Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
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limited in the coverage and duration they can devote to sectoral<br />
reforms). They can also be designed as multiyear, multitranche<br />
operations that support sector-wide assistance<br />
programs in response to government requests when appropriate,<br />
and are associated with different types of conditionality<br />
(see box 6.10 and box 6.11).<br />
The good practice principles proposed by the World<br />
Bank 2005 Conditionality Review are relevant for strong<br />
policy operations aiming to achieve forest sector reforms.<br />
These principles are reviewed in the following paragraphs:<br />
Ownership. Success of sector policy reforms depends heavily<br />
on the ownership and institutional capacity of the agencies<br />
responsible for implementing the reforms. A realistic assessment<br />
of ownership must rely on the government’s expressed<br />
policy intentions and its track record of reform. The nature of<br />
policy loans requires separating the reforms from the stakeholders<br />
responsible for implementation. Perspectives diverge<br />
on the implication of this for the utility of DPL for sectoral<br />
reforms. With DPLs, sector reforms often must be initiated<br />
and owned by central economic and policy ministries, thus<br />
broadening the group of agencies responsible for reform.<br />
Furthermore, policy loans can be more effective because disbursements<br />
are triggered by the delivery of tangible and<br />
measurable results. This can be an important incentive in<br />
achieving sectoral reforms that might not come to fruition<br />
under sector investment lending because of institutional inertia<br />
and unwillingness to venture into reform areas in the<br />
implementing agencies themselves (see boxes 6.11).<br />
Separating reforms from the stakeholders responsible<br />
runs the risk of a disconnect between reform and implementation<br />
at the sector level, especially in cases where very<br />
specific sectoral objectives have been included in the DPL<br />
package. For example, in some countries energy sector<br />
reforms have been included in a series of DPLs over several<br />
years, with little impact on the sector program. When using<br />
DPLs for sectoral reforms, it can also be unclear where the<br />
funds required for costs of implementing triggers or prior<br />
actions for subsequent loans will be raised.<br />
Harmonization. Under the lead of country authorities,<br />
World Bank staff should reach an understanding with the<br />
government and other partners on a single and internally<br />
coherent framework for measuring progress under the government’s<br />
program. These accountability frameworks are set<br />
out as policy matrices showing policy actions and expected<br />
results. These frameworks can serve to coordinate broader donor<br />
support, including technical assistance. Accountability<br />
Box 6.10<br />
Typology of Conditionality<br />
Policy based loans are made available when the borrower<br />
accomplishes critical policy and institutional<br />
actions, or loan conditions. Actions to be met before an<br />
operation can be approved by the Board are referred to<br />
as prior actions and are listed in a schedule to the legal<br />
agreement, and all conditions for single-tranche operations<br />
are prior actions. In an operation with more<br />
than one tranche, the borrower complies with certain<br />
conditions after Board approval and effectiveness (in<br />
addition to any prior actions), termed tranche-release<br />
conditions. Unless all tranche-release conditions are<br />
met, a tranche can be released only if the Board<br />
approves a waiver of the unmet conditions.<br />
In addition to the critical policy and institutional<br />
actions that are recorded as prior actions or trancherelease<br />
conditions in legal agreements, the World Bank<br />
uses triggers and benchmarks to review and describe<br />
progress under a programmatic series of loans.<br />
■<br />
Triggers represent critical actions for achieving and<br />
Source: World Bank 2005.<br />
■<br />
sustaining the results of the medium-term program.<br />
Achievement of triggers normally indicates sufficient<br />
progress to move from one operation to the<br />
next. Triggers offer greater operational flexibility<br />
than using tranche-release conditions, because triggers<br />
can be adapted more easily to a changing program<br />
environment. Bank operations are expected to<br />
describe how triggers are adapted and modified to<br />
support program objectives before being converted<br />
into the prior actions of a follow-on operation.<br />
Benchmarks in program matrices describe the contents<br />
and results of the government’s program in<br />
areas supported by the World Bank. Benchmarks<br />
are frequently used to describe steps in a reform<br />
process that represent significant, though not necessarily<br />
critical, progress markers for the implementation<br />
of the program. Although they help define an<br />
area of the Bank’s policy involvement, they are not<br />
intended to determine disbursement of Bank loans<br />
or grants.<br />
222 CHAPTER 6: MAINSTREAMING FORESTS INTO DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PLANNING