Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

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Box 2.13 Water Services Provided by Forests: Claims and Reality Claim Forests slow runoff Forests increase total annual water flow Forests increase dry season water flow Forests increase precipitation Forests reduce flooding Forests reduce erosion Reality True Because of increased evapotranspiration, forests usually reduce total annual water flow Exception: Cloud forests Unclear Minor effect, except at continental scale True at small scales, not at large scales Depends on use that is made of deforested areas Sources: Bruijnzeel 2004; Calder 1999; Chomitz and Kumari 1998. Charging service users It is sometimes asserted that water users will never pay for services. This assertion is manifestly false. In Costa Rica, a variety of water users (hydroelectric producers, bottlers, municipal water supply systems, agribusinesses, hotels) are paying to conserve the watersheds from which they draw their water, generating about US$500,000 annually in payments. Other examples exist throughout Central and South America, and in South Africa. In Kenya, the Nairobi Water Company has indicated its willingness in principle to pay for watershed protection. The principal challenge is to demonstrate to users that they will, in fact, benefit from making such payments, by reducing or avoiding costs from reduced water services. Nairobi Water, for example, is currently spending about US$150,000 a year in additional water treatment and desilting costs at its Sasumua treatment plant as a result of upstream degradation. In general, the primary interlocutors in such discussions are not the ultimate consumers of the water services but the companies and public agencies that generate hydropower, provide domestic water services, or distribute irrigation water. In many cases, funding for payments comes from the existing budgets of these agencies. Thus, Nairobi Water would finance payments for upstream conservation from the savings resulting from reduced costs at its treatment plant. Only in rare instances is it necessary to increase fees to consumers to pay for PES. In those instances, experience has shown that this can be achieved with public support if the need for and use of the revenue are clearly explained. As noted above, charging biodiversity users is difficult if not impossible. Most available funding from biodiversity users (for example, from the GEF) is short term, limiting its use to paying for the up-front costs of PES mechanism establishment or to capitalization of a trust fund. Paying service providers For PES to have the desired effect, the payments must reach the land users and do so in a way that motivates them to change their land use decisions. This is not easy. The historical record is replete with examples of efforts to induce land users to adopt particular land use practices, for a variety of reasons and using a variety of payment mechanisms. Most have very little to show for their efforts. In general, several principles are clear: Payments need to be ongoing. The benefits being sought are generally ongoing benefits, which will be enjoyed year after year as long as appropriate land uses are maintained. For this to occur, land users must receive payments as long as they maintain the land use. All too often, payments have been frontloaded into a few years. Predictably, however, when payments cease, any leverage over land users’ behavior also ceases. Payments need to be targeted. Environmental services depend on both the kind of land use and its location. An undifferentiated payment system that pays everyone the same will be much more expensive than a targeted scheme. It will also make it difficult to tailor interventions to the particular requirements of given situations. Perverse incentives need to be avoided. Particular care needs to be taken to avoid perverse incentives. For example, 88 CHAPTER 2: ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN FOREST SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

payments for reforestation can encourage land users to cut down standing trees so as to qualify. have a field presence, but sometimes it may be necessary to establish new organizations to undertake this task. Creating the institutional framework Scale of project. A critical initial question concerns the scale of the PES mechanism. There are, in principle, three broad scales at which PES could be implemented: (1) nationwide, (2) at the scale of a river basin, and (3) locally, usually at the scale of a microwatershed. In practice, although there are some high-profile national systems (in Costa Rica and Mexico), almost all existing mechanisms are at the local scale. There are no river basin–scale programs. Nationwide systems may appear attractive because they can cover large areas quickly and can have relatively low costs because of economies of scale. Experience has shown that such systems tend to be very inefficient, however. They are easily distorted by political considerations and exhibit low transaction costs mainly because they sidestep the difficult questions. Local initiatives are more likely to be efficient because they tend to be closely tailored to local needs and conditions. However, they often are constrained by limited local capacity. The El Salvador Environmental Services Project is exploring an intermediate approach, in which local mechanisms are being developed under a nationwide umbrella. Legal framework. PES programs are often thought to require a specific legal framework. They only do so if they are to be based on public financing, in which case a legal framework is desirable so that the payment program is not wholly at the mercy of annual budgetary decisions. Relying on public financing is, however, generally an undesirable approach to PES. PES programs that are based on payments from service users do not require any specific law, other than general contract law. There may be a need for legal reform to remove obstacles, however. For example, public utilities may be restricted in their ability to charge consumers for the costs of conservation, or in their ability to use available funding in PES mechanisms. Functions to be accomplished. Systems of payments for environmental services require a supporting institutional infrastructure. This can take many forms, but several common functions must be accomplished (see figure 2.4). Organizationally, the most complex task to be undertaken is paying service providers because agents must be sent into the field, with all the logistical issues that entails. This task can often be subcontracted to NGOs or other agencies that already Ensuring the poor benefit PES programs are not poverty-reduction instruments, but given the often high spatial correlation between areas that provide environmental services and areas of high poverty, PES programs may contribute to poverty reduction, at least locally. Guidelines are available on how to design PES programs to maximize their positive impact on the poor and minimize any potential negative impacts. For example, in some countries, even within a community, benefits may be captured by local elites at the expense of the poor. To address this issue, capacity needs to be built to empower the poor and vulnerable groups in the community. Because some participants may be indigenous groups, it may be necessary to prepare an Indigenous Peoples Plan (IPP) or an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPFP). However, because PES programs are largely voluntary, these safeguards are triggered mainly in cases with collective decision making on land use and the use of PES revenues (see chapter 12, Applying OP 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, in section II of this sourcebook). Other operational considerations Project type. PES projects can generally take two forms: ■ ■ Projects entirely dedicated to PES, which typically work on a nationwide basis (as in Costa Rica and Mexico). PES components within a broader project. Such PES components could be part of a variety of projects. Obvious examples include watershed management and sustainable land management projects (as in the Kenya KAPSLM (Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Sustainable Land Management), but there is also significant potential to undertake PES as part of institutional reform projects or water infrastructure projects (the Brazil Espirito Santo Project is partially blended with a domestic water supply project in the town of Vitoria). Avoiding perverse incentives. PES projects do not support any clearing or degradation of forests or other natural habitats. On the contrary, they are intended to promote the conservation and restoration of forests and other natural habitats. PES projects, therefore, are usually fully compatible with both the World Bank’s Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04 and the Forests OP/BP 4.36. NOTE 2.3: INNOVATIVE MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS: PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 89

