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Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

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NOTE 5.4<br />

Strengthening Fiscal Systems<br />

in the Forestry Sector<br />

Fiscal instruments encompass a wide range of mechanisms<br />

by which money flows between public and<br />

private sector institutions involved in the forestry<br />

sector. Flows from the private sector to the public sector<br />

(forest charges) can be broadly categorized as taxes, royalties,<br />

fees, and fines. Financial flows in the other direction<br />

(incentives) include tax incentives, grants, subsidies, and<br />

subsidized loans. Other fiscal instruments include temporary<br />

measures (such as performance bonds) and direct<br />

intervention by the state (for example, joint ventures, public<br />

shareholding, state marketing boards, and price restrictions).<br />

All of these instruments have different strengths and<br />

weaknesses (see box 5.14) and deciding on the right mix of<br />

instruments depends on the objectives that the forestry policy<br />

maker wishes to achieve.<br />

The main objectives of fiscal instruments in the forestry<br />

sector are the same as in other parts of government. The<br />

two most important are to raise money for the state and to<br />

cover the costs of forest administration. In addition, a distinction<br />

should be made between raising revenue from the<br />

use of the forest resource (royalties) and general revenue<br />

collection (taxes).<br />

Fiscal instruments (charges and incentives) can also be<br />

used as tools for policy implementation, either to promote<br />

Box 5.14<br />

Common Problems with Fiscal Systems in the Forestry Sector<br />

Fiscal systems in the forestry sector generally suffer<br />

from three similar problems:<br />

Inadequate rent capture. Charges for the harvesting<br />

of publicly owned forest resources often do not capture<br />

the full commercial value of the harvested products.<br />

Charges are often set administratively and are not<br />

updated frequently, so they rarely reflect true market<br />

values. The main consequence is that these artificially<br />

low prices distort markets, discourage efficient use of<br />

the resource, and result in lost revenues to the state.<br />

Inadequate charges may also encourage corruption, if<br />

government officials can capture some of the uncollected<br />

rent for themselves during the process of monitoring,<br />

controlling, and approving forestry activities.<br />

Complexity. Fiscal systems in the forestry sector are<br />

often complicated, as a result of administrative<br />

processes (setting and collecting forest charges, for<br />

instance) that attempt to replicate market forces by the<br />

use of detailed schedules of charges according to product<br />

type, tree species, forest location, and total area of<br />

production. The main consequence is that such systems<br />

are often expensive to administer and administration<br />

costs can account for a high proportion of total<br />

revenue collected. Complexity may also present more<br />

opportunities for corruption.<br />

Perverse or unintended effects. Fiscal systems also<br />

often have unintended effects, particularly with<br />

respect to environmental and social aspects of forest<br />

management. Incorrect pricing often leads to poor<br />

harvesting practices (for example, selective harvesting<br />

rather than harvesting of all commercial trees, thus<br />

leaving large amounts of roundwood as waste in the<br />

forest). Fiscal systems are also sometimes inequitable,<br />

especially where harvesting activities impose costs on<br />

people living in and around forests but provide them<br />

few benefits.<br />

Source: Whiteman 2006.<br />

180

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