Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network
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NOTE 5.4<br />
Strengthening Fiscal Systems<br />
in the Forestry Sector<br />
Fiscal instruments encompass a wide range of mechanisms<br />
by which money flows between public and<br />
private sector institutions involved in the forestry<br />
sector. Flows from the private sector to the public sector<br />
(forest charges) can be broadly categorized as taxes, royalties,<br />
fees, and fines. Financial flows in the other direction<br />
(incentives) include tax incentives, grants, subsidies, and<br />
subsidized loans. Other fiscal instruments include temporary<br />
measures (such as performance bonds) and direct<br />
intervention by the state (for example, joint ventures, public<br />
shareholding, state marketing boards, and price restrictions).<br />
All of these instruments have different strengths and<br />
weaknesses (see box 5.14) and deciding on the right mix of<br />
instruments depends on the objectives that the forestry policy<br />
maker wishes to achieve.<br />
The main objectives of fiscal instruments in the forestry<br />
sector are the same as in other parts of government. The<br />
two most important are to raise money for the state and to<br />
cover the costs of forest administration. In addition, a distinction<br />
should be made between raising revenue from the<br />
use of the forest resource (royalties) and general revenue<br />
collection (taxes).<br />
Fiscal instruments (charges and incentives) can also be<br />
used as tools for policy implementation, either to promote<br />
Box 5.14<br />
Common Problems with Fiscal Systems in the Forestry Sector<br />
Fiscal systems in the forestry sector generally suffer<br />
from three similar problems:<br />
Inadequate rent capture. Charges for the harvesting<br />
of publicly owned forest resources often do not capture<br />
the full commercial value of the harvested products.<br />
Charges are often set administratively and are not<br />
updated frequently, so they rarely reflect true market<br />
values. The main consequence is that these artificially<br />
low prices distort markets, discourage efficient use of<br />
the resource, and result in lost revenues to the state.<br />
Inadequate charges may also encourage corruption, if<br />
government officials can capture some of the uncollected<br />
rent for themselves during the process of monitoring,<br />
controlling, and approving forestry activities.<br />
Complexity. Fiscal systems in the forestry sector are<br />
often complicated, as a result of administrative<br />
processes (setting and collecting forest charges, for<br />
instance) that attempt to replicate market forces by the<br />
use of detailed schedules of charges according to product<br />
type, tree species, forest location, and total area of<br />
production. The main consequence is that such systems<br />
are often expensive to administer and administration<br />
costs can account for a high proportion of total<br />
revenue collected. Complexity may also present more<br />
opportunities for corruption.<br />
Perverse or unintended effects. Fiscal systems also<br />
often have unintended effects, particularly with<br />
respect to environmental and social aspects of forest<br />
management. Incorrect pricing often leads to poor<br />
harvesting practices (for example, selective harvesting<br />
rather than harvesting of all commercial trees, thus<br />
leaving large amounts of roundwood as waste in the<br />
forest). Fiscal systems are also sometimes inequitable,<br />
especially where harvesting activities impose costs on<br />
people living in and around forests but provide them<br />
few benefits.<br />
Source: Whiteman 2006.<br />
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