in</strong>ce it will not be entitled to 50 per cent of privatization<br />
revenues, which belongs to it if the privatized enterprise is from its territory. Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to some estimates, “privatization money would enable the creation of 50 thous<strong>an</strong>d new<br />
jobs”.<br />
42 Such tendencies were observed on a number of occasions. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Boj<strong>an</strong> Pajtic, some republic<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istries, while draft<strong>in</strong>g new laws, missed to <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s competences <strong>in</strong> the statutory provisions, which leads to the abrogation of its<br />
autonomy. Under the laws govern<strong>in</strong>g telecommunications, higher education, student<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dard <strong>an</strong>d energy, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial competences are either m<strong>in</strong>imized or completely<br />
disregarded. Dnevnik, 21 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005. In their talk with Josep Lloveras, Head of the EC<br />
Delegation to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d President of<br />
the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly expressed their concern about the systematic negation of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s competences <strong>an</strong>d a tendency towards abrogat<strong>in</strong>g its autonomy, which is<br />
demonstrated by the Republic<strong>an</strong> Government <strong>an</strong>d the majority <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly.<br />
Dnevnik, 26 August 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
highway from Horgos to Pozega. 43 Neither the Parliament nor the Executive<br />
Council of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a were consulted, or <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the preparation of this<br />
proposal which, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, shows that the "current Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Government is absolutely <strong>an</strong>ti-Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a oriented. They care about Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
only be<strong>for</strong>e the elections <strong>an</strong>d when its money should be taken so as to f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce<br />
projects <strong>in</strong> Serbia". 44 The Law on the Government especially caused discontent,<br />
because it authorizes the Government to verify the constitutionality <strong>an</strong>d<br />
legality of the enactments of the prov<strong>in</strong>ces, cities, municipalities, public<br />
enterprises, <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d public authority holders, as well as to suspend the<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement of general <strong>an</strong>d particular enactments <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> real fact, never to<br />
launch <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>for</strong> the verification of their constitutionality. In public<br />
reactions it was po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the verification of constitutionality <strong>an</strong>d<br />
legality comes with<strong>in</strong> the competence of the Constitutional Court <strong>an</strong>d that, <strong>in</strong><br />
this case, it is the question of "usurp<strong>in</strong>g constitutional-court authority to the<br />
detriment of the autonomy of the prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d local self-governments", 45 or,<br />
<strong>in</strong> other words, that it was the question of the "empire of executive authority",<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that "contrary to the Constitution, all <strong>state</strong> regulations are subjected to the<br />
Government’s discretionary right <strong>an</strong>d bureaucratic voluntarism". 46 "If I wish to<br />
be rude, I c<strong>an</strong> say that the Government’s attempt to enable itself to <strong>in</strong>validate<br />
the decisions of the prov<strong>in</strong>cial bodies <strong>an</strong>d local self-governments is – a mild<br />
43 The semi-highway from Horgos to Novi Sad has not been constructed, while<br />
the full-profile highway E-75 from Novi Sad to Belgrade is be<strong>in</strong>g completed; the<br />
highway section from the Serbi<strong>an</strong> capital to Pozega has not been constructed. In the<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ion of Jov<strong>an</strong> Vujicic, “a concession c<strong>an</strong>not be gr<strong>an</strong>ted <strong>for</strong> the already constructed<br />
section of a highway, but only <strong>for</strong> the section which the concessionary is obliged to<br />
construct.” Dnevnik, 25 May 2005. In <strong>an</strong> attempt to prevent the tr<strong>an</strong>sfer of money from<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly proposed that concession money should be<br />
allocated <strong>for</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g road construction <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a - the bypass road around Fruska<br />
Gora <strong>an</strong>d the B<strong>an</strong>at trunk road. “We do not shy away from apply<strong>in</strong>g the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of<br />
solidarity <strong>an</strong>d allocat<strong>in</strong>g a portion of that money <strong>for</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce of the road<br />
network outside our territory as well,” said Kostres, “but the larger portion of money<br />
should rema<strong>in</strong> here <strong>an</strong>d be spent on road improvement <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a”. Dnevnik, 13 April<br />
2005.<br />
44 Dnevnik, 25 May 2005.<br />
45 Argu<strong>in</strong>g that, by usurp<strong>in</strong>g someone else’s competences, the Government<br />
acts as some k<strong>in</strong>d of governor of the prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d local governments, Momcilo Grubac<br />
said: “Just as it c<strong>an</strong>not verify the constitutionality <strong>an</strong>d legality of the regulations<br />
adopted by the National Assembly, so the Government c<strong>an</strong>not do that with the<br />
regulations adopted by the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Parliament. It is the question of the same<br />
authority, so that the same rules must also apply to its org<strong>an</strong>ization, s<strong>in</strong>ce one legislative<br />
authority c<strong>an</strong>not be less valid th<strong>an</strong> the other”. Dnevnik, 4 June 2005.<br />
46 Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, Dnevnik, 18 June 2005.<br />
362<br />
363
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>for</strong>m of coup d’etat", said Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, President of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Assembly. 47<br />
The <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> tendency, demonstrated <strong>in</strong> the<br />
mentioned cases, is not only directed towards the prov<strong>in</strong>cial resources 48 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their economic exploitation. It is also <strong>an</strong> attempt to negate Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
autonomy. Comment<strong>in</strong>g on the Plat<strong>for</strong>m on the status of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> the<br />
future Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitution, Dus<strong>an</strong> Bajatovic <strong>state</strong>d that "Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is the Serb-<br />
Serb question <strong>an</strong>d not the m<strong>in</strong>ority one". 49 The first part of Bajatovic’s<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment is the general nationalist pattern used <strong>for</strong> the negation of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy because, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the nationalists, "it made sense<br />
only <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>eign empire, but not <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>". The mentioned pattern<br />
is also repeated by some Hungari<strong>an</strong> nationalists, who also hold that the<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a question is a "Serb-Serb question". 50 In the op<strong>in</strong>ion of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
nationalists, the question of autonomy is superfluous from the viewpo<strong>in</strong>t of the<br />
<strong>state</strong> (<strong>an</strong>d the prov<strong>in</strong>ce) <strong>in</strong> which the Serbs constitute a majority, while <strong>in</strong> the<br />
view of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> nationalists, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy is unimport<strong>an</strong>t or,<br />
at least, less import<strong>an</strong>t, relative to the desired ethnic autonomy. Consequently,<br />
<strong>in</strong> either case, the ethnic reason is used aga<strong>in</strong>st Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy.<br />
The second part of Bajatovic’s assertion that the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a question is<br />
not the m<strong>in</strong>ority question po<strong>in</strong>ts to the hegemonistic <strong>an</strong>d ethnocentric<br />
aspirations, whereby the question of the governmental system is the question<br />
of the ethnic (Serb) majority or, better said, the privilege exercised on the basis<br />
of one’s ethnocultural affiliation, <strong>an</strong>d not the right which arises from the<br />
citizen status entitl<strong>in</strong>g every <strong>in</strong>dividual, regardless of his/her ethnic orig<strong>in</strong>, to<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
participate <strong>in</strong> political decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>an</strong> attempt to liquidate Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s<br />
autonomy politically, the ethnonationalists do not hesitate to <strong>an</strong>nul the basic<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of modern democracy – the idea of citizen equality. The question of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d its autonomy concerns all citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a/Serbia. What is<br />
at stake here is not only the question of control over its resources, <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
but also the question of identity.<br />
Although it is import<strong>an</strong>t, the question of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s identity is<br />
absolutely disregarded. Through the build<strong>in</strong>g of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s identity, the<br />
process of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s <strong>for</strong>ced ethnization <strong>an</strong>d burst<strong>in</strong>g at the ethnic seams c<strong>an</strong><br />
be weakened <strong>an</strong>d slowed down to a great extent. Identity enables every citizen<br />
of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to cherish his/her specific ethnic identity <strong>an</strong>d, through the<br />
common values, 51 build identity which is not based on one’s belong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>an</strong><br />
ethnic community. As the example of identity multiplication, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s<br />
identity has become the target of majority ethnonationalists, 52 because, from<br />
the nationalist viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, it has been identified as one of the mech<strong>an</strong>isms by<br />
me<strong>an</strong>s of which one’s own ethnic community is weaken<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
fragmented, 53 <strong>an</strong>d which c<strong>an</strong> be "abused" <strong>for</strong> the secession of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a from<br />
Serbia. 54<br />
One of the ma<strong>in</strong> reasons why the identity of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a causes the<br />
odium of the ethnonationalists also lies <strong>in</strong> the fact that it c<strong>an</strong> mobilize support<br />
<strong>for</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, through the request <strong>for</strong> ethnic<br />
autonomy, that support is decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d the position of prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
is weaken<strong>in</strong>g. However, one th<strong>in</strong>g must be emphasized – despite all comments<br />
that could be heard <strong>in</strong> public with respect to the request <strong>for</strong> ethnic autonomy, 55<br />
47 Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1 June 2005. Serbi<strong>an</strong> President Boris Tadic refused to sign the<br />
Law on the Government because it was not <strong>in</strong> con<strong>for</strong>mity with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitution.<br />
48 One of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s resources is agriculture. When Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a was struck by<br />
flood, the Vice-Presidents of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Executive Council, Tihomir Simic <strong>an</strong>d Dus<strong>an</strong><br />
Jakovljev, criticized the relev<strong>an</strong>t Republic<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isters <strong>for</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to declare the <strong>state</strong> of<br />
natural disaster. Zor<strong>an</strong> Loncar, M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d Local Self-Government,<br />
replied that the Government could not do that, s<strong>in</strong>ce there were no legal grounds <strong>for</strong><br />
that. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the pr<strong>in</strong>t media, one million hectares of arable l<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
were not protected aga<strong>in</strong>st flood<strong>in</strong>g, because Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a has no money <strong>for</strong> the<br />
construction of new levees <strong>an</strong>d the re<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>cement of new ones, or <strong>for</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
water structures. For that purpose, the public enterprise Vode Vojvod<strong>in</strong>e (water<br />
m<strong>an</strong>agement comp<strong>an</strong>y) required 675 million d<strong>in</strong>ars, but obta<strong>in</strong>ed only 200 million<br />
d<strong>in</strong>ars from the republic<strong>an</strong> budget. Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 16 February 2005.<br />
49 Dnevnik, 29 March 2005.<br />
50 Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a will be what the Serbs w<strong>an</strong>t it to be, holds S<strong>an</strong>dor Pall, President<br />
of the Democratic Union of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. Dnevnik, 27 November 2005. In their<br />
letter to President Tadic, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ister Draskovic, S<strong>an</strong>dor Pall,<br />
Andras Agoston <strong>an</strong>d Laszlo Racz Szabo po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is<br />
not the autonomy of its m<strong>in</strong>orities, but of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Dnevnik, 15<br />
December 2005.<br />
51 One should bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the words of Laszlo Vegel: “Those who advocate<br />
the autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a do not know how to <strong>for</strong>mulate the values of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, nor<br />
do they know how to respect the values which do not only have political dimensions…<br />
We have always been focused on politics… but, autonomy beg<strong>in</strong>s with spiritual <strong>for</strong>ce”.<br />
Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 30 April/2 May 2005.<br />
52 “Those attempts at divid<strong>in</strong>g identity rely on the Kom<strong>in</strong>tern’s obsessive<br />
struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st ‘Greater Serbi<strong>an</strong> hegemonism’, which is still encouraged by the still<br />
alive ‘Kumrovec <strong>in</strong>telligentsia’, with a view to separat<strong>in</strong>g Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a from Serbia”, holds<br />
Velibor Radus<strong>in</strong>ović, a DSS official, 20 October 2005.<br />
53 The nationalists po<strong>in</strong>t out that only the Serbs will be Vojvodj<strong>an</strong>i, while<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, Slovaks <strong>an</strong>d Croats, <strong>for</strong> example, will rema<strong>in</strong> to be Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, Slovaks,<br />
Croats, etc.<br />
54 “In itself, emphasis on regional identity is not disputable”, says Velibor<br />
Radus<strong>in</strong>ovic, a DSS official, “if, naturally, there is no abuse. The problem lies <strong>in</strong> the fact<br />
that some people <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a are ready <strong>for</strong> abuse. When someone says that he is a<br />
Sumad<strong>in</strong>ac, that does not cause negative <strong>an</strong>y negative reaction, because nobody even<br />
contemplates seced<strong>in</strong>g Sumadija from Serbia”. Dnevnik, 20 October 2005.<br />
55 Dragoslav Petrović (DS): “Should the model of ethnic autonomies be<br />
adopted, that would me<strong>an</strong> the ghettoization of the m<strong>in</strong>ority populations, which is not <strong>in</strong><br />
364<br />
365
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
it is a <strong>for</strong>ced solution <strong>in</strong> the situation when the m<strong>in</strong>orities do not accept it <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the universal democratic contents are brought <strong>in</strong>to question. Any deal made by<br />
ethnonationalists that everyone should govern where his ethnic group<br />
constitutes a majority, would get other m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong>to very<br />
unfavourable position <strong>an</strong>d lead to their reproduction at the lowest possible<br />
cultural level, accelerated assimilation <strong>an</strong>d v<strong>an</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g. F<strong>in</strong>ally, such a deal<br />
would <strong>in</strong>cite migration with<strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, s<strong>in</strong>ce everyone would like to live <strong>in</strong><br />
the environment where the members of his ethnic group constitute a majority.<br />
In such a situation, ethnic violence would be not only the accomp<strong>an</strong>y<strong>in</strong>g<br />
phenomenon of a new migratory movement, but one of the basic <strong>in</strong>struments<br />
of ethnic stylization <strong>an</strong>d recomposition of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a territory.<br />
Ethnic violence is one of the problems that were faced by Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a 56<br />
<strong>for</strong> the greater part of the last year. 57 Officially, ethnic violence was reduced to<br />
the <strong>in</strong>terest of the m<strong>in</strong>ority populations, or Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, or Europe itself”. Dnevnik, 10<br />
November 2005.<br />
Gabor Lodi, Vice-President of the Executive Council of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a: “The<br />
<strong>in</strong>itiatives of some political parties <strong>for</strong> the provisions of territorial autonomy <strong>for</strong><br />
members of some ethnic communities under the Republic<strong>an</strong> Constitution c<strong>an</strong>not end<br />
well <strong>for</strong> members of those national communities, or the citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a”, which is<br />
“permeated with numerous nations so much that there are no ethnically pure territories.<br />
For example, almost half of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (about 124 thous<strong>an</strong>d) lives outside<br />
the municipalities <strong>in</strong> which the Hungari<strong>an</strong>s constitute a majority”, Dnevnik, 17<br />
November 2005.<br />
Emil Fejzulahu (LSDV): “Ethnic autonomies would be disastrous <strong>for</strong> a<br />
mult<strong>in</strong>ational community such as Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d, there<strong>for</strong>e, the requests of the Belgrade<br />
authorities <strong>for</strong> the ethnic autonomy of Kosovo Serbs would be especially problematic <strong>for</strong><br />
us, because some representatives of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> community <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong>voke just<br />
that <strong>for</strong>mula <strong>for</strong> settl<strong>in</strong>g their status, based on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of reciprocity.” Dnevnik, 21<br />
November 2005.<br />
Djordje Basic (PSS): “Neither the Hungari<strong>an</strong>s nor members of other m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
groups <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a deserve to live <strong>in</strong> a ghetto.” Dnevnik, 21 November 2005.<br />
Rasim Ljajic, M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro: “Ethnic autonomies are not a solution, s<strong>in</strong>ce Serbia would thus practically<br />
become the confederation of ethnic autonomies”, Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 1 November 2005.<br />
Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Popov, Director of the Centre <strong>for</strong> Regionalism: “Ethnic autonomies<br />
dim<strong>in</strong>ish a ch<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> civil autonomy, which would contribute that we all feel better.<br />
Those are the leaders’ games that the tendencies towards ghettoization <strong>an</strong>d division <strong>in</strong>to<br />
national groups are brought to <strong>an</strong> end, but I th<strong>in</strong>k that this vari<strong>an</strong>t enables only the<br />
leaders to make ga<strong>in</strong>s, while members of all peoples will lose”, Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 11 J<strong>an</strong>uary<br />
2005.<br />
56 Inter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce have become the object of the<br />
monitor<strong>in</strong>g mission of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament. At the end of J<strong>an</strong>uary, a five-member<br />
commission arrived <strong>in</strong> the country <strong>in</strong> order to get acqua<strong>in</strong>ted with the nature of<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. “We c<strong>an</strong>not blame the whole <strong>state</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents”, said Doris<br />
Pack, who was at the head of this commission, “but it rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen why they<br />
happen so often. At the end of September, the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament passed the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the level of <strong>an</strong> accident <strong>an</strong>d the political elite <strong>in</strong>sisted on such a qualification<br />
even when the public <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a was faced with the horizontal distribution<br />
of violence. 58 Not only the political elite, but also various civil society<br />
representatives tried to expla<strong>in</strong> "<strong>in</strong>cidents" <strong>in</strong> various ways. Once these<br />
"<strong>in</strong>cidents" were expla<strong>in</strong>ed as a reaction to the violence <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, then as<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ipulation by ethnic leaders <strong>an</strong>d their will to power, then it was resorted to<br />
b<strong>an</strong>al political functionalization <strong>an</strong>d the causes of these conflicts were sought<br />
outside Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a/Serbia <strong>an</strong>d reduced to <strong>in</strong>ternal competitions <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
struggles <strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g Hungary, then to <strong>in</strong>sufficient mutual knowledge<br />
among different nations, <strong>in</strong>efficient work of the police <strong>an</strong>d judiciary, a difficult<br />
economic situation <strong>an</strong>d a great number of unemployed, etc.<br />
It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that almost no one considered the fact that<br />
those <strong>in</strong>cidents are also <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t piece of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on developments <strong>in</strong><br />
the depths of society. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to a survey conducted by the Civil Society<br />
Development Centre, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a is faced with the division of society along<br />
ethnic l<strong>in</strong>es 59 <strong>an</strong>d, this is a prerequisite <strong>for</strong> violence. 60 If one bears <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that<br />
Resolution on the Protection of Multiethnicity <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. The Parliament requested<br />
from the Commission, the Council <strong>an</strong>d the High Representative <strong>for</strong> the Common<br />
Foreign <strong>an</strong>d Security Policy to monitor the situation <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d send EU monitors<br />
to the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> October, after the adoption of the Resolution, a debate on the<br />
status of the m<strong>in</strong>orities was held <strong>in</strong> Brussels. Apart from the Government’s<br />
representatives, the particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>cluded the representatives of the m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d Sonja<br />
Biserko, Chairperson of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>, as the only representative of the nongovernmental<br />
sector. In the debate, Sonja Biserko pleaded <strong>for</strong> the constitutional<br />
autonomy of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the imposition of the ethnic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple on<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a would be a d<strong>an</strong>gerous precedent.<br />
57 Members of the Hungari<strong>an</strong> community were the most frequent targets of<br />
ethnic b<strong>an</strong>ditry. It should be noted that the Hungari<strong>an</strong> political elite, faced with the<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imization of the problem by official Belgrade, did not display <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>tensification <strong>an</strong>d escalation of the conflict but, with the help of Hungary, decided to<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationalize the problem. Such a strategy proved to be very successful, s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
number of <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> 2005 was reduced. On the eve of its negotiations on the f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
status of Kosovo, the Belgrade authorities did not w<strong>an</strong>t to have stra<strong>in</strong>ed relations with<br />
the <strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>in</strong>ternational factors.<br />
58 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the past 15 years, <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a were<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>uously stra<strong>in</strong>ed, said S<strong>an</strong>dor Pall, the leader of the Democratic Union of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (DZVM), but the Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities did noth<strong>in</strong>g to improve the<br />
situation. They even have no exact data on the number of <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, while<br />
the courts apply a double st<strong>an</strong>dard to the Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Hungari<strong>an</strong>s. In his view, the degree<br />
of ethnic toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a decl<strong>in</strong>ed - which should not be m<strong>in</strong>imized. Dnevnik, 24<br />
October 2005.<br />
59 There are various reasons <strong>for</strong> such a division along ethnic l<strong>in</strong>es – when<br />
members of one or more ethnic communities are not accepted as equal members of<br />
society <strong>in</strong> every respect; when import<strong>an</strong>t agencies are unable to provide professional<br />
services to members of different ethnic communities, when members of m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
366<br />
367
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a are also <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the developments<br />
outside Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, then one should not rule out the possibility of new attacks<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st some m<strong>in</strong>orities. This refers especially to the Ashkalia, who are often<br />
equated with Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s by their fellow townsmen.<br />
In addition to the <strong>in</strong>efficient reaction by the government bodies, the<br />
aggravation of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations has shown that the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce has no<br />
efficient <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>for</strong> conflict m<strong>an</strong>agement. One of those <strong>in</strong>struments, the<br />
police, is still a very centralized <strong>in</strong>stitution over which the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce actually<br />
has no jurisdiction. 61 Truly, by realiz<strong>in</strong>g the project "The Affirmation of<br />
Multiculturalism <strong>an</strong>d Toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a", the prov<strong>in</strong>cial adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
has taken the appropriate steps so as to reduce the ethnic dist<strong>an</strong>ce, promote the<br />
mutual underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of different ethnic communities <strong>an</strong>d encourage<br />
<strong>in</strong>terethnic accommodation, while at the same time reliev<strong>in</strong>g the society of<br />
tensions <strong>an</strong>d unproductive conflicts. The effects of these affirmative actions<br />
would be much stronger should their promotion <strong>an</strong>d realization be <strong>in</strong> charge<br />
of import<strong>an</strong>t social subsystems – <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mative, cultural <strong>an</strong>d educational. This<br />
refers especially to educational ones, because a great number of young people<br />
took part <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. 62<br />
The general atmosphere <strong>in</strong> society, ideological confusion, social crisis<br />
<strong>an</strong>d a great number of unemployed provide a suitable ground not only <strong>for</strong> the<br />
radicalization of young people <strong>an</strong>d the spread<strong>in</strong>g of rightist, neo-Nazi<br />
ideologies, but also <strong>for</strong> their <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly more aggressive public<br />
demonstration. A very illustrative example is the sc<strong>an</strong>dal that took place at the<br />
communities do not accept the exclusive values or <strong>in</strong>terests by which one system is<br />
legitimized, etc.<br />
60 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Tamas Korhecz, Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Secretary <strong>for</strong> Adm<strong>in</strong>istration,<br />
Regulations <strong>an</strong>d National M<strong>in</strong>orities, ethnic communities <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a “live next to<br />
each other”. He holds that the reasons <strong>for</strong> ethnic <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d ethnically-motivated<br />
<strong>in</strong>cidents lie <strong>in</strong> the lack of knowledge about each other’s cultures. Dnevnik, 19 October<br />
2005.<br />
61 The draft law on the police does not <strong>an</strong>ticipate the police adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. The President of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly, Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres, requested that this<br />
document should regulate the <strong>for</strong>mation of the police adm<strong>in</strong>istration, s<strong>in</strong>ce it would be<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest both of the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d the Republic. Tomislav Bogunovic, President of<br />
the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly Security <strong>Committee</strong>, also agreed to the <strong>for</strong>mation of a special<br />
police adm<strong>in</strong>istration. He requested that a part of the police’s competences should be<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sferred to the local level, so that the mayors could have certa<strong>in</strong> authority over the<br />
police. Dnevnik, 21 October 2005.<br />
62 The educational contents do not dissem<strong>in</strong>ate enough <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on the<br />
history <strong>an</strong>d culture of members of different ethnic communities, thus provid<strong>in</strong>g enough<br />
space both <strong>for</strong> the “negative action” of stereotypes <strong>an</strong>d prejudices, as well as <strong>for</strong> their<br />
political exploitation <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>ipulation. The decl<strong>in</strong>e of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic communication <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g ethnic dist<strong>an</strong>ce create a social gap which is filled by various <strong>for</strong>ms of<br />
violence committed by national extremists aga<strong>in</strong>st the m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Novi Sad Philosophical Faculty on 9 November, when a group of neo-Nazis<br />
<strong>in</strong>terrupted the <strong>for</strong>um org<strong>an</strong>ized to commemorate the International Day of<br />
Struggle Aga<strong>in</strong>st Fascism, Anti-Semitism <strong>an</strong>d Racism, <strong>in</strong>sult<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d slapp<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the particip<strong>an</strong>ts. The public condemned this sc<strong>an</strong>dal strongly <strong>an</strong>d requested<br />
that all neo-Nazi groups <strong>in</strong> the society should be outlawed. The police<br />
identified the perpetrators <strong>an</strong>d took them <strong>in</strong>to custody, while the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial<br />
Parliament requested from the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government <strong>an</strong>d other competent<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions to prevent the activities of the Sk<strong>in</strong>heads, the org<strong>an</strong>izations<br />
National Guard, Blood <strong>an</strong>d Honour <strong>an</strong>d Racial Nationalists, to <strong>for</strong>bid the<br />
political movement Obraz, as well as the activities of the Sixty-Four Counties<br />
Youth Movement 63 <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>sult<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the Republic of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
national feel<strong>in</strong>gs of its citizens. 64<br />
63 In cooperation with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior, the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Assembly Security <strong>Committee</strong> prepared the report on the activities of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal groups<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals hav<strong>in</strong>g neo-Nazi characteristics, <strong>in</strong> which it is <strong>state</strong>d as follows: “The<br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal social group Sk<strong>in</strong>heads (especially its subgroup Sk<strong>in</strong> Nazis) is aga<strong>in</strong>st crime,<br />
drugs, sexual perversion (they persecute tr<strong>an</strong>svestites, homosexuals, lesbi<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
prostitutes), Sat<strong>an</strong>ist <strong>an</strong>d other destructive cults <strong>an</strong>d all religious sects <strong>an</strong>d Free<br />
Masonry; they are also aga<strong>in</strong>st Roma, Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, Muslims, Jews, Negroes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>eigners<br />
(towards whom they demonstrate racism <strong>an</strong>d chauv<strong>in</strong>ism) <strong>an</strong>d advocate a centralist<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>. The <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal social group National Guard is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational secret, racist,<br />
chauv<strong>in</strong>ist <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic org<strong>an</strong>ization, which is active <strong>in</strong> 18 countries. The <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal<br />
group Blood <strong>an</strong>d Honour, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Blood <strong>an</strong>d Honour Division, beg<strong>an</strong> to operate <strong>in</strong><br />
1995, with the idea of spread<strong>in</strong>g National-Socialism <strong>an</strong>d motivat<strong>in</strong>g its followers by<br />
radical activism. Its flags are similar to the nationalist ones, or have a restylized swastika<br />
<strong>an</strong>d two-headed eagle with four steels… that is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational Nazi, racist, chauv<strong>in</strong>ist<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitic org<strong>an</strong>ization, which is active <strong>in</strong> 17 countries. The <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal group Racial<br />
Nationalists – Racionalists supports the idea that the Serbs should have the greatest rights<br />
<strong>in</strong> their <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d that they alone should decide about their <strong>state</strong>. It advocates the<br />
struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st Roma – Gipsies <strong>an</strong>d the defence of the Serb honour <strong>in</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which<br />
their <strong>an</strong>cestors have done that. It also advocates the country <strong>in</strong> which there are no drug<br />
addicts, homosexuals, thief sectari<strong>an</strong>s, degenerates <strong>an</strong>d other mentally ill persons. Their<br />
slog<strong>an</strong> is: “A sound m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> a sound body, a sound environment <strong>an</strong>d a sound <strong>state</strong>”.<br />
The org<strong>an</strong>ization is similar to the Americ<strong>an</strong> racist org<strong>an</strong>ization KKK. The political<br />
movement Obraz is a clerofascist org<strong>an</strong>ization. In contrast to the org<strong>an</strong>izations Dveri<br />
<strong>an</strong>d St Just<strong>in</strong> the Philosopher, which belong to the Christi<strong>an</strong> right, Obraz is a racist<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization. There is <strong>an</strong>imosity between the Christi<strong>an</strong> right <strong>an</strong>d Sk<strong>in</strong>heads, because the<br />
latter are non-believers. But, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> ideological sense, their programmes co<strong>in</strong>cide.<br />
Namely, the basic elements of their programmes are identical: <strong>an</strong>ti-Westernism,<br />
nationalism, ideological exclusivity, commitment to Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadzic <strong>an</strong>d Ratko<br />
Mladic, homophobia, <strong>an</strong>imosity towards liberal values <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism. The <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal<br />
social group the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement was observed <strong>for</strong> the first time <strong>in</strong><br />
2004. Its iconography <strong>in</strong>cludes the flag the Republic of Hungary, the Tri<strong>an</strong>on flag <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
black shirt with the white <strong>in</strong>scription <strong>in</strong> Hungari<strong>an</strong>: “I am a Hungari<strong>an</strong>”. A smaller<br />
group of its members have shaven heads. The idea beh<strong>in</strong>d this movement is the<br />
unification of all regions <strong>in</strong> the Carpathi<strong>an</strong> bas<strong>in</strong> which are populated by Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, as<br />
368<br />
369
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
At the session of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly, at which the <strong>in</strong>trusion of<br />
the neo-Nazis <strong>in</strong>to the Philosophical Faculty was condemned, the coalition<br />
partners failed to agree on the "object of condemnation", s<strong>in</strong>ce the deputies of<br />
the Hungari<strong>an</strong> political parties found it unacceptable to lump the Honved <strong>an</strong>d<br />
members of the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement together with the<br />
National Guard. 65 This detail is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d worthy of attention, because it<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ts to some more general ideological trends <strong>in</strong> society. The suppression of<br />
the universal, em<strong>an</strong>cipative ideas is accomp<strong>an</strong>ied not only by the emergence of<br />
various rightist, neo-Nazi groups <strong>an</strong>d their aggressive <strong>an</strong>d impudent activities,<br />
but also but also by the re<strong>in</strong>terpretation of history <strong>an</strong>d the role of some<br />
historical actors. The nationalist relaxation of history leads to the trivialization<br />
of the role of the Honved as <strong>in</strong>nocent, <strong>for</strong>cefully <strong>an</strong>d recruited people, 66 on the<br />
well as the revision, that is, abrogation of the Treaty of Tri<strong>an</strong>on. The org<strong>an</strong>ization is<br />
<strong>for</strong>bidden <strong>in</strong> Hungary <strong>an</strong>d has not been registered here. The Honved are also <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal group. It is a historical fact that the Honved were the voluntarily or <strong>for</strong>cefully<br />
recruited citizens of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to serve <strong>in</strong> the Hungari<strong>an</strong> fascist army dur<strong>in</strong>g World<br />
War II. At that time, they belonged to its regular units. The Honved are now aged from<br />
70 to 80.<br />
64 Gradj<strong>an</strong>ski list, 21 December 2005. On the occasion of these requests, Obraz<br />
sent <strong>an</strong> open letter to the prov<strong>in</strong>cial authorities, accus<strong>in</strong>g them of “tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong>to the worst occupation zone <strong>in</strong> which every scum will have the rights <strong>an</strong>d<br />
freedoms, while the Serbs will have to keep quite <strong>an</strong>d be subservient”. Emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
they are not “atheistic communists, or paid mondialists, or alleged fascists, but<br />
uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g St Sava nationalists”, Obraz requested that the members of the<br />
National Guard should be immediately released. Dnevnik, 16 November 2005.<br />
65 Dnevnik, 16 November 2005. S<strong>an</strong>dor Egeresi, Vice-President of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Assembly <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> official of the Union of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (SVM), said that the<br />
Honved from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a were not fascists, but the people who were <strong>for</strong>cefully recruited<br />
<strong>an</strong>d sent to the Eastern Front. The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement is not a fascist<br />
movement either, said Laszlo Gyula, a deputy of the Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s (DSVM). He also said that his son is not a fascist, although he is a member<br />
of that movement, which only advocates the multiethnic northern region. Dnevnik, 16<br />
November 2005. The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement accused the SVM of plott<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political parties, thus betray<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terests of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s,<br />
because it upheld the conclusions of the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Assembly. Egeresi repeated that this<br />
movement is not a neo-fascist org<strong>an</strong>ization, but that <strong>in</strong> its activities there are some<br />
elements which could be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as revisionist. Dnevnik, 24 December 2005.<br />
66 “While some turned overnight <strong>in</strong>to retired <strong>an</strong>ti-fascists, some others now<br />
wish to dim<strong>in</strong>ish or even marg<strong>in</strong>alize their participation <strong>in</strong> the fascist <strong>for</strong>ces, by claim<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that they were noth<strong>in</strong>g else but regular, <strong>for</strong>cefully recruited soldiers”, said the histori<strong>an</strong><br />
R<strong>an</strong>ko Koncar, Director of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Museum. “How viable is the thesis that the<br />
Honved, Wermacht <strong>an</strong>d other regular military <strong>for</strong>mations of the fascist regimes were<br />
comprised of ord<strong>in</strong>ary soldiers <strong>an</strong>d how seriously c<strong>an</strong> one conclude that there was no<br />
dark ideology <strong>in</strong> their r<strong>an</strong>ks? For example, horrible war crimes were committed just on<br />
the Eastern Front <strong>an</strong>d on the Germ<strong>an</strong> side there were not only the Nazis… Who is wellacqua<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
with the history of 1941-1945 will never accept the thesis that someone had<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> side, <strong>an</strong>d the rehabilitation of Chetniks 67 as <strong>an</strong>tifascists, on the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> side. The dark sides of one’s past are suppressed, while the role of <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>nocent victim is emphasized, s<strong>in</strong>ce such revisionist <strong>in</strong>terventions <strong>in</strong> history<br />
attempt to create the picture of one’s past that is acceptable <strong>for</strong> the Western<br />
allies. 68 On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, those genu<strong>in</strong>ely Europe<strong>an</strong> contents <strong>in</strong> history, like<br />
partis<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>tifascism, are marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>an</strong>d hardly reach the public. 69 The<br />
public <strong>an</strong>d open political (<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>y other) struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st nationalism <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
specific myth about one’s sacrifice; read<strong>in</strong>ess to speak openly about the<br />
suppressed, dark pages of one’s past, 70 build<strong>in</strong>g of toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d accept<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
to submit to someth<strong>in</strong>g if he has <strong>an</strong> alternative. Thus, you c<strong>an</strong>not compla<strong>in</strong> later on that<br />
someone <strong>for</strong>ced you to do someth<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, history c<strong>an</strong>not gr<strong>an</strong>t amnesty to the<br />
Honved <strong>for</strong> what they were, nor c<strong>an</strong> easily <strong>state</strong> that they were that under coercion –<br />
although politics c<strong>an</strong> do that. For some time already, nobody has been mention<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>tifascists who were the first to bear the brunt of the Horthy troops.<br />
Consequently, the Honved had <strong>an</strong> alternative <strong>an</strong>d I simply c<strong>an</strong>not accept fear <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cowardl<strong>in</strong>ess as a historical virtue”. Dnevnik, 20 November 2005.<br />
67 Why the world <strong>state</strong>smen had no problem with the commemoration of<br />
<strong>an</strong>tifascism? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Olivera Milosavljevic, histori<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d professor at Belgrade<br />
University, “because they have no problem of <strong>in</strong>ferior societies which, <strong>in</strong> the absence of<br />
identity <strong>an</strong>d legitimacy, try to f<strong>in</strong>d them <strong>in</strong> the fabricated past… They do not have, like<br />
our political elite, to celebrate victory <strong>an</strong>d keep quiet about the victors so as to provide<br />
space <strong>for</strong> the celebration of the losers <strong>an</strong>d hush<strong>in</strong>g up of their defeat… The losers are not<br />
celebrated <strong>an</strong>d equated with the victors over fascism because of them alone. They are<br />
celebrated only to keep their ideology alive. And when one day the rehabilitation of the<br />
Chetnik ideology becomes <strong>an</strong> accomplished fact, then, <strong>in</strong> the view of our political elite,<br />
the wars of the 1990s, which were led by that ideology, will also be rehabilitated. D<strong>an</strong>as,<br />
23/24 May 2005.<br />
68 R<strong>an</strong>ko Koncar: “I c<strong>an</strong>not believe that the meet<strong>in</strong>g on Ravna gora will be<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized by the Government, the meet<strong>in</strong>g to the glory of the movement which had the<br />
idea of homogeneous Serbia <strong>in</strong> its programme. One should also bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that the<br />
concept of homogeneous Serbia po<strong>in</strong>ts out clearly that all national m<strong>in</strong>orities will be<br />
expelled from the Serbi<strong>an</strong> territory <strong>an</strong>d that is conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the programme of the<br />
movement to which we have given <strong>an</strong>ti-fascist legitimacy”. Dnevnik, 8 May 2005.<br />
69 Nobody even mentions the <strong>an</strong>tifascism of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
70 The deputies’ clubs of the coalitions For Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d the Union of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s submitted to the Executive Council of the Autonomous Prov<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a the draft declaration on the condemnation of war crimes committed <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica. By this declaration the government bodies of the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Serbia are called to pay tribute to the Srebrenica victims <strong>an</strong>d learn the<br />
last<strong>in</strong>g lesson from their suffer<strong>in</strong>g about the disastrous consequences of ethnonationalism,<br />
warmonger<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d bl<strong>in</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d uncritical patriotism. It should also be noted<br />
that the Executive Council of the Autonomous Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a proposed to the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government to proclaim 11 July the Day of Mourn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to commemorate<br />
the suffer<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>nocent victims <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica <strong>in</strong> a dignified way. Dnevnik, 23 June 2005.<br />
Although not one <strong>in</strong>itiative was accepted, the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament was the only <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitution which commemorated the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of the genocide <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica on<br />
370<br />
371
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Another as one’s equal, cooperation with the neighbours <strong>an</strong>d the adoption of<br />
the Europe<strong>an</strong> democratic values are the most efficient barriers aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
fascization of society. "Every ef<strong>for</strong>t put <strong>for</strong>th by Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a toward Serbia’s<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d every support given to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> that respect",<br />
said Boj<strong>an</strong> Kostres at the <strong>for</strong>mal meet<strong>in</strong>g devoted to the Day of Victory over<br />
Fascism, "are the expression of attempts to prevent the fascization of these<br />
regions <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tegrate them with the civilized, org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>an</strong>d modern<br />
countries, with someth<strong>in</strong>g that is called Europe". 71<br />
Conclusions<br />
In <strong>an</strong> attempt to achieve a higher degree of autonomy, the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
political elite is faced with several problems: one of them is that the politici<strong>an</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a have not reached a consensus on the desired model of autonomy;<br />
the second problem concerns the identity of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, whose mobilization<br />
potential has been completely suppressed <strong>an</strong>d neglected <strong>an</strong>d, f<strong>in</strong>ally, the third<br />
problem is a double st<strong>an</strong>dard applied by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Government, <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
attempt to reduce even the current degree of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s autonomy, while at<br />
the same time offer<strong>in</strong>g "more th<strong>an</strong> autonomy" to Kosovo. Thus, the already<br />
weak position of the autonomists is weaken<strong>in</strong>g still further, while the central<br />
authorities are able to redirect support <strong>for</strong> them by mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g political<br />
sentiments <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> some other ways.<br />
Apart from the mentioned processes, the support <strong>for</strong> autonomy is also<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluenced by the processes outside Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly more certa<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo will build up pressure both on the m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d on<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. The m<strong>in</strong>orities c<strong>an</strong> resist the Serbi<strong>an</strong>ization of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> two<br />
ways – by tak<strong>in</strong>g a more active part <strong>in</strong> the struggle <strong>for</strong> its autonomy,<br />
recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> it the import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutional possibilities <strong>for</strong> the preservation of<br />
their identity, or by respond<strong>in</strong>g to Serbi<strong>an</strong>ization by self-isolation <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
case of the largest <strong>an</strong>d best org<strong>an</strong>ized Hungari<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority, by request<strong>in</strong>g some<br />
special <strong>in</strong>stitutional arr<strong>an</strong>gements. The request <strong>for</strong> territorial ethnic autonomy<br />
11 July. On that occasion, <strong>in</strong> the hall of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Assembly, the collected works<br />
“Srebrenica – from Denial to Recognition”, edited by Sonja Biserko, Chairperson of the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>, were presented. The gather<strong>in</strong>g was org<strong>an</strong>ized by the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the Independent Journalists Association of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
71 Dnevnik, 10 May 2005. The open<strong>in</strong>g of the reconstructed Bridge of Freedom <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Sad was of great symbolic signific<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tegration of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, that is,<br />
Serbia <strong>in</strong>to the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union. Although it was agreed that the <strong>for</strong>mal open<strong>in</strong>g should<br />
be on 11 October, it was put <strong>in</strong>to operation by Mayor of Novi Sad Maja Gojkovic several<br />
days earlier. From the Radical viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, this was a clear message to Europe how th<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
with Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration st<strong>an</strong>d. Otherwise, this bridge was destroyed <strong>in</strong> April 1999,<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g NATO bomb<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>an</strong>d its reconstruction was f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced by the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument by me<strong>an</strong>s of which, with the withdrawal of the Hungari<strong>an</strong><br />
political factor, the autonomist bloc is fragmented.<br />
The Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a question is completely overshadowed by the unsettled<br />
Kosovo question. The central authorities <strong>in</strong> Belgrade are try<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>an</strong>d will try) to<br />
use the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the negotiations about the f<strong>in</strong>al status of Kosovo <strong>for</strong><br />
delay<strong>in</strong>g the adoption of the new Constitution <strong>an</strong>d, thus, <strong>for</strong> the settlement of<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s status. By settl<strong>in</strong>g the status of Kosovo, as well as the relations<br />
with<strong>in</strong> the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a question will<br />
be raised both on the <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>an</strong>d external pl<strong>an</strong>e.<br />
Insistence on the Europe<strong>an</strong> values <strong>an</strong>d read<strong>in</strong>ess to participate <strong>in</strong><br />
broader Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration processes c<strong>an</strong> be <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t asset <strong>in</strong> acquir<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational support <strong>for</strong> the requests of the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a elite. To protect its<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests on the <strong>in</strong>ternal pl<strong>an</strong>e, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a must to secure its place <strong>in</strong> the team<br />
negotiat<strong>in</strong>g about the accession of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro to the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Union. In addition, the autonomists’ activities must be directed, more th<strong>an</strong><br />
ever be<strong>for</strong>e, towards the conservative part of the public, whose prejudices <strong>an</strong>d<br />
stereotypes are exploited by the nationalists.<br />
Recommendations<br />
• To provide strong support to Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s pro-Europe<strong>an</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>ts;<br />
• To reach a consensus on the desired model of autonomy;<br />
• To acqua<strong>in</strong>t the representatives of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community<br />
with the desired model of autonomy <strong>an</strong>d to lobby <strong>for</strong> their support;<br />
• To deconstruct the <strong>an</strong>ti-autonomist prejudices of the conservative<br />
part of the population;<br />
• To support the regionalization of Serbia with a view to stabiliz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s position as much as possible;<br />
• To regulate Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s status accord<strong>in</strong>g to the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of<br />
consistent decentralization, regionalization <strong>an</strong>d autonomy;<br />
• To enable Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a to achieve the greatest possible political<br />
autonomy relative to Belgrade;<br />
• To work on build<strong>in</strong>g the identity of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> a systematic<br />
way;<br />
• To promote the common values;<br />
To <strong>in</strong>clude the representatives of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> the draft<strong>in</strong>g of the new<br />
Constitution.<br />
372<br />
373
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
SANDŽAK:<br />
AT THE CROSSROADS<br />
OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS<br />
On the eve of start-up of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo<br />
<strong>an</strong>d expected referendum on the <strong>state</strong> status of Montenegro, the region of<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak is <strong>an</strong>ew at the very juncture of the most import<strong>an</strong>t political<br />
developments <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. And while it is not expected that <strong>an</strong>y<br />
results of negotiations on Kosovo would impact the political future of that<br />
region, a possible <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro would lead up to emergence of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> border divid<strong>in</strong>g that region <strong>an</strong>d its local Bosniak population.<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak is currently adm<strong>in</strong>istratively divided between the two<br />
members of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. Six S<strong>an</strong>dzak<br />
municipalities, namely Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tut<strong>in</strong>, Priboj, Prijepolje <strong>an</strong>d Nova<br />
Varoš, belong to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d five of them- Bijelo Polje, Rožaje, Plav, Pljevlja <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Ber<strong>an</strong>e, belong to Montenegro. That border between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
was established at the end of the First Balk<strong>an</strong>s War, <strong>in</strong> 1912. Previously<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak mad part of the Ottom<strong>an</strong> Empire. That region has never had a special<br />
status or <strong>an</strong>y k<strong>in</strong>d of autonomy <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the current <strong>state</strong><br />
union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. However, Bosniak locals <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak, notably<br />
those <strong>in</strong> its Serb part, tend to feel strongly about their regional roots.<br />
Intra-Bosniak Divisions<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the 2002 Serb census, population of the Serb part of<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak amounts to 235,567 people, of whom 132,350 are Bosniaks or<br />
Muslims, 89,396 are Serbs <strong>an</strong>d 5,000 belong to other nations <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
136,087 Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d 19,503 Muslims liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the whole Republic of Serbia,<br />
make up 2% of its total population. Interest<strong>in</strong>gly enough nearly all Bosniaks <strong>in</strong><br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak responded to the calls of their cultural <strong>an</strong>d political associations to<br />
declare their nationality as Bosniak, <strong>an</strong>d their mother tongue as Bosniak. In<br />
Tut<strong>in</strong>, <strong>for</strong> example, of 30,054 citizens 1,299 declared themselves as Serbs, 28,319<br />
as Bosniaks, <strong>an</strong>d only 223 as Muslims. However, accept<strong>an</strong>ce of the terms<br />
Bosniak <strong>an</strong>d Bosniak l<strong>an</strong>guage was not so smooth <strong>in</strong> the rest of Serbia. In<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Belgrade only 1,188 citizens declared themselves as Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d 4,617 as<br />
Muslims. In Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the 2002 census, only 417 people declared<br />
themselves as Bosniaks, <strong>an</strong>d 3,634 as Muslims.<br />
With only 2% share <strong>in</strong> total population of Serbia, Bosniaks do not<br />
represent <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t political <strong>for</strong>ce, but <strong>in</strong> that regard situation <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro is completely different. Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Montenegro are the third<br />
largest population group. Of 672,656 citizens of that Republic, 273,366<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s account <strong>for</strong> 40.64% of population, 201,892 Serbs account <strong>for</strong><br />
30.01 % of population, 63,272 Bosniaks account <strong>for</strong> 9.41% of total Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
population, 47,682 Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s account <strong>for</strong> 7.09%, <strong>an</strong>d 28,714 Muslims account<br />
<strong>for</strong> 4.27%. Neither <strong>in</strong> Montenegro the term Bosniak was easily accepted, which<br />
prompted Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d his coalition List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak, to repeatedly<br />
accuse Milo Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović, Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d the official<br />
Podgorica of toe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Bosniak l<strong>in</strong>e. Breakdown of the Bosniak municipal<br />
population is the follow<strong>in</strong>g: Novi Pazar- 80%, Tut<strong>in</strong>-97%, Sjenica-85%,<br />
Prijepolje-40%, Priboj-10%, Nova Varoš-8%, Rožaje-90%, Bijelo Polje-40%, Plav-<br />
80%, Pljevlja-30% <strong>an</strong>d Ber<strong>an</strong>e-30%.<br />
While part of members of that nationality are still undecided<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g their national name, their political representatives are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> faction-style strife. The entire 2005 <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak was marked by<br />
mutual accusations of <strong>an</strong>d run-<strong>in</strong>s between the two lead<strong>in</strong>g Bosniak parties,<br />
Party of Democratic Action headed by Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>dzak<br />
Democratic Party headed by Rasim Ljajić. Other Bosniak parties were divided,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to their back<strong>in</strong>g, either <strong>for</strong> "Sulja or Rasima". September 2004 local<br />
elections heralded <strong>an</strong> excit<strong>in</strong>g year-2005- <strong>for</strong> the Bosniak party scene, s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
until then unbeatable Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>-led PDA <strong>an</strong>d coalition List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak lost<br />
their absolute majority <strong>in</strong> municipal assemblies of Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d Sjenica, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
reta<strong>in</strong>ed power only <strong>in</strong> Tut<strong>in</strong>.<br />
List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak most sorely felt the loss of power <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar,<br />
where it won only 21 of a total of 47 seats. However <strong>in</strong> the run-off Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
m<strong>an</strong>aged to become the municipal president, though the strife between him<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the assembly majority is yet to be f<strong>in</strong>alized. At the 11 November 2004<br />
session, Azem Hajdarević, Vice President of List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak was elected<br />
President of Assembly th<strong>an</strong>ks to votes of 26 MPs of Ljajic-led S<strong>an</strong>dzak<br />
Democratic Party, the Serb Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d the Serb Radical Party.<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that sessions of municipal assembly of Novi<br />
Pazar were unlawfully convened <strong>an</strong>d consequently refused to recognize<br />
election of Hajdarevic, <strong>an</strong>d decision of new authorities relat<strong>in</strong>g to nam<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
local directors. Th<strong>an</strong>ks to the police <strong>in</strong>tervention new directors took office only<br />
on 9 February 2005. Because of that <strong>in</strong>tervention, List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak dem<strong>an</strong>ded<br />
resignations of the Serb Interior Secretary Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić <strong>an</strong>d of Head of Novi<br />
Pazar Police Department, Muamer Nicović.<br />
374<br />
375
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
On that occasion the List of S<strong>an</strong>džak issued the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
communique: "By <strong>for</strong>cibly <strong>an</strong>d groundlessly raid<strong>in</strong>g premises of directors of<br />
public comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitutions, members of Serb police <strong>an</strong>d those of police<br />
department <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar carried out a brutal action aga<strong>in</strong>st the law. " 1 In late<br />
February posters-search warr<strong>an</strong>ts with photos of Rasim Ljajic, Fevzija Muric<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Azem Hajdarevic, respectively President <strong>an</strong>d Vice President of the Party<br />
<strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>dzak <strong>an</strong>d names of 17 MPs of Bosniak called traitors because of their cooperation<br />
with MPs of the Serb Radical Party, were affixed on walls of m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar. The posters read: "You have betrayed Bosniak<br />
national <strong>in</strong>terests, you are collud<strong>in</strong>g with Chetniks <strong>an</strong>d policemen <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
divide Bosniaks. Shame on you! Bosniak people <strong>an</strong>d your children shall never<br />
<strong>for</strong>give you that gesture." 2<br />
Rasim Ljajić accused Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> of be<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d that action. Ljajic said:<br />
"Org<strong>an</strong>ization which has signed the leaflet does not exist. Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> backed that<br />
leaflet by say<strong>in</strong>g that everyone is entitled to write accord<strong>in</strong>g to his or her will.<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s party lost power <strong>in</strong> all S<strong>an</strong>dzak municipalities, barr<strong>in</strong>g Tut<strong>in</strong>. Such<br />
moves are motivated by the p<strong>an</strong>ic he feels." 3<br />
Strife <strong>for</strong> Local Self-Government<br />
Added to that Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> accused the Serb Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>orities Rights of the State Union<br />
of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Rasim Ljajić, of us<strong>in</strong>g the local, Novi Pazar police to<br />
the political ends, <strong>an</strong>d the Serb Local Self-Rule M<strong>in</strong>ister, Zor<strong>an</strong> Lončar, of<br />
"encourag<strong>in</strong>g unlawful actions of representatives of municipal assembly."<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that someone <strong>in</strong> Belgrade obviously w<strong>an</strong>ted to<br />
provoke <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d to curb positive political processes <strong>an</strong>d<br />
development of the city. He also assessed that Lončar, Jočić <strong>an</strong>d their "new<br />
friend Ljajić" would gladly <strong>in</strong>troduce lex specialis <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
"effect a showdown with Bosniak people who had never elected Ljajic at<br />
proper elections". 4<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s accusations were refuted by the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned public<br />
figures, <strong>an</strong>d the majority <strong>in</strong> the municipal assembly of Novi Pazar set up a<br />
Commission to probe <strong>in</strong>to the budgetary spend<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>for</strong>mer,<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>-led authorities. At the helm of Commission was Munir Poturak, Vice<br />
President of S<strong>an</strong>džak Democratic Party, <strong>an</strong>d as early as <strong>in</strong> mid-February, it<br />
disclosed various abuses of municipal coffers, amount<strong>in</strong>g to losses to the tune<br />
of 7-10 million Euro. Azem Hajdarević, President of Assembly of Municipality<br />
1 D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 February 2005<br />
2 Gas javnosti, 21February 2005<br />
3 Blic, 26 February 2005<br />
4 D<strong>an</strong>as,15 February 2005<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
of Novi Pazar, assessed that Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> obstructed the new, local authorities, <strong>in</strong><br />
order to hide "nepotism, crimes <strong>an</strong>d corruption dur<strong>in</strong>g his rule." 5<br />
President of Party <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>an</strong>d member of Municipal Council <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Pazar, Fevzija Murić, asked the Serb Interior <strong>an</strong>d F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>isters,<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić <strong>an</strong>d Mlađ<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić to send a budgetary <strong>in</strong>spection team <strong>an</strong>d<br />
embezzlement experts to Novi Pazar to probe <strong>in</strong>to the alleged misuses of<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>-led authorities. Murić also asked the Serb Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Stojkovic to task the prosecution <strong>an</strong>d judicial bodies with <strong>in</strong>vestigation of that<br />
case. Muric, a fomer close aide of Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d president of the municipal<br />
assembly <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar <strong>in</strong> 1997 also <strong>state</strong>d: "Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> well knows what was<br />
stolen <strong>an</strong>d who from his <strong>in</strong>ner circle robbed the municipal property. He is<br />
afraid of jail, <strong>an</strong>d does his utmost by caus<strong>in</strong>g chaos <strong>in</strong> the city to prevent <strong>an</strong>y<br />
legal probe <strong>in</strong>to the case." 6<br />
Confronted sides then resorted to fil<strong>in</strong>g of charges. Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> filed<br />
charges aga<strong>in</strong>st the newly-elected local officials <strong>an</strong>d new directors of public<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar, but also lodged a lawsuit aga<strong>in</strong>st M<strong>in</strong>isters Jočić <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Lončara, <strong>for</strong> "hav<strong>in</strong>g misused their m<strong>in</strong>isterial prerogatives <strong>in</strong> order to provoke<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-Bosniak conflict." Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> also accused the Serb M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Local<br />
Self-Rule <strong>an</strong>d State Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, Zor<strong>an</strong> Lončar, of pass<strong>in</strong>g unlawful<br />
decisions <strong>in</strong> the Novi Pazar local parliament, <strong>an</strong>d the Serb Interior Secretary,<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić, of abus<strong>in</strong>g the police <strong>for</strong> political purposes, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>cit<strong>in</strong>g them to<br />
take part <strong>in</strong> unlawful actions. Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> also called on the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Vojislav Koštunica to convene <strong>an</strong> urgent meet<strong>in</strong>g of the Council <strong>for</strong> M<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
to discuss "the hostile st<strong>an</strong>d of <strong>state</strong> bodies" on legitimate representatives of<br />
Bosniak M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar. 7 On behalf of the municipal majority Azem<br />
Hajdarević responded by fil<strong>in</strong>g a series of charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d his<br />
aides on grounds of "their misuse of power <strong>in</strong> the period between 2000 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
2004."<br />
However none of those charges saw its epilogue <strong>in</strong> the court, while the<br />
central authorities <strong>in</strong> Belgrade rema<strong>in</strong>ed on the sidel<strong>in</strong>es because "we do not<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t to act as judges <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal Bosniak political conflict." Because of its<br />
role, only the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> the State Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d Local Self-Rule<br />
was compelled to respond. And its reaction consisted <strong>in</strong> reject<strong>in</strong>g the dem<strong>an</strong>d<br />
of Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> to declare null <strong>an</strong>d void the constitut<strong>in</strong>g session of<br />
assembly of municipality of Novi Pazar, election of municipal council <strong>an</strong>d<br />
subsequent decisions of those bodies. Lack of co-operation between Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d municipal council led to near-total blockade of public services <strong>in</strong> Novi<br />
Pazar. In l<strong>in</strong>e with Amendments to the Act on Local Self-Rule, president of<br />
municipality is elected directly <strong>an</strong>d vested <strong>in</strong> broader authority. On the other<br />
5 D<strong>an</strong>as,16 February 2005<br />
6 Večernje novosti, 6 April 2005<br />
7 Politika, 23 February 2005.<br />
376<br />
377
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d due to import<strong>an</strong>t powers of the executive power, co-operation between<br />
municipal council <strong>an</strong>d municipal president is of great import<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>for</strong> it<br />
impacts a proper function<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong>y municipality.<br />
And such co-operation <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar does not exist. Because of the<br />
ongo<strong>in</strong>g power-struggle, the municipal budget was repeteadly blocked <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> went as far to refuse to sign orders relat<strong>in</strong>g to payment of salaries to<br />
some public services employees. Due to overdue salaries the cle<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other utilities services staff went on strike, while the regional TV staff strike<br />
has entered its sixth month. Mutual accusations are fly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> regard to such a<br />
situation <strong>in</strong> local services. Situation <strong>in</strong> nearby Sjenica is equally bad. At the<br />
September 2004 local elections Esad Zoric, c<strong>an</strong>didate of Ljajic’s party, was<br />
elected the municipal president, <strong>an</strong>d the municipal majority was <strong>for</strong>med by<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>-led party <strong>an</strong>d Popular Movement <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak led by Dzemail<br />
Suljević. But that coalition was disb<strong>an</strong>ded after several months, <strong>an</strong>d Suljević<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>for</strong>ces with Ljajić’s party to <strong>for</strong>m a new municipal majority. Though it<br />
still exists, due to visible weaknesses of that coalition, some members of other<br />
parties urge new, snap elections <strong>for</strong> the Sjenica municipal assembly.<br />
Belgrade's Tilt Towards Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
Though officials of the Democratic Party of Serbia <strong>in</strong> the post-2004<br />
election period <strong>in</strong>cluded Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>-led Party of Democratic Action <strong>in</strong>to political<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations "not earmarked <strong>for</strong> coalition co-operation", due to the mid-2005<br />
Copernik<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> turn, <strong>in</strong> September 2005, Vojislav Kostunica <strong>an</strong>d Sulejm<strong>an</strong><br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> signed a co-operation agreement. That move surprised the Serb<br />
public at large <strong>in</strong> view of <strong>an</strong> obvious <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation of official Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Democratic Party of Serbia towards the Bosniak leader, Rasim Ljajić. Dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the most <strong>in</strong>tense <strong>an</strong>d violent conflicts between DPS <strong>an</strong>d DOS <strong>in</strong> the post-5<br />
October period, Koštunica kept underscor<strong>in</strong>g his high regard of Rasim Ljajić.<br />
After the fall of the DOS-lead authorities, DPS <strong>in</strong>sisted on Rasim Ljajić as a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>isterial holdover, <strong>an</strong>d moreover named him the president of the National<br />
Council <strong>for</strong> Co-operation <strong>for</strong> the Hague Tribunal. That the latter post was<br />
<strong>in</strong>deed a hot potato <strong>for</strong> Ljajic, was evidenced by the previous rejection thereof<br />
by all the Serb c<strong>an</strong>didates.<br />
Representatives of Serb parties <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar won the back<strong>in</strong>g of their<br />
headquarters <strong>for</strong> coalition with Ljajić’s party. DPS MP Gor<strong>an</strong> Saric then said:<br />
"We, members of the Serb community are familiar with Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s personality.<br />
So there is no need <strong>for</strong> him to promise us now monastery of Sopoć<strong>an</strong>e, all the<br />
while label<strong>in</strong>g us as Chetniks. We constituted authorities together with<br />
representatives of the Bosniak community because we have at our heart the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
future of Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d the whole region." In parallel he dem<strong>an</strong>ded <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to misuses of power committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> rule. 8<br />
In mid-2005 Serb M<strong>in</strong>isters Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić <strong>an</strong>d Velimir Ilić dur<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
visit to Novi Pazar had talks with Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>. Dur<strong>in</strong>g that visit they gave a wide<br />
berth to the local municipal council adm<strong>in</strong>istered by Ljajic’s party. After their<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g with Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, the Serb Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister, Drag<strong>an</strong> Jočić <strong>state</strong>d: "High<br />
crime rate <strong>in</strong> this region must be reduced to the lowest possible measure <strong>an</strong>d<br />
peace <strong>an</strong>d confidence <strong>in</strong> legal <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d order must be restored to citizens of<br />
Novi Pazar." 9 Both sides seemed to have <strong>for</strong>gotten that several months earlier<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> dem<strong>an</strong>ded Jočić’s resignation <strong>an</strong>d filed charges aga<strong>in</strong>st him <strong>for</strong><br />
abus<strong>in</strong>g the Novi Pazar police. M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Capital Investments Velimir Ilić<br />
promised that his m<strong>in</strong>istry with<strong>in</strong> the next two years would make "enormous<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestments" <strong>in</strong>to road-construction <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> other <strong>in</strong>frastructure." 10<br />
Such a move of Belgrade flabbergasted <strong>in</strong> the first place Novi Pazar<br />
Serbs used to generally accepted op<strong>in</strong>ion that Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> was a d<strong>an</strong>gerous<br />
