HAP Afghanistan Field Trial - Assessment Report - HAP International

Humanitarian Accountability Project – Herat Assessment Mission February 2002 

HAP ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 

ISLAMABAD – PESHAWAR – HERAT 

Agnès Callamard and Andy Featherstone 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Andy Featherstone and Agnès Callamard from the HAP went on a mission to Pakistan 

and Afghanistan to assess the possibilities of running a field trial in Afghanistan. 

The HAP met with representatives of humanitarian agencies (NGOs, UN agencies), in 

Islamabad, Peshawar, and Herat for the following purposes: to seek advice and reactions 

on a HAP field trial, to discuss with the host organization the terms of our relationships, 

to identify the possibilities, costs, and constraints of running a field trial, and to gather 

substantive information on the situation in the region. 

Our itinerary included: 

19/01 - 23/01 Islamabad 

24/01 - 26/01 Peshawar 

27/01 - 01/02 Herat 

02/02 - 04/02 Islamabad 

Agencies visited: 

Islamabad: Afghanistan Information Centre, UNHCR, UNOCHA - Protection, ACBAR, 

Oxfam, Ockenden International, MSF-H, Strategic Monitoring Unit (SMU) 

Peshawar: DACAAR, European Commission, AWWD, SEAL, ICRC, MADERA 

Herat: AREA, Christian Aid, CHA, DACAAR, IOM, MDM, MSF, UN Security, 

UNHCR, Ockenden International, WFP, IAM, IRC, CHA, IFRC, MDM, UNOCHA, UN 

Co-ordination Meeting, Afghan women workers, one day trip to Pashtoun (3 hours drive 

from Herat) and participation to a Shura’s. 

The assessment team for the second HAP Field Trial concluded that there were extremely 

positive reasons why a HAP Trial should be undertaken in Afghanistan. 

o There is a large degree of success with Herat constituting a potentially good Trial 

site with extremely positive feedback from agencies about the proposed Trial, and 

a number of issues raised that could act as a good starting point. 

o There is also a demonstrable need - there is a large and accessible group of IDPs 

in camps, receiving assistance and a large hinterland affected by a 3-year drought. 

o There is also a large and varied actor constellation (INGO/UN/ICRC/Afghan 

NGO) running both new and old assistance programmes. The more established 

agencies are particularly interesting as many of them have quite well developed 

community participation methodologies which HAP may be able to borrow from. 

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o The “humanitarian” operation in Afghanistan raises many coordination and 

accountability issues, some of which are presented in the second part of this 

document. 

At the same time, the team also recognized that a trial would pose large operational 

difficulties, that it would require support from the Host Agency. 

o The main constraining factors are operational and include security, logistics and 

staffing and the level of support the host agency may be able to offer, given its 

own operational needs and priorities. 

o The issue of support is fundamental to the success of the project. The HAP team 

will need to rely quite heavily on the Host Agency for admin/logistics support 

especially within the first weeks (visa renewal, house rental, car rental). It will 

clearly take some time for newly recruited HAP staff (both national and 

international) to have the necessary networks to be able to operate. Without such 

support, it will not be possible to run the field trial. 

o Security is particularly important due to the significant problems of access and 

evacuation. If there is a strong likelihood of further deterioration in security, then 

it would be ill-advised to go further in establishing an office - evacuation plans 

are at best, sketchy and given the military posturing of the Khan regime, it would 

seem well possible that in the next 6 months, there may be a return to conflict. 

o Finding suitably qualified staff will likely be problematic (languages, education, 

experience, understanding context) – without which it will be impossible to run 

the Trial along the lines of the methodology currently tested in Sierra Leone. 

Gender considerations will also be an important issue and also one that, as a new 

agency, HAP will need to be mindful of. 

o Finally, logistics is currently, and is likely to remain extremely difficult. Internal 

flights within Afghanistan is difficult because of their limited number, the 

prioritization system, the limits imposed on the number of staff able to travel (no 

more than two per agency at once) and the necessity to ensure that the HAP team 

does not impede the host agency flight plans. Moving around the country will 

require patience and will be time-consuming. 

Table of content 

This report is divided in two sections: the first focuses on the conditions for setting up a 

small field trial in Herat and identifies both constraints and opportunities. The second 

part presents a summary of the substantive issues raised by our interlocutors during the 

mission. 

First part 

I – Seeking advices and reactions 

II – Setting up a HAP field trial 

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Second Part 

I - The structure and politics of the operation 

II - Programmatic Issues 

III – Humanitarian staff 

IV – Methodological issues 

Warning: 

The two weeks mission conducted by the HAP allowed us to get a (time-based) snapshot 

on the humanitarian operation in Herat and its accountability issues. 

The information contained in the second part of this report should not be seen as an 

evaluation. It is a summary of the reactions and comments made by our contacts 

during the mission, coupled with some observations and analysis on the part of the 

HAP team. 

Unlike a HAP field trial, this snapshot is based on agencies viewpoints and our own 

analysis and observations. The time-frame of the mission did not allow us to get a feel 

for the beneficiaries perspectives and for the nature of accountability issues from their 

standpoint. It is therefore not possible to comment on the accountability concerns of 

people affected by the assistance activities (such as the quality of the assistance provided 

and the dialogue between aid givers and receivers). Furthermore, we were not able to 

follow up and investigate the problems or allegations made by our contacts. Finally, it is 

likely that some of the problems raised (e.g. coordination) may have been addressed or 

alleviated since the mission. 

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FIRST PART 

I – SEEKING ADVICE AND REACTIONS 

The two questions guiding this objective were: 

- Should the HAP consider a field operation in Afghanistan? 

- Where should this operation take place, taking into account security, logistical 

and strategic considerations 

I.1. Reactions to the HAP 

In the course of almost all meetings held, the HAP team got very positive responses to 

the proposal of holding a HAP field trial in Afghanistan or Herat. Representatives met 

pointed out that the situation was ripe for this kind of work, highlighted accountability 

issues. Quite a few presented their own work on or with accountability, either at a 

programmatic level (OI, Afghan NGOs, EC) or at a theoretical one (MSF, ICRC). Below 

is a sample of some of the reactions: 

International NGOs: 

“Very appropriate time to kick something like the HAP… So many new agencies. No 

name NGOs. What is needed are: practical recommendations, practical benchmarks, best 

practices.” (OI) 

“It is prime time to set up a project like that in Herat.” (DACAAR-Heart) 

“You should run the trial…” (MSF-Holl) 

“ Very good idea… I actually thought that the HAP could come and talk to the 

beneficiaries of our projects to assess them…” (IAM) 

United Nations: 

“I am a big supporter of accountability. I suggest a focus on best practices and not only 

on what does not work in order to extract lessons.” (UNOCHA-Protection) 

“ Welcome the project and its possible use by WFP: We need monitoring done by some 

people.” (WFP) 

Afghan NGOs 

“I welcome the HAP and its project: a very good suggestion. You will need a lot of work 

and contacts. I suggest that you contact big donors…” (SEAL) 

“I welcome the HAP: you need to work out a system. Community should be involved 

and informed. We would highly appreciate this kind of mechanisms.” (AREA) 

Donors: 

“I welcomes the project: good idea: accountability to the beneficiaries and not only to 

donors…” (EC) 

I.2. HAP by invitation 

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Especially interesting was the fact that four of the organizations we met suggested that 

our field trial include “their” beneficiaries. These four organizations were keen in finding 

out how their beneficiaries felt and perceived the work done on their behalf, the social 

and longer term impact of their activities and the extent and effectiveness of their 

accountability mechanisms. 

