Report
Report
Report
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
7 Revenue and Welfare Implications<br />
of SAFTA: Partial Equilibrium Analysis<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The trade theory argues that trade liberalisation<br />
enhances economic efficiency, promotes growth and<br />
helps correct domestic market failures in imperfectly<br />
competitive markets. However, these benefits have<br />
associated costs, one of which is the loss of trade tax<br />
revenue. Trade taxes constitute an important part of<br />
government revenue in developing countries. In general,<br />
it is found that countries’ reliance on revenues from<br />
taxes on international trade is inversely related to their<br />
income levels (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005). Given this,<br />
tariff loss due to trade liberalisation may be substantial<br />
for SAFTA member countries, therefore welfare<br />
implications of trade liberalisation become an<br />
important issue.<br />
Recent research suggests that for developing<br />
countries with binding government budget constraints,<br />
it is a priority to implement comprehensive reform<br />
packages of the domestic tax system to accompany<br />
trade liberalisation. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) use<br />
panel data of over 25 years for 111 countries and show<br />
that high-income countries in fact recovered the<br />
revenues they have lost from other sources from past<br />
episodes of trade liberalisation. For middle-income<br />
countries, recovery has been in the order of 45–60 cents<br />
for each dollar of lost trade tax revenue, with signs of<br />
close to full recovery when separately identifying<br />
episodes in which trade tax revenues fell. Troublingly,<br />
however, revenue recovery has been extremely weak in<br />
low-income countries (most of which depend on trade<br />
tax revenues): they have recovered, at best, no more<br />
than about 30% of each lost dollar. The view that loss<br />
of tariff revenue may have adverse implications for<br />
tariff-dependent developing countries, as it may lead<br />
to lower government expenditure as the entire loss is<br />
not recovered by taxes, has been supported by many<br />
1<br />
SMART rests on the Armington assumptions.<br />
studies in the literature (Emran and Stiglitz 2005, Munk<br />
2005, Atolia 2006).<br />
It is although argued about the loss of revenue to<br />
the government may not be fully recovered through<br />
alternative source, very few studies have actually<br />
estimated the extent of revenue loss to countries under<br />
SAFTA. In this chapter, we use the partial equilibrium<br />
model to estimate the impact of zero tariff regime<br />
on the revenue and welfare of SAFTA member<br />
countries.<br />
REVENUE, WELFARE AND TRADE EFFECTS:<br />
METHODOLOGY<br />
Revenue, Welfare and Trade Effects have been<br />
estimated using UNCTAD/World Bank SMART model.<br />
SMART is a partial equilibrium model simulating the<br />
impact of a tariff change on trade flows, tariff revenue<br />
and consumer welfare for a single market. 1 It focuses<br />
on one importing market and its exporting partners<br />
and assesses the impact of a tariff change scenario by<br />
estimating new values for a set of variables.<br />
The theoretical framework of SMART on the<br />
export side assumes that, for a given good, different<br />
countries compete to supply a given home market. The<br />
focus of the simulation exercise is on the composition<br />
and volume of imports into that market. Export supply<br />
of a given good by a given country supplier is assumed<br />
to be related to the price that it fetches in the export<br />
market. The degree of responsiveness of the supply of<br />
export to changes in the export price is given by the<br />
export supply elasticity. SMART assumes infinite export<br />
supply elasticity – that is, the export supply curves are<br />
flat and the world prices of each variety are exogenously<br />
given. This is often called the price-taker assumption.<br />
SMART can also operate with finite elasticity – upward<br />
sloping export supply functions – which entails a price<br />
effect in addition to the quantity effect.