milit<strong>an</strong>t. Most popular party among the local Serbs, the Serb Radical Party,<br />
condemned the non-visit to the municipal assembly, <strong>an</strong>d talks with Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
"who obstructed the work of the municipal assembly, public comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions." The Novi Pazar Radical Party members <strong>in</strong> its communiqué <strong>state</strong>d<br />
the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "M<strong>in</strong>isters together with Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> toured the Serb local<br />
communities to restore his lost rat<strong>in</strong>g, while they left Serbs <strong>in</strong> a <strong>state</strong> of<br />
confusion <strong>an</strong>d wonder<strong>in</strong>g what was happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d who was guilty <strong>for</strong> the<br />
power struggle <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar." 11<br />
The Serb Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce, the coalition of which Democratic Party<br />
of Serbia is a member, backed the m<strong>in</strong>isters’ visit <strong>an</strong>d expressed its hope that<br />
the visit would lead to stabilization of political situation <strong>in</strong> the region. On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d, that m<strong>in</strong>isterial visit <strong>an</strong>d notably talks with Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, prompted<br />
President of Municipal Assembly, Azem Hajdarević, to accuse "some circles" <strong>in</strong><br />
government of Serbia of "render<strong>in</strong>g their support" to "'lawlessness' which<br />
reigns supreme <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d back<strong>in</strong>g political option of Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, which<br />
was plung<strong>in</strong>g us <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>stability" 12<br />
Several days on from that visit, the two MPs of the List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak,<br />
Bajram Omeragić <strong>an</strong>d Esad Džudžević, who had been elected to the Serb<br />
Parliament from the list of Democratic Party, left the MP club of Democratic<br />
Party <strong>an</strong>d decided to back the Serb government. Thus the cab<strong>in</strong>et of Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Koštunica, as expected, compensated the previous loss of two MPs,<br />
from Čović-led Social-Democratic Party who had walked out over the NISrelated<br />
row <strong>an</strong>d jo<strong>in</strong>ed the opposition r<strong>an</strong>ks. Bajram Omeragić <strong>an</strong>d Esad<br />
8 Večernje novosti, 21 April 2004<br />
9 Politika, 2 June 2005<br />
10 Politika 2 June 2005<br />
11 D<strong>an</strong>as, 7 June 2005<br />
12 D<strong>an</strong>as, 10 June 2005<br />
378<br />
379
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Džudžević then recommended the rul<strong>in</strong>g parties to ponder their government<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>tments, as representatives of Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s party. Omeragić went on to<br />
expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Serb Parliament that List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak was open <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y offer <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that their reasons <strong>for</strong> co-operation with Kostunica-led government were<br />
primarily of pragmatic nature <strong>for</strong> "that government did a lot <strong>for</strong> development<br />
of S<strong>an</strong>džak".<br />
Omeragic ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed: "Currrently government of Serbia is f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong> our region. Those <strong>in</strong>vestments are by far superior to <strong>an</strong>y made<br />
<strong>in</strong> the previous 10 or 15 years. We are buld<strong>in</strong>g two sports halls, 15-16 routes <strong>in</strong><br />
Pester mounta<strong>in</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d also f<strong>in</strong>aliz<strong>in</strong>g the reconstruction of a very import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
Kraljevo-Novi Pazar highway. Added to that Telekom Serbia has <strong>in</strong> our region<br />
<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment near<strong>in</strong>g 4.5 - 5 million Euro." Soon leaflets br<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Esad<br />
Džudžević <strong>an</strong>d Bajram Omeragić as traitors appeared <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar. In the<br />
leaflet titled "Traitors of Party of Democratic Action", Džudžević <strong>an</strong>d Omeragić<br />
were told the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "Expla<strong>in</strong> to the membership how much money did<br />
you get <strong>for</strong> your political tr<strong>an</strong>sfer. Voters shall punish you." Soon speculations<br />
emerged about possible ouster of Ljajić. But that ouster not only did not come<br />
to pass, but after Covic’s fir<strong>in</strong>g, by a government’s decision Rasim Ljajić was<br />
appo<strong>in</strong>ted Head of Co-ord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g Team <strong>for</strong> South Serbia.<br />
Belgrade’s new <strong>an</strong>d different position on Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d Sulejm<strong>an</strong><br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> was demonstrated dur<strong>in</strong>g Kostunica’s visit to that city on 25<br />
November. Kostunica then said: "Government of Serbia is resolute <strong>in</strong> its<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention to effect <strong>an</strong> equitable development of all parts of the country <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
that regard this region is a high-prority one. Secondly, status of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations are our priority too. This is <strong>an</strong> area <strong>in</strong> which priority must<br />
be given to the ideas of need <strong>for</strong> cohabitation, of improvement <strong>an</strong>d promotion<br />
of <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic relations, of a higher awareness of our country as a homel<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
We endeavour to improve national m<strong>in</strong>orities status through the work of<br />
councils <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>istries. And thirdly, the goal of governmental policy is to<br />
make major <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> development, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>frastructure of this region,<br />
because of its import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the stability of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro. I am conv<strong>in</strong>ced that this city keeps together Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d gives sense to cohabitation <strong>in</strong> this region. Government of<br />
Serbia is duty bound to make Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d its nearby municipalities<br />
progress at a rapid pace, <strong>for</strong> only then Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro shall progress too." 13 Concern of government of Serbia <strong>for</strong> Novi<br />
Pazar was demonstrated then by Kostunica himself. Namely he laid a<br />
found<strong>in</strong>g stone <strong>for</strong> construction of a new, 5.6 km circular road <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>augurated<br />
a new, 7 km long section of road to Golija, whose construction was f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced -<br />
140 million d<strong>in</strong>ars-by the Republic<strong>an</strong> Directoriat <strong>for</strong> Roads. In contrast to some<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
earlier visits by high Serb officials to Novi Pazar, this time around the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal<br />
<strong>in</strong>terlocutor <strong>an</strong>d host of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica was Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>.<br />
Under agreement on List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the rul<strong>in</strong>g Serb coalition,<br />
signed on 22 September 2005 <strong>in</strong> Belgrade by Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Vojislav<br />
Koštunica, that S<strong>an</strong>dzak party committed itself to extend<strong>in</strong>g full support to the<br />
government of Serbia, while the rul<strong>in</strong>g coalition committed itself to guar<strong>an</strong>tee<br />
nam<strong>in</strong>g "of persons put <strong>for</strong>ward by the List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak" to correspond<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>state</strong> positions. Then MPs Esad Džudžević <strong>an</strong>d Bajram Omeragić were named<br />
Deputy Education M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d Deputy M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Capital Investments<br />
respectively. But they had to resign from those new posts, s<strong>in</strong>ce, under the law,<br />
MPs c<strong>an</strong>not simult<strong>an</strong>eously discharge the powers of deputy m<strong>in</strong>isters.<br />
Omeragić was subsequently named president of the newly-established<br />
government’s council <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> equitable regional development. On 29 September<br />
the Serb government named representatives of coalition List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>state</strong><br />
secretaries <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>for</strong> capital <strong>in</strong>vestments, education <strong>an</strong>d sport, the <strong>state</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d local self-rule. Edib Dedeić, mech<strong>an</strong>ical eng<strong>in</strong>eer from<br />
Novi Pazar, was named the <strong>state</strong> secretary <strong>for</strong> capital <strong>in</strong>vestments, Nusret<br />
Nuhović, lawyer from Sjenica was named the <strong>state</strong> secretary <strong>for</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d local self-rule, <strong>an</strong>d Bajro Gegić, professor from Tut<strong>in</strong>, was<br />
named the <strong>state</strong> secretary <strong>for</strong> education <strong>an</strong>d sports. In October 2005 the Serb<br />
government named Šemsud<strong>in</strong> Kučević, president of Tut<strong>in</strong> municipality, a<br />
member of the Executive Board of the Fund <strong>for</strong> Development of the Republic<br />
of Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d Nerm<strong>in</strong> Bejtović, high PDA official, a member of the Executive<br />
Board of the Republic<strong>an</strong> Agency <strong>for</strong> Privatization. Subsequently members of<br />
Ljajić’s party, act<strong>in</strong>g as local officials, were replaced by Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s party<br />
members. Ljajić then threatened to resign from all his <strong>state</strong> positions.<br />
He said: "This is neither pressure or blackmail. I c<strong>an</strong> only h<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> my<br />
resigatnion <strong>in</strong> order to show my solidarity with my people <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
protect them. If this is the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of a showdown with my party faithfuls <strong>in</strong><br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak, I don’t need this totally naked position <strong>in</strong> Belgrade." He went on to<br />
note: "All those replacements are effected on grounds of alleged misuses of<br />
power. But <strong>in</strong> fact at play is sheer horse-trad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d it is obvious that the only<br />
criterium <strong>for</strong> replacements if the party affiliation." 14<br />
The Future of the State Union<br />
Promotion of relations between Democratic Party of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s party was driven by the need of the <strong>for</strong>mer to compensate <strong>for</strong> the<br />
two lost MPs <strong>in</strong> the republic<strong>an</strong> parliament, <strong>an</strong>d its position on the future of the<br />
<strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. Added to M<strong>in</strong>isters Jočić <strong>an</strong>d Ilić, Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Žižić, president of the Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
13 D<strong>an</strong>as, 26-27 November 2005.<br />
14 Blic, 4 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006<br />
380<br />
381
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of FR Yugoslavia also had talks with<br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>. Žižić asked Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> to try to conv<strong>in</strong>ce Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
part of S<strong>an</strong>džak to vote <strong>for</strong> the survival of the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>in</strong> a future<br />
referendum. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the coverage of some Montenegr<strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t media,<br />
Žižić asked Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s party, PDA, to officially jo<strong>in</strong> the Movement <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Common State. This has not happened so far, but Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d other PDA<br />
officials <strong>in</strong> their <strong>state</strong>ments urged the survival of the <strong>state</strong> union. Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
made clear the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "Our political group<strong>in</strong>g urges the preservation of the<br />
<strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. For us is acceptable <strong>an</strong>y EU-brokered<br />
agreement <strong>an</strong>d I th<strong>in</strong>k that the time of divisions is beh<strong>in</strong>d us. The future of all<br />
of us lies <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> united Europe, Europe without borders, <strong>an</strong>d we all deem as a<br />
very positive step the greenlight<strong>in</strong>g of Feasibility Study." 15<br />
Rasim Ljajic backs the preservation of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro but he refused the Democratic Party of Serbia offer to try to<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>ce Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Bosniaks to vote <strong>for</strong> the survival of the common <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
a future referendum. Ljajić expla<strong>in</strong>ed his refusal by a m<strong>in</strong>or <strong>in</strong>fluence which<br />
Bosniak parties <strong>for</strong>m the Serb part of S<strong>an</strong>dzak have on the Montegr<strong>in</strong> part of<br />
the region.<br />
S<strong>an</strong>dzak Bosniaks are divided over the issue of Montengr<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence. Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> the serb part of S<strong>an</strong>džak resolutely back the<br />
preservation of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, while their fellownationals<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> part of S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> equal measure are <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
towards the idea of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Montenegro. They share only one wish,<br />
that is they don’t w<strong>an</strong>t a possible <strong>state</strong> border between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
halv<strong>in</strong>g the region to make more difficult <strong>in</strong>tra-Bosniak communication <strong>an</strong>d<br />
impair<strong>in</strong>g their cultural <strong>an</strong>d economic ties.<br />
Such division of Bosniaks on such <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t political issue may be<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreted only by the success of Milo Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of<br />
Montenegro, <strong>in</strong> attract<strong>in</strong>g votes of Bosniak citizens. S<strong>in</strong>ce the eruption of <strong>an</strong><br />
open conflict between the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslav President Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Milo Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović, the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d leader of the Democratic<br />
Party of Socialists, Bosniak national parties have been totally sidel<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
majority of Bosniaks have been vot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> DPS. The latter is not so much due to<br />
their satisfaction with the l<strong>in</strong>e toed by the rul<strong>in</strong>g Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities, but<br />
rather to the fact that Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović was the first politici<strong>an</strong> to successfully<br />
confront Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević <strong>an</strong>d moreover to launch the idea of Montenegro<br />
as a multi-ethnic, civil <strong>state</strong>. Civic image of Mila Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović was not even<br />
tarnished or threatened by the ongo<strong>in</strong>g judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>itiated by<br />
families of Bosniak refugees from Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a who <strong>in</strong> the early<br />
stages of Bosniak war were arrested by the then Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
h<strong>an</strong>ded over to the authorities of Republika Srpska. Most of them were later<br />
killed. And <strong>in</strong> 1992 Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović was also the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Montenegro.<br />
At the last parliamentary elections <strong>in</strong> Montenegro of 70.000 voters of<br />
Bosniak nationality 50.000 cast their ballots. Less then 5.000 voted <strong>for</strong> the two<br />
coalitions composed of national parties. Vast majority voted <strong>an</strong>ew <strong>for</strong> the party<br />
headed by Milo Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović. However <strong>in</strong> the sharp contrast to the <strong>in</strong>titial stages<br />
of multi-party system <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, <strong>in</strong> the current parliament of that republic<br />
there are no MPs of Bosniak national parties. Bosniak parties are not even<br />
represented <strong>in</strong> the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> local bodies.<br />
In the first multi-party elections held <strong>in</strong> 1990 <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, PDA<br />
won 9 seats <strong>an</strong>d was the party of national m<strong>in</strong>orities with the largest<br />
representation <strong>in</strong> the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament. But then that Bosniak party<br />
started gradually los<strong>in</strong>g its reputation due to <strong>in</strong>-fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d a virulent media<br />
campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st PDS. The <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g was amply m<strong>an</strong>ifest <strong>in</strong> elections held <strong>in</strong><br />
1996. Then the PDA won only 3 seats, <strong>an</strong>d a f<strong>in</strong>al rift among members of the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> br<strong>an</strong>ch of PDA came about <strong>in</strong> 1997.<br />
Ljajić th<strong>in</strong>ks that those who thought that Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> might guar<strong>an</strong>tee<br />
them the support of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Bosniaks were wrong: "Those who th<strong>in</strong>k that<br />
through Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> they may w<strong>in</strong> over Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Montenegro are ridiculous,<br />
<strong>for</strong> it is <strong>an</strong> established fact that his satellites were able to garner only 300 votes<br />
<strong>in</strong> the last elections. If Montenegro may be preserved with such a small<br />
number of votes, then someone has problems both with politics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
mathematics. Ljajić went on to note that Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s commitment to<br />
preservation of Montenegro with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong> union would compel the few<br />
Bosniaks who favoured such a solution to turn coats <strong>an</strong>d become<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence-m<strong>in</strong>ded." 16<br />
Status of Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>džak<br />
Embroiled <strong>in</strong> their conflicts <strong>an</strong>d power struggle the lead<strong>in</strong>g Bosniak<br />
parties <strong>in</strong> the course of 2005 failed to raise the issue of status of their nation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d region. Both PDP <strong>an</strong>d PDA are content with the rights gr<strong>an</strong>ted to national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities by the federal law <strong>an</strong>d amendments to the republic<strong>an</strong> election<br />
legislation, which abolished census <strong>for</strong> ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities parties. In exercise of<br />
the rights they are guar<strong>an</strong>teed by the law, representatives of S<strong>an</strong>dzak parties<br />
have resolutely decided to co-operate with Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d government of Serbia.<br />
September 2003 saw the <strong>for</strong>mation of the National Council of the Bosniak National<br />
Community <strong>an</strong>d election of Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong> its president.<br />
Last local elections showed a shift <strong>in</strong> the Bosniak electorate, so that <strong>in</strong><br />
May 2005 seven Bosniak parties headed by Ljajic’s PDP launched <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative<br />
<strong>for</strong> conven<strong>in</strong>g a new assembly of the Bosniak National Council <strong>an</strong>d election of<br />
15 Večernje novosti, 13 May 2005<br />
16 Blic, 2 August 2005<br />
382<br />
383
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the new leadership. Vice President of PDP Mujo Mukovic, on behalf of that<br />
group, expressed discontent with the previous work of the National Council<br />
<strong>an</strong>d br<strong>an</strong>ded it as one-party, Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>-style org<strong>an</strong>ization. President of the<br />
Executive Council of the Bosniak National Council Esad Džudžević, <strong>an</strong> official<br />
of the List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak, officially backed the re-election <strong>in</strong>itiative by call<strong>in</strong>g it "a<br />
legitimate <strong>an</strong>d encourag<strong>in</strong>g endeavour to keep pace with the m<strong>in</strong>ority rights<br />
exercised <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. " 17 The new assembly of the National Council was<br />
convened twice last year, but was never held. Meho Omerović, MP of the<br />
Social Democratic Party <strong>in</strong> the assembly of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d elector of the assembly<br />
of the Bosniak National Council was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the delay was due to the<br />
lack of majority of Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>’s party <strong>an</strong>d "Koštunica’s decision not to allow his<br />
coalition partner to lose that office."<br />
Party <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak headed by Fevzija Murić <strong>in</strong> February last year <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Pazar rallied 15 Bosniak parties <strong>an</strong>d associations from Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro to make a dem<strong>an</strong>d that the new Constitution of Serbia clearly<br />
def<strong>in</strong>es status of Bosniak <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>dzak. At that meet<strong>in</strong>g the majority of<br />
particip<strong>an</strong>ts urged preservation of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d various<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ions were voiced on a possible status of S<strong>an</strong>dzak <strong>in</strong> the future<br />
constitutional order of Serbia, r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from classical autonomy to a specific<br />
region encompass<strong>in</strong>g both parts of S<strong>an</strong>džak. In mid-summer Dzemail<br />
Suljevic’s National Movement of S<strong>an</strong>dzak espoused its st<strong>an</strong>ce. Namely <strong>in</strong> mid-<br />
July it started gather<strong>in</strong>g signatures <strong>for</strong> a petition dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a status of<br />
people/nation <strong>for</strong> Bosniaks. Redzip Demirovic, Secretary General of NMS,<br />
warned that: "By curry<strong>in</strong>g favour with Belgrade, Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Ljajić with their<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest groups accepted that the Bosniak people be categorized as a national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority, together with Rom<strong>an</strong>y, Vlashs, Slovaks, Rutheni<strong>an</strong>s. …Bosniaks are<br />
threatened with a possible ext<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>in</strong> this territory." 18<br />
That NMS <strong>in</strong>itiative was called m<strong>in</strong>dless by the majority of other<br />
Bosniak parties. List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak assessed that Suljević was concerned about<br />
Bosniaks only when he saw his approval rat<strong>in</strong>g threatened <strong>an</strong>d noted that :<br />
"The move to gather signatures coupled with the dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> the status of<br />
nation has only one objective: to cover up NMS coalition with Šešelj’s<br />
Radicals." Azem Hajdarević, Vice President of the Party <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>an</strong>d<br />
President of the assembly of Novi Pazar municipality assessed that Suljevic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d his party once aga<strong>in</strong> showed their politick<strong>in</strong>g streak. He underscored:<br />
"Bosniaks have un<strong>for</strong>tunately lost their status of nation/people 13 years ago.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ority status is not acceptable <strong>for</strong> Bosniaks. We would like to be recognized<br />
as a nation, but not <strong>in</strong> the way NMS <strong>an</strong>d Džemail Suljević w<strong>an</strong>t it." 19<br />
17 D<strong>an</strong>as, 6 May 2005<br />
18 Večernje novosti 22 July 2005<br />
19 Večernje novosti, 22 July 2005<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
In November 2005 three smaller Bosniak parties, National Movement <strong>for</strong><br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak (NMS), S<strong>an</strong>džak Democratic Union (SDU) <strong>an</strong>d S<strong>an</strong>džak Alternative (SA)<br />
agreed that <strong>in</strong> the future they would work jo<strong>in</strong>tly on <strong>in</strong>tensification of<br />
settlement of status of S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>an</strong>d Bosniaks. The three parties noted <strong>in</strong> their<br />
pert<strong>in</strong>ent communiqué: "At the moment when EU is pass<strong>in</strong>g a Resolution on<br />
Breaches of Rights of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s, Bosniaks have been omitted from<br />
that document, though we have been witness<strong>in</strong>g gross violations of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
rights <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak." As examples of violations of the Bosniak rights, the three<br />
parties mentioned also abductions <strong>an</strong>d kill<strong>in</strong>g of 30 members of their<br />
nationality <strong>in</strong> Štrpci <strong>an</strong>d Sjever<strong>in</strong>, framed up political trials <strong>in</strong> Novi Pazar <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Bijelo Polje, as well as economic <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>for</strong>ms of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation aga<strong>in</strong>st their<br />
fellow-nationals.<br />
The jo<strong>in</strong>t communiqué of NMS, SDU <strong>an</strong>d SA read: "We dem<strong>an</strong>d that<br />
representatives of <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> bodies start resolv<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
S<strong>an</strong>dzak –Bosniak issues. The three parties also considered that some S<strong>an</strong>dzak<br />
leaders are responsible <strong>for</strong> non-mention of Bosniaks by EU. Although they are<br />
not mentioned directly their criticism is obviously related to the lead<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Bosniak politici<strong>an</strong>s Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Rasim Ljajić. The three parties don’t<br />
have a major stronghold <strong>in</strong> the Bosniak electorate <strong>an</strong>d at the last elections only<br />
the National Movement <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak won several seats <strong>in</strong> Tut<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Sjenica <strong>an</strong>d<br />
took part <strong>in</strong> the coalition government <strong>in</strong> Sjenica. That party was is headed by<br />
Džemail Suljević, <strong>for</strong>mer president of Sjenica municipality <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer MP of<br />
List <strong>for</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak <strong>in</strong> the Serb parliament. Due to repeated conflicts with<br />
Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, he resigned from all high offices <strong>in</strong> the PDA.<br />
In expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the objectives of that <strong>in</strong>itiative Suljević noted that <strong>in</strong> case<br />
of secession of Montenegro, citizens of S<strong>an</strong>džak would be entitled to declare<br />
where they would like to live <strong>in</strong> a special referendum. Suljevic accused<br />
Djuk<strong>an</strong>ovic of m<strong>an</strong>ipulat<strong>in</strong>g Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d said: "We dem<strong>an</strong>d that the <strong>state</strong><br />
bodies of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, <strong>in</strong> case of<br />
Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović-orchstrated secession of Montenegro, allow the survey of the will<br />
of citizens of north Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d South S<strong>an</strong>dzak. We are sure that at least<br />
80% <strong>an</strong>d even 90% of locals of North Montenegro, Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d Serbs, do not<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t border between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." 20 PDA <strong>an</strong>d SDP failed to<br />
respond to Suljevic’s criticism, <strong>an</strong>d both parties stressed the lack of stronghold<br />
of Suljevic’s ideas among the Bosniak electorate.<br />
Leader of the S<strong>an</strong>dzak Democratic Party <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
Rights M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Rasim Ljajić, opposes the calls <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationalization of the S<strong>an</strong>dzak-Bosniak issue: "Recently <strong>in</strong>ternationalization<br />
of similar issues harmed rather th<strong>an</strong> helped members of m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
Any <strong>in</strong>ternationalization would be particularly harmful at this moment of time<br />
when negotiations on Kosovo are near<strong>in</strong>g. Possible rais<strong>in</strong>g of the S<strong>an</strong>dzak-<br />
20 D<strong>an</strong>as, 28 November 2005<br />
384<br />
385
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Bosniak issue would be understood by the majority people as a k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>oritities-<strong>in</strong>stigated conspiracy aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs <strong>an</strong>d their <strong>state</strong>." Ljajić also<br />
deems that ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities should resolve <strong>an</strong>y problem <strong>in</strong> a direct dialogue<br />
with Belgrade.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Ljajić disagrees with Suljević over the position of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Bosniaks on <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro. Ljajic reiterates:<br />
"Wishes are one th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d reality on the ground <strong>an</strong>other th<strong>in</strong>g. In Serbia nearly<br />
90% of Bosniaks favour preservation of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Montenegro most surely <strong>an</strong> equal percentage of them<br />
favours <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro. I am sorry, but the th<strong>in</strong>gs st<strong>an</strong>d that<br />
way now, <strong>in</strong> a consequence of a decade-long, wrong Milosevic’s policy<br />
towards Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d also Đuk<strong>an</strong>ović’s success <strong>in</strong> impos<strong>in</strong>g himself as a<br />
lead<strong>in</strong>g politici<strong>an</strong> among members of Bosniak people <strong>in</strong> Montenegro." 21<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
Though <strong>in</strong> 2005 there were no serious <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>cidents (barr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the run- of- the mill chauv<strong>in</strong>istic <strong>in</strong>cidents at football matches <strong>an</strong>d nationalistic<br />
graffitti on school walls- "We shall not <strong>for</strong>get Srebrenica" <strong>an</strong>d "Death to Serbs")<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak is still a vulnerable region, whose destabilization may be impacted by<br />
cross-border, that is non-regional developments.<br />
The <strong>state</strong> of Serbia should be take a pro-active st<strong>an</strong>ce on that region,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d its high officials should cont<strong>in</strong>ue the policy of employment of S<strong>an</strong>dzakborn<br />
citizens <strong>in</strong> its <strong>state</strong> structures, notably <strong>in</strong> the police, whose current set-up<br />
does not correspond to the ethnic structure <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the judiciary.<br />
A good move of the <strong>state</strong> would be clarification of crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
S<strong>an</strong>dzak-born citizens <strong>in</strong> the early 90’s <strong>an</strong>d punishment of their perpetrators.<br />
Official Belgrade should discont<strong>in</strong>ue its practice of m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of<br />
Bosniak parties <strong>an</strong>d politici<strong>an</strong>s, while the latter should show greater political<br />
maturity.<br />
In the near future we may expect cont<strong>in</strong>uation of <strong>in</strong>ter-Bosniak<br />
political disputes <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>dzak, to the detriment of Bosniaks, who after<br />
amend<strong>in</strong>g of the election law <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>troduction of "the natural threshold" <strong>for</strong><br />
national m<strong>in</strong>orities parties, were provided with <strong>an</strong> opportunity to have major<br />
representation <strong>in</strong> the future parliament of Serbia.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
VII<br />
SERBIA<br />
IN THE REGION AND<br />
THE INTERNATIONAL<br />
COMMUNITY<br />
21 D<strong>an</strong>as, 28 November 2005<br />
386<br />
387
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:<br />
MOVING TOWARDS EUROPE<br />
In the course of 2005 Serbia took two import<strong>an</strong>t steps <strong>in</strong>ternationally<br />
<strong>in</strong> the direction of Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations: <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g, it received from the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Union (EU) a positive Feasibility Study, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the autumn its<br />
started official stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association talks with Brussels. It took Serbia<br />
full five years (s<strong>in</strong>ce the overthrow of the regime of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević) to<br />
make this much progress, its road to democratic tr<strong>an</strong>sition hav<strong>in</strong>g been one of<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ual ups <strong>an</strong>d downs on both <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational pl<strong>an</strong>es,<br />
particularly regard<strong>in</strong>g the fulfilment of its commitments. The open<strong>in</strong>g up of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> vistas <strong>for</strong> Serbia that year was also the result chiefly of the strategic<br />
decision of the EU to <strong>in</strong>clude Serbia <strong>in</strong> a more vigorous approach to the<br />
Western Balk<strong>an</strong>s as a whole (signify<strong>in</strong>g a ch<strong>an</strong>ge of its general st<strong>an</strong>ce on<br />
deal<strong>in</strong>g with the region’s <strong>in</strong>stability of m<strong>an</strong>y years). By start<strong>in</strong>g membership<br />
talks with Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Turkey, the EU held out Europe<strong>an</strong> prospects to all<br />
countries <strong>in</strong> the region (except Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, the only country not<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association process so far), exhort<strong>in</strong>g them to<br />
adopt Europe<strong>an</strong> values <strong>in</strong> order to accelerate their socio-economic<br />
development <strong>an</strong>d democratic tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation as a me<strong>an</strong>s of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>dards of their citizens.<br />
But although the countries <strong>in</strong> the region are un<strong>an</strong>imous <strong>in</strong> welcom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
these Europe<strong>an</strong> prospects, there are signific<strong>an</strong>t differences <strong>in</strong> their ideas of<br />
their common Europe<strong>an</strong> future depend<strong>in</strong>g, above all, on their tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
achievements <strong>an</strong>d the degree of <strong>in</strong>ternal democratic tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation. All<br />
<strong>in</strong>dications are that Serbia has made the least progress <strong>in</strong> this regard as a result<br />
of its <strong>in</strong>ternal economic, political <strong>an</strong>d social limitations. The <strong>in</strong>itial swift<br />
repudiation of the recent past dur<strong>in</strong>g 2001 <strong>an</strong>d 2002 was cut short by the<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić <strong>in</strong> March 2003, block<strong>in</strong>g further<br />
progress <strong>for</strong> almost two years. Serbia is still a country with vague borders, the<br />
Milošević 1990 Constitution is still <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce, power is centralized <strong>in</strong> the republic<br />
government, the pace of economic re<strong>for</strong>ms (privatization <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestments) is less th<strong>an</strong> expected...<br />
Though the political elites <strong>an</strong>d most citizens like to po<strong>in</strong>t out their<br />
‘pro-Europe’ orientation, there is no society-wide consensus to show proof of<br />
388<br />
389
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
their s<strong>in</strong>cerity <strong>an</strong>d fixity of purpose. On the contrary, a tacit ‘<strong>an</strong>ti-Europe’<br />
consensus that far more outweighs the vogue ‘pro-Europe’ asseverations<br />
seems to pervade m<strong>an</strong>y spheres of life of import<strong>an</strong>ce to Serbia itself <strong>an</strong>d<br />
particularly to its relations with its immediate neighbours (a major test of<br />
devotion to Europe<strong>an</strong> values). This is especially <strong>in</strong> evidence <strong>in</strong> Serbia’s attitude<br />
to the recent past <strong>an</strong>d its unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to come to terms with it. After a series<br />
of extraditions of war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees early <strong>in</strong> the year, cooperation with the<br />
Hague tribunal was aga<strong>in</strong> suspended <strong>in</strong> spite of const<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
pressure to cont<strong>in</strong>ue it, particularly <strong>in</strong> the case of Ratko Mladić. Also, on the<br />
occasion of the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Srebrenica genocide, the National<br />
Assembly rejected a draft declaration by eight domestic nongovernmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia)<br />
to denounce that monstrous crime <strong>in</strong> no uncerta<strong>in</strong> terms.<br />
In their contacts with <strong>in</strong>ternational actors, the authorities often raise<br />
the threat of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g radicalization <strong>an</strong>d the prospect of the ‘Radicals tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
over <strong>in</strong> Serbia’. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> criticiz<strong>in</strong>g the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party (SRS)<br />
the rul<strong>in</strong>g parties steer clear of denounc<strong>in</strong>g its warlike policy <strong>an</strong>d policy of<br />
crime <strong>in</strong> order to discredit it on the home policy level; they do this not only<br />
because they w<strong>an</strong>t to stay <strong>in</strong> power, but also because the leader of the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
coalition, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), is ideologically close to the<br />
SRS.<br />
Confused by the <strong>in</strong>congruity between the Europe<strong>an</strong> orientation <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the rehabilitation, as part of repudiat<strong>in</strong>g the communist part, of the nationalist<br />
<strong>for</strong>ces defeated <strong>in</strong> the Second World War (notably the Chetniks but even the<br />
more radical Ljotićites), Serbia has expelled itself from the <strong>an</strong>ti-fascist<br />
movement on which modern Europe bases its values. At the celebration of<br />
Victory Day, 9 May 2005, <strong>in</strong> Moscow, commemorat<strong>in</strong>g the sixtieth <strong>an</strong>niversary<br />
of the Allied victory, no one represented either Serbia or the <strong>state</strong> union of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro (SCG), just as no one from them was present at the<br />
commemorative gather<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Auschwitz on the same occasion. Furthermore,<br />
the SCG Assembly failed to adopt a declaration mark<strong>in</strong>g the sixtieth<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of the United Nations. In this way a country which, as a successor<br />
to the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia, rightfully claims its place among the founders of the<br />
<strong>for</strong>emost <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>ization, dist<strong>an</strong>ced itself from this position of<br />
honour <strong>an</strong>d prestige. The declaration was blocked <strong>in</strong> the SCG Assembly by the<br />
deputies of the SRS <strong>an</strong>d Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), who denounced the<br />
United Nations as the ‘fifty-first Americ<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>’ which ‘did everyth<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
break up the SFRY, FRY, <strong>an</strong>d now SCG’ <strong>an</strong>d is ‘now try<strong>in</strong>g to wrest Kosovo<br />
from us’.<br />
*<br />
* *<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
On 12 April 2005, Europe opened its door to Serbia slightly by giv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
it a positive Feasibility Study (the first of the four most import<strong>an</strong>t steps a<br />
country must make on its road to full EU membership). This was preceded by<br />
a series of extraditions to the Hague tribunal of senior army <strong>an</strong>d police officers<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicted <strong>for</strong> war crimes (a total of 14), a condition on which the EU <strong>in</strong>sisted.<br />
The government ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that all these <strong>in</strong>dictees had gone to The Hague<br />
voluntarily, that is, that ‘<strong>for</strong> the first time the war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees are<br />
cooperat<strong>in</strong>g with the authorities’ (Miroljub Labus).<br />
Whatever the truth, the positive Feasibility Study gave the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
government a trump card, ‘the first major tribute to our <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its re<strong>for</strong>ms’,<br />
with which to boost its prestige. As deputy prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Miroljub Labus said<br />
<strong>in</strong> this connection, ‘just as we succeeded <strong>in</strong> stabiliz<strong>in</strong>g our economy <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><br />
fulfill<strong>in</strong>g most of our electoral promises from December 2003, our <strong>state</strong> is <strong>for</strong><br />
the first time pursu<strong>in</strong>g a pro-re<strong>for</strong>m economic <strong>an</strong>d a robust <strong>an</strong>d restrictive as<br />
well as just budgetary policy, so we’re go<strong>in</strong>g to fully capitalize on the great<br />
accomplishments of Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> the course of last year’.<br />
In their eagerness to project their Euro-enthusiasm on the public with<br />
the help of the most <strong>in</strong>fluential media establishments they control, the<br />
authorities <strong>in</strong>itially removed from the public stage the Euro-sceptics <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
opponents of a ‘headlong rush’ <strong>in</strong>to Europe. The open<strong>in</strong>g of Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
prospects <strong>in</strong> Serbia, however, co<strong>in</strong>cided with <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal crisis of the EU itself.<br />
The differences <strong>an</strong>d disagreements aris<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the largest cont<strong>in</strong>ental<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration regard<strong>in</strong>g the military <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> Iraq (giv<strong>in</strong>g rise to a division<br />
between <strong>an</strong> ‘old’ <strong>an</strong>d a ‘new’ Europe) took on a new dimension <strong>in</strong> may 2005<br />
with first Fr<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d then Belgium hold<strong>in</strong>g referendums oppos<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
ratification of a new Europe<strong>an</strong> constitution. The crisis with<strong>in</strong> the EU<br />
suggest<strong>in</strong>g the complexity of the problems that were likely to beset Europe <strong>in</strong><br />
the years to come emboldened the ‘guardi<strong>an</strong>s’ of the national identity <strong>an</strong>d<br />
national dignity <strong>in</strong> Serbia to raise their voice <strong>in</strong> public. ‘Unlike <strong>in</strong> the case of<br />
other Eastern Europe<strong>an</strong> countries, the imposition of neo-liberal ideology on<br />
Serbia is less <strong>an</strong> outcome of economic enticement, <strong>an</strong>d more of s<strong>an</strong>ctions <strong>an</strong>d<br />
bombs...For this reason the countries of the East, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Serbia, must draw<br />
lessons <strong>in</strong> the light of the failure of the Europe<strong>an</strong> constitution referendums.<br />
One must bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that although we may be "weak <strong>an</strong>d powerless" (as we<br />
often like to portray ourselves), the sovereign will of the people must be of<br />
decisive political import<strong>an</strong>ce...In all probability, we shall be able to enjoy all<br />
the economic privileges currently enjoyed by EU member <strong>state</strong>s: to keep the<br />
right to distil our own br<strong>an</strong>dy, to learn our own history, to be called to account<br />
<strong>in</strong> accord<strong>an</strong>ce with our own laws, <strong>an</strong>d to educate our children accord<strong>in</strong>g to our<br />
own values – a scenario we w<strong>an</strong>t but some <strong>in</strong> our country tell us is<br />
impossible.’ 1<br />
1 Politika, 3 August 2005.<br />
390<br />
391
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Or, <strong>in</strong> the words of Professor Zor<strong>an</strong> Vidojević, ‘One should not<br />
approach the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union project <strong>an</strong>d its implementation from a position<br />
of <strong>an</strong> a priori <strong>an</strong>d unbounded Euro-enthusiasm’. He expla<strong>in</strong>s that a Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
orientation often boils down to a convenient political phraseology devoid of a<br />
social, <strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>an</strong>d cultural foundation, ‘<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g of a culture of<br />
resist<strong>an</strong>ce to neo-colonialism, Europe<strong>an</strong> or other’, a groundwork which, he<br />
argues, would guar<strong>an</strong>tee the atta<strong>in</strong>ment of what is best <strong>for</strong> one’s own country.<br />
But beneath the seem<strong>in</strong>g un<strong>an</strong>imity regard<strong>in</strong>g ‘Serbia’s Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
course’ which is said to have ‘no alternative’, the traditional conflict between<br />
conservative <strong>an</strong>d liberal <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d options cont<strong>in</strong>ues to pulsate with<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
society. In Serbia’s modern history, on which this conflict has left its strongest<br />
mark, the bal<strong>an</strong>ce has more often th<strong>an</strong> not been turned by the conservatives<br />
who have masked their <strong>an</strong>ti-Westernism <strong>an</strong>d fear of Europe beh<strong>in</strong>d concern<br />
lest the ‘national identity’ should be lost. This is also m<strong>an</strong>ifested <strong>in</strong> their<br />
irrational resist<strong>an</strong>ce to all th<strong>in</strong>gs com<strong>in</strong>g ‘from abroad’ <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g aid <strong>in</strong><br />
particular, <strong>in</strong> spite of the fact that without <strong>for</strong>eign assist<strong>an</strong>ce Serbia could<br />
hardly cope with the problems bequeathed by its <strong>for</strong>mer regime. The civil<br />
sector <strong>an</strong>d nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>in</strong> particular are the ma<strong>in</strong> targets of<br />
renewed criticism of recipients of <strong>for</strong>eign funds, though the government <strong>an</strong>d<br />
its <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d agencies have not been spared either. On the occasion of the<br />
adoption by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly early <strong>in</strong> the summer of the ‘National<br />
Strategy of Serbia <strong>for</strong> the Accession of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro to the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Union’, a document which attracted very little attention, the most <strong>in</strong>fluential<br />
daily Politika published a commentary rais<strong>in</strong>g doubt about its content <strong>an</strong>d<br />
orientation. The motive <strong>for</strong> doubt was found <strong>in</strong>, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, the fact<br />
that the preparation of ‘such <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t project’ was f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially supported<br />
by the Fund <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> Open Society, that is, by George Soros: ‘He is that stock<br />
exch<strong>an</strong>ge fixer who wholeheartedly campaigned <strong>for</strong> the bomb<strong>in</strong>g of Serbia. A<br />
friend of Madele<strong>in</strong>e Albright <strong>an</strong>d Richard Holbrooke, but no friend of Balk<strong>an</strong><br />
peoples...’ The author lays the blame on the ‘technocrats <strong>in</strong> power’ who ‘draw<br />
their strength not from Serbi<strong>an</strong> citizens but from fulfill<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terests of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial lobbies which support them’. 2<br />
Lack of a sense of reality <strong>an</strong>d of discernment of the newly established<br />
constellations is what keeps Serbia <strong>in</strong> limbo. As a result, the rul<strong>in</strong>g elites<br />
respond to <strong>an</strong>y new challenge by apply<strong>in</strong>g the old, rigid <strong>an</strong>d obsolete<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulas. In this connection, Kosovo is a case <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t. Early last year,<br />
especially after it became quite clear that Serbia would get a positive Feasibility<br />
Study (a signal from Brussels of <strong>an</strong> offer of accelerated Europe<strong>an</strong> prospects <strong>in</strong><br />
compensation <strong>for</strong> the ‘loss’ of Kosovo), neither the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government nor<br />
<strong>an</strong>y other <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution believed that talks on the future status of Kosovo<br />
would start so soon. They b<strong>an</strong>ked on the status quo <strong>in</strong> Kosovo dragg<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>for</strong><br />
2 Politika, 2 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
decades on the model of Cyprus, <strong>an</strong>d that me<strong>an</strong>while it would be enough to<br />
repeat ad nauseum the ‘more th<strong>an</strong> autonomy, less th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence’ m<strong>an</strong>tra<br />
as a <strong>for</strong>mula <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> advisable settlement. It was <strong>for</strong> this reason that the <strong>in</strong>itial<br />
signals of <strong>an</strong> approach<strong>in</strong>g debate on the status of Kosovo – first the <strong>state</strong>ment<br />
of the International Commission on the Balk<strong>an</strong>s, then the relev<strong>an</strong>t pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of<br />
the Contact Group – were perceived as hostile or at least documents contrary<br />
to Serb national <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
A member of the International Commission on the Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
SCG <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>ister, Gor<strong>an</strong> Svil<strong>an</strong>ović, was <strong>for</strong> weeks the target of a smear<br />
political campaign <strong>in</strong> the media <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>nounc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> acceleration of<br />
the Kosovo agenda.<br />
In the summer, however, the <strong>in</strong>ternational community made quite<br />
clear that there would be no more delay <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g the future status of<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d proceeded <strong>in</strong> the course of the com<strong>in</strong>g months to carry out all the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>an</strong>d subst<strong>an</strong>tial preparations <strong>for</strong> the talks (which started <strong>in</strong> Vienna <strong>in</strong><br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006).<br />
Although Serbia acquiesced <strong>in</strong> talks on the future of its <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
prov<strong>in</strong>ce, its preparations from start to f<strong>in</strong>ish exuded rejection of the very<br />
thought that Kosovo may constitute its own sovereignty (through conditional<br />
or unconditional <strong>in</strong>dependence). The ‘territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity’ of Serbia was<br />
defended by <strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g UN Security Council resolution 1244 which, admittedly,<br />
refers to Kosovo as a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (there however<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g no mention of the Republic of Serbia). On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, the resolution<br />
stipulates that the future status of Kosovo would be the subject of subsequent<br />
talks. This relev<strong>an</strong>t provision of the resolution is not mentioned by the very<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y advocates (among politici<strong>an</strong>s, public figures, experts, etc.) of ‘keep<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Kosovo with<strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> framework’. Among the arguments believed to<br />
carry special weight because they are allegedly based on <strong>in</strong>ternational public<br />
law is the one on which Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica <strong>in</strong>sists <strong>in</strong> particular,<br />
namely that <strong>an</strong>y ‘grab of territory from a democratic country’ is out of the<br />
question because ‘Serbia is now a democratic country’. The first dignitary of<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, lent his weight to this<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpretation of <strong>in</strong>ternational public law, say<strong>in</strong>g that ‘<strong>in</strong> the context of justice<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational law, <strong>an</strong>y thought of grabb<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija would<br />
me<strong>an</strong> wrest<strong>in</strong>g a territory from a democratic <strong>state</strong> right <strong>in</strong> the middle of<br />
Europe <strong>in</strong> the 21st century be<strong>for</strong>e the eyes of the whole world...’ In <strong>an</strong>y case, a<br />
precedent where a country has lost part of its territory <strong>for</strong> the sole reason of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g undemocratic c<strong>an</strong> hardly be found <strong>in</strong> the application of <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
public law; the territorial sovereignty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tegrity of <strong>state</strong>s is guar<strong>an</strong>teed as<br />
part of the general pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the <strong>in</strong>violability of borders of <strong>in</strong>ternationally<br />
recognized <strong>state</strong>s, both democratic <strong>an</strong>d undemocratic (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce,<br />
North Korea). As far as Serbia is concerned, the Kosovo problem stems from<br />
the fact that it has lost legitimacy to govern that territory; as a result, Kosovo’s<br />
392<br />
393
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
future status will be settled on the basis of the will of the local majority<br />
population, <strong>in</strong> con<strong>for</strong>mity with the position taken by the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community.<br />
This position has been used <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> further accusations aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
the <strong>in</strong>ternational community of partiality <strong>an</strong>d double st<strong>an</strong>dards – the critics<br />
have <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d Republika Srpska <strong>an</strong>d its ‘<strong>for</strong>cible keep<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong><br />
framework of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a’ – as well as be<strong>in</strong>g the source of<br />
deepen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Western sentiments. Probably the most<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluential exponent of these sentiments <strong>in</strong> Serbia is the author Dobrica Ćosić,<br />
who specified his reserve towards Serbia’s Europe<strong>an</strong> orientation <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> October<br />
<strong>in</strong>terview with Politika: ‘Whereas half a century ago the Serb people paid<br />
dearly under Moscow’s ideological dictates <strong>for</strong> the construction of socialism,<br />
today, unm<strong>in</strong>dful of history, they have completely bowed to the Brussels<br />
ideological dictates. It was the Brussels commissars that bombed us <strong>an</strong>d placed<br />
us <strong>in</strong> a provisional <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> which the people of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro sob on<br />
the crucifix. At the same time, they are threaten<strong>in</strong>g us with new "<strong>in</strong>tegrative"<br />
associations while tear<strong>in</strong>g Republika Srpska apart <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g Serbs to live <strong>in</strong> a<br />
"multi-ethnic Kosovo" camp with their murderers.’ 3<br />
The purpose of such rhetoric is to let the Serbs know the ‘truth’ about<br />
the West’s <strong>an</strong>d Europe’s hypocritical ef<strong>for</strong>ts to make Serbia part of Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrations. This is not a matter of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>itari<strong>an</strong>ism or the fulfilment of<br />
economic st<strong>an</strong>dards – the argument runs – this is a matter of voluntary<br />
accept<strong>an</strong>ce of solutions at the expense of the Serb people, hence the loss of its<br />
confidence <strong>in</strong> Europe <strong>an</strong>d its values: ‘The end result of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community’s lack of favour <strong>an</strong>d "double st<strong>an</strong>dards" regard<strong>in</strong>g Serbia will be<br />
the f<strong>in</strong>al destruction of the trust <strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> values that had been severely<br />
shaken by the bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1999; a by-product of this will be that the Serb will<br />
give more credence to <strong>an</strong>y conspiracy theory th<strong>an</strong> to assur<strong>an</strong>ces that<br />
"Europe<strong>an</strong> values" br<strong>in</strong>g prosperity or that they exist at all...’ 4<br />
The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong>ty about the future status of Kosovo caused<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g jitters <strong>in</strong> Serbia, each message to this effect from <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
representative draw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>th <strong>an</strong> ever stronger rhetoric upon its arrival <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade. The first to draw flak was Sloveni<strong>an</strong> President J<strong>an</strong>ez Drnovšek (‘All<br />
the world knows that Kosovo is go<strong>in</strong>g to be <strong>in</strong>dependent’), followed by <strong>an</strong><br />
uproar caused by Doris Pack who declared <strong>in</strong> December that Kosovo’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence would constitute deserved punishment <strong>for</strong> Milošević’s Serbia:<br />
‘Does the defensive on to which the Serbi<strong>an</strong> politici<strong>an</strong>s have been <strong>for</strong>ced over<br />
the Hague question me<strong>an</strong> that one must <strong>an</strong>d should accept even th<strong>in</strong>gs such as<br />
the <strong>state</strong>ment by this Doris Pack wom<strong>an</strong>, based on a vague <strong>an</strong>d, if you wish,<br />
<strong>in</strong>correct idea of the role of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong> the events <strong>in</strong> Kosovo...[does it<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
me<strong>an</strong>] that, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, no one will w<strong>an</strong>t to hear that the mass expulsion of<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> 1999 was not the outcome of Milošević’s deliberate policy<br />
towards the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, but of the way war was conducted <strong>in</strong> the conditions of<br />
NATO bomb<strong>in</strong>g raids. This is not the same th<strong>in</strong>g. Or, should one leave it up to<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpreters such as Doris Pack to proclaim the <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>in</strong><br />
adv<strong>an</strong>ce, on the strength of a fictitious Serb holocaust aga<strong>in</strong>st the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>for</strong><br />
obvious w<strong>an</strong>t of better arguments? Or should one protest <strong>an</strong>d – why not – say<br />
that we here may read such <strong>state</strong>ments as a rehabilitation of Hitlerism by a<br />
Germ<strong>an</strong> deputy wom<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament?’ 5<br />
The atmosphere <strong>in</strong> which the <strong>an</strong>ti-Western sentiments were be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
stoked gave rise to a pronounced rehabilitation of Russia <strong>an</strong>d to exaggerations<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g the role it played <strong>in</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g Serbia from <strong>an</strong> ‘unjust’ West. The<br />
clos<strong>in</strong>g months of 2005 were marked by eulogies – with <strong>in</strong>fluential media<br />
outlets lead<strong>in</strong>g the way – of Vladimir Put<strong>in</strong> as a ‘hero’ defend<strong>in</strong>g Russi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
‘our’ <strong>in</strong>terests aga<strong>in</strong>st the unpr<strong>in</strong>cipled champions of globalization from the<br />
West (his <strong>an</strong>nouncement that he may move to cut <strong>for</strong>eign fund<strong>in</strong>g of domestic<br />
nongovernmental org<strong>an</strong>izations earn<strong>in</strong>g him particular applause). The secret<br />
hopes were revived that Russia will exercise its right of veto <strong>in</strong> the Security<br />
Council when the next resolution on Kosovo, or rather on its future status, is<br />
put on the agenda, all the more so as Put<strong>in</strong> had already verbally opposed such<br />
a precedent. Serbia’s new reli<strong>an</strong>ce on the East was reflected <strong>in</strong> the general<br />
mood of the citizens: the Institute of Social Sciences found <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> ethnic dist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
survey published early <strong>in</strong> 2006 that Serbs identified Russi<strong>an</strong>s as the people<br />
closest to them (<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>gly, Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s, who had always been rated<br />
highly <strong>in</strong> this regard, slumped to fifth place beh<strong>in</strong>d – Sloveni<strong>an</strong>s).<br />
*<br />
* *<br />
In July 2005, SCG Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Vuk Drašković signed the<br />
Agreement on Ground L<strong>in</strong>es of Communication <strong>for</strong> NATO Forces Through the<br />
Territory of Serbia-Montenegro (ratified <strong>in</strong> the SCG Assembly on 4 November<br />
2005). The agreement allows NATO to use roads <strong>an</strong>d rail l<strong>in</strong>es on our soil <strong>for</strong><br />
the tr<strong>an</strong>sport of its troops to dest<strong>in</strong>ations of its choos<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with its<br />
own <strong>in</strong>tentions, pl<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d objectives. The move provoked <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>gry public<br />
reaction <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>sults aga<strong>in</strong>st Drašković personally. Although the <strong>an</strong>ti-<br />
NATO campaign was spearheaded by the Radicals, one ga<strong>in</strong>ed the impression<br />
that they served as mouthpieces <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y others, all the more so as no<br />
government <strong>in</strong>stitution appeared too keen to rise to the defence of either the<br />
Agreement or Drašković.<br />
3 Politika, 2 October 2005.<br />
4 NIN, 24 November 2005.<br />
5 NIN, 19 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
394<br />
395
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
With regard to Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations, one notices a marked difference<br />
<strong>in</strong> attitudes towards the EU <strong>an</strong>d NATO regardless of the fact that no country<br />
has become <strong>an</strong> EU member so far without first becom<strong>in</strong>g a full member of the<br />
military alli<strong>an</strong>ce or, at least, part of its structure with<strong>in</strong> the Partnership <strong>for</strong><br />
Peace. Subdued though more often open resist<strong>an</strong>ce to <strong>an</strong>y relationship with<br />
NATO permeates the const<strong>an</strong>t rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the 1999 <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>an</strong>d of the<br />
alleged hostility the org<strong>an</strong>ization still harbours towards Serbia (SCG’s<br />
accession to the Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace is conditional on the extradition of Ratko<br />
Mladić to the Hague tribunal). On the occasion of the sign<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
Agreement, a commentary r<strong>an</strong>: ‘The sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Agreement is a political<br />
mistake’ because ‘<strong>for</strong>eign armies have a cont<strong>in</strong>uous "green light" <strong>for</strong> tr<strong>an</strong>sit<br />
across our soil, even though they are neither our partners nor our allies. They<br />
have no obligation to be friendly either. Instead of emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
un<strong>for</strong>tunately there is still no mutual trust between SCG <strong>an</strong>d NATO <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
time is needed to gradually establish it, it appears that we have gullibly<br />
slipped <strong>in</strong>to a camouflaged protectorate that is even be<strong>in</strong>g denied membership<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> unimport<strong>an</strong>t org<strong>an</strong>ization like the Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace, like a baby<br />
deprived of its rattle. This protectorate will perhaps have the heaviest<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> concentration of <strong>for</strong>eign troops, ready <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y sort of <strong>in</strong>tervention,<br />
but unlike the other protectorates <strong>in</strong> our vic<strong>in</strong>ity, it will not also enjoy the<br />
protection of the UN Security Council.’ 6<br />
*<br />
* *<br />
Although s<strong>in</strong>ce the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 2005 Serbia had extradited none of the<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g seven war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees w<strong>an</strong>ted by the Hague tribunal, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Ratko Mladić who is specifically named on each occasion, SCG was on 10<br />
October gr<strong>an</strong>ted <strong>an</strong>other privilege – the start of stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association<br />
talks. The gesture was yet <strong>an</strong>other ‘favour’ from the <strong>in</strong>ternational community,<br />
<strong>an</strong> opportunity <strong>for</strong> faster Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration through cast<strong>in</strong>g off the grave<br />
legacy of the past (on 5 October <strong>in</strong> Belgrade Stef<strong>an</strong> Lehne urged <strong>an</strong> ‘end to the<br />
pa<strong>in</strong>ful chapter of cooperation with the Hague tribunal by extradit<strong>in</strong>g all the<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dictees’, with Oli Rehn say<strong>in</strong>g on the same occasion that the ‘time<br />
has come to f<strong>in</strong>d out how far Serbia has gone <strong>an</strong>d to establish its priorities’,<br />
add<strong>in</strong>g at the open<strong>in</strong>g of the stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association talks a few days later<br />
that ‘dur<strong>in</strong>g the talks we will be carefully monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y progress, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Commission will not hesitate to recommend a suspension of the talks if there is<br />
none’). All the same, already at that time Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>izations beg<strong>an</strong> to show considerable impatience <strong>an</strong>d<br />
agitation over Serbia’s sluggishness, particularly <strong>in</strong> ‘carry<strong>in</strong>g out the<br />
6 Politika, 21 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational obligations undertaken’ but also regard<strong>in</strong>g other fields where a<br />
break with the regime of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević was called <strong>for</strong>. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
reception of the positive Feasibility Study, the Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission<br />
published a re<strong>for</strong>m progress report early <strong>in</strong> November criticiz<strong>in</strong>g lack of<br />
headway <strong>in</strong> re<strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g a number of segments of the socio-economic system <strong>an</strong>d<br />
identify<strong>in</strong>g problems <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>efficient <strong>in</strong>stitutions, resist<strong>an</strong>ce to <strong>an</strong>d<br />
obstruction of army re<strong>for</strong>ms, corruption, slow judiciary re<strong>for</strong>m, lack of<br />
lustration...<strong>an</strong>d negative attitudes towards the civil sector. The report notes,<br />
among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, that ‘There is a well developed <strong>an</strong>d very active civil<br />
society <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. Its situation rema<strong>in</strong>s precarious, notably <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia due to the cont<strong>in</strong>ued lack of adequate legislation...parliaments have<br />
become more open, allow<strong>in</strong>g NGOs to attend sessions...on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, the<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration cont<strong>in</strong>ues to show <strong>in</strong>sufficient underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g [of that sector]’.<br />
Objections were made concern<strong>in</strong>g the situation of m<strong>in</strong>orities (<strong>an</strong> issue<br />
discussed by the Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament <strong>in</strong> Brussels <strong>in</strong> October), unresolved<br />
issues <strong>in</strong> relations with neighbours (border disputes with Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a’s aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide<br />
action aga<strong>in</strong>st SCG), as well as the fact that Serbia (<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro) had not<br />
yet emerged from the grey zone of org<strong>an</strong>ized crime. The report also says that<br />
‘Org<strong>an</strong>ized crime rema<strong>in</strong>s a source of serious concern <strong>in</strong> both Republics. The<br />
ratification <strong>an</strong>d implementation of <strong>in</strong>ternational conventions <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
f<strong>in</strong>alization of national strategies <strong>an</strong>d action pl<strong>an</strong>s need to be speeded up.<br />
Threat <strong>an</strong>alysis needs to be <strong>in</strong>troduced, as well as tools such as <strong>in</strong>telligence<br />
gather<strong>in</strong>g, secret surveill<strong>an</strong>ce techniques <strong>an</strong>d the development of a common<br />
database. The seizure <strong>an</strong>d freez<strong>in</strong>g of assets, b<strong>an</strong>k accounts <strong>an</strong>d the proceeds of<br />
crime appear to be problematic <strong>in</strong> practice...In Serbia, the action pl<strong>an</strong> to<br />
implement the National Strategy <strong>for</strong> Org<strong>an</strong>ized Crime has not yet been<br />
f<strong>in</strong>alized...[<strong>an</strong>d]...the f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g of the witness protection system rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
<strong>in</strong>adequate.’ 7<br />
The clos<strong>in</strong>g months of 2005 passed with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
actors exch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g hot <strong>an</strong>d cold messages. Aware that the challenges await<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Serbia <strong>in</strong> 2006 – above all the end of the Kosovo status talks <strong>an</strong>d the demise of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro after be<strong>in</strong>g connected to lifesusta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
apparatus by <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> three years – will be a source of further<br />
objective frustration to Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Serbia, <strong>in</strong>ternational officials cont<strong>in</strong>ued to<br />
exercise toler<strong>an</strong>ce. This policy cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>in</strong>to the early months of 2006: <strong>in</strong><br />
February the Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission neither delayed nor suspended the<br />
stabilization <strong>an</strong>d association talks with the EU (<strong>in</strong> spite of threats to that effect)<br />
although Ratko Mladić had not been extradited even by that deadl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
7 Report on progress s<strong>in</strong>ce the Feasibility Report, Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 14-15 November 2005.<br />
396<br />
397
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
In spite of hav<strong>in</strong>g been subjected long enough to cont<strong>in</strong>uous parallel<br />
treatment by the EU <strong>an</strong>d other Europe<strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>izations (OSCE, Council of<br />
Europe), consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> exercis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>bear<strong>an</strong>ce whenever adv<strong>an</strong>tageous without<br />
at the same time <strong>for</strong>go<strong>in</strong>g pressure whenever called <strong>for</strong>, Serbia has failed to<br />
rationalize its own approach to current <strong>in</strong>ternational developments. In other<br />
words, it has failed to achieve a broad social <strong>an</strong>d political consensus on its own<br />
priorities not only regard<strong>in</strong>g acceleration of its <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to Europe but also<br />
regard<strong>in</strong>g three key ‘domestic’ issues: cooperation with the Hague tribunal,<br />
position on Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>an</strong>d the future status of Kosovo. The<br />
British <strong>an</strong>alyst Judith Bath observes lucidly that these three problems are only<br />
slow<strong>in</strong>g Serbia’s Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d proffers this bold advice<br />
(tr<strong>an</strong>slated back <strong>in</strong>to English): ‘Once these are settled [the Hague tribunal,<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo issues], noth<strong>in</strong>g else will keep you from mov<strong>in</strong>g<br />
towards the Union at full steam. So hurry up. Don’t withdraw <strong>in</strong>to passivity,<br />
play the underdog, <strong>in</strong>sist that no one underst<strong>an</strong>ds you, stick to one <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
same position, the same arguments, out of fear of st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g to lose out (yet<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>)..."it isn’t fair" is neither <strong>an</strong> argument nor politics.’<br />
*<br />
* *<br />
Serbia still has no clear strategy regard<strong>in</strong>g its <strong>in</strong>ternational position<br />
<strong>an</strong>d participation <strong>in</strong> current developments <strong>in</strong> its neighbourhood <strong>an</strong>d the rest of<br />
Europe. This is so because its current political elites lack the potential to<br />
marshal energy <strong>for</strong> the ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>an</strong>d subst<strong>an</strong>tial re<strong>for</strong>ms Serbi<strong>an</strong> society must<br />
carry out after nearly fifteen lost years (except <strong>for</strong> the brief two-year period on<br />
whose ma<strong>in</strong>stream the assass<strong>in</strong>ated Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Zor<strong>an</strong> Đ<strong>in</strong>đić left his<br />
stamp). Serbia’s society is now pay<strong>in</strong>g a price <strong>for</strong> not keep<strong>in</strong>g up with the<br />
momentous global ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> the spheres of technology, communications,<br />
economy, politics <strong>an</strong>d others co<strong>in</strong>cid<strong>in</strong>g with Serbia’s (self-imposed) isolation.<br />
Serbia went to war bent on realiz<strong>in</strong>g its <strong>an</strong>achronous national project <strong>an</strong>d now<br />
has to attend to the unpaid bills. The succession of m<strong>an</strong>ifest defeats is not the<br />
only legacy to be dealt with, <strong>for</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> society as a whole appears unequal,<br />
given its very low start<strong>in</strong>g base, to the ef<strong>for</strong>t required to re<strong>for</strong>m itself, its<br />
economy, morals, strategy, values, etc.<br />
Serbia’s economy is deva<strong>state</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d its middle classes ru<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
several generations of its young people have had to emigrate with little or no<br />
prospect of com<strong>in</strong>g back. Hav<strong>in</strong>g grown up <strong>in</strong> a climate of xenophobia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>sularity, the young generations <strong>in</strong> the country have no realistic <strong>an</strong>d impartial<br />
ideas about the world exist<strong>in</strong>g beyond the country’s borders. This is not<br />
surpris<strong>in</strong>g given that most of those who have come of age <strong>in</strong> the last fifteen<br />
years could not have communicated with the immediate neighbourhood, let<br />
alone with faraway regions <strong>an</strong>d peoples, even if they had w<strong>an</strong>ted to.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Development Report <strong>for</strong> 2005, only 44 per cent of the citizens of Serbia<br />
have a passport <strong>an</strong>d 40 per cent have never had one. The majority of passport<br />
holders are people over sixty years of age, their numbers dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g among<br />
the younger generations. More th<strong>an</strong> half of those aged fifteen to twenty-five<br />
have never been abroad <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslav republics <strong>an</strong>d only a third<br />
have been abroad more th<strong>an</strong> once. A computer is owned by 25.2 per cent of<br />
citizens, with 16.5 per cent hav<strong>in</strong>g access to the Internet <strong>an</strong>d only 13.8 per cent<br />
hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> e-mail address.<br />
The report says that as m<strong>an</strong>y as 95 per cent of the citizens of Serbia<br />
come from mono-ethnic marriages <strong>an</strong>d 92 per cent of the respondents’<br />
marriages are also mono-ethnic.<br />
In a recent poll young respondents were asked to mark as ‘strong’,<br />
‘moderate’, ‘weak’ <strong>an</strong>d ‘nonexistent’ their attachment to the nation, religion,<br />
place of residence, Serbia, the <strong>state</strong> union, <strong>an</strong>d Europe: 30 per cent said they<br />
were strongly attached to the nation, 28 per cent to Serbia, 26 per cent to the<br />
religion <strong>an</strong>d the place of residence, 14 per cent to the <strong>state</strong> union, <strong>an</strong>d only 11<br />
per cent to Europe.<br />
At the same time, Europe<strong>an</strong>s are show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g dist<strong>an</strong>ce from<br />