From a HAP stand point, and in view of the difficulties in running a field trial in 

Afghanistan, especially with regard to accessing communities, these suggestions may be 

very helpful and could allow us to initiate the trial. 

These four organizations have established relationships with specific communities and 

working with and through them will allow for a smoother and relatively easier insight 

from both a methodological and information-gathering perspectives. 

I.3. Choosing a location for the trial 

By the time the team departed for its assessment mission, a number of our contacts, 

including DACAAR our host organization, had suggested Herat as the place to conduct a 

field trial. In the course of the trial itself, the large majority of representatives agreed 

with this choice. Those that appeared to question it may have done so more on the basis 

of the fact that their own organization was little involved in Herat itself. It should be 

highlighted that there was no objection to the choice of Heart, but more simply a 

preference for other areas. 

The rational for the choice of Herat is listed below. It is based on Thomas Tompsen 

(DACAAR director) assessment and our own findings: 

(i) Herat has been one of the main areas for direct humanitarian assistance as the western 

region has been one of the worst affected in terms of fighting and in particular drought. 

Assistance is focusing on two caseloads: a) IDPs in camps in and around Herat city. 

The population in these camps is reported to have grown from 100,000 to 300,000 over 

the past month, although the figures are highly contested. This involves both food and 

non-food assistance; b) Drought-stricken communities in their areas of origin - with the 

objective of preventing further displacement. The principal element has been food 

(initially in the form of food-for-work/asset creation and lately more and more as free 

food distribution) along with efforts to re-establish drinking water supply through 

deepening of wells. 

(ii) New NGO have settled in the western region in recent months (although maybe not to 

the large extent as predicted or thought). This along with the absence of expatriate staff 

during the period September-December 2001 has led to a breakdown of coordination in 

the region, and the effects of this are already now starting to be apparent. 

(iii) At the time of the assessment mission, it was possible to access rural areas in Herat 

province, except towards the south (Farah province). One could also travel into parts of 

Badghis province. 

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(iv) The security situation in Herat is improving although it remains highly unpredictable, 

as in the rest of the country. There are many question marks as to the political (and 

geographical!) direction the regional governor (Ismael Khan) will take over the next few 

months, i.e. move closer to the central interim government or to Iran. 

(v) It is relatively cheaper to operate in Herat (as compared to Kabul for instance). An 

office building in Kabul currently costs no less than $4,000 per month, whereas one can 

be found in Herat for a fraction of that amount ($1,500). The going rate for interpreters in 

Kabul is at the moment $100 per day. They along with other necessary staff may be more 

difficult to find in Herat - but, again, it will be far cheaper. 

(vi) Kabul is currently very much the centre of gravity for all macro-level planning and 

co-ordination. Most UN organisations are in the process of moving their headquarters 

from Islamabad, and there is already a very substantial senior presence in Kabul (e.g. 

Brahimi as well as most of the heads of operational UN agencies). There is also a major 

influx of donor and diplomatic missions. This is i.e. the place to be if you want overall 

information and analysis on the general direction of political developments, assistance 

planning etc. However, there are only very limited direct linkages between the activities 

in Kabul and concrete action on the ground. One reason for this is that access to rural 

areas outside Kabul is highly restricted for security reasons, and in a way that tends to 

make the activities in Kabul somewhat introvert and in some cases even surreal. 

II – SETTING UP A FIELD TRIAL 

The second objective of the assessment mission consisted in assessing the conditions 

necessary for establishing a field trial, including: 

- Costs of an office, accommodation for staff, etc. 

- Security considerations and rules 

- Coast of renting or buying cars 

- Communications equipment 

- Hiring local researchers 

- Access to communities 

The main conclusions are twofold: (i) Afghanistan implies difficult to very difficult work 

conditions, and (ii) the support of the host agency will be important, especially at the 

beginning of the trial, to address these. 

II. 1. Security 

Security is far from being assured and a number of precautions have to be followed. 

Security threats are both political and criminal. 

At the Provincial level, security is reasonably good - despite an increase in banditry 

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following the withdrawal of the Taleban, law and order has largely been restored in Herat 

although there are still large numbers of weapons in evidence and large numbers of 

armed troops in the city. Outside of the city, the situation is a little less stable, with small 

pockets of insecurity and occasional reports of banditry on the main roads. 

At the national level, there is much greater cause for concern with increasing signs of 

fractures between the Interim government and Provincial Warlords. Whilst there appears 

to be broad support for the new Interim Government from large parts of the population, 

there are already signs of fractures with an anti-government uprising in Paktia Province 

(killing 50 and resulting in the pushing out of the government representative), inter-ethnic 

rivalry in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif (between General Dostam - an Uzbek warlord, and 

Atta Mohammed, a Tajik), and signs of unrest in the West there are currently negotiations 

ongoing between Ishmael Khan and a representative from Kandahar. 

On this latter issue, it would appear that the long-term situation and security of Herat are 

unclear and uncertain. 

Opinions tended to vary as to the political and geographical directions which Ismail Khan 

may take and when. According to our main security contact, the gunpowder keg is in 

place, the fuse has been set and all that is needed is someone to light it. The city is awash 

with guns, there are troop movements to the south and there is every indication that 

conflict may occur in the foreseeable future. All that is unclear is the course that this 

conflict will take and the timeframe in which it will happen. This would appear to be very 

much in the hands of Ishmael Khan, self-appointed Emir of the West. 

In our contact’s opinion, there are three main scenario's for the future of the Western 

region; 

• either Khan will retain his position in Herat, continue to defy the Interim government 

whilst reinforcing links with Iran (who would support the creation of a buffer state for 

religious and economic reasons) and wait for Kabul to attack (there are already 

20,000 troops from Kandahar stationed to the south of Herat for this purpose); 

• or he will make a pre-emptive strike against Kabul, and in doing so will sever links 

with Iran and the Hazara's (who will only support him if he is in Herat, not Kabul) in 

which case he will likely be fighting on two fronts - against Iran and Kabul; 

• or he will join the government, sever links with Iran (and by association, the Hazara's 

also - both are Shi’ite Muslim) and seek to drive them out. 

Depending on the course of action pursued, conflict might be sudden (scenario 2 and 3) 

or there will be a gradual build-up (scenario 1). Any decisive move by Khan will likely 

trigger unrest in Herat - which will be divided ethnically (Hazara's, Pashtun's, Tajiks), 

religiously (Sunni and Shi’ite) and militarily (Herat Defence force, troops loyal to Khan, 

Hazara's and Iranians). Any unrest in Herat will likely inflame anti-West sentiment which 

will be targeted at the UN agencies and NGOs (being the most visible symbols of 

Western influence). 

