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Forests Sourcebook - HCV Resource Network

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Assess the overall decentralization context. Forest<br />

decentralization will generally be part of broader decentralization<br />

initiatives involving the whole government, which<br />

will largely shape what can be done in the forest sector.<br />

Government-wide characteristics may impose limits as well<br />

as offer opportunities to decentralization in the forest sector.<br />

For example, some decentralized governments, such as<br />

that of Switzerland, have strong locally elected bodies that<br />

make local participation and downward accountability of<br />

local public forest administration to local populations and<br />

electorates easier to achieve. Other governments are not<br />

inclined to go this far and their levels of local participation<br />

and accountability may be lower. Project designers must<br />

evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of public and<br />

private sector organizations and their capacity to perform<br />

the forest management functions before drawing plans for<br />

forest decentralization interventions (see chapter 2, Engaging<br />

the Private Sector in Forest Sector Development, and<br />

note 2.1, Community-Private Partnerships).<br />

Forest decentralization must be adequately linked to<br />

overall decentralization processes because of the multidisciplinary<br />

characteristics of forest administration and the<br />

numerous cross-sectoral influences that shape forest governance<br />

(see chapter 6, Mainstreaming <strong>Forests</strong> into Development<br />

Policy and Planning: Assessing Cross-Sectoral<br />

Impacts, and associated notes). For example, in Albania, a<br />

Bank intervention observed that the Forest Administration<br />

was unable to control illegal logging except in selected areas<br />

where it was able to establish operational links with other<br />

decentralized agencies. In this case, an interministerial task<br />

force of various stakeholders at the national level was complemented<br />

by the creation at the prefecture and district levels<br />

of intersectoral task forces to organize collaboration<br />

(World Bank 2004).<br />

Get the legal framework right. A critical operational<br />

consideration to making forest decentralization work is the<br />

existence of a clear and consistent legal framework guiding<br />

the distribution of responsibilities, resources, and authority<br />

at the different levels of government and the relationships<br />

between government and local communities and the private<br />

sector (see note 5.3, Strengthening Legal Frameworks in the<br />

Forest Sector). While this appears to be a self-evident aspect<br />

of good governance, experience shows that, in practice, forest<br />

decentralization often takes place in an environment of<br />

considerable legal uncertainty (see box 5.3). This legal<br />

uncertainty is a sure recipe for conflicts between tiers of<br />

government and government institutions as well as between<br />

public and private entities that defeat the potential governance<br />

benefits of decentralization. Legal regimes should<br />

provide local people and the private sector with enforceable<br />

rights to resources and enable them to play a meaningful<br />

Box 5.4<br />

Legal Uncertainty in Indonesia<br />

In 1999 the Indonesian government approved legislation<br />

to decentralize government authority, resources, and<br />

responsibilities to provinces (second tier government)<br />

and districts (third tier). Districts, considered closer to<br />

the people and therefore more apt to promote democratization,<br />

were assigned primary responsibility for administrative<br />

and regulatory functions. However, drafted in<br />

haste, the decentralization laws were inconsistent or even<br />

contradictory with other laws. And in the midst of the<br />

instability that dominated the political scene after the fall<br />

of Suharto, corresponding operational regulations to the<br />

decentralization laws were slow to come, leaving much to<br />

interpretation and to the discretion of local public officials<br />

who were often inadequately prepared.<br />

In the same year, the Basic Forestry Law was<br />

enacted. This law and its regulations contradicted significant<br />

parts of the decentralization legislation. A<br />

decree issued a year later sought to clarify matters, limiting<br />

forest sector decentralization to marginal functions,<br />

and was resisted by some districts. Legal uncertainty<br />

surrounding the division of powers and<br />

responsibilities created a de facto movement toward<br />

forest decentralization and intense conflicts between<br />

the district governments and the center.<br />

In these circumstances, and fearing appropriation<br />

or interference by other levels of government, forest<br />

resource–rich districts had a powerful incentive to<br />

accelerate resource exploitation, giving only secondary<br />

consideration to the long-term consequences of unsustainable<br />

practices. In some cases, legal uncertainty<br />

favored the creation of local alliances between powerful<br />

groups and government officials. To a great extent,<br />

the poor have yet to reap the benefits expected from<br />

forest decentralization.<br />

Source: Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005; Boccucci and Jurgens 2006.<br />

NOTE 5.1: DECENTRALIZED FOREST MANAGEMENT 161

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