Serbia: accord<strong>in</strong>g to a Eurobarometer survey, Serbia has the least support <strong>for</strong><br />
EU membership of all <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslav republics (40 per cent), rat<strong>in</strong>g better<br />
only th<strong>an</strong> Alb<strong>an</strong>ia <strong>an</strong>d Turkey <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s. Serbia got more support from<br />
‘new’ EU members (54 per cent) th<strong>an</strong> from ‘old’ (38 per cent). In this poll, most<br />
respondents (52 per cent) favoured Croatia as the next new member of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> community of peoples <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>s. 8<br />
Given that, as a result of Europe’s constitutional crisis <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
structure challenges, each new accession will have to be approved <strong>in</strong> a<br />
referendum held by the EU member <strong>state</strong>s, Serbia’s prospects <strong>for</strong> EU<br />
membership appear <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly dist<strong>an</strong>t. Such <strong>an</strong> outlook may <strong>in</strong> turn produce<br />
a grow<strong>in</strong>g number of Euro-sceptics <strong>in</strong> Serbia itself <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly discourage<br />
a pro-development orientation.<br />
The <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Western mood may be expected to spread<br />
because Serbia <strong>an</strong>ticipates with frustration the settlement of two issues –<br />
Kosovo’s status <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro’s <strong>in</strong>dependence referendum – <strong>in</strong> the course of<br />
2006. The ma<strong>in</strong> responsibility <strong>for</strong> this attaches no doubt to the rul<strong>in</strong>g political<br />
<strong>an</strong>d dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tellectual elites which stick to the old criteria <strong>in</strong> gaug<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational developments <strong>an</strong>d determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Serbia’s response to them. On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d, the <strong>in</strong>sistence on be<strong>in</strong>g the ‘underdog’ that is ‘misunderstood’ by<br />
the whole world <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e the target of everlast<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>in</strong>justice’ has turned<br />
Serbia <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> object of concern of <strong>in</strong>ternational (above all Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d US)<br />
actors rather th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> actor <strong>in</strong> its own right <strong>an</strong>d a partner <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
8 D<strong>an</strong>as, 20 July 2005.<br />
398<br />
399
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
mutual relations. As th<strong>in</strong>gs st<strong>an</strong>d now, these relations still operate on the<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of cont<strong>in</strong>uous pressure on Serbia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>ced moves on its part;<br />
consequently Serbia has to be slowly prodded towards the fulfilment of its real<br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d national <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong>stead of runn<strong>in</strong>g at full throttle under its own<br />
power.<br />
The m<strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>ternational actors deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the resolution of the<br />
‘Serbia case’ over the past fifteen years cont<strong>in</strong>ue to m<strong>an</strong>ifest their goodwill to<br />
help Serbia’s subst<strong>an</strong>tial tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation. This is, after all, a Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest<br />
too, what with Serbia’s geographic position <strong>an</strong>d the need to neutralize the key<br />
source of <strong>in</strong>stability <strong>in</strong> this part of the cont<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>for</strong> good. However, the<br />
patience <strong>an</strong>d goodwill to help Serbia seem to be runn<strong>in</strong>g out. Already the first<br />
months of 2006 will show how much of it is left follow<strong>in</strong>g Serbia’s const<strong>an</strong>t<br />
evasion of commitments on the <strong>in</strong>ternational pl<strong>an</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d reversion to old criteria<br />
<strong>an</strong>d values at home. A number of serious warn<strong>in</strong>gs have already been made<br />
that ought to be kept <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. The most explicit <strong>an</strong>d acerbic caution comes<br />
from William Montgomery, the US ambassador <strong>in</strong> Belgrade <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y years<br />
<strong>an</strong>d expert on Serbi<strong>an</strong>, US <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> affairs (tr<strong>an</strong>slated back <strong>in</strong>to English):<br />
‘The days are past when Serbia posed a major military <strong>an</strong>d political threat to its<br />
neighbours. At the moment it looks as though the only threat it poses is to<br />
itself. I really am conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the <strong>in</strong>ternational community has resolved<br />
that, should the Serbs wish to isolate themselves <strong>an</strong>d to lag beh<strong>in</strong>d the rest of<br />
Europe, the Serbs alone are go<strong>in</strong>g to get hurt. There<strong>for</strong>e, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
government ought not to look to the EU or the United States <strong>for</strong> sympathy <strong>in</strong><br />
the hard days to come. Those days were over a few years back.’ 9<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
SLOVENIA:<br />
PUTTING FORTH SOLUTIONS<br />
TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS<br />
Slovenia, <strong>an</strong> EU member <strong>an</strong>d chairm<strong>an</strong> of the OSCE, is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
partner of Serbia on the latter's road to economic <strong>an</strong>d political <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to<br />
Europe. 1 Slovenia has m<strong>an</strong>ifested its read<strong>in</strong>ess to render support to Serbia 2 ,<br />
weighted down by numerous problems <strong>an</strong>d no resolution thereof <strong>in</strong> sight, 3 by<br />
a constructive strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of democratic processes contribut<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
regional stability <strong>an</strong>d progress. For official Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a relations between the<br />
member-<strong>state</strong>s of the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, as well as<br />
resolution of the issue of Kosovo, have a major bear<strong>in</strong>g on the stability of<br />
Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d the region. 4 Slovenia is of op<strong>in</strong>ion that all problems <strong>an</strong>d economic<br />
progress of Serbia 5 <strong>an</strong>d the region may be most efficiently resolved with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
EU context, that is by Serbia's gett<strong>in</strong>g closer to Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
However, accord<strong>in</strong>g to official Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a no-one knows how the most probable<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo shall affect Serbia's conduct. One of the speculations<br />
afoot concerns a possible rise to power of "those <strong>for</strong>ces which <strong>in</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g 1999 <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo provoked the NATO <strong>in</strong>tervention.?!" 6 Bilateral co-operation between<br />
9 D<strong>an</strong>as.<br />
1 Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a established diplomatic relations <strong>in</strong> December 2000<br />
<strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce then the two countries have signed 17 bilateral agreements, while <strong>in</strong> the off<strong>in</strong>g<br />
are new agreements to constitute the foundations of a further consolidation of cooperation.<br />
“Day of Modern Serbia <strong>in</strong> Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19-20 March 2005.<br />
2 Sloveni<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister J<strong>an</strong>ez J<strong>an</strong>ša backed accession-related negotiations<br />
between EU <strong>an</strong>d the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro without <strong>an</strong>y conditions.<br />
“Betrayal of Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples”, Politika, 18 March 2005.<br />
3 “Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro Stil Face M<strong>an</strong>y Unresolved Problems”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 31.<br />
December – 3 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
4 “Day of Modern Serbia <strong>in</strong> Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19-20 March 2005.<br />
5 Slovenia enters the new years as the largest <strong>in</strong>vestor <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro. “Sloveni<strong>an</strong> Pleased with 2005.”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 31 December – 3. J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
6 “Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro Still Face M<strong>an</strong>y Unresolved Problems”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 31<br />
December – 3 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
400<br />
401
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
the two countries was focused on promotion of economic co-operation, 7 then<br />
on resolution of status of Serbs struck off Sloveni<strong>an</strong> citizens'registers, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
settlement of status of Kosovo. In its capacity of the OSCE chairm<strong>an</strong>, the issue<br />
of Kosovo was a high-priority one <strong>for</strong> the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> diplomacy. That is why<br />
that diplomacy got so much <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> resolution of regional problems. It<br />
moreover amply <strong>in</strong>dicated its st<strong>an</strong>ce that a positive settlement of Kosovo issue<br />
would impact positively the situation <strong>in</strong> Macedonia <strong>an</strong>d Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. However,<br />
Sloveni<strong>an</strong> diplomacy met with the fact that Serbia "has never had enough<br />
courage to turn to the future". 8<br />
Statement of President of Slovenia, J<strong>an</strong>ez Drnovšek, that "after<br />
fulfilment of some conditions <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo may become the only<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e option" caused a veritable odium 9 <strong>in</strong> Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d led to a diplomati<br />
sc<strong>an</strong>dal <strong>in</strong> the shape of c<strong>an</strong>cellation of Drnovsek's visit to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro. Official Belgrade reacted <strong>in</strong> a very hostile way by stress<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g: "Under no conditions the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro are<br />
ready to accept proclamation of <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>in</strong> its <strong>state</strong> territory<br />
<strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized borders." Rasim Ljajić, M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights, <strong>state</strong>d that <strong>state</strong>ment made by J<strong>an</strong>ez Drnovsek<br />
was impermissible <strong>an</strong>d that c<strong>an</strong>cellation of his visit to Serbia was a normal<br />
response of Belgrade. 10 The Serb Orthodox Church also qualified Drnovsek's<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment as impermissible. 11 Dur<strong>in</strong>g Drnovsek's visit to Pecka Patrijarsija <strong>an</strong>d<br />
7 Trade between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Slovenia has reached half a million dollars, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Sloveni<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> the Serb economy <strong>in</strong> 2004 were worth 260 million Euro.<br />
“Rupel: Day of Modern Serbia <strong>in</strong> Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19-20. March 2005.<br />
8 Jelko Kac<strong>in</strong>, Sloveni<strong>an</strong> member of EU Foreign Policy <strong>Committee</strong>: “For a vast<br />
majority of citizens of Serbia the last decade is more import<strong>an</strong>t th<strong>an</strong> the current decade,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d vision of the next century is const<strong>an</strong>tly overshadowed by recent <strong>an</strong>d even Balk<strong>an</strong>s<br />
wars. ”. “Serbia has a ch<strong>an</strong>ce”, NiN, 7 April 2005.<br />
9 Vladeta J<strong>an</strong>ković, Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister's aide : “Insistence on <strong>in</strong>dependence of<br />
the prov<strong>in</strong>ce is contrary to positions of all <strong>in</strong>ternational factors, from EU to members of<br />
Contact Group. At play is a gross prejudg<strong>in</strong>g which ignores pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
law order <strong>an</strong>d the need to reach a resolution by compromise. Drnovsek:" Independence<br />
of Kosovo is a realistic option”, www.B92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo, 12 November 2005.<br />
10 M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights, Rasim Ljajić, <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
Drnovsek's <strong>state</strong>ment was impermissible <strong>an</strong>d that the move of Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
President, that is c<strong>an</strong>cellation of Drnovsek's visit was quite expected. “Even if that<br />
satement was fully accurate, even it if were to come true, it is impermissible to tell a<br />
<strong>state</strong>, on the very eve of official visit to that <strong>state</strong>, that it shall be stripped of part of its<br />
territory. ”<br />
11 Episcope of Backa, Ir<strong>in</strong>ej, <strong>state</strong>d that the Serb Orthodox Church was<br />
perplexed <strong>an</strong>d embittered by impermissible claims of the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> President J<strong>an</strong>ez<br />
Drnovšek relat<strong>in</strong>g to the future status of Kosovo. www.kosovo.com/news/<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
monastery Visoki Dec<strong>an</strong>i 12 not a s<strong>in</strong>gle Kosovar Serb representative met with<br />
the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> top official.<br />
Despite Drnovšek’s clarification of his st<strong>an</strong>ce on Kosovo 13 , dur<strong>in</strong>g his<br />
visit to Montenegro, several hundred pro-Serb opposition loyalists protested<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st his st<strong>an</strong>ces on <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo. 14 Despite the uproar <strong>an</strong>d<br />
heated atmosphere, c<strong>an</strong>cellation of of Drnovsek's visit to Serbia has not<br />
jeopardized <strong>in</strong> a serious way further settlement of open bilateral issues or<br />
Sloveni<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>terests.<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Diaspora of Serbia launched a few <strong>in</strong>itiatives 15 with a view<br />
to regulat<strong>in</strong>g the status of Serbs liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Slovenia, that it enabl<strong>in</strong>g them to<br />
acquire the national m<strong>in</strong>ority status, 16 <strong>an</strong>d resolv<strong>in</strong>g the problem of Serbs<br />
struck off from the list of perm<strong>an</strong>ent residents. After Slovenia's <strong>in</strong>dependence,<br />
Serbs have not been gr<strong>an</strong>ted citizenship. 17 In those terms M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong><br />
Diaspora <strong>an</strong>nounced that the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry would pass a resolution<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g from the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> parliament to recognize the status of national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority to Serbs. 18 Acquisition of status of national m<strong>in</strong>ority 19 , would enable<br />
the Serb community to have its political representatives <strong>in</strong> the Sloveni<strong>an</strong><br />
12 “Drnovšek: Indepndence of Kosovo is a realistic option”, www.B92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo,<br />
12 November 2005.<br />
13 Drnovšek’s adviser <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign policy, Ivo Vajgl, <strong>state</strong>d that Drnovšek did<br />
not speak about the f<strong>in</strong>al sttus of Kosovo. "President of Slovenia said that the status shall<br />
be as the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> side agree". “Drnovšek: Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence is a realistic<br />
option”, www.B92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo, 12 November 2005.<br />
14 They shouted: “Go home”, “Kosovo is Serb”. They accused Drnovsek of<br />
jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ces with Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> milit<strong>an</strong>ts. www.kosovareport.blogspot.com , 28 November<br />
2005.<br />
15 To date Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia have dem<strong>an</strong>ded protection of rights of their<br />
fellow-nationals <strong>an</strong>d a systematic regulation of that area. Namely they submitted to the<br />
Sloveni<strong>an</strong> parliament a special resolution dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that such rights be guar<strong>an</strong>teed to<br />
all citizens from <strong>for</strong>mer SFRY. “M<strong>in</strong>orities – <strong>state</strong> secret”, Vreme, 17. March 2005.<br />
16 Deputy Diaspora M<strong>in</strong>ister, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Čotrić, told Delo journalist that :”Our<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d is justified <strong>in</strong> view of the fact that Serbs have been <strong>an</strong> autochtonous people <strong>in</strong><br />
Slovenia <strong>for</strong> centuries <strong>an</strong>d that the 2002 census figure of 39,000 declared Serbs <strong>in</strong><br />
Slovenia, attests to the fact that even today they are the most numerous ethnic group<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong> the territory of Slovenia. “M<strong>in</strong>orities-State Secret”, Vreme, 17 March 2005.<br />
17 Problem of 8,000 Serbs struck off the register of perm<strong>an</strong>ent residents <strong>in</strong><br />
Slovenia, has not yet been resolved despite a positive decision of the Constitutional<br />
Court of Slovenia. “Serbs <strong>in</strong> Slovenia: a National M<strong>in</strong>ority”, Politika, 22 March 2005.<br />
18 “Serbs <strong>in</strong> Slovenia: a National M<strong>in</strong>ority”, Politika, 22 March 2005.<br />
19 President of Sloveni<strong>an</strong> Parliament <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med the Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Diaspora<br />
that Serbs liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Slovenia might <strong>in</strong>itiate the procedure <strong>for</strong> acquisition of status of<br />
national m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> two ways: either by collect<strong>in</strong>g 40,000 signatures on the basis of<br />
which the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> parliament may launch a pert<strong>in</strong>ent debate, or hav<strong>in</strong>g at least 26<br />
MPs of Sloveni<strong>an</strong> parliament launch such <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative. “MP’s Support”, Politika, 19<br />
February 2005.<br />
402<br />
403
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
parliament <strong>an</strong>d provide them with funds <strong>for</strong> b<strong>an</strong>kroll<strong>in</strong>g their schools <strong>an</strong>d<br />
associations. 20 However what rema<strong>in</strong>s a thorny issues is a list of 400 persons,<br />
who accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> authorities data, took part <strong>in</strong> conflicts <strong>in</strong><br />
Slovenia. 21 Added to that there is a new problem of those who have worked <strong>in</strong><br />
federal bodies. To date they have not been allowed to exercise the right to<br />
pension, social <strong>an</strong>d health <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>in</strong> view of non-sign<strong>in</strong>g of social <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
agreement with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. 22<br />
Fly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the face of decision of the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> Constituional Court that<br />
all perm<strong>an</strong>ent residency rights-unlawfully abolished <strong>in</strong> 1992- be restituted to<br />
all those struck off the perm<strong>an</strong>ent residents registry, the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> authorities<br />
opted <strong>for</strong> the pass<strong>in</strong>g of a Constitutional Act allow<strong>in</strong>g a selective <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual resolution of such cases. That me<strong>an</strong>s that the right to perm<strong>an</strong>ent<br />
residence shall be gr<strong>an</strong>ted to those who have already laid claim to such status.<br />
The damaged parties however th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>in</strong>dividual resolution of their claims<br />
is t<strong>an</strong>tamount to attempt to <strong>in</strong>troduce a criterium of political compatibility <strong>in</strong><br />
the whole procedure, <strong>for</strong> the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> government w<strong>an</strong>ts to reject claims of<br />
those <strong>in</strong>dividuals who have possibly committed some crim<strong>in</strong>al offences. 23<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Center <strong>for</strong> Anti-Racism <strong>an</strong>d Xenophobia (ECARX) cautioned<br />
Slovenia aga<strong>in</strong>st impermissible discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>an</strong>d segregation of persons<br />
struck off the list of citizens of Slovenia. 24 It ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the problem of<br />
18,000 such persons is far from be<strong>in</strong>g resolved. 25 The struck off persons were<br />
also discussed at the session of the State Council (Upper House) of Sloveni<strong>an</strong><br />
20 Ethnic groups, that is <strong>in</strong> alphabetical order, Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, Bosniaks,<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s, Croats, Madedoni<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d Serbs, <strong>in</strong> the newly-emerged <strong>state</strong> of Slovenia<br />
have not been recognized as m<strong>in</strong>orities, though, some of them, are several times more<br />
numerous th<strong>an</strong> the officially recognized m<strong>in</strong>orities. “M<strong>in</strong>orities-State Secret”, Vreme, 17<br />
March 2005.<br />
21 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Čotrić “I am referr<strong>in</strong>g mostly to the lower-r<strong>an</strong>kign servicemen<br />
who don’t have the right to pension, <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, <strong>an</strong>d are compelled to moonlight <strong>an</strong>d if<br />
they are caught they are most likely to be deported from Slovenia though they have<br />
lived there <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y years”. “Serbs <strong>in</strong> Slovenia Still Without Status”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 22 March<br />
2005.<br />
22 “Serbs <strong>in</strong> Slovenia Still Without Status”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 22 March 2005.<br />
23 “Another Reprisal ”, Politika, 15 December 2005.<br />
24 In its response to the report, the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior expla<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
that the status of the struck off citizens would be regulated by a constitutional act.<br />
“Slovenia Discrim<strong>in</strong>ates Aga<strong>in</strong>st Rom<strong>an</strong>y <strong>an</strong>d the Struck Off”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 November<br />
2005.<br />
25 In the report of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Centre <strong>for</strong> Anti-Racism <strong>an</strong>d Xenophobia it was<br />
also noted that <strong>in</strong> Slovenia m<strong>an</strong>y hush up discrim<strong>in</strong>ation cases <strong>in</strong> workplaces because of<br />
their ethnicity or nationality. And <strong>in</strong> fear of employers’s reprisals. “The Struck Off Far<br />
from the Justice”, Politika, 25 November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
parliament. 26 That session was also addressed by Ombudsm<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong><br />
Rights who underscored the fact that <strong>in</strong> the said case the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> r<strong>an</strong><br />
counter to the decisions of its own Constitutional Court. 27 Members of<br />
communities devoid of status of national m<strong>in</strong>ority have org<strong>an</strong>ized themselves<br />
<strong>an</strong>d are now dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> "puts <strong>in</strong> place such <strong>state</strong><br />
media able to present us to the broad public, like they did with Itali<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Hungari<strong>an</strong>s." 28 Those m<strong>in</strong>orities reject the division <strong>in</strong>to autochtonous <strong>an</strong>d nonautochtonous<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities , that is, be<strong>in</strong>g termed the new m<strong>in</strong>orities, they oppose<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alization <strong>an</strong>d wish to launch a debate 29 on the possibility of atta<strong>in</strong>ment<br />
<strong>an</strong>d protection of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. 30 The Serb M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Diaspora stresses that<br />
it backs "a full <strong>in</strong>tegration of members of the Serb people <strong>in</strong>to the Sloveni<strong>an</strong><br />
society, <strong>an</strong>d recognition of status of m<strong>in</strong>ority would <strong>in</strong>centivize their more<br />
successful <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to Sloveni<strong>an</strong> economic, 31 political <strong>an</strong>d cultural 32 life".<br />
Future relations between Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d Sernia to a large extent depend<br />
on the ability of both sides to strike the right bal<strong>an</strong>ce between genu<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>terests<br />
<strong>an</strong>d irrational responses, notably as regards the Serb side (<strong>in</strong> view of its<br />
overreaction to Drnovšek’s <strong>state</strong>ment on Kosovo). Positive, mutual <strong>in</strong>vestment<br />
climate is however threatened by, on the one h<strong>an</strong>d, discussions <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Slovenia on the defence of national <strong>in</strong>terests 33 <strong>an</strong>d on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, on the<br />
26 A group of 22 MPs from all the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> parliamentary parties <strong>in</strong> the new<br />
Sloveni<strong>an</strong> parliament has decided to devote itself to nurtur<strong>in</strong>g of friendship between<br />
Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. “MP’s Support”, Politika, 19<br />
February 2005.<br />
27 “Prosecution Cont<strong>in</strong>ues”, Politika, 15 July 2005.<br />
28 “M<strong>in</strong>orities-State Secret”, Vreme, 17 March 2005.<br />
29 Particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the round-table on status of Serbs <strong>in</strong> Slovenia, held <strong>in</strong><br />
Hrasnik <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ized by the Serb Cultural Society Sava, stressed that their problem<br />
was their status <strong>in</strong> Slovenia. 13 Serb societies are active <strong>in</strong> Slovenia. Representatives of<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry of Culture <strong>an</strong>d Bureau <strong>for</strong> Sloveni<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the World did not take part <strong>in</strong> that<br />
round-table. “Serbs <strong>in</strong> Slovenia W<strong>an</strong>t a M<strong>in</strong>ority Status”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 5 October 2005.<br />
30 In Slovenia there were Serb l<strong>an</strong>guage classes be<strong>for</strong>e the break-up of SFRY.<br />
One of the current claims of the Serb authorities is that Serbs liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Slovenia be<br />
provided with mother tongue classes. “No school <strong>in</strong> Slovenia has additional Serb<br />
l<strong>an</strong>guage classes”. “M<strong>in</strong>orities-State Secret”, Vreme, 17 March 2005.<br />
31 It was <strong>an</strong>nounced that the Commercial Chamber of Serbia would soon open<br />
<strong>in</strong> Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a its representative office, with a view to boost<strong>in</strong>g mutual economic cooperation..<br />
“MP’s Support”, Politika, 19. February 2005.<br />
32 Open<strong>in</strong>g of the Serb Cultural Centre <strong>in</strong> Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a is also pl<strong>an</strong>ned. “MP’s<br />
Support”, Politika, 19 February 2005.<br />
33 “I assume m<strong>an</strong>y are bothered by the fact that C market is still a Serb<br />
commercial cha<strong>in</strong>. Do you wonder why I have not sold C market to Merkator, why I<br />
have opted to fight? Believe me that the said decision of m<strong>in</strong>e encroached upon big<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests of some people. But if C market is bought by a <strong>for</strong>eign compnay, be it even<br />
Merkator, the Serb production shall disappear"! www.kurir-<strong>in</strong>fo.co.yu, 23-24 October<br />
2005.<br />
404<br />
405
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
discussions on consequences <strong>an</strong>d extent of "<strong>for</strong>eign" <strong>in</strong>vestments" 34 . On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d non-exist<strong>an</strong>ce of legal <strong>an</strong>d political <strong>security</strong>, as well as feel<strong>in</strong>gs of<br />
latent <strong>an</strong>imosity 35 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>feriority 36 <strong>in</strong> Serbia may also affect co-operation with<br />
Slovenia. Sloveni<strong>an</strong> government which has been seriously ponder<strong>in</strong>g its<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests, has already adopted a Program of Incentivization of Internationalization<br />
of Comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> 2005-2009 Period which has set out concrete goals, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>creased presence of Sloveni<strong>an</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign markets, <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong><br />
exports <strong>an</strong>d major <strong>in</strong>vestments abroad. In that program Serbia occupies <strong>an</strong><br />
import<strong>an</strong>t place, <strong>for</strong> Slovenia pl<strong>an</strong>s to <strong>in</strong>vest 320 million Euros <strong>in</strong>to that<br />
country <strong>in</strong> 2005-2009 period. 37<br />
34 “In Slovenia There Are No Retrograde Processes”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 23-24. July 2005.<br />
35 Serb market is wide open to Sloveni<strong>an</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>ies, we have here about 300<br />
comp<strong>an</strong>ies with Sloveni<strong>an</strong> capital. That is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t data <strong>for</strong> Slovenia, <strong>for</strong> they<br />
represent nearly 13% of all Sloveni<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestments abroad. Thus Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
became the second most import<strong>an</strong>t country <strong>for</strong> Sloveni<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestments. “We Invest 320<br />
Million Euro <strong>in</strong> Serbia”, www.svedok.co.yu<br />
36 Sloveni<strong>an</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> Serbia get the best locations, <strong>an</strong>d the best possibility<br />
to buy the best Serb comp<strong>an</strong>ies under regular conditions. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d Slovenia is<br />
closed to either Serb <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>vestors. In withdraw<strong>in</strong>g its offer <strong>for</strong> purchase<br />
of C market Merkator accused our country of legal <strong>in</strong>stability <strong>an</strong>d unlawful sale. But the<br />
truth is much simpler: Delta offer a 40% higher price per share of C market. “We <strong>in</strong>vest<br />
320 Million Euro <strong>in</strong> Serbia”, www.svedok.co.yu<br />
37 “We Invest 320 Million Euro <strong>in</strong> Serbia”, www.svedok.co.yu<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
CROATIA:<br />
FACING THE CHALLENGE OF EUROPE<br />
Relations between Croatia <strong>an</strong>d Serbia are a prerequisite <strong>for</strong> stability <strong>in</strong><br />
the whole of the region, particularly <strong>in</strong> Bosnia. The broad r<strong>an</strong>ge of bilateral<br />
activities dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005 demonstrates not only how import<strong>an</strong>t this relationship is<br />
<strong>for</strong> the future of the region, but also how fragile it is. Throughout the year<br />
Serbia strove to keep its pr<strong>in</strong>cipal role as pace-setter <strong>for</strong> ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> order to be<br />
able to control future developments <strong>an</strong>d the normalization of the situation <strong>in</strong><br />
the region. The imperial reflex of Serbia’s official policy put a great stra<strong>in</strong> on<br />
the region’s stability, <strong>an</strong>d it was th<strong>an</strong>ks to the responsibility of the Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
officials <strong>in</strong> particular that the provocations which jeopardized even polite<br />
political communication failed to do more damage. Even the Ljublj<strong>an</strong>a daily<br />
Delo observed that the ‘politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Belgrade behaved irresponsibly, 1<br />
reopen<strong>in</strong>g without real cause the history books 2 that say one th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Belgrade<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>other <strong>in</strong> Zagreb.’ 3<br />
A c<strong>an</strong>didate <strong>for</strong> EU membership, Croatia views EU <strong>an</strong>d NATO<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration as the only way to normalize <strong>an</strong>d stabilize the region. 4 It is <strong>in</strong> this<br />
context that it also looks upon the solution of the open questions <strong>in</strong> the two<br />
countries’ relations: the return of refugees, the restitution of property <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
resolution of ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights, the question of borders, revision of the lists of<br />
persons accused of war crimes <strong>an</strong>d discovery of miss<strong>in</strong>g persons <strong>an</strong>d, above<br />
all, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal <strong>an</strong>d thorough preparation <strong>for</strong> trials<br />
<strong>for</strong> war crimes committed <strong>in</strong> 1991-95. Croatia’s EU membership depends on<br />
1 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić: ‘We c<strong>an</strong>’t be <strong>in</strong> the same place with Tadić, who’s giv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
reception to the Ustashe headm<strong>an</strong> Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić celebrat<strong>in</strong>g the largest ethnic cle<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce the Second World War - [Operations] Storm <strong>an</strong>d Flash.’ ‘Vučić: parastos nije za<br />
estradu’, Nacional, 5 August 2005.<br />
2 One is chilled by the fact that the Greater Serbia rhetoric of Slobod<strong>an</strong><br />
Milošević still em<strong>an</strong>ates from the city at the confluence of the Sava <strong>an</strong>d D<strong>an</strong>ube rivers,<br />
<strong>for</strong> one would have thought that it disappeared with the departure of its author to The<br />
Hague. Official Zagreb preserved its composure <strong>an</strong>d dignity under severe attacks <strong>an</strong>d<br />
reproaches from Belgrade. ‘Zagreb trezveno, Beograd žučno’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 9 August 2005.<br />
3 ‘Zagreb trezveno, Beograd žučno’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 9 August 2005.<br />
4 ‘Važno pomirenje sa SCG’, Politika, 8 June 2005.<br />
406<br />
407
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
fulfilment of the membership criteria, above all on the ef<strong>for</strong>ts Croatia makes to<br />
create the conditions <strong>for</strong> refugee return, 5 on its attitude towards its m<strong>in</strong>orities, 6<br />
<strong>an</strong>d on war crimes trials conducted at home. Aware of the fact that its<br />
membership of the EU depends on the fulfilment of these conditions, Croatia<br />
has adopted a highly constructive attitude towards its neighbours, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
calls <strong>for</strong> cooperation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>terests on the road to the EU. 7<br />
Serbia’s political elite has no clear-cut <strong>for</strong>eign policy <strong>an</strong>d policy<br />
towards neighbours, relations with whom are marked by the wars of 1991-99<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the result<strong>in</strong>g problems. A characteristic of Serbia’s policy towards its<br />
neighbours is feed<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>an</strong>d stirr<strong>in</strong>g up their problems with the object of<br />
slow<strong>in</strong>g their progress towards Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration. Regard<strong>in</strong>g Croatia, this<br />
is m<strong>an</strong>ifested by the <strong>in</strong>cess<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>sistence on the repatriation of the Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
refugees. Also, it was only after lengthy ponder<strong>in</strong>g 8 that Serbia confirmed its<br />
support of Croatia’s election as a non-perm<strong>an</strong>ent member of the UN Security<br />
Council. 9 Another problem, which keeps be<strong>in</strong>g raised <strong>in</strong> critical situations, is<br />
the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the 1991-95 war <strong>an</strong>d the character of the Serb exodus from<br />
Croatia.<br />
5 Speak<strong>in</strong>g about the problem of refugee return <strong>an</strong>d property restitution,<br />
S<strong>an</strong>ader said that the objectives of the Sarajevo declaration – restitution of property <strong>an</strong>d<br />
return of all refugees by the end of 2006 – were very ambitious <strong>an</strong>d that Croatia was<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>in</strong> its power to achieve these goals. ‘Važno pomirenje sa SCG’, Politika, 8 June<br />
2005.<br />
6 Milorad Pupovac: ‘The fact is, you c<strong>an</strong> perceive a trend <strong>in</strong> Croatia where,<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g euphoria, we now have <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation towards <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong>ism, which turns<br />
<strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb attitude <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>t. But this quite certa<strong>in</strong>ly is not Croatia’s <strong>in</strong>terest, it<br />
is the <strong>in</strong>terest of those who wish to keep Croatia with<strong>in</strong> the sphere of warlike policy.’<br />
‘Pupovac: Neki ponovo razbuktavaju nacionalističke strasti u Hrvatskoj’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 30 May<br />
2005.<br />
7 Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić, ambassador of the Republic of Croatia <strong>in</strong> Belgrade: ‘Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Croatia have a large potential <strong>for</strong> cooperation <strong>an</strong>d it does not matter who is <strong>for</strong>ward <strong>an</strong>d<br />
who beh<strong>in</strong>d on the road to Europe. They c<strong>an</strong> adv<strong>an</strong>ce if they rely on each other, because<br />
they are not strong enough on their own to sell their products <strong>in</strong> the most developed<br />
markets <strong>in</strong> the world. While brotherhood <strong>an</strong>d unity is a th<strong>in</strong>g of the past, one ought to<br />
<strong>in</strong>sist on the jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>terests.’ ‘Prepišite od nas’, Večernje novosti, 2 April 2005.<br />
8 Svetozar Marović, Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro (SCG) President: ‘We expect<br />
Croatia to back the process of SCG accession to the Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong><br />
union’s <strong>in</strong>tention to become a fully member of the Adriatic Charter.’ ‘Učvrstiti odnose i<br />
krenuti dalje’, Politika, 7 July 2005.<br />
9 Deputies of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> People’s Party <strong>an</strong>d the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party from<br />
Montenegro said <strong>in</strong> the SCG Assembly that they would dem<strong>an</strong>d the removal of SCG<br />
Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Vuk Drašković <strong>an</strong>d perhaps also of SCG President Svetozar Marović<br />
‘<strong>for</strong> humiliat<strong>in</strong>g SGC <strong>an</strong>d favour<strong>in</strong>g Croatia, <strong>for</strong> this is a sc<strong>an</strong>dalous <strong>an</strong>d ignom<strong>in</strong>ious<br />
gesture on the part of our diplomacy.’ ‘Podrška stvar diplomatskih dogovora i<br />
reciprociteta’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16 February 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of Operation Storm was a real test <strong>in</strong> this<br />
regard. Serbi<strong>an</strong> President Boris Tadić said as a matter of pr<strong>in</strong>ciple that ‘deal<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with the crimes that were committed contributes directly to a f<strong>in</strong>al<br />
reconciliation 10 <strong>an</strong>d to the further promotion of the relations of the two<br />
countries.’ 11 However, his <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the war betrays a quite different<br />
attitude to the problem of deal<strong>in</strong>g with the past: the fact that the establishment<br />
of the so-called RSK was preceded by the massive expulsion of Croats from<br />
that territory is passed over <strong>in</strong> silence nearly as a matter of course. At a time<br />
when Croatia’s ma<strong>in</strong> ef<strong>for</strong>t was focused on conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g its Europe<strong>an</strong> partners<br />
that Croatia is fulfill<strong>in</strong>g all the necessary preconditions <strong>for</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g talks with<br />
the EU, the hold<strong>in</strong>g of the found<strong>in</strong>g convention of the RSK government <strong>in</strong> exile<br />
came as no mere co<strong>in</strong>cidence.<br />
The found<strong>in</strong>g of the RSK government <strong>in</strong> exile was given extensive<br />
coverage <strong>in</strong> Croatia. The Croati<strong>an</strong> authorities protested because their SCG<br />
counterparts had not clearly dist<strong>an</strong>ced themselves from ‘those events which<br />
are contrary to the Europe<strong>an</strong> spirit of cooperation, 12 which unnecessarily cast a<br />
shadow on the ascend<strong>in</strong>g path 13 of the development of bilateral relations<br />
between Zagreb <strong>an</strong>d Belgrade.’ 14 In the absence of <strong>an</strong>y reaction by the<br />
Government of the Republic of Serbia, the occasion was used to shift the<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> ‘exaggerat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d mak<strong>in</strong>g heavy weather of th<strong>in</strong>gs’ on to the<br />
‘Croati<strong>an</strong> parapolitical <strong>an</strong>d media sphere’ which, <strong>in</strong> the words of Vladeta<br />
J<strong>an</strong>ković, adviser to Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica, was ‘rather poisoned’. 15<br />
10 Reuters reported that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party (SRS) alone welcomed the<br />
declaration adopted at a Belgrade gather<strong>in</strong>g, which set up, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, the<br />
government <strong>in</strong> exile of the Republic of Serb Kraj<strong>in</strong>a (RSK). ‘The RSK is under the<br />
occupation of the Republic of Croatia, but this <strong>state</strong> of affairs c<strong>an</strong>not last,’ said a SRS<br />
leader, Drag<strong>an</strong> Todorović. ‘Zagreb očekuje novu osudu zv<strong>an</strong>ičnog Beograda’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 28<br />
February 2005.<br />
11 Boris Tadić: ‘We c<strong>an</strong>’t characterize as excesses the fact that <strong>in</strong> a few days<br />
250,000 Serbs were expelled from Croatia, because that was ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g. The kill<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of 2,500 people is by no me<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong> isolated case, it is <strong>an</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized crime.’ ‘Oluja jeste bila<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izov<strong>an</strong> zloč<strong>in</strong>’, Večernje novosti, 1 August 2005.<br />
12 Vladimir Šeks: ‘The found<strong>in</strong>g of the RSK assembly <strong>in</strong> exile represents a<br />
political provocation of the v<strong>an</strong>quished nostalgists.’ ‘Provokacija poraženih<br />
nostalgičara’, Večernje novosti, 1 March 2005.<br />
13 The event was denounced as a d<strong>an</strong>gerous political provocation by over 80<br />
viewers of the HRT programme Otvoreno. ‘Oluja u čaši vode’, NIN, 3 March 2005.<br />
14 ‘St<strong>an</strong>imirović: Pl<strong>an</strong> da se doliva ulje na vatru’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 March 2005.<br />
15 Vladeta J<strong>an</strong>ković, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’s <strong>for</strong>eign policy adviser, said<br />
this was a storm <strong>in</strong> a teacup. ‘Too much signific<strong>an</strong>ce is be<strong>in</strong>g attached to someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
which objectively lacks such signific<strong>an</strong>ce. Though the government has neither been<br />
thrown off nor taken by surprise by this, it considers that its official reaction is not<br />
necessary.’ ‘Oluja u čaši vode’, NIN, 3 March 2005.<br />
408<br />
409
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The Croati<strong>an</strong> Assembly <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d National<br />
M<strong>in</strong>orities 16 debated whether to recommend that the Assembly denounce the<br />
proclamation of the RSK government <strong>in</strong> exile <strong>in</strong> a special <strong>an</strong>nouncement, above<br />
all because that self-styled government enjoys the support of the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodox Church (SPC) 17 as well as of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radicals, the strongest<br />
political party <strong>in</strong> SCG. In spite of the sober warn<strong>in</strong>gs that the Greater Serbia<br />
idea has suffered a decisive defeat, 18 notions are be<strong>in</strong>g revived <strong>in</strong> Serbia that it<br />
will be possible to ‘somewhat rectify the great historical <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>in</strong>justice 19<br />
done the Serbs from Croatia.’ 20 The Veritas documentation-<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation centre<br />
said <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>nouncement that ‘even ten years after the end of the war <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
exodus of the Serbs, Croatia is not succeed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> solv<strong>in</strong>g the Serb question<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, so the b<strong>an</strong>ished Serbs see the resolution of<br />
their status <strong>in</strong> activat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d implement<strong>in</strong>g Pl<strong>an</strong> Z-4.’ 21 Veritas also po<strong>in</strong>ted<br />
out that the RSK government <strong>in</strong> exile w<strong>an</strong>ted negotiations on the status of the<br />
Serb people <strong>in</strong> Croatia on the basis of the V<strong>an</strong>ce Pl<strong>an</strong>, respect <strong>for</strong> ten<strong>an</strong>cy<br />
rights, amnesty <strong>for</strong> some of the accused, <strong>an</strong>d the return of refugees. 22<br />
The commemoration of the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of Operation Storm<br />
triggered a fresh polemic about the nature of the Croati<strong>an</strong> military operation,<br />
at the same time be<strong>in</strong>g used to divert attention from the pressure be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
brought to bear on Serbia <strong>in</strong> connection with the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the<br />
Srebrenica massacre. In order to negate the legitimacy of the Croati<strong>an</strong> military<br />
operation, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political elite pronounced verdicts r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from the<br />
16 The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d National M<strong>in</strong>orities backed a draft<br />
agreement with SCG to protect the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Croatia <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Croat m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> SCG. ‘Sporazum o m<strong>an</strong>j<strong>in</strong>ama’, Politika, 9 March 2005.<br />
17 Zagreb will be the first city <strong>in</strong> the world to have a prestigious gymnasium<br />
(secondary school) to be founded by the SPC. In addition to Serb pupils it will be open<br />
to all who pass the dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g entr<strong>an</strong>ce exam<strong>in</strong>ation. ‘Pravoslavna gimnazija u<br />
Zagrebu’, Blic, 18 August 2005.<br />
18 Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader: ‘The political reality is that Croatia has won the war imposed<br />
on it <strong>an</strong>d that we have absolutely <strong>an</strong>d def<strong>in</strong>itively, as far as Croatia is concerned, done<br />
with the idea of the Greater Serbia conquerors.’ ‘Zagreb očekuje osudu zv<strong>an</strong>ičnog<br />
Beograda’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 28 February 2005.<br />
19 Rajko Ležajić, RSK government m<strong>in</strong>ister: ‘If the President of Serbia, Boris<br />
Tadić, considers that these facts ought to be <strong>for</strong>gotten <strong>in</strong> Serbia, let him say so openly,<br />
but we don’t believe that Tadić me<strong>an</strong>s that.’ ‘Nepromenjeni odnosi Srbije i Hrvatske’,<br />
Glas javnosti, 6 March 2005.<br />
20 ‘Veritas: primeniti pl<strong>an</strong> Z-4’, Politika, 4 August 2005.<br />
21 The Croati<strong>an</strong> Serbs believe that the authors did not devise the pl<strong>an</strong> as a oneoff<br />
proposition or to please the then leaders of Croatia, RSK or Federal Republic of<br />
Yugoslavia (FRY), but on the basis of historical conditions <strong>an</strong>d facts as well as those<br />
prevail<strong>in</strong>g at the time. ‘Veritas: primeniti pl<strong>an</strong> Z-4’, Politika, 4 August 2005.<br />
22 ‘Nepromenjeni odnosi Srbije i Hrvatske’, Glas javnosti, 6 March 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
largest ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce the Second World War 23 to a genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
Serb people, 24 the rationale beh<strong>in</strong>d this be<strong>in</strong>g that all sides were equally<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> the war. The patriotic rhetoric was rek<strong>in</strong>dled which<br />
shamelessly trades upon the Serb victims 25 <strong>in</strong> order to relativize the crimes<br />
committed by ‘all sides’ <strong>an</strong>d to promote the idea of a symmetry of crime. On<br />
the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of Operation Storm, Boris Tadić urged the Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
leaders to condemn ‘the crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs <strong>in</strong> the same way he condemned<br />
the crimes <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica.’ 26 President Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić retorted that ‘Serbia ought<br />
to experience a catharsis, its citizens must seek their <strong>for</strong>tune <strong>in</strong> their own<br />
country, <strong>an</strong>d we must all together open our borders <strong>an</strong>d wage war <strong>for</strong> the<br />
adoption of Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards rather th<strong>an</strong> equate Storm with Srebrenica.’ 27<br />
Boris Tadić wondered publicly ‘how Croatia will treat, dur<strong>in</strong>g the festivities <strong>in</strong><br />
connection with Storm, the crimes committed aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs who were Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
citizens? I am ask<strong>in</strong>g this question now <strong>an</strong>d I would dearly like to hear the<br />
reply of the Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d especially the Croati<strong>an</strong> politici<strong>an</strong>s.’ 28 Belgrade’s<br />
accusations that ten years after the ‘brutal aggression of the Croati<strong>an</strong> army <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g of the Serbs <strong>in</strong> the territory of the RSK neither Croatia nor<br />
the <strong>in</strong>ternational community has done <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g to cont<strong>in</strong>ue the process of<br />
resolv<strong>in</strong>g the question of Serbs <strong>in</strong> Croatia’ 29 brought a bout a stagnation which,<br />
the Croati<strong>an</strong> Government said <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>nouncement, ‘does not benefit the<br />
further development of relations between Croatia <strong>an</strong>d SCG.’ 30<br />
23 Vojislav Koštunica: ‘An entire people, the Kraj<strong>in</strong>a Serbs, was uprooted from<br />
its centuries-old home under ruthless threat of destruction <strong>in</strong> only a few days. The<br />
column of expellees stretch<strong>in</strong>g from Kn<strong>in</strong> to Belgrade was the spectacle of a horrendous<br />
crime the like of which had not been seen be<strong>for</strong>e, represent<strong>in</strong>g the largest ethnic<br />
cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce the Second World War.’ ‘Iskorenjen ceo jed<strong>an</strong> narod’, Večernje novosti, 5<br />
August 2005.<br />
24 S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić: ‘Croatia committed a genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serb people.<br />
For this reason Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader <strong>an</strong>d Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić ought to feel ashamed <strong>for</strong> declar<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
Croatia is proud of Storm <strong>an</strong>d that the action was brilli<strong>an</strong>t.’ ‘Hrvatska poč<strong>in</strong>ila genocid<br />
nad Srbima’, Blic, 4 August 2005.<br />
25 Čedomir Antić: ‘Croatia has proclaimed [Operation] Storm its Victory Day.<br />
So, they do not mark their Victory Day when other countries do, because that is when<br />
their headm<strong>an</strong> was thrown out <strong>in</strong> 1945, they celebrate the day on which they expelled<br />
200,000 of their citizens.’ ‘Sad im Srbi i teroristi’, Večernje novosti, 14 July 2005.<br />
26 The Croati<strong>an</strong> Assembly paid a tribute to the victims of the tragedy <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica by adopt<strong>in</strong>g a Srebrenica <strong>state</strong>ment. It condemned the crime perpetrated by<br />
the Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serb army on the <strong>in</strong>nocent victims <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica, then a safe zone under UN<br />
control. It thereby denounced <strong>an</strong>y genocide, <strong>an</strong>ywhere <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> whatever <strong>for</strong>m. ‘Usvojena<br />
izjava o Srebrenici’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16-17 July 2005.<br />
27 ‘Oluja jeste bila org<strong>an</strong>izov<strong>an</strong> zloč<strong>in</strong>’, Večernje novosti, 1 August 2005.<br />
28 Boris Tadić, ‘E, sad Oluja’, Kurir, 29 July 2005.<br />
29 ‘Zagreb očekuje osudu zv<strong>an</strong>ičnog Beograda’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 28 February 2005.<br />
30 ‘Regard<strong>in</strong>g the accusations which have been made by Belgrade lately, the<br />
Croati<strong>an</strong> Government draws attention to the historical fact that the only pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
410<br />
411
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
After the arrest of the Hague Tribunal <strong>in</strong>dictee Ante Gotov<strong>in</strong>a, Serbia<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed isolated <strong>in</strong> its avoid<strong>an</strong>ce of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. For<br />
all the accusations by Croati<strong>an</strong> war veter<strong>an</strong>s 31 <strong>an</strong>d right-w<strong>in</strong>g associations 32<br />
that the ‘<strong>state</strong> leadership has betrayed the national <strong>in</strong>terests’, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
S<strong>an</strong>ader reacted rationally <strong>an</strong>d called <strong>for</strong> ‘self-comm<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d coolness.’<br />
Determ<strong>in</strong>ed to honour the Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>’s commitments to the Hague<br />
Tribunal, Croati<strong>an</strong> politici<strong>an</strong>s are <strong>in</strong>sistent on SCG <strong>an</strong>swer<strong>in</strong>g charges of<br />
aggression 33 <strong>an</strong>d genocide be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of Justice. Stjep<strong>an</strong><br />
Mesić also argued that ef<strong>for</strong>ts should be made to <strong>in</strong>dividualize guilt because<br />
‘when specific people are made to <strong>an</strong>swer <strong>for</strong> crimes, then collective<br />
accusations will cease.’ 34 As well as repudiat<strong>in</strong>g responsibility <strong>for</strong> Belgrade’s<br />
crimes <strong>in</strong> Croatia, Montenegr<strong>in</strong> officials signalled their read<strong>in</strong>ess to make good<br />
some of the damage caused <strong>in</strong> the Dubrovnik h<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>an</strong>d, sign<strong>in</strong>g as a first step<br />
a memor<strong>an</strong>dum on war reparations <strong>for</strong> the Konavle area. 35 Belgrade’s response<br />
to this was to make further accusations aga<strong>in</strong>st Zagreb <strong>for</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g<br />
secessionists <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. 36<br />
Speakers <strong>in</strong> the SCG Assembly debate on ratify<strong>in</strong>g the Agreement on<br />
the Protection of the Rights of the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Croatia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d of the Croat M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> SCG opposed ratification on the grounds that<br />
‘Croatia came <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g through the ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong>d war crimes<br />
objective of Operation Storm was liberation of the occupied territory, defence of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized borders, <strong>an</strong>d term<strong>in</strong>ation of the reign of terror of the illegal<br />
pack of crim<strong>in</strong>al terrorists.’ ‘Vlada Hrvatske: čast<strong>an</strong> č<strong>in</strong>’, Politika, 5 August 2005.<br />
31 The rally <strong>in</strong> support of Ante Gotov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> Split brought together 50,000 to<br />
70,000 people. The rally, entitled ‘The truth, not the lie’, was org<strong>an</strong>ized jo<strong>in</strong>tly by<br />
associations of veter<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d disabled veter<strong>an</strong>s. ‘U Splitu više od 50 hiljada ljudi’, D<strong>an</strong>as,<br />
12 December 2005.<br />
32 Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić: ‘If young people were taught <strong>in</strong> school what the throatcutt<strong>in</strong>g<br />
crim<strong>in</strong>al regime of Ante Pavelić <strong>an</strong>d the NDH [Independent State of Croatia]<br />
was like, <strong>an</strong>d if they knew what would have happened to Zadar if the Ustashe regime<br />
had endured, then they probably would not be wear<strong>in</strong>g Ustashe hats on their heads.’<br />
‘Najžešće u Zadru’, Politika, 11 December 2005.<br />
33 Predrag Bulatović, president of the Socialist People’s Party, believes that <strong>in</strong><br />
agree<strong>in</strong>g to pay compensation <strong>for</strong> a plundered farm at Grude <strong>in</strong> Croatia the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> government ‘caused harm to Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> union because it<br />
admitted responsibility <strong>an</strong>d guilt <strong>for</strong> the aggression of which the Croats are accus<strong>in</strong>g it.’<br />
‘Milova vlast priznala agresiju’, Kurir, 19 September 2005.<br />
34 ‘Mesić: Hrvatska neće odustati od tužbe protiv SCG’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 February<br />
2005.<br />
35 Croatia claims 385,000 euro <strong>for</strong> replenish<strong>in</strong>g the livestock fund (650 cows)<br />
from a farm <strong>in</strong> Konavle. ‘Prebij<strong>an</strong>je preko kolena’, Vreme, 4 August 2005.<br />
36 ‘Saradnja je nužnost’, Politika, 9 August 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st part of the population of the RSK 37 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> this reason they c<strong>an</strong>’t be<br />
admitted <strong>in</strong>to Europe.’ 38 Theses about the ‘genocidal nature of the Croat<br />
people’ were also put <strong>for</strong>ward on the occasion of the sixtieth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the<br />
mass escape of Jasenovac camp prisoners. S<strong>an</strong>ader commented on the various<br />
estimates of the number of prisoners murdered <strong>in</strong> the camp, say<strong>in</strong>g that on the<br />
one h<strong>an</strong>d that already large crime had been exaggerated by the ‘imposition of<br />
the thesis from Greater Serbia st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>ts about the alleged genocidal nature<br />
of the Croat people’, while on the other the number of Jasenovac victims had<br />
been played down as a way of shunn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d hush<strong>in</strong>g up the truth. 39<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g his visit to Croatia Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica did not<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d it necessary to apologize <strong>for</strong> the war damage <strong>an</strong>d crimes, 40 this at a time<br />
when Croatia was mark<strong>in</strong>g the fourteenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the three-month<br />
siege of Vukovar. 41 Koštunica said <strong>in</strong>stead that the problems caused by war<br />
‘are not solved by words, but by address<strong>in</strong>g the problems 42 that exist on both<br />
sides.’ 43<br />
The judgement <strong>in</strong> the first case entrusted to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> judiciary by<br />
the Hague Tribunal conta<strong>in</strong>s the first official acknowledgement by Serbia of<br />
the crimes committed at the Ovčara farm near Vukovar. The War Crimes Trial<br />
Chamber of the Belgrade District Court found guilty <strong>an</strong>d sentenced 14 of 16<br />
members of Vukovar territorial defence charged with the execution of at least<br />
192 Croat prisoners. 44 At the same time, legal experts from both <strong>state</strong>s argued<br />
that the case of the ‘Vukovar three’, currently tried by the Hague Tribunal,<br />
should be referred to national war crime courts. Croatia regards the Vukovar<br />
37 Milorad Pupovac: ‘This <strong>in</strong>itiative is <strong>an</strong>ti-Serb, aga<strong>in</strong>st the policy of Serb<br />
repatriation to Croatia, as well as aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>an</strong> improvement of relations between Croatia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Serbia.’ ‘Protest ambasadoru Mil<strong>an</strong>u Simurdiću’, Politika, 2 March 2005.<br />
38 ‘Žestoka rasprava o Srbima u Hrvatskoj’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 21-22 May 2005.<br />
39 ‘S<strong>an</strong>ader: utvrditi ist<strong>in</strong>u o strad<strong>an</strong>ju žrtava’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 April 205.<br />
40 The Croati<strong>an</strong> association of prisoners of Serb concentration camps has<br />
records that some 8,000 Croat soldiers <strong>an</strong>d civili<strong>an</strong>s passed through Serb camps, 300 of<br />
whom died as a result of abuse. ‘Kolona seć<strong>an</strong>ja na žrtve’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19-20 November 2005.<br />
41 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the siege of Vukovar 1,624 people were killed <strong>an</strong>d 2,557 wounded,<br />
with some 22,000 Croats <strong>an</strong>d non-Serbs expelled from the ru<strong>in</strong>ed city after its capture by<br />
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). ‘Kolona sjeć<strong>an</strong>ja za žrtve’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19-20 November<br />
2005.<br />
42 At the sign<strong>in</strong>g of the declaration establish<strong>in</strong>g a ferry service across the<br />
D<strong>an</strong>ube between Vukovar <strong>an</strong>d Bač, local Croat officials from the Croati<strong>an</strong> Democratic<br />
Union (HDZ) <strong>an</strong>d the Croati<strong>an</strong> Party of Rights (HSP) <strong>in</strong>sisted that Serbi<strong>an</strong> Deputy Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Miroljub Labus, who was about to visit Vukovar, would have to apologize <strong>for</strong><br />
the th<strong>in</strong>gs that happened <strong>in</strong> the town or not to come at all. ‘HDZ traži izv<strong>in</strong>jenje’,<br />
Politika, 20 October 2005.<br />
43 ‘Oprez i uzdrž<strong>an</strong>ost’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 November 2005.<br />
44 Eight were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment each <strong>an</strong>d three to 15 years,<br />
three others were given milder sentences <strong>an</strong>d two were acquitted <strong>for</strong> lack of evidence.<br />
412<br />
413
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
crime as ‘the gravest crime committed <strong>in</strong> Croatia ever’ <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>sists that the <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong> which the crime was committed has absolute priority to try it. Vukovar also<br />
figures <strong>in</strong> Croatia’s aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide suit aga<strong>in</strong>st the FRY, i.e. SCG, to<br />
the International Court of Justice <strong>in</strong> The Hague. Serbia, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
considers that lett<strong>in</strong>g Croatia prosecute the Ovčara case would have ‘negative<br />
consequences because <strong>in</strong> that case opposition of public op<strong>in</strong>ion to the Tribunal<br />
would grow’. The Hague Tribunal resolved the controversy by decid<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
keep the ‘Vukovar three’ <strong>for</strong> itself.<br />
A law adopted by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly equat<strong>in</strong>g the Chetnik <strong>an</strong>d<br />
partis<strong>an</strong> movements provoked negative reactions <strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g countries.<br />
Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić’s visit to SCG was put off over the celebrations on Mt Ravna<br />
Gora, the Chetnik World War Two stronghold, the festivities org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>an</strong>d<br />
carried out with the active support of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
participation of a number of government officials. Croatia did not w<strong>an</strong>t to lend<br />
legitimacy of Serbia’s revision 45 of twentieth century history, 46 particularly<br />
bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> the name of the followers of Draža Mihailović 47<br />
numerous atrocities aga<strong>in</strong>st the civili<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d other population were committed<br />
<strong>in</strong> the 1990s dur<strong>in</strong>g the war <strong>in</strong> Croatia. 48 There was hardly <strong>an</strong>y reaction <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia to the Mt Ravna Gora celebration, with SCG Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Vuk<br />
Drašković, who hosted the event, declar<strong>in</strong>g that ‘We will not condition our<br />
relations with our neighbours on their attitude towards events from the past, 49<br />
so we expect the same from them. Europe is our common home.’ 50 Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader<br />
proposed that the Assembly adopt a <strong>state</strong>ment condemn<strong>in</strong>g the Chetnik<br />
movement, all its crimes <strong>in</strong> Croatia, <strong>an</strong>d its collaboration with Fascism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Nazism. 51<br />
45 Žarko Obradović: ‘Mesić’s <strong>state</strong>ment conta<strong>in</strong>s a message not only to the<br />
public <strong>in</strong> Croatia, but to a much wider audience, because no one <strong>in</strong> the world has dared<br />
revise history the way we did.’ ‘Bez velike štete’, Politika, 18 May 2005.<br />
46 Croati<strong>an</strong> President Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić said that the history textbooks should be<br />
revised as part of a school re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>in</strong> order that the period under the Ustashe should be<br />
taught properly. ‘Croatia did not evolve from the NDH but from <strong>an</strong>ti-fascism; our<br />
young ones ought to know this, <strong>an</strong>d they will know if they are taught that <strong>in</strong> school.’<br />
‘Mesić za revidir<strong>an</strong>je udžbenika istorije’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 13 December 2005.<br />
47 The Croati<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Integration<br />
expressed regret that competent US <strong>in</strong>stitutions had made possible the presentation of<br />
President Harry Trum<strong>an</strong>’s award to the successors of the Chetnik movement leader<br />
Dragoljub ‘Draža’ Mihailović. ‘Osuda Zagreba’, Politika, 10 May 2005.<br />
48 ‘Osuda Zagreba’, Politika, 10 May 2005.<br />
49 Miroljub Albij<strong>an</strong>ić: ‘We do not <strong>in</strong>terfere <strong>in</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which Croatia<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ages its affairs, so they should not <strong>in</strong>terfere <strong>in</strong> ours.’ ‘Bez velike štete’, Politika, 18<br />
May 2005.<br />
50 ‘Mesić ne dolazi u Srbiju zbog Ravne Gore’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 May 2005.<br />
51 ‘Zagreb najavio mogućnost preispitiv<strong>an</strong>ja viznog režima sa SCG’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19<br />
May 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The law jeopardized all progress achieved up till then cooperation<br />
with the neighbours, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister S<strong>an</strong>ader even rais<strong>in</strong>g the possibility of a<br />
re<strong>in</strong>troduction of visas <strong>for</strong> SCG citizens: ‘Our borders are our own affair, so<br />
bear<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d we will be closely watch<strong>in</strong>g developments <strong>in</strong> SCG <strong>an</strong>d<br />
react<strong>in</strong>g, if need be, also with recourse to our visa regime.’ 52 But <strong>in</strong> spite of the<br />
sparks caused by Serbi<strong>an</strong> historical revisionism, the protestations that ‘the idea<br />
of the political cont<strong>in</strong>uation of the RSK is not dead’, 53 the proposals that<br />
Croatia be sued <strong>for</strong> genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs, 54 <strong>an</strong>d the thesis that Croatia bases<br />
its <strong>state</strong>hood on genocide, 55 the Croati<strong>an</strong> Government decided to extent the<br />
suspension of the visa regime <strong>for</strong> SCG from 1 J<strong>an</strong>uary until 31 December<br />
2006. 56<br />
Respect <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d protection of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights is a problem both<br />
countries are striv<strong>in</strong>g to solve. 57 Serbia does not pursue <strong>an</strong> active <strong>an</strong>d<br />
responsible m<strong>in</strong>ority policy, 58 <strong>an</strong>d modifies its attitude towards its m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
only under pressure of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community. International<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations say <strong>in</strong> their reports that persons belong<strong>in</strong>g to the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
<strong>in</strong> Croatia face various discrim<strong>in</strong>ation particularly <strong>in</strong> employment, proceed<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e judicial authorities, the exercise of ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights <strong>an</strong>d freedom of<br />
movement. 59 Deputies of the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
52 ‘Zagreb najavio mogućnost preispitiv<strong>an</strong>ja viznog režima sa SCG’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 19<br />
May 2005.<br />
53 ‘Izmenjena etnička slika Hrvatske’, Politika, 5 August 2005.<br />
54 The found<strong>in</strong>g convention of the RSK government <strong>in</strong> exile on the tenth<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of Operation Storm was attended by Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić’s brother Luka.<br />
‘Tuže Hrvatsku sudu u Hagu’, Politika, 5 August 2005.<br />
55 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić’s ‘special greet<strong>in</strong>gs to the Karadžić family’ were given <strong>an</strong><br />
ovation <strong>an</strong>d the audience ch<strong>an</strong>ted the name of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>for</strong> several m<strong>in</strong>utes. In<br />
the Trade Union Hall where the meet<strong>in</strong>g was held posters, badges <strong>an</strong>d key r<strong>in</strong>g<br />
attachments with portraits of Vojislav Šešelj were on sale, <strong>an</strong>d some <strong>in</strong> the audience<br />
wore T-shirts bear<strong>in</strong>g the logo of the right-w<strong>in</strong>g org<strong>an</strong>ization Obraz. ‘Traže da se<br />
hrvatska država proglasi za genocidnu tvorev<strong>in</strong>u’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 5 August 2005.<br />
56 ‘Bez viza u Hrvatsku’, Građasnki list, 20 December 2005.<br />
57 Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić: ‘We c<strong>an</strong> open the borders <strong>an</strong>d cooperate, with the national<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities becom<strong>in</strong>g our bridges of cooperation.’ ‘Zatvoriti ratne knjige’, Borba, 7 July<br />
2005.<br />
58 Threats to members of the Croat national community were written on a wall<br />
<strong>in</strong> Vrbas <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. They read ‘Death to Croats’ <strong>an</strong>d ‘Kill <strong>an</strong>d cut throats till there’re<br />
no more Croats’. The graffiti were removed after a police on-site <strong>in</strong>vestigation, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
local Democratic Party (DS) br<strong>an</strong>ch asked the rul<strong>in</strong>g Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),<br />
SRS, <strong>an</strong>d Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) to do someth<strong>in</strong>g to lessen the tensions. ‘U Vrbasu<br />
prijeteće poruke tamošnjim Hrvatima’, Jutarnji list, 7 April 2005.<br />
59 The Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission says <strong>in</strong> its report on Croatia’s progress that Serbs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Roma are still discrim<strong>in</strong>ated aga<strong>in</strong>st especially <strong>in</strong> employment <strong>an</strong>d that holders<br />
have problems exercis<strong>in</strong>g their ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights. ‘Srbi i Romi diskrim<strong>in</strong>is<strong>an</strong>i’, Politika, 10<br />
November 2005.<br />
414<br />
415
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
out that the right to use the Serb l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d alphabet under <strong>an</strong> agreement<br />
with the HDZ has hardly been realized <strong>an</strong>ywhere <strong>in</strong> Croatia, 60 a right also<br />
guar<strong>an</strong>teed by the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National M<strong>in</strong>orities. 61<br />
The SCG Assembly ratified the Agreement on the Protection of the Rights of<br />
the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Croatia <strong>an</strong>d of the Croat M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong><br />
SCG, which guar<strong>an</strong>tees rights <strong>in</strong> the doma<strong>in</strong>s of culture, 62 education, the use of<br />
mother tongue <strong>an</strong>d alphabet, <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, scientific research, national m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
heritage, <strong>an</strong>d national m<strong>in</strong>ority protection. 63 Under the Agreement, SCG <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Croatia undertake to ensure official use of the national m<strong>in</strong>ority l<strong>an</strong>guages <strong>an</strong>d<br />
alphabets <strong>an</strong>d to respect the national m<strong>in</strong>orities’ right to freedom of<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization, cultural events <strong>an</strong>d participation <strong>in</strong> decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority rights <strong>an</strong>d situation. The Agreement provides <strong>for</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g up a jo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
commission <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority representatives to monitor the implementation<br />
of the Agreement. 64 Both countries’ officials stress that the persons belong<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Croat m<strong>in</strong>orities are expected to be loyal citizens of the <strong>state</strong>s 65<br />
<strong>in</strong> which they live, 66 at the same time underly<strong>in</strong>g the commitments of the<br />
mother countries to their diaspora m<strong>in</strong>orities. 67 Croati<strong>an</strong> officials gave credit to<br />
60 The SDSS vice-president <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary deputy, Milorad Pupovac, has<br />
asked Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader that 7 J<strong>an</strong>uary on which Orthodox Christi<strong>an</strong>s celebrate their<br />
Christmas should be declared a holiday <strong>in</strong> all schools <strong>in</strong> Croatia. He said that if S<strong>an</strong>ader<br />
did not agree, he <strong>an</strong>d the SDSS would dem<strong>an</strong>d a modification of next year’s school<br />
calendar to <strong>in</strong>clude 7 J<strong>an</strong>uary as a holiday. ‘Traže neradni d<strong>an</strong> u školama’, Politika, 6-7<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
61 ‘Nezadovoljstvo u redovima SDSS-a’, Politika, 9 November 2005.<br />
62 SDSS vice-president Jov<strong>an</strong> Ajduković <strong>an</strong>nounced that a Serb Culture Centre<br />
would soon be established <strong>in</strong> Vukovar. He said the centre would launch a mult<strong>in</strong>ational<br />
TV station, a regional outlet network<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the near future with TV stations<br />
from Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, Hungary <strong>an</strong>d the Tuzla c<strong>an</strong>ton. ‘Jov<strong>an</strong> Ajduković: Uskoro<br />
mult<strong>in</strong>acionalna televizija u Vukovaru’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 24 Oktober 2005.<br />
63 A large part of Croatia’s artistic <strong>an</strong>d cultural heritage, consist<strong>in</strong>g of 8,500<br />
museum <strong>an</strong>d 10,000 sacral exhibits stolen dur<strong>in</strong>g the last war, is yet to be returned. A<br />
number of items have been returned <strong>an</strong>d the rest will be sent back subject to talks to be<br />
resumed shortly by the two countries’ m<strong>in</strong>istries of culture. The restoration of Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
objects of art is part of <strong>an</strong> agreement reached <strong>in</strong> New York <strong>in</strong> 2001 by the then <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
m<strong>in</strong>isters. ‘Hrvatska još čeka kulturno nasleđe’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 August 2005.<br />
64 ‘Žestoka rasprava o Srbima u Hrvatskoj’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 21-22 May 2005.<br />
65 The Croati<strong>an</strong> police <strong>in</strong>vestigated two provocations dur<strong>in</strong>g the celebration of<br />
Orthodox Christmas <strong>in</strong> Borovo <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stituted misdeme<strong>an</strong>our proceed<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st four<br />
persons from Trp<strong>in</strong>je. Several young people unfurled a flag display<strong>in</strong>g a two-headed<br />
eagle <strong>an</strong>d four Cyrillic letters ‘S’. A person was spotted <strong>in</strong> a car wear<strong>in</strong>g a Serb cap<br />
called šajkača with a Chetnik cockade. ‘Provokacije u Vukovaru’, Politika, 8 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
66 Vojislav St<strong>an</strong>imirović: ‘The Serbs <strong>in</strong> Croatia now do not need guardi<strong>an</strong>s like<br />
those who <strong>for</strong>med the RSK assembly <strong>in</strong> exile <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.’ ‘Loša usluga Srbima’, Večernje<br />
novosti, 1 March 2005.<br />
67 ‘Važnost i zrnca različitosti’, Politika, 7 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the m<strong>in</strong>ority Serbs <strong>for</strong> their contribution to Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration, promotion of<br />
the culture of dialogue <strong>an</strong>d mutual respect <strong>an</strong>d toler<strong>an</strong>ce. Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
S<strong>an</strong>ader stressed <strong>in</strong> this connection that ‘a major step <strong>for</strong>ward has been taken<br />
with support from the m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d their representatives <strong>in</strong> the Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
Assembly 68 regard<strong>in</strong>g respect <strong>for</strong> the values we share together with<br />
progressive Europe.’ 69 Croati<strong>an</strong> officials further stressed the import<strong>an</strong>ce of the<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ged picture of Serbi<strong>an</strong>-Croati<strong>an</strong> relations because, they said, ‘we have<br />
much more <strong>in</strong> common th<strong>an</strong> that which happened ten years ago.’ 70 The<br />
National Coord<strong>in</strong>ation of the Councils of the Serb National M<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Republic of Croatia is the official name of the new Serb representative body <strong>in</strong><br />
Croatia 71 established <strong>in</strong> Zagreb under the new Constitutional Law on the<br />
Rights of National M<strong>in</strong>orities. 72 Croati<strong>an</strong> media stressed that ‘there is no reason<br />
whatever <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>yone <strong>in</strong> Croatia to feel offended over the flag decision<br />
adoption; the Serbs must have the right to a flag <strong>an</strong>d to other symbols, just as<br />