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The assessment team opinion differed as to the weight to attribute to these scenarios. On 

one hand, our contact was very knowledgeable about Afghanistan and security questions 

and has already gone through many upheavals. 

On the other, it was difficult to obtain detailed information, if at all, as to the nature of his 

evidence and the patterns. In previous and further discussions, corroborations of his 

analysis was difficult to establish, except by individuals who had been briefed by him! 

Since our return from the mission, information from Iran seems to indicate that Iran is 

keen on distancing itself from the opposition to the Afghan interim government 1 . On the 

other hand (!), given the internal struggles within the Iranian government, and especially 

the struggle between the “fundamentalists” (as represented by the secret services, 

apparently those working in Herat) and the more “progressive” ones, decisions from the 

Iranian President or members of his government may not necessarily say much about 

how others are acting. 

But whatever the medium, long or short-term scenario, it is clear that a large 

number of precautions have to be taken by expatriates in Herat. It will be necessary 

for the HAP team to: 

(i) Find secure accommodation with a private compound and food stocks to last 

for at least 24 hours (most agencies are continuing to keep a reasonably low 

profile - no stickers on houses/offices etc), strong doors, barbed wires, metal 

bars on houses (this was not the situation in the guest house where we stayed 

but it strongly advisable) 

(ii) Get regular security briefings 

(iii) Hire day and night guards (several) 

(iv) Drive rather than walk (some of the people we met did walk and go to the 

market but overall, expatriates remain cautious) 

(v) 

(vi) 

Get Radio Communication system in house and in cars 

Be included in an evacuation plan and devise alternative evacuation routes, 

via Turkmenistan or Iran. 

II.2. Renting Office and accommodation 

The rent may vary but should be around USD 1,200 and above. There is increased 

competition among agencies to locate houses and accommodation but the overall 

impression is that it will be possible to rent a house, which could serve as both an office 

and accommodation. This may require some work (as in SL). The DACAAR staff 

member responsible for purchasing showed us one house (much too big for the HAP). In 

his opinion, it will be possible to rent a house for six months, although the monthly rent 

may be bigger than for a longer period of time. (At the time of the visit, two large 

agencies were looking for new guest houses and offices, one of which had been shown 14 

houses). 

1 One additional piece of information to be confirmed is that the Iranian authorities would have closed 

down Ismail Khan’s houses in Iran. 

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In addition to renting, additional costs will have to be covered to ensure the security of 

the occupants. 

Further, the office will need to include a women’s office from where Afghan women staff 

can work. 

II.3. Car hiring or rental 

Cars can be purchased in Herat itself and it did not seem to present much difficulties 

when it was discussed with DACAAR staff. 

II.4. Communication equipment 

These should include: 

- Thoraya satellite phones (very popular in Afghanistan and Pakistan) which we 

can purchase from Geneva and hand carry to Afghanistan. HF comms will be 

extremely difficult to import and for this reason, it is recommended that the team 

have two satellite phones - at least one of these should be a portable device and 

should travel with the field team in the absence of an HF radio. 

- VHF for travel around town and for access to the security network. These can be 

bought in through Pakistan or freighted directly to Afghanistan. 

II.5. Hiring local staff 

This is probably one of the hardest dimensions of a HAP field trial. 

With the recent increase in the scale of operations and with the arrival of a number of 

new agencies, the market for educated staff is extremely small. Specifically in the context 

of running an action research project, it is far from certain that staff with any training or 

experience will be available for such a short time period. In particular, finding Afghan 

staff able to speak English is becoming very difficult. The challenge appeared greater 

with regard to recruiting female staff. 

It is also important to note that there has been an “edict” made by the Minister of 

Planning that any new staff should be recruited with their assistance (which essentially 

involves them providing a list of names). At the time of the mission, relief agencies were 

determining the meaning and implication of the “edict” and how to apply it. Whether this 

will be done in a coordinated fashion was opened to question at the time of the mission. 

A weak national staff base would present a significant obstacle to the team - particularly 

given the need to access communities. It is not satisfactory to expect credible results 

without a reasonably strong team, and at least one team member with good language 

skills (English, Dari, Pashtun) will be an extremely important part of this. 

Provided the Provincial Authorities fully support the recruitment of female staff members 

to NGOs (which remains debatable – see Part Four), we will need to set up a separate 

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women’s office space, and the team will need to be extremely careful in how it relates to 

female team members (not to be left alone with a male team member, not to sit next to 

male colleagues in HAP vehicles etc.). 

The challenge for the HAP will be to recruit male and female staff and to do so without 

engaging in unethical staff poaching (a major unaccountable way of working!). During 

the assessment mission, the team explored ways of doing so. 

‣ Second staff from other agencies: It may be possible to second staff from 

Afghan NGOs - and discussions with OI and AREA confirmed this possibility 

(AREA offered to second a staff member for at least a month in order to train 

HAP researchers). This would take the pressure off the immediate need to recruit 

our own staff and may facilitate initial access to communities. 

‣ Hire students: In the absence of trained research staff, it may be possible to 

recruit students with some English language skills. In terms of accessing 

communities, Afghan NGOs interviewed agreed that communication skills were 

key but were split on the subject of age, with some suggesting middle-age and 

others advocating for young people who would be less prejudiced and more 

flexible. 

‣ Organize an international recruitment for a Dari speaker: this will ease the 

pressure in terms of finding local researchers with both research and English 

skills. HAP Geneva could set this in motion rapidly. 

II.6. Accessing local communities 

This constitutes the other major challenge for a HAP field trial. 

Currently in Herat and surrounding Provinces (Badghis, Ghor, Farrah), there are two 

distinct communities receiving aid - IDPs in high profile camps which are served well by 

NGOs, and those in more remote villages who are in need but who are more numerous 

but less visible and hence who receive less assistance. Much of the relief effort (by 

INGOs and UN agencies at least) has focused on the IDP camps and it is only recently 

that agencies are proactively targeting rural villages. It will be important that the HAP 

team strikes a balance between the two although this may be difficult due to the distance 

of some of the more remote (and hence more needy) areas. 

In terms of working within rural communities, there are a number of NGOs, which have 

developed participatory methodologies (AREA, OI, DACAAR) and it is these who could 

act as entry points for the HAP team. Communities are consulted about needs after which 

village leaders Committees (Shura's) are consulted throughout the life of the project. It is 

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interesting to note that for all of these agencies, the same methodology is used for both 

long- and short-term programs. 

Without further research, it is difficult to gauge the quality of the dialogue between aid 

giver and receiver. 

Talking to both men and women will present a challenge. In the last years, a small 

number of agencies have managed to continue activities focusing or involving women, 

particularly medical projects and those in areas where negotiations could take place with 

local rulers. Many others, however scaled down any aspects of programming relating to 

women leaving a very large gap in assistance programmes. Of the agencies interviewed, 

few made specific reference to the need for gender balance (e.g. establishment of 

women's focus groups in communities where they work). 

II.7. Working with the Regional Authorities 

During the assessment there were no specific meetings held with the Regional 

Authorities. This was for a number of reasons - firstly to avoid confusion as to how HAP 

would be operating (it is yet to be confirmed whether DACAAR are willing to support 

the Trial) and also as agencies themselves have not yet re-established relations with them 

(and many are fairly reticent given the tensions between the regimes in Herat and Kabul). 

