Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

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Box 6.12 The Use of DPLs to Support Natural Resources Management in Gabon and Cameroon In November 2005, the World Bank approved a US$15 million IBRD Natural Resources development policy loan to help Gabon design and implement reforms in the forest, fisheries, biodiversity and environment, mining, and oil sectors. In February 2006, it approved a US$35 million Forest and Environment development policy grant to help Cameroon consolidate and scale up recent sector reforms. Both operations represent World Bank contributions to national sector programs supported by multiple donors—the Cameroon grant is a joint IDA-Global Environment Fund (GEF) operation, while the Gabon development policy loan is an IBRD loan to be complemented by a parallel GEF grant. Forests, biodiversity, and other natural resources are critical to rural livelihoods in both countries, where the majority of people live in extreme poverty. They are also central to economic development and stability, and are the focus of a number of international partnerships. While adapted to fit their specific country contexts, both operations focus on reforming sector incentive frameworks, improving governance, enhancing participation, and enforcing laws and regulations in the field. Their design is based on several principles: that natural resources are public goods to be managed in the interests of local people, the country, and the global environment; that sustainable forest management and fiscal and environmental responsibility must be integrated into the business model of the forest industry; and that government must assume full responsibility for the quality of management of the assets under its stewardship. Well-designed, comprehensive forest operations tend to involve difficult choices and reforms ranging from reshaping and enforcing taxation regimes, curbing illegal logging, restoring the traditional rights of local populations, closing down parastatals, overcoming inertia, and reforming institutions. Two decades of Bank experience in providing assistance to the forest sector in Cameroon and Gabon revealed clearly the limits of traditional projects (called Sector Investment Loans, or SILs by the World Bank) in reforming forest sectors traditionally dominated by political patronage and vested interests. It also indicated that more successful reform programs can be pursued through sector-wide structural adjustments, if the programs are sufficiently broad, and endowed with flexible time frames and adequate resources for supervision. A number of considerations led the World Bank to select DPL as the instrument for the new Cameroon and Gabon operations: ■ ■ ■ DPLs directly involve central economic ministries, engaging high-level authorities to support fundamental changes in policy and its implementation. SILs, however, are often limited to sector ministries in which narrower interests tend to guard the status quo, leaving necessary policy changes in the hands of those most resistant to change. DPL disbursements are triggered by the delivery of tangible and measurable results, whereas SIL proceeds are used to reimburse eligible expenditures incurred by the client. SILs are based on the assumption that a strong direct link exists between expenditures and results, while DPLs focus more directly and uncompromisingly on results. DPL disbursements are far fewer in number and involve much larger amounts than SIL disbursements, making them significant to heads of state and central economic authorities who would otherwise likely overlook forest-related issues. DPL places a strong emphasis on defining results clearly and measuring achievements objectively, because these are at the core of legal agreements and key to World Bank loan and grant disbursements. This focus on results facilitates donor alignment and harmonization, joint donor supervision, public scrutiny, and independent monitoring. For example, the joint adoption of the results matrix negotiated in the course of the preparation of the Cameroon Forest and Environment development policy loan, encouraged Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the FAO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), to sign a partnership agreement that provides a clear framework for aligning their support to the forest sector. ■ DPLs sharpen the focus of Bank-government dialogue on the achievement of larger results and the quality of processes. Dialogue surrounding SILs tends to revolve around individual procurement 224 CHAPTER 6: MAINSTREAMING FORESTS INTO DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PLANNING

Box 6.12 The Use of DPLs to Support Natural Resources Management in Gabon and Cameroon (continued) ■ ■ ■ and financial transactions, leaving less time and fewer supervision resources for the operation’s larger objectives and the underlying structural constraints that may be hindering procurement and disbursement processes. By providing for interministerial review of the results that disbursements are directly contingent upon, and requiring periodic audits of fiduciary processes, DPLs can more effectively and purposefully bring structural improvements to procurement and disbursement. While DPLs are usually used as single tranche, quick-disbursing operations that can help budget support geared toward domestic financing needs, they can also be designed as multiyear, multitranche operations that support sector-wide assistance programs in response to government requests when appropriate. The timeframe for disbursement in the Cameroon and Gabon DPLs is comparable to those of SILs. DPL components can be tailored according to Bank fiduciary concerns in a specific country, and be used to monitor compliance with the enhanced procurement and financial practices that have been previously agreed to with the World Bank in the context of its major assessments of the country’s financial accounting, administrative, and procurement procedures. The Cameroon and Gabon DPLs include agreements that the government will use dedicated accounts for monitoring relevant resource flows, conduct external audits, and share the results with the World Bank, and use technical assistance as needed to improve procurement and financial management. DPLs afford adequate flexibility to address any likely significant environmental and social issues appropriately. While DPLs do not trigger World Bank safeguard policies, OP8.60 requires that the Bank determine whether policies it supports have any likely significant effect on the environment, natural resources, or forests, or any likely significant poverty and social impact. If there are any such likely significant effects, the World Bank needs to ascertain whether it has a clear understanding of how negative effects can be reduced or positive ones enhanced through the borrower’s systems, drawing on relevant country-level or sectoral environmental and social analysis. Carrying out due diligence in the Cameroon and Gabon DPLs and related GEF operations, the Bank teams advised the governments to conduct full SEAs. In the view of World Bank staff, these assessments met the highest standards, including those set by Bank safeguard policies, and allowed staff to conclude that likely significant effects of the supported policies would be addressed appropriately during program implementation. Are forest development policy loans suitable to all situations? DPLs require particularly advanced policy dialogue on sector policy reforms and reform implementation. They can only be built upon strong collaboration between central economic and technical ministries, and in the presence of completed or unfolding national financial management, auditing, and procurement reforms. In the cases of Cameroon and Gabon, these conditions were created through long processes of intersectoral dialogue with the government and strong collaboration within the country team. Source: Topa and Debroux 2006. results of the program. Managing the size of program matrices is challenging, especially in harmonized donor settings, with different outcomes in different countries. Transparency and predictability. In the context of medium-term World Bank support, progress should be reviewed regularly and in line with a country’s M&E cycle, drawing to the extent possible on internal accountability processes. It is equally important to be explicit about conditions, triggers, and expected results. In a programmatic series, it is possible to integrate a review of results into the next operation (see box 6.14). Aligning these reviews with government budget cycles is preferable. Monitoring impacts. An immediate challenge facing the World Bank and other institutions engaged in operations at NOTE 6.2: PROSPECTS FOR USING POLICY LENDING TO PROACTIVELY ENABLE FOREST SECTOR REFORMS 225