no one denies the Croati<strong>an</strong> Itali<strong>an</strong>s the right to a flag. Rather th<strong>an</strong> jeopardiz<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the RH [Republic of Croatia], the national m<strong>in</strong>ority symbols at least bespeak<br />
the <strong>in</strong>ternal toler<strong>an</strong>ce 73 <strong>an</strong>d the level of democracy desired. 74<br />
A Serb delegation from Croatia visited Sombor <strong>an</strong>d Subotica at the<br />
<strong>in</strong>vitation of the Croat National Council <strong>in</strong> SCG. On that occasion Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
ambassador Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić said that ‘after a period <strong>in</strong> which m<strong>in</strong>orities were<br />
the cause of misunderst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, a time is com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities to practice the<br />
policy of underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, cooperation <strong>an</strong>d solidarity among themselves <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
exhort <strong>state</strong>s to active m<strong>in</strong>ority policies <strong>an</strong>d open relations <strong>in</strong> order that <strong>state</strong>s<br />
should not pose obstacles to the realization of l<strong>in</strong>ks between the mother nation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d those who have me<strong>an</strong>while 75 become m<strong>in</strong>orities.’ 76 The Croat m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong><br />
68 The SDSS is satisfied with the local election results giv<strong>in</strong>g it twice as m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
deputies as last time. The party won <strong>in</strong> Kn<strong>in</strong> with 36.5 per cent of the vote equivalent to<br />
eight seats, <strong>an</strong>d 30 per cent of the vote <strong>in</strong> Vukovar.<br />
69 Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader, ‘Unapređenje suživota’, Politika, 8 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
70 Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić, ‘Prepišite od nas’, Večernje novosti, 2 April 2005.<br />
71 The coord<strong>in</strong>ation of the Serb national councils will be <strong>an</strong> umbrella<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization operat<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>state</strong> level <strong>an</strong>d compris<strong>in</strong>g representatives of the elected<br />
county councils of the Serb national m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Croatia. The found<strong>in</strong>g assembly was<br />
attended by 77 delegates from 17 counties <strong>in</strong> which the Serb national m<strong>in</strong>ority has its<br />
elected councils.<br />
72 ‘Zajednički do prava’, Politika, 6 April 2005.<br />
73 After the May 2005 local elections <strong>in</strong> the multiethnic towns of Kn<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Vukovar, the HDZ cold-shouldered the Independent Democratic Serb Party <strong>an</strong>d set up<br />
local government <strong>in</strong> coalition with the far-right Croat parties, a move which is not<br />
conducive to the lessen<strong>in</strong>g of tensions.<br />
74 ‘Zastava hrvatskih Srba ne treba nikome smetati’, Jutarnji list, 7 April 2005.<br />
75 Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić: ‘Dur<strong>in</strong>g the life of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia the Croats were a<br />
constituent people. The fact that they were recognized as a m<strong>in</strong>ority comparatively<br />
recently expla<strong>in</strong>s why they still do not know what it me<strong>an</strong>s to be a m<strong>in</strong>ority. They have<br />
416<br />
417
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Serbia is also <strong>in</strong> a very unfavourable situation 77 characterized by <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>an</strong>d<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> relation to both the majority people <strong>an</strong>d other m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia. The Declaration of the Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Croats <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
highlights discrim<strong>in</strong>ation by the civil service regard<strong>in</strong>g employment <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
failure to take affirmative action. The Croat m<strong>in</strong>ority compla<strong>in</strong>s that the<br />
provisions regulat<strong>in</strong>g the official use of the Croati<strong>an</strong> l<strong>an</strong>guage <strong>an</strong>d alphabet <strong>in</strong><br />
the civil service <strong>an</strong>d adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>an</strong>d judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are not<br />
implemented. They po<strong>in</strong>t out that the ‘Croats <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a w<strong>an</strong>t only what all<br />
other m<strong>in</strong>orities have - noth<strong>in</strong>g more <strong>an</strong>d noth<strong>in</strong>g less.’ 78<br />
By sign<strong>in</strong>g the Sarajevo Declaration Croatia undertook actively to<br />
support coord<strong>in</strong>ated regional ef<strong>for</strong>ts <strong>an</strong>d to do all it c<strong>an</strong> to prove that the ‘<strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>stitutions are function<strong>in</strong>g’ 79 <strong>an</strong>d that it is ‘<strong>in</strong> Croatia’s national<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests that its refugee citizens return to the country’. 80 For all Belgrade’s lip<br />
service to the return of refugees, 81 to their legal 82 <strong>an</strong>d property <strong>security</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d to<br />
the f<strong>in</strong>al resolution of the matter of registers of births, marriages <strong>an</strong>d deaths<br />
no developed m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong>frastructure, they are learn<strong>in</strong>g to behave <strong>an</strong>d operate as a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority.’ ‘Hapšenje Gotov<strong>in</strong>e ne treba slaviti, ali nije ni nešto oko čega treba tugovati’,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 17-18 December 2005.<br />
76 ‘Susret Srba iz Hrvatske sa Hrvatima iz Srbije’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 23 December 2005.<br />
77 Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić: ‘Perhaps the most serious problem is the <strong>in</strong>sufficient<br />
representation of Croats <strong>in</strong> the org<strong>an</strong>s of government, representative as well as on all<br />
other levels. The existence of problems is attested to, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, by the<br />
Declaration of the Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Croats <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a on the situation of the<br />
Croat m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>an</strong>d by the debate <strong>in</strong> the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of<br />
Europe.’ ‘Hapšenje Gotov<strong>in</strong>e ne treba slaviti, ali nije nešto oko čega treba tugovati’,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 17-18 December 2005.<br />
78 TV Novi Sad started a Croat programme three years ago <strong>an</strong>d broadcast it,<br />
with occasional <strong>in</strong>terruptions, until June 2004. The competent authorities <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a say that the 30-m<strong>in</strong>ute semi-monthly programme should be restarted <strong>an</strong>d<br />
that the TVNS director should expla<strong>in</strong> why it is not runn<strong>in</strong>g. S<strong>in</strong>ce the found<strong>in</strong>g of the<br />
Croat National Council, the newspaper publish<strong>in</strong>g house Hrvatska riječ which launched<br />
the programme has not been able to sign a broadcast<strong>in</strong>g contract because TVNS does<br />
not w<strong>an</strong>t it to. The Croat National Council held a press conference compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
discrim<strong>in</strong>ation aga<strong>in</strong>st the Croat m<strong>in</strong>ority, <strong>an</strong>d TVNS retorted by fil<strong>in</strong>g a suit aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
programme editor <strong>for</strong> alleged hate speech. ‘Gr<strong>an</strong>ice ne predstavljaju problem u našim<br />
odnosima’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 February 2005.<br />
79 Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić. ‘Ubrzati povratak izbeglica’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 April 2005.<br />
80 Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesić. ‘Ubrzati povratak izbeglica’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 April 2005.<br />
81 Rasim Ljajić: ‘S<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 2005, 1,941 persons have returned to<br />
Croatia.’ ‘Rasim Ljajić: izvršena revizija tajnih optužnica iz Hrvatske’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 15 July<br />
2005.<br />
82 Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić: ‘A list of persons be<strong>in</strong>g prosecuted <strong>in</strong> Croatia <strong>for</strong> war crimes<br />
was tr<strong>an</strong>smitted to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side at least twice. The new revised list made up be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
the summer of this year conta<strong>in</strong>s [the names of] 930 persons.’ ‘Hapšenje Gotov<strong>in</strong>e ne<br />
treba slaviti, ali nije ni nešto oko čega treba tugovati’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17-18 December 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d other registers, the refugee repatriation campaign Croatia launched 83 was<br />
either ignored <strong>in</strong> Serbia or mostly criticized. Keep<strong>in</strong>g the Serb refugees <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia as part of a strategy of ethnic consolidation of Serbia itself is Serbia’s<br />
<strong>state</strong> policy.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the pl<strong>an</strong>s of the Croati<strong>an</strong> government, most of the<br />
100,000 registered refugees are expected to return to Croatia by the end of<br />
2006. 84 A promotion of the repatriation campaign <strong>in</strong> the Croati<strong>an</strong> embassy <strong>in</strong><br />
Belgrade was called off because the republic Commissariat <strong>for</strong> Refugees had<br />
not responded to the <strong>in</strong>vitation. The Croati<strong>an</strong> ambassador <strong>in</strong> Belgrade said that<br />
‘<strong>in</strong>stead of [promot<strong>in</strong>g] communication’ the media carried <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>nouncement<br />
say<strong>in</strong>g that ‘the time is not ripe <strong>for</strong> a campaign, it will not contribute to the<br />
process of return, the refugees <strong>an</strong>d refugee associations are aga<strong>in</strong>st the<br />
campaign.’ 85 The appeals to open a dialogue on <strong>an</strong>d make constructive room<br />
<strong>for</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g the complex issue of return failed to elicit specific action by the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> side, which responded by threaten<strong>in</strong>g to ‘<strong>in</strong>ternationalize this<br />
problem’ <strong>an</strong>d call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>for</strong>ums to expedite the process’. 86 As<br />
part of the return campaign, the Consulate of the Republic of Croatia launched<br />
a telephone <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation service <strong>for</strong> refugees from Croatia. This is yet <strong>an</strong>other<br />
source of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on the protection of refugees’ rights, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g their right<br />
to return, property rights, right to a pension, etc. 87<br />
Obstacles to faster return <strong>in</strong>clude lack of progress <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with the<br />
loss of ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to ‘socially-owned’ flats, limited economic<br />
prospects partly ow<strong>in</strong>g to discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> employment <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>consistent<br />
implementation of legislation on the proportional representation of m<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istration, judiciary <strong>an</strong>d regional offices of <strong>state</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istries. An<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the number of violent attacks on Serbs is also <strong>in</strong> evidence. 88 The<br />
83 Vojislav St<strong>an</strong>imirović: ‘Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> statistics record the return of some<br />
110,000 people, but we th<strong>in</strong>k that about 80,000 have returned. There are at least 150,000<br />
more people who have taken up perm<strong>an</strong>ent residence <strong>in</strong> SCG, <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>an</strong>y are com<strong>in</strong>g<br />
here only temporarily because there are no conditions here <strong>for</strong> their perm<strong>an</strong>ent return.’<br />
‘Loše, ali bolje’, Večernje novosti, 26 May 2005.<br />
84 In the op<strong>in</strong>ion of Milorad Pupovac, the local elections <strong>in</strong> Croatia were <strong>an</strong><br />
encouragement to return, a step towards the <strong>in</strong>tegration of the Serb community <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
government <strong>in</strong>stitutions, public affairs <strong>an</strong>d Croati<strong>an</strong> society as a whole. ‘Mržnja sa<br />
ekr<strong>an</strong>a’, Politika, 24 May 2005.<br />
85 Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić: ‘Hapšenje Gotov<strong>in</strong>e ne treba slaviti, ali nije ni nešto oko čega<br />
treba tugovati’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17-18 December 2005.<br />
86 Rasim Ljajić: ‘Spisak osumnjičenih tek krajem avgusta’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 4 August<br />
2005.<br />
87 ‘In<strong>for</strong>mativni telefon za izbeglice’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 15 July 2005.<br />
88 The office of the UN High Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Refugees <strong>in</strong> Croatia<br />
condemned <strong>in</strong> the strongest terms the attacks on Serb returnees <strong>in</strong> the village of<br />
Ostrovica near Benkovac. Although it considered such attacks isolated <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>security</strong><br />
situation <strong>in</strong> the return area satisfactory, the UNHCR warned that the frequency of<br />
418<br />
419
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Croati<strong>an</strong> police made a report on the ethnically motivated <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> 2005. 89<br />
In most cases the police failed to identify <strong>an</strong>d arrest the perpetrators. 90 Of the<br />
25 Serbs arrested <strong>in</strong> Croatia <strong>in</strong> 2005, 20 were returnees from exile. 91 Ratko<br />
Gajica, SDSS parliamentary deputy, blamed this trend on the general mood <strong>in</strong><br />
some parts of Croatia (the Šibenik <strong>an</strong>d Zadar h<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>an</strong>ds) 92 <strong>an</strong>d on private<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests rather th<strong>an</strong> ideological grounds. 93 The Croati<strong>an</strong> public showed <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g will<strong>in</strong>gness to take a critical look at the political legacy of the<br />
previous period 94 <strong>an</strong>d to confront its own past 95 though, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Watch, prosecutions of Serbs suspected of war crimes 96 far<br />
outnumbered those of Croats on the same charges. 97 A cooperation protocol of<br />
attacks on refugees <strong>an</strong>d their property had of late given cause <strong>for</strong> concern. ‘Osuda<br />
UNHCR’, Večernje novosti, 21 July 2005.<br />
89 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the police report, only a third of the perpetrators of<br />
misdeme<strong>an</strong>ours <strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>al offences aga<strong>in</strong>st citizens of Serb nationality had been<br />
identified. There were a total of 50 <strong>in</strong>cidents (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g two homicides, four explosions,<br />
three cases of grievous bodily harm, five gr<strong>an</strong>d larcenies, six cases of property<br />
destruction, sett<strong>in</strong>g fire to vehicles, the use of firearms...).<br />
90 Milorad Pupovac: ‘This is conducive to the spread<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d revival of a<br />
nationalism which is the product of a policy of fear <strong>an</strong>d of cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g lack of read<strong>in</strong>ess<br />
to make clear political <strong>state</strong>ments.’ ‘Srbi u pat poziciji’, Vreme, 9 June 2005.<br />
91 ‘Srbi građ<strong>an</strong>i drugog reda’, Večernje novosti, 3 March 2005.<br />
92 Slobodna Dalmacija writes that not a s<strong>in</strong>gle perpetrator was ever identified <strong>in</strong><br />
connection with the murder of between 10 <strong>an</strong>d 20 Serb civili<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d the blow<strong>in</strong>g up of<br />
scores of Serb refugee houses <strong>in</strong> 1991-93 <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d around Zadar, <strong>an</strong> area under the control<br />
of Croati<strong>an</strong> police <strong>an</strong>d military <strong>for</strong>ces dur<strong>in</strong>g the war. ‘Zadarski slučaj Glavaš’, Politika, 2<br />
August 2005.<br />
93 ‘The general atmosphere <strong>in</strong> those parts is unfavourable <strong>an</strong>d still generates<br />
<strong>an</strong>imosities that are out of place at this time so long s<strong>in</strong>ce the war events. On the other<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, community leaders, certa<strong>in</strong> veter<strong>an</strong>s’ org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d certa<strong>in</strong> other lobbies<br />
promot<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>ly their private causes keep stok<strong>in</strong>g such <strong>an</strong> atmosphere because it is <strong>in</strong><br />
their <strong>in</strong>terests.’<br />
94 The TV programme Lat<strong>in</strong>ica, which raised the question of the political legacy<br />
of Fr<strong>an</strong>jo Tuđm<strong>an</strong>, caused a public uproar. Vladimir Šeks said that ‘Lat<strong>in</strong>ica is a<br />
blasphemous falsification of Croati<strong>an</strong> history’.<br />
95 The State Prosecutor’s Office said that a total of 3,558 crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
had been filed by the end of 2005 aga<strong>in</strong>st persons suspected of committ<strong>in</strong>g war crimes.<br />
Some 1,360 <strong>in</strong>dictments were brought of which some 240 were cast aside, <strong>an</strong>d about 550<br />
persons were convicted of war crimes. Only four Croats were sentenced under f<strong>in</strong>ally<br />
b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g judgements, <strong>for</strong> crimes <strong>in</strong> Gospić <strong>an</strong>d Paul<strong>in</strong> Dvor near Osijek. Some 420<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigations were pend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d 1,440 were discont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>for</strong> lack of evidence. ‘Osuđeno<br />
malo Hrvata’, Glas javnosti, 9 August 2005.<br />
96 With<strong>in</strong> six months of the sign<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>an</strong> agreement by the Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> judiciaries, five Serbs were tr<strong>an</strong>sferred to prisons <strong>in</strong> Serbia, with 60 Serbs still<br />
await<strong>in</strong>g trial <strong>in</strong> Croati<strong>an</strong> prisons. ‘Da se ne zaboravi’, Večernje novosti, 13 August 2005.<br />
97 Pursu<strong>an</strong>t to a new <strong>in</strong>vestigation order aga<strong>in</strong>st five of eight <strong>for</strong>mer Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
policemen, issued by the County Prosecutor’s Office <strong>in</strong> Split early <strong>in</strong> December 2004, a<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istries of justice <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized their<br />
cooperation 98 <strong>an</strong>d made it possible to simplify deal<strong>in</strong>g with m<strong>an</strong>y matters such<br />
as prisoner tr<strong>an</strong>sfer, social <strong>security</strong> agreements 99 <strong>an</strong>d succession. The process of<br />
refugee return does not appear viable mostly ow<strong>in</strong>g to problems with hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d employments <strong>an</strong>d partly to lack of basic utility services <strong>an</strong>d social<br />
<strong>in</strong>frastructure. The process of return <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tegration is slow 100 <strong>in</strong> spite of the<br />
present positive atmosphere created by the Croati<strong>an</strong> Government with the<br />
support of the opposition <strong>an</strong>d the political leaders of the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority.<br />
The political representative of the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> the Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
Assembly, the SDSS, conditions its support <strong>for</strong> the S<strong>an</strong>ader government on the<br />
resolution of issues of key import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> the successful return of refugees:<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued development of areas under special <strong>state</strong> care, repair <strong>an</strong>d restitution<br />
of property, <strong>an</strong>d solution of the question of ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights. 101 The solution <strong>in</strong><br />
Croatia of the last question is a condition set out <strong>in</strong> its Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Association Agreement with the EU. The OSCE has recommended the<br />
necessity of amend<strong>in</strong>g the Law 102 on Civil Procedure 103 to <strong>for</strong>bid the users of<br />
property to sue the owners (Serb returnees) <strong>for</strong> reimbursement of <strong>in</strong>vestments<br />
made. 104 There also rema<strong>in</strong>s to solve the problem of misappropriation of Serb<br />
pre-<strong>in</strong>vestigation exam<strong>in</strong>ation started of the suspects accused of war crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
civili<strong>an</strong>s at Lora prison <strong>in</strong> 1992. ‘Zlostavlj<strong>an</strong>i i ratni zarobljenici’, Politika, 8 March 2005.<br />
98 ‘Sporazum o saradnji m<strong>in</strong>istarstva pravde Srbije i Hrvatske’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 6<br />
December 2005.<br />
99 As a result of the two <strong>state</strong>s’ agreement on social <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce, ratified <strong>in</strong> 2003,<br />
pensioners <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia beg<strong>an</strong> receiv<strong>in</strong>g their pensions. At the moment, over<br />
12,000 Croati<strong>an</strong> pensioners <strong>in</strong> Serbia are receiv<strong>in</strong>g their pensions regularly. The Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
negotiators failed to secure payment of back pensions <strong>an</strong>d recognition of length of<br />
service <strong>for</strong> the Serb pensioners. There are also unresolved problems regard<strong>in</strong>g the right<br />
to shares distributed as part of the privatization process.<br />
100 The Croati<strong>an</strong> ombudsm<strong>an</strong> Ante Klarić refers to ‘several factors which<br />
contribute to this, especially the slow return of property, the unsolved question of the<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer holders of ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights, destruction of ab<strong>an</strong>doned property, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
compensation claims by the temporary users, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g court judgements which place<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial burden on owners <strong>for</strong> actions <strong>for</strong> which they are not responsible.’<br />
101 ‘Pupovac najavio podršku rebal<strong>an</strong>su budžeta’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 6 July 2005.<br />
102 The first pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the repatriation procedure are that the successful<br />
applic<strong>an</strong>t must live <strong>in</strong> Croatia <strong>an</strong>d may purchase the flat to which they have ten<strong>an</strong>cy<br />
rights on easy terms. Pupovac condemned the first requirement as racist. ‘Prebij<strong>an</strong>je<br />
preko kolena’, Vreme, 4 August 2005.<br />
103 ‘Upozorenje OEBS-a‘, Politika, 11 April 2005.<br />
104 The OSCE <strong>an</strong>d other <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>in</strong> Croatia expressed their<br />
concern at the <strong>for</strong>ced sale of the house of a Serb returnee, Stevo Zabradac, who could not<br />
pay compensation <strong>for</strong> the unsolicited <strong>in</strong>vestments made <strong>in</strong> the house by the temporary<br />
user, who <strong>in</strong>habited the house s<strong>in</strong>ce 1992. International representatives recommended<br />
that the Croati<strong>an</strong> authorities adopt legislation <strong>for</strong>bidd<strong>in</strong>g the temporary users of houses<br />
under Croati<strong>an</strong> Government m<strong>an</strong>agement to sue the owners of the property <strong>an</strong>d claim<br />
420<br />
421
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
property through purchases by the Agency <strong>for</strong> Legal <strong>an</strong>d Real E<strong>state</strong><br />
Tr<strong>an</strong>sactions (APN), giv<strong>in</strong>g rise to 127 judicial proceed<strong>in</strong>gs to date. Tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>tage of the scam devised by corrupt officials <strong>an</strong>d org<strong>an</strong>ized crime<br />
syndicates, the ab<strong>an</strong>doned property was bought by the Croati<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d sold<br />
without the knowledge of its owners. 105 The SDSS was dissatisfied with the<br />
realization so far of its agreement with the HDZ on the restitution of the<br />
property of Serb refugees <strong>an</strong>d displaced persons, specifically with the failure to<br />
implement crucial po<strong>in</strong>ts of the agreement. 106 Croatia twice extended the<br />
deadl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> accommodation applications from <strong>for</strong>mer holders of ten<strong>an</strong>cy<br />
rights who had acquired these rights <strong>in</strong> the territory of the Republic of Croatia<br />
other th<strong>an</strong> areas affected by war <strong>an</strong>d subject to special <strong>state</strong> care. The extension<br />
was welcomed by m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations, notably the OSCE,<br />
above all because the Croati<strong>an</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Sea, Tourism, Tr<strong>an</strong>sport <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Development had registered only some 2,600 out of 27,000 such flats. 107<br />
There was further progress regard<strong>in</strong>g outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g issues such as the<br />
matter of borders, which were no longer regarded as a ‘political <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational issue’. The ch<strong>an</strong>ge was the result of the commitment to Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration, which requires that territorial disputes must be settled be<strong>for</strong>eh<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d this is why the question of borders was looked upon as ma<strong>in</strong>ly a<br />
‘technical’ matter that ought to be ‘solved be<strong>for</strong>e entry <strong>in</strong>to the EU’. 108 The<br />
<strong>in</strong>ter<strong>state</strong> diplomatic commission <strong>in</strong> charge of the matter cont<strong>in</strong>ues to<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>e the border l<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>an</strong>d is deal<strong>in</strong>g with most issues such as Prevlaka<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Pen<strong>in</strong>sula <strong>an</strong>d the northern border. The commission operates under the 2002<br />
Protocol Concern<strong>in</strong>g the Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>for</strong> Determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Border L<strong>in</strong>e. 109<br />
The two countries agree that it is necessary to determ<strong>in</strong>e the directions<br />
of their economic <strong>an</strong>d technological cooperation to f<strong>in</strong>d jo<strong>in</strong>t markets <strong>an</strong>d<br />
realize jo<strong>in</strong>t programmes. They had reason to be pleased with their trade <strong>in</strong><br />
goods which, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the latest data, achieved growth of 50 per cent<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g the first eight months of the year over the same period <strong>in</strong> 2004, reach<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the value of some 300 million US dollars. 110 Croati<strong>an</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>ies accounted <strong>for</strong><br />
2 per cent of <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> firms. 111 In spite of occasional<br />
outbursts of ‘economic patriotism’, the results of the cooperation of Croati<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>ies has surpassed all expectations, said Serbi<strong>an</strong> Deputy<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Miroljub Labus on the occasion of the establishment of the<br />
Croati<strong>an</strong> Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Club <strong>in</strong> Belgrade. 112<br />
reimbursement of <strong>in</strong>vestments. ‘OEBS u Hrvatskoj br<strong>in</strong>e pr<strong>in</strong>udna prodaja kuće srpskog<br />
povratnika’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17-18 December 2005.<br />
105 The scheme is now characterized as the biggest fraud <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
guile built upon ethnic cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g. S<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>for</strong>mation the APN has spent over 200 euro<br />
on the purchase of 8,300 Serb houses <strong>in</strong> the Kraj<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Slavonia regions, most of the<br />
money end<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> private pockets. ‘Hrvatska prevara za proter<strong>an</strong>e Srbe’, Nacional, 14<br />
February 2005.<br />
106 S<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of last year, when accord<strong>in</strong>g to official data 3,509<br />
houses owned by Serb refugees were still illegally occupied, owners were unable to take<br />
possession of <strong>an</strong>other 1,197 although the deadl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>for</strong> their restitution had expired on 31<br />
December. ‘Hiljadu zaposednutih kuća’, Politika, 13 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
107 Milorad Pupovac rem<strong>in</strong>ded S<strong>an</strong>ader that 887 hous<strong>in</strong>g units were yet to be<br />
returned to citizens of Serb nationality, that not a penny had been spent to provide<br />
accommodation <strong>for</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer holders of ten<strong>an</strong>cy rights, <strong>an</strong>d that all the money had<br />
already been spent that had been set aside <strong>for</strong> the repair by year’s end of 3,500 build<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
fall<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> damage grades 4-6. Pupovac said that the agreement implementation<br />
delay was equally damag<strong>in</strong>g to the Croati<strong>an</strong> Government <strong>an</strong>d the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority.<br />
108 ‘Gr<strong>an</strong>ice ne predstavljaju problem u našim odnosima’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 February<br />
2005.<br />
109 The border l<strong>in</strong>e on the Šarengradska Ada river isl<strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> other pockets on<br />
the D<strong>an</strong>ube <strong>an</strong>d other places along the river c<strong>an</strong> be determ<strong>in</strong>ed accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
cadastral books, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs. ‘Gr<strong>an</strong>ice ne predstavljaju problem u našim<br />
odnosima’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 February 2005.<br />
110 ‘Tonči St<strong>an</strong>ičić: odnosi Hrvatske i SCG idu napred’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 25 October 2005.<br />
111 Employees of the Toza Marković tile factory protested outside the<br />
conference hall aga<strong>in</strong>st moves by the Croati<strong>an</strong> group Nekse to take over their firm.<br />
‘What do you w<strong>an</strong>t me to tell you? You c<strong>an</strong> see <strong>for</strong> yoursefl why we’re protest<strong>in</strong>g! They<br />
beat us <strong>in</strong> Croatia, while here our police protect them,’ a protester told the reporter.<br />
‘Poklon Mesiću za Oluju’, Nacional, 26 July 2005.<br />
112 The club is a venue where Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Croati<strong>an</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>essmen will exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
experiences with a view to improv<strong>in</strong>g bilateral economic cooperation. ‘Saradnja iznad<br />
očekiv<strong>an</strong>ja’, Politika, 22 November 2005.<br />
422<br />
423
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:<br />
THE BURDEN OF THE PAST<br />
Relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a are still burdened by problems from recent past, which are yet to<br />
be resolved <strong>in</strong> a satisfactory way. Political elite <strong>in</strong> Serbia is expend<strong>in</strong>g<br />
enormous energy to deny the BH genocide <strong>an</strong>d aggression charges aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
SM, 1 while pert<strong>in</strong>ent judgements passed by the Hague Tribunal are be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
trivialized. Serbia is try<strong>in</strong>g to down-size the policy of aggression <strong>an</strong>d ethnic –<br />
cle<strong>an</strong>s<strong>in</strong>g 2 result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> displacement of 2 million <strong>in</strong>habit<strong>an</strong>ts, kill<strong>in</strong>g of 200,000<br />
people <strong>an</strong>d tens of thous<strong>an</strong>ds of g<strong>an</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividual rapes, to "the crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
hallmarks of a regime" 3 . Added to that the future of B-H as a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>state</strong><br />
h<strong>in</strong>ges to a large degree on the revision of the Dayton Accord, which should<br />
relativise the ethnic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.<br />
Co-operation between the two countries is mostly propelled by the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community. SM <strong>an</strong>d B-H have kicked-started negotiations on the<br />
Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association Agreement with EU, <strong>for</strong> that is the only way of<br />
prevent<strong>in</strong>g the West Balk<strong>an</strong>s from rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the "black hole <strong>in</strong> Europe" 4 . In<br />
view of parallel negotiations on the future status of Kosovo, Belgrade <strong>in</strong>sists<br />
that the BH talks on association with EU should also embrace the country's<br />
specific features, "<strong>in</strong> the similar fashion it was done with the <strong>state</strong> union of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." 5 This is <strong>an</strong> attempt at draw<strong>in</strong>g a parallel between a<br />
1 Member of B-H Presidency, Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Tihić: “Judgements are import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
because of the truth, justice <strong>an</strong>d victims. They also have a bear<strong>in</strong>g on confidencebuild<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>an</strong>d promotion of relations between our two countries <strong>an</strong>d our peoples, <strong>for</strong><br />
only on foundations of justice <strong>an</strong>d truth we c<strong>an</strong> build a better future. “Tihić: Judgements<br />
are import<strong>an</strong>t because of the truth”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 31 December – 3 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
2 BH Ambassador to Belgrade, Tomislav Leko, welcomed the response of the<br />
Serb authorities to disclose the video record<strong>in</strong>g on the kill<strong>in</strong>g of Srebrenica victims <strong>an</strong>d<br />
assessed that the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g was the right way to resolve open issues between Belgrade<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Sarajevo. “Leko welcomes Belgrade’s response”, Politika, 6 June 2005.<br />
3 President of DP political council, D. Micunovic, “Regime Is Guilty”, Novosti, 4<br />
June 2005.<br />
4 “Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d SM the Biggest Challenges <strong>for</strong> EU ”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 28-29 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
5 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Simić, adviser to the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, “By Accusations They<br />
Cover Up Their Guilt”, Novosti, 16 September 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
similar status of Republika Srpska <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo. That st<strong>an</strong>ce of the Serb elite<br />
clearly demonstrates that <strong>in</strong> its view the issue of borders <strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s is still<br />
open, 6 <strong>an</strong>d that it reckons on the new draw<strong>in</strong>g of ethnic borders.<br />
Tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Srebrenica massacre was <strong>an</strong> occasion <strong>for</strong> a reappraisal<br />
of <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>ces on the crime committed <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica. But<br />
contrary to all expectations Serbia failed to act likewise. On the contrary, it<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>ued to deny 7 , contest the reality 8 <strong>an</strong>d relativise it 9 , as well as to counter<br />
the Srebrenica genocide with the misuse <strong>an</strong>d doctor<strong>in</strong>g of the number of Serb<br />
victims <strong>in</strong> Bratunac. 10 Moreover the suffer<strong>in</strong>g of the Sarajevo-based Serbs 11 is<br />
now be<strong>in</strong>g qualified as a genocide. 12<br />
Presence of the Serb president Boris Tadić 13 <strong>in</strong> the Srebrenica<br />
commemoration ceremony was not a gesture of a politici<strong>an</strong> assum<strong>in</strong>g<br />
responsibility of Serbia <strong>for</strong> a pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>an</strong>d systematic destruction of Bosniak<br />
6 Boris Tadić ”This is the region of traditional <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic conflicts which have<br />
been currently more or less curbed, but there are always salient <strong>an</strong>d sensitive issues<br />
which c<strong>an</strong> revive those conflicts. Any precedent <strong>in</strong> the region may be tragical.” “Tadić<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Imposed Solutions”, Novosti, 21 November 2005.<br />
7 Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Tihić “Denial of Genocide Is the Last Stage of Genocide”. “Use of<br />
Genocide”, NiN, 14 July 2005.<br />
8 Zor<strong>an</strong> Stojković, Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister, “Video record<strong>in</strong>g on the crimes committed<br />
by members of paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation Scorpions, is revolt<strong>in</strong>g, but it was only one of<br />
m<strong>an</strong>y crimes committed on the whole territory of <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia”. “Trials <strong>in</strong> Serbia”,<br />
Nacional, 6 June 2005.<br />
9 Tomislav Nikolić “One-sided tack to Srebrenica is unacceptable <strong>for</strong> the Serb<br />
Radical Party. It hurts me to see all <strong>an</strong>d sundry <strong>in</strong> Serbia talk<strong>in</strong>g about crimes<br />
committed by Serbs, but no-one talks about crimes committed by Muslims. If some<br />
Serbs <strong>in</strong> Republika Srpska committed crimes, what k<strong>in</strong>d of s<strong>in</strong> is it <strong>for</strong> Serbia?”.<br />
“Witnesses of Crimes”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 8 June 2005.<br />
10 With that <strong>in</strong>tent the date of the 1993 Bratunac massacre of Serbs-which<br />
happened on Christmas <strong>in</strong> a reprisal <strong>for</strong> the previous Serb-committed crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Muslims- was doctored. Thus the Serb side on 12 July commemorated 3,000 killed <strong>an</strong>d<br />
miss<strong>in</strong>g Serbs dur<strong>in</strong>g the B-H war.<br />
11 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the 44 –month long siege of Srajevo over 11,000 people, of whom<br />
1,500 children. died. An average of 1,000 shells from the Yugoslav People's Army<br />
weaponry fell daily on Sarajevo. The circle around Sarajevo m<strong>an</strong>ned by 12,000 soldiers<br />
was 62 km long. “1,000 shells every day”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 6 April 2005.<br />
12 Liken<strong>in</strong>g of suffer<strong>in</strong>g of Sarajevo Serbs with the Srebrenica genocide “is<br />
equal to a political bl<strong>in</strong>dness <strong>an</strong>d no-one c<strong>an</strong> on grounds of current political needs<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge or re-tailor the truth.” “Bukejlović’s Political Provocation”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 29 March<br />
2005.<br />
13 Members of association Women of Srebrenica sent a letter to the Bosniak<br />
member of B-H Presidency Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Tihić <strong>an</strong>d reis-ul-ulema of the B-H Islamic<br />
community, Mustafa Cerić, ask<strong>in</strong>g them to b<strong>an</strong> the arrival of SM delegation to<br />
Srebrenica commemoration. They warned that "<strong>in</strong> case of arrival of SM representatives,<br />
we are not to be held accountable <strong>for</strong> our actions". “Do Not Come to Srebrenica”,<br />
Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
424<br />
425
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
population 14 . Commemoration at which all <strong>in</strong>ternational representatives<br />
acknowledged their responsibility <strong>for</strong> not act<strong>in</strong>g fast enough <strong>an</strong>d sufficiently<br />
enough to foil such a crime, ended by "the whole world, barr<strong>in</strong>g Serbia,<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g a public apology." 15 Former head of the legal team of BH <strong>in</strong> the<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs relat<strong>in</strong>g to BH aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide charges aga<strong>in</strong>st SM,<br />
Fr<strong>an</strong>ces Boyle, <strong>state</strong>d that the arrival of the Serb President Boris Tadić was <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>sult <strong>for</strong> victims of Srebrenica: "His arrival <strong>an</strong>d presence <strong>in</strong> Počare was<br />
t<strong>an</strong>tamount to a visit by a Nazi officer 16 to Auschwitz". 17<br />
Initiative of the eight NGOs to make the Serb parliament adopt a<br />
Declaration acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g responsibility <strong>for</strong> the committed genocide <strong>an</strong>d<br />
pay<strong>in</strong>g tribute to victims, was met with a great odium <strong>in</strong> Serbia. 18 In that<br />
regard the eight NGOs staged m<strong>an</strong>y m<strong>an</strong>ifestations, notably, the promotion of<br />
the book "Srebrenica: from denial to acknowledgement" published by the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d the only <strong>in</strong>stitutionally<br />
<strong>an</strong>d publicly org<strong>an</strong>ized mark<strong>in</strong>g of the tenth <strong>an</strong>niversary of massacre <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica <strong>in</strong> the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Parliament. Added to that the Women <strong>in</strong> Black<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized a protest Let us not <strong>for</strong>get, which was <strong>in</strong>terrupted by a group of the<br />
right-w<strong>in</strong>g milit<strong>an</strong>ts ch<strong>an</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g "Knife, wire, Srebrenica", <strong>an</strong>d "This is a Serb<br />
l<strong>an</strong>d" <strong>an</strong>d throw<strong>in</strong>g tear-gas." 19 Nearly all billboards with <strong>an</strong> artistic depicton of<br />
Srebrenica massacre <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Čačak, Niš <strong>an</strong>d Novi Sad, were re-pa<strong>in</strong>ted with<br />
black colour, torn up, or the follow<strong>in</strong>g grafitti were written over them:<br />
"Reprisal is near<strong>in</strong>g", "Milica Rakić", "Knife, wire, Srebrenica", "To see, to<br />
remember, to repeat" 20 . Fund <strong>for</strong> the Hum<strong>an</strong>itari<strong>an</strong> Law screened a<br />
documentary on the paramilitary <strong>for</strong>mation Scorpions, which had been<br />
previously shown <strong>in</strong> the Hague Tribunal. All those attempts of the eight NGOs<br />
to break up the generally accepted conspiracy of silence were met with the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g responses: "Why those greatest fighters <strong>for</strong> peace try to raise<br />
14 Berl<strong>in</strong> daily Welt, rem<strong>in</strong>ded its readership that the Srebrenica massacre was<br />
a taboo topic <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d that one TV poll <strong>in</strong>dicated that barely 50% of respondents<br />
believed that Srebrenica massacre really took place, <strong>an</strong>d that two thirds of them<br />
considered Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Mladic, heroes. “The Great Stigma”, Politika, 5 June 2005.<br />
15 “Lack of Tadic’s Apology Is a Bad Sign”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 13 July 2005.<br />
16 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the Potočari commemoration, <strong>in</strong> several places <strong>in</strong> Negot<strong>in</strong>, the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g grafitti appeared: “Mladić, th<strong>an</strong>k you <strong>for</strong> the Serb Srebrenica”, “Knife, wire,<br />
Srebrenica”, “Srebrenica 1995-2005”, signed by the National Squad. “Message of<br />
gratitude to Mladić”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 14 July 2005.<br />
17 “The Goal Is Abolishment of Republika Srpska”, Novosti, 12 July 2005.<br />
18 18 Miloš Aligrudić “Text of declaration is unfit, <strong>for</strong> it implies repent<strong>an</strong>ce of<br />
the whole people <strong>for</strong> war crimes, that is, as if all citizens backed crimes, though, <strong>in</strong> fact,<br />
the majority of them were aga<strong>in</strong>st crimes”.“Marković: An Urgent Declaration on<br />
Condemnation of Crime”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 7 June 2005.<br />
19, “You are contam<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g our city”. “Let’s throw tear-gas on’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 July<br />
2005.<br />
20. “Disrespect of the Crime”, Glas, 7 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
awareness of the people by provok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> fact a counter-effect? Are they<br />
bothered by the peacetime, so they need now someth<strong>in</strong>g else to fight aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
?" 21<br />
President of the Serb Parliament, Predrag Marković, <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
"Srebrenica is a blemish on the consciousness of the whole 22 m<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>d" 23 , but<br />
added that "parliament of Serbia is not authorized to discuss a s<strong>in</strong>gle event,<br />
which has moreover happened outside our territory." 24 Parliament of Serbia<br />
beg<strong>an</strong> its 11 th July session by a m<strong>in</strong>ute of silence devoted to all victims of<br />
Srebrenica, Bratunac, <strong>an</strong>d Skel<strong>an</strong>e. MPs of the Serb Radical Party were absent,<br />
while only one MP of Democratic Party was present. 25 The republic<strong>an</strong><br />
parliament debated the Resolution condemn<strong>in</strong>g generally all war crimes. That<br />
was <strong>an</strong> attempt to show that Serbia disapproved of crimes <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> them held<br />
accountable only some <strong>in</strong>dividuals 26 "<strong>in</strong> order to avoid condemnation of the<br />
whole Serb people". 27 Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d such a prevail<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>ce of the Serb<br />
political elite, 28 presence of President Tadic <strong>in</strong> Potocari was mostly <strong>in</strong>terpreted<br />
by the BH public as his personal 29 st<strong>an</strong>d. 30 Only the Bosniak National Council of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro passed the decision that 11 th of July be celebrated as the<br />
Day of Remembr<strong>an</strong>ce. MPs of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament 31 expressed their regret<br />
<strong>for</strong> non-adoption of Srebrenica-related resolution by the Serb Parliament.<br />
21 Savo Štrbac. “Srebrenica on Billboards”, Kurir, 2-3 July 2005.<br />
22 House of Representatives of the US Congress <strong>an</strong>d Senate adopted the<br />
Resolution on Srebrenica. “False Victory”, Nacional, 7 July 2005.<br />
23 Paul Wolfovitz, “A Blemish on the Consciousness of the Whole M<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>d”,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 July 2005.<br />
24 “All <strong>for</strong> Condemnation”, Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
25 “Uproar because of Silence”, NiN, 14 July 2005.<br />
26 Miroljub Labus “It must be openly said that it was done by crim<strong>in</strong>als, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the dictatorial regime was responsible <strong>for</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g our <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>eign people”. “Killers Have<br />
Names”, Novosti, 5 June 2005.<br />
27 Tomislav Nikolić, vice president of the Serb Radical Party. “All <strong>for</strong><br />
Condemnation”, Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
28 Association of students' of the Belgrade Law Faculty, Nomok<strong>an</strong>on, <strong>state</strong>d<br />
that the p<strong>an</strong>el discussion Truth about Srebrenica “was a scientific meet<strong>in</strong>g based on<br />
facts, <strong>an</strong>d not the meet<strong>in</strong>g staged <strong>for</strong> the sake of glorification of crimes”. “P<strong>an</strong>el<br />
Discussion on Srebrenica Was a Scientific Meet<strong>in</strong>g”, Politika, 19 May 2005.<br />
29 With respect to the p<strong>an</strong>el discussion Truth about Srebrenica, at which<br />
liberation of Srebrenica was extolled, Boris Tadić <strong>state</strong>d that "Citizens of every country<br />
have the right to freely express their st<strong>an</strong>ce, even when it is contrary to the official policy<br />
of those countries".<br />
30 Mirsad Tokača, Director of Research-Documentary Centre from Sarajevo<br />
“That gesture does not me<strong>an</strong> that the <strong>state</strong> of Serbia has thus paid tribute to all the<br />
Bosniaks killed <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica.” “Tadić Is Not the State of Serbia”, Novosti, 14 July 2005.<br />
31 MPs of Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament adopted the Resolution on the Future of the<br />
West Balk<strong>an</strong>s ten years after Srebrenica. “Condemnation of Crime <strong>an</strong>d Calls on Co-<br />
Operation with the Hague Tribunal”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 8 July 2005.<br />
426<br />
427
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Responses to Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>niversary only laid bare unread<strong>in</strong>ess of the<br />
Serb political elite to assume responsibility, or rather <strong>in</strong>dicated that it still<br />
adhered to the project of unification of all Serb ethnic territories. 32 Anew the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g comments could be heard: "Serbia is still the only guar<strong>an</strong>tee of the<br />
Serb survival <strong>in</strong> BH, <strong>for</strong> we are tak<strong>in</strong>g about the same people. River Dr<strong>in</strong>a has<br />
never represented a demarkation l<strong>in</strong>e." 33 "Re<strong>for</strong>m lead<strong>in</strong>g to unification of the<br />
police <strong>an</strong>d armed <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> BH, causes fear <strong>in</strong> Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d B<strong>an</strong>jaluka that the<br />
Dayton Accord may be revised that the a Brussels-style, Europe<strong>an</strong> BH may be<br />
covertly created." 34 In response to such developments, 35 the follow<strong>in</strong>g is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
suggested: a referendum on secession of Republika Srpska from BH 36 . In that<br />
regard President of Serbia <strong>state</strong>d: "Existence of RS is very import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Serb people, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>y ch<strong>an</strong>ges <strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong> BH arr<strong>an</strong>gement, contrarty to the<br />
will of one of three peoples, would not be good." 37 Key role of Belgrade <strong>in</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g more difficult negotiations on BH re<strong>for</strong>ms is tr<strong>an</strong>sparent, <strong>for</strong> "Belgrade<br />
w<strong>an</strong>ts to use the situation <strong>in</strong> BH <strong>for</strong> the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g negotiations on the status<br />
of Kosovo". 38 Obstruction of the re<strong>for</strong>m endeavours 39 , made BH a hostage of<br />
the Belgrade policy whose goal is to slow down its accession to EU. Milorad<br />
Dodik, President of SNSD, th<strong>in</strong>ks that "Serbs could lay a claim to<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence if the position of Republika Srpska is threatened, by us<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
same arguments as Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Kosovo" 40 .<br />
Serb Orthodox Church was <strong>an</strong> active factor of war <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, 41 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
protected perpetrators of crimes dur<strong>in</strong>g the B-H war. 42 The SOC moreover was<br />
32 Government of the Republic of Serbia on the eve of <strong>an</strong>niversary of war<br />
crimes committed on 11 July <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica <strong>an</strong>d on 12 July <strong>in</strong> Bratunac most resolutely<br />
condemns all war crimes <strong>an</strong>d underscores that it is of paramount import<strong>an</strong>ce to avoid<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g differences <strong>in</strong> their condemnation on the basis of nationality <strong>an</strong>d religion of<br />
victims. “Government of Serbia Condemns All the War Crimes”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 8 July 2005.<br />
33 Slavko Jovičić “Despite everyth<strong>in</strong>g we don’t expect much from Serbia, <strong>for</strong> it<br />
is clear that Serbia is blackmailed by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d that it is not<br />
allowed to mention Republika Srpska. “They All Expect Tadic’s <strong>an</strong>d Kostunica’s<br />
Protection”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 14 September 2005.<br />
34 “Dayton is a Real Disgrace”, Politika, 3 February 2005.<br />
35 The Serb Radical Party dem<strong>an</strong>ds that parliaments of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro convene a session to discuss the RS problem, after a request that it<br />
abolishes its police. “Radicals Back RS”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16 September 2005.<br />
36 “Five Regions”, Politika, 31 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
37 “Tadić aga<strong>in</strong>st Imposed Solutions”, Novosti, 21 November 2005.<br />
38 “Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Bukejlović Does Not Expect S<strong>an</strong>ctions”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 16<br />
September 2005.<br />
39 The police re<strong>for</strong>m was the last condition <strong>for</strong> BH to sign the Agreement on<br />
Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association with EU.<br />
40 “Dodik: RS Could Dem<strong>an</strong>d Independence”, Start, 3 December 2005.<br />
41 Video record<strong>in</strong>g of the kill<strong>in</strong>g of six Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Trnovo shows how Father<br />
Gavrilo, head of monastery Priv<strong>in</strong>a Glava, blesses members of the Scorpion paramilitary<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
consistent <strong>in</strong> its support of prime movers 43 <strong>an</strong>d direct executioners of crimes. 44<br />
Monk Gavrilo, who blessed killers of six Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Trnovo, does not repent<br />
<strong>for</strong> bless<strong>in</strong>g members of a paramilitary unit Škorpioni, <strong>for</strong> "we should not <strong>for</strong>get<br />
that the same or even worse crimes were committed aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serb<br />
children." 45 S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić, Co-ord<strong>in</strong>ator of the Centre <strong>for</strong> Kosovo,<br />
suggested that Serbs "face a great d<strong>an</strong>ger of orchestrated media <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
campaign to depict the Serb people as genocide-prone, 46 the Serb <strong>state</strong> as <strong>an</strong><br />
aggressor <strong>an</strong>d stressed that "We are <strong>in</strong> d<strong>an</strong>ger of los<strong>in</strong>g Republika Srspka <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Kosovo". 47<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> charges aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>for</strong> genocide <strong>an</strong>d aggression<br />
is one of the priorities of the <strong>state</strong> policy. Serbia is endeavour<strong>in</strong>g to solve that<br />
issue <strong>in</strong> a diplomatic way, by offer<strong>in</strong>g to BH <strong>an</strong> out-of-court settlement.<br />
Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, legal representative of SM, <strong>in</strong> those terms suggests the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g: "I w<strong>an</strong>t this matter settled <strong>in</strong> a diplomatic way, <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>y k<strong>in</strong>d of<br />
judgement would leave its <strong>in</strong>delible mark on the future relations between the<br />
two neighbour<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>s. And that would not contribute to reconciliation <strong>in</strong> the<br />
group with the follow<strong>in</strong>g words: “Brothers, Turks are rear<strong>in</strong>g their ugly heads aga<strong>in</strong>.<br />
They w<strong>an</strong>t the Serb sacred places. Give strength to your failthful army to defeat the<br />
enemy people.” “I Have Five of Them <strong>in</strong> the Package”, Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
42 By this honourable act we have made <strong>an</strong> oath of allegi<strong>an</strong>ce, similar to the<br />
one made by your <strong>an</strong>cestors <strong>in</strong> previous centuries, <strong>an</strong> oath which the Serb people<br />
deserve. You have made that oath be<strong>for</strong>e honourable SOC fathers, be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
honourable cross, be<strong>for</strong>e the b<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>an</strong>d hymn of RS, <strong>an</strong>d not on behalf of <strong>an</strong>yone else<br />
or <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g else. “In M<strong>an</strong>jača, there is no Bosnia”, Novosti, 17 April 2005.<br />
43 Patriarch Pavle was present dur<strong>in</strong>g the Serb Radical Party-org<strong>an</strong>ized<br />
screen<strong>in</strong>g of a documentary The Truth (on crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st Serbs <strong>an</strong>d members of the<br />
Yugoslav People’s Army dur<strong>in</strong>g 1991-1999 wars <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. Luka Karadžić,<br />
brother of the Hague Tribunal war crime suspect, Radov<strong>an</strong>, was also present dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
screen<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
44 Serb Ortodox Church offered its most heartfelt condolences regard<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
suffer<strong>in</strong>g of Srebrenica people. “Today <strong>an</strong>d tomorrow the <strong>an</strong>niversary of the two<br />
popular mis<strong>for</strong>tunes <strong>in</strong> two places, <strong>in</strong> Potočari <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Bratunac shall be publicly marked.<br />
Both commemorations have the same character <strong>an</strong>d goal: to serve as a memory <strong>an</strong>d<br />
warn<strong>in</strong>g”. “SOC: commemoration <strong>in</strong> Potočare <strong>an</strong>d Bratunac – memory <strong>an</strong>d warn<strong>in</strong>g”,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 July 2005<br />
45 “Monk Gavrilo Does Not Repent <strong>for</strong> Bless<strong>in</strong>g “Škorpioni””, D<strong>an</strong>as, 9 June<br />
2005.<br />
46 S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić “We <strong>in</strong> this period remember all the victims of the last<br />
war, all the crim<strong>in</strong>als. We are alone <strong>in</strong> that endeavour, <strong>in</strong> contrast to commemoration <strong>in</strong><br />
Potocari, when the whole world was with Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d their victims, <strong>for</strong> whom we feel<br />
compassion too. But it does not matter if we are alone now. For, we hope that one day<br />
the world shall underst<strong>an</strong>d that there were Serb victims too, that there are crim<strong>in</strong>als<br />
responsible <strong>for</strong> our victims.. “The World Shall Underst<strong>an</strong>d”, Novosti, 13 July 2005.<br />
47 “Victims, Executioners <strong>an</strong>d Politics”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 11 July 2005.<br />
428<br />
429
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
territory of <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia <strong>an</strong>d establishment of co-operation." 48 Legal<br />
representative of B <strong>an</strong>d H, Sakib Softić rejected that proposal <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>d: "The<br />
<strong>in</strong>tent of B <strong>an</strong>d H is to primarily show through the court proceed<strong>in</strong>gs that <strong>in</strong><br />
that country the genocide was committed <strong>an</strong>d that the country was attacked.<br />
Our primary concern is not the war damage compensation assessed to r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<br />
between $ 50 <strong>an</strong>d 200 billion. 49 Večernji list disclosed that accord<strong>in</strong>g to some<br />
assessments Belgrade would be ready to pay a symbolic compensation, if the<br />
BH representatives dropped their charges be<strong>for</strong>e the International Court of<br />
Justice <strong>in</strong> the Hague. 50<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the BH political context, a positive resolution of BH<br />
charges aga<strong>in</strong>st SM <strong>for</strong> aggression <strong>an</strong>d genocide 51 would be of great<br />
import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the region, <strong>for</strong> it would provide a legal<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpretation of the war. RS denies the legitimacy of charges, <strong>for</strong><br />
"representatives of the Serb people <strong>in</strong> BH are not beh<strong>in</strong>d those charges, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consequently <strong>for</strong> us they don’t have a full legitimacy of BH bodies" 52 . Added to<br />
that Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of RS ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "RS has never admitted that <strong>in</strong><br />
Srebrenica 8,000 Bosniaks were killed, <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e we shall no longer tolerate<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ipulation of such allegations." 53 He po<strong>in</strong>ted out that the Commission<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g Srebrenica developments from 10 to 19 July 1995 had not come<br />
up with a qualification of the offence/act, nor established that there were<br />
victims of crime <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica. He added that the Commission only established<br />
that <strong>in</strong> the course of July 2005 <strong>in</strong> that area 7, 806 persons disappeared. 54 Report<br />
of the work<strong>in</strong>g group of the RS authorities was submitted to the Office of High<br />
Representative <strong>for</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d BH Prosecution Office. In the<br />
action <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica 23,000 soldiers <strong>an</strong>d policemen took part. 55 OHR<br />
spokesm<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>d that "denial of facts presented by the Commission<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g developments <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica aimed at doctor<strong>in</strong>g the reality" 56 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
48 Radoslav Stoj<strong>an</strong>ović, legal representative of SM “Trnka: that is a sure sign of<br />
their realization that they are bound to lose the lawsuit. ”, Dnevni avaz, 16 March 2005.<br />
49 “There Was No Genocide <strong>in</strong> BH”, NiN, 17 March 2005.<br />
50 “Jović: Beograd Shall Pay Compensation to BH”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 12. September 2005.<br />
51 Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Tihić “Mass kill<strong>in</strong>g of Srebrenica locals <strong>in</strong> the best way proves not<br />
only the proportions of the crime but also the fact that the armed <strong>for</strong>ces of other <strong>state</strong><br />
took part <strong>in</strong> aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st BH <strong>an</strong>d genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st Srebrenica locals.”. “Nura<br />
Recognized Her Son”, Politika, 6 June 2005.<br />
52 “Beograd <strong>an</strong>d Sarajevo Should Reach <strong>an</strong> Agreement”, Politika, 3 April 2005.<br />
53 “We W<strong>an</strong>t Disclosure of the Truth about Sarajevo Serbs”, Novosti, 1 August<br />
2005.<br />
54 “Ill-<strong>in</strong>tentioned Stories about Srebrenica”, Novosti, 23 July 2005.<br />
55 “Alarm of Indictees”, Novosti, 10 April 2005.<br />
56 OHR Spokesm<strong>an</strong> : “It is import<strong>an</strong>t to clarify that the RS authorities have<br />
accepted the figure disclosed by the Commission <strong>for</strong> Srebrenica. RS government has<br />
admitted its responsibility <strong>for</strong> the massacre of 7,000-8,000 Bosniaks <strong>an</strong>d apologized to<br />
the family victims.” “8,000 Victims Are Nowhere To Be Found”, Novosti, 4 August 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
that "those accused of war crimes <strong>in</strong> BH are protected by the RS rul<strong>in</strong>g party<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the SOC. They co-ord<strong>in</strong>ate activities of numerous <strong>in</strong>dividuals 57 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions 58 provid<strong>in</strong>g protection to Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Mladić." 59<br />
Trials of war crimes perpetrators be<strong>for</strong>e the national courts <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
are still <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial stage. Bogd<strong>an</strong> Iv<strong>an</strong>išević, researcher of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
Watch, stresses that "due to lack of political will <strong>for</strong> the fac<strong>in</strong>g process Special<br />
Prosecution <strong>for</strong> War Crimes "works to the extent of allow<strong>in</strong>g the authorities to<br />
"pacify" the potential detractors of the passivity of that body" 60<br />
BH Court <strong>for</strong> War Crimes confirmed the first <strong>in</strong>dictment <strong>for</strong> genocide<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st 11 persons suspected <strong>for</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g of several thous<strong>an</strong>d<br />
Bosniaks <strong>in</strong> Srebrenica. 61 After a decade of total judicial <strong>in</strong>activity, <strong>in</strong> RS are<br />
currently under way several trials related to war crimes. In the entire post-war<br />
period trials of only 50 persons (6 Croats, 17 Serbs <strong>an</strong>d 27 Bosniaks), have been<br />
f<strong>in</strong>alized, while national judicial bodies are currently conduct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigation<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st 73 suspects. 62 Special department <strong>for</strong> war crimes <strong>an</strong>d a detention unit<br />
of the BH Court was opened 63 <strong>in</strong> the premises of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslav People's<br />
Army barracks Viktor Bub<strong>an</strong>j <strong>in</strong> Sarajevo. 64<br />
On the 13th <strong>an</strong>niversary of deportation of 143 BH citizens from<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d their subsequent liquidation on the Bosniak Serb-controlled<br />
57 Momčilo M<strong>an</strong>dić, <strong>for</strong>mer RS Justice M<strong>in</strong>ister, was accused of b<strong>an</strong>kroll<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
hid<strong>in</strong>g of war crime suspect Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić.<br />
58 The <strong>in</strong>dictment related to the case of Commercial B<strong>an</strong>k Serb Sarajevo, <strong>in</strong>ter<br />
alia reads: “A group of crim<strong>in</strong>als founded by Momčilo M<strong>an</strong>dić is still operational<br />
“th<strong>an</strong>ks to a widespread net of funds, persons, public <strong>an</strong>d private org<strong>an</strong>izations,<br />
<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the high officials of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro”.<br />
59 Steven Shook added that one of the signs of a decreas<strong>in</strong>g support <strong>for</strong> the two<br />
fugitives from justice was a big add <strong>in</strong> newspapers of Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serbs <strong>in</strong> which they were<br />
called on to surrender. “General Steven Shook: Karadžić Be<strong>for</strong>e the Face of Justice ”,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 August 2005.<br />
60 Bogd<strong>an</strong> Iv<strong>an</strong>išević, researcher of HRW. RFE, 24.December 2005.<br />
61 10,000 cases are yet to be <strong>in</strong>vestigated.<br />
62 Of 846 cases related to war crimes submitted to the BH judiciary by the ICTY<br />
as A cases-imply<strong>in</strong>g the existence of hard evidence <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dictment-fil<strong>in</strong>g- only 54 cases<br />
relat<strong>in</strong>g to 94 <strong>in</strong>dictees, were processed, that is, brought to the stage of ma<strong>in</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
“Slow <strong>an</strong>d Biased”, Politika, 25 March 2005.<br />
63 Vice President of the Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Former Detention Camps Inmates of RS,<br />
Slavko Jovičić has sharply condemned presence of the Serb officials at <strong>in</strong>auguration of<br />
the Special Department of the BH Court <strong>for</strong> War Crimes. “Insult to Victims”, Novosti, 9<br />
March 2005.<br />
64 Research-documentation centre <strong>in</strong> Sarajevo has data on 25,000 war crim<strong>in</strong>als<br />
hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Federation of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
430<br />
431
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
territory, their families asked <strong>for</strong> the assisst<strong>an</strong>ce of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
bodies <strong>in</strong> clarify<strong>in</strong>g that crime. 65<br />
Republika Srpska to date has not shown its read<strong>in</strong>ess to co-operate<br />
with the Hague Tribunal. 66 Official B<strong>an</strong>jaluka, despite accept<strong>an</strong>ce of voluntary<br />
surrender, <strong>in</strong>sisted on elaboration of operational agreements <strong>in</strong> the region.<br />
Adn<strong>an</strong> Terzić <strong>an</strong>nounced as a possibility <strong>for</strong> the arrest of war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees<br />
"a total seal<strong>in</strong>g off of borders with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." 67<br />
Act on Equalization of Chetniks <strong>an</strong>d Partis<strong>an</strong>s passed by the Serb<br />
parliament <strong>in</strong> May 2005 was met with disapproval <strong>in</strong> Bosnia. Assembly of<br />
c<strong>an</strong>ton of Sarajevo sharply condemned <strong>state</strong>ment of SM Foreign Secretary that<br />
"the Chetnic Movement headed by Draža Mihajlović has equal <strong>an</strong>ti-war merits<br />
as the <strong>an</strong>ti-fascist movements of WW2." That is why a resolution dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that SM Foreign Secrtary be proclaimed a non grata person <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a was proposed. 68<br />
Agreement on Special Ties between RS <strong>an</strong>d Serbia is still a ma<strong>in</strong> hurdle on<br />
the path of RS <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to Europe<strong>an</strong> processes. Peddy Ashdown has<br />
repeatedly underscored that Republika Srpska „was a hostage to the isolationm<strong>in</strong>ded<br />
l<strong>in</strong>e toed by Belgrade", <strong>an</strong>d that the road to Europe „<strong>in</strong>cludes meet<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of st<strong>an</strong>dards". 69 RS still expects Serbia to protect its <strong>in</strong>terests on the basis of the<br />
agreement on special ties <strong>an</strong>d a bevy of similar agreements. 70 SM has opened a<br />
consulate <strong>in</strong> B<strong>an</strong>jaluka on the basis of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned Special Agreement<br />
<strong>an</strong>d stressed that "with this move we don’t threaten the sovereignty <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrity of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a." Ambassador of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro<br />
<strong>in</strong> Bosnia stressed that "For Serbs <strong>in</strong> general <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> RS <strong>in</strong> particular open<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
SM consulate <strong>in</strong> B<strong>an</strong>jaluka has a special weight, stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the character<br />
of signed agreements <strong>an</strong>d special <strong>an</strong>d parallel ties between RS <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
65 Families of victims have filed lawsuits claim<strong>in</strong>g damage compensation to the<br />
tune of 38 million Euro. “Deportation of Refugees-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Hague”, Glas, 4 June<br />
2005.<br />
66 Bosni<strong>an</strong> Serb authorities only this year, after a decade of passivity, m<strong>an</strong>aged<br />
to deport to the ICTY several war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees. That is, after Lord Ashdown fired<br />
several <strong>security</strong> officials last year, 7 <strong>in</strong>dictees left <strong>for</strong> the Hague. “Paddy, Go Away!”,<br />
Nacional, 16-17 April 2005.<br />
67 “I am not referr<strong>in</strong>g to a physical closure, but rather to a total control of the<br />
border between the two countries, <strong>for</strong> it is currently too porous <strong>an</strong>d we must make sure<br />
that it becomes less so. ". “Priority is Given to Massive Hunt <strong>for</strong> War Crimes Indictees”,<br />
Politika, 6 February 2005.<br />
68 “Drašković is Undesirable”, Politika, 25 May 2005.<br />
69 Paddy Ashdown “if you w<strong>an</strong>t to jo<strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro on the road to<br />
Europe then you must meet Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, or you shall rema<strong>in</strong> isolated. Belgrade<br />
shall not help you <strong>an</strong>d shall not look back <strong>in</strong> order to save B<strong>an</strong>jaluka”. “Ashdown:<br />
Belgrade shall not look back <strong>in</strong> order to save B<strong>an</strong>jaluka”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 22 April 2005.<br />
70 “Impal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> RS”, Novosti, 23 May 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Montenegro". 71 In render<strong>in</strong>g his support to preservation of all the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>state</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> their current borders, President of Serbia, Tadić <strong>state</strong>d that he<br />
would counter unilateral decisions aimed at ch<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>state</strong> arr<strong>an</strong>gement of<br />
BH, that is, of RS with<strong>in</strong> that arr<strong>an</strong>gement. 72<br />
With a view to more efficient resolution of open border issues two<br />
commissions have been set up: a sub-commission <strong>for</strong> border issues between<br />
BH <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-<strong>state</strong> diplomatic commission <strong>for</strong><br />
border issues between BH <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. 73 Both sides officially<br />
<strong>in</strong>sist on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of non-alteration of BH borders, <strong>for</strong> violation of that<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple could lead to grave consequences <strong>in</strong> the region. 74 Resolution of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Parliament on the West Balk<strong>an</strong>s deemed as a factor of <strong>in</strong>stability of<br />
the BH <strong>state</strong> the existence of entities, Republika Srpska <strong>an</strong>d Federation BH.<br />
Belgrade <strong>in</strong>terprets that resolution as a sign of possible ch<strong>an</strong>ges of <strong>in</strong>ternal<br />
<strong>state</strong> arr<strong>an</strong>gement of BH but also of RS 75 , all of which is deemed as<br />
unacceptable. 76<br />
Revision of the Dayton Accord 77 is one of the key topics <strong>in</strong> relations<br />
between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia. It turned out that the revision was necessary<br />
because of harmonization of constitutional provisions with Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards, <strong>an</strong>d also as a way of prevail<strong>in</strong>g over ethnic-national divisions. At<br />
the same time constitutional ch<strong>an</strong>ges would reduce possibilities of RS to opt<br />
<strong>for</strong> secession. Hence the opposition to all <strong>in</strong>itiatives aim<strong>in</strong>g to def<strong>in</strong>e Bosnia<br />
71 St<strong>an</strong>islav Vukičević, SM Ambassador to BH “As regards all the<br />
neighbour<strong>in</strong>g countries, we have the most developed economic co-operation with BH”.<br />
“SM Opens a Consulate”, Politika, 30 March 2005.<br />
72 “All that is <strong>an</strong> imposed suspension, all that is not a result of agreement, may<br />
affect the regional political situation”. “Tadić aga<strong>in</strong>st Imposed Solutions”, Novosti, 21<br />
November 2005.<br />
73 “State Commission <strong>for</strong> BH Borders Founded”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 29 September 2005.<br />
74 Nenad Kecm<strong>an</strong>ović “Recomposition of borders <strong>in</strong> the West Balk<strong>an</strong>s would<br />
lead to both fragmentation <strong>an</strong>d enlargement. Alb<strong>an</strong>ia with Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Western<br />
Macedonia would not be a Greater Alb<strong>an</strong>ia, but a <strong>state</strong> with<strong>in</strong> its national borders.<br />
Croatia with Herzeg-Bosnia would not be a Greater Croatia, but <strong>an</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> of<br />
average size. And that obviously applies to Serbia with RS <strong>an</strong>d Bosniak republic with<br />
S<strong>an</strong>džak. The number of <strong>state</strong>s would practically rema<strong>in</strong> the same, that is, would have<br />
only one addition-Montenegro. “Greater Croatia”, Novosti, 16 April 2005.<br />
75 At a B<strong>an</strong>jaluka rally An Outdoor Parliament, plackards “Long Live RS”, “We<br />
W<strong>an</strong>t Referendum" <strong>an</strong>d "Serbia Help Us" <strong>an</strong>d flags were carried. Some protesters also<br />
carried T-shirts with the images of Radov<strong>an</strong> Karadžić <strong>an</strong>d Ratko Mladić with<br />
<strong>in</strong>scriptions Serb heroes. “They Threaten Us with 5 October”, Politika, 18 May 2005.<br />
76 “Honour<strong>in</strong>g of the Dayton Accord <strong>an</strong>d Republika Srpska”, Politika, 6-7<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
77 Jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>state</strong>ment on read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>for</strong> amendments to the supreme legal act which<br />
were <strong>an</strong>nounced <strong>in</strong> parallel with the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Dayton Accord. That<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment was signed by the eight lead<strong>in</strong>g political parties. “BH Leaders Agree to<br />
Constitutional Amendments”, Politika, 23 November 2005.<br />
432<br />
433
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a as a s<strong>in</strong>gle, unified <strong>state</strong>. With respect to discussions on<br />
revision of the Dayton Accord, Dragoljub Kojčić, Democratic Party of Serbia,<br />
expressed his fear "of a new attempt to place us <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ferior position" 78 ,<br />
"<strong>in</strong>tention of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community to compel the Serb public to<br />
experience a collective guilt, <strong>in</strong> order to make the punishment meted out to us,<br />
go down well. That punishment is most likely to be <strong>in</strong> the shape of toppl<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
the Dayton position of Republika Srpska, or accept<strong>an</strong>ce of BH charges aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. I don't even exclude the lay<strong>in</strong>g of foundations <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija." 79<br />
RS has put up a stiff opposition to the re<strong>for</strong>m of army <strong>an</strong>d police, 80<br />
<strong>for</strong>, "such <strong>an</strong> overhaul, that is tr<strong>an</strong>sfer of prerogatives from entities to the <strong>state</strong><br />
level, would seriously threaten prerogatives, even the very survival of RS<br />
entity." There was a widespread conviction that RS could not survive without<br />
its own army <strong>an</strong>d police. However, th<strong>an</strong>ks to a strong EU pressure laws on<br />
defence <strong>an</strong>d armed <strong>for</strong>ces were passed, 81 <strong>an</strong>d only after 8 months of<br />
negotiations <strong>an</strong> agreement on the police re<strong>for</strong>m was reached. Serbia became<br />
the most vocal advocate of status quo <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, that is of the Dayton Accord,<br />
<strong>for</strong> that Accord is seen as the only guar<strong>an</strong>tee of survival of Republika Srpska<br />
<strong>an</strong>d its prerogatives. 82 Resist<strong>an</strong>ce to the army re<strong>for</strong>m was m<strong>an</strong>ifested by the<br />
March conscripts of the RS Army who dur<strong>in</strong>g the tak<strong>in</strong>g of oath of allegi<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
<strong>in</strong> barracks <strong>in</strong> M<strong>an</strong>jača <strong>an</strong>d Bilece <strong>in</strong>stead of vow<strong>in</strong>g to guard BH <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