What is clear, however, is that under the Taleban, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 

Ministry of Plan posed significant obstacles to humanitarian operations. 

It is yet to be seen how the new regime will engage although early feedback has been 

mixed (already regulations have been passed on the recruitment of local labor, and 

women in particular). If the Field Trial goes ahead, HAP will need to have links with the 

government. 

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SECOND PART 

The two weeks mission conducted by the HAP allowed us to get a (time-based) snapshot 

on the humanitarian operation in Herat and its accountability issues. Unlike a HAP field 

trial, this snapshot is based on agencies viewpoints and our own analysis and 

observations. The time-frame of the mission did not allow us to get a feel for the 

beneficiaries perspectives and for the nature of accountability issues from their 

standpoint. It is therefore not possible to comment on the accountability concerns of 

people affected by the assistance activities (such as the quality of the assistance provided 

and the dialogue between aid givers and receivers). Furthermore, we were not able to 

follow up on each of the problems or allegations made by our contacts. Finally, it is 

likely that some of the problems raised (e.g. coordination) may have been addressed or 

alleviated since the mission. 

The information below should not be seen as an evaluation. It is a summary of the 

reactions and comments made by our contacts during the mission, coupled with some 

analysis on the part of the HAP team. 

I - THE STRUCTURE AND POLITICS OF RELIEF ASSISTANCE 

I.1. Labelling the situation: are we dealing with a new emergency? 

The naming of the crisis faced by Afghanistan is a complex issue, which raises many 

operational issues. It rapidly emerged that the crisis is probably not an emergency 

humanitarian one in the usual sense of the word. While life-saving activities remain 

much needed, they are addressing structural and longer-term problems rather than those 

emerging from a sudden unset. 

“It is a chronic emergency. There is nothing particularly new in the current situation, 

with the exception of the necessity to providing food in Mazlak camp. There is an 

emergency but it is an old one: emergencies upon emergencies upon emergencies…” 

“Drought has brought people one step lower in the chronic emergency scale. It took 

about 6 to 8 months for us to realize that the drought brought people to the limits. 

People in the rural areas are on the edge of survival - There is a real risk of applying 

emergency response to long-term problems.” 

There are certainly pockets where immediate humanitarian needs predominate but the 

majority of our informants were very cautious in terms of referring to the situation as a 

humanitarian and emergency crisis (and many backed down from doing so). Indeed, 

quite a number had very quickly moved to activities with a longer-term and 

reconstruction dimension. 

The labeling has serious programmatic implications, as was demonstrated by the 

controversy over the distribution of free food or rations (see below). Probably more 

important with regard to the future of Afghanistan, it also has political implications: a 

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humanitarian labeling is likely to delay or impede an Afghan control and ownership over 

the activities. This point was made very clear in the context of one meeting but it may be 

said to be at the forefront of Afghan (NGOs) concerns. 

“You’re talking about a complex emergency but is it? This is a post war recovery, not a 

complex emergency. So we need to change our mentality. We need to support the 

administration. They need ownership. Otherwise, the minute you leave, the system will 

collapse.” 

“We are approaching the emergency needs with an emergency approach grounded in a 

long-term perspective. Agencies who don’t do that may not be effective and may irritate 

local authorities. By so doing, they will put everyone at risk.” 

I.2. The politics and coordination of funding 

Along with the coordination structure and mechanisms (see below), the funding of the 

operations in Afghanistan remained throughout the assessment mission a rather opaque 

question. There may be simple answers and explanations but we were unable to get a 

very clear picture. So to follow up from Geneva… 

Some of the questions we began to research: 

1. Whether the Tokyo process and its outcome ($4.5 billion being pledged), 

focus exclusively on the longer-term reconstruction needs of Afghanistan or 

whether it includes as well humanitarian activities. 

It seems that the first option is the correct one. There appear to be two different 

processes or programs: the immediate and transitional Assistance program for 

Afghanistan and the reconstruction program (UNDP/WB/Asian Bank). Apparently, 

UNOCHA pushed without success for a common strategy in Tokyo, i.e. a strategy 

including humanitarian assistance. 

“New York and Washington pushed the Afghanistan and Tokyo process at the time it did 

“because Afghanistan is hot right now.” But it was premature. Not ready. Criteria for 

decisions are not necessarily in the best interests of Afghans.” 

Given the above point on the labeling of the crisis, it remains unclear how the two 

(reconstruction and humanitarian) will be linked and coordinated. We were also unable 

to establish how the 2002 Appeal process (based on project submission for a total of 

1,114,000,000 dollars – to be double checked) will link up with the other funding 

processes. 

2. Who is funding what (reconstruction vs. humanitarian activities)? 

According to all our informants, the funding climate at the time of the mission was very 

“positive”. This means that money was available, and available immediately. At the time 

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of the mission, consultants from the EC and DFID were assessing needs with a view to 

scaling up their assistance missions. (For instance, the EU has 2 million to spend this 

year.) 

“Money will finish in 1 or 2 years. The money should be spread over a 10 year period. 

We should have a 10 year plan.” 

3. The implications of the funding climate: 

The positive implications of this favorable funding climate cannot be denied. NGOs have 

been able to recruit new staff and implement new activities or activities they had planned 

for in previous months or years but had been unable to fund until then 2 . 

But the risks and abuses were also very much in everyone’s minds. Many of our 

informants brought them to our attention. 

The speed of disbursement often meant that there were no or limited accountability 

systems, financial and others, and most probably limited or no monitoring: 

“Donors are allocating resources without accountability lines.“ 

“NGOs have become shopkeepers.” 

“Financial accountability? Forget it! You can get any justification you need in 

Afghanistan. Only way to monitor is to go through the field. To do Real Time 

monitoring: but it is time consuming and raises staffing issue.” 

“I have a recommendation to donors: there should be three parties on a contract: The 

NGO, donors, and the community where the project is to take place. Community should 

know about the project, who implements it, for whom, outcome, budget, etc. For instance, 

they should know the number of teachers, their salary, they should be asked whether it is 

a good project.” 

Fears were raised that there may be insufficient partner capacity to 'absorb' such 

quantities of funds, the so-called absorption capacity problem. With no formal criteria for 

partner selection and with the need to spend funds quickly, it is well possible that 

mistakes may be made in the selection process. 

There were allegations (we cannot substantiate them) made against some donors who 

had funded agencies with no experience in the sectors/areas they are funded to work in. 

Also reported to us was the creation of Afghan NGOs by implementing partners as a 

vehicle to disburse funds, increasing bilateralisation by UN agencies in particular who 

establish partnerships outside of existing co-ordination mechanisms. Reference was also 

2 Interestingly enough, the only ones who seemed not to be able to take advantage of the positive funding 

climate were Afghan women’s NGOs absent at the time of the mission from Herat (and possibly elsewhere 

in Afghanistan.) 

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made to a donor Quick Impact Projects as being a vehicle to spend money rather than to 

provide relief. In an Afghanistan context, the time frame within which to spend the funds 

was far too short. 