payments for reforestation can encourage land users to cut<br />

down standing trees so as to qualify.<br />

have a field presence, but sometimes it may be necessary to<br />

establish new organizations to undertake this task.<br />

Creating the institutional framework<br />

Scale of project. A critical initial question concerns the<br />

scale of the PES mechanism. There are, in principle, three<br />

broad scales at which PES could be implemented: (1)<br />

nationwide, (2) at the scale of a river basin, and (3) locally,<br />

usually at the scale of a microwatershed. In practice,<br />

although there are some high-profile national systems (in<br />

Costa Rica and Mexico), almost all existing mechanisms are<br />

at the local scale. There are no river basin–scale programs.<br />

Nationwide systems may appear attractive because they can<br />

cover large areas quickly and can have relatively low costs<br />

because of economies of scale. Experience has shown that<br />

such systems tend to be very inefficient, however. They are<br />

easily distorted by political considerations and exhibit low<br />

transaction costs mainly because they sidestep the difficult<br />

questions. Local initiatives are more likely to be efficient<br />

because they tend to be closely tailored to local needs and<br />

conditions. However, they often are constrained by limited<br />

local capacity. The El Salvador Environmental Services<br />

Project is exploring an intermediate approach, in which<br />

local mechanisms are being developed under a nationwide<br />

umbrella.<br />

Legal framework. PES programs are often thought to<br />

require a specific legal framework. They only do so if they<br />

are to be based on public financing, in which case a legal<br />

framework is desirable so that the payment program is not<br />

wholly at the mercy of annual budgetary decisions. Relying<br />

on public financing is, however, generally an undesirable<br />

approach to PES. PES programs that are based on payments<br />

from service users do not require any specific law, other<br />

than general contract law. There may be a need for legal<br />

reform to remove obstacles, however. For example, public<br />

utilities may be restricted in their ability to charge<br />

consumers for the costs of conservation, or in their ability to<br />

use available funding in PES mechanisms.<br />

Functions to be accomplished. Systems of payments for<br />

environmental services require a supporting institutional<br />

infrastructure. This can take many forms, but several common<br />

functions must be accomplished (see figure 2.4).<br />

Organizationally, the most complex task to be undertaken is<br />

paying service providers because agents must be sent into the<br />

field, with all the logistical issues that entails. This task can<br />

often be subcontracted to NGOs or other agencies that already<br />

Ensuring the poor benefit<br />

PES programs are not poverty-reduction instruments, but<br />

given the often high spatial correlation between areas that<br />

provide environmental services and areas of high poverty,<br />

PES programs may contribute to poverty reduction, at least<br />

locally. Guidelines are available on how to design PES programs<br />

to maximize their positive impact on the poor and<br />

minimize any potential negative impacts. For example, in<br />

some countries, even within a community, benefits may be<br />

captured by local elites at the expense of the poor. To<br />

address this issue, capacity needs to be built to empower the<br />

poor and vulnerable groups in the community.<br />

Because some participants may be indigenous groups, it<br />

may be necessary to prepare an Indigenous Peoples Plan<br />

(IPP) or an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework<br />

(IPFP). However, because PES programs are largely voluntary,<br />

these safeguards are triggered mainly in cases with collective<br />

decision making on land use and the use of PES revenues<br />

(see chapter 12, Applying OP 4.10 on Indigenous<br />

Peoples, in section II of this sourcebook).<br />

Other operational considerations<br />

Project type. PES projects can generally take two forms:<br />

■<br />

■<br />

Projects entirely dedicated to PES, which typically work<br />

on a nationwide basis (as in Costa Rica and Mexico).<br />

PES components within a broader project. Such PES<br />

components could be part of a variety of projects. Obvious<br />

examples include watershed management and sustainable<br />

land management projects (as in the Kenya<br />

KAPSLM (Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Sustainable<br />

Land Management), but there is also significant<br />

potential to undertake PES as part of institutional reform<br />

projects or water infrastructure projects (the Brazil<br />

Espirito Santo Project is partially blended with a domestic<br />

water supply project in the town of Vitoria).<br />

Avoiding perverse incentives. PES projects do not<br />

support any clearing or degradation of forests or other<br />

natural habitats. On the contrary, they are intended to<br />

promote the conservation and restoration of forests and<br />

other natural habitats. PES projects, therefore, are usually<br />

fully compatible with both the World Bank’s Natural<br />

Habitats OP/BP 4.04 and the <strong>Forests</strong> OP/BP 4.36.<br />

NOTE 2.3: INNOVATIVE MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS: PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 89

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