they would guard RS. That was the first tak<strong>in</strong>g oath of allegi<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> RS <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e<br />
78 Dragoljub Kojčić, DPS, “Serbs Shall Be Anew Pushed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>an</strong> Inferior<br />
Position”. “Why Should <strong>an</strong> Entire Nation Be Condemned because of the Bestial Conduct<br />
of Some Individuals?!”, Nacional, 6 June 2005.<br />
79 Dragoljub Kojčić, DPS. “Why Should <strong>an</strong> Entire Nation Be Condemned<br />
because of the Bestial Conduct of Some Individuals?!”, Nacional, 6 June 2005.<br />
80 Co-ord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g centre of 11 NGOs of RS threatened to stage a massive rally if<br />
the NC of RS adopted a proposal of the Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters on the police re<strong>for</strong>m. That<br />
NGO Center sent <strong>an</strong> open letter to President of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Serbia, as a guar<strong>an</strong>tor of the Dayton Peace Accord to protect RS <strong>in</strong>stitutions<br />
<strong>an</strong>d at the same time provisions of the Dayton Accord. “All <strong>an</strong>d Sundry Expect Tadic’s<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Kostunica’s Protection”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 14 September 2005.<br />
81 In the sector of defence <strong>an</strong>d armed <strong>for</strong>ces entity defence m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>an</strong>d chief<br />
of staffs are abolished. They shall exist only at the <strong>state</strong> level. A unified budget is<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduced, military service is abolished, reserve units are abolished, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> exclusive<br />
professional army with 10,000 professional servicemen <strong>an</strong>d 1,000 civili<strong>an</strong>s is be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
established. On the national basis shall exist only three <strong>in</strong>f<strong>an</strong>try divisions-the Bosniak,<br />
the Serb <strong>an</strong>d the Croat one.<br />
82 Head of Press Bureau of the government of Serbia, Srđ<strong>an</strong> Đurić, <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
speculations on Belgrade’s pressure on B<strong>an</strong>jaluka to reject the police re<strong>for</strong>m were “just<br />
one <strong>in</strong> a series of fabrications”. “Political Retribution because of Police”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 2 June<br />
2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
with the Act on BH Defence, accomp<strong>an</strong>ied by notes of the <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>them <strong>an</strong>d<br />
with <strong>in</strong>signia of the BH armed <strong>for</strong>ces. 83<br />
Conduct of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d general mood <strong>in</strong> Serbia as regards status of RS 84<br />
are reflected on the conduct <strong>an</strong>d lack of read<strong>in</strong>ess of RS to turn towards<br />
Sarajevo, 85 <strong>an</strong>d thus become part of the process of Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
Progress of negotiations on Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association <strong>in</strong> both countries<br />
h<strong>in</strong>ges on their fulfilment of <strong>in</strong>ternational committments, <strong>in</strong> the first place<br />
those relat<strong>in</strong>g to co-operation with the Hague Tribunal. 86 Refusal of Belgrade<br />
to fully co-operate with the ICTY affected the relations between RS <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Hague Tribunal. High Representative Paddy Ashdown frequently po<strong>in</strong>ted out<br />
the fact that the largest number of war crimes <strong>in</strong>dictees was hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia,<br />
but added that "Belgrade has not helped RS to relieve to its burden. Belgrade<br />
has betrayed B<strong>an</strong>jaluka". 87<br />
International community has already set <strong>in</strong> motion preparations <strong>for</strong><br />
the revision process with the argument that "the goal of the Dayton Accord<br />
was to stop the war <strong>in</strong> BH <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> those terms the DA was successful. But the<br />
US authorities have never w<strong>an</strong>ted the Dayton Accord to be cemented. We have<br />
always thought that it must be updated, that it evolved." 88 The focus would no<br />
longer be on entities, that is constituent peoples, but rather on citizens <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>an</strong>d a loose confederation should be replaced by a centralized<br />
<strong>state</strong>. 89<br />
83 First notes of the BH <strong>an</strong>them were booed by families <strong>an</strong>d friends of recruits,<br />
while the notes of RS <strong>an</strong>them were widely applauded. Dur<strong>in</strong>g a m<strong>in</strong>ute of silence tribute<br />
to all fallen fighters the follow<strong>in</strong>g comments were heard “Wher is RS?", "We are <strong>for</strong> RS,<br />
We Do Not W<strong>an</strong>t BH".<br />
84 Adn<strong>an</strong> Terzić <strong>state</strong>d that BH needed <strong>for</strong>eign soldiers <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong> the neighbour<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Serbia <strong>in</strong> the last elections 1.3 million citizens voted <strong>for</strong> Greater Serbia. He added that<br />
Serbia still had special ties with RS <strong>an</strong>d that BH citizens were discrim<strong>in</strong>ated aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia. “Terzić: We Need Foreign Servicemen”, Politika, 22 October 2005.<br />
85 National Assembly of RS certified the Act on Territorial Org<strong>an</strong>izaiton of RS,<br />
whose article 3 listed the municipalities which names were to be ch<strong>an</strong>ged. None of those<br />
municipalities had the pre-war adjective-Bosniak. “Adjective Bosniak is <strong>an</strong>ew b<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>in</strong><br />
RS”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 August 2005.<br />
86 Drag<strong>an</strong> Čavić “As regards co-operation with the Hague, both Serbia <strong>an</strong>d RS<br />
face a difficult problem. Political ambience <strong>in</strong> RS has totally ch<strong>an</strong>ged. All serious prime<br />
movers <strong>in</strong> RS now th<strong>in</strong>k that co-operation with the ICTY is a must. General ch<strong>an</strong>ge of<br />
mood <strong>in</strong> RS was positively assessed <strong>in</strong> the world. The <strong>in</strong>ternational community<br />
recognized that voluntary surrenders were a result of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense work of competent<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d RS.” “Message to Fugitives: Commit Suicide or Surrender”,<br />
Politika, 29 March 2005.<br />
87 Paddy Ashdown, “Belgrade Betrays B<strong>an</strong>jaluka”, Novosti, 6 March 2005.<br />
88 Nicholas Burns. “Burns : Dayton Accord Should Be Updated”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 13<br />
October 2005.<br />
89Constitutional amendments devised by the US Institute <strong>for</strong> Peace envisage<br />
abolishment of a three-member Presidency while the exist<strong>in</strong>g Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters<br />
434<br />
435
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Redef<strong>in</strong>ition of the <strong>state</strong> arr<strong>an</strong>gement of BH is s<strong>in</strong>e qua non of<br />
establishment of <strong>in</strong>ternal stability <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong> subjectivity. By d<strong>in</strong>t of new<br />
solutions activities of the Inter-<strong>state</strong> Council <strong>for</strong> Co-operation between Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro would help foster <strong>in</strong>tegration. That <strong>in</strong><br />
turn would make easier repatriation of refugees 90 <strong>an</strong>d displaced persons, 91 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
implementation of a bevy of agreements <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>itiatives, 92 <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
Agreement on Free Trade <strong>an</strong>d Dual Citizenship. 93 Sarajevo Declaration, which<br />
opens up regional prospects <strong>for</strong> resolution of problem of repatriation of<br />
refugees, was adopted by Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a<br />
as a good vehicle <strong>for</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g problems <strong>in</strong> their entirety. Both sides are<br />
pleased with the repatriation process to date <strong>an</strong>d dynamics of restitution of<br />
property <strong>an</strong>d re<strong>in</strong><strong>state</strong>ment of tenency rights. The issue of illegal cross-border<br />
trade rema<strong>in</strong>s unresolved, <strong>an</strong>d honour<strong>in</strong>g of provisions of the Agreement on<br />
Free Trade was called <strong>in</strong>to question by violation of some provisions by<br />
Montenegro. 94 Because of the <strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a passed a decision on <strong>in</strong>terim suspension of implementation of the<br />
Agreement on Free Trade between Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro. The goal of the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned agreement is <strong>for</strong>mation of a free<br />
trade zone <strong>in</strong> South East Europe mak<strong>in</strong>g up a 650,000 square kilometers<br />
market cater<strong>in</strong>g to 60 million people <strong>an</strong>d enabl<strong>in</strong>g comp<strong>an</strong>ies to sell their<br />
goods<br />
tax-free.<br />
would be replaced by a centralized government. “Republika Srpska Shall Not Accept<br />
Moves Lead<strong>in</strong>g To Its Suicide”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 14 November 2005.<br />
90 B<strong>an</strong>ja Luka bishop Komarica disclosed data on the number of Cahtolics <strong>in</strong><br />
districts of B<strong>an</strong>ja Luka bishopry <strong>in</strong> the territory of RS entity. Those figures <strong>in</strong>dicate the<br />
presence of only 6,838 Catholics of pre-war 70,000. He also said that the situation was<br />
even more dramatic <strong>in</strong> 33 districts of Vrhbos<strong>an</strong>ska bishopry <strong>in</strong> the territory of RS entity,<br />
<strong>for</strong> "of pre-war 130,000 Catholics, now only 5,280 rema<strong>in</strong>." “Heavy Rout of Authorities”,<br />
Oslobođenje, 16 March 2005.<br />
91 In RS there are only 7% of Croats <strong>an</strong>d Bosniaks, <strong>an</strong>d be<strong>for</strong>e the war they<br />
made up nearly half of population of the current RS. “B <strong>an</strong>d H <strong>in</strong> Jaws of the Dayton<br />
Controversies”, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter,no.. 89-90.<br />
92 Last year's case of destruction of Shehiti trigger-holes <strong>in</strong> front of the Belgrade<br />
Military Museum, prompted the Commission <strong>for</strong> Preservation of National Monuments<br />
to propose to the BH Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters a <strong>for</strong>mation of <strong>in</strong>ter-<strong>state</strong> commissions with<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Croatia. “Shehiti Trigger-Holes Affair Still Awaits a Good<br />
Epilogue”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 18 March 2005.<br />
93 Government of Serbia is ready to write off one fourth of debt of RS to the<br />
heatlh funds of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d to enable RS to pay off the rest of debt <strong>in</strong> the next three years<br />
without <strong>in</strong>terest rates. RS owes to the health funds of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the Medical-Military<br />
Academy 26 million Euros. “Serbia Writes Off Part of the RS Debt”, Politika, 12<br />
November 2005.<br />
94 Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>in</strong> late 2005 upped duties on wheat flour by 30%,<br />
without <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g the BH authorities. That <strong>in</strong> itself constituted a breach of the <strong>in</strong>ter<strong>state</strong><br />
agreement. “Resignations Are Not a Good Solution”, Politika, 3 February 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
MACEDONIA:<br />
COOPERATION AND<br />
VEILED CONFRONTATION<br />
Relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia <strong>in</strong> the year 2005 were<br />
burdened by the Serb Orthodox Church (SOC) treatment of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodox Church, that is, the SOC’s denial of the latter. In those terms the Serb<br />
<strong>state</strong> structures back<strong>in</strong>g of such a SOC st<strong>an</strong>ce had a negative impact on<br />
relations between the two <strong>state</strong>s. Unresolved status of Kosovo was <strong>an</strong><br />
additional problem <strong>in</strong> the body of border issues between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Macedonia.<br />
Despite the fact that the a<strong>for</strong>ementioned problems have been<br />
hamper<strong>in</strong>g a swifter development <strong>an</strong>d normalization of relations between the<br />
two countries, <strong>in</strong> their official meet<strong>in</strong>gs representatives of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Macedonia regularly po<strong>in</strong>ted out that bilateral relations were dom<strong>in</strong>ated by<br />
the policy of co-operation <strong>an</strong>d not confrontation 1 , that both countries strove<br />
towards accept<strong>an</strong>ce of Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, <strong>an</strong>d that economic <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia were good, despite existence of open<br />
issues. 2<br />
Start-up of negotiations on resolution of status of Kosvo called <strong>in</strong>to<br />
question a long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal coalition between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia on<br />
the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> issue. Hence a public warn<strong>in</strong>g by the leader of the Democratic<br />
Party of Serbs <strong>in</strong> Macedonia (DPSM) to his coalition partners from the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
1 Let the Churches Independently Settle Their Dispute, NiN, 8 September 2005.<br />
2 “Serb cultural-historical monuments are not sufficiently protected, notably<br />
the Ossiary Monument near Kum<strong>an</strong>ovo. A road is cutt<strong>in</strong>g across the Serb Military<br />
Cemetery, while the WW2 Kajmakcal<strong>an</strong> Monument is half-destroyed. Controversial is<br />
also the status of Ohrid arch-episcopy, <strong>for</strong> its priests don’t have the right to christen,<br />
bury <strong>an</strong>d conduct wedd<strong>in</strong>gs. In the near future teachers from Serbia shall be able to give<br />
Serb l<strong>an</strong>guage classes.” Assist<strong>an</strong>ce to Emigr<strong>an</strong>ts from Serbia, D<strong>an</strong>as, 5-6 February 2005.<br />
436<br />
437
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
block For Macedonia Together, "not to make rash <strong>state</strong>ments on negotiations<br />
related to the Kosovo status." 3<br />
In the me<strong>an</strong>time Macedonia was gr<strong>an</strong>ted status of c<strong>an</strong>didate <strong>for</strong> EU<br />
membership. Oli Ren, EU Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Enlargement, thus commented<br />
that EU decision: "It is a genu<strong>in</strong>e signal <strong>for</strong> the whole Balk<strong>an</strong>s region. EU thus<br />
clearly demonstrated to all the Balk<strong>an</strong>s countries what prospects lie ahead of<br />
them if they meet the necessary preconditions." 4 After Croatia, Macedonia is<br />
the second, <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslav republic to obta<strong>in</strong> the status of c<strong>an</strong>didate <strong>for</strong> EU<br />
membership, while Slovenia has already found its place <strong>in</strong> the family of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>s. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vlade Bučkovski "Macedonia<br />
has f<strong>in</strong>ally left the Balk<strong>an</strong>s dirt track <strong>an</strong>d embarked on the highway lead<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Europe." He added: "We shall be patient 5 <strong>an</strong>d shall toe a constructive l<strong>in</strong>e on<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> concerns, as much as EU was patient <strong>in</strong> help<strong>in</strong>g us solve our<br />
problems. 6 " St<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g OSCE Council welcomed the EU decision relat<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
3 “We don’t w<strong>an</strong>t the <strong>in</strong>ternational community to back leaders <strong>an</strong>d population<br />
who are aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>an</strong> evidently respectable <strong>an</strong>d democratic country, as Serbia is today. For<br />
Serbs <strong>in</strong> Macedonia Kosmet is <strong>an</strong> all-Serb concern. The goal of the DPSM national policy<br />
is a moral <strong>an</strong>d spiritual recovery of the Serb people.” “Kosmet – <strong>an</strong> All-Serb Concern”,<br />
Novosti, 28 November 2005.<br />
4 Oli Ren, EU Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Enlargement: Good News <strong>for</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s,<br />
Blic, 19 December 2005.<br />
5 Academici<strong>an</strong>-witnesses th<strong>in</strong>k that creation of a unified Serb <strong>state</strong>, that is<br />
rally<strong>in</strong>g of the whole or the largest part of the Serb people <strong>in</strong> one <strong>state</strong>, is not a greater<strong>state</strong><br />
idea, but a legitimate right of the Serb people. But none of those witnesses<br />
mentioned millions of victims sacrificed <strong>for</strong> the sake of atta<strong>in</strong>ment of that idea, that is, of<br />
that "right." Greece shall use its right to veto <strong>an</strong>d thus foil <strong>an</strong>y attempt of the Former<br />
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to jo<strong>in</strong> under other name <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization. After <strong>an</strong> urgent meet<strong>in</strong>g with Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Costas Karam<strong>an</strong>lis, head of<br />
the Greek diplomacy, Petros Molivijatis, sent the follow<strong>in</strong>g message to Skoplje: "the<br />
position of Athens is based on the 1995 agreement. Proposal of the UN envoy that the<br />
FYRM be called the Republic of Macedonia is not acceptable <strong>for</strong> Greece. Also<br />
unacceptable is the idea of a special agreement between Athens <strong>an</strong>d Skopje, under<br />
which Greece woul call the FYRM, the Republic of Macedonia. "Athens Says No to<br />
Skoplje", Politika, 12 October 2005.<br />
6 Elections <strong>for</strong> the local bodies were the most direct illustration of mould<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> society on <strong>an</strong> ethnic, rather th<strong>an</strong> on a civil ground. Political parties of<br />
Macedonias tried to get across their messages to Macedoni<strong>an</strong>s, political parties of<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s communicated only with Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>an</strong>d the smaller ethnic communities<br />
addressed only the issues of their communities- Turks, Rom<strong>an</strong>y, Serbs, Bosniaks. “The<br />
Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Europe”, Politika, 4 April 2005.<br />
Br<strong>an</strong>ko Crvenkovski: “In my m<strong>in</strong>d the most import<strong>an</strong>t feature of the region, or<br />
of all the regional countries, is the existence of <strong>for</strong>ward-look<strong>in</strong>g political structures, or of<br />
the structures turned towards the future jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of of their countries the common family<br />
of EU <strong>an</strong>d NATO. “Let the Churches Settle Their Dispute Independently”, NiN, 8<br />
September 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Macedonia’s status of EU membership c<strong>an</strong>didate <strong>an</strong>d consequently <strong>state</strong>d: "It<br />
is a very import<strong>an</strong>t step not only <strong>for</strong> Macedonia but also as regards the<br />
stability <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> prospects of the whole Balk<strong>an</strong>s. Furthermore it is <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>centive <strong>for</strong> all the others to work on their step-by-step accession to EU". 7<br />
Bilateral Relations<br />
The assessement by the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vlade Buckovski<br />
that the Serb-Macedoni<strong>an</strong> bilateral relations are "rapidly improv<strong>in</strong>g" 8 , was<br />
contested by the follow<strong>in</strong>g words of his: "It is not easy to underst<strong>an</strong>d why last<br />
year we had more <strong>in</strong>tense co-operation with all the neighbours th<strong>an</strong> with<br />
Belgrade, though our ties with Belgrade are the firmest <strong>an</strong>d our relations are<br />
traditionally good." 9 In his m<strong>in</strong>d those relations were affected by the SOC-<br />
MOC conflict. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> daily Večer, official Belgrade<br />
accused Macedonia of stepp<strong>in</strong>g up the regional tensions by gett<strong>in</strong>g embroiled<br />
<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tra-church conflict. 10 On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, Br<strong>an</strong>ko Crvenkovski,<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> President, th<strong>in</strong>ks that traditionally good co-operation "did not<br />
result only from short-term assessments or the <strong>in</strong>cumbent political<br />
authorities 11 , but rather from realistic, rational <strong>an</strong>d long-term <strong>in</strong>terests of both<br />
sides." 12 Crvenkovski then said that "it is of paramount import<strong>an</strong>ce that the<br />
regional leaders resolutely tackle the common problem of org<strong>an</strong>ized crime, 13 <strong>in</strong><br />
order to build ‘a more efficient <strong>an</strong>d stable Balk<strong>an</strong>s’, geared towards the EU<br />
accession.". He also voiced his conviction that <strong>in</strong> the next phase of the EU<br />
enlargement "all the Balk<strong>an</strong>s country shall together enter EU." 14<br />
7 “OSCE: Europe Is Not Complete Without the Balk<strong>an</strong>s”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 23 December<br />
2005.<br />
8 “New Border Passes Shall Reduce Incidents”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 2 February 2005.<br />
9 “Without Border Ch<strong>an</strong>ges”, Politika, 28 February 2005.<br />
10 “Serbs Are Cry<strong>in</strong>g”, Glas, 29 July 2005.<br />
11 Representatives of <strong>state</strong>s-successors of <strong>for</strong>mer SFRY <strong>in</strong> Skopje have set up a<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>t committee tasked with oversee<strong>in</strong>g the process of implementation of agreement on<br />
division of property of the <strong>for</strong>mer, common <strong>state</strong>. At a Skoplje meet<strong>in</strong>g they shall<br />
disscuss recent <strong>an</strong>d future steps <strong>in</strong> that direction, notably the issue of f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial assets<br />
deposited <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign b<strong>an</strong>ks by the <strong>for</strong>mer Federation. “<strong>Committee</strong> of Countries,<br />
Successors of Former SFRY, Has Been Set-Up”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 7 June 2005.<br />
12 “Let the Churches Settle Their Dispute Independently”, NiN, 8 September<br />
2005.<br />
13 Br<strong>an</strong>ko Crvenkovski “Org<strong>an</strong>ized g<strong>an</strong>gl<strong>an</strong>d does not recognize borders,<br />
hence we must jo<strong>in</strong>tly combat that evil. We agreed to hold a summit of regional leaders<br />
dedicated to <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-org<strong>an</strong>ized g<strong>an</strong>gl<strong>an</strong>d combat. “New Border Passes Shall Reduce<br />
Incidents”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 2 Feburary 2005.<br />
14 “There’s <strong>an</strong> EU pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> the whole West Balk<strong>an</strong>s, a k<strong>in</strong>d of Marshall Pl<strong>an</strong>f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial<br />
<strong>an</strong>d economic support-which at the same time makes it possible <strong>for</strong> all of us to<br />
438<br />
439
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> officials also expressed their read<strong>in</strong>ess to back Belgrade-<br />
Podgorica 15 agreement, deem<strong>in</strong>g it conducive to the regional stability. 16 In<br />
parallel they warned the Serb leaders that their lack of read<strong>in</strong>ess to seriously<br />
negotiate the Kosovo issue would impact negatively Serbia's aspirations to jo<strong>in</strong><br />
EU. 17 Agreement on Borders <strong>an</strong>d Demarcation respects <strong>in</strong>terests of both <strong>state</strong>s as<br />
regards draw<strong>in</strong>g the border l<strong>in</strong>e between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia towards<br />
Kosovo. 18 Serbia is <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g five new border passes-the two of<br />
which are on the po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>auguration-at its border with Macedonia. 19 In the<br />
context of resolution of the issue of Serb-Macedoni<strong>an</strong> border, President of<br />
Serbia, Boris Tadic, stressed that "<strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija is<br />
absolutely unacceptable." 20 On the other h<strong>an</strong>d Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia<br />
Vojislav Koštunica, underscored the import<strong>an</strong>ce of honour<strong>in</strong>g the UN Security<br />
Council Resolution 1244 21 <strong>in</strong> the course of resolution of the issue of<br />
demarcation of border between the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Macedonia 22 , which implied that the said demarcation would possible only<br />
after settlement of the issue of Kosovo status. 23 However, Soren Jesen Petersen<br />
reach a compromise on all the salient issues”. “Without Border Ch<strong>an</strong>ges”, Politika, 28<br />
February 2005.<br />
15 Crvenkovski <strong>an</strong>nounced open<strong>in</strong>g of a Macedoni<strong>an</strong> consular office <strong>in</strong><br />
Podgorica with a view to enh<strong>an</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g development of bilateral relations <strong>an</strong>d further cooperation<br />
between Macedonia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. “Together without Agreement”,<br />
Politika, 4 March 2005.<br />
16 “Together without Agreement”, Politika, 4 March 2005.<br />
17 “Republic of Macedonia is not one of the key factors <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g a possible<br />
fate of Kosovo”. “Let Churches Settle Their Dispute Independently ”, NiN, 8 September<br />
2005.<br />
18 Sources of Kosmet Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s have been <strong>for</strong> days putt<strong>in</strong>g out rumours that<br />
Wash<strong>in</strong>gton has brought pressure to bear on the Balk<strong>an</strong>s <strong>state</strong>s, notably Macedonia, to<br />
publicly back <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo, <strong>in</strong> order to effect regional isolation of Serbia.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to State Department op<strong>in</strong>ions of neighbour<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>s are one of the criteria <strong>for</strong><br />
determ<strong>in</strong>ation of the f<strong>in</strong>al status of Kosmet. “Someth<strong>in</strong>g In-Between”, Politika, 29<br />
October 2005.<br />
19 “Together without Agreement”, Politika, 4 March 2005.<br />
20 “Balk<strong>an</strong>s Should not Become the Black Hole of Europe”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 March<br />
2005.<br />
21 Skoplje daily Dnevnik quoted the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign Secretary Vuk<br />
Draskovic: “It is not a Kosovo border, <strong>an</strong>d Serb borders with Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not be altered or renamed <strong>in</strong>to the Kosovo <strong>state</strong> border”. “Border Sours Relations<br />
between Skoplja <strong>an</strong>d Prišt<strong>in</strong>a”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 May 2005.<br />
22 “Border Demarcation Is the Most Import<strong>an</strong>t Topic”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 March 2005.<br />
23 The “third way” Macedoni<strong>an</strong> parties- – Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Socialists, Democratic<br />
Party <strong>an</strong>d Democratic Party of Serbs <strong>in</strong> Macedonia dem<strong>an</strong>d that Macedonia <strong>in</strong>troduces<br />
“a total embargo towards Kosovo.” That is their response to the UNMIK <strong>an</strong>d Prist<strong>in</strong>a<br />
authorities <strong>an</strong>nouncement relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>troduction of a visa regime <strong>an</strong>d customs <strong>for</strong> all<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
emphasized that "the process of border l<strong>in</strong>e demarcation should not be held<br />
hostage to unresolved status of Kosovo." 24 Macedoni<strong>an</strong> officials on the other<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d th<strong>in</strong>k that "Macedonia should not be a barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g chip <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
between Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Prišt<strong>in</strong>a". 25 Process of draw<strong>in</strong>g closer to EU exacts jo<strong>in</strong>t<br />
ef<strong>for</strong>t to stop the Balk<strong>an</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g the "black hole of Europe" 26 , <strong>an</strong>d notably <strong>in</strong> the<br />
light of resolution of status of Kosovo.<br />
Serb Orthodox Church<br />
– Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church<br />
Alli<strong>an</strong>ce between the Serb political establishment <strong>an</strong>d the Serb<br />
Orthodox Church throughout 2005 led to exacerbation of relations with<br />
Serbia’s neighbours, the most notably m<strong>an</strong>ifestation of which was provocation<br />
of <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. Serb nationalists still have aspirations towards<br />
Macedonia, 27 so the attempt to divide the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> church was met with<br />
very negative responses <strong>in</strong> the region <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the world. The conflict between<br />
the two churches peaked with the arrest of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> (Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Vr<strong>an</strong>iškovski) on grounds of "his spread<strong>in</strong>g of religious, racial <strong>an</strong>d national<br />
hatred" 28 . Ignor<strong>in</strong>g the existence of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox<br />
Church 29 , the Serb Orthodox Church tried to put <strong>in</strong> place its own church<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>in</strong> Macedonia by issu<strong>in</strong>g Tomos on Autonomy of Ohrid Archbishopric<br />
(Zor<strong>an</strong> Vr<strong>an</strong>iškovski was named Archbishop of Ohrid <strong>an</strong>d Mitropolite of<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> produce as of 1 July. “Border Sours Relations between Skoplje <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Prišt<strong>in</strong>a”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 17 May 2005.<br />
24 “First the Status <strong>an</strong>d then Resolution of Other Issues”, Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
25 “No solution should raise the issue of border ch<strong>an</strong>ge. On the contrary, a<br />
dom<strong>in</strong>o effect would cause grave regional consequences. ”. “Without Border Ch<strong>an</strong>ge”,<br />
Politika, 28 February 2005.<br />
26 “Balk<strong>an</strong>s Should not Be the Black Hole of Europe”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 March 2005.<br />
27 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić: “Our future <strong>in</strong>terest are good relations with Macedonia<br />
enabl<strong>in</strong>g us to make one day wit that country either a federation or confederation. That<br />
is why we should not provoke tensions <strong>in</strong> Macedonia but rather decisively <strong>an</strong>d boldly<br />
tell the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> leadership <strong>an</strong>d Crvenkovsi that his conduct was not good.” “Put<strong>in</strong>-<br />
Style Anti-Corruption Model”, Novosti, 6 August 2005.<br />
28 Statement of the SOC Holy Synod reads: “We hoped that the time of the<br />
Church persecution was beh<strong>in</strong>d us. Conviction of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>, recognized by all<br />
local Orthodox churches, is t<strong>an</strong>tamount to conviction of the <strong>in</strong>tern<strong>an</strong>tional Orthodoxy .<br />
“Multicultural Arrest”, NiN, 28 July 2005.<br />
29 Mitropolite of Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Coastal Area, Amfilohije: “Conviction of<br />
Archbishop of Ohrid <strong>an</strong>d Mitropolite of Skoplje, Jov<strong>an</strong> is a major outrage committed by<br />
the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Macedoni<strong>an</strong> courts. Added to that it is also a major outrage<br />
committed by a dissent<strong>in</strong>g org<strong>an</strong>ization, self-styled Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, <strong>for</strong><br />
that breakaway Macedoni<strong>an</strong> hierarchy is obviously beh<strong>in</strong>d that ignom<strong>in</strong>ous<br />
act.”.“Mitropolite Amfilohije: Sheer Outrage”, Novosti, 28 July 2005.<br />
440<br />
441
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Skoplje). That move was t<strong>an</strong>tamount to denial of sovereignty of Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its church. The SOC –issued Tomos on Autonomy, paved the way <strong>for</strong><br />
escalation of religious tensions, 30 <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of extremist <strong>an</strong>d milit<strong>an</strong>t political<br />
st<strong>an</strong>ds. Holy Synod of the Serb Orthodox Church also decided to give the<br />
property of Pec Patriarchy <strong>in</strong> Macedonia to Orhid Archbishopric. 31<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> delegation marked the Il<strong>in</strong>den day <strong>in</strong> the ASNOM Memorial<br />
Centre, <strong>in</strong> village Pel<strong>in</strong>ce near Kum<strong>an</strong>ovo. 32<br />
By issu<strong>in</strong>g Tomos 33 on autonomy of the Orthodox Archbishopric of<br />
Ohrid, the Holy Synod of the Serb Orthodox Church morphed the Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
church issue <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>state</strong>-political issues. In those terms the SOC <strong>in</strong>sisted on a<br />
clear response by the official Belgrade, <strong>for</strong> Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> was convicted <strong>for</strong><br />
"profess<strong>in</strong>g his faith". Thus the Serb Orthodox Church demonstrated its<br />
disrespect of laws of the other <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d its legal order. By mak<strong>in</strong>g official the<br />
com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g of Ohrid Archbishopric 34 <strong>in</strong> the territory of a sovereign <strong>state</strong><br />
of Macedonia, the Serb Orthodox Church called <strong>in</strong>to question the reality of<br />
existence of a sovereign, Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>s which has its own Church.<br />
Statements call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to question the existence of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>, nation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d l<strong>an</strong>guage, dom<strong>in</strong>ated the Serb public <strong>an</strong>d political scene. The <strong>state</strong>ment of<br />
the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> President Crvenkovski that "the Church c<strong>an</strong>not be made by<br />
d<strong>in</strong>t of a decree 35 <strong>in</strong> a secular <strong>state</strong> which gives precedence to the civili<strong>an</strong><br />
legislation", was understood <strong>in</strong> Serbia as stripp<strong>in</strong>g the Serb Orthodox Church<br />
30 24 religious org<strong>an</strong>izations were registered <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. The court<br />
established that Zor<strong>an</strong> Vr<strong>an</strong>iškovski spread religious hatred <strong>an</strong>d practically <strong>in</strong>itiated<br />
activities conducive to replacement of the exist<strong>in</strong>g MOC.<br />
31 “Multicultural Arrest”, NiN, 28 July 2005.<br />
32 Sasho Colakovski, Spokesm<strong>an</strong> of the government of Macedonia <strong>state</strong>d:<br />
”Flowers shall be laid aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> monastery Prohor Pč<strong>in</strong>jski when Europe<strong>an</strong> spirit prevails<br />
among our northern neighbour.” “Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Authorities Mark Il<strong>in</strong>den <strong>in</strong> Pel<strong>in</strong>ovac”,<br />
D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 August 2005.<br />
33 Head of the Serb Orthodox Church named Mirtropolite of Veles <strong>an</strong>d Vardar<br />
Area, Jov<strong>an</strong>, the Archbishop of Ohrid <strong>an</strong>d Mitropolite of Skopje, <strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
framework of enh<strong>an</strong>cement of the SOC Constitution Holy Synod recommended to <strong>an</strong><br />
autonomous Ohrid Arsbishopric to embark upon draft<strong>in</strong>g of its part of constitution.<br />
“Mitropolite Jov<strong>an</strong> Named Archbishop of Ohrid”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 28-29 May 2005.<br />
34 Mirko Đorđević “If one knows that Tomos is the ultimate act or decree of<br />
faith by which Synods regulate Christology issues-<strong>an</strong>d between the Serb Orthodox<br />
Church <strong>an</strong>d Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church there are no Christology-related differencesone<br />
must question the goal thereof”. “Battle <strong>for</strong> C<strong>an</strong>onic Territories”, Republika, 1-31<br />
August 2005.<br />
35 “Serb Church B<strong>an</strong>ned, <strong>an</strong>d Serb Songs under Embargo”, Svedok, 7 June 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Patriarchy 36 of their right to take <strong>an</strong>y decision on the territory of<br />
Macedonia. 37<br />
The Serb political establishment rendered full legitimacy <strong>an</strong>d support<br />
to excessive <strong>an</strong>d conflict-deepen<strong>in</strong>g responses of the Serb Orthodox Church.<br />
Mil<strong>an</strong> Radulović, the Serb M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Religions, admitted that the Serb-<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> relations were weighted down by the non-recognition of the SOC<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Ohrid Archbishopric by the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>, 38 but he nonetheless<br />
stressed as positive the fact that the dissent<strong>in</strong>g bishops still had a ch<strong>an</strong>ce to<br />
place themselves under a spiritual jurisdiction of Ohrid Archbishopric th<strong>an</strong>ks<br />
to the SOC read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>for</strong> a dialogue. 39 Aside <strong>for</strong> charges relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>stigation<br />
<strong>an</strong>d spread<strong>in</strong>g of religious, racial <strong>an</strong>d national hatred, head of Ohrid<br />
Archbishopric was also accused of a crim<strong>in</strong>al offence of embezzlement of half a<br />
million Euro dur<strong>in</strong>g his tenure <strong>in</strong> the c<strong>an</strong>onically unrecognized Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodox Church. 40 Macedoni<strong>an</strong> President Crvenkovski suggested that "the<br />
church dispute would be best resolved by a dialogue or negotiations between<br />
the two churches." 41 The Serb side, that is Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica, President<br />
36 Tomos calls on the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church to return to the unity of<br />
the Church, <strong>for</strong>, on the contrary, all its faithfuls shall be considered –dissidents. “Battle<br />
<strong>for</strong> C<strong>an</strong>onic Territories”, Republika, 1-31. August 2005.<br />
37 Egzarhat <strong>in</strong> the area of the Republic Macedonia-RM is considered a c<strong>an</strong>onic<br />
area of the Serb Orthodox Church headed by the Serb Patriarch Pavle-by d<strong>in</strong>t of Tomos<br />
was elevated to the level of the newly-established Ohrid Archbishopric- with<strong>in</strong> the SOCheaded<br />
by Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>. In fact that move me<strong>an</strong>t a return of Macedoni<strong>an</strong> church to<br />
the fold of the Serb Orthodox Church. Now we face a paradoxical situation-<strong>in</strong> the<br />
territory of the Republic of Macedonia there are two operational Churches <strong>an</strong>d none of<br />
them has its status clarified or resolved. Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church does not have its<br />
c<strong>an</strong>onic status resolved, <strong>an</strong>d the newly-estblished archbishopric does not have its status<br />
resolved with<strong>in</strong> the framework of the <strong>state</strong> of Macedonia. C<strong>an</strong>onically unrecognized<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church operates <strong>in</strong> its c<strong>an</strong>onic territory, has it clergy, has its<br />
temples, <strong>an</strong>d church structure, <strong>an</strong>d Synod as well. “Battle <strong>for</strong> C<strong>an</strong>onic Territories”,<br />
Republika, 1-31 August 2005.<br />
38 Mil<strong>an</strong> Radulović “Serb Orthodox Church has resolved its side of the<br />
problem, but it is of utmost import<strong>an</strong>ce that other Orthodox Churches muster up<br />
enough courage to tell their authorities not to touch their <strong>in</strong>ner order <strong>an</strong>d our sacros<strong>an</strong>ct<br />
legislation. “The State Does Not Exert Influence on the Serb Orthodox Church”, Novosti,<br />
4. June 2005.<br />
39 Local bishops there have not been condemned, no <strong>an</strong>athema aga<strong>in</strong>st them<br />
was pronounced, they have not been declared heretics – it was just made pla<strong>in</strong> to them<br />
that the church life may unfold only via Ohrid Archbishopric. “State Does Not Exert<br />
Influence on the Serb Orthodox Church SPC”, Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
40 “Jov<strong>an</strong> Is Tried <strong>for</strong> Embezzlement”, Novosti, 27 October 2005.<br />
41 “Let the Churches Resolve Their Conflict Independently”, NiN, 8 September<br />
2005.<br />
442<br />
443
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Tadic, Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign Secretary, SOC representatives, 42 aides to<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>siter of Serbia, launched appeals <strong>for</strong> the realease of Archbishop<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>. Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> was accused of show<strong>in</strong>g a shortage of democratic<br />
capacity 43 by refus<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>in</strong>to its legal order the Orthodox Orhid<br />
Archbishopric, or to even register it as <strong>an</strong> associaiton of citizens. 44<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church responded to Belgrade's decision by<br />
issu<strong>in</strong>g a communique: "Serb Orthodox Church is disregard<strong>in</strong>g the will of<br />
people of Macedonia, <strong>for</strong> the popular am<strong>in</strong> is above <strong>an</strong>y clericalism <strong>an</strong>d<br />
uncontrolled decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g by high church dignitaries" 45 <strong>an</strong>d "Belgrade's<br />
decision is noth<strong>in</strong>g else but declaration of church war to faithfuls <strong>in</strong><br />
Macedonia." 46 By refut<strong>in</strong>g responsibility 47 <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> imposed spiritual terror<br />
Vladeta J<strong>an</strong>kovic, <strong>an</strong> aide to Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Kostunica, assessed that the arrest<br />
of the bishop caused destabilization of relations between the two <strong>state</strong>s. 48 By<br />
extension communique of the Foreign M<strong>in</strong>istry of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Yugoslavia read:<br />
"Such a decision of the SOC's Holy Synod c<strong>an</strong>not ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> brotherly<br />
feel<strong>in</strong>gs of 49 of the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> peoples towards the people of<br />
Macedonia." 50 Officials of the Republic of Serbia br<strong>an</strong>d the MOC as so-called<br />
42 ”That is why we call on the bodies of the Republic of Macedonia to renounce<br />
that m<strong>in</strong>dless act which tarnishes the image <strong>an</strong>d reputation of that country <strong>an</strong>d its<br />
judiciary be<strong>for</strong>e God, justice <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational public. “Multicultural Arrest”, NiN, 28<br />
July 2005.<br />
43 The first mistake of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities is their tackl<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>tra-<br />
Church relations, while, their second, fundamental mistake, is their disrespect of<br />
autonomy of the Church legislation. The <strong>state</strong> which does not respect <strong>an</strong> age-old Church<br />
legislation, <strong>an</strong>d only honours its Constitution <strong>an</strong>d modern laws, c<strong>an</strong>not be considered a<br />
democratic <strong>state</strong>. Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Synod of Ohrid Archbishopric should call on a<br />
breakaway <strong>an</strong>d unrecognized Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church to <strong>for</strong>ge a c<strong>an</strong>onic unity<br />
with Ohrid Archbishopric <strong>an</strong>d to resume talks with the SOC Patriarchy <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
“Free Jov<strong>an</strong>”, NiN, 28 July 2005.<br />
44 “Serb Church B<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>an</strong>d Serb Songs Under Embargo”, Svedok, 7 June 2005.<br />
45 “Mitropolite Jov<strong>an</strong> Named Archbishop of Ohrid”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 28-29 May 2005.<br />
46 www.B92.net, 27 May 2005.<br />
47 Ljupčo Jord<strong>an</strong>ovski, president of Macedoni<strong>an</strong> parliament “Republic of<br />
Makedonija is not a problem-creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong>, <strong>in</strong> fact it is a problem-solg<strong>in</strong>g one.” “Cooperation-<br />
the Only Option”, Politika, 31 July 2005.<br />
48 “That move of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities clearly <strong>in</strong>creases regional<br />
tensions, though we, <strong>in</strong> fact, very much need stability, mutual underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d goodwill.<br />
Because of all consequences of that move, both the government of Macedonia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the <strong>in</strong>ternational community should immediately tackle that case.” “Tension Between<br />
Neighbours”, Novosti, 28. July 2005.<br />
49 Velimir Ilić, Capital Investments M<strong>in</strong>ister, stressed: "I would underst<strong>an</strong>d if<br />
our Church was persecuted by Shiptari or Al-Quaida, but I c<strong>an</strong>not underst<strong>an</strong>d why it is<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g persecuted by the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities. ". “Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
Authorities Mark Il<strong>in</strong>d<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pel<strong>in</strong>ovac”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 August 2005.<br />
50 www.B92.net , 27 May 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, 51 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dicate that the SOC has every right to<br />
approve autonomy of <strong>an</strong> archbishopric <strong>in</strong> the territory under its jurisdiciton or<br />
to tr<strong>an</strong>sfer to it part of its prerogatives. But accord<strong>in</strong>g to them the problem lies<br />
<strong>in</strong> the fact that <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the <strong>state</strong> law <strong>in</strong> Macedonia, a church <strong>for</strong>med by the<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> parallely functions. 52<br />
The Serb authorities underscored that the arrest of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong><br />
was a blat<strong>an</strong>t case of violation of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, notably of the right to freedom<br />
of faith of the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. They furthermore <strong>in</strong>sisted on the<br />
fact that Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> was of a Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox faith-though of<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> nationality <strong>an</strong>d with Macedoni<strong>an</strong> cizitenship- <strong>an</strong>d that "he was<br />
arrested because he belongs to <strong>an</strong>d spearheads the only recognized Christi<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodox church <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. Once the authorities realize that they c<strong>an</strong>not<br />
arrest all their citizens of the Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox faith, they shall release<br />
Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>". 53 The Serb authorities also tried to use that case to raise the<br />
issue of status of the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Macedonia: 54 "Although President of<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> parliament spoke about the Serb community as a loyal one <strong>an</strong>d as<br />
"a constructive element of co-operation between Macedonia <strong>an</strong>d the State<br />
Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro" 55 , some representatives of the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that "the DPSM is still <strong>in</strong> a delicate situation, <strong>for</strong> we have entered a<br />
period of the major freeze of relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Macedonia." Due to<br />
irrational motives or perhaps because of a "conscious <strong>in</strong>strumentalization of<br />
faith to political ends, Serbs <strong>in</strong> Macedonia are the only ehtnic m<strong>in</strong>ority stripped<br />
of the right to freedom of religion, <strong>an</strong>d their situation has been additionally<br />
exacerbated by the arrest of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>." 56 Vojislav Vukčević, the Serb<br />
51 Mil<strong>an</strong> Radulović, Serb M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Religions: “That Church aspires to be a<br />
successor of the Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. It may even act as such, but<br />
it lacks what we call apostolic guar<strong>an</strong>tees-its bishops have not been elected legitimately<br />
by a synod, but rather by civili<strong>an</strong> authorities. They are a k<strong>in</strong>d of free clergy who are<br />
try<strong>in</strong>g to exert rights <strong>an</strong>d prerogatives <strong>in</strong> which they have not been vested by the church<br />
order <strong>an</strong>d authorities.” “The State Does Not Influence the Serb Orthodox Church”,<br />
Novosti, 4 June 2005.<br />
52 It is easy to notice, as <strong>in</strong>dicated by the highest SOC officials, notably by a<br />
reputable member of the Holy Synod, Bishop of Backa, Ir<strong>in</strong>ej, that the issue of the<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church is be<strong>in</strong>g discussed <strong>an</strong>d tackled more often <strong>an</strong>d more<br />
vocally by Messrs Bučkovski, Crvenkovski <strong>an</strong>d other prime movers of the Skoplje<br />
political scene, th<strong>an</strong> by the local church frontmen. ”. “Multicultural Arrest”, NiN, 28 July<br />
2005.<br />
53 “Radulović: A Stupid Move”, Novosti, 28 July 2005.<br />
54 Our people <strong>in</strong> Macedonia are <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> unpleas<strong>an</strong>t situation, <strong>for</strong> it is not easy to<br />
be members of a m<strong>in</strong>ority. We as a M<strong>in</strong>istry shall protect their rights <strong>in</strong> the way we are<br />
allowed to do that under <strong>in</strong>ternational contracts <strong>an</strong>d treaties. “We Must Protect Our<br />
People”, Svedok, 7 June 2005.<br />
55 “Co-operation-the Only Option”, Politika, 31 July 2005.<br />
56 “Kosmet – An All Serb Issue”, Novosti, 28 November 2005.<br />
444<br />
445
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Diaspora, <strong>state</strong>d that the M<strong>in</strong>istry was duty-bound to "protect the<br />
reputation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terests of m<strong>an</strong>y Serbs 57 liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Macedonia, though they,<br />
alike Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>, are citizens of Macedonia." 58 Representatives of The<br />
National Council of Macedoni<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro thus responded to<br />
accusations that Macedonia disrespected <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights guar<strong>an</strong>teed by<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational conventions: "Relations betweeen the Serb Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church should not affect relations between the two<br />
<strong>state</strong>s." That Council also took the st<strong>an</strong>d that the Churches should<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependently resolve their problems, while Gojko Ilijevski, President of<br />
Community of Macedoni<strong>an</strong>s <strong>state</strong>d: "No-one asks Macedoni<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia if<br />
they enjoy their religious rights <strong>an</strong>d how they feel as faithfuls of the<br />
Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>in</strong> the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro." 59<br />
All the appeals to Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities 60 <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations related to the release of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>, as well as numerous<br />
responses to his arrest, failed to take note of the fact that the decion on the<br />
arrest was taken by <strong>in</strong>dependent judicial <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Macedonia. 61 The Serb<br />
Orthodox Church Synod equalized conviction of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> to "the<br />
conviction of the whole, <strong>in</strong>ternational Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodoxy". 62 What followed<br />
up were the threats 63 that unless the conviction was declared null <strong>an</strong>d void <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> released, the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church clergy would be<br />
prevented from officiat<strong>in</strong>g a 2 August lithurgy <strong>in</strong> monastery Prohor Pč<strong>in</strong>jski,<br />
on the <strong>an</strong>niversary of Il<strong>in</strong>den. S<strong>in</strong>ce the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
57 Serbs <strong>in</strong> Macedonia have long been burdened by constitutional <strong>in</strong>equality<br />
<strong>an</strong>d long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g exclusion from legal, political <strong>an</strong>d public life. Added to that the<br />
collective responsibility <strong>for</strong> recent wars <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia was imposed on them.<br />
After the 21 war developments <strong>in</strong> Macedonia, the new situation emerged here. Then the<br />
KLA agenda became <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegral part of our constitutional system. “Kosmet – <strong>an</strong> All Serb<br />
Issue”, Novosti, 28 November 2005.<br />
58 We were contacted by representatives of the Democratic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbs, of<br />
some municipalities, Serb schools <strong>an</strong>d numerous Serb local communities <strong>in</strong> Macedonia.<br />
Concerned over the arrest of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>, they w<strong>an</strong>ted us to take <strong>an</strong> official st<strong>an</strong>d.<br />
“Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Authorities Mark the Anniversary of Il<strong>in</strong>d<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pel<strong>in</strong>ovac”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1<br />
August 2005.<br />
59 “Official Skoplje Searches Legal Basis <strong>for</strong> Release”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 30-31 July 2005.<br />
60 Vojislav Kostunica, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia, sent the follow<strong>in</strong>g message:<br />
“Release of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> is the best th<strong>in</strong>g that Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities could do at<br />
this moment of time. “<br />
61 Arrest of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> is a nervous, m<strong>in</strong>dless <strong>an</strong>d politically stupid<br />
response of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities to <strong>in</strong>ternal issues of the Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox<br />
Church <strong>in</strong> that <strong>state</strong>. “Radulović: A Stupid Move”, Novosti, 28. jul 2005.<br />
62 “Brutal Persecution”, Novosti, 23 July 2005.<br />
63 Lawyer Sava Anđelković “In Kostunica-led government of Serbia there are<br />
serious jurists who are yet to publicly protest aga<strong>in</strong>st torture of SOC priests <strong>in</strong><br />
Macedonia”. “Archbishop <strong>in</strong> Jail, States <strong>in</strong> Conflict?”, Glas, 28 July 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
decl<strong>in</strong>ed to respond to the offical request of the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong> delegation to<br />
approve its flower-lay<strong>in</strong>g ceremony on 2 August <strong>an</strong>d thus mark the 61st<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary of the first session of ASNOM <strong>an</strong>d proclamation of Macedoni<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>state</strong>hood, the <strong>state</strong> delegation of Macedonia was compelled to mark that<br />
<strong>an</strong>niversary <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>other place. 64 Added to the appeal <strong>for</strong> the release of<br />
Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong>, the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign M<strong>in</strong>istry also made it clear<br />
that it did not oppose the presence of the <strong>state</strong> delegation of Macedonia <strong>in</strong><br />
monastery Prohor Pč<strong>in</strong>jski, but rem<strong>in</strong>ed that "the owner of monastery is the<br />
Serb Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d not this M<strong>in</strong>istry". 65 But all the ef<strong>for</strong>ts made by<br />
President of Serbia Boris Tadić <strong>an</strong>d the SOC Synod to that end failed, <strong>for</strong><br />
Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> is <strong>for</strong>mally a Macedoni<strong>an</strong> citizen. 66 Most concrete move <strong>in</strong><br />
the campaign <strong>for</strong> the release of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> was made by Velimir Ilic, the<br />
Serb M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> Capital Investments, who ordered a swift return of the two<br />
Yugoslav Airl<strong>in</strong>es aircraft- –leased to the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> air-carrier- from<br />
Skoplje. 67<br />
In the process of greenlight<strong>in</strong>g the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> EU c<strong>an</strong>didacy the case<br />
of arrest of Bishop Jov<strong>an</strong> required additional clarification. 68 Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Commission viewed that problem <strong>in</strong> the light of violation of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, but<br />
also assessed positively the possibility of legal resolution of that problem 69 as<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated by the Skoplje authorities. In the face of the campaign which aimed<br />
at slow<strong>in</strong>g down 70 or mak<strong>in</strong>g more difficult Macedonia's ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of status of<br />
c<strong>an</strong>didate, the campaign which also tried to call <strong>in</strong>to question read<strong>in</strong>ess of<br />
Macedonia to open its territory <strong>an</strong>d guar<strong>an</strong>tee implementation of fundamental<br />
64 “Without Delegation <strong>in</strong> Prohor Pč<strong>in</strong>jski”, Glas, 29 July 2005.<br />
65 “Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Authoritis Mark Il<strong>in</strong>den <strong>in</strong> Pel<strong>in</strong>ovac”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 August 2005.<br />
66 Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Vučić “Arrest of Archbishop Jov<strong>an</strong> is not only unlawful, but also<br />
a m<strong>in</strong>dless <strong>an</strong>d savage gesture of Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities.” “Put<strong>in</strong>-Style Anti-Corrption<br />
Model”, Novosti, 6 August 2005.<br />
67 “We <strong>in</strong>vest billions <strong>in</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g of a highway enabl<strong>in</strong>g Macedonia to enter<br />
Europe, <strong>an</strong>d they pay us back <strong>in</strong> this way." Ilic also rem<strong>in</strong>ded Macedoni<strong>an</strong> President of<br />
"My recent ef<strong>for</strong>ts to effect the write-off of Macedoni<strong>an</strong> air carrier-MAT-to YAT<br />
Airways...<strong>in</strong> the face of strong opposition." “Macedoni<strong>an</strong> authorities Mark the<br />
Anniversary of Il<strong>in</strong>d<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Pel<strong>in</strong>ovac”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 1 August 2005.<br />
68 Br<strong>an</strong>ko Crvenkovski “The fact is that to date no request was submitted <strong>for</strong><br />
registration of a religious association deal<strong>in</strong>g exclusively with religious feel<strong>in</strong>gs of Serbs<br />
<strong>in</strong> Macedonia”. “Let Churches Resolve Their Dispute Independently’, NiN, 8 September<br />
2005.<br />
69 “EU Asks Skoplje To Expla<strong>in</strong> the Arrest of Bishop Jov<strong>an</strong>”, D<strong>an</strong>as, 21 October<br />
2005.<br />
70 In his letter to President of the Commission of EU Bishop Conferences,<br />
Bishop Joseph Homeier, High EU Representative <strong>for</strong> Foreign Policy <strong>an</strong>d Security, Xavier<br />
Sol<strong>an</strong>a, cautioned that the arrest of Bishop Jov<strong>an</strong>, on grounds of alleged <strong>in</strong>stigation of<br />
rational <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce, may seriously slow-down <strong>an</strong>d even threaten accession of<br />
Macedonia to EU. “Sol<strong>an</strong>a: Freedom <strong>for</strong> Bishop Jov<strong>an</strong>”, Blic, 16 September 2005.<br />
446<br />
447
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of freedom of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d religious liberties, Macedonia has<br />
demonstrated the maturity <strong>an</strong>d responsibility as befits the future member of<br />
EU <strong>in</strong> the case of the SOC-MOC dispute.<br />
Head of the Russi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church, Alekesej, also got embroiled <strong>in</strong><br />
resolution of status of Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Church. Namely he <strong>state</strong>d that <strong>in</strong> the world<br />
of the Christi<strong>an</strong> Orthodoxy there was no rule as to ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>dependence of<br />
a church, but he added that despite that the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church<br />
might resolve its status without <strong>an</strong>y talks with the Serb Orthodox Church.<br />
Aleksej also said that to date there was no consensus as to the procedure <strong>for</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence-ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of a church. He also admitted that <strong>in</strong> he was <strong>in</strong> touch<br />
with the Serb <strong>an</strong>d the Greek Orthodox Church <strong>in</strong> a bid to help them solve the<br />
problem faced by the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Church. But he added that he was engaged<br />
only <strong>in</strong> "church talks of general nature." As a settlement he <strong>an</strong>nounced the<br />
possibility of us<strong>in</strong>g "the term-<strong>in</strong>dependent or self-m<strong>an</strong>ag<strong>in</strong>g Church, <strong>for</strong> that<br />
would contribute to re-launch<strong>in</strong>g the currently dead-ended talks with the Serb<br />
Orthodox Church". 71<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
VIII<br />
KEY CHALLENGES:<br />
KOSOVO AND<br />
MONTENEGRO<br />
71 SOC <strong>an</strong>d MOC Must Talk, Blic, 15 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
448<br />
449
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
KOSOVO:<br />
CONSENSUS ON TWO PRINCIPLES<br />
In spite of the new reality <strong>an</strong>d of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>an</strong>d guidel<strong>in</strong>es 1 laid<br />
down by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, 2 the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side (that is, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
government, parliamentary parties, Serbi<strong>an</strong> president <strong>an</strong>d greater part of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectual elite) rema<strong>in</strong>s entrenched <strong>in</strong> the positions it has held <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
years, 3 show<strong>in</strong>g almost no progress compared with 2004. In the last two years<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government <strong>an</strong>d Assembly have adopted a number of documents<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t to the status talks based on two pr<strong>in</strong>ciples: Kosovo’s rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a part<br />
of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo’s decentralization on ethnic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. These pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
also underlie the Plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> Talks on the Future Status of Kosovo put<br />
<strong>for</strong>ward by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> president <strong>an</strong>d Democratic Party (DS) leader, Boris<br />
Tadić. Although their rhetoric differs accord<strong>in</strong>g to their constituencies, the<br />
ma<strong>in</strong> parliamentary parties, the rul<strong>in</strong>g Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party (SRS), DS <strong>an</strong>d Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), are agreed<br />
on the future status of Kosovo. In other words, as far as Kosovo is concerned,<br />
there is no dialogue <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d no opposition <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>stitutions, particularly<br />
<strong>in</strong> parliament.<br />
On the political stage, only a few m<strong>in</strong>or parties have made a genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
break with the Kosovo policy of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević, whose term of office<br />
started with the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy <strong>an</strong>d repression of the Kosovo<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. Although the two sides cont<strong>in</strong>ue to hold opposite views, the very<br />
fact that the talks were got under way <strong>in</strong> February 2006 was a step <strong>for</strong>ward<br />
from the status quo the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side had been striv<strong>in</strong>g to preserve over the<br />
years. But <strong>for</strong> the pressure of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side<br />
would <strong>in</strong> all probability have gone on <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on a postponement; thus,<br />
address<strong>in</strong>g the United Nations Security Council <strong>in</strong> February 2006, Tadić<br />
proposed that the f<strong>in</strong>al settlement of Kosovo’s status should be postponed <strong>for</strong><br />
1 These pr<strong>in</strong>ciples are: no return to the situation <strong>in</strong> 1999, no division of Kosovo,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d no <strong>in</strong>corporation with other <strong>state</strong>s follow<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>ation of f<strong>in</strong>al status.<br />
2 The Contact Group, Europe<strong>an</strong> Union <strong>an</strong>d United States.<br />
3 The pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity of Serbia.<br />
450<br />
451
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
twenty years. 4 The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> its part<br />
<strong>in</strong>sists that issues such as respect <strong>for</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>security</strong><br />
(<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>an</strong>d regional), org<strong>an</strong>ized crime <strong>an</strong>d economic progress c<strong>an</strong>not be<br />
addressed be<strong>for</strong>e Kosovo’s status is def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d the borders of the newlyestablished<br />
<strong>state</strong>s on the territory of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia are determ<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
This presupposes def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the status of Kosovo’s m<strong>in</strong>orities, develop<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
system <strong>for</strong> the implementation of st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d legislation to ensure respect<br />
<strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>d protection of m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>stitut<strong>in</strong>g a system to<br />
identify responsibility <strong>for</strong> the creation of a democratic society.<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Negotiat<strong>in</strong>g Position <strong>an</strong>d Status<br />
The basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple on which the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side <strong>in</strong>sists is respect <strong>for</strong> the<br />
sovereignty <strong>an</strong>d territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity of Serbia. 5 A second pr<strong>in</strong>ciple concerns the<br />
compactness of the Serb-populated territory <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>stitutional l<strong>in</strong>k with<br />
Belgrade. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly achieved consensus on the matter of Kosovo’s<br />
status, with the far-right SRS tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> the draft<strong>in</strong>g of certa<strong>in</strong> ‘strategic<br />
documents’. 6<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly would consider <strong>an</strong>y imposition of <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo solution as <strong>an</strong> act of violence <strong>an</strong>d would declare it<br />
illegitimate, illegal <strong>an</strong>d hav<strong>in</strong>g no effect. M<strong>an</strong>y politici<strong>an</strong>s expla<strong>in</strong>ed that <strong>in</strong><br />
that case Serbia would proclaim <strong>an</strong> occupation of Kosovo, a possibility first<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church (SPC). 7 The Serbi<strong>an</strong> prime<br />
4 Boris Tadić: ‘The consensual solution which would be reached <strong>in</strong> this way<br />
would carry <strong>in</strong>ternational guar<strong>an</strong>tees <strong>an</strong>d, after the expiration of a specified period (say,<br />
twenty years), would aga<strong>in</strong> be placed on the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table.’<br />
(www.b92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo/vesti, ‘Savet bezbednosti o Kosovu’, 14 February 2006). A<br />
postponement had been raised by Tadić’s adviser, Duš<strong>an</strong> Bataković, <strong>in</strong> April 2005 <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terview with NIN: ‘...the reasons are gett<strong>in</strong>g more <strong>an</strong>d more serious <strong>for</strong> the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community to stop be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a great hurry regard<strong>in</strong>g the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />
the future status of the prov<strong>in</strong>ce.’ (‘Protiv defetizma’, 28 April 2005.<br />
5 On 21 November 2005, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly adopted a Resolution on the<br />
M<strong>an</strong>date <strong>for</strong> Political Talks on the Future Status of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija. Other th<strong>an</strong><br />
be<strong>in</strong>g approved by the rul<strong>in</strong>g DSS, the resolution was backed by the extreme SRS <strong>an</strong>d<br />
SPS. The resolution was carried by a vote of 205 <strong>in</strong> favour, none aga<strong>in</strong>st, <strong>an</strong>d 29<br />
abstentions by deputies of the DS <strong>an</strong>d Social Democratic Party who did not, however,<br />
fundamentally oppose the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the resolution. Deputies Nataša Mićić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Žarko Korać alone criticized the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government’s approach to solv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Kosovo’s status <strong>an</strong>d walked out be<strong>for</strong>e the vote was taken.<br />
6 This was asserted by the member of the Assembly <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Metohija, Duš<strong>an</strong> Proroković. Politika, 20 November 2005.<br />
7 Serbi<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica: ‘To divide Serbia by grabb<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija would be to directly violate the most general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational law. All the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples Serbia espouses <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g the question of<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister’s adviser, Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Simić, said that Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence would<br />
be totally unacceptable <strong>an</strong>d would me<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong> occupation of part of the territory<br />
of Serbia. 8<br />
The SRS deputy president, Tomislav Nikolić, said that Koštunica had<br />
assured him that ‘neither he nor <strong>an</strong>y other official would ever sign <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija which would me<strong>an</strong> a ch<strong>an</strong>ge of borders <strong>an</strong>d<br />
predeterm<strong>in</strong>e the <strong>in</strong>dependence, sovereignty, autonomy of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Metohija.’ 9 Speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Assembly, Nikolić addressed the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
message to the government: ‘We are send<strong>in</strong>g you to these negotiations with <strong>an</strong><br />
open heart <strong>an</strong>d we undertake that you will negotiate on our behalf. Though I<br />
c<strong>an</strong> promise you that you will never see us fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> power <strong>in</strong> the streets, <strong>in</strong><br />
the struggle <strong>for</strong> Kosmet [Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija] the Serb Radicals will use all<br />
available me<strong>an</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>an</strong>ybody <strong>an</strong>d even aga<strong>in</strong>st you, should you venture<br />
upon a bad solution.’ 10<br />
The Assembly plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> talks also provides <strong>for</strong> hold<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
referendum to let the citizens of Serbia declare themselves on Kosovo’s<br />
status. 11 In consider<strong>in</strong>g this possibility, the government <strong>in</strong>vokes the 1991<br />
Constitution that <strong>for</strong>mally abolished Kosovo’s autonomy.<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> president <strong>an</strong>d DS leader, Boris Tadić, <strong>an</strong>nounced his<br />
plat<strong>for</strong>m called Formation of a Serb Entity <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
official visit to Moscow, on the very day the government adopted the plat<strong>for</strong>m<br />
<strong>for</strong> talks on the future status of Kosovo (Rather th<strong>an</strong> offer<strong>in</strong>g a subst<strong>an</strong>tial<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge, the Tadić plat<strong>for</strong>m was more a propag<strong>an</strong>da stunt calculated at steal<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a march on the government). Tadić <strong>in</strong>sists on the creation of Serb <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
entities <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, with the Serb entity hav<strong>in</strong>g direct <strong>in</strong>stitutional l<strong>in</strong>ks with<br />
Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d the rest of Kosovo be<strong>in</strong>g guar<strong>an</strong>teed ‘subst<strong>an</strong>tial autonomy’. The<br />
plat<strong>for</strong>m provides <strong>for</strong> a special relationship of the two entities with<strong>in</strong> the<br />
framework of official Kosovo <strong>in</strong>stitutions. Tadić said at the UN Security<br />
Kosovo are without exception universal pr<strong>in</strong>ciples compatible with <strong>in</strong>ternational law.<br />
Based on these most general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, [Serbia] is committed to f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> effective<br />
compromise solution <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>m of subst<strong>an</strong>tial autonomy <strong>for</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija.’<br />
(www.b92.net/<strong>in</strong>fo/vesti, ‘Kosovo na putu do...’, 15 February 2006.<br />
8 Večernje novosti, ‘Nema šargarepe za okupaciju’, 10 November 2005.<br />
9 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Koštunica obećao Nikoliću da neće potpisati akt o otcepljenju<br />
Kosova’, 12 May 2005.<br />
10 Politika, 22 November 2005.<br />
11 The president of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Constitutional Court, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Vučetić, said<br />
that a direct vote by the citizens was obligatory concern<strong>in</strong>g a ch<strong>an</strong>ge of borders or<br />
detachment of territory. ‘Any referendum decision would be b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on the political<br />
leaderships of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> union,’ said Vučetić, who drafted the Milošević<br />
Constitution. (Politika, 20 November 2005). Koštunica’s adviser Aleks<strong>an</strong>adar Simić said<br />
that the ‘possibility of a referendum vote by the citizens on the status of Kosovo ought<br />
to be a focus of public consideration.’<br />
452<br />
453
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Council Meet<strong>in</strong>g 12 that the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s would be offered autonomy from<br />
Belgrade <strong>in</strong> most affairs of daily life ‘on condition that they accept the same<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of autonomy <strong>for</strong> the Serb entity’.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Tadić, the Serb entity would comprise the present <strong>an</strong>d<br />
newly-established municipalities ‘with a clear Serb majority’. The new<br />
municipalities would be established <strong>in</strong> northern Mitrovica, central Kosovo, the<br />
Morava river valley <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, <strong>an</strong>d Metohija. The Serb entity would <strong>in</strong>clude<br />
the ‘most import<strong>an</strong>t centres of the Orthodox faith <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija such<br />
as the Patriarchate of Peć, [Monastery of] Deč<strong>an</strong>i, [Church of] Bogorodica<br />
Ljeviška, [Monastery of] the Holy Arch<strong>an</strong>gels <strong>an</strong>d Devič [Monastery], with safe<br />
zones around them.’ It is further said that <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g the safe zones one<br />
should ‘take account of the justified dem<strong>an</strong>ds of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church<br />
<strong>for</strong> the restitution of property taken away by nationalization after the Second<br />
World War.’ The competence of local self-government authorities would<br />
encompass full cultural autonomy (education, media, culture, protection of<br />
religious <strong>an</strong>d cultural monuments; right to special <strong>in</strong>stitutional relations <strong>in</strong><br />
these fields), self-government <strong>in</strong> health care (specific competence <strong>in</strong> the spheres<br />
of social welfare <strong>an</strong>d pension <strong>in</strong>sur<strong>an</strong>ce; right to receive material <strong>an</strong>d<br />
personnel assist<strong>an</strong>ce from Belgrade). ‘Regard<strong>in</strong>g decisions of the [Kosovo]<br />
parliament concern<strong>in</strong>g vital <strong>in</strong>terests of the Serb community, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
adoption of prov<strong>in</strong>cial legislation, it ought to be provided that a decision<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not be valid if not voted also by the majority of deputies of Serb<br />
nationality,’ the Proposal says. 13<br />
The Tadić pl<strong>an</strong> tallies with the Serbi<strong>an</strong> government’s Pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> Political<br />
Solution of the Situation <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija adopted on 29 March 2004 14<br />
(<strong>an</strong>d approved by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly <strong>in</strong> April 2004), as well as with other<br />
documents concern<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo. This was confirmed by the prime m<strong>in</strong>ister’s<br />
adviser Slobod<strong>an</strong> Samardžić, who expla<strong>in</strong>ed that the term ‘Serb entity’ used <strong>in</strong><br />
the Tadić pl<strong>an</strong> was compatible with the ‘previously adopted st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t on the<br />
necessity of establish<strong>in</strong>g the autonomous status of Serbs <strong>an</strong>d other non-<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija’. 15<br />
Although the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side 16 denies that it w<strong>an</strong>ts a divided Kosovo, the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s fear rightly that the pl<strong>an</strong>s envisag<strong>in</strong>g the establishment of entities<br />
12 February 2006.<br />
13 Večernje novosti, 25 November 2005.<br />
14 The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly un<strong>an</strong>imously approved the Pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> Political Solution<br />
of the Situation <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija on 20 April 2004. The pl<strong>an</strong> envisaged a division<br />
<strong>in</strong>to entities on the model of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. The pl<strong>an</strong> denounces the 1974<br />
Constitution under which Kosovo enjoyed the widest possible degree of autonomy, the<br />
government consider<strong>in</strong>g that arr<strong>an</strong>gement ‘not rational <strong>an</strong>d just’.<br />
15 Politika, 25 November 2005.<br />
16 The Serbi<strong>an</strong> president’s adviser, Duš<strong>an</strong> Bataković, who proposed a<br />
c<strong>an</strong>tonization of Kosovo as far back as 1998, argues that the Tadić pl<strong>an</strong> does not aim <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