Given the focus of attention on 'absorption capacity' of agencies, and the ability to spend 

funds in limited time spans, and given the fact that a number of agencies had been absent 

from Afghanistan for a while or never there, funding were (often) disbursed without 

needs assessment. There were exceptions (NGOs with longer term presence in 

Afghanistan, both international and Afghan). 

The problem of funding without needs assessment has to be seen in light of the first point 

raised above: the labeling of the crisis. 

“You got to get the balance right between grabbing money and using it constructively.” 

These problems are compounded by the difficulties (this may be an understatement) in 

the coordination of funding. 

4. The coordination of funding activities and strategies 

“Checking what other donors are doing: it is a nightmare.” 

A coordination structure seems to have been put into place but it does not seem to be 

working! It may be because the structure itself is rather heavy… 

- The Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering group, made up of Japan, US, EU, 

Saudi Arabia 

- The Implementation Group, made up of UNDP, Asian Development Bank, 

Islamic Development Bank, World Bank, Chair of ASG, NGO and UN 

representatives 

- The ASG (Afghan Support Group), made up of bi-lateral donors (Western donors, 

Russia, Japan) whose mandate may be humanitarian (not reconstruction) 

activities. According to our contacts, the ASG is fighting to demonstrate they are 

the main coordination body. 

At the time of the assessment mission, there were several on-going discussions on how to 

distribute the funds, e.g. through a trust fund, through the government, etc. The team does 

not know the outcome of these discussions. Some of our informants recognized that the 

best way to coordinate is through the government, but that the search for freedom and 

flexibility and the absence of trust militated against it. 

“ A trust fund would have been an approach but who will manage? Funding should be 

centralized. But there is no real state right now.” 

“The most important next step is coordination with interim authorities in terms of 

reconstruction. But we are very cautious. We are willing to support them but we know 

that the interim authorities are polarized.” 

15


I.3. Coordination of humanitarian activities 

Below is a review of some of the reactions: 

“No one knows who is in charge at this point. There is no coherent body.” 

“Information flow is critical but it is not working at the moment.” 

“Can the UN coordinate itself? Infighting and turf wars are going on. Brahmini, Mike 

Sackett, UNHCR, etc. » 

“All coordination mechanisms are playing catch up at the moment.” 

There is strong evidence to suggest that the problems faced by the aid community in 

Herat represent a failure of co-ordination. Many of the 'accountability' issues identified 

by the NGOs and UN agencies can be put down to an inability of agencies to 

communicate with each other in any meaningful way and the difficulties of UNOCHA 

and other mandated co-ordination mechanisms to function effectively. 

Before September 11, co-ordination mechanisms in Herat were reportedly good, based on 

functional formal structures and an extremely good informal system. This all stopped as a 

greater number of agencies returned to the Province to find greater numbers of displaced. 

“Regional coordinating bodies are key but OCHA collapsed after 11 September.” 

In principle, there should be 7 coordination bodies for all 7 regions of Afghanistan, with 

one RCO per region. The Regional Co-ordination body in Herat was eventually reestablished 

along with its sectoral teams but this mechanism was playing catching up at 

the time of the assessment mission. 

“RCO Structure: Hit and miss, some are good others not. Whether they can manage to 

get NGOs on board is opened to question. Whether NGOs want to be coordinated is also 

a question.” 

The NGOs have been little better with a noteable vacuum: along with the UN 

mechanisms, the NGO one (ACBAAR) is also playing catching up, having to re-establish 

itself and its legitimacy in Afghanistan. New and old members have to be brought in. 

According to an international NGO representative: 

“Herat Coordination is poor but I will lay the blame on NGOs… For instance, Mazlak 

camp. It was set up about 18 months ago. The whole community fell apart around this 

concrete yet simple problems. There were nasty in-fighting between NGOs… It was 

unmanageable especially under the Taleban rule. NGOs negotiated with the Taleban on 

their own. There were no common strategy.” 

16


It also seemed that there were duplicitous NGOs co-ordination mechanisms currently 

being proposed for Afghanistan (NGO forum and ACBAAR), although we were not able 

to follow up on how the two initiatives will work together. 

Sectoral coordination mechanisms seemed to work better (at least we could understand 

who was doing what). The coordination of non food items outside the IDPs camps were 

UNHCR task, each IDP camp had a focal point (IOM and the Danish Afghan 

Committee), and food distribution was coordinated by WFP. 

The HAP team attended two coordination meetings during its mission (a UN and an NGO 

led meeting.) On a comparative basis, the NGO coordination meeting was better 

managed, in that it provided an agenda, the minutes of a previous meeting had been 

circulated, the minutes of the meeting were taken, and Afghan NGOs, essential partners, 

were present. None of these tasks were performed during the UN coordination meeting 

and there was no Afghan presence. 

But whether or not any of these two meetings amounted to actual coordination is opened 

to question. 

Very problematic is the absence of Afghan NGOs from the UN led coordination meetings 

(a criticism made by both international and Afghan NGOs.) This is all the more serious 

that Afghan partners are also absent from the informal information sharing mechanisms 

(e.g. ICRC or UN bars). 

Our informants pointed out that the role of these mechanisms should consist not only of 

ensuring a better exchange of information (no one was really talking about coordinating 

activities at this point) but also of linking very different partners with a difficult history: 

“It is important now to involve government in coordination meetings so that they have a 

good idea of what we are doing.” 

“UNOCHA should bridge the gap between relief community and the government.” 

As was reiterated throughout the mission, these mechanisms, old or new, are playing 

catching up and have to establish some ground rules and legitimate role. The situation 

may have improved since our return. 

But by the time of our departure, it is fair to say that the majority of our informants had 

little faith in the UNOCHA coordination role, and that the majority of our UN contacts 

were uncertain as to the division of labor among themselves, and whether lead role had 

changed. Some NGOs had taken the lead in terms of establishing an NGO coordination 

system in Herat and much hope was expressed that it will fill some of the vacuum. In the 

meantime, coordination very much depended on individual or institutional stewardship. 

17


“We got no clear answer from HQ as to who is leading on what. We used to be the lead 

agency on … in Herat but it may have changed.” 

“We have asked NGOs who are working in the same areas as ours to coordinate with us. 

It is working a bit. We get an idea of what is going on.” 

I.4.Too many “New” NGOs? 

There was an overall perception that a number of new NGOs had arrived and were 

creating problems. For many of our informers, there are too many new NGOs, without 

appropriate experience, which are spoiling the work done so far. 

“When spring comes, the follow up to Tokyo will get into full swing. It will be a 

CIRCUS. “ 

“A lot of new NGOs: 280 registered NGOs in Afghanistan, including 90 international. 

So many new agencies. No name NGOs. Never did this type of work before or never 

worked in this region.” 

“Problem with NGOs with no experience, not talking to people, not planning, not 

coordinating.” 

“Non experienced people and NGOs are coming. They don’t know about Afghan needs, 

they just spend money on projects.” 

However, when pushed a bit, people do admit too that there may not be as many as 

expected because so far a number of filters have been effectively preventing newcomers. 