Box 6.12<br />

The Use of DPLs to Support Natural <strong>Resource</strong>s Management in Gabon and Cameroon (continued)<br />

■<br />

■<br />

■<br />

and financial transactions, leaving less time and<br />

fewer supervision resources for the operation’s<br />

larger objectives and the underlying structural constraints<br />

that may be hindering procurement and<br />

disbursement processes. By providing for interministerial<br />

review of the results that disbursements are<br />

directly contingent upon, and requiring periodic<br />

audits of fiduciary processes, DPLs can more effectively<br />

and purposefully bring structural improvements<br />

to procurement and disbursement.<br />

While DPLs are usually used as single tranche,<br />

quick-disbursing operations that can help budget<br />

support geared toward domestic financing needs,<br />

they can also be designed as multiyear, multitranche<br />

operations that support sector-wide assistance<br />

programs in response to government requests<br />

when appropriate. The timeframe for disbursement<br />

in the Cameroon and Gabon DPLs is comparable<br />

to those of SILs.<br />

DPL components can be tailored according to Bank<br />

fiduciary concerns in a specific country, and be used<br />

to monitor compliance with the enhanced procurement<br />

and financial practices that have been previously<br />

agreed to with the World Bank in the context<br />

of its major assessments of the country’s financial<br />

accounting, administrative, and procurement procedures.<br />

The Cameroon and Gabon DPLs include<br />

agreements that the government will use dedicated<br />

accounts for monitoring relevant resource flows,<br />

conduct external audits, and share the results with<br />

the World Bank, and use technical assistance as<br />

needed to improve procurement and financial management.<br />

DPLs afford adequate flexibility to address any<br />

likely significant environmental and social issues<br />

appropriately. While DPLs do not trigger World<br />

Bank safeguard policies, OP8.60 requires that the<br />

Bank determine whether policies it supports have<br />

any likely significant effect on the environment,<br />

natural resources, or forests, or any likely significant<br />

poverty and social impact. If there are any<br />

such likely significant effects, the World Bank needs<br />

to ascertain whether it has a clear understanding of<br />

how negative effects can be reduced or positive<br />

ones enhanced through the borrower’s systems,<br />

drawing on relevant country-level or sectoral environmental<br />

and social analysis. Carrying out due<br />

diligence in the Cameroon and Gabon DPLs and<br />

related GEF operations, the Bank teams advised<br />

the governments to conduct full SEAs. In the view<br />

of World Bank staff, these assessments met the<br />

highest standards, including those set by Bank<br />

safeguard policies, and allowed staff to conclude<br />

that likely significant effects of the supported policies<br />

would be addressed appropriately during program<br />

implementation.<br />

Are forest development policy loans suitable to<br />

all situations?<br />

DPLs require particularly advanced policy dialogue on<br />

sector policy reforms and reform implementation.<br />

They can only be built upon strong collaboration<br />

between central economic and technical ministries,<br />

and in the presence of completed or unfolding national<br />

financial management, auditing, and procurement<br />

reforms. In the cases of Cameroon and Gabon, these<br />

conditions were created through long processes of<br />

intersectoral dialogue with the government and strong<br />

collaboration within the country team.<br />

Source: Topa and Debroux 2006.<br />

results of the program. Managing the size of program<br />

matrices is challenging, especially in harmonized donor settings,<br />

with different outcomes in different countries.<br />

Transparency and predictability. In the context of<br />

medium-term World Bank support, progress should be<br />

reviewed regularly and in line with a country’s M&E cycle,<br />

drawing to the extent possible on internal accountability<br />

processes. It is equally important to be explicit about conditions,<br />

triggers, and expected results. In a programmatic<br />

series, it is possible to integrate a review of results into the<br />

next operation (see box 6.14). Aligning these reviews with<br />

government budget cycles is preferable.<br />

Monitoring impacts. An immediate challenge facing the<br />

World Bank and other institutions engaged in operations at<br />

NOTE 6.2: PROSPECTS FOR USING POLICY LENDING TO PROACTIVELY ENABLE FOREST SECTOR REFORMS 225

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