seek to lay the foundations <strong>for</strong> a division of Kosovo or <strong>for</strong> its federalization<br />
along the l<strong>in</strong>es of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a, a solution likely to render the<br />
Kosovo <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d society dysfunctional. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> side has been <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
a territorial arr<strong>an</strong>gement <strong>for</strong> the Kosovo Serbs on the model of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a s<strong>in</strong>ce the end of the NATO <strong>in</strong>tervention, though pl<strong>an</strong>s <strong>for</strong><br />
divid<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>in</strong>to entities go back further th<strong>an</strong> that, there be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dications<br />
that Serbi<strong>an</strong> academic circles exert<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fluence on the government <strong>in</strong><br />
particular had been work<strong>in</strong>g on them. 17 After 17 March 2004 the Serbs<br />
succeeded <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g the issue of a decentralization based on ethnic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
as part of the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g process of Kosovo’s status. 18 S<strong>in</strong>ce the war, the Serbs<br />
have striven to legalize the enclaves <strong>an</strong>d to weave them together <strong>in</strong>to a<br />
compact territory effectively <strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> entity.<br />
The president of the Coord<strong>in</strong>ation Centre <strong>for</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija,<br />
S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić, says that ‘official Belgrade looks upon the northern part<br />
of Kosovska Mitrovica as a model that may help the Serbs to stay <strong>an</strong>d live<br />
there’. She said that, tak<strong>in</strong>g northern Mitrovica as a model, ‘the object of the<br />
pl<strong>an</strong> of the government of Serbia is to protect the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Serb <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
non-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> population <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce through a system of territorial<br />
wholes’. 19<br />
The Union of Serb Municipalities <strong>in</strong> Kosovo (the Serb National<br />
Council of Northern Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d the Serb National Council of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Metohija) advocates a concept whereby the Serbs would be represented <strong>in</strong> 18<br />
newly-established municipalities on 38 per cent of the territory of Kosovo,<br />
correspond<strong>in</strong>g to the percentage of l<strong>an</strong>d it alleges to be <strong>in</strong> Serb private<br />
ownership. Of these, 16 municipalities would be purely Serb <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g two made up of members of the Gor<strong>an</strong>i <strong>an</strong>d Muslim communities.<br />
a division of Kosovo because the ‘Serb municipalities, both new <strong>an</strong>d old, are territorially<br />
unconnected <strong>an</strong>d scattered all over the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce; their l<strong>in</strong>ks would be functionally<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutional though not territorial, which <strong>in</strong> itself rules out a division’. (An <strong>in</strong>terview<br />
with D<strong>an</strong>as, 3 December 2005).<br />
17 After the NATO <strong>in</strong>tervention, Kosovo officers discovered <strong>in</strong> the Highway<br />
Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, which had been under Serb control <strong>for</strong> years, maps <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g roads<br />
that would be built only through Metohija to <strong>in</strong>terconnect the Serb areas.<br />
18 Koštunica’s adviser Slobod<strong>an</strong> Samardžić: ‘The issue of decentralization is<br />
closely bound up with that of status. We don’t wish to determ<strong>in</strong>e the position of the<br />
Serbs <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce be<strong>for</strong>e the status is determ<strong>in</strong>ed. This is why UNMIK <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Kosovo government are do<strong>in</strong>g all they c<strong>an</strong> to by-pass us <strong>in</strong> talks concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
decentralization <strong>an</strong>d the position of the Serbs. It’s not that we are not tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> talks<br />
because we do not w<strong>an</strong>t to, but because UNMIK will not let us. And the reason they<br />
won’t let us is because the whole th<strong>in</strong>g h<strong>in</strong>ges on the question of decentralization.<br />
UNMIK must not cave <strong>in</strong> to the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> pressure.’ (‘Unmik u p<strong>an</strong>ici’, Večernje novosti,<br />
17 March 2005).<br />
19 ‘U potrazi za modelom opst<strong>an</strong>ka Srba na Kosovu’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 24 September<br />
2005.<br />
454<br />
455
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
These municipalities would be <strong>in</strong>terconnected. All of them would also be<br />
connected with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d would no longer exist as enclaves. There are pl<strong>an</strong>s<br />
to build roads to l<strong>in</strong>k the newly-established municipalities together.<br />
The president of the SNC Executive <strong>Committee</strong>, Drag<strong>an</strong> Velić, says<br />
that the ‘territory of these municipalities would have to be compact...We aren’t<br />
<strong>in</strong>terested only <strong>in</strong> local self-government <strong>in</strong> the municipalities, we dem<strong>an</strong>d<br />
subst<strong>an</strong>tial autonomy with<strong>in</strong> this territory: charge of the judiciary, <strong>security</strong>,<br />
health care, education <strong>an</strong>d religion’. 20<br />
This <strong>in</strong>dicates that the Serbi<strong>an</strong> side has effectively given up the idea of<br />
Serbs return<strong>in</strong>g to certa<strong>in</strong> parts of Kosovo, particularly to Prišt<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
large towns. S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić says that it would be more realistic <strong>for</strong> Serbs<br />
to return to Grač<strong>an</strong>ica ‘which is <strong>in</strong> the vic<strong>in</strong>ity of Prišt<strong>in</strong>a, to turn it <strong>in</strong>to a Serb<br />
centre <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>for</strong>tify the <strong>in</strong>tellectual <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> potential that exists there. We<br />
must become realists. It’s a great pity that the towns are lost, but that’s not our<br />
fault’.<br />
Decentralization on ethnic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples was me<strong>an</strong>t to be used by the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> side as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument <strong>for</strong> a possible carve-up of Kosovo <strong>in</strong> the future.<br />
But this possibility is ruled out <strong>for</strong> now by the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community that Kosovo c<strong>an</strong>not be divided.<br />
The G17 Plus party is the chief advocate of the creation of two entities<br />
<strong>in</strong>to which Kosovo would eventually be divided. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> deputy prime<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ister, Miroljub Labus, proposed as early as 2004 that the Serb entity should<br />
comprise the Northern Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Kosovsko Pomoravlje regions. Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the Labus proposal, the sovereignty of the entire territory of Kosovo would<br />
have provisional Europe<strong>an</strong> guar<strong>an</strong>tees pend<strong>in</strong>g EU membership, <strong>an</strong><br />
arr<strong>an</strong>gement whereby the EU would take over from the UN, with Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Serbia exercis<strong>in</strong>g partial sovereignty over the respective entities. Čedomir<br />
Antić of G17 Plus suggested that the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s should be offered autonomy; if<br />
they do not accept this, then they should be offered <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> three<br />
stages: first, the creation of two entities; second, evaluation of the<br />
implementation of st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>in</strong> both entities over five years; <strong>an</strong>d third,<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporation of the Serb entity with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the proclamation of the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of the second entity. 21<br />
A solution was also put <strong>for</strong>ward by the <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>an</strong>d president<br />
of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Renewal Movement (SPO), Vuk Drašković, who considers that<br />
Kosovo should be modelled on South Tyrol <strong>in</strong> Italy. This solution would<br />
provide <strong>for</strong> positive discrim<strong>in</strong>ation towards the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> relation to the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> majority as well as <strong>for</strong> Kosovo’s rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> Serbia. Drašković<br />
also called <strong>for</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> majority the rights offered the Republic of<br />
Serb Kraj<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Republika Srpska under the Z4 pl<strong>an</strong> (own parliament,<br />
20 ‘Briše etničko čišćenje’, Večernje novosti, 28 September 2005.<br />
21 Večernje novosti, 20 November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
president, currency, police, judiciary, <strong>in</strong>dependent representation on<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational org<strong>an</strong>izations save those symboliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>state</strong> sovereignty such as<br />
the UN).<br />
The idea of establish<strong>in</strong>g a Serb <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> entity <strong>an</strong>d divid<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Kosovo accord<strong>in</strong>gly dates from the mid-1990s. Academic Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Despić,<br />
<strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, proposed the idea publicly <strong>in</strong> 1996. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the NATO<br />
<strong>in</strong>tervention, the most <strong>in</strong>fluential ideologue of modern Serb nationalism,<br />
Dobrica Ćosić, 22 suggested that the large Serb monasteries should become the<br />
centres of small <strong>state</strong>s such as S<strong>an</strong> Mar<strong>in</strong>o; the Serb parts <strong>in</strong> northern Kosovo<br />
would be jo<strong>in</strong>ed to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the southern Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> majority regions<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporated with Alb<strong>an</strong>ia or with <strong>an</strong> autonomous Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>. In his book<br />
Kosovo, Ćosić proposes the follow<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e of action: ‘For nearly two decades I<br />
have been conv<strong>in</strong>ced that Kosovo is Serbia’s c<strong>an</strong>cerous wound <strong>an</strong>d ought to be<br />
excised while sav<strong>in</strong>g the Patriarchate of Peć, Deč<strong>an</strong>i, Grač<strong>an</strong>ica <strong>an</strong>d the ethnic<br />
space <strong>in</strong> the pla<strong>in</strong> of Kosovo around Grač<strong>an</strong>ica. [Slobod<strong>an</strong>] Milošević <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
majority of Serbi<strong>an</strong> politici<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those from the opposition have had<br />
no courage <strong>for</strong> such "national treason", hence the use of army <strong>an</strong>d police to<br />
deal with the Kosovo question. Either a war with the Kosovo Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s or a<br />
gradual capitulationist surrender of Kosovo to Alb<strong>an</strong>ia is now <strong>in</strong>evitable.’ 23<br />
A spatial pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g expert, Br<strong>an</strong>islav Krstić, proposed establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong><br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> area hav<strong>in</strong>g a special status (a ‘safe area’ on the model of the V<strong>an</strong>ce-<br />
Owen Pl<strong>an</strong>) <strong>in</strong> parts <strong>in</strong> which Serbia could not exercise its control, with Serb<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> historical territories <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the mother <strong>state</strong>. Call<strong>in</strong>g<br />
this a ‘spatial rearr<strong>an</strong>gement’ rather th<strong>an</strong> a division, he argues that it is<br />
warr<strong>an</strong>ted by the need to realize the historical right of the Serbs <strong>an</strong>d the ethnic<br />
right of the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. A reordered Kosovo would rema<strong>in</strong> a prov<strong>in</strong>ce with<strong>in</strong><br />
22 Dobrica Ćosić was criticized by the president of the Serb National Council,<br />
Radmila Trajković, because ‘he is known to be beh<strong>in</strong>d [Nebojša] Čović’. She said she had<br />
satisfied herself that ‘Ćosić exerted <strong>in</strong>fluence on the editorial policy of the RTS <strong>state</strong><br />
ch<strong>an</strong>nel <strong>an</strong>d that he was ‘<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the go<strong>in</strong>gs-on <strong>in</strong> the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Patriarchate <strong>in</strong><br />
connection with Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija’. ‘The decentralization project offers the removal<br />
of the Serbs from the central parts of Kosovo: this is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t strategic <strong>in</strong>terest of the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d it is clearly denoted <strong>in</strong> the document of the Kosovo Protection Corps; it<br />
was also the subject of a political discussion of the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> leaders, who publicly<br />
offered Belgrade a deal regard<strong>in</strong>g the evacuation of central Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d its exch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>for</strong><br />
territories border<strong>in</strong>g on central Serbia. Ćosić came out advocat<strong>in</strong>g the right to selfdeterm<strong>in</strong>ation<br />
<strong>for</strong> Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s as far as Zveč<strong>an</strong>, which is unnecessary at this juncture. He<br />
has very powerful mech<strong>an</strong>isms at his disposal, I don’t know where they lie, but they’re<br />
stupendous. I know that he harboured a considerable <strong>an</strong>imosity towards Bishop<br />
Artemije, as it turned out there were some embarrass<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs go<strong>in</strong>g on at Bishop<br />
Artemije’s expense although he <strong>an</strong>d the eparchy are the ma<strong>in</strong>stay of Serb survival. As to<br />
other Serb <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, we just haven’t got them.’ (D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Rada Trajković:<br />
Akademik utiče na RTS i SPC’, 17 August 2005).<br />
23 Quotes from D<strong>an</strong>as, 30 November 2005.<br />
456<br />
457
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Serbia under the aegis of <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>for</strong>ces. 24 The closest to this proposal is<br />
Nebojša Čović, the <strong>for</strong>mer president of the Coord<strong>in</strong>ation Centre <strong>for</strong> Kosovo<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Metohija, who is now campaign<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> President Tadić’s ‘entity approach’.<br />
On 20 November Čović’s Social Democratic Party published maps <strong>in</strong> support<br />
of divid<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo <strong>in</strong>to entities.<br />
‘More th<strong>an</strong> autonomy, less th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence’ was a <strong>for</strong>mula the<br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g circles mentioned most often dur<strong>in</strong>g 2005 as a solution <strong>for</strong> Kosovo’s<br />
status. It envisages no <strong>in</strong>ternational dependence <strong>for</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e no<br />
renam<strong>in</strong>g of Serbia’s borders with Macedonia <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>ia. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the<br />
president of the Coord<strong>in</strong>ation Centre, S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić, the <strong>for</strong>mula me<strong>an</strong>s<br />
that Serbia would have sovereignty <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo executive, judicial <strong>an</strong>d<br />
legislative power. The border would be guarded by Serbi<strong>an</strong> police <strong>an</strong>d fiscal<br />
<strong>an</strong>d customs policy would be tied to the <strong>state</strong>, that is, determ<strong>in</strong>ed centrally.<br />
There would be one defence m<strong>in</strong>ister, one <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>ister, <strong>an</strong>d one place <strong>for</strong><br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo at the United Nations. 25<br />
Political actors <strong>in</strong> Belgrade agree that there should be no dilemma<br />
between Serbia’s EU <strong>an</strong>d Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations <strong>an</strong>d resolv<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo’s<br />
status with<strong>in</strong> Serbia’s borders. President Tadić was explicit that not even<br />
Serbia’s membership of the EU could compensate <strong>for</strong> the loss of Kosovo. 26<br />
Koštunica’s adviser Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Simić po<strong>in</strong>ted out that ‘although entry <strong>in</strong>to<br />
NATO is essentially import<strong>an</strong>t to us, we c<strong>an</strong>not give up part of territory <strong>for</strong><br />
that reason. Although countries which are even smaller th<strong>an</strong> ours have not<br />
acceded to every dem<strong>an</strong>d, they are today nevertheless serious <strong>state</strong>s <strong>in</strong> their<br />
own right’. 27<br />
The Role of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g exerted a strong <strong>in</strong>fluence on the Kosovo Serbs <strong>for</strong> years, at<br />
the end of 2005 the SPC was effectively enabled to <strong>in</strong>fluence the settlement of<br />
Kosovo’s status <strong>for</strong>mally by hav<strong>in</strong>g its representatives on the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team. 28 The position of the SPC <strong>for</strong> the most part co<strong>in</strong>cides with<br />
Belgrade’s official policy on Kosovo.<br />
24 ‘Od razgr<strong>an</strong>ičenja preko uređenja prostora, k<strong>an</strong>tonizacije, do entiteta’, D<strong>an</strong>as,<br />
30 November 2005.<br />
25 D<strong>an</strong>as, ‘Srbiji suverenitet, Kosovu izvršna, zakonodavna i sudska vlast’, 22<br />
September 2005.<br />
26 Boris Tadić: ‘Serbia c<strong>an</strong>not accept the “quicker road to the EU <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge<br />
<strong>for</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija’ <strong>for</strong>mula because a compensation is to be ruled out...A quicker<br />
road to the EU c<strong>an</strong>not compensate <strong>for</strong> the loss of KiM [Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija]’. (‘Kosmet<br />
nije karta za EU’, Večernje novosti, 15 September 2005.)<br />
27 ‘Nema šargarepe za okupaciju’, Večernje novosti, 10 November 2005.<br />
28 Bishop Pahomije sat at the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table at a time when he was on trial<br />
charged with paedophilia.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The first meet<strong>in</strong>g of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team took place on 6<br />
December <strong>an</strong>d was attended by members of the Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija<br />
<strong>Committee</strong> of the SPC Holy Assembly of Bishops, headed by Patriarch Pavle.<br />
The meet<strong>in</strong>g was org<strong>an</strong>ized at Patriarch Pavle’s request to discuss church,<br />
private <strong>an</strong>d socially-owned property <strong>in</strong> Kosovo. The meet<strong>in</strong>g agreed to<br />
establish cooperation between the SPC <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>an</strong>d the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team<br />
with a view to <strong>an</strong> ‘adequate response to the challenges the negotiations will<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g’. The SPC <strong>in</strong>sists that restitution of church property should be <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegral<br />
part of the future status talks.<br />
The SPC was the first <strong>in</strong>stitution to <strong>an</strong>nounce, <strong>in</strong> early November<br />
2005, that <strong>an</strong>y declaration of Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence would be regarded as <strong>an</strong><br />
occupation of a part of Serbi<strong>an</strong> territory, Patriarch Pavle say<strong>in</strong>g on the occasion<br />
that <strong>an</strong> ‘act of grabb<strong>in</strong>g KiM [Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija] from Serbia, however<br />
covert, would essentially have the character of <strong>an</strong> occupation’. The Holy<br />
Assembly of Bishops <strong>an</strong>nounced that a solution could not be imposed<br />
unilaterally, nor be the result of a territorial rearr<strong>an</strong>gement, because such <strong>an</strong><br />
outcome would trigger mass evacuation of population <strong>an</strong>d renewed tensions<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Balk<strong>an</strong>s. It concluded that <strong>in</strong> the event of <strong>an</strong> imposed settlement the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Assembly would have to ‘enunciate to the whole people that <strong>an</strong><br />
illegitimate <strong>an</strong>d illegal occupation of a part of our national territory has been<br />
carried out’. An almost identical rhetoric was later adopted by the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Belgrade elites <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica.<br />
The close nexus between the <strong>state</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d the SPC is also <strong>in</strong><br />
evidence at numerous gather<strong>in</strong>gs devoted to Kosovo. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, on 19<br />
November 2005, the Assembly of Serb Youth <strong>an</strong>d the periodical Srpske dveri<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>an</strong> event <strong>in</strong> Belgrade’ large Hall of Trade Unions that was attended<br />
by high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g SPC dignitaries (Bishops At<strong>an</strong>asije <strong>an</strong>d Teodosije) <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong><br />
officials (S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić), its message be<strong>in</strong>g that the ‘crucified Kosovo is<br />
the only th<strong>in</strong>g on which we c<strong>an</strong> be united. It is the foundation stone of our<br />
future, <strong>for</strong> it is on our attitude towards such a Kosovo that our future<br />
depends’.<br />
The nexus between the SPC <strong>an</strong>d the <strong>state</strong> is confirmed by Đorđe<br />
Vukad<strong>in</strong>ović, a political <strong>an</strong>alyst close to the DSS <strong>an</strong>d the prime m<strong>in</strong>ister:<br />
‘People <strong>in</strong> these parts do not realize how import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d signific<strong>an</strong>t Church<br />
attitudes <strong>an</strong>d the Church as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution are regard<strong>in</strong>g Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d world<br />
public op<strong>in</strong>ion. While I am not sure that the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team ought to have<br />
started out as it did, the question of protect<strong>in</strong>g our large s<strong>an</strong>ctuaries is certa<strong>in</strong><br />
to figure at the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g talks as a major argument work<strong>in</strong>g to Belgrade’s<br />
adv<strong>an</strong>tage along with <strong>in</strong>ternational law. This is why it was import<strong>an</strong>t to<br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ate the policy of the <strong>state</strong> team with the Kosovo church committee <strong>an</strong>d<br />
to set up a coord<strong>in</strong>ator. The few concessions Belgrade will be able to get will<br />
concern precisely the question of protect<strong>in</strong>g the s<strong>an</strong>ctuaries <strong>an</strong>d church<br />
458<br />
459
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
property.’ 29 This attitude was reaffirmed by the Serbi<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ister of religion,<br />
Mil<strong>an</strong> Radulović, who said that ‘we must realize that Serbia is as strong <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija as the SPC is strong <strong>in</strong> that space’. 30<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Opposition <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy <strong>in</strong> 1989 there has been no<br />
dialogue on Kosovo <strong>in</strong> Serbia, with alternative op<strong>in</strong>ions aired only at the p<strong>an</strong>el<br />
discussions <strong>an</strong>d with<strong>in</strong> the circles of a small number of nongovernmental<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations. On the political stage, alternative op<strong>in</strong>ions on Kosovo’s status<br />
have been expressed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of Serbia (GSS), the Social Democratic Union (SDU), <strong>an</strong>d certa<strong>in</strong> small parties<br />
<strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. The LDP, founded <strong>in</strong> November 2005, <strong>state</strong>s <strong>in</strong> its programmatic<br />
document that it espouses <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo; it <strong>an</strong>d the GSS hold that the<br />
Kosovo Serbs should be gr<strong>an</strong>ted the status of a constituent people <strong>an</strong>d able to<br />
exercise the veto regard<strong>in</strong>g crucial issues such as accession to Alb<strong>an</strong>ia.<br />
At a meet<strong>in</strong>g at which the plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> talks was put to the vote, the<br />
government’s attitude to the question of Kosovo was effectively criticized only<br />
by the GSS <strong>an</strong>d SDU leaders, Nataša Mićić <strong>an</strong>d Žarko Korać. They hold the<br />
regime of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević responsible <strong>for</strong> the present situation of the Serbs.<br />
GSS president Nataša Mićić said that priority <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g the status<br />
of Kosovo ought to be attached to <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>an</strong>d peoples rather th<strong>an</strong> to<br />
territories. She th<strong>in</strong>ks that the Kosovo Serbs ought to turn to the Kosovo<br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d to deal with their problems there if they do not w<strong>an</strong>t to isolate<br />
themselves <strong>in</strong> a ghetto. 31 Speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Assembly, she said that Serbia should<br />
pursue a policy of help<strong>in</strong>g people <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija to live better as a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>an</strong>d as <strong>in</strong>dividuals, as well as striv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the negotiations to ensure <strong>an</strong><br />
extraterritorial status <strong>for</strong> the monasteries <strong>an</strong>d protection of the cultural<br />
heritage.<br />
Also address<strong>in</strong>g the Assembly, SDU leader Žarko Korać described the<br />
government’s resolution as unrealistic ‘because those who brought Kosovo<br />
<strong>in</strong>to the present <strong>state</strong> of affairs are be<strong>in</strong>g amnestied <strong>an</strong>ew, [<strong>an</strong>d because] the<br />
advocacy of dialogue <strong>an</strong>d compromise is com<strong>in</strong>g very late’.<br />
On account of their positions, Mićić <strong>an</strong>d Korać were accused <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Assembly <strong>an</strong>d publicly of be<strong>in</strong>g traitors, a charge much used <strong>an</strong>d favoured by<br />
the Milošević regime. A fellow deputy, <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, told Korać that he would<br />
have ‘struck a chord had his address been <strong>in</strong> Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>’.<br />
Serbia.<br />
29 ‘Pravi sast<strong>an</strong>ak tek predstoji’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 December 2005.<br />
30 ‘Duhovni koreni orijentir budućnosti’, Politika, 23 September 2005.<br />
31 Srpsko-alb<strong>an</strong>ski dijalog 2005, p. 21, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović’s LDP <strong>state</strong>s <strong>in</strong> its programmatic document 32 that<br />
the ‘recognition of Kosovo by Serbia will ensure the Serbs the most favourable<br />
position <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong> constitutional-law terms’. The LPD also campaigns <strong>for</strong><br />
‘Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> recognition of the status of the Serb community as a constituent<br />
people with<strong>in</strong> Kosovo’. 33 Such a settlement of the status of Serbs with<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo implies ‘adoption of the Ohrid Agreement pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
complemented by a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of bilateral <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational guar<strong>an</strong>tees <strong>for</strong><br />
their observ<strong>an</strong>ce. The settlement would be <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong> a Constitutional<br />
Agreement between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo whereby Serbia would tr<strong>an</strong>sfer its<br />
sovereignty to Kosovo <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>for</strong> specific constitutional arr<strong>an</strong>gements <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo’. 34 The agreement would give the Kosovo Serbs the right to veto<br />
amendments to the Kosovo Constitution.<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>ović argues that Serbia has ‘neither political, nor economic, nor<br />
social, nor <strong>security</strong> capacity to adm<strong>in</strong>ister Kosovo <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests of the citizens<br />
who live there’. 35 In <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview with T<strong>an</strong>jug news agency, he said that<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija were already <strong>in</strong>dependent of Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d that the<br />
<strong>for</strong>ego<strong>in</strong>g was merely a <strong>state</strong>ment of the <strong>state</strong> of affairs on the ground. 36<br />
The Messages Sent to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Public<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> side persisted with the rhetoric that because Kosovo’s<br />
society is allegedly steeped <strong>in</strong> crime <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>capable of democracy the two<br />
communities must be kept apart. In corroboration of its argument, the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
side kept referr<strong>in</strong>g to the March 2004 violence aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serb community <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s were prepar<strong>in</strong>g a repetition. In the early stages of<br />
the talks it used the media to run down the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team, 37<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g a campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st the appo<strong>in</strong>tment of Maarti Ahtisaari as the UN<br />
Secretary General’s Kosovo talks envoy.<br />
A number of <strong>state</strong>ments <strong>an</strong>d messages carried by media, even by<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> politici<strong>an</strong>s, could be construed as racist talk. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, the<br />
Serb elites kept assur<strong>in</strong>g the Serbi<strong>an</strong> public that Kosovo would rema<strong>in</strong> with<strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia’s borders <strong>an</strong>d perpetuat<strong>in</strong>g the decades-old stereotypes about Kosovo<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g the cradle of the Serb people essential <strong>for</strong> its survival <strong>an</strong>d about the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s as its centuries-old enemy. It was these very stereotypes, used to<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ipulate public op<strong>in</strong>ion, on which Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević had built his policy.<br />
32 ‘Srbiji se radi - prvih deset poslova’, p. 14.<br />
33 Ibid, p. 14.<br />
34 Ibid.<br />
35 ‘Kosovom da upravljaju građ<strong>an</strong>i koji tamo žive’, D<strong>an</strong>as, 12 November 2005.<br />
36 ‘Kosovo nezavisno od Beograda’, Večernje novosti, 14 November 2005.<br />
37 At a time when the Serbi<strong>an</strong> team had not even been selected, Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
newspapers were full of texts alleg<strong>in</strong>g discord with<strong>in</strong> the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team.<br />
460<br />
461
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Like <strong>in</strong> the late 1980s, the Serb elites urged national unity, effectively<br />
suppress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>y dissent<strong>in</strong>g view not only <strong>in</strong> the Assembly but <strong>in</strong> public life as<br />
well. Thus the <strong>an</strong>alyst Đorđe Vukad<strong>in</strong>ović declared that the Democrats’<br />
<strong>in</strong>opportune arguments dur<strong>in</strong>g the Assembly debate on the Kosovo resolution<br />
<strong>an</strong>d their reserve towards it constituted a bad message to the <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>an</strong>d<br />
domestic public. He blamed this partly on the <strong>in</strong>ability of political actors to<br />
relegate their <strong>an</strong>imosities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terests to the background at least temporarily.<br />
He added that luckily the absence of votes aga<strong>in</strong>st the resolution had<br />
prevented a fiasco <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> embarrass<strong>in</strong>g situation <strong>in</strong> the Assembly. 38<br />
The <strong>in</strong>dividuals argu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> favour of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo risked<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g lynched. The attitude towards dissent<strong>in</strong>g op<strong>in</strong>ion became glar<strong>in</strong>gly clear<br />
when the <strong>for</strong>mer <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>ister, Gor<strong>an</strong> Svil<strong>an</strong>ović, said, <strong>in</strong> his capacity as a<br />
member of the Independent Commission on the Balk<strong>an</strong>s, that Kosovo ought to<br />
become <strong>in</strong>dependent. As a result, Svil<strong>an</strong>ović immediately became the target of<br />
attacks from various political circles differ<strong>in</strong>g only <strong>in</strong> terms of the l<strong>an</strong>guage<br />
they used.<br />
Thus the adviser to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> president, Leon Kojen, said: ‘Surely<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g must be amiss with the political elite of a people when someone<br />
who was <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>ister only a short while ago does not care a hoot about<br />
what was <strong>an</strong>d rema<strong>in</strong>s the policy of his country. Though, <strong>in</strong> Svil<strong>an</strong>ović’s case,<br />
this comes as no particular surprise.’ Kojen went on to recall <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident<br />
recorded by Mil<strong>an</strong> St. Protić <strong>in</strong> his book Izneverena revolucija (A Revolution<br />
Betrayed): at a d<strong>in</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> November 1999 with Richard Holbrooke, attended by<br />
representatives by the Alli<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>for</strong> Ch<strong>an</strong>ges, among others, Svil<strong>an</strong>ović was ‘the<br />
most vociferous, shout<strong>in</strong>g almost beside himself: "Rid us of Kosovo!"’ 39 At the<br />
time of Kojen’s critique, supporters of Bogoljub Karić’s Movement <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Strength of Serbia were past<strong>in</strong>g posters <strong>in</strong> downtown Belgrade carry<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
message ‘Stop the Break-up of Serbia’ <strong>an</strong>d display<strong>in</strong>g a map of Kosovo<br />
overlaid with a caption say<strong>in</strong>g ‘Sold’ <strong>an</strong>d a blurred photograph portray<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Gor<strong>an</strong> Svil<strong>an</strong>ović wear<strong>in</strong>g the traditional Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> cap with the letters UCK<br />
(Kosovo Liberation Army) on it. The SRS <strong>for</strong> its part filed a crim<strong>in</strong>al compla<strong>in</strong>t<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Svil<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>for</strong> ‘putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong>ward the view, as m<strong>in</strong>ister of <strong>for</strong>eign affairs,<br />
on the necessity of creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo’. The SRS charged <strong>in</strong> the<br />
compla<strong>in</strong>t that Svil<strong>an</strong>ović had committed the crim<strong>in</strong>al offence of<br />
end<strong>an</strong>germent of the territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity of SCG. Furthermore, a member of<br />
Karić’s movement, Boris Strajkovac, dem<strong>an</strong>ded that Svil<strong>an</strong>ović should be<br />
stripped of his m<strong>an</strong>date. Svil<strong>an</strong>ović left the DS parliamentary floor group on<br />
the grounds of his disagreement with the DS about Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
The report of the Independent Commission on the Balk<strong>an</strong>s was criticized by<br />
the representatives of all parties <strong>in</strong> the Assembly.<br />
38 Večernje novositi, 23 November 2005.<br />
39 ‘O Kosovu neće odlučivati ni Srbi ni Alb<strong>an</strong>ci’, Blic, 15 April 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The Serbi<strong>an</strong> president’s adviser, Duš<strong>an</strong> Bataković, was asked the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g suggestive question by a journalist of the weekly NIN: ‘What is the<br />
extent of the lawlessness <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, which is undeniable regardless of what<br />
UNMIK may say about it – <strong>an</strong> argument which may carry weight <strong>in</strong> the<br />
negotiations – <strong>an</strong>d does that strengthen Belgrade’s h<strong>an</strong>d?’ Bataković replied:<br />
‘The bal<strong>an</strong>ce of power is now ch<strong>an</strong>ged <strong>in</strong> that Serbia has become a l<strong>in</strong>chp<strong>in</strong> of<br />
stability <strong>an</strong>d dependable cooperation with the <strong>in</strong>ternational community,<br />
whereas Kosovo is aga<strong>in</strong> the dark Balk<strong>an</strong> boondocks where bloody local<br />
clashes, this time only between Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> elites, are recurr<strong>in</strong>g. All the same,<br />
whatever is bad <strong>for</strong> Kosovo is also bad <strong>for</strong> Serbia, <strong>for</strong> they are, after all, one<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ic whole kept together by almost unbreakable threads <strong>in</strong> spite of their<br />
great differences of mentality, chronic conflict <strong>an</strong>d opposite political<br />
aspirations.’ 40<br />
Those who dare to present views essentially contrary to Belgrade’s<br />
policy become the target of hate speech characteristic of the period of<br />
Milošević’s rule. Among the ma<strong>in</strong> bearers of the hate speech are the SRS,<br />
media, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>dividuals who c<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence public op<strong>in</strong>ion. The citizens are<br />
const<strong>an</strong>tly <strong>for</strong>ce-fed the message that Kosovo’s society is crim<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>capable of democracy <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e <strong>in</strong>capable of be<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>state</strong>, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s are depicted as a nation <strong>in</strong>ferior to the Serbs. Thus, the <strong>for</strong>mer head<br />
of the Coord<strong>in</strong>ation Centre <strong>for</strong> Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, Nebojša Čović, said:<br />
‘There’s no ch<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo surviv<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially or <strong>security</strong>wise.<br />
It will belong either to Serbia or to Alb<strong>an</strong>ia, but all that will become<br />
relative if we jo<strong>in</strong> the EU together.’ 41<br />
Čović’s successor <strong>an</strong>d official of the DSS, S<strong>an</strong>da Rašković-Ivić,<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ifests the same attitude toward the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. When after a visit to Kosovo<br />
<strong>in</strong> September 2005 she was taken ill, the media speculated that she might have<br />
been poisoned by Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s. She denied this with the words: ‘I certa<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
wasn’t poisoned. I stayed with Serbs, I ate from Serb plates, so poison<strong>in</strong>g<br />
wasn’t the cause of the compla<strong>in</strong>t.’ 42 Only the daily D<strong>an</strong>as condemned this<br />
<strong>state</strong>ment as racist.<br />
The citizens are also cont<strong>in</strong>ually assured that Serbia will be helped by<br />
its ‘old allies’ Russia, Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Greece to keep Kosovo. For <strong>in</strong>st<strong>an</strong>ce, on 2<br />
November the daily Večernje novosti published <strong>an</strong> article headl<strong>in</strong>ed ‘Of<strong>an</strong>ziva<br />
naše diplomatije na Moskvu i Pek<strong>in</strong>g – vera u stare saveznike’ (Our<br />
diplomacy’s offensive aga<strong>in</strong>st Moscow <strong>an</strong>d Beij<strong>in</strong>g – trust <strong>in</strong> the old allies), the<br />
message be<strong>in</strong>g that a ‘veto by Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Russia <strong>in</strong> the Security Council would<br />
prevent <strong>for</strong>mal <strong>in</strong>dependence of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija’. Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Vuk<br />
Drašković was quoted as say<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g his visit to Beij<strong>in</strong>g that ‘Taiw<strong>an</strong> is<br />
40 ‘Protiv defetizma’, NIN, 28 April 2005.<br />
41 ‘Kosovo ne može opstati nezavisno’, Blic.<br />
42 D<strong>an</strong>as, 26 September 2005.<br />
462<br />
463
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Ch<strong>in</strong>a, Kosovo is Serbia’. The daily further writes that ‘Russia <strong>an</strong>d Ch<strong>in</strong>a as<br />
perm<strong>an</strong>ent members of the UN Security Council c<strong>an</strong> prevent by veto <strong>an</strong><br />
attempt by Western countries to legalize the secession of Kosovo from Serbia.<br />
The eyes <strong>an</strong>d hopes of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> public <strong>an</strong>d politics have been focused on<br />
these two countries s<strong>in</strong>ce the Western political <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectual stage beg<strong>an</strong> to<br />
be seized with the idea that Kosovo ought to be given a k<strong>in</strong>d of autonomy.’<br />
In a 3 November 2005 article headl<strong>in</strong>ed ‘S kim ćemo u boj na Kosovo’<br />
(Who are we go<strong>in</strong>g to the Battle of Kosovo with) the high-circulation<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluential tabloid Kurir writes that Ch<strong>in</strong>a, Greece <strong>an</strong>d Russia will back the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> position on Kosovo. In this connection, SRS leader Tomislav Nikolić<br />
said: ‘Put<strong>in</strong> is a m<strong>an</strong> who’s not go<strong>in</strong>g to let us down! We have no other! Do we<br />
have other Russi<strong>an</strong>s? Do we have <strong>an</strong>other Put<strong>in</strong>? We don’t!’ To which S<strong>an</strong>da<br />
Rašković-Ivić added her assur<strong>an</strong>ces: ‘The Russi<strong>an</strong> Federation has from the very<br />
first been very clear concern<strong>in</strong>g respect <strong>for</strong> Resolution 1244 <strong>an</strong>d protection of<br />
territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>an</strong>d sovereignty. They figured it all out <strong>an</strong>d have on several<br />
occasions <strong>state</strong>d everyth<strong>in</strong>g that Serbia advocates.’<br />
On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, a number of public op<strong>in</strong>ion polls carried out by<br />
CeSID <strong>in</strong>dicated that more <strong>an</strong>d more citizens were resigned to the prospect<br />
that Kosovo will not rema<strong>in</strong> as part of Serbia. When asked whether they would<br />
like Kosovo to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Serbia they replied <strong>in</strong> the affirmative; but aga<strong>in</strong>, when<br />
asked whether that was realistic, more <strong>an</strong>d more of them replied that it was<br />
not. 43 In April, 45 per cent of respondents said they would like Kosovo to<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Serbia as <strong>an</strong> autonomous prov<strong>in</strong>ce or as a third member of the <strong>state</strong><br />
union, 34 favoured a division <strong>in</strong>to a Serb <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> part, 6 per cent<br />
w<strong>an</strong>ted the current <strong>state</strong> of affairs to cont<strong>in</strong>ue under prolonged UN<br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istration, 3 per cent thought the creation of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo <strong>state</strong><br />
would be a good outcome, <strong>an</strong>d 12 per cent were undecided. However, 26 per<br />
cent considered a Kosovo <strong>state</strong> realistic, 25 per cent were undecided, 21 per<br />
cent believed there would be a partition, 15 per cent envisioned Kosovo as <strong>an</strong><br />
autonomous prov<strong>in</strong>ce or as a third member of the <strong>state</strong> union, <strong>an</strong>d 13 per cent<br />
predicted a prolongation of the current <strong>state</strong> of affairs under a UN<br />
protectorate.<br />
Four months later, <strong>in</strong> August 2005, 55 per cent of respondents w<strong>an</strong>ted<br />
Kosovo to rema<strong>in</strong> a part of Serbia or SCG, 25 per cent supported a partition, 9<br />
per cent were undecided, 7 per cent supported Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>an</strong>d 4<br />
per cent were <strong>for</strong> the current <strong>state</strong> of affairs to cont<strong>in</strong>ue. On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, 34<br />
per cent believed the creation of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo <strong>state</strong> probable <strong>an</strong>d<br />
possible, 23 per cent were not sure whether that would happen, 20 per cent<br />
expected a division <strong>in</strong>to a Serb <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong> Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> part, 13 per cent w<strong>an</strong>ted<br />
Kosovo to rema<strong>in</strong> with<strong>in</strong> Serbia or SCG, <strong>an</strong>d 10 believed that the UN will<br />
rema<strong>in</strong> there <strong>for</strong> a long time to come.<br />
43 Večernje novosti, 29 November 2005.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
South Serbia <strong>in</strong> the Kosovo Status Context<br />
Stability <strong>in</strong> the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>-majority parts of southern Serbia (Preševo,<br />
Buj<strong>an</strong>ovac <strong>an</strong>d Medveđa) will rema<strong>in</strong> fragile until Kosovo’s status is def<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
In response to the Kosovo Serbs’ <strong>in</strong>sistence on territorial autonomy <strong>in</strong> Kosovo,<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> the establishment of territorial autonomy <strong>in</strong> southern Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
other parts of the Republic are grow<strong>in</strong>g. 44<br />
On 14 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005 the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> deputies <strong>in</strong> the municipalities of<br />
Preševo, Buj<strong>an</strong>ovac <strong>an</strong>d Medveđa adopted a Political Plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> the Region.<br />
They <strong>an</strong>nounced that <strong>in</strong> case the Contact Group pr<strong>in</strong>ciples on the future status<br />
of Kosovo were not respected, or <strong>in</strong> the event of a border ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> the Preševo<br />
Valley, they would strive <strong>for</strong> the region’s <strong>in</strong>tegration with Kosovo. Their<br />
Political Plat<strong>for</strong>m also urges the establishment of special ties between the<br />
Preševo Valley <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> the region to be arr<strong>an</strong>ged on <strong>an</strong><br />
adm<strong>in</strong>istrative-territorial pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. This is what the Kosovo Serbs w<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong><br />
themselves <strong>an</strong>d, of late, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
Towards the end of 2005, the Party <strong>for</strong> Democratic Activity of Riza<br />
Halimi, the recalled mayor of Preševo, <strong>an</strong>nounced a Political Declaration<br />
stat<strong>in</strong>g that the ‘Preševo Valley is a natural ethnic part of the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> people,<br />
upon whom have been imposed a way of life <strong>an</strong>d political decisions aga<strong>in</strong>st its<br />
will’. 45 The Preševo Valley Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s dem<strong>an</strong>d that their vital problems should<br />
be addressed simult<strong>an</strong>eously with the Kosovo status talks. The Belgrade<br />
government was also asked to demilitarize the Preševo Valley, pull out all<br />
special <strong>security</strong> <strong>for</strong>ces located there s<strong>in</strong>ce the withdrawal of Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong>ces<br />
from Kosovo, <strong>an</strong>d stop build<strong>in</strong>g military bases. Another dem<strong>an</strong>d concerns the<br />
establishment of a border police <strong>for</strong>ce reflect<strong>in</strong>g the ethnic composition of the<br />
population.<br />
The situation <strong>in</strong> the region has been made worse by the suspension of<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestments dur<strong>in</strong>g the past three years. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Halimi, assist<strong>an</strong>ce to<br />
44 Dem<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> territorial autonomy have also been made by the Hungari<strong>an</strong><br />
national m<strong>in</strong>ority. Three Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong> party leaders, Andras Agoston (DSVM),<br />
S<strong>an</strong>dor Pall (DZVM) <strong>an</strong>d Laszlo Ratz Szabo (GSM), have launched <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiative to gr<strong>an</strong>t<br />
the Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong>s ethnic autonomy on a territorial pr<strong>in</strong>ciple such as the ‘Serbs<br />
<strong>in</strong> Kosovo are likely to be given’. Andras Agoston: ‘In launch<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong>itiative we didn’t<br />
w<strong>an</strong>t to say that the Hungari<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a are hav<strong>in</strong>g as hard a time of it as the Serbs<br />
<strong>in</strong> Kosovo, only that we consider that a territorial autonomy, such as the Serbs <strong>in</strong><br />
Kosovo are likely to get, would be the right solution <strong>for</strong> us <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a too. If a<br />
territorial autonomy is <strong>an</strong> option <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, it would be the right solution also <strong>for</strong> us <strong>in</strong><br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a.’ (Večernje novosti, 30 November 2005.) A fourth Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Hungari<strong>an</strong> leader,<br />
Josef Kasza, asked <strong>for</strong> a territorial autonomy to unify eight municipalities <strong>in</strong> northern<br />
Bačka with a majority Hungari<strong>an</strong> population.<br />
45 ‘Pregovori i o jugu Srbije’, Večernje novosti, 17 October 2005.<br />
464<br />
465
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Preševo dried up ‘at the height of m<strong>an</strong>y works <strong>an</strong>d projects’. 46 ‘Neither has the<br />
economy been set <strong>in</strong> motion, nor have Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s started work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions,’ he alleged. 47 The <strong>for</strong>mer head of the Coord<strong>in</strong>ation Body <strong>for</strong><br />
Southern Serbia, Nebojša Čović, confirmed that all projects <strong>in</strong> the region had<br />
been suspended <strong>an</strong>d blamed the government <strong>for</strong> stopp<strong>in</strong>g the funds <strong>for</strong> their<br />
realization.<br />
A Regional Concern<br />
The countries <strong>in</strong> the region are of the op<strong>in</strong>ion that the issue of Kosovo<br />
should be resolved as soon as possible. But although the Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities<br />
<strong>state</strong> publicly that they have the support of most countries <strong>in</strong> the immediate<br />
neighbourhood, particularly Greece, none of these countries has <strong>state</strong>d its<br />
opposition to Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence so far. Notably, Greek Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Petros Molyvatis said <strong>in</strong> a meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Prišt<strong>in</strong>a attended by the Rom<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Croati<strong>an</strong> deputy <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>isters (Interbalk<strong>an</strong> Cooperation Delegations):<br />
‘We’re not here to suggest a solution. We rema<strong>in</strong> dedicated to the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<br />
<strong>an</strong>d guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>for</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>al status of Kosovo adopted by the UN, EU<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Contact Group.’ 48 There was also a proposal by Greece’s academic circles<br />
(Professor Ev<strong>an</strong>ghelos Kofos) to set up a ‘church adm<strong>in</strong>istrative-spiritual unit<br />
under the name Monastic Orthodox Community KiM’ enjoy<strong>in</strong>g ‘selfgovernment<br />
on the model of Mount Athos’. 49<br />
The Croati<strong>an</strong> government’s resolve to follow the policy of the EU <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the US was confirmed by, among others, Croati<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader.<br />
He said that his country would back <strong>an</strong>y decision by the EU <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational community because Croatia was obliged to do so as a c<strong>an</strong>didate<br />
<strong>for</strong> EU membership. 50<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Sali Berisha said that Kosovo’s status should<br />
be resolved ‘<strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the repeatedly expressed will of its people, which<br />
is <strong>in</strong>dependence’. Alb<strong>an</strong>ia supports full rights <strong>for</strong> the Serbs <strong>an</strong>d other<br />
m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, the return of displaced persons, real decentralization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
its implementation, <strong>an</strong>d a dialogue between Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Prišt<strong>in</strong>a.<br />
Slovenia’s President J<strong>an</strong>ez Drnovšek was among the first to say that<br />
the settlement of the Kosovo question lied <strong>in</strong> Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence. Dur<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
visit to Grač<strong>an</strong>ica, he observed that Kosovo was already <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
46 Halimi was recalled <strong>in</strong> November 2005 after serv<strong>in</strong>g as mayor of Preševo<br />
municipality <strong>for</strong> m<strong>an</strong>y years.<br />
47 ‘Ideje o odvaj<strong>an</strong>ju su igre vatrom’, Večernje novosti, 5 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005.<br />
48 ‘International community criteria as import<strong>an</strong>t as f<strong>in</strong>al Kosovo status, FM<br />
says’, quote from Athens News Agency, 7 December 2006.<br />
49 ‘Kosmet kao Sveta Gora’, Politika, 17 March 2005.<br />
50 D<strong>an</strong>iel Server’s conversation with Ivo S<strong>an</strong>ader, 20 July 2005;<br />
http:www.cfr.org/publication/8589/conversation_with_ivo_s<strong>an</strong>ader.htm<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
the Serb m<strong>in</strong>ority should be guar<strong>an</strong>teed two th<strong>in</strong>gs: protection of autonomy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d protection of religious <strong>an</strong>d cultural monuments with a view to their<br />
extraterritorial status. 51 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Drnovšek’s pl<strong>an</strong>, the UN mission would<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d over all power to the Prišt<strong>in</strong>a government with<strong>in</strong> eighteen months, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Kosovo would become <strong>in</strong>dependent with<strong>in</strong> five years provided it creates the<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> the peaceful life <strong>an</strong>d coexistence of all peoples liv<strong>in</strong>g there.<br />
Drnovšek’s scheduled visit was c<strong>an</strong>celled by Belgrade over these <strong>state</strong>ments.<br />
Bishop Ir<strong>in</strong>ej Bulović condemned Drnovšek’s <strong>state</strong>ments as ‘impermissible <strong>an</strong>d<br />
irrational’ <strong>an</strong>d Koštunica’s adviser Vladeta J<strong>an</strong>ković described them as <strong>an</strong><br />
‘example of un<strong>state</strong>sm<strong>an</strong>like behaviour’.<br />
Weighed down by the question of its own status, Montenegro did not<br />
comment on Kosovo’s status though a number of its officials said that the<br />
settlement of Kosovo’s status must not be delayed. Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Miodrag Vlahović said that although Kosovo was not Montenegro’s<br />
problem, Montenegro was <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> its earliest possible solution. 52<br />
Conclusions <strong>an</strong>d Recommendations<br />
Ignor<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>ternational context <strong>an</strong>d the reality <strong>in</strong> Kosovo, the rul<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Democratic Party of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d its coalition partners have not yet offered a<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e alternative to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Radical Party’s position on the Kosovo<br />
question <strong>an</strong>d the def<strong>in</strong>ition of Serbia’s borders. In view of the prevail<strong>in</strong>g<br />
position of the numerous <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>direct <strong>an</strong>d direct actors <strong>in</strong> the talks on<br />
Kosovo’s status – a position favour<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo’s <strong>in</strong>dependence – the lack of<br />
such <strong>an</strong> alternative is merely contribut<strong>in</strong>g to the radicalization of Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
politics <strong>an</strong>d by that very fact mak<strong>in</strong>g it possible <strong>for</strong> the SRS to exp<strong>an</strong>d its<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence.<br />
It is necessary to create the conditions <strong>for</strong> a free dialogue on Kosovo so<br />
as to hear <strong>an</strong>d recognize alternative views <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a political discourse <strong>in</strong><br />
favour of <strong>in</strong>dependence. Preparation of the public <strong>for</strong> realistic solutions is a<br />
precondition <strong>for</strong> the weaken<strong>in</strong>g of the SRS <strong>an</strong>d nationalistic options.<br />
Based on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the separation of Church <strong>an</strong>d State, the direct<br />
participation of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>in</strong> the Kosovo talks is<br />
impermissible. Solutions ensur<strong>in</strong>g the preservation of the Orthodox churches<br />
<strong>an</strong>d monasteries <strong>in</strong> Kosovo must be sought <strong>in</strong> a wider context given that they<br />
are not only part of Serb but also of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d world culture heritage.<br />
51 ‘Drnovšek: Kosovo de fakto nezavisno’, Politika, 13 November 2005.<br />
52 ‘Srpsko-Alb<strong>an</strong>ski dijalog’ (Serb-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Dialogue), Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
466<br />
467
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
MONTENEGRO:<br />
ON THE EVE OF THE REFERENDUM<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Constitutional Charter of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro,<br />
moratorium on a referendum relat<strong>in</strong>g to the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> status expires<br />
on 5 February 2006. And now Montenengro is resolved to exercise that right. As<br />
early as <strong>in</strong> 2001 Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d opposition were ready <strong>for</strong> the<br />
referendum. But EU then prevented that vehicle <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence of<br />
Montenegro <strong>in</strong> order not to encourage similar, <strong>in</strong>dependence-oriented<br />
aspirations <strong>an</strong>d claims of Kosovars <strong>an</strong>d upset a delicate bal<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong> the<br />
wake of downfall of Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević. By d<strong>in</strong>t of Belgrade Agreement,<br />
masterm<strong>in</strong>ded by Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a, the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro was<br />
<strong>for</strong>med.<br />
Creation of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro did not lessen the<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence claims of Kosovar Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s or stop the pro-<strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
process <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. Negotiations on the status of Kosovo start <strong>in</strong> February<br />
2006. Contrary to the predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t impression that Belgrade is focused on<br />
keep<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo with<strong>in</strong> Serbia, the priority of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav<br />
Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d conservative block <strong>in</strong> Serbia-is Montengro. Countries-members<br />
of the <strong>state</strong> union from the <strong>in</strong>ception thereof had different positions on <strong>an</strong><br />
already ambivalent Belgrade Agreement. Montenegro agreed to a m<strong>in</strong>imum of<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>stitutions, while Serbia jo<strong>in</strong>ed the union with the idea of unitariz<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
<strong>state</strong> <strong>for</strong>mation <strong>in</strong> the future.<br />
Due to decision of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> government <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary<br />
majority to hold a referendum <strong>in</strong> late April 2006, Brussels was compelled to<br />
take on the role of mediator <strong>in</strong> kick<strong>in</strong>g off talks between the authorities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
opposition. High EU representative Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a entrusted the Slovak<br />
diplomat Miroslav Lajček with that role.<br />
Official Belgrade keeps pil<strong>in</strong>g pressure on Podgorica to postpone the<br />
referendum <strong>an</strong>d renounce its resolve to go <strong>in</strong>dependent. Kostunica’s<br />
presentation of the list of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia to Brussels was<br />
seen as <strong>an</strong> attempt to impact the result of vot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d consequently to preserve<br />
the <strong>state</strong> union. However, the Venice Commission, <strong>an</strong> expert body of Council of<br />
Europe, <strong>in</strong> its recommendations issued at its December session, did not take<br />
<strong>in</strong>to consideration the proposal of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia.<br />
The Serb Orthodox Church throughout 2005 acted very aggressively <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro. In order to help preserve the <strong>state</strong> union the SOC openly sided<br />
with opponents of referendum <strong>an</strong>d directly assisted activities of the pro-Serb<br />
opposition <strong>an</strong>d the Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State. By erect<strong>in</strong>g a preprefabricated,<br />
metal, church atop of Rumija, the mounta<strong>in</strong> embody<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
multi-confessional character of Montenegro, the SOC openly showed its close<br />
ties with the army. The Serb Orthodox Church is one of the founders of the<br />
Council of National Assemblies, whose representatives (League <strong>for</strong> North)<br />
<strong>an</strong>nounced that <strong>in</strong> case of <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro they would proclaim<br />
their union with Serbia.<br />
High EU officials throughout 2005 tried to persuade the official<br />
Podgorica to postpone the referendum <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong>other 6 months. But they failed <strong>in</strong><br />
their <strong>in</strong>tent despite promises relat<strong>in</strong>g to the sign<strong>in</strong>g of Agreement on<br />
Stabilization <strong>an</strong>d Association. When that Agreement was f<strong>in</strong>ally signed <strong>in</strong><br />
October 2005, EU started a new campaign dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g amendments to the Act<br />
on Referendum with a view to mak<strong>in</strong>g more str<strong>in</strong>gent conditions <strong>for</strong> its hold<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
However, after the rul<strong>in</strong>g of the Venice Commission that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> law<br />
was <strong>in</strong> tune with the Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards, EU f<strong>in</strong>ally agreed to hold<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
referendum <strong>in</strong> late April 2006.<br />
Act on Referendum<br />
On 16 December 2005 the Venice Commission passed a Report<br />
assess<strong>in</strong>g that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Law on Referendum was harmonized with the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards. It also issued its basic recommendations: 50% turn-out of<br />
electorate should be reta<strong>in</strong>ed, Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia are to stay<br />
away from vot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d authorities <strong>an</strong>d opposition should agree on a necessary<br />
majority <strong>for</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g a decision on the <strong>state</strong> status.<br />
Those recommendations, notably the one stripp<strong>in</strong>g of the referendum<br />
vot<strong>in</strong>g right Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia were propped by the dem<strong>an</strong>d that<br />
"Serbia should not resort to disenfr<strong>an</strong>chis<strong>in</strong>g its citizens declar<strong>in</strong>g themselves as<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s or claim<strong>in</strong>g to be Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens." Those recommendations<br />
are of a paramount import<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> view of strong pressures piled on some<br />
members of the Venice Commission on the eve of its December session. James<br />
Lyons, Head of the Belgrade Office of International Crisis Group <strong>in</strong> those terms<br />
po<strong>in</strong>ted out the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "In talks wiht some members of the Venice<br />
Commission we learnt that EU brought to bear a large political pressure on<br />
them."<br />
Nicholas White, representative of the International Crisis Group,<br />
earlier assessed that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Law on Referendum which bore the<br />
brunt of attacks by the local opposition <strong>an</strong>d Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a, was satisfactory.<br />
When asked about the whys <strong>an</strong>d where<strong>for</strong>es of the EU criticism of that act,<br />
White warned: "Sol<strong>an</strong>a has very a very firm st<strong>an</strong>ce on that issue <strong>an</strong>d generally<br />
468<br />
469
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
speak<strong>in</strong>g has a very protective attitude towards the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>in</strong> which<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation he took part." 1<br />
As the referendum approaches, so the Serb pressures <strong>in</strong> regard to<br />
amendments to the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Act on referendum are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g. Added to<br />
that Belgrade has raised the issue of majority which should take a decision on<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence. Boris Tadić, President of Serbia, <strong>state</strong>d that decision on<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro "c<strong>an</strong>not be conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g unless it is taken by a<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g majority" <strong>an</strong>d warned that "a very small number of citizens <strong>in</strong> that<br />
referendum may take a decision lead<strong>in</strong>g to dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationally<br />
recognized <strong>state</strong>. " 2<br />
Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister's List<br />
The staunchest advocate of the <strong>state</strong> community is Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Vojislav Koštunica. That st<strong>an</strong>ce of his was best demonstrated by his tak<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
the list of 263,000 Montengr<strong>in</strong> citizens to the top Brussels officials, Xavier<br />
Sol<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Ollie Ren, as a crown evidence of non-feasibility of Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence. While h<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that list he <strong>state</strong>d: "This is <strong>an</strong> import<strong>an</strong>t<br />
evidence <strong>for</strong> the future Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum if it ever comes to pass".<br />
Along with the names of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia, the list<br />
<strong>in</strong>cludes the names of towns-a total of 176 towns <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the number of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> them (Ada - 72; Aleks<strong>in</strong>ac - 563; Aleks<strong>an</strong>drovac –<br />
210; Alibunar – 236 ...) The list also <strong>in</strong>cludes the names of 30,000 Kosovo<br />
citizens. As it was officially expla<strong>in</strong>ed the list was obta<strong>in</strong>ed by d<strong>in</strong>t of the last<br />
Serb census (census was not carried out <strong>in</strong> Kosovo s<strong>in</strong>ce 1981). In fact it is a<br />
Milosevic era list of voters drawn up dur<strong>in</strong>g the 90's host of elections.<br />
At play is obviously <strong>an</strong> attempt of the Serb government to prevent<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dpendence by "relocation" of the voters cont<strong>in</strong>gent from Serbia<br />
to Montenegro. S<strong>in</strong>ce the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> electorate totals 450,000 voters it is clear<br />
that with additonal 263,000 voters the outcome of referendum would be called<br />
<strong>in</strong>to question. Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister's move is illegitimate also from the constitutional<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dpo<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>for</strong> the Serb Constitution guar<strong>an</strong>tees confidentiality of personal<br />
data. The latter is also laid down by the republic<strong>an</strong> Act on Personals, "which are<br />
to be dislosed only if so agreed by the concerned persons." On the other h<strong>an</strong>d<br />
President of Serbia Boris Tadić <strong>an</strong>d President of the Radical Party Tomislav<br />
Nikolić assessed the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister's move as "justified <strong>an</strong>d legitimate."<br />
Podgorica daily Vijesti sharply criticized the st<strong>an</strong>d of President of<br />
Serbia, Boris Tadić, <strong>an</strong>d po<strong>in</strong>ted out that "Boris Tadić, who together with his<br />
father ( academici<strong>an</strong> Ljubomir Tadić, president of the Belgrade br<strong>an</strong>ch of<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State) <strong>in</strong>stigated that name-count<strong>in</strong>g, could as well<br />
f<strong>in</strong>d his name on that list." The daily concluded that Montenegr<strong>in</strong> President,<br />
1 Statement to agency Fonet <strong>in</strong> Podgorica, carried by Politika, 16 April 2005<br />
2 Blic, 23 December 2005<br />
470<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović, who sent a protest letter to Tadić, "now underst<strong>an</strong>ds that there<br />
is no person to whom he may compla<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Serbia." Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović also warned<br />
that "Vojislav Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d his government have mounted <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense<br />
campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st Montenegro." 3<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Samardžić, <strong>an</strong> adviser to the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, th<strong>in</strong>ks that<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens <strong>in</strong> Serbia have the vot<strong>in</strong>g right <strong>an</strong>d that "the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
authorities are discrim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st their citiznes <strong>an</strong>d eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> artificial<br />
division between the Serb <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> people." The same op<strong>in</strong>ion was<br />
voiced by the Serb M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>for</strong> the State Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d Local Self-Rule,<br />
Zor<strong>an</strong> Lončar. 4 Under the headl<strong>in</strong>e "Yellow Arm-B<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s" daily<br />
Večernje novosti r<strong>an</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g commentary: "If Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia c<strong>an</strong>not vote <strong>in</strong> a historic referendum, which would abolish both the 1918<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 1945 <strong>state</strong> creations, then what makes them citizens of Montenegro?<br />
Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović, <strong>in</strong> collusion with Marović, <strong>an</strong>d not Kostunica, are <strong>in</strong><br />
fact those bent on reduc<strong>in</strong>g their citizenship to a worthless chapel <strong>in</strong> their<br />
homel<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d are possibly pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> them genu<strong>in</strong>e yellow arm-b<strong>an</strong>ds.". 5<br />
Message which the other media tried to get across was the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
"Koštunica is try<strong>in</strong>g to expla<strong>in</strong> to Brussels that if Milo Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović has his way,<br />
<strong>in</strong> Serbia shall rema<strong>in</strong> a quarter of million of totally disenfr<strong>an</strong>chised voters." 6<br />
That campaign was also aimed aga<strong>in</strong>st Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
Namely that part of population was exposed to various status-related threats, if<br />
Montenegro went <strong>in</strong>dependent. Thus the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> the State Adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Local Self-Rule on 2 December 2005 posted on its Web site the<br />
recommendation that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens <strong>in</strong> Serbia be stripped of their<br />
vot<strong>in</strong>g right, "<strong>for</strong>, <strong>in</strong> case of referendum on <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro<br />
criterion of citizenship must prevail over criterion of residence." Blagota Mitrić,<br />
judge of the State Union court, responded to those threats by assert<strong>in</strong>g that "no<br />
m<strong>in</strong>istry c<strong>an</strong> strip citizens of their long-st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g rights." Mitrić also made it<br />
clear that "this was a classical <strong>for</strong>m of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, <strong>an</strong>d if someone <strong>in</strong>stituted<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>for</strong>e the Court of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, that position of the<br />
M<strong>in</strong>istry would be declared null <strong>an</strong>d void". 7<br />
Srdj<strong>an</strong> Darm<strong>an</strong>ović, member of the Venice Commission <strong>an</strong>d professor<br />
of the Podgorica Law Faculty, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that the issue of suffrage of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens was clarified: "They have been exercis<strong>in</strong>g their vot<strong>in</strong>g<br />
right <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>for</strong> 15 years now, <strong>an</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce the first parliamentary elections they<br />
voted <strong>in</strong> all referendums <strong>in</strong> Serbia. It is quite clear that they shall not be able to<br />
vote <strong>in</strong> Montenegro." Darm<strong>an</strong>ovic also underscored that "no <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
pressure c<strong>an</strong> make the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> government <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary majority<br />
3 Interview to BK TV, 14 July 2005<br />
4 Večernje novosti, 20 June 2005<br />
5 Večernje novosti, 21 June 2005<br />
6 NIN, 23 June 2005<br />
7 Monitor, 9 december 2005<br />
471
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
ch<strong>an</strong>ge their voters list, <strong>for</strong> it was established <strong>an</strong>d drawn up <strong>in</strong> co-operation<br />
with other bodies." 8<br />
Javier Sol<strong>an</strong>a's Tack<br />
Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a, a creator of the Belgrade Agreement, tried persistently<br />
to promote Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro as a functional <strong>state</strong>. In those terms he<br />
backed without <strong>an</strong>y reservations <strong>an</strong>d uncritically similar attempts made by<br />
Belgrade. But the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> reality flew <strong>in</strong> the face of claims made both by<br />
Sol<strong>an</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d official Belgrade. Though the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Charter <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Constitution clearly spell out that Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
outside the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> territory c<strong>an</strong>not vote <strong>in</strong> a Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum,<br />
Brussels kept send<strong>in</strong>g paradoxical messages. In its first reaction to Kostunica's<br />
list, EU pledged not get <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal issue, that is, not to voice its<br />
op<strong>in</strong>ion as to who may vote <strong>in</strong> a Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum. But then Sol<strong>an</strong>a<br />
threatened to resort to a "political decision," that is his cab<strong>in</strong>et communicated<br />
that "EU legal services are study<strong>in</strong>g the issue of the right of Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
citizens <strong>in</strong> Serbia to vote <strong>in</strong> a possible referendum <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, on which EU<br />
shall have to adopt a political decision.". But then, EU gradually stopped<br />
mention<strong>in</strong>g a political decision.<br />
One of EU-devised scenarios <strong>for</strong> the resolution of status of Montenegro<br />
was creation of the confederation of Kosovo, Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Serbia, along<br />
with a promise on its swift accession to EU. However, after a failed referendum<br />
<strong>for</strong> the EU Constitution <strong>in</strong> Fr<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds, the story about a swift<br />
accession of new members of EU disappeared from circulation. The second<br />
scenario was giv<strong>in</strong>g "compensation" to Serbia <strong>for</strong> its loss of Kosovo: that is,<br />
rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of Montenegro with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>state</strong> community (<strong>in</strong> early 90's that was the<br />
proposal made by Lord David Owen). In mid-2005 the rumour circulated<br />
among diplomatic circles that "a secret Kosovo-related trad<strong>in</strong>g with Serbia,<br />
<strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g Montenegro as a major chip, was under way with Serbia." 9<br />
It is ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the shift <strong>in</strong> EU st<strong>an</strong>ce happened because, <strong>in</strong>ter alia<br />
"Chris Patten's faction, advocat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro, prevailed<br />
over Sol<strong>an</strong>a's faction." 10 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to some <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, the gist of Sol<strong>an</strong>a's<br />