“Overflowing of bogus and wastecoat NGOs: may not happen to the extent it did in 

Kosovo. Because of filtering mechanisms such as Visas, flights, etc. But as soon as 

direct planes are on, filtering won’t take place.” 

“New NGOs cannot get in because of planes filters. They require 2 year presence in the 

country.” 

“New NGOs may not pop up because of violence and culture. It was different in 

Kosovo.” 

“Whether they will be drawn to Kabul remain questionable. Many won’t set themselves 

up because of the rent: our office rent increased from 450 to 7000 USD.” 

These filters include: 

- Security conditions 

- Inability to travel by road to the main cities 

- Limited number of flight services to and within Afghanistan 

- High rates on UN flight (up to USD 1,200 one way to Kabul until recently) 

18


- Strict conditions as to whom can get access to UN or ICRC flights (e.g. UN 

affiliated, no more than 2 staff person per agency, free flights only to the end of 

March) 

- New Visas and registration requirements, although these were quite unclear by the 

time of our departure. What could be asserted is that NGOs will have to be 

registered and that NGO staff must have visas in order to remain in Herat. 

- High rent and more generally high expenses to operate in Afghanistan 

Whether or not these filters will function for much longer is opened to question. With 

Afghan airlines opening services, it is to be expected that new relief actors will arrive. In 

Herat, some of the new NGOs have arrived via Iran. A number of newcomers in the relief 

world are Afghans and Iranians. 

It is difficult to assess who is actually left out because of the filters. We could only assert 

that the small Afghan NGOs based in Pakistan, in the first place women’s NGOs, have 

not returned. 

The relatively widespread perception of “too many new NGOs” may reflect (i) 

difficulties with coordination, (ii) early warning and experience of other emergencies, 

(iii) increased number of staff within each existing agency, (iv) increased competition, (v) 

staff poaching, (vi) Afghan NGOs left out or feeling left out of the relief process and 

business, (vii) arrival each week of new actors, etc. 

As far as we could establish, new international NGOs in Herat included: World Vision, 

War child (Food distribution), Help Germany (Education), Maltesa (Swiss development 

NGO), ACF (UNHCR implementing partner in Gore province), MDM-P, Shelter 

International (?), Iranian NGOs (?). 

One “new” international NGO was the object of severe criticisms. Almost all of our 

contacts had a negative story or complaints to tell about them. We tried unsuccessfully to 

follow that up with the agency in question while in Herat. At issue was the seemingly 

absence of efforts to coordinate, share information, establish working relationships, etc. 

“There are major tensions with … Local NGOs are upset because they are not talking to 

them. They only refer to their local agreement with their UN agency.” 

“We have serious problems with them. They are working in areas where we are located 

but they have not yet visited us. They want to run a malnutrition program but they need 

planning and coordination.” 

I.5. Afghan Women’s NGOs 

As stated above, there were few, if any, Afghan women’s NGOs in Afghanistan and to 

the best of our knowledge and most importantly of our contacts there, they were absent 

from Herat. 

19


Some of the reasons included: security concerns and absence of resources for moving 

activities and offices back into Afghanistan. 

“I need a need assessment, a survey, practical support. How can I return to Afghanistan 

without all these? They are not helping us in resettling in Kabul. How should I go there 

in my old car? Yet, 56% of the Afghan population is made up of women and girls… 

Only men’s organizations get assistance. I have nothing against men’s organizations but 

why only them? UN agencies funds local partner organizations through old 

connections.” 

HAP was not in a position to follow up on the factors, which may prevent some of the 

Afghan women’s NGOs from setting up activities in Afghanistan. Nor could we assess 

the history of their relationships with funding agencies in Pakistan. 

But we certainly were in a position to assert (along with many others) that accountability 

to women beneficiaries has been and remains a key problem and issue as far as 

humanitarian activities are concerned. The presence of Afghan women’s NGOs and their 

integration in humanitarian/reconstruction activities will fail very short of addressing 

meaningfully this problem, and of implementing the fairly weak and general statements 

on women contained in the Bonn agreement. But their absence augurs badly of the 

prospects for doing so. 

II – PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES 

There is a large and accessible group of IDPs in five camps located in or around Herat, 

receiving assistance and a large hinterland affected by a 3-year drought. There is also a 

large and varied actor constellation (INGO/UN/ICRC/Afghan NGO) running both new 

and old assistance programmes. 

Overall, the humanitarian situation in the camps is stable, although concerns were raised 

regarding the adequacy of food distribution. The provision of basic services has now been 

consolidated which has meant that food, water and sanitation along with health provision 

is available. This was not the case a month ago but in the last weeks, assistance has 

reportedly been much better targeted. There was already talk of return (It is planned to 

return 11,000 IDPs from Maslakh camp in the next 6 weeks). 

That said, there is still a large IDP population in the camps (numbering between 200- 

250,000 - numbers are disputed and a re-registration was pending at the time of the 

mission), displaced largely as a result of the drought (not conflict). This caseload is still 

increasing although this has slowed in recent weeks (Nov increase - 8,000/Dec increase - 

26,000/Jan 1-10 increase - 6,000/UNHCR). 

II.1. Targetting the “right” beneficiaries: IDPs Camps vs. the rest of the province 

20


One of the main issues being discussed at the time of the HAP mission concerned the 

targeting of the “right” beneficiaries, and especially the (growing?) gap between 

assistance provided to IDPs in camps and assistance in further away rural areas. 

“The main ethical dilemna is how to provide minimum humanitarian standards in the 

camps without emptying the provinces?” 

“We must keep the balance right between IDP camps and the communities in the 

provinces.” 

“Assistance is too heavy in IDP camps as compared to places of origin. We need to solve 

grass root problems in the places of origin so that people can come back. We should be 

doing everything in places of origin.” 

Assistance to rural communities has been far slower to scale up. There are large 

humanitarian needs in the rural areas. Despite a growing realization that assistance 

programs need to scale up and decentralize, many areas were said to not be receiving 

adequate assistance. 

Rural families continue to be displaced both as a result of the continuing drought and 

difficult conditions but also because of the amount of assistance targeted at the camps 

constituting a significant pull factor. 

“When I visited a village, I was told that 5 families were planning to leave to go to the 

IDP camp in Herat. One head of family showed me a letter he had received from a family 

member, a cousin, in the camp where it listed all the items they had received for free. 

“Our relatives are receiving much more than what we are. One bag of wheat is nothing 

compared to what they are receiving in the camp”. 

But these were probably a minority. There are reported to be a number of people who do 

not have the means to move to more accessible areas - a caseload which UNHCR have 

termed as Internally Stranded Persons (ISP). 

It is important to note that the situation in these areas is one of chronic food shortage and 

as such it is difficult to categorize it as a classic emergency situation, particularly as the 

prevailing assistance model is one that borrows heavily from long-term development. 

Most of the large agencies have well developed participatory mechanisms, which appear 

to be reasonably effective although the distances between Herat and rural program areas 

(up to 3 days drive) do considerably hinder the effective provision of relief. 

