Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
Figure 2.4 Institutional Elements of a PES Mechanism Governance structure Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Financing mechanism Payment mechanism Land user Land user Land user Land user Land user Land user Land user Environmental services The main risk is of unintended, perverse consequences, such as land users clearing forest to qualify for reforestation payments or moving into previously intact ecosystems to claim payments for managing them correctly. These problems can generally be avoided by instituting appropriate eligibility criteria for participation, setting appropriate conditions for payments, and instituting effective monitoring systems (see box 2.14). LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS Box 2.14 Contracts under the Regional Silvopastoral Project specify that land users who switch any of their land to less environmentally desirable uses (as measured using the project’s environmental services index) will not receive payment. Induced perverse incentives outside project areas may be more subtle. The Regional Silvopastoral Project had intended to only pay for improvements over baseline conditions, but ultimately decided to make nominal payments for preexisting baseline services to encourage current nonparticipants to undertake such improvements even before they were formally in the PES program. Source: Pagiola 2006. Avoiding Perverse Incentives in PES PES programs are not a universal answer to all forest conservation problems. Even when PES approaches are warranted, the details of their application will differ substantially from case to case, in light of local technical, economic, and institutional conditions. Identifying the services sought is critical, and most effectively done by focusing on the demand for services and asking how best to meet it, rather than on the supply. Beginning from the supply side carries the risk of developing mechanisms that supply the wrong services, in the wrong places, or at prices that buyers are unwilling to pay. The land uses that can generate the services sought must then be identified and their impact quantified to the extent possible. Monitoring effectiveness is essential to documenting to buyers that they are getting what they are paying for and to adjusting the functioning of the mechanism should problems arise. At the same time, excessively burdensome monitoring requirements can discourage potential suppliers without necessarily further reassuring buyers. Finding the right balance between information and compliance costs is an ongoing concern, as seen in the case of markets for certified timber and agricultural products. PES mechanisms must also be sufficiently flexible to respond to changing demand and supply conditions and improvements in knowledge about how forests generate services. SELECTED READINGS Pagiola, S., A. Arcenas, and G. Platais. 2005. “Can Payments for Environmental Services Help Reduce Poverty? An Exploration of the Issues and the Evidence to Date from Latin America.” World Development 33: 237–53. Pagiola, S., and G. Platais. 2007. Payments for Environmental Services: From Theory to Practice. Washington, DC: World Bank. 90 CHAPTER 2: ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN FOREST SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
Wunder, S. 2005. “Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts.” CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 42, CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. REFERENCES CITED Bruijnzeel, L. A. 2004. “Hydrological Functions of Tropical Forests: Not Seeing the Soil for the Trees?” Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environments 104 (1): 185–228. Calder Ian R., 1999. The Blue Revolution: Land Use and Integrated Water Resource Management. London: Earthscan. Chomitz, K. M., and K. Kumari. 1998. “The Domestic Benefits of Tropical Forests: A Critical Review Emphasizing Hydrological Functions.” World Bank Research Observer 13 (1): 13–35. ITTO. 2006. Guidebook for the Formulation of Afforestation and Reforestation Projects Under the Clean Development Mechanism. ITTO technical series No. 25. Yokohama: International Tropical Timber Organization. Pagiola, S. 2006. “Innovative Marketing Arrangements for Environmental Services.” Note submitted to World Bank as input to Forests Sourcebook. Unpublished. World Bank, Washington, DC. Pearson, T., S. Walker, and S. Brown. 2005. Sourcebook for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Projects. Washington, DC: Winrock International. WBCFU (World Bank Carbon Finance Unit). n.d. “Operations Handbook.” http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm? Page =DocLib&ht=34&dl=1. World Bank, Washington, DC. NOTE 2.3: INNOVATIVE MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS: PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 91
- Page 40 and 41: [Indigenous Peoples’] rights of o
- Page 42 and 43: inappropriate. Thus, development pr
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- Page 46 and 47: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- Page 48 and 49: Borrini-Feyerabend, G., M. Pimbert,
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- Page 52 and 53: Figure 1.1 Toward Tenure Security:A
- Page 54 and 55: Box 1.21 Opportunities to Advance C
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- Page 58 and 59: ■ environmental groups to produce
- Page 60 and 61: Box 1.25 Medicinal Plants as NTFPs
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- Page 67 and 68: Box 2.2 Since 1995, Brazilian small
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- Page 94 and 95: Box 3.1 Technical Definitions Wood
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- Page 108 and 109: Box 3.7 Applying HCVF in Papua New
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Wunder, S. 2005. “Payments for Environmental Services:<br />
Some Nuts and Bolts.” CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 42,<br />
CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.<br />
REFERENCES CITED<br />
Bruijnzeel, L. A. 2004. “Hydrological Functions of Tropical<br />
<strong>Forests</strong>: Not Seeing the Soil for the Trees?” Agriculture,<br />
Ecosystems and Environments 104 (1): 185–228.<br />
Calder Ian R., 1999. The Blue Revolution: Land Use and Integrated<br />
Water <strong>Resource</strong> Management. London: Earthscan.<br />
Chomitz, K. M., and K. Kumari. 1998. “The Domestic Benefits<br />
of Tropical <strong>Forests</strong>: A Critical Review Emphasizing<br />
Hydrological Functions.” World Bank Research Observer<br />
13 (1): 13–35.<br />
ITTO. 2006. Guidebook for the Formulation of Afforestation<br />
and Reforestation Projects Under the Clean Development<br />
Mechanism. ITTO technical series No. 25. Yokohama:<br />
International Tropical Timber Organization.<br />
Pagiola, S. 2006. “Innovative Marketing Arrangements for<br />
Environmental Services.” Note submitted to World Bank<br />
as input to <strong>Forests</strong> <strong>Sourcebook</strong>. Unpublished. World Bank,<br />
Washington, DC.<br />
Pearson, T., S. Walker, and S. Brown. 2005. <strong>Sourcebook</strong> for<br />
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Projects. Washington,<br />
DC: Winrock International.<br />
WBCFU (World Bank Carbon Finance Unit). n.d. “Operations<br />
Handbook.” http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?<br />
Page =DocLib&ht=34&dl=1. World Bank, Washington, DC.<br />
NOTE 2.3: INNOVATIVE MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS: PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 91
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