Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

Box 5.6
Participation and Transparency
in Bolivia
To ensure increased transparency in government
decisions, the Public Forest Administration is
empowered to consult with various groups of civil
society. After decentralization and the reorganization
of the forest sector administration, forest
resources decisions are no longer at the exclusive
discretion of bureaucrats, but are instead subject
to public scrutiny and made with public participation.
Thus, open auctions govern the allocation of
all new concession contracts. Open auctions also
rule the sale of confiscated forest products and
equipment. Regulations allow the cancellation of
previously granted rights only with due process,
guaranteeing people’s rights and fostering a balance
between regulators and the regulated. Moreover,
the forest administration must submit
reports to the government twice a year, hold public
hearings once a year to explain work carried
out, and provide an opportunity for the public to
raise questions about performance. Any citizen
can freely request copies of official documents.
Source: Contreras-Hermosilla and Vargas Rios 2002.
responsibilities and commensurate resources and authority
are essential for quality decentralized governance. The problems
faced by the rapid forest decentralization processes in
Indonesia illustrate the importance of achieving a clear distribution
of authority and responsibilities for various forest
management functions (licensing, forest concessions, classification
of forests) between the levels of government and
between governments and civil society and private sector
institutions (Boccucci and Jurgens 2006.
Bureaucratic resistance to change. Decentralization in
India (Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh), Guatemala
(Elias and Wittman 2004), Nicaragua (Larson 2001), and
other countries shows that government executives are generally
opposed to sharing power and resources with lower
levels of government. Even when transfer of certain powers
is mandated by law, in practice this has meant granting
autonomy to manage only the least significant resources,
keeping decisions about the use of the most valuable ones at
higher levels. Furthermore, higher levels of government
commonly have a tendency to maintain control over financial
resources, thus effectively shaping the actions of lower
levels of government or of local communities and other
interest groups that require financial backing. This resistance
to sharing power is one of the most critical threats to
effective forest decentralization. In most cases, tackling this
obstacle entails twin efforts aimed at (i) raising awareness of
government officials based on clear and sound intellectual
discourse and (ii) identification and support of key agents
of change, as in Indonesia. Systems of institutional incentives
must be geared toward rewarding progress in decentralization
processes. This can be facilitated by democratic
decision making schemes that enhance downward accountability
of local government officials to local populations.
(Resistance to change is also addressed in note 5.2, Reforming
Forest Institutions).
Capacity building. Another lesson of experience is that lack
of local capacity is often used as an excuse for reducing the pace
of forest decentralization or for recentralizing. However, local
capacity is unlikely to ever be created unless decentralization
takes place. Thus, implementation of forest decentralization
programs may require education and training programs for
local governments and civil society institutions expected to
play a role in the decentralized management of forest resources
(World Bank 2004). If significant responsibility for forest
resource management is transferred to local institutions, as in
Indonesia, technical assistance will be required. Planning such
assistance will require an institutional analysis of demands and
capacities of the various levels of government and a coherent
plan to fill in gaps. Improving the knowledge base and managerial
capacity are long-term undertakings that may require
sustained support for extended periods. As emphasized by a
project in Nicaragua, World Bank interventions should pilot
decentralization initiatives and be designed as a series of sequential
building blocks as institutional and managerial capacity
gradually develops over long periods (World Bank 1998).
SELECTED READINGS
Manor, J. 1999. The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kaimowitz, D., C. Vallejos, P. Pacheco, and R. Lopez. 1998.
“Municipal Governments and Forest Management in
Lowland Bolivia.” Journal of Environment and Development
7 (1): 45–59.
Larson, A., P. Pacheco, F. Toni, and M. Vallejo. 2006.
Exclusión e Inclusión en la Forestería Latinoamericana.
¿Hacia Dónde va la Decentralización? La Paz, Bolivia:
CIFOR/IDRC.
Ribot, J. C. 2002. “Democratic Decentralization of Natural
Resources. Institutionalising Popular Participation.”
World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
164 CHAPTER 5: IMPROVING FOREST GOVERNANCE