The future of these drought-affected communities is far from certain - despite more rain 

and snow than last year, there is still the need for significantly greater precipitation if 

groundwater is to be recharged. This coupled with the scarcity of seed in the country will 

mean that livelihoods support to the rural areas may continue for some time to come. 

Shifting to the provinces 

21


At the time of the HAP mission, almost everyone recognized that there was an urgent 

need to shift assistance from the camps to the provinces. A number of agencies had 

already established or reactivated activities further inland, had opened offices or were 

about to open them, to address the problems. 

Yet, even if the trend appeared to be towards addressing the rural needs, several factors, 

however, militated against a rapid shift: 

(i) The humanitarian obligation to provide adequate assistance to those in the 

camps, 

(ii) A tension between this obligation and a “larger” perspective 

(iii) Logistical problems in reaching our the provinces (although an air strip was to 

opened very soon in Badghis province and warehouses were opened there), 

(iv) Security concerns, 

(v) Some vested interests in the camps: corruption, military elements, etc. 

(vi) Possibly a lack of interest on the part of some humanitarian actors in working 

further inland: this point was raised by some of our contacts but we were 

unable to establish its accuracy. 

“More than 44 returnees came back when they heard there was water and irrigation in 

the village.” 

“I have suggested that agencies focus on places of origin. But practically, most agencies 

spend huge money to provide assistance in IDPs. In my mind, you should just provide 

wheat and concentrate on places of origin.” 

II.2. Impact of food distribution on longer-term approach 

Ironically, the change of focus of activities from camps to rural areas has also bought its 

problems with concerns voiced by the established agencies about new agencies coming in 

and undermining their programmes. The general assistance model is that of a large 

established agency providing long-term support and distributing free food from WFP and 

perhaps one or two smaller agencies providing 'hit and run' drops, usually of non-food 

items gifted by one of the UN agencies (UNHCR or Unicef). 

Although many of the agencies consulted engaged in food distribution on behalf of WFP 

or other agencies, our impression was that a number of them were rather of two minds 

about it. In fact, quite a few questioned openly the strategy and brought up examples of 

its negative impact on the communities and on reconstruction activities. Afghan NGOs 

and Afghan staff within international NGOs were especially critical of the approach. 

“We do not believe in distributing food for free. Only families with no manpower should 

be entitled to free food.” 

“We used to do food for work projects or Food Asset Creation (FoodAc) but now WFP is 

distributing food for free. Food Asset Creation (Foodac) involves identifying vulnerable 

communities and individuals. Food is distributed to the all community in exchange of 

22


labor of some members of the communities for the realization of specific project. Almost 

al road repairs have been done through Foodac. But since October, food has been 

distributed for free.” 

The reasons for engaging in activities which may contravene an organization overall 

principles, approaches or assessment are twofold: (i) the (business or corporate) necessity 

to grab an opportunity, to become a donor or UN agency implementing partners and 

therefore to be well placed for future work, (ii) the possibility of working around some of 

the expectations: 

“This donor put some cash for free distribution of rations to drought affected people. The 

community heads told us it will have very negative impact. We distributed the ration but 

asked the community to build a surrounding wall.” 

II.3. Shortage of Seeds: 

Another major issue discussed at the time of the mission concerned the shortage of seeds, 

which would greatly threaten a self-sufficient future. NGOs and UN agencies tended to 

hold each other responsible for this major problem, although one particular actor – the 

FAO – was seen by everyone in Herat as bearing the primary responsibility. We did not 

meet with the FAO representatives so cannot establish their side of the story. 

It may be fair to say, however, that independently of FAO role, almost everyone 

overlooked to plan for seeds distribution. This oversight may result from the absence of 

relief actors for several months, the slow down of activities, the actual and objective 

difficulties in locating adequate seeds, the large needs as compared to the possible 

provision, etc. 

“There are insufficient seeds for planting. Even if rains come, farmers will be unable to 

plant because there won’t be seeds available. FAO asked us to make a commitment now 

to contract seed growers. But we don’t know whether we will have our funding and we 

cannot commit. Some families want to return but they need seeds and tools and enough 

food to feed itself for a while.” 

“Some of the seeds are not working here. There are two types of seeds: irrigated fed 

seeds and natural rain seeds. We are getting irrigated fed seeds in the hope that 

something will grow but they are not appropriate for here.” 

“We tried to order rain fed seeds but the contractor ran out of them.” 

“Disastrous situation. Seeds need to be distributed before 15 Feb but it won’t happen. 

UN agencies have totally failed in this regard. Why is FAO not acting?” 

II.4. WFP Food distribution 

23


During the mission, WFP food distribution activities were very criticized by other 

agencies on the ground that they did not reach the beneficiaries, that they were a PR 

exercise, that the numbers and figures were not correct, etc. 

“Food got to central distribution centers in districts but was not distributed to 

beneficiaries.” 

“A scandal! Yet they are not taking to task. To feed people, you need rations, not just 

wheat. Food dumps all over the country.” 

“WFP relies too much on implementing partners for assessment and implementation.” 

Our WFP interlocutor agreed that some of the critiques were founded (not the PR one 

though!) but that they were working on improving their distribution and targeting of 

communities. (By the time of our departure, some of our contacts agreed that the situation 

was improving.) Some of the possible reasons for the problems included the absence of 

information flows from the implementing agencies to the WFP, the reliance on 

implementing partners for assessment and implementation, and logistical difficulties in 

reaching mountainous areas. But whatever the reasons, WFP image within the 

humanitarian community was fairly to very negative. 

III – HUMANITARIAN STAFF 

III.1. Staffing and staff poaching 

Recruitment of local staff and staff poaching ran very high on the agenda of all 

informants. Both were described as problematic for many relief agencies, although not 

surprisingly it is particularly problematic for Afghan NGOs and international NGOs. The 

relatively scarce resource base coupled with bad and unethical practices on the part of a 

number of agencies were listed as the main reasons. 

The workings of a free labor market necessarily implies different salary scale and 

opportunities for experienced staff to move to a better employer as far as the salary is 

concerned. NGOs cannot match the salary offered by UN agencies, and Afghan NGOs 

find it especially difficult. 

As a way to handle the issue, the relief agencies are moving towards a “regulatory” 

approach: regulating the process, procedures of recruitment and possibly the conditions 

of employment. Whether or not ACBAAR will be successful in setting up a code of 

conduct and monitoring its implementation is however opened to questions. (It was 

interesting to see how a sector, which is not too keen on regulations and function very 

much on the basis of an extreme form of free market, reacts very negatively whenever the 

free market works against institutional interests). 

The problematic implications of staff poaching are twofold: (i) on going programs of 

activities may be negatively affected, and possibly unable to be pursued because of the 

24


loss of key staff, thus creating disruptions, (ii) local staff are not necessarily moving to 

better jobs but they appear to be moving to better paid jobs, thus resulting in a loss of 

much needed expertise. 

The main loser will be the Afghan government. 

Donors could fix the salary but they won’t. 

Code of conduct re poaching of staff, require advertising for the post, inform everyone. 

New staff is very difficult to recruit. 

Staff poaching is a big issue. Local NGOs pay 6000 to 8000 ruppees for locals, 

international NGOs offer 15000, and UN agencies offer 50,000 

We lost a person 4 days ago who had been with us for 4 months only. All we did during 

this period was train him. And then we lose him. 