pl<strong>an</strong> <strong>for</strong> preservation of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro consists <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "if<br />
Serbia quickly h<strong>an</strong>ds over Mladic to the Hague Tribunal, EU shall stall<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration of Montenegro <strong>in</strong> case of its secession." 11<br />
EU <strong>in</strong>sisted on a 6-month postponement of referendum <strong>in</strong> view of the<br />
October 2006 sign<strong>in</strong>g of Association Agreement between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d EU. Brussels also suggested that "the process of stabilization<br />
8 Interview of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>, 14 December 2005<br />
9 Monitor, 1 July 2005<br />
10 Evropa, 10 February 2005<br />
11 Blic, 21 July 2005<br />
472<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>d association of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro should be prioritized with respect to<br />
a future referendum <strong>in</strong> Montenegro". Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Milo Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović rejected<br />
those suggestions because, accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, "the process of accession to EU<br />
should not be l<strong>in</strong>ked to other, current political questions, notably resolution of<br />
the <strong>state</strong> status of Montenegro." The official st<strong>an</strong>d of Montenegro is that the<br />
impend<strong>in</strong>g referendum would not hamper the sign<strong>in</strong>g of the said accession<br />
agreement, <strong>for</strong>, "EU is able to tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>m the tw<strong>in</strong> track process <strong>in</strong>to the parallel<br />
track one, <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro as a <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> may sign up to those<br />
agreements without delay."<br />
Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a tried to persuade Montenegro that "its expectations to<br />
jo<strong>in</strong> quckly EU as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> are sheer miscalculation." Later he<br />
<strong>in</strong>sisted on <strong>an</strong> amendment to the Act on Referendum relat<strong>in</strong>g "to a qualified<br />
majority <strong>in</strong> a possible referendum on the <strong>state</strong> status." 12 All attempts of Sol<strong>an</strong>a<br />
to contest referendum have always been meet by a hard l<strong>in</strong>e that "Montenegro<br />
shall not acccept <strong>an</strong>yone's attempt at arbitratr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d impos<strong>in</strong>g conditions <strong>for</strong><br />
referendum org<strong>an</strong>ization just <strong>for</strong> the sake of prevention of Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence".<br />
On the eve of the Venice Commission session, High EU Representative<br />
sent a letter to the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> opposition <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g them that "EU shall not<br />
accept <strong>an</strong>y one-sided move lead<strong>in</strong>g to non-cooperation of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
authorities <strong>an</strong>d opposition with EU <strong>an</strong>d other responsible <strong>in</strong>ternational bodies<br />
on questions relat<strong>in</strong>g to the establishment of <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>for</strong> the<br />
referendum." However, the letter also highlighted the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "We should<br />
wait <strong>for</strong> the assessment of the Venice Commission on whether the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
Act on Referendum is <strong>in</strong> harmony with <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards." 13<br />
Serbia Contests Montenegro's Independence<br />
Government of Serbia still expects that <strong>in</strong> the post-referendum period<br />
the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament would have to ch<strong>an</strong>ge its constitution by the twothird<br />
majority because of the ch<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>state</strong> status. However, Srdj<strong>an</strong><br />
Darm<strong>an</strong>ović, member of the Venice Commission <strong>an</strong>d Podgorica Law Faculty<br />
professor, says that as early as <strong>in</strong> 2002 the Constitutional Court of Montenegro<br />
ruled on that matter: "Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that rul<strong>in</strong>g of the Constitutional Court that<br />
is not a problem, <strong>for</strong> the two third majority is related to constitutional ch<strong>an</strong>ges,<br />
while, under Article 2 of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Constitution only citizens are<br />
empowered to decide on the ch<strong>an</strong>ge of <strong>state</strong> status <strong>in</strong> a referendum. Under the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Act on Referendum results thereof are b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> the parliament.<br />
That Act was contested be<strong>for</strong>e the Constitutional Court <strong>in</strong> 2002, <strong>an</strong>d the latter's<br />
rul<strong>in</strong>g confirmed its validity. "<br />
12 Beta Agency report from Podgorica, carried by Politika, 10 April 2005<br />
13 Blic, 1 December 2005<br />
473
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Darm<strong>an</strong>ović underscores that "it is difficult to expect that the citizens’<br />
votes would be contested <strong>in</strong> parliament, even by opponents of <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
Also, even if the Socialist Popular Party <strong>an</strong>d perhaps some pro-Serb parties <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro embark upon negotiations on referendum <strong>an</strong>d referendum is held<br />
on the basis of a compromise <strong>an</strong>d with EU presence, it would be difficult <strong>for</strong><br />
them to contest results of such a referendum." 14<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> President Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Milo<br />
Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović suggested to Serb President Boris Tadić <strong>an</strong>d Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister<br />
Vojislav Koštunica <strong>an</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce of sovereign <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized<br />
<strong>state</strong>s. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that proposal, the same-text agreement would be adopted<br />
by parliaments of member-<strong>state</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d parliament of the <strong>state</strong> union. Thus the<br />
<strong>state</strong> union would be declared null <strong>an</strong>d void. After that Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Serbia<br />
would recognize each other as <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong>s with all rights <strong>an</strong>d<br />
obligations stemm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> such <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent, <strong>in</strong>ternational-legal sovereignty.<br />
Instead of Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters the work of such alli<strong>an</strong>ce would be co-ord<strong>in</strong>ated<br />
by a Commission. Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro would <strong>for</strong>m a military alli<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d<br />
would have two armies, separate embassies <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong>eign m<strong>in</strong>istries. Serbia<br />
would be a successor of the State Union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational political org<strong>an</strong>izations.<br />
Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister rejected that proposal assess<strong>in</strong>g it "a gross breach<br />
of the Belgrade Agreement". Montenegr<strong>in</strong> President Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović then<br />
publicly posed the follow<strong>in</strong>g question: "Why Serbia does not w<strong>an</strong>t its own<br />
diplomacy, its own army, open borders. ?" 15 Representatives of parliamentary<br />
parties <strong>in</strong> Serbia then un<strong>an</strong>imously concluded that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities<br />
suggested <strong>an</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce of sovereign <strong>state</strong>s <strong>in</strong> order to avoid a referendum on<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence, though it is <strong>for</strong>eseen that citizens of Montengro must have their<br />
say about such <strong>an</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> a referendum relat<strong>in</strong>g also to the question of the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> status.<br />
An <strong>an</strong>ti-<strong>in</strong>dependence, official st<strong>an</strong>d of Belgrade is backed by the<br />
patriotic block. In those terms <strong>in</strong>dicative are <strong>state</strong>ments of personalities who<br />
share that st<strong>an</strong>d. For example, Srdja Trifković, Director of Centre <strong>for</strong><br />
International Relations of the US Rock<strong>for</strong>d Institute, said: "Duklja-size<br />
Montenegro would be the most zealous Ustashi country <strong>in</strong> the world", while<br />
Dragomir Acović, member of the Crown Council, <strong>state</strong>d that "In case of<br />
secession, Montenegro shall become Serbia’s greatest foe." 16<br />
Regardless of assur<strong>an</strong>ces that <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro essentially<br />
shall not ch<strong>an</strong>ge status of citizens from Serbia, barr<strong>in</strong>g their loss of vot<strong>in</strong>g right,<br />
the Belgrade press cont<strong>in</strong>ues to <strong>in</strong>timidate Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens <strong>in</strong> Serbia. In <strong>an</strong><br />
article headl<strong>in</strong>ed "Difficult employment <strong>for</strong> Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s", Belgrade daily<br />
Večernje novosti suggests to its readers the worsen<strong>in</strong>g of employment<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
conditions: "Citizens of Serbia, non-residents do the most difficult, low-<strong>in</strong>come,<br />
menial jobs <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. They are either employed as seasonal workers on<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g sites, dur<strong>in</strong>g grape-harvest<strong>in</strong>g, or they work as cooks, maids,<br />
cle<strong>an</strong>ers." 17<br />
Campaign <strong>in</strong> S<strong>an</strong>džak<br />
Anti-referendum campaign mounted by Belgrade has been exp<strong>an</strong>ded<br />
to S<strong>an</strong>dzak <strong>in</strong> a bid to persuade the locals, notably Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Bosniaks, of<br />
the necessity to preserve the <strong>state</strong> union. Mayor of Novi Pazar, Sulejm<strong>an</strong><br />
Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, has been entrusted with spearhead<strong>in</strong>g that campaign. In late<br />
November 2005 Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Vojislav Koštunica, together with his m<strong>in</strong>isters<br />
Predrag Bubalo <strong>an</strong>d Velimir Ilić visited Novi Pazar. Nearly at the same time<br />
Head of Security-In<strong>for</strong>mative Agency, Rade Bulatovic, paid a visit to Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
too.<br />
Koštunica asked Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong> to steer Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Muslims <strong>an</strong>d Bosniaks<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence, <strong>for</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, "<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>depnedent<br />
Montenegro shall be terribly harmful <strong>for</strong> the entire Bosniak people." Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong><br />
promised to do his utmost to persuade his fellow-nationals to vote <strong>for</strong> the<br />
common <strong>state</strong>.<br />
Belgrade media glossed over Kostunica's visit to Novi Pazar. On the<br />
other h<strong>an</strong>d the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> weekly Monitor ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that "the Serb Prime<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister had his reasons <strong>for</strong> hid<strong>in</strong>g his visit to Novi Pazar, <strong>for</strong> his pl<strong>an</strong> is to<br />
engage part of the Bosniak corps <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-referendum campaign <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro. Thus, it would be shown, above all to the <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
community, that <strong>in</strong> addition to Serbs <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, members of national<br />
communities also advocate the survival of common <strong>state</strong>. That is why a close<br />
co-operation was established with Sulejm<strong>an</strong> Uglj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, who, <strong>in</strong> exch<strong>an</strong>ge, was<br />
also promised assist<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> strenghten<strong>in</strong>g the st<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of his party.".<br />
To that <strong>an</strong>d similar <strong>an</strong>noucements, notably that Montenegr<strong>in</strong> police<br />
should be controlled dur<strong>in</strong>g referendum, Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Milo<br />
Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović responded <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g fashion: "That control shall be effected<br />
<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with Montenegr<strong>in</strong> law <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational practice". He also <strong>in</strong>dicated that<br />
it was <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that the secret police was mostly criticized by those<br />
who were not <strong>in</strong> the least concerned with various malractices of neighbour<strong>in</strong>g<br />
secret services. Djuk<strong>an</strong>ovic went on to note "those most critical of the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> secret police failed to touch on the Military-Security Agency talks<br />
<strong>in</strong> cab<strong>in</strong>et of Mitropolite Amfilohije <strong>an</strong>d attempts by certa<strong>in</strong> Belgrade services<br />
to tr<strong>an</strong>spl<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong> alleged Muslim-Bosniak st<strong>an</strong>ce on the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>in</strong> Rožaje." 18<br />
14 Interview of Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>, 14 December 2005<br />
15 Interview aired by BK TV, 14 July 2005<br />
16 “Impression of the Week” B 92 , talk show, 24 July 2005<br />
474<br />
17 Večernje novosti, 17 J<strong>an</strong>uary 2005<br />
18 Report by RT Montenegro, 26 December 2005.<br />
475
Independence: Pros <strong>an</strong>d Cons<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
December public op<strong>in</strong>ion poll <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, conducted by the Damar<br />
agency showed that most citizens favoured <strong>in</strong>dependence. Of total electorate,<br />
41% favoured <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> status, while 32% backed union with Serbia.<br />
Those percentages also <strong>in</strong>cluded the undecided voters <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to stay away<br />
from referendum. But if only pro <strong>an</strong>d contras are counted, like <strong>in</strong> a genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
vot<strong>in</strong>g process, then the result is 56% <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>an</strong>d 44% aga<strong>in</strong>st it. The<br />
most noticeable trend is a modest <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the number of advocates of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
Rul<strong>in</strong>g parties, Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) <strong>an</strong>d Social-<br />
Democratic Party are oriented towards the sovereign, <strong>in</strong>ternationally<br />
recognized <strong>state</strong> of Montenegro. In expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that at play is a natural process<br />
of restoration of the <strong>state</strong> status to the old Europe<strong>an</strong>-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong>, which<br />
had been gr<strong>an</strong>ted <strong>in</strong>dependence as early as at the 1878 Berl<strong>in</strong> Congress,<br />
representatives of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities through pro-active diplomacy <strong>in</strong> the<br />
world highlight adv<strong>an</strong>tages of <strong>in</strong>dependence, notably <strong>in</strong> terms of a more<br />
accelerated accession to Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegration, which, as regards the <strong>state</strong><br />
union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro has been slowed down.<br />
As regards re<strong>for</strong>ms Montenegro has done much more th<strong>an</strong> Serbia, the<br />
fact which is even recognized by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community: it has its own<br />
currency, its own customs <strong>an</strong>d trade system, <strong>an</strong>d fully controls its territory. In<br />
full respect of that reality on the ground, EU, two years ago <strong>in</strong> Mastricht, took a<br />
"tw<strong>in</strong> track" decision, which <strong>in</strong> fact me<strong>an</strong>t separate EU negotiations with Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong> economic sphere. The fact that EU is hold<strong>in</strong>g separate<br />
negotiations with the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> team on Association Agreement <strong>in</strong>dicates<br />
that Montenegro is draw<strong>in</strong>g closer to its <strong>in</strong>dependence.<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> Independent <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Montenegro, set up <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary<br />
2005, rallied the broadest possible circle of citizens of all faiths <strong>an</strong>d nations. Its<br />
leadership is made up of civili<strong>an</strong>s, <strong>for</strong>merly stiff opponents of wars <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
Yugoslavia <strong>an</strong>d hegemony-m<strong>in</strong>ded Greater Serbia Milosevic policy, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
currently opponents of those bent on cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g that policy <strong>in</strong> Serbia. In<br />
parallel with the government they pursue their own pro-referendum or pro<strong>in</strong>dependence<br />
campaign <strong>in</strong> all parts of Montenegro.<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State, which has been also <strong>for</strong>med <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro, though mak<strong>in</strong>g a legitimate dem<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> preservation of the union<br />
with Serbia, is doubly h<strong>an</strong>dicapped. First of all it is made of by parties bear<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
strong national hallmark, the Serb one. In fact it is composed of the pro-Serb<br />
opposition partes <strong>an</strong>d Serb associations <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. Secondly, it is openly<br />
backed by Belgrade, <strong>an</strong>d the Serb Orthodox Church, which took part <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong>mation of the Council of National Assemblies. The movement has its name-sake<br />
offshoot <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, headed by the Serb academici<strong>an</strong>s, masterm<strong>in</strong>ds of the Serb<br />
Academy of Sciences Memor<strong>an</strong>dum. The largest opposition Montenegr<strong>in</strong> party,<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Socialist Popular Party, (SPP) is not <strong>for</strong>mally a member of the Movement <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Common State, but makes part of its top leadership <strong>an</strong>d membership.<br />
That org<strong>an</strong>ization, established along one-party l<strong>in</strong>es, urges a<br />
centralized <strong>state</strong> with Serbia, due to, as highlighted, historical, cultural <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>security</strong> reasons. Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State highlights Serbhood <strong>an</strong>d<br />
denies existence of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> nation. The Movement is particularly<br />
active <strong>in</strong> underdeveloped parts <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> North of Montenegro. That org<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
basically pursues <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-referendum campaign, <strong>an</strong>d dem<strong>an</strong>ds the suffrage of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia. The movement backs its <strong>an</strong>ti-referendum<br />
campaign by a thesis about a high level of corruption <strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>ality among<br />
the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities.<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> Independent <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Montenegro<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> Independent <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Montenegro summed up its<br />
program <strong>in</strong> "10 po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence". It is underscored that "<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> empowers its people to decide their own fate", <strong>for</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to the Movement, "the world political, economic <strong>an</strong>d military order is made up<br />
of sovereign <strong>state</strong>s (UN, IMF, SC, NATO, WTO), <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Union is also <strong>an</strong><br />
union of sovereign <strong>state</strong>s."<br />
The second reason <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence is the fact that the <strong>state</strong> union<br />
with Serbia does not provide Monenegro with a full equality. The Movement's<br />
program says: "Our dilemma is not <strong>in</strong>dependence or <strong>state</strong> union, but rather<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence or disappear<strong>an</strong>ce of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong>hood <strong>an</strong>d identity,<br />
which me<strong>an</strong>s that Montenegro shall either become <strong>in</strong>dependent or become only<br />
part of the Serb <strong>state</strong>." That program also cautions: "Let us not be naïve, the<br />
current <strong>state</strong> community c<strong>an</strong>not last long. History does not know <strong>an</strong> equitable<br />
union of the two, so structurally different, <strong>state</strong>s. Serbia is 6 times bigger th<strong>an</strong><br />
Montenegro, has 11 times more citizens, <strong>an</strong>d its economy is 12 times larger.<br />
That is why <strong>an</strong> equitable, last<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d successful <strong>state</strong> union is not feasible."<br />
In the Movement's op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> shall have a swifter<br />
access to Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, <strong>an</strong>d "Montenegro because of its<br />
cohabitaiton with Serbia s<strong>in</strong>ce dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of the SFRY, has dist<strong>an</strong>ced itself<br />
from democratically progressive societies." The Movement's program also<br />
reads: "Beh<strong>in</strong>d us are m<strong>an</strong>y lost years <strong>an</strong>d a slowed-down process of return to<br />
the fold of <strong>in</strong>ternational community. For 15 years now we have been suffer<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the consequences of a destructive Serb <strong>for</strong>eign <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternal policy. The <strong>state</strong><br />
union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro is a metaphor <strong>for</strong> a bad community <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sluggish return to the fold of democratic world. Our experience tells us that<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence is <strong>an</strong> optimal road to the Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations. Sovereign<br />
Montenegro would immediately become a member of the UN, <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>in</strong>stitutions, Council of Europe, Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace. Such a<br />
Montenegro c<strong>an</strong> only accelerate its accession to Brussels <strong>an</strong>d EU."<br />
476<br />
477
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
The movement’s program furthermore underscores that <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> is a condition <strong>for</strong> friendly relations with Serbia, <strong>for</strong> a<br />
sovereign Montenegro is a condition <strong>for</strong> development of prosperous relations<br />
with Serbia. Such a st<strong>an</strong>d is expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g fashion: "Historical<br />
experience s<strong>in</strong>ce 1918 has clearly been warn<strong>in</strong>g us that the Greater Serbia <strong>state</strong><br />
policy does not contribute to prosperity of Montenegro. That is why we are<br />
conv<strong>in</strong>ced that Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence is the foundation stone <strong>for</strong> the<br />
future, best possible relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro. That<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence is the only way <strong>for</strong> remov<strong>in</strong>g causes hamper<strong>in</strong>g establishment of<br />
stable <strong>an</strong>d progressive relations between Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Serbia. All historical<br />
<strong>an</strong>d contemporary ties between Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Serbia only after constitut<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of the two <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong>s shall foster fruitful <strong>an</strong>d close political, economic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d cultural relations. And f<strong>in</strong>ally we shall leave beh<strong>in</strong>d us all the bad times,<br />
while the future belongs to the policy of open borders <strong>an</strong>d friendly Serb-<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> relations."<br />
The program also notes that size of Montenegro is it adv<strong>an</strong>tage, <strong>for</strong> the<br />
most developed <strong>an</strong>d stable Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>state</strong>s are the smallest ones (Isl<strong>an</strong>d,<br />
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Esthonia, Monaco, Lichenste<strong>in</strong>, Andorra, S<strong>an</strong> Mar<strong>in</strong>o.) It<br />
is also underscored that <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> is a guar<strong>an</strong>tee of economic<br />
development <strong>an</strong>d better liv<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>an</strong>dards of citizens, as well as, the best<br />
framework <strong>for</strong> preservation of a multi-ethnic society. After underscor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence as a prerequisite <strong>for</strong> self-respect <strong>an</strong>d self-confidence, as well as<br />
"the past which b<strong>in</strong>ds to <strong>in</strong>dependence", the program concludes that<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence would be confirmed <strong>in</strong> peace <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> a democratic way:<br />
"Throughout past century Montenegro three times ch<strong>an</strong>ged its <strong>state</strong> status (<strong>in</strong><br />
1918, 1945, 1992), <strong>an</strong>d each time under the war circumst<strong>an</strong>ces <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
undemocratic way. There<strong>for</strong>e after 87 years, the time is up <strong>for</strong> Montenegro to<br />
restore <strong>in</strong> peace <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> a democratic referendum its <strong>state</strong>. For the first time<br />
citizens of Montenegro shall vote <strong>for</strong> themselves <strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> a democratic return to<br />
the world family of <strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized <strong>state</strong>s. Independence shall put<br />
<strong>an</strong> end to <strong>an</strong> exhaust<strong>in</strong>g domestic political <strong>an</strong>d other divisions <strong>an</strong>d turn <strong>in</strong>to<br />
w<strong>in</strong>ners all citizens of Montenegro."<br />
Members of that Movement have often made referendum-related<br />
public <strong>state</strong>ments. Br<strong>an</strong>ko Lukovac, <strong>for</strong>mer ambassador of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro to Rome, <strong>an</strong>d co-ord<strong>in</strong>ator of the Movement, openly responded to<br />
some pressures from Brussels reagard<strong>in</strong>g postponement of referendum: "We<br />
shall not postpone referendum even if EU w<strong>an</strong>ts us to do that. Montenegro is<br />
our first priority, there<strong>for</strong>e because of its future we shall org<strong>an</strong>ize the<br />
referendum, the way it is laid down by the Constitutional Charter." 19 Film<br />
director Br<strong>an</strong>ko Baletić thus assessed found<strong>in</strong>g of the Belgrade br<strong>an</strong>ch of the<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State: "I am not surprised by their strong<br />
campaign, <strong>for</strong> they have uppermost <strong>in</strong> their m<strong>in</strong>d preservation of the project of<br />
19 Večernje novosti, 2 July 2005<br />
478<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Greater Serbia, which does not w<strong>an</strong>t a common <strong>state</strong>, but rather a unified <strong>state</strong><br />
of all Serbs to be taken as such to EU." 20<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State enjoys <strong>an</strong> open back<strong>in</strong>g of Belgrade.<br />
Vojislav Koštunica, <strong>in</strong> his capacity of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister met with the leadership of<br />
that movement. That event received a wide coverage by the Belgrade pr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d<br />
electronic media. The Serb Orthodox Church m<strong>an</strong>aged to coalesce all the<br />
nationalistic <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Montenegro <strong>in</strong> that Movement, without hid<strong>in</strong>g its true<br />
<strong>in</strong>tent <strong>an</strong>d lay<strong>in</strong>g down foundations of that org<strong>an</strong>ization by stag<strong>in</strong>g several<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs of leaders of the pro-Serb political parties.<br />
Nationally homogenous Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State espouses<br />
the st<strong>an</strong>d on the need <strong>for</strong> a firm <strong>an</strong>d close <strong>state</strong> unity with Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
consistently floats the thesis about threatened Serbhood <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. It also<br />
keeps accus<strong>in</strong>g the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities of jeopardiz<strong>in</strong>g all rights of local<br />
Serbs, from the right to use of mother tongue, to persecution of the Serb<br />
Orthodox Church. With<strong>in</strong> its <strong>an</strong>ti-referendum campaign the Movement keeps<br />
<strong>in</strong>still<strong>in</strong>g fear from the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g vote. Representatives of parliamentary<br />
parties (members of Movement) publicly threaten that the upcom<strong>in</strong>g<br />
referendum shall be the "the war-style" one.<br />
The Serb Popular Party ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that Serbs are currently more<br />
threatened <strong>in</strong> Montenegro th<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong> Croatia dur<strong>in</strong>g the operation Storm. SPS, the<br />
most radical party <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, <strong>in</strong> case of <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence-confirm<strong>in</strong>g vote<br />
<strong>in</strong> the referendum, dem<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> local Serbs their own parliament, their own<br />
budget, their own <strong>in</strong>stitutions, Serb school classes, <strong>an</strong>d separate frequencies <strong>for</strong><br />
the Serb electronic media. Aćim Višnjić from NGO Serbs <strong>in</strong> the 21 st Century<br />
called on its like-m<strong>in</strong>ded fellows to org<strong>an</strong>ize a tribal referendum <strong>for</strong> the sake of<br />
"effect<strong>in</strong>g a secession of the Serb tribes territory from <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
Montenegro." 21<br />
In his expose at the convention of the Belgrade Movement <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Common State held <strong>in</strong> the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army club <strong>in</strong> Nis, Zor<strong>an</strong> Žižić, high<br />
official of the Socialist Popular Party <strong>an</strong>d President of the Movement <strong>for</strong><br />
Montenegro, po<strong>in</strong>ted out that "the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> regime is carry<strong>in</strong>g out a<br />
cultural genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st its own people, <strong>an</strong>d that the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g referendum<br />
is one of the vehicles <strong>for</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g that goal." 22 Smajo Šobajić, President of NGO<br />
League <strong>for</strong> North, warns that <strong>in</strong> case of <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro, its<br />
northern part shall secede <strong>an</strong>d unite with Serbia <strong>for</strong> "it is clearly <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest<br />
of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens to be part of the D<strong>an</strong>ube bas<strong>in</strong> countries, as much as it<br />
is <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of citizens of Serbia to be part of the Mediterr<strong>an</strong>e<strong>an</strong> area. "<br />
20 NIN,1 February 2005<br />
21 Blic, 3 August 2005<br />
22 Politika, 22 May 2005<br />
479
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Association Vaso from Lijeva Reka publicly pledges: "Without a<br />
bloodbath we shall not yield our holy l<strong>an</strong>d", while founder of that org<strong>an</strong>ization,<br />
Zor<strong>an</strong> Lakušić (member of the Socialist Popular Party), <strong>an</strong>nounces that he<br />
would rather die then give up his l<strong>an</strong>d. Marko Pekić, leader of the students’<br />
movement Njegoš, calls the referendum "a crazy idea" <strong>an</strong>d says that he prepares<br />
a march on Montenegro with a view to abolish<strong>in</strong>g "artificial borders ." 23<br />
Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State was founded <strong>in</strong> Belgrade by<br />
academici<strong>an</strong>s Ljubomir Tadić <strong>an</strong>d Matija Bećković, who have always denied<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> nation <strong>an</strong>d <strong>state</strong>. Ljubomir Tadić, one of co-authors of<br />
Memor<strong>an</strong>dum of the Serb Aacademy of Sciences, <strong>state</strong>d that "Montenegr<strong>in</strong> regime<br />
fears a probable defeat …hence its referendum-related threats." He dem<strong>an</strong>ds<br />
that Montenegr<strong>in</strong> citizens liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbia be gr<strong>an</strong>ted a vot<strong>in</strong>g right <strong>in</strong> the<br />
referendum . 24 Furthermore he is of op<strong>in</strong>ion that "neither the loss of Serb<br />
Kraj<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d Slavonic countries <strong>in</strong> which Serbs constituted the majority nor<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> separatism should be accepted." Academici<strong>an</strong> Vesel<strong>in</strong> Djuretić<br />
publicly cautioned "<strong>in</strong>compatible" Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s that they would be "expulsed<br />
from Serbia."<br />
The Movement members held a three-day meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Podgorica, as<br />
part of <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-referendum campaign, mounted on three levels-the legal,<br />
political <strong>an</strong>d <strong>security</strong> one. Threats addressed to m<strong>in</strong>orities were voiced ("<strong>in</strong> case<br />
of <strong>in</strong>dependence-confirm<strong>in</strong>g vote, civil war shall erupt"), <strong>an</strong>d some guests,<br />
notably P<strong>an</strong>ajotis Haristos from Greece, used pejorative words ("that<br />
memor<strong>an</strong>dum is monkey-bus<strong>in</strong>ess"). Added to academici<strong>an</strong>s Ljubomir Tadić<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Matija Bećković, the meet<strong>in</strong>g was attended by Mitropolite Amfilohije,<br />
Br<strong>an</strong>ko Kostić, <strong>for</strong>mer President (of the rump) Presidency of the SFRY, Zor<strong>an</strong><br />
Žižić, <strong>for</strong>mer FRY President, James Bissett, C<strong>an</strong>adi<strong>an</strong> ambassador, Ronald<br />
Hatchett, <strong>for</strong>mer Reag<strong>an</strong>-era adm<strong>in</strong>istrator, etc.<br />
In late 2005 Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State <strong>state</strong>d that no talks on<br />
referendum were possible with the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d suggested that<br />
Montenegro <strong>for</strong>med a caretaker government <strong>for</strong> "prim<strong>in</strong>g a democratic<br />
ambience <strong>for</strong> parliamentary elections <strong>an</strong>d a possible referendum." That idea<br />
was identical to the one earlier floated by NGO Group <strong>for</strong> Ch<strong>an</strong>ges. Accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to Belgrade press, Nebojša Medojević, one of members of that org<strong>an</strong>ization was<br />
officially received by President of Serbia, Boris Tadić. With the goal of<br />
contest<strong>in</strong>g the referendum that org<strong>an</strong>ization was also <strong>in</strong>strumentalized by the<br />
Serb media.<br />
Official Podgorica reacted to <strong>an</strong> official meet<strong>in</strong>g between Vojislav<br />
Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d representatives of the Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> President Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović cautioned the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> public that<br />
"representatives of that movement were met by Vojislav Koštunica <strong>in</strong> his<br />
capacity of Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d not the one of president of Democratic<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Party of Serbia. By that <strong>an</strong>d similar activities he postured as one of the frontmen<br />
of the movement aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro." 25<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Opposition<br />
In 2005 Montenegr<strong>in</strong> opposition lost local elections <strong>in</strong> 6 towns, <strong>an</strong>d due<br />
to parliamentary representation of the four, opposition, m<strong>in</strong>orities parties, they<br />
c<strong>an</strong>not foil even a possible adoption of the new, Referendum Act. On the other<br />
h<strong>an</strong>d, the pro-Serb opposition parties are <strong>in</strong> disarray, <strong>an</strong>d under the direct<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence of the Serb Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d official Belgrade.<br />
Socialist Popular Party is not a member of the Movement, but its leader<br />
Predrag Bulatović, <strong>in</strong> contrast to presidents of other Serb political parties, does<br />
not have close ties with Mitropolite Amfilohije. Their strategy is not clear. If the<br />
boycott of referendum <strong>an</strong>d dialogue with authorities suits smaller parties, it<br />
should not be the case with the SPP. Socialist Popular Party could represent <strong>an</strong><br />
authentic, strong, opposition party <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Montenegro. Because of that<br />
Bulatovic could be the biggest loser if he opts <strong>for</strong> the boycott.<br />
In late 2001 Predrag Bulatović <strong>an</strong>d his party agreed to referendum. He<br />
then <strong>state</strong>d that he was aga<strong>in</strong>st the boycott of referendum, <strong>an</strong>d that if the<br />
decision on <strong>in</strong>dependence is reached by fair me<strong>an</strong>s, his party would agree to<br />
amendments to Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Constitution, confirm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependence of<br />
Montenegro. But his ch<strong>an</strong>ge of heart is aga<strong>in</strong> possible. He may call on<br />
membership to take part <strong>in</strong> the referendum. That possibility is <strong>in</strong>dicated by the<br />
fact that <strong>in</strong> December 2005 Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a had talks not only with the Serb <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> officials, but with Bulatovic too. President of the Socialist Popular<br />
Party then <strong>state</strong>d: "I don’t exclude referendum under certa<strong>in</strong> conditions, but as I<br />
personally urge a common <strong>state</strong>, no-one has the right to ask me to renounce my<br />
program." 26 He once aga<strong>in</strong> confirmed that he would not have talks with<br />
representatives of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d reiterated the st<strong>an</strong>d shared by<br />
the whole pro-Serb opposition <strong>in</strong> Montenegro that he would talk only with EU<br />
representatatives.<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Union does not prejudge <strong>an</strong>y result of referendum <strong>in</strong><br />
Montenegro. That is the gist of the st<strong>an</strong>d espoused by the Special EU Envoy<br />
Miroslav Lajcak, <strong>in</strong> late December 2005, after the referendum conditions-related<br />
talks with both the authorities <strong>an</strong>d opposition. Earlier, Michael Polt, the US<br />
Ambassador to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, mad public a very clear-cut US<br />
position: "Constitutional Charter enables referendum after February 2006. After<br />
that citizens of Montenegro shall decide whether they w<strong>an</strong>t the referendum,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d then its hold<strong>in</strong>g must be <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with EU st<strong>an</strong>dards, <strong>an</strong>d fair <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
23 Monitor, 22 July 2005<br />
24 Večernje novosti, 3 February 2005<br />
480<br />
25 Statement made to TV CG, 25 July 2005<br />
26 TV B 92, 7 December 2005<br />
481
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
open process." He added that "<strong>for</strong> the referendum it is sufficient to respect the<br />
Constitutional Charter <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>dards." 27<br />
Serbia's Alternative St<strong>an</strong>ces<br />
There are different op<strong>in</strong>ions on Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> Serbia,<br />
though they are the m<strong>in</strong>ority ones. Some th<strong>in</strong>k that the <strong>state</strong> union is a loose<br />
alli<strong>an</strong>ce between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, which has not succeeded <strong>in</strong><br />
accelerat<strong>in</strong>g its accession to Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations <strong>an</strong>d there<strong>for</strong>e they back<br />
Montenegro’s ef<strong>for</strong>ts to atta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence. Some parties, like the Christi<strong>an</strong>-<br />
Democratic one urge <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Serbia, or like Group 17 plus, also mention<br />
<strong>in</strong> their program that their goal is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Serbia. The latter has<br />
however "frozen" its program due to its participat<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Kostunica-led<br />
government. Social-Democratic Union (Žarko Korać) <strong>an</strong>d the Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
(Nataša Mićić) are the only parliamentary parties positively speak<strong>in</strong>g about the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence.The newly-emerged party, Liberal-Democratic<br />
Party (Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović) also backs <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro.<br />
The Civic Alli<strong>an</strong>ce of Serbia th<strong>in</strong>ks that Montenegro is entitled to<br />
referendum without <strong>an</strong>y <strong>in</strong>terference of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d deems the referendum <strong>an</strong><br />
exclusively <strong>in</strong>ternal Montenegr<strong>in</strong> issue. Nataša Mičić says: "For us the proposal<br />
of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> government on alli<strong>an</strong>ce of <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong>s is totally<br />
acceptable, s<strong>in</strong>ce it is <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the historic ties between the two peoples <strong>an</strong>d<br />
their common Europe<strong>an</strong> future." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to her, resolution of status of<br />
Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d Metohija, <strong>an</strong>d also future relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro, c<strong>an</strong>not be viewed outside the context of Europe<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrations.<br />
What is certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>d what no-one c<strong>an</strong> deny is <strong>an</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> future of Serbia,<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo." However, Nataša Mićić, also underscores: "Our<br />
mutual relations mostly depend on us, the current authorities have a great<br />
responsibility to judiciously <strong>an</strong>d constructively take part <strong>in</strong> the pert<strong>in</strong>ent<br />
negotiations <strong>an</strong>d agree to a solution which above all should meet the need of<br />
citizens to live <strong>in</strong> a stable, democratic society, <strong>an</strong>d be respectful of <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
rights <strong>an</strong>d also enable them to lead normal <strong>an</strong>d decent lives." 28<br />
Čedomir Jov<strong>an</strong>ović, President of the Liberal-Democratic Party th<strong>in</strong>ks<br />
that Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montengro as separate <strong>state</strong>s shall more swiftly access EU. He<br />
warns that "the <strong>state</strong> union as the last refuge of a totalitari<strong>an</strong> concept threatens<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro" <strong>an</strong>d concludes "the problem of the <strong>state</strong> union is not of<br />
a national, but rather of a democratic character. That is why we face such rigid<br />
messages that the union is necessary because of the army. If someone is afraid<br />
of the Army tr<strong>an</strong>s<strong>for</strong>mation, then we, <strong>in</strong> Serbia, should <strong>in</strong>stead tackle the roots<br />
of that fear."<br />
27 Blic, 8 December 2005<br />
28 Interview of Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>, 16 December 2005<br />
482<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
If Montenegro goes <strong>in</strong>dependent, Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Serbia shall dem<strong>an</strong>d<br />
to be recognized the m<strong>in</strong>ority status. That is the objective of Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
association Krstač whose newly-founded Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a committee <strong>in</strong> a locality<br />
Lovćenac has launched a money-collect<strong>in</strong>g action <strong>for</strong> the construction of the<br />
first Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>in</strong> Serbia. Similar committees shall be set<br />
up <strong>in</strong> all major towns of Serbia, <strong>for</strong>, as it was said, Montengro has embarked<br />
upon its own road, while Serbia is set on the path of its own <strong>an</strong>d "we should<br />
live here <strong>an</strong>d must protect our rights." 29<br />
Role of the Serb Orthodox Church<br />
Although Montenegro is a civil <strong>an</strong>d secular <strong>state</strong>, the Serb Orthodox<br />
Church has openly engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>ti-referendum campaign <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> aggressive,<br />
<strong>an</strong>ti-<strong>in</strong>dependence political activities. At rallies of the Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common<br />
State high church dignitaries demonstrate their negative position on the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence. Council of National Assemblies, set up under the<br />
SOC auspicies, adopted the Declaration on the Common State, identical to the one<br />
passed by the Movement at its found<strong>in</strong>g assembly. By d<strong>in</strong>t of the Movement,<br />
the SOC coalesced all the Serb nationalistic <strong>for</strong>ces <strong>in</strong> Montengro. On the eve of<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation of the Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State, the SOC has repeatedly held<br />
meet<strong>in</strong>gs with leaders of the Serb opposition parties <strong>in</strong> Montenego <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
lay the political groundwork <strong>for</strong> activities of that org<strong>an</strong>ization.<br />
Mitropolite Amfilohije Radović takes part <strong>in</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs of the Belgrade<br />
br<strong>an</strong>ch of the Movement <strong>for</strong> the Common State, bent on deny<strong>in</strong>g the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
nation, <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> other political <strong>an</strong>d party meet<strong>in</strong>gs. His lawyer disclosed that the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Mitroplite has filed a request to the court <strong>in</strong> Strasbourg <strong>for</strong><br />
restitution of the church l<strong>an</strong>d, nationalized <strong>in</strong> the post-WW2 period, <strong>an</strong>d that is,<br />
"one third of Montenegro." Government of Montenegro rejected the SOC<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d to <strong>in</strong>troduce religion classes <strong>in</strong> the school syllabus. That prompted the<br />
church circles <strong>an</strong>d pro-Serb parties to <strong>state</strong> that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Education<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister was worse th<strong>an</strong> "Ustashi Pavelić".<br />
Most milit<strong>an</strong>t activity of the SOC is the one aimed at f<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terconfessional<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic tensions <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, by erect<strong>in</strong>g a metal<br />
church atop Rumija mounta<strong>in</strong>, a sumbol of mutliconfessional toler<strong>an</strong>ce of the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> society. That metal church was tr<strong>an</strong>sported <strong>an</strong>d placed atop<br />
Rumija by a military chopper. The <strong>for</strong>eog<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicates close ties between the<br />
SOC <strong>an</strong>d the most milit<strong>an</strong>t faction of the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army.<br />
The SOC has never condemned war crimes. On the contrary it extolls<br />
their perpetrators as heroes. The church is the ma<strong>in</strong>stay of so-called <strong>an</strong>ti-Hague<br />
lobby, which is also active <strong>in</strong> Montenegro. Mitropolite Amfilohije shows his<br />
ambitions to rule Montenegro by highlight<strong>in</strong>g the fact that the top Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
church dignitaries-vladikas-always wielded both spiritual <strong>an</strong>d secular power.<br />
29 Report broadcast on TV CG, 5 December 2005<br />
483
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
He says: "What would rema<strong>in</strong> of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Mitroplites if they were b<strong>an</strong>ned<br />
from political activities." He also admits that his political engagment aims at<br />
preserv<strong>in</strong>g sovereignty of Serbhood <strong>in</strong> Montenegro.<br />
In May 2005 the SOC c<strong>an</strong>onized as martyrs 9 Plevlje priests, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Slobod<strong>an</strong> Šiljak <strong>an</strong>d Milorad Vukojčić, who accord<strong>in</strong>g to testimonies of m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
Plevlje locals, dur<strong>in</strong>g WW2 commited grave crimes. That move promted<br />
protests by <strong>for</strong>mer Partis<strong>an</strong>s, the rul<strong>in</strong>g Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parties, <strong>an</strong>d frontmen of<br />
the largest opposition party, the Socialist Popular Party. Momčilo Vučetić,<br />
President of Plevlje committee of that party, <strong>state</strong>d: "I respect the Church, but<br />
the decision to proclaim crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>for</strong> sa<strong>in</strong>ts is impermissible." The backlash<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the SOC milit<strong>an</strong>cy is already visible: a number of faithfuls of the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Orthodox Church is on the steady rise.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> histori<strong>an</strong> Šerbo Rastoder th<strong>in</strong>ks that the SOC has a hefty<br />
ambition to arbitrate both <strong>in</strong> spiritual <strong>an</strong>d secular matters, <strong>in</strong> order to "establish<br />
value judgements stemm<strong>in</strong>g from recent past. Then the Church would become<br />
a focal po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>for</strong> rally<strong>in</strong>g its ideological followers. Consequently, by act<strong>in</strong>g so<br />
the Church consciously reduces its mission <strong>an</strong>d causes divisions among its<br />
faithfuls."<br />
Serb Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d the Army<br />
By us<strong>in</strong>g a military chopper to erect a metal church atop Rumija<br />
mounta<strong>in</strong>, the SOC demonstrated not only its milit<strong>an</strong>cy, but also its collusion<br />
with the army. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> press coverage, donator of the<br />
church is Dunav Insur<strong>an</strong>ce, whose director Mirko Petrović is a high official of<br />
Democratic Party of Serbia. That donation was agreed upon <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
celebration of the Orthodox New Year, 2005. Later, that is, on 28 February,<br />
under contract 741, Belgrade office of Dunav Insur<strong>an</strong>ce made 125,000 EY worth<br />
donation to the eparchy m<strong>an</strong>agement board of Coastal-Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
Mitropolite. Part of the donation was used to procure material <strong>for</strong> the church,<br />
while the end-dest<strong>in</strong>ation of the rest of the sum is not known. Those <strong>in</strong> the<br />
know assert that it was not the only donation of Comp<strong>an</strong>y Dunav.<br />
Un<strong>for</strong>tunately Montenegr<strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial bodies are not able to control deal<strong>in</strong>gs of<br />
Amfilohije-run Mitropolite. 30<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities have repeatedly protested aga<strong>in</strong>st the church<br />
erection, <strong>in</strong> view of the purpose of the whole move: to sow discord among the<br />
Catholic church faithfuls <strong>an</strong>d Muslims who together with the Orthodox church<br />
faithfuls consider the top of that mounta<strong>in</strong> as sacred <strong>an</strong>d make pilgrimages to<br />
it.<br />
Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić, the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>state</strong>d that: "the<br />
whole event is be<strong>in</strong>g turned <strong>in</strong>to a sensationalistic sc<strong>an</strong>dal." Drag<strong>an</strong> Kujović,<br />
Vice President of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament, retorted: "We are not deal<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
30 Monitor, 9 December 2005<br />
484<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>an</strong>y sensation, but rather with a direct <strong>an</strong>d open <strong>in</strong>terference of church <strong>in</strong>to<br />
<strong>state</strong> affairs, <strong>an</strong>d sid<strong>in</strong>g of the army with the SOC activities <strong>in</strong> Montenegro." 31<br />
President of Montenegro Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović then <strong>state</strong>d that the gesture of the<br />
army of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro should be re-appraised "<strong>for</strong> without the<br />
consent of the Supreme Defence Council the army gave its chopper to the SOC<br />
to erect a metal church atop Rumija."<br />
Mitropolite Amfilohije thus responded to the decision of the M<strong>in</strong>istry<br />
<strong>for</strong> Territorial Pl<strong>an</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g that the church be removed: <strong>in</strong> his letter to the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister he wrote that he would not respect the said<br />
decision, <strong>an</strong>d went as far as to say that "tear<strong>in</strong>g down of the church would<br />
gravely affect peace <strong>an</strong>d order <strong>in</strong> Montenegro." Pro-Serb parties sided with<br />
Amfilohije <strong>an</strong>d even <strong>state</strong>d that they would "defend that <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>y other church<br />
with all me<strong>an</strong>s at our disposal." Bishop of Budimlje-Niksic, Jo<strong>an</strong>ikije, <strong>state</strong>d that<br />
"Montenegro, <strong>in</strong> sheer emulation of Macedonia, is mount<strong>in</strong>g a media camapagn<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the SOC." He added that Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities were prim<strong>in</strong>g their<br />
public <strong>for</strong> the lynch of church dignitaries <strong>an</strong>d destruction of the shr<strong>in</strong>e. 32<br />
Patriarch Pavle also asked President of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, Svetozar<br />
Marović, "not to destroy the church, <strong>for</strong> it would be a shameful <strong>an</strong>d crim<strong>in</strong>al<br />
act."<br />
NGO Serb Corps <strong>in</strong> a letter to leaders of Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> parties, Mehmet<br />
Bardi <strong>an</strong>d Ferhad D<strong>in</strong>oši, criticized <strong>in</strong> a threaten<strong>in</strong>g ve<strong>in</strong>, the whole<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> leadership <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>tellectuals urg<strong>in</strong>g Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence:<br />
"The price to be exacted <strong>for</strong> the Kosovo l<strong>an</strong>d is-blood, <strong>an</strong>d that applies to<br />
Rumija too." Mehmet Bardi publicly condemned plac<strong>in</strong>g of that church <strong>an</strong>d<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>ded a prompt governmental reaction, that is, removal of that object.<br />
Speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament he warned that "Rumija belongs to all<br />
nations <strong>an</strong>d confessions", <strong>an</strong>d that the act of the SOC is aimed at "provok<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s ." 33<br />
Nenad Č<strong>an</strong>ak, leader of the Social-Democrats of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, warned<br />
that "Koštunica <strong>an</strong>d Amfilohije, assisted by the army, are lay<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
groundwork <strong>for</strong> a civil war between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong> the postreferendum<br />
period." He ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that the latest Amfilohije’s activities are<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicative of those preparations: "Those who saw the images of a military<br />
chopper carry<strong>in</strong>g a church to Rumiju, know that the next image shall be the one<br />
of Amfilohije on a t<strong>an</strong>k trampl<strong>in</strong>g on all those who are aga<strong>in</strong>st his ideas.<br />
Amfilohije is not act<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>gle-h<strong>an</strong>dedly or <strong>in</strong> a chaotic way. In fact <strong>in</strong> his latest<br />
undertak<strong>in</strong>g he was supported by Kostunica <strong>an</strong>d the army. Montenegro is<br />
fac<strong>in</strong>g a Bosni<strong>an</strong> scenario. Once the referendum on <strong>in</strong>dependence succeeds, <strong>in</strong><br />
north of Montenegro shall be <strong>for</strong>med a k<strong>in</strong>d of a Serb Autonomous Area,<br />
similar to the one <strong>in</strong> Bosnia. I see a new Dayton <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, the only<br />
31 D<strong>an</strong>as, 27-28 August 2005<br />
32 Blic, 27 July 2005<br />
33 D<strong>an</strong>as ,23-24 July 2005<br />
485
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
difference be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the signatory, <strong>for</strong> that this time around the peace accord<br />
would be signed by Kostunica <strong>an</strong>d not by Milosevic. " 34<br />
A multi-media, artistic procession, "Rumija Rosary" held <strong>in</strong> Bar, rallied<br />
a large number of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> artists, scientists, <strong>an</strong>d public workers. It was<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong> sign of protests over "devastation of cultural-historica monuments<br />
which make up the cultural heritage of Montengro." An appeal was made to<br />
UNESCO to "protect, <strong>in</strong> its capacity of unbiased guardi<strong>an</strong> of spiritual <strong>an</strong>d<br />
cultural heritage of all peoples, Rumija, as a symbol of a dist<strong>in</strong>ct tradition,<br />
toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d cohabitation."<br />
Director of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Institute <strong>for</strong> Protection of Cultural<br />
Monuments, Slobod<strong>an</strong> Mitrović, <strong>state</strong>d that over 200 churches <strong>in</strong> Montenegro<br />
were built or re-vamped without build<strong>in</strong>g permissions. He warned that the<br />
SOC is not <strong>in</strong> the possession of a permit <strong>for</strong> re-build<strong>in</strong>g or build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Ostrog<br />
monastery, or <strong>for</strong> other works carried out <strong>in</strong> sacred <strong>an</strong>d historical monuments. 35<br />
The State Union<br />
Although EU, by act<strong>in</strong>g as a "god-father" to the <strong>state</strong> union, thought<br />
that with the passage of time the loose union between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montengro<br />
would evolve <strong>in</strong>to a functional <strong>state</strong>, those expectations did not come true.<br />
Objectively speak<strong>in</strong>g such a prospect was not feasible, <strong>for</strong> the very agreement<br />
on the union establishment, the Belgrade Agreement, spelled out only a threeyear<br />
time-frame <strong>for</strong> the union’s existence, while the Constitutional Charter of<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montengro passed <strong>in</strong> February 2003, a year on from the union’s<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation, strengthened the right to the referendum on <strong>in</strong>dependence, the right<br />
which Montenegro is currently prepar<strong>in</strong>g to exercise.<br />
Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montengro has jo<strong>in</strong>t diplomacy, but Montenegro has it<br />
own Foreign Affairs M<strong>in</strong>istry. Head of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> diplomacy, Miodrag<br />
Vlahović, repeatedly said that the position of Montenegro was that someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that was not previously agreed with Montengro c<strong>an</strong>not be be considered the<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>t st<strong>an</strong>d of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro.<br />
Aside from some unclarified sc<strong>an</strong>dals (unlawful purchase of military<br />
hardware because of which the Defence Secretary Prvoslav Dav<strong>in</strong>ić was <strong>for</strong>ced<br />
to resign, or purchase of a satellite <strong>for</strong> surveill<strong>in</strong>g South Serbia, that is,<br />
Montenegro <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo), the union is shaken up by the common popertyrelated<br />
strife. Svetozar Marović, President of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, accused<br />
Serbia that contrary to the Constitutional Charter <strong>an</strong>d without agreement with<br />
the Montengr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters it tried to establish control<br />
over the media <strong>an</strong>d f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cial <strong>in</strong>stitutions of the <strong>state</strong> union.<br />
The Serb F<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ce M<strong>in</strong>ister, Mladj<strong>an</strong> D<strong>in</strong>kić, <strong>state</strong>d that Serbia was the<br />
owner of property on its territory, <strong>an</strong>d c<strong>an</strong> use, but not alienate it or make deals<br />
34 Blic, 15 August 2005<br />
35 Politika, 21 August 2005<br />
486<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
without a previous consent of the Serb government. Boris Tadic, President of<br />
Serbia th<strong>in</strong>ks that Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro should control property on their<br />
respective territories, but without obstruct<strong>in</strong>g development of <strong>in</strong>stitutions.<br />
There is a major polemic about the division of the military property too. In case<br />
of <strong>in</strong>dependence of Montenegro, under the Constitutional Charter, Serbia is a<br />
successor of the <strong>state</strong> union.<br />
Milo Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović told the members of the US Chamber of Commerce,<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g their visit to Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro, that Montenegro was bent on<br />
preserv<strong>in</strong>g the best possible ties with Serbia, but "we also w<strong>an</strong>t to m<strong>an</strong>age our<br />
own future." He underscored that the fate of Montenegro was to be a member<br />
of EU <strong>an</strong>d particip<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong> Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, though the pace of process<br />
was still <strong>an</strong> imponderable. Djuk<strong>an</strong>ovic went on to note: "We have a<br />
disproportional <strong>state</strong> union. It is dom<strong>in</strong>ated by Serbia, while Montenegro keeps<br />
striv<strong>in</strong>g to atta<strong>in</strong> equality. There<strong>for</strong>e the best solution <strong>for</strong> Montenegro would be<br />
to accelerate its <strong>in</strong>dependent accession to Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tegrations, after<br />
settlement of its <strong>state</strong> status at the referendum." 36<br />
Amendment to Constitutional Charter<br />
On the eve of the second <strong>an</strong>niversary of adoption of the Constitutional<br />
Charter (5 February 2005), Serbia piled pressure on Montenegro to hold direct<br />
elections <strong>for</strong> parliament of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro whose m<strong>an</strong>date was about<br />
to expire. The Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister stressed that elections had to be held, <strong>in</strong><br />
view of the pert<strong>in</strong>ent provision of the Constitutional Charter, <strong>an</strong>d accused the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> side of breach<strong>in</strong>g the Charter. Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliament however<br />
refused direct elections <strong>for</strong> they would lead to centralization <strong>an</strong>d unitarization,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d also because "it is not rational to call elections <strong>in</strong> the period preced<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
referendum."<br />
On the occasion of the second <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Constitutional<br />
Charter, official Podgorica underscored that the <strong>state</strong> union "failed to meet its<br />
expectations" <strong>an</strong>d "slowed down Montenegr<strong>in</strong> accession to EU." R<strong>an</strong>ko<br />
Krivokapic, President of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Parliament, then said that "Montenegro<br />
must quickly, at the latest by February 2006, opt <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent road to<br />
EU" <strong>an</strong>d disclosed that the <strong>state</strong> union was at the bottom of the list of countries<br />
aspir<strong>in</strong>g to jo<strong>in</strong> EU <strong>in</strong>tegrations. He also assessed that Montenegro was ready<br />
<strong>for</strong> the WTO <strong>an</strong>d Partnership <strong>for</strong> Peace membership.<br />
On the same occasion, the Serb Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, Vojislav Koštunica<br />
expressed his conviction that "<strong>in</strong>clusion of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro <strong>in</strong>to EU is<br />
the best solution", <strong>an</strong>d that cont<strong>in</strong>uation of <strong>in</strong>tegration "was a much better <strong>an</strong>d<br />
rational solution th<strong>an</strong> separation <strong>an</strong>d dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of the <strong>state</strong>, <strong>for</strong> the latter<br />
would only generate new problems." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to his assessment, EU-assissted<br />
adoption of the Constitutional Charter, stopped the <strong>in</strong>ternal rifts <strong>in</strong> Montenegro<br />
36 D<strong>an</strong>as, 30 June 2005<br />
487
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
<strong>an</strong>d further dis<strong>in</strong>tegration of the country. Kostunica added that "Serbia had no<br />
serious political, economic or <strong>security</strong> reasons to severe <strong>state</strong> ties with<br />
Montenegro." 37<br />
The dispute about direct elections <strong>for</strong> the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament<br />
was ultimately resolved, by sign<strong>in</strong>g of amendment to the Constitutional<br />
Charter <strong>in</strong> the presence of Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a. Under that amendment those<br />
elections are postponed until parliamentary elections <strong>in</strong> member-<strong>state</strong>s. And<br />
thus the m<strong>an</strong>date of the old Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament was extended.<br />
Army<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce Montenegro set out on its own path, the army was <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>strument<br />
by which Slobod<strong>an</strong> Milošević tried to "discipl<strong>in</strong>e" Montenegro. That military<br />
pressure from Belgrade was open <strong>an</strong>d brutal, notably on the eve of NATO<br />
<strong>in</strong>tervention. Such pressures are no longer employed, but the highest, military<br />
structures are rife with Milosevic era holdovers, advocates of the doctr<strong>in</strong>e, that<br />
"the country should be defended from <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal enemy," <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s<br />
were deemed as such dur<strong>in</strong>g Milosevic rule. As the prime movers of the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> political scene are still the same, namely Djuk<strong>an</strong>ovic Vuj<strong>an</strong>ovic<br />
<strong>an</strong>d others, they are be<strong>in</strong>g publicly taken to task <strong>for</strong> destroy<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>state</strong> union<br />
of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> officials stress that neither the Constitutional Charter nor<br />
the Belgrade Agreement call <strong>in</strong>to question the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Defence M<strong>in</strong>istry,<br />
but that after the referendum they will discuss the <strong>for</strong>mation of their own army.<br />
Experts of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> government have already drawn up a project on<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation of the professional Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to that project, the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> army would have 400 high-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g officers <strong>in</strong> peacetime, 900<br />
lower-r<strong>an</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g officers, 200 civili<strong>an</strong> employees, 1,200 soldiers under contract,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d 400 recruits serv<strong>in</strong>g the military service. As <strong>an</strong>nounced the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
authorities would soon ponder the national <strong>security</strong> strategy on the basis of<br />
which they would make profiles of the future Defence M<strong>in</strong>sitry <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent army of Montenegro. The Serb parties <strong>in</strong> Montenegro assessed<br />
that found<strong>in</strong>g of the defense m<strong>in</strong>istry "was t<strong>an</strong>tamount to a breach of<br />
Constitution <strong>an</strong>d to <strong>an</strong> attempt to effect a creep<strong>in</strong>g separation <strong>an</strong>d secession." 38<br />
In Serbia only the Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Army is mentioned. There are no<br />
official projections as to the set-up of the future Serb army. Zor<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>ković, the<br />
Serb-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Defence Secretary, thus <strong>state</strong>d: "At a meet<strong>in</strong>g with<br />
Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović <strong>an</strong>d Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović I have decidedly said that the army would not<br />
<strong>in</strong>terfere <strong>in</strong>to implementation of referendum, <strong>for</strong> it is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal matter of<br />
Montenegro. We shall respect <strong>an</strong>y outcome of their referendum. In case of<br />
confrontation between the two sides, the army may act as the constitutional<br />
37 D<strong>an</strong>as, 5 June 2005<br />
38 D<strong>an</strong>as, 26 September 2005<br />
488<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
procedure specifies, <strong>an</strong>d I said that we would stick to our constitutional<br />
prerogatives, <strong>in</strong> the sense, that the identity of the army comm<strong>an</strong>der is well<br />
specified <strong>in</strong> such situations." 39<br />
Relations with Neighbours<br />
In contrast to Serbia, which has recently soured relations with its<br />
neighbours, Montenegro has been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly promot<strong>in</strong>g regional relations. By<br />
its wide array of <strong>for</strong>eign policy activities Montenegr<strong>in</strong> diplomacy on the<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational scene has also promoted its relations with Vatic<strong>an</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the visit<br />
of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Foreign Secretary, Miodrag Vlahovic to the Holy Seat.<br />
Relations with the US are const<strong>an</strong>tly improv<strong>in</strong>g, as are those with numerous EU<br />
member-<strong>state</strong>s, notably with Austria which has assumed EU Presidency s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 2006.<br />
As regards the region, Montenegro has developed particularly good<br />
relations with Croatia as confirmed by the July 2005 visit of the Croat President<br />
Stjep<strong>an</strong> Mesic to Podgorica. Montenegr<strong>in</strong> President Filip Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović then said<br />
that Montenegro would effect damage compensation to Croatia, <strong>for</strong> the siege of<br />
Dubrovnik <strong>an</strong>d plunder of Konavle. Presentation of the Movement <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
Independent <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Montenegro <strong>in</strong> Zagreb, attended by representatives<br />
of the Croat authorities <strong>an</strong>d of the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Croatia, recieved<br />
extensive media coverage.<br />
Added to <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly successful economic co-operation,<br />
Montengro <strong>an</strong>d Slovenia have also improved their political relations, as<br />
certified by the late November 2005 visit of the Sloveni<strong>an</strong> President J<strong>an</strong>ez<br />
Drnovšek to Podgorica. That visit to Montenegro was staged after Belgrade had<br />
called off Drnovsek’s visit because of his <strong>state</strong>ment that Kosovo would become<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent. Drnovšek told his host Vuj<strong>an</strong>ović that the best solution <strong>for</strong><br />
relations between Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro would be <strong>an</strong> alli<strong>an</strong>ce of sovereign,<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized <strong>state</strong>s. That was the first-time, positive assessment of<br />
the pert<strong>in</strong>ent Montenegr<strong>in</strong> proposal-rejected by the Serb side-by <strong>an</strong> EU<br />
member-<strong>state</strong>.<br />
As regards Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a with which Montenegro has also<br />
good relations, the official Podgorica backs ef<strong>for</strong>ts of the central authorities <strong>in</strong><br />
Sarajevu aimed at amend<strong>in</strong>g the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a. By sett<strong>in</strong>g up the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> –Macedoni<strong>an</strong> Society <strong>an</strong>d open<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
the Macedoni<strong>an</strong> consulate <strong>in</strong> Podgorica, Montenegro has confirmed its highquality<br />
diplomatic relations with Macedonia.<br />
As regards negotiations on the status of Kosovo, Milo Djuk<strong>an</strong>ović<br />
<strong>state</strong>d that "the resolve of the domestic elites <strong>an</strong>d relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational factors<br />
to start up talks on settlement of the complex problem of Kosovo, as the only<br />
pend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>security</strong> problem, is <strong>an</strong> encourag<strong>in</strong>g sign." He added that "def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
39 Blic, 13 November 2005<br />
489
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
a functional <strong>state</strong> framework <strong>for</strong> EU <strong>an</strong>d NATO <strong>in</strong>tegrations would positively<br />
impact the resolution of Kosovo problem <strong>an</strong>d a make all political elites <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
take a more pronounced pro-Europe<strong>an</strong> course." 40 The fact that the Serb<br />
parliament <strong>an</strong>d not the one of the <strong>state</strong> union of Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro passed<br />
Declaration on Kosovo, as well as absence of representatives of the <strong>state</strong> union <strong>in</strong><br />
the Serb negotiat<strong>in</strong>g team is a confirmation of the st<strong>an</strong>d of Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
authorities that Montenegro is not <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong>y way <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a negotiat<strong>in</strong>g process<br />
on Kosovo.<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Union<br />
Policy of shilly-shally<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d non-perception of reality, processes, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
relations on the ground, <strong>in</strong> Montenegro, led to delay <strong>in</strong> EU assessments <strong>an</strong>d<br />
decisions. Brussels needed much time to show its respect <strong>for</strong> that reality,<br />
namely to acknowledge that Montenegro is much more ahead of Serbia <strong>in</strong> the<br />
process of implementation of re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>an</strong>d completion of its own <strong>in</strong>stitutional,<br />
<strong>state</strong> framework on the road to <strong>in</strong>dependence. Initially EU did not count on the<br />
resolve of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> government <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary majority to org<strong>an</strong>ize<br />
<strong>an</strong>d call a referendum.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Belgrade Agreement, Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a, refused <strong>an</strong>y<br />
talks on the referendum conditions. In that way EU <strong>in</strong>directly encouraged<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> opposition to boycott the referendum.<br />
In view of refusal of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities to postpone the<br />
referendum <strong>an</strong>d the greenligh<strong>in</strong>g of domestic referendum-related legislation by<br />
the Venice Commission experts, EU was compelled to offer its good services <strong>in</strong><br />
start<strong>in</strong>g up talks between the authorities <strong>an</strong>d opposition on the referendum<br />
conditions. High EU Representative appo<strong>in</strong>ted the Slovak diplomat, Miroslav<br />
Lajčak, as his envoy.<br />
But all those EU moves made Podgorica much more cautious. For <strong>an</strong><br />
EU mediat<strong>in</strong>g mission may lead to elim<strong>in</strong>ation of all the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>stitutions, notably of Montenegr<strong>in</strong> parliament. Under the Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
Constitution, parliament is the only relev<strong>an</strong>t venue <strong>in</strong> which the authorities <strong>an</strong>d<br />
opposition may make <strong>an</strong>d verify agreements. If Xavier Sol<strong>an</strong>a or <strong>an</strong>y other<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> diplomat were allowed to lead <strong>an</strong>d steer <strong>in</strong>tra-Montenegr<strong>in</strong><br />
negotiations, that would be t<strong>an</strong>tamount to underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of domestic<br />
constitutional <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary order, <strong>an</strong>d Podgorica would lose a possibility<br />
to impact domestic political developments. That is why representative of<br />
authorities <strong>in</strong>sist that talks take place <strong>in</strong> Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>an</strong>d that<br />
referendum would be held even <strong>in</strong> case of its boycott by the opposition.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to James Lyons, head of the Belgrade office of International<br />
Crisis Group," the <strong>in</strong>ternational community, notably EU, has long been to<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
wrong Balk<strong>an</strong>s l<strong>in</strong>e, notably as regards <strong>security</strong> issues." He underscores the<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g: "As early as <strong>in</strong> 2000 we should have started negotiations on status of<br />
Kosovo, but, because of that unresolved issue the <strong>in</strong>ternational community<br />
lacked the will to tackle the issue of <strong>state</strong> status of Montenegro." Lyons adds:<br />