4 or 5 key staff were lost over the last month. 

III.2. Recruiting Afghan Women 

In principle, Afghan women are “allowed” to return to work. Within a few days of 

arrival in Heart, we were told that the MOP had suggested in the course of a meeting with 

an Afghan representative that relief agencies should be careful in recruiting women and 

that women should not be recruited. 

As far as we could assert, the recruitment of Afghan women is allowed although 

prudence and caution may be required: there are or will be far more controls and 

procedures regarding the recruitment of women, and women staff should be given a 

separate office. 

We could not assert how many Afghan women had been recruited by UN and NGOs. Our 

observations indicate: 

- Very few Afghan women are working in the main offices, 

- Women’s offices have been set up by a number of agencies visited 

- One Afghan woman was working in a UN office wearing a simple veil 

Afghan women interviewed in one office remarked that there were extremists and 

fundamentalists in NGOs and UN offices, as well as in the government, and that they 

were preventing women from returning to work. 

It seems that so far the majority of NGOs and UN have been fairly cautious in pursuing 

an ambitious recruitment of women (with the exception of medical agencies who are 

advertising for many women positions), although most of them had begun recruiting a 

25


few. At the time of the HAP mission, the Taleban legacy was still very much in the minds 

of those expatriates who worked under or with them 3 . 

III.3. Expatriate women: 

At the time of the HAP mission, the gender-balance among the expatriate (and local staff) 

staff was far from established but there were signs of increasing balance. Under the 

Taleban, some agencies had a policy of not sending expatriate women to work in 

Afghanistan. This policy had been revoked and women had been recruited, including to 

head Herat sub-offices. 

“Personally, the last 6 years of my life has been with men” 

“You tend to live a very isolated life with limited contact with the communities. Gender is 

the issue, which will determine whether I will be working here longer than the three 

month contract. We are planning to employ two local women: a radio operator and a 

secretary but we will have to see how the government will react.” 

III.4. The legacy of the Taleban (and pre-Taleban) years 

This legacy could be seen in almost all aspects of the humanitarian work, approach to 

working, and individual reactions, including: recruitment, overall caution, cynicism, 

fears, etc. This legacy especially determined the nature and extent of the relationships 

between NGOs/UN agencies and the regional authorities, and explained the lack of trust 

on both sides: from the NGO/UN side because of “fear”: in Herat, the Taleban MOP 

(minister of planning) rule had been particularly brutal, from the authorities standpoint 

because of lack of knowledge and understanding on how these actors worked (coupled 

probably with a lack of general know-how: one does not become a minister over night.) 

Some of our contacts were particularly aware of the impact of recent history on actions, 

reactions and behaviors, and on the difficulties this history posed in terms of building and 

sustaining new relationships and activities, especially with the regional and central 

authorities. The problem in Herat was particularly compounded by the Ismail Khan 

regime and the questions regarding its political future. 

“The ministers have changed but not the aid NGOs.” 

But the main question, of course, is whether the Taleban years (and the pre-Taleban 

period) constitutes (just) a legacy or also a possible future, in one form or another. 

3 The reactions or resistance to the Taleban edicts regarding working women and projects for women or 

girls varied very much from one agency to the next. The medical ones kept some of their (technical?) 

female staff and negotiated a space of activities for women and with women. Some agencies recruited 

couples as a way to “resist” the Taleban edict. Others worked in secrete ways, even if their resistance 

strategies were in effect more “frontal”: e.g. pursuing education activities for girls with women teachers. 

Some agencies laid off their female workers fairly quickly, others kept them for longer, yet others laid them 

off but kept them on their payroll for several months. 

26


IV. METHODOLOGICAL ISUES: ACCESSING LOCAL 

COMMUNITIES 

One of the HAP team objectives was to dress a list of the existing mechanisms of 

engagement with local communities. We did not evaluate them. 

Local and international NGOs with longer-term programs worked very much along 

similar lines, i.e. through the Shura (village leaders’ committees). One agency also refers 

to the need of establishing women’s focus groups. 

Communities were involved in each part of the programme: their signatories were a 

must, donors should monitor that communities are involved. We work through the Shora, 

community elders elected by their own people. We are doing our best to involve 

communities. We need to involve them, and they need to solve their own problems. 

Communities are involved in every stages of the program. We have a participatory 

approach through: 

- Rural rapid appraisal 

- Encourage men to make a Shura and women to set up a women focus group 

(women shura do not exist) 

- Community workers are in close contact with the community. We encourage the 

community to use it own capacities 

- We explain the budget of the project at the beginning 

- Communities are involved and actively participate in: need assessment, base line 

survey, design, technical design, implementation, mid-term review, evaluation 

“We recruit information on qualified people in the village. We try to recruit people from 

the community: these are assets for the rural area and it improves the capacity of the 

community to manage its own resources.” 

Without further research, it is difficult to gauge the quality of the dialogue between aid 

giver and receiver, and whether accountability mechanisms are in place. What is clear is 

that there is a tradition of participatory methods and engagement with the communities 

on the part of relief agencies (both local and international). This approach has been 

applied to humanitarian activities and not only to development or reconstruction 

activities. From the HAP mandate perspective, there is probably a lot to be learned and 

extracted in terms of “good” humanitarian practices as far as consulting, listening and 

informing communities are concerned. 

“Non food items distribution: we have two teams in the area: two men and two women. 

In the first stage, we contact the community. In the second, we propose the setting up of a 

Shora and women’s focus group. We don’t go and distribute like this. We first identify 

priorities.” 

27


Many of our contacts were also aware of the limits of the approach they have sought to 

implement, many of which are not specific to the Afghan context. 

In the reflective words of our contacts: 

Accuracy of the data: 

“We recently conducted a survey: in the first walli, it worked, but in the second, people 

adjusted! The communities have learned how to cheat.” 

“How to collect relevant information: the drought is a big issue for people but it is 

difficult to get the right information. People exaggerate to get more assistance.” 

Identifying and targeting the “right” beneficiaries: 

“We do many surveys but still I am not convinced. How to identify and approach the 

needy people? Different people with influence. Under the Taleban, one central governor 

decides. Now, every gunman in the village decides.” 

“Identify the right beneficiaries: NGOs have tried to do that but they worked mostly with 

community leaders.” 

Informing beneficiaries: 

“I did an evaluation two years ago. 6 agencies were evaluated. My findings were that 

NGOs were working with community leaders only, and beneficiaries were not aware of 

what they were entitled to. There was no transparency. Another agency tried to open the 

system by displaying the list of beneficiaries and asking people to comment. The list was 

read aloud. It gave excellent results.” 

Corruption and food diversion 

Our winterization program was done through block leaders. They are very corrupted. 

How to reach the population? We know that 45% of our stuff got diverted. 

Targeting women beneficiaries: 

Targeting and working with women beneficiaries constituted a challenge for many 

agencies. One had established women’s focus groups in order to address the challenge. 

Others had a less formal system (working through their female staff). 

28

HAP Afghanistan Field Trial - Assessment Report - HAP International

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