"International Crisis Group has repeatedly suggested to EU to treat the<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum as <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-Montenegr<strong>in</strong> issue, because m<strong>an</strong>y<br />
pend<strong>in</strong>g economic issues objectively c<strong>an</strong>not be tackled until it is clarified once<br />
<strong>an</strong>d <strong>for</strong> all whether Montenegro is <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> or part of the <strong>state</strong><br />
union with Serbia. Montenegro should hold a referendum <strong>an</strong>d once <strong>for</strong> all<br />
resolve that issue. "<br />
Lyons says: "So m<strong>an</strong>y years have been lost ma<strong>in</strong>ly because of EU<br />
shilly-shally<strong>in</strong>g, due to lack of harmonization between <strong>for</strong>eign policies of<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> countries." He goes on to note: "But that is only a partial truth.<br />
Though the EU representatives are chief negotiators, the US are runn<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
whole show. The US Adm<strong>in</strong>istration has <strong>in</strong>sisted on putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> place the<br />
pert<strong>in</strong>ent strategy <strong>an</strong>d pl<strong>an</strong>ned it together with Europe. The US Adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />
rendered unreserved, maximu support to EU <strong>in</strong> that regard. Americ<strong>an</strong><br />
diplomats sometimes were even more aggressive th<strong>an</strong> the EU ones <strong>in</strong><br />
implementation of the pert<strong>in</strong>ent EU policy. The Balk<strong>an</strong>s problems are not<br />
resolved <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>an</strong>d exclusively by EU. For example, America has<br />
realized that Europe<strong>an</strong>s refuse to face the Kosovo problem. That is why<br />
Wash<strong>in</strong>gton focuses on the issue of Kosovo <strong>an</strong>d the US assisted EU <strong>in</strong> shap<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Kosovo policy. The US diplomacy sometimes acts as a v<strong>an</strong>guard <strong>an</strong>d<br />
sometimes as a rearguard support. Montenegro does not represent <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational problem. A new, <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong> would not destabilize the<br />
Balk<strong>an</strong>s. Even Bosnia <strong>an</strong>d Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a is not a real problem. The real, complex<br />
problem is Kosovo." Lyons concludes: "Let us call a spade a spade: Kosovo has<br />
been <strong>in</strong>dependent from Serbia s<strong>in</strong>ce July 1999. The crux of the matter is whether<br />
that <strong>in</strong>dependence shall be <strong>in</strong>ternationally recognized or it shall be conditional,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d which conditions are envisaged <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong> which time-frame. " 41<br />
James Lyons th<strong>in</strong>ks that EU is still mildly <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed towards the idea of<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong>hood, <strong>an</strong>d that the majority of member-<strong>state</strong>s do not th<strong>in</strong>k<br />
that Montengro should be <strong>an</strong>yone’s compensation. Lyons mentions that a large<br />
number of EU countries have opened their office <strong>in</strong> Podgorica <strong>an</strong>d underscores:<br />
"Were Montenegro to proclaim <strong>in</strong>dependence tomorrow, <strong>in</strong> a month time about<br />
15 embassies would be opened there <strong>in</strong> view of a swift <strong>in</strong>ternational recognition<br />
of Montenegro.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> opposition to the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence was<br />
greatly reduced at the end of 2005. EU is no longer call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to question the<br />
<strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g Montenegr<strong>in</strong> referendum or dem<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g its postponement.<br />
40 D<strong>an</strong>as, 9 November 2005<br />
490<br />
41Monitor, 2 December 2005<br />
491
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary majority are firm <strong>in</strong> their decision<br />
to hold the referendum by the end of April. The Venice Commission assessed<br />
that the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> Law on Referendum was f<strong>in</strong>e-tuned to Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards. If the EU mission on mediat<strong>in</strong>g referendum conditions-related talks<br />
fails, citizens of Montenegro shall decide on the <strong>state</strong> status of Montenegro<br />
regardless of a possible boycott of referendum by the Montenegr<strong>in</strong> opposition.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> authorities <strong>an</strong>d parliamentary majority, as well as most<br />
citizens of Montenegro have susta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>an</strong>d successfully countered all pressures<br />
by the pro-Serb opposition, the Serb Orthodox Church, Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Brussels.<br />
OSCE has positively assessed all Montenegr<strong>in</strong> elections held so far,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d that by itself constitutes a guar<strong>an</strong>tee that the <strong>for</strong>thcom<strong>in</strong>g referendum shall<br />
be held <strong>in</strong> a peaceful <strong>an</strong>d democratic atmosphere.<br />
Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence shall mark the end of process of<br />
dissolution of <strong>for</strong>mer SFRY, the latter be<strong>in</strong>g a necessary pre-condition <strong>for</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration<br />
of the region on a new basis.<br />
ANNEX<br />
HELSINKI<br />
COMMITTEE'S<br />
ACTIVITY IN 2005<br />
492<br />
493
PROJECTS IN 2005<br />
"Build<strong>in</strong>g up Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Good Govern<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
<strong>in</strong> Multiethnic Communities"<br />
Throughout 2005 the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> was pursu<strong>in</strong>g the activities<br />
pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>for</strong> the 2 nd year of the complex, three-year project launched <strong>in</strong> 2004<br />
under the title "Build<strong>in</strong>g up Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Good Govern<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> Multiethnic<br />
Communities." The project is realized th<strong>an</strong>ks to the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Commission under the Europe<strong>an</strong> Initiative <strong>for</strong> Democracy <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights’<br />
program of support<strong>in</strong>g democratization, good govern<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d the rule of law.<br />
Designed as <strong>an</strong> attractive <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>teractive endeavor, the project is aimed<br />
at capacitat<strong>in</strong>g young people <strong>for</strong> a life <strong>in</strong> multiethnic communities –<br />
particularly mortgaged by the recent past, <strong>in</strong>terethnic distrust <strong>an</strong>d stereotypes –<br />
but also <strong>for</strong> a life under conditions that are imperative to a modern democracy<br />
<strong>an</strong>d its norms. In today’s Serbia, such objectives imply, <strong>in</strong>ter alia, rational<br />
perception of notions, developments <strong>an</strong>d phenomena that are still blurred,<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alized, seen as relative or differently <strong>an</strong>d even misguidedly <strong>in</strong>terpreted.<br />
The project pl<strong>an</strong>s to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>an</strong>nually 560 direct beneficiaries, i.e. 1,680 young<br />
people <strong>in</strong> just two segments of its overall three-year activity.<br />
Like <strong>in</strong> 2004, the project’s educational outreaches took place at four<br />
locations – <strong>in</strong> Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kragujevac <strong>an</strong>d Novi Pazar.<br />
The activities carried out <strong>in</strong> 2005 were as follows:<br />
• "Schools of Democracy" – twelve 5-day courses org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong><br />
Kragujevac (start<strong>in</strong>g October 21, October 26 <strong>an</strong>d November 2), Novi Sad<br />
(start<strong>in</strong>g May 27, September 26 <strong>an</strong>d October 31), Novi Pazar (start<strong>in</strong>g June 10,<br />
September 12 <strong>an</strong>d October 13) <strong>an</strong>d Belgrade (start<strong>in</strong>g June 10, November 7 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
November 14);<br />
• Sem<strong>in</strong>ars "Life <strong>an</strong>d Liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Multiethnic Environments" – eight 3-<br />
day sem<strong>in</strong>ars org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac (start<strong>in</strong>g June 10 <strong>an</strong>d November 11),<br />
Novi Sad (start<strong>in</strong>g May 6 <strong>an</strong>d June 24), Novi Pazar (start<strong>in</strong>g May 28 <strong>an</strong>d<br />
October 13) <strong>an</strong>d Belgrade (start<strong>in</strong>g September 19 <strong>an</strong>d September 22);<br />
• The pl<strong>an</strong>ned essay-writ<strong>in</strong>g competition resulted <strong>in</strong> the bil<strong>in</strong>gual<br />
edition titled "Selected Essays by Young Authors - Vol. II." Awards were<br />
bestowed upon 20 short-listed c<strong>an</strong>didates <strong>in</strong> late December 2005;<br />
494 495
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
• The books that came out of pr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> 2005 were "Women <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Children: Serbia <strong>in</strong> the Modernization Processes <strong>in</strong> 19 th <strong>an</strong>d 20 th Centuries" by a<br />
group of authors, "Ethnology of Everyday Life" by Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Boskovic<br />
(pl<strong>an</strong>ned <strong>for</strong> 2004), "Repression <strong>an</strong>d Denial of Anti-Semitism: the Memory of<br />
Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic /1880/1956/ <strong>in</strong> Contemporary Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox<br />
Culture" by Jov<strong>an</strong> By<strong>for</strong>d, "Serbia Between Constitution <strong>an</strong>d Constitutionality"<br />
by Marij<strong>an</strong>a Pajv<strong>an</strong>cic <strong>an</strong>d "Testimony" (Vladimir Popovic’s testimony be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
the Special Court <strong>in</strong> the trial of the accused of Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic’s<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation);<br />
• Two <strong>an</strong>alytical studies – "Serbia <strong>in</strong> the Thrall of Dogmatic<br />
Thought: the Outcome of a Failed Project" <strong>an</strong>d "Nation vs. Individual" were<br />
written <strong>an</strong>d circulated as referential literature to courses/sem<strong>in</strong>ars curricula.<br />
In 2005, the number of direct beneficiaries <strong>in</strong> only two segments of the<br />
project’s overall activities totaled 565 young people ages 16-25.<br />
Belgrade-Prisht<strong>in</strong>a:<br />
Steps to Build Confidence <strong>an</strong>d Underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
In 2005, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> f<strong>in</strong>alized the one-year project under<br />
the title "Belgrade-Prisht<strong>in</strong>a: Steps to Build Confidence <strong>an</strong>d Underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g."<br />
The project was realized th<strong>an</strong>ks to the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of the United States Institute<br />
of Peace (USIP).<br />
Apart from a p<strong>an</strong>el org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong> Prisht<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> November 2004 (Kosovo<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Regional Security), it was <strong>in</strong> Prisht<strong>in</strong>a too that the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> held<br />
three successive p<strong>an</strong>els <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary, March <strong>an</strong>d April 2005. These p<strong>an</strong>els<br />
broached the issues of decentralization, Kosovo m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
st<strong>an</strong>dards, as well as tr<strong>an</strong>sitional justice.<br />
The project culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> the two-day conference "The Future Status of<br />
Kosovo" org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong> Prisht<strong>in</strong>a on June 13-14, 2005. The conference that ended<br />
by adopt<strong>in</strong>g a jo<strong>in</strong>t declaration <strong>an</strong>d rounded off, <strong>in</strong> a way, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong>’s longst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g endeavor to establish a dialogue between the Serbs<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s.<br />
Not only the fact that the conference assembled over 100 particip<strong>an</strong>ts –<br />
Serbs, Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d representatives of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community – its<br />
constructive debate <strong>an</strong>d adopted declaration, but also the echo it found <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Kosovo public <strong>in</strong> particular, testified of its hav<strong>in</strong>g been a step <strong>in</strong> the right<br />
direction. All media <strong>in</strong> Kosovo regularly covered it as break<strong>in</strong>g news, while the<br />
ma<strong>in</strong> Kosovo broadcaster, the Radio & Television of Kosovo, telecast live its<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
Addresses of all particip<strong>an</strong>ts clearly demonstrated that Kosovo’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependence was unquestionable. Representatives of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> alternative<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicated that a historical agreement between the Serbs <strong>an</strong>d the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s<br />
would be viable on the condition that the recent past was fully scrut<strong>in</strong>ized, the<br />
Greater Serbia project denounced, Serbia’s actual position realistically<br />
perceived – imply<strong>in</strong>g renouncement of leadership claims – the crime<br />
acknowledged <strong>an</strong>d the issue of <strong>state</strong> borders resolved. Only thus Serbia <strong>an</strong>d the<br />
entire Western Balk<strong>an</strong> region may activate their potential <strong>for</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tegration. The historical agreement would not only contribute to the<br />
normalization of mutual relations, but would also considerably strengthen the<br />
position of Kosovo Serbs.<br />
The very fact that, at the conference, representatives of the Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
side met <strong>for</strong> the first time the people ready to face up both the Kosovo reality<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the recent past galv<strong>an</strong>ized a positive <strong>an</strong>d constructive atmosphere,<br />
unprecedented over the past 25 years at no matter what level of Serb-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
meet<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
The project also produced two books - "Unty<strong>in</strong>g of the Kosovo Knot: A<br />
Two-sided View" by Fahri Musliu <strong>an</strong>d Drag<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>jac (published <strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong>,<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English) <strong>an</strong>d the book carry<strong>in</strong>g the tr<strong>an</strong>script of the conference’s<br />
proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d other relev<strong>an</strong>t documents, <strong>an</strong>d titled "Serb-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Dialogue<br />
2005: The Future Status of Kosovo".<br />
Particip<strong>an</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> the conference “Future Status of Kosovo,”<br />
assembled <strong>in</strong> Prisht<strong>in</strong>a on June 13-14, 2005<br />
by the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
• Aware of the fact that the ma<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>an</strong>ce of status quo <strong>in</strong> Kosovo is not<br />
only impossible, but also counterproductive both <strong>for</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo, as<br />
well as <strong>for</strong> the entire region,<br />
• Bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that all relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational factors, the Contact<br />
Group <strong>in</strong> the first place, deem the resolution of the status of Kosovo a priority<br />
issue of the <strong>in</strong>ternational agenda <strong>an</strong>d have consequently designated 2005 the<br />
year of Kosovo,<br />
• Tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account that the Contact Group has already def<strong>in</strong>ed the<br />
framework <strong>for</strong> negotiations that should ensure regional <strong>security</strong> <strong>an</strong>d stability,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d open the door to Western Balk<strong>an</strong>s’ association with <strong>an</strong>d ultimate<br />
membership of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Union,<br />
• Cogniz<strong>an</strong>t that such approach by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>an</strong>d<br />
favorable circumst<strong>an</strong>ce should not be allowed to pass by, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
• Confident that this provides a unique momentum <strong>for</strong> all regional<br />
leaders to prove their political wisdom, constructiveness <strong>an</strong>d genu<strong>in</strong>e<br />
commitment to true <strong>in</strong>terests of peoples <strong>an</strong>d citizens they represent<br />
Adopt this<br />
496<br />
497
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
DECLARATION<br />
Whereby they<br />
• Call on Belgrade <strong>an</strong>d Prisht<strong>in</strong>a, as two directly <strong>in</strong>volved parties, to<br />
engage <strong>in</strong> a subst<strong>an</strong>tial dialogue with maximum good will <strong>an</strong>d to fully<br />
cooperate with representatives of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community;<br />
• Request political actors on both sides to acknowledge Kosovo’s reality<br />
as the start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>for</strong> negotiations, while const<strong>an</strong>tly bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d<br />
legitimate <strong>in</strong>terests of Serbs, Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d other communities <strong>in</strong> Kosovo;<br />
• Insist on the respect <strong>an</strong>d full implementation of all <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
documents <strong>an</strong>d st<strong>an</strong>dards deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d m<strong>in</strong>ority rights;<br />
• Appeal to Belgrade authorities not to hamper representatives of<br />
Kosovo Serbs to autonomously act <strong>in</strong> the best <strong>in</strong>terest of the exercise of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d civil rights of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> Kosovo;<br />
• Appeal to provisional <strong>in</strong>stitutions of self-government <strong>in</strong> Kosovo to<br />
recognize that the protection of all m<strong>in</strong>ority communities is the litmus test of<br />
their capability to build up a democratic, prosperous <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Kosovo;<br />
• Welcome the settlement of Kosovo’s status that is based on multiethnicity<br />
<strong>an</strong>d full respect of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the right of all refugees<br />
<strong>an</strong>d displaced persons to return to their homes <strong>in</strong> safety; offers effective<br />
constitutional guar<strong>an</strong>tees to ensure the protection of m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>for</strong> their participation <strong>in</strong> govern<strong>an</strong>ce; establishes a central<br />
government <strong>an</strong>d structures of local government through the decentralization<br />
process that encourages coexistence of different communities; <strong>in</strong>cludes specific<br />
safeguards <strong>for</strong> the protection of cultural <strong>an</strong>d religious heritage; <strong>an</strong>d promotes<br />
effective mech<strong>an</strong>isms <strong>for</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g org<strong>an</strong>ized crime.<br />
498<br />
Prisht<strong>in</strong>a, June 14, 2005<br />
Prevention of Torture <strong>in</strong> the Closed Institutions<br />
of Central <strong>an</strong>d Eastern Europe<br />
The year 2005 was the third year of the implementation of this regional<br />
project realized th<strong>an</strong>ks to the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Commission – EIDHR.<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> is a partner org<strong>an</strong>ization <strong>in</strong> this composite project that<br />
encompasses Hels<strong>in</strong>ki committees of Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Hungary,<br />
Pol<strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>d Russia, as well as the International Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Federation.<br />
At regional level, the project aims at prevent<strong>in</strong>g torture, <strong>in</strong><strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> or<br />
degrad<strong>in</strong>g treatment or punishment <strong>in</strong> detention facilities (police stations,<br />
prisons, psychiatric <strong>in</strong>stitutions, etc.), encourag<strong>in</strong>g non-governmental<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations to monitor overall conditions <strong>in</strong> these <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>an</strong>d at exert<strong>in</strong>g<br />
pressure on national governments to make it possible <strong>for</strong> the non-governmental<br />
sector to conduct these fact-f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g missions.<br />
The project’s objectives, at national level, are as follows:<br />
• To encourage a ch<strong>an</strong>ge <strong>in</strong> the adverse practice of ill-treatment of<br />
persons deprived of their liberty by the police, law-en<strong>for</strong>cement <strong>an</strong>d prison<br />
officers;<br />
• To support legislative re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>in</strong> terms of adjust<strong>in</strong>g national<br />
legislations to relev<strong>an</strong>t <strong>in</strong>ternational st<strong>an</strong>dards <strong>an</strong>d ratified conventions;<br />
• To raise public awareness about torture <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> treatment by<br />
the police or other law-en<strong>for</strong>cement officers, as well as about the situation of<br />
persons deprived of their liberty.<br />
In the period April 2005 – March 2006, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>’s team<br />
paid fact-f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g missions to Serbia’s three closed penitentiaries-re<strong>for</strong>matories<br />
(Nis, Pozarevac <strong>an</strong>d Sremska Mitrovica), the women prison <strong>in</strong> Pozarevac, the<br />
juvenile prison <strong>in</strong> Valjevo, the juvenile re<strong>for</strong>matory <strong>in</strong> Krusevac <strong>an</strong>d the Special<br />
Prison Hospital <strong>in</strong> Belgrade.<br />
In the same period, the team paid visits to pre-trial <strong>an</strong>d closed wards of<br />
seven district prisons <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
Once all <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation related to a specific <strong>in</strong>stitution was systematized<br />
<strong>an</strong>d compiled <strong>in</strong> a report, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>in</strong> letters to the Central<br />
Prison Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>an</strong>d a relev<strong>an</strong>t prison adm<strong>in</strong>istration, highlighted its<br />
basic f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d recommendations.<br />
Quarterly reports – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g overall f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d recommendations -<br />
were drawn up after several fact-f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g missions <strong>an</strong>d distributed to the abovementioned<br />
authorities.<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g visited all <strong>in</strong>stitutions pl<strong>an</strong>ned under the project, <strong>an</strong>d then<br />
systematized <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>alyzed all <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation it gathered, the team drew up the<br />
summarized report brought to the public eye <strong>in</strong> the third publication of the<br />
type.<br />
South Serbia:<br />
Build<strong>in</strong>g Grassroots, Intercommunal Ties<br />
In the period April-December 2005, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> realized<br />
this program with the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of the Democracy Commission, US Embassy,<br />
Belgrade.<br />
The project’s purpose was to break the ice between Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> youngsters separated by deep-rooted ethnic stereotypes <strong>in</strong> South<br />
Serbia, get them know one <strong>an</strong>other <strong>an</strong>d underst<strong>an</strong>d one <strong>an</strong>other’s problems <strong>an</strong>d<br />
worries, <strong>an</strong>d eventually realize that their shared goals <strong>an</strong>d aspirations were<br />
closely connected with the establishment of a civil society <strong>an</strong>d highly<br />
499
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
dependent on their capacity to jo<strong>in</strong> h<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>in</strong> the ef<strong>for</strong>t to chart a better future<br />
<strong>for</strong> themselves.<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized 4 three-day workshops assembl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
20 tra<strong>in</strong>ees from Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>, Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Roma communities each (July 20-22,<br />
2005, Presevo; August 8-10, 2005, Presevo; August 11-13, 2005, Buj<strong>an</strong>ovac; <strong>an</strong>d<br />
December 23-25, 2005, Presevo).<br />
Every workshop <strong>in</strong> the series <strong>in</strong>cluded role-play<strong>in</strong>g where<strong>in</strong> the<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ees themselves <strong>for</strong>med mixed groups <strong>in</strong> terms of ethnicity <strong>an</strong>d gender.<br />
This segment was aimed at br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g them closer together <strong>an</strong>d help<strong>in</strong>g them to<br />
identify shared aspirations <strong>an</strong>d fears, <strong>an</strong>d then put heads together so as to<br />
present a project they deemed import<strong>an</strong>t <strong>for</strong> the group as a whole or <strong>an</strong> idea<br />
they would all, without exception, st<strong>an</strong>d up <strong>for</strong>.<br />
Given that young Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s hardly ever make friends or go<br />
to the same places (<strong>in</strong> both towns there are so-called Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong><br />
cafeterias), hav<strong>in</strong>g them sit together <strong>in</strong> local coffee shops c<strong>an</strong> be taken as a real<br />
success. This is the more so s<strong>in</strong>ce those were their first out<strong>in</strong>gs together dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />
which they chatted <strong>an</strong>d laughed regardless of the fact that other customers<br />
were look<strong>in</strong>g at them ask<strong>an</strong>ce. Moreover, young Serbs accepted their peers’<br />
suggestion <strong>an</strong>d went to <strong>an</strong> "Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>" coffee shop, while young Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s were<br />
do<strong>in</strong>g their best to keep conversation go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong>.<br />
Another illustrative example of the project’s success is that, after a<br />
workshop’s first day, the tra<strong>in</strong>ees from the two ethnic communities begun to<br />
greet each other <strong>in</strong> street <strong>an</strong>d even engage <strong>in</strong> lively conversation.<br />
Overcom<strong>in</strong>g Anti-Semitism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Nationalistic Bias<br />
As of September 2005 the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> has been implement<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the one-year project titled "Overcom<strong>in</strong>g Anti-Semitism <strong>an</strong>d Nationalistic Bias"<br />
th<strong>an</strong>ks to the support of the Council of Europe. The project addresses the root<br />
causes of racism, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism, xenophobia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> today’s Serbia,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts underly<strong>in</strong>g threats to future decision-makers, tr<strong>an</strong>sition<br />
processes, the country’s modernization <strong>an</strong>d its <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to the ma<strong>in</strong>stream<br />
of today’s world. The project activities <strong>in</strong>clude one round table, four public<br />
debates throughout Serbia <strong>an</strong>d one pert<strong>in</strong>ent study.<br />
On November 2, 2005, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> org<strong>an</strong>ized the round<br />
table under the title "The New Serbi<strong>an</strong> Right <strong>an</strong>d Anti-Semitism" <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Belgrade Media Center. The round table concluded that <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
was to be ascribed to the overall radicalization of Serbi<strong>an</strong> politics <strong>an</strong>d society,<br />
rather th<strong>an</strong> perceived as <strong>an</strong> isolated phenomenon. In this context, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d its m<strong>an</strong>ifestations perfectly fit <strong>in</strong> the predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t exclusionist politics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
conservative thought that negate <strong>an</strong>y dissimilarity be it ethnic, religious or<br />
other. The persistence of <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism is thus even more d<strong>an</strong>gerous as it goes<br />
<strong>for</strong> the small Jewish community of no great weight <strong>in</strong> Serbia’s f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ces or<br />
500<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
politics. Major promoters of such <strong>an</strong>ti-Jewish climate are to be traced down <strong>in</strong> a<br />
number of <strong>for</strong>mal groups r<strong>an</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g from those that follow <strong>in</strong> the footsteps of a<br />
part of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church’s tradition le<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>g on the teach<strong>in</strong>gs of the<br />
recently c<strong>an</strong>onized Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic <strong>an</strong>d his overt <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism,<br />
through those <strong>in</strong> the limelight of pop culture to today’s authorities unwill<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
come to grips with grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toler<strong>an</strong>ce.<br />
The first public debate pl<strong>an</strong>ned under the project was org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong><br />
Novi Sad on December 22, 2005, under the title "Racism, Fascism,<br />
Xenophobia…" All keynote speakers highlighted the fact that Serbia’s overall<br />
political <strong>an</strong>d social climate provided the background <strong>in</strong> which racism, fascism<br />
<strong>an</strong>d xenophobia were mushroom<strong>in</strong>g. As of recently, they agreed, general<br />
perception of such <strong>in</strong>tolerable trends has been misguided by the discourse<br />
some political, <strong>in</strong>tellectual <strong>an</strong>d clerical circles use whenever <strong>state</strong> politics <strong>an</strong>d<br />
"the issue of nation" are on the agenda.<br />
Capacitat<strong>in</strong>g Future Decision-Makers<br />
The purpose of this one-year project, realized th<strong>an</strong>ks to the assist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of the Balk<strong>an</strong> Trust <strong>for</strong> Democracy as of July 2005, is to encourage young<br />
people’s active approach to decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g processes at all levels of<br />
govern<strong>an</strong>ce, particularly <strong>in</strong> the matters affect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d civil rights <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>terethnic relations, as well as to imbue them with the set of values acceptable<br />
<strong>in</strong> the modern world <strong>an</strong>d to raise their awareness about disastrous effects of the<br />
policies grounded on hegemonism, ethnic bias <strong>an</strong>d conservative notions. The<br />
entire project is implemented <strong>in</strong> the multiethnic prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a <strong>an</strong>d<br />
<strong>in</strong>cludes three 3-day "conflict-prevention" workshops assembl<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong>ees from<br />
Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s diverse ethnic communities, <strong>an</strong>d a visit to Srebrenica of a group of<br />
young people recruited from the r<strong>an</strong>ks of the <strong>Committee</strong>’s earlier tra<strong>in</strong>ees.<br />
The first out of the three pl<strong>an</strong>ned three-day sem<strong>in</strong>ars (workshops) was<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ized on December 2 – 4, 2005, <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad. The tra<strong>in</strong>ees were captured by<br />
what they heard from the members of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>’s Youth Group<br />
that had attended the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Srebrenica massacre <strong>in</strong> this<br />
Bosni<strong>an</strong> town. Young activists’ accounts were brimm<strong>in</strong>g with strong emotions,<br />
but the topic itself once aga<strong>in</strong> proved to be "a po<strong>in</strong>t of discord." A couple of<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ees argued that the Srebrenica massacre was be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>strumentalized <strong>for</strong><br />
political purposes <strong>an</strong>d that the fact that Serbs were victims too was be<strong>in</strong>g swept<br />
under the carpet. In their view, only emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g of the victims com<strong>in</strong>g from<br />
the r<strong>an</strong>ks of "one’s own people" leads to unbiased perception of accountability.<br />
The tra<strong>in</strong>ees who thought differently, on the other h<strong>an</strong>d, po<strong>in</strong>ted out over the<br />
discussion that speak<strong>in</strong>g of Serb victims alone was usually me<strong>an</strong>t to avoid the<br />
issue of guilt <strong>an</strong>d responsibility, while a matureness of a community implied<br />
not solidarity with crim<strong>in</strong>als but their punishment <strong>an</strong>d solidarity with victims.<br />
At the end of the sem<strong>in</strong>ar the tra<strong>in</strong>ees themselves identified three major<br />
problems plagu<strong>in</strong>g today’s Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a – concentration camps <strong>in</strong> its territory<br />
501
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g ex-Yugoslav wars, the "high price" of those wars Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a had to pay<br />
<strong>an</strong>d bra<strong>in</strong> dra<strong>in</strong>. In the org<strong>an</strong>izers’ view, the first sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>in</strong> the series made the<br />
tra<strong>in</strong>ees aware of the signific<strong>an</strong>ce of rais<strong>in</strong>g questions about the recent past <strong>an</strong>d<br />
actual situation, triggered their <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> active citizenship <strong>an</strong>d capacitated<br />
them <strong>in</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g the steps aimed at ensur<strong>in</strong>g greater accountability <strong>an</strong>d<br />
tr<strong>an</strong>sparency of governmental <strong>in</strong>stitutions. The second sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>in</strong> the series<br />
was held on February 24-26, 2006, <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad.<br />
Religion <strong>an</strong>d Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
Through this one-year program f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially assisted by the He<strong>in</strong>rich<br />
Böll Foundation, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> attempted to factually illustrate the<br />
m<strong>an</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> which the predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church plays its<br />
signific<strong>an</strong>t role <strong>in</strong> a country such as Serbia where nationalistic <strong>an</strong>d conservative<br />
thought dramatically threatens to overpower the <strong>an</strong>yway small potential <strong>for</strong><br />
radical re<strong>for</strong>m. The project activities <strong>in</strong>cluded two studies <strong>an</strong>d their<br />
presentation at two p<strong>an</strong>els, as well as a 50-m<strong>in</strong>ute documentary broach<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
issue of church-society relationship.<br />
The study titled "What the Church C<strong>an</strong> (not) Be Asked About?" by<br />
Prof. Mil<strong>an</strong> Vukom<strong>an</strong>ovic posits, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, that particularly <strong>in</strong> the<br />
wake of October 5, 2000 the highly politicized <strong>an</strong>d politically <strong>in</strong>strumentalized<br />
Church begun to impose itself as a major arbiter <strong>in</strong> all social <strong>an</strong>d political<br />
issues, <strong>an</strong>d fill <strong>in</strong> the value vacuum left after the collapse of communism with<br />
its conservative, <strong>an</strong>ti-Western <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-Europe<strong>an</strong> st<strong>an</strong>ces. The first p<strong>an</strong>el<br />
centered on this study <strong>an</strong>d held under the same name was org<strong>an</strong>ized on<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 18, 2006, <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad. Prof. Mil<strong>an</strong> Vukom<strong>an</strong>ovic, sociologist, sociologist<br />
of religion Mirko Djordjevic, philosopher Tomislav Zigm<strong>an</strong>ov <strong>an</strong>d philosopher<br />
of religion Miroslav Kevezdi acted as keynote speakers.<br />
Journalist Radov<strong>an</strong> Kupres byl<strong>in</strong>ed the second study "The Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d the New Serbi<strong>an</strong> Identity" that was discussed at the<br />
p<strong>an</strong>el <strong>in</strong> the Belgrade Media Center on J<strong>an</strong>uary 30, 2006. Apart from Mr.<br />
Kupres, the study was <strong>in</strong>troduced by sociology professor Mil<strong>an</strong> Vukom<strong>an</strong>ovic,<br />
sociologist of religion Mirko Djordjevic <strong>an</strong>d philosopher Obrad Savic.<br />
The documentary the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> produced under the title<br />
"The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church <strong>an</strong>d ex-Yugoslavia’s Dis<strong>in</strong>tegration" provides a<br />
valuable <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church’s role <strong>in</strong> late 1980s when<br />
warr<strong>in</strong>g propag<strong>an</strong>da was <strong>in</strong> full sw<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> the period of the wars <strong>in</strong> the ex-<br />
Yugoslav territory <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> particular, after October 5, 2000 supposed to make a<br />
clear break with the Greater Serbia project. The documentary also tries to clarify<br />
the ideology that imbues the Church’s present-day activity, particularly the<br />
ideology based on the writ<strong>in</strong>gs of the newly c<strong>an</strong>onized bishop, Nikolaj<br />
Velimirovic, the notions such as "St. Sava’s teach<strong>in</strong>gs" <strong>an</strong>d their misuse <strong>for</strong><br />
purposes other th<strong>an</strong> religions, the role <strong>an</strong>y predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t religious org<strong>an</strong>ization<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
should play <strong>in</strong> a secular society, etc. The documentary has not been brought<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the public eye so far.<br />
Com<strong>in</strong>g to Grips with<br />
Serbia's Prevalent Ideological Matrix<br />
As of September 2005, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> has been pursu<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
publish<strong>in</strong>g program supported by the Federal M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Foreign Affairs of<br />
the Federal Republic of Germ<strong>an</strong>y via the Embassy of the Federal Republic of<br />
Germ<strong>an</strong>y to Serbia-Montenegro. The project is aimed at combat<strong>in</strong>g Serbia’s<br />
predom<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>t matrix of denial of the past through provid<strong>in</strong>g factual <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation<br />
about major l<strong>an</strong>dmarks of atrocities <strong>an</strong>d crimes committed <strong>in</strong> ex-Yugoslav<br />
wars. So far the project’s outcomes have been as follows:<br />
"Srebrenica: From Denial To Confession" – the repr<strong>in</strong>t of the book,<br />
prepared <strong>an</strong>d edited by Sonja Biserko, <strong>an</strong>d firstly published with the assist<strong>an</strong>ce<br />
of the US Department of State. The book provides <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>-depth <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to the<br />
context of the Srebrenica massacre, the biggest atrocity <strong>an</strong>d the most monstrous<br />
crime committed over the 1991-99 wars <strong>in</strong> the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. From<br />
the moral po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the Srebrenica massacre was not only a watershed <strong>in</strong><br />
the Bosni<strong>an</strong> war, but also a symbol of the West’s <strong>in</strong>difference. The Srebrenica<br />
massacre was a crucial po<strong>in</strong>t that made the Western civilization remember its<br />
fundamental values based on <strong>an</strong>ti-fascism.<br />
"Dubrovnik: ‘The War <strong>for</strong> Peace’" – prepared <strong>an</strong>d edited by Sonja<br />
Biserko. Even fifteen years after the months' long siege of Dubrovnik, Serbia<br />
would not accept the truth that Serbi<strong>an</strong> troops, particularly the <strong>for</strong>mer YPA,<br />
have had <strong>an</strong>yth<strong>in</strong>g to do with it. The scope of Dubrovnik's destruction is taken<br />
with reserve, while m<strong>an</strong>y voice their suspicion that this was all about a<br />
"Croati<strong>an</strong> complot" the purpose of which was to have Croatia recognized as <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>state</strong>. This is why this book of orig<strong>in</strong>al documents <strong>an</strong>d<br />
commentaries is primarily aimed at Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong> readerships.<br />
"Milosevic vs. Yugoslavia, Vol. III" <strong>an</strong>d books on Vukovar <strong>an</strong>d Sarajevo<br />
have not come out of pr<strong>in</strong>t so far.<br />
Strategy <strong>for</strong> Serbia's Modernization<br />
at the Crossroads Between the 20 th <strong>an</strong>d 21 st Centuries<br />
This one-year publish<strong>in</strong>g project – realized with the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of the<br />
Fund <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong> Open Society, Belgrade – aims at encourag<strong>in</strong>g the society’s<br />
democratic consolidation through a scientific, multidiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary assessment of<br />
the modernization strategy pursued by Dr. Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic, <strong>in</strong> his capacity as <strong>an</strong><br />
opposition leader <strong>an</strong>d the first democratically elected Premier of Serbia. The<br />
project’s purpose fully corresponds with the need to identify "a new cultural<br />
model" at this crucial stage of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society’s development.<br />
502<br />
503
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
"Among the authors of scores of the books on Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic there are<br />
some who take that it was his tragic end – the fact that he was murdered <strong>in</strong> his<br />
prime <strong>an</strong>d unique capacity – that made him a favorite of the history. ‘ A<br />
murdered leader goes down the history <strong>an</strong>d become a legend. Dj<strong>in</strong>djic’s<br />
murderers themselves have secured him a place among immortals.’ However,<br />
this is not to be taken <strong>for</strong> gr<strong>an</strong>ted," says histori<strong>an</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong>ka Perovic, the project<br />
coord<strong>in</strong>ator, <strong>in</strong> her <strong>in</strong>troductory study.<br />
The project that assembled a multidiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary group of scientists –<br />
histori<strong>an</strong>s <strong>an</strong>d other experts, most of whom have been study<strong>in</strong>g Serbia’s<br />
modernization processes of 19 th <strong>an</strong>d 20 th centuries – will soon result <strong>in</strong> the<br />
collection of papers under the title "Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic: the Ethics of Responsibility."<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter st<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>'s longst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
project – the magaz<strong>in</strong>e published ever s<strong>in</strong>ce 1995. In 2005, the same as <strong>in</strong> 2004,<br />
the magaz<strong>in</strong>e was supported by the Norwegi<strong>an</strong> Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>an</strong>d issued<br />
as a bimonthly.<br />
M<strong>an</strong>y perceive the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Charter as the only domestic paper the<br />
policy of which provides the best <strong>in</strong>vestigative journalists <strong>an</strong>d columnists the<br />
opportunity to speak their m<strong>in</strong>d. Most outst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g figures com<strong>in</strong>g from the<br />
r<strong>an</strong>ks of liberal <strong>in</strong>telligentsia <strong>an</strong>d <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights activists, the same as scores of<br />
open-m<strong>in</strong>ded people – regular or occasional readers – consider the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
Charter the best <strong>an</strong>d most straight<strong>for</strong>ward magaz<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the region, tackl<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the po<strong>in</strong>t delicate subjects that no other paper copes with <strong>in</strong> such m<strong>an</strong>ner. This<br />
mostly refers to non-impunity <strong>for</strong> war crimes committed <strong>in</strong> the territory of ex-<br />
Yugoslavia, nationalism, xenophobia, racism, <strong>an</strong>ti-Semitism, hate speech, neofascism,<br />
marg<strong>in</strong>alization of fascist conceptions or ethnically motivated war<br />
crimes, clericalism, gender discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, etc. – <strong>in</strong> a nutshell, to the stumbl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
blocks <strong>in</strong> the way of build<strong>in</strong>g a truly democratic, civil society. Last but not least,<br />
researchers <strong>an</strong>d experts from home <strong>an</strong>d abroad often turn to the magaz<strong>in</strong>e –<br />
also available at the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>'s website along with seven selected<br />
articles <strong>in</strong> English - <strong>for</strong> valuable source of <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation <strong>an</strong>d referential literature.<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Application of Precedents <strong>an</strong>d St<strong>an</strong>dards of ECHR at the Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Strasbourg." The Royal Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign<br />
Affairs (MATRA) <strong>an</strong>d Open Society Institute, Budapest, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>cially support the<br />
program.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong> application call, twenty c<strong>an</strong>didates from the r<strong>an</strong>ks of<br />
younger <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights lawyers, attorneys at law <strong>an</strong>d practitioners from NGOs<br />
from all over the territory of Serbia-Montenegro have been short-listed after<br />
careful consideration of their qualifications <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>terviews conducted <strong>in</strong><br />
cooperation with the representatives of the Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d Interights. They will be tra<strong>in</strong>ed through four 5-day <strong>an</strong>d one 7-day sem<strong>in</strong>ar<br />
to be held <strong>in</strong> 2006 (two sem<strong>in</strong>ars were org<strong>an</strong>ized <strong>in</strong> J<strong>an</strong>uary <strong>an</strong>d March 2006).<br />
Each sem<strong>in</strong>ar comb<strong>in</strong>es lectures <strong>an</strong>d workshops, <strong>an</strong>d is conducted by two<br />
renowned national <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>ternational experts. Four sem<strong>in</strong>ars deal with the<br />
rights guar<strong>an</strong>teed under the ECHR <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong>clude workshops with simulations<br />
<strong>an</strong>d moot courts. The fifth <strong>an</strong>d the last sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>in</strong> the series st<strong>an</strong>ds <strong>for</strong> <strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tensive workshop <strong>in</strong> major steps <strong>in</strong> the application procedure be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Strasbourg. The first sem<strong>in</strong>ar held on<br />
J<strong>an</strong>uary 18-22, 2006, at Mt. Fruska Gora, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, addressed the topics such<br />
as the nature of the rules <strong>an</strong>d decisions of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights<br />
<strong>in</strong> Strasbourg; difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g, approach, <strong>an</strong>d underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g of<br />
concepts; territorial <strong>an</strong>d material jurisdiction; summarized procedure of the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights; criteria <strong>for</strong> accept<strong>an</strong>ce of applications to the<br />
Europe<strong>an</strong> Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights; the right to life; <strong>an</strong>d prohibition of torture,<br />
degrad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>an</strong>d <strong>in</strong><strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong>e treatment <strong>an</strong>d punishment.<br />
The Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Program <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Lawyers <strong>an</strong>d<br />
NGOs from Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro on Application of<br />
Precedents <strong>an</strong>d St<strong>an</strong>dards of ECHR at the Europe<strong>an</strong><br />
Court of Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Strasbourg<br />
In t<strong>an</strong>dem with the Netherl<strong>an</strong>ds Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> (NHC) <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Interights, London, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
launched <strong>in</strong> July 1, 2005, the three-year project titled "The Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Program <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights Lawyers <strong>an</strong>d NGOs from Serbia <strong>an</strong>d Montenegro on<br />
504<br />
505
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
The Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>'s Youth Groups<br />
In 2005, the youth groups work<strong>in</strong>g under the auspices of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki<br />
<strong>Committee</strong>’s br<strong>an</strong>ch offices <strong>in</strong> Novi Sad <strong>an</strong>d Kragujevac were focused on the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g projects:<br />
Monitor<strong>in</strong>g of the Broadcast Media: The Impact on the Youth<br />
Activists of the Novi Sad Youth Group monitored two popular talk<br />
shows aired by Most <strong>an</strong>d BK televisions. The two shows were selected <strong>for</strong> their<br />
high rat<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>an</strong>d underly<strong>in</strong>g messages. The purpose of the project was to gauge<br />
their impact on general audience <strong>an</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> particular, on young people <strong>in</strong><br />
particular.<br />
Do Someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> Your Conscience: Not Words Only<br />
The project was aimed at present<strong>in</strong>g the activities of the Novi Sad<br />
Youth Group to the peer population at the two-day EXIT festival. Apart from<br />
distribut<strong>in</strong>g promo brochures <strong>an</strong>d leaflets, young activists stage <strong>an</strong> "<strong>in</strong>teractive"<br />
campaign <strong>in</strong> the memory of the 10 th <strong>an</strong>niversary of the Srebrenica massacre.<br />
Right To Rights: Peer Education<br />
The project, implemented <strong>in</strong> t<strong>an</strong>dem with Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s Ombudsm<strong>an</strong>,<br />
implies "peer-to-peer" education – the activists of the Novi Sad Youth Group<br />
org<strong>an</strong>ize workshops on <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> <strong>an</strong>d children’s rights <strong>for</strong> students of secondary<br />
<strong>an</strong>d elementary schools throughout Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a. So far, the project has <strong>in</strong>cluded<br />
117 schools. In 2005, young activists started to pl<strong>an</strong> the third stage of the same<br />
project that has become most popular among Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a’s students.<br />
Hello Europe!<br />
Activists of the Kragujevac Youth Group were distribut<strong>in</strong>g a brochure<br />
on Europe "<strong>in</strong> a nutshell" <strong>an</strong>d preconditions <strong>for</strong> jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the EU, as well as<br />
balloons, balls <strong>an</strong>d flags with the EU’s <strong>in</strong>signia to students <strong>an</strong>d citizens. The<br />
project also <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>an</strong> artistic <strong>an</strong>d literary competition, <strong>in</strong>spired by Europe,<br />
<strong>for</strong> elementary school students. Awards were bestowed on w<strong>in</strong>ners.<br />
Xenophobia <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac<br />
Given that m<strong>an</strong>y Ch<strong>in</strong>ese nationals live <strong>in</strong> Kragujevac, the Youth<br />
Group decided to conduct <strong>an</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion poll so as to assess their townspeople’s<br />
attitude towards them <strong>an</strong>d see what problems plague the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese colony <strong>in</strong><br />
Kragujevac. A number of Serbia’s media carried the relev<strong>an</strong>t f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
*<br />
* *<br />
In 2005, activists of the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>’s youth groups attended<br />
three regional schools of <strong>hum<strong>an</strong></strong> rights <strong>for</strong> the young people <strong>in</strong> the Western<br />
Balk<strong>an</strong>s, f<strong>in</strong><strong>an</strong>ced by the Norwegi<strong>an</strong> Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>. Together with their<br />
peers from all over the region, they staged a campaign to mark November 9,<br />
the International Day Aga<strong>in</strong>st Fascism <strong>an</strong>d Anti-Semitism. Besides, on the same<br />
day activists from Novi Sad, Kragujevac <strong>an</strong>d Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> t<strong>an</strong>dem with the<br />
Jagod<strong>in</strong>a Center <strong>for</strong> Democratic Initiative, circulated to their townspeople<br />
pert<strong>in</strong>ent leaflets <strong>an</strong>d the press release issues by the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
In early 2006, the Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong>’s Youth Group was <strong>for</strong>mally<br />
established <strong>in</strong> Zrenj<strong>an</strong><strong>in</strong>. The group is composed of the young people who have<br />
attended some of the <strong>Committee</strong>’s earlier workshops or sem<strong>in</strong>ars. Young<br />
people from Zajecar, Kik<strong>in</strong>da, Prijepolje, Novi Pazar, Jagod<strong>in</strong>a, etc., are now<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their footsteps.<br />
National <strong>an</strong>d Europe<strong>an</strong> Identities <strong>in</strong> Domestic Educational System<br />
The Kragujevac Youth Group conducted a survey aimed at gaug<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the impact of history textbooks on elementary <strong>an</strong>d secondary school students.<br />
Relev<strong>an</strong>t f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs were publicized <strong>in</strong> a brochure that also <strong>in</strong>cluded authorial<br />
pieces on critical history, the role of myths, collective memory <strong>an</strong>d misuse of<br />
history <strong>an</strong>d history textbooks. Copies of the brochure are presently circulated to<br />
relev<strong>an</strong>t authorities, students <strong>an</strong>d their teachers, while activists make pl<strong>an</strong>s <strong>for</strong><br />
the project’s follow-up <strong>in</strong> other towns throughout Serbia.<br />
506<br />
507
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
A DOCUMENTARY SERIAL PRODUCED BY THE<br />
HELSINKI COMMITTEE<br />
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA<br />
A Look <strong>in</strong>to the Past<br />
Serbia 1965-1991<br />
AUTHOR:<br />
Izabela Kisic<br />
SCRIPT CONSULTANT:<br />
Sonja Biserko<br />
CAMERAMEN:<br />
M. Radivojsa, R. Radivojsa <strong>an</strong>d H. Topic<br />
ASSISTANT CAMERAMAN:<br />
D. Begovic<br />
EDITOR:<br />
D. Mihajlovic<br />
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER:<br />
Boj<strong>an</strong> Andjelic<br />
DIRECTOR:<br />
Zlatko Pakovic<br />
The Federal M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>for</strong> Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germ<strong>an</strong>y<br />
has assisted the production of the serial with<strong>in</strong> the project<br />
"Fac<strong>in</strong>g the Truth 2002"<br />
COPYRIGHT:<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Zmaj Jov<strong>in</strong>a 7, 11000 Belgrade, S&M<br />
Tel. +381 11 3032 408; fax: +381 11 2636 429<br />
E-mail: biserkos@eunet.yu;<br />
http://www.hels<strong>in</strong>ki.org.yu<br />
TEN 60-MINUTE EPISODES OF THE DOCUMENTARY SERIAL ATTEMPT TO<br />
THROW MORE LIGHT ON CRUCIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE RECENT PAST THAT –<br />
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY – BROUGHT ABOUT SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND THE<br />
YUGOSLAV CALAMITY<br />
"The 1965 Re<strong>for</strong>m"<br />
The when <strong>an</strong>d whys of the failed processes of the country's democratization <strong>an</strong>d<br />
decentralization. Was Yugoslavia's dis<strong>in</strong>tegration h<strong>in</strong>ted back at that time? As of<br />
1960s the conflict between modern <strong>an</strong>d conservative, re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>an</strong>d <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>m,<br />
centralistic <strong>an</strong>d federal <strong>for</strong>ces dom<strong>in</strong>ates the League of Communist of Serbia, <strong>an</strong>d<br />
the Serbi<strong>an</strong> society as a whole. The <strong>an</strong>ti-re<strong>for</strong>m current w<strong>in</strong>s the battle. The 1968<br />
student protest <strong>an</strong>d the Praxis group. A period crucial to underst<strong>an</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
processes that triggered the dissolution of the Yugoslav <strong>state</strong> <strong>an</strong>d wars.<br />
"Rise <strong>an</strong>d Fall of the Liberals"<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual circles respond to the aspirations to more <strong>in</strong>dependence voiced by<br />
republic<strong>an</strong> leaderships of the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia by call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration of all<br />
Serbs, primarily <strong>in</strong> the cultural doma<strong>in</strong>. At the same time <strong>an</strong> alternative – known<br />
as the Liberals - emerges <strong>in</strong> the communist party. As the solution to <strong>in</strong>terethnic<br />
relations, the Liberals advocate more <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>for</strong> a decentralized Serbia,<br />
<strong>an</strong>d consistent federalization <strong>for</strong> Yugoslavia.<br />
"Open<strong>in</strong>g of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Question"<br />
Writer Dobrica Cosic’s circles <strong>an</strong>d the Praxis group – the <strong>for</strong>mer open the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
national issue, while the latter st<strong>an</strong>d up <strong>for</strong> the Yugoslav idea. In late 60s <strong>an</strong>d<br />
early 70s the two oppositionist group<strong>in</strong>gs are unquestionably alike – both<br />
criticize the Yugoslav socialist system. M<strong>an</strong>y Yugoslavs turn Serbs. The concept<br />
of unitary Yugoslavia turns <strong>in</strong>to the idea of cultural unity of territories <strong>in</strong>habited<br />
by Serbs. When accepted as a full-fledged member of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Academy of<br />
Arts <strong>an</strong>d Sciences, Cosic delivers a speech that as of that moment associates just<br />
one of his phrases, "Serbs are wartime victors, <strong>an</strong>d peacetime losers."<br />
"The 1974 Constitution"<br />
The model of centralistic rule is def<strong>in</strong>itely used up. Over debates that precede declaration<br />
of the Constitution, more <strong>an</strong>d more reference is made to Yugoslavia as <strong>an</strong><br />
artificial creation, <strong>an</strong>d dungeon of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> people. The 1974 Constitution – the<br />
last attempt to preserve the multiethnic <strong>state</strong> through federalization, but also a<br />
source of its dis<strong>in</strong>tegration. The Constitution does not guar<strong>an</strong>tee political<br />
freedoms <strong>an</strong>d market economy, but it sets up <strong>in</strong>stitutions supposed to replace<br />
Tito. Prov<strong>in</strong>ces are entitled to constitutions of their own, <strong>an</strong>d their competences<br />
actually equal those of the republics. Prevalent cultural <strong>an</strong>d political elites of the<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> majority nation strongly oppose the ch<strong>an</strong>ge.<br />
"National Program Completes"<br />
Early 80s – <strong>in</strong>tellectual elites stage a campaign <strong>for</strong> the freedom of expression assembl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>tellectuals from all over the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia. Professors from the Praxis<br />
group make the core of the strongest oppositionist circle, the Free University.<br />
Mid-80s – <strong>in</strong>tellectuals propagat<strong>in</strong>g a national <strong>state</strong> of all Serbs as the only option<br />
beg<strong>in</strong> to conquer the Serbi<strong>an</strong> political scene on the eve of the country's<br />
dis<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>an</strong>d wars. The concept that turns <strong>in</strong>to a <strong>state</strong> policy with<br />
Milosevic's com<strong>in</strong>g to power completes.<br />
508<br />
509
"Party Plays the Oracle"<br />
Late 80s <strong>in</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer Yugoslavia – economic crisis, high <strong>in</strong>debtedness, <strong>in</strong>flation,<br />
unemployment. The Serbi<strong>an</strong> Academy of Arts <strong>an</strong>d Sciences' Memor<strong>an</strong>dum, the<br />
first program committed to paper that promotes national unity of Serbs even<br />
beyond Serbia's borders. Tendencies towards more <strong>in</strong>dependence grow stronger<br />
<strong>in</strong> Slovenia <strong>an</strong>d Croatia, as well as <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Kosovo. In East Europe's<br />
last decade of communism, it is authoritari<strong>an</strong>ism that carries the day <strong>in</strong> Serbia.<br />
The dogmatic w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the League of Communists of Serbia that defeats the one of<br />
compromise, jo<strong>in</strong>s h<strong>an</strong>ds with oppositionist cultural elites.<br />
"Homogenization"<br />
April 1987 – S. Milosevic goes to the town of Kosovo Polje <strong>an</strong>d promises to the Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
masses, "No one is allowed to beat you." In June 1989 <strong>in</strong> Gazimest<strong>an</strong>, he goes<br />
public with his solution to the crisis <strong>an</strong>d says, "Six centuries after the Battle of<br />
Kosovo we are aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> battle. Though this is not about <strong>an</strong> armed conflict, even<br />
such conflicts are not to be ruled out." The Berl<strong>in</strong> wall is toppled. Instead of<br />
opt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> political <strong>an</strong>d economic re<strong>for</strong>ms, the Serbi<strong>an</strong> regime, cultural elites <strong>an</strong>d<br />
opposition parties emerged <strong>in</strong> 1990 actually reach a consensus on the Greater<br />
Serbia program.<br />
"Kosovo"<br />
The em<strong>an</strong>cipation of Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong> the aftermath of the World War II <strong>an</strong>d a<br />
historical overview of Kosovo’s autonomy. What makes Kosovo Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s<br />
dem<strong>an</strong>d a republic of their own <strong>in</strong> 1968? What makes Serbs <strong>an</strong>d Montenegr<strong>in</strong>s<br />
move out? Serbi<strong>an</strong> authorities clamp down on every Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> revolt. It is Kosovo<br />
where the repression of political prisoners is the worst. Kosovo’s autonomy is<br />
<strong>an</strong>nulled after <strong>an</strong> unprecedented <strong>an</strong>ti-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> campaign throughout 1980s.<br />
"The Role of the Yugoslav People's Army"<br />
In 1980s the YPA is reorg<strong>an</strong>ized. The territorial defense system is dism<strong>an</strong>tled. Serbia<br />
prepares itself <strong>for</strong> war. Top army officers see Milosevic as the "only champion" of<br />
the SFRY <strong>an</strong>d thus of the YPA's <strong>in</strong>terests. The YPA dist<strong>an</strong>ces itself from other<br />
Yugoslav republics, turns <strong>in</strong>to a Serbi<strong>an</strong> army <strong>an</strong>d plays a crucial role <strong>in</strong> the<br />
dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia.<br />
"The International Community <strong>an</strong>d Yugoslav Crisis"<br />
The <strong>in</strong>ternational community endeavors to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia – if so, how? Germ<strong>an</strong>y<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Vatic<strong>an</strong> recognize <strong>an</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent Croatia, but under certa<strong>in</strong> conditions. The<br />
Hague Conference – the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s last attempt to prevent a war<br />
<strong>in</strong> the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Prospects <strong>for</strong> the SFRY’s jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Euro-Atl<strong>an</strong>tic<br />
org<strong>an</strong>izations <strong>an</strong>d programs – the Council of Europe, PHARE, EBRD, associate<br />
membership of the Europe<strong>an</strong> Community – open <strong>in</strong> parallel.<br />
A DOCUMENTARY PRODUCED BY<br />
HELSINKI COMMITTEE<br />
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox Church<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Dis<strong>in</strong>tegration<br />
of ex-Yugoslavia<br />
AUTHOR:<br />
Izabela Kisic<br />
SCRIPT CONSULTANT:<br />
Sonja Biserko<br />
CAMERAMEN:<br />
Milos Radivojsa, Rade Radivojsa<br />
ASISTANT CAMERAMAN:<br />
Zor<strong>an</strong> Zivkovic<br />
EDITOR:<br />
Dragoslav Mihajlovic<br />
DIRECTOR:<br />
Zlatko Pakovic<br />
The documentary was produced with the assist<strong>an</strong>ce of the He<strong>in</strong>rich<br />
Böll Foundation<br />
COPYRIGHT:<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Zmaj Jov<strong>in</strong>a 7, 11000 Belgrade, S&M<br />
Tel. +381 11 3032 408; fax: +381 11 2636 429<br />
E-mail: biserkos@eunet.yu;<br />
http://www.hels<strong>in</strong>ki.org.yu.<br />
510<br />
511
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Publish<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Edition Title Author(s)<br />
Documents<br />
Documents<br />
Documents<br />
Documents<br />
Documents<br />
512<br />
Yea<br />
r<br />
Hate Speech as Freedom of Speech<br />
(<strong>in</strong> English only)<br />
1995<br />
In the Name of Hum<strong>an</strong>ity<br />
Collect. of<br />
(<strong>in</strong> English only)<br />
documents<br />
1996<br />
Serbo-Croati<strong>an</strong> Relations <strong>an</strong>d the Problem of<br />
Refugees (Belgrade, J<strong>an</strong>. 30-31, 1997)<br />
1997<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
Lex, Whistles <strong>an</strong>d Lies (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only) Boris Delic ed. 1997<br />
Broken Soul (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only) J<strong>an</strong>ja Bec 1997<br />
Serbo-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Dialogue, Ulc<strong>in</strong>j, June 23-25.<br />
1997/ Dialogu Serbo-Shqiptar Ulq<strong>in</strong>, 23-25.<br />
1997<br />
qershor 1997 (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>)<br />
Radicalization of the Serbi<strong>an</strong> Society (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
<strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
1998<br />
Self-Determ<strong>in</strong>ation: between Autonomy <strong>an</strong>d Milenko<br />
Secession (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>) Markovic ed.<br />
1998<br />
Kosovo: Law <strong>an</strong>d Politics - Kosovo <strong>in</strong><br />
Normative Acts be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>an</strong>d after 1974 (<strong>in</strong><br />
1998<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
International Community <strong>an</strong>d Kosovo -<br />
Collection of Relev<strong>an</strong>t Documents (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong><br />
1998<br />
<strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Citizen <strong>in</strong> FRY Legal System<br />
Group of<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
authors<br />
1999<br />
Serbo-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Dialogue, Ulc<strong>in</strong>j, Belgrade,<br />
Nov. 21-22, 1998<br />
1999<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>)<br />
Workers <strong>an</strong>d Trade Unions <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
2000<br />
M<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
2000<br />
For a World without L<strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>es YU Campaign to<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
B<strong>an</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>es<br />
2000<br />
Yugoslavia F<strong>in</strong>ally B<strong>an</strong>s L<strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>es YU Campaign to<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
B<strong>an</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>es<br />
2001<br />
Refugees <strong>in</strong> Serbia: Between Integration <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Susta<strong>in</strong>able Return (<strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Vladimir Ilic 2001<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia 2000<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Annual Report 2001<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Tr<strong>an</strong>sition – Serbia 2001 (<strong>in</strong><br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Annual Report 2002<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> the Shadow of Nationalism –<br />
Serbia 2002 (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Annual Report 2003<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d Accountability – Serbia<br />
2003 (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Annual Report 2004<br />
Documents Military Secret – Vol. I <strong>an</strong>d II (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only) Vlad<strong>an</strong> Vlajkovic 2004<br />
Kosovo – A Cha<strong>in</strong> of Causes (1225 B.C. – 1991)<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Consequences (1991-1999)<br />
FAMA<br />
International 2004<br />
(<strong>in</strong> English, Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Serbi<strong>an</strong>)<br />
Team<br />
Secected Essays (1) (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English) Young authors 2004<br />
Documents<br />
In Quest <strong>for</strong> Civic Identity<br />
– Published to mark the 10th Aniversary of the<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong><br />
Serbia (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d only)<br />
Report on Antipersonnel M<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Montenegro (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>an</strong>d Collective Identity – Serbia<br />
2004 (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
513<br />
Group of<br />
authors<br />
YU Campaign to<br />
B<strong>an</strong> L<strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>es<br />
2004<br />
2004<br />
Annual Report 2005<br />
Selected Essays (2) (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English) Young authors 2005<br />
"Testimony" (Vladimir Popovic’s testimony<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the Special Court <strong>in</strong> the trial of the Vladimir<br />
accused of Premier Zor<strong>an</strong> Dj<strong>in</strong>djic’s<br />
Popović<br />
2006<br />
assass<strong>in</strong>ation)<br />
Edition Title Author(is Year<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 1<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 1<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 2<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 3<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 4<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 5<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 6<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 7<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 8<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 9<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Elite<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> Elite, 2 nd edition<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Potential <strong>for</strong> Ch<strong>an</strong>ges<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Russia, Serbia, Montenegro<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Individual <strong>an</strong>d Collective Rights of<br />
National M<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
"Otpor" – <strong>in</strong> or beyond Politics<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
The Case of Iv<strong>an</strong> Stambolic<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
The Hague Tribunal: Discord between Us<br />
<strong>an</strong>d the World (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
M<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d Refugees <strong>in</strong> Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
In the Tri<strong>an</strong>gle of State Power<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Group of authors 2000<br />
Group of authors 2001<br />
Group of authors 2000<br />
Group of authors 2000<br />
Collection of<br />
papers<br />
2001<br />
V. Ilic 2001<br />
Documents 2001<br />
M. Despot, V. Ilic 2001<br />
V. Ilic 2001<br />
Group of authors 2001
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>for</strong> Hum<strong>an</strong> Rights <strong>in</strong> Serbia<br />
Hum<strong>an</strong> Security <strong>in</strong> <strong>an</strong> Unf<strong>in</strong>ished State<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 10<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 11<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 12<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 13<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 14<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 15<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 16<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 17<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 18<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 19<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 20<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 21<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 22<br />
Hels<strong>in</strong>ki Files 23<br />
Unlearnt Lesson: Central Europe<strong>an</strong> Idea<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Serb National Program<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
The Balk<strong>an</strong>s Rachomon – Historiography<br />
<strong>an</strong>d Literature on Dissolution of SFRY<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Tr<strong>an</strong>sition <strong>an</strong>d M<strong>in</strong>orities<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
The Past as Challenge to the Law<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Wallachi<strong>an</strong>s or Rum<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Eastern<br />
Serbia: the Wallachi<strong>an</strong> Issue / Rum<strong>an</strong>ii<br />
sau Rom<strong>an</strong>ii d<strong>in</strong> Serbia de rasarit (<strong>in</strong><br />
Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d Wallachi<strong>an</strong>-Rum<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>)<br />
National M<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>an</strong>d Law<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
The Po<strong>in</strong>t of Discord (the polemic<br />
launched by the Vreme weekly <strong>an</strong>d<br />
publicized from Aug. 1 to Nov. 21, 2002)<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
How to Atta<strong>in</strong> Europe<strong>an</strong> St<strong>an</strong>dards: the<br />
Situation of Serbi<strong>an</strong> Prisons - 2002-2003<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> <strong>an</strong>d English)<br />
Altar <strong>an</strong>d Crown<br />
(<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
Between Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>an</strong>d Practice: the<br />
Situation of "Small" <strong>an</strong>d "Big" M<strong>in</strong>ority<br />
Communities <strong>in</strong> Serbia (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong> only)<br />
Unty<strong>in</strong>g the Kosovo Knot – a two-sided<br />
view (<strong>in</strong> Serbi<strong>an</strong>, English <strong>an</strong>d Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong>)<br />
Serbo-Alb<strong>an</strong>i<strong>an</strong> Dialogue 2005 – The<br />
Future Status of Kosovo<br />
Serbia between Constitution <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Constitutionality<br />
Women <strong>an</strong>d Children: Modernization<br />
Processes <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>in</strong> 19th <strong>an</strong>d 20th<br />
Centuries<br />
C. Ingrao, L.<br />
Vrkatic<br />
Kuljic, Milosavljevic,<br />
M<strong>an</strong>ojlovic<br />
Collection of<br />
papers<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
2002<br />
Vladimir Vod<strong>in</strong>elic 2002<br />
Dragomir Dragic 2002<br />
Group of authors 2002<br />
Collection of<br />
articles <strong>an</strong>d<br />
commentaries<br />
F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the<br />
prison monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
project<br />
Boj<strong>an</strong> Aleksov,<br />
Dragoljub<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong>ovic<br />
Collection of<br />
papers <strong>an</strong>d<br />
documents<br />
Fahri Musliu <strong>an</strong>d<br />
Drag<strong>an</strong> B<strong>an</strong>jac<br />
Collection of<br />
papers<br />
2002<br />
2003<br />
2004<br />
2004<br />
2005<br />
2005<br />
Marij<strong>an</strong>a Pajv<strong>an</strong>čić 2005<br />
Group of Authors 2006<br />
Testimonies 9 Mud <strong>an</strong>d Blood Bogd<strong>an</strong> Bogd<strong>an</strong>ovic 2002<br />
Testimonies 10 The Root of Evil Iv<strong>an</strong> Stambolic 2002<br />
Testimonies 11 Yugoslavia’s Last Ch<strong>an</strong>ce Collect. of documents 2002<br />
Testimonies 12 Alternative Serbia – Ten Years Later Collection of papers 2002<br />
Testimonies 13 Kosovo: Reality <strong>an</strong>d Myth Ilija Djukic 2003<br />
Testimonies 14 A Chronicle of a Va<strong>in</strong> Resistence Slobod<strong>an</strong> Belj<strong>an</strong>ski 2003<br />
Testimonies 15 Serbi<strong>an</strong> Fragile Vertical Marko Nikezic 2003<br />
Testimonies 16 Time Written <strong>in</strong> the Me<strong>an</strong>time Laslo Vegel 2003<br />
Testimonies 17 The Last Inst<strong>an</strong>ce (Vol. I, II & III) Srdja Popovic 2003<br />
Testimonies 18 Serbia <strong>in</strong> Orient Sonja Biserko 2004<br />
Testimonies 19 Between Arrog<strong>an</strong>ce <strong>an</strong>d Humility Zivorad Kovacevic 2004<br />
Testimonies 20 Milosevic vs. Yugoslavia Collect. of documents 2004<br />
Testimonies 21 Refugees: Victims of Ethnic Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Group of authors 2004<br />
Testimonies 22 Srebrenica: From Denial to Confession Collect. of documents 2004<br />
Testimonies 23 Ethnology of Everyday Life Aleks<strong>an</strong>dar Bošković 2005<br />
Testimonies 24 Dubrovnik: "A War <strong>for</strong> Peace" Collect. of documents 2006<br />
Edition Title Author(s) Year<br />
Studies 1 In the Tradition of Nationalism Olivera Milosavljevic 2002<br />
Studies 2 Politika <strong>an</strong>d Politics Miodrag Marovic 2002<br />
Studies 3 Overcom<strong>in</strong>g the Past Todor Kuljic 2003<br />
Studies 4 Serbi<strong>an</strong> Conservative Thought MirkoDjordjevic (ed.) 2003<br />
Studies 5 Serbi<strong>an</strong> Paper Wars: 1884-2000 Mihailo Bjelica 2003<br />
Studies 6<br />
Repression <strong>an</strong>d Denial of Anti-<br />
Semitism: the Memory of Bishop<br />
Nikolaj Velimirovic (1880-1956) <strong>in</strong><br />
Contemporary Serbi<strong>an</strong> Orthodox<br />
Culture<br />
Jov<strong>an</strong> By<strong>for</strong>d 2005<br />
Edition Title Author(s) Year<br />
Testimonies 1 People, Developments <strong>an</strong>d Books Lat<strong>in</strong>ka Perovic 2000<br />
Testimonies 1 People, Developments <strong>an</strong>d Books (2 nd ed.) Lat<strong>in</strong>ka Perovic 2000<br />
Testimonies 2 Is There Any Reson<strong>an</strong>ce? Novak Pribicevic 2000<br />
Testimonies 3 A Chronicle of International Isolation Mil<strong>an</strong> Sahovic 2000<br />
Testimonies 4 The Road to Barbari<strong>an</strong>ism Srdja Popovic 2000<br />
Testimonies 5 The Discord with the World Milivoje Maksic 2001<br />
Testimonies 6 Portraits Slobod<strong>an</strong> Inic 2001<br />
Testimonies 7 World <strong>an</strong>d Yugoslav Crisis Ljubivoje Acimovic 2001<br />
Testimonies 8 Catharsis <strong>an</strong>d Cataract Miodrag St<strong>an</strong>isavljevic 2001<br />
514<br />
515
516