Untitled - Greenpeace
Untitled - Greenpeace Untitled - Greenpeace
30 CARVING UP THE CONGO UNIMPLEMENTED AND UNENFORCED, THE 2002 FORESTRY CODE WILL NOT STOP RAINFOREST PLUNDER OR CONTRIBUTE TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION Central to the World Bank’s reform strategy for the DRC is the Forestry Code which it imposed on the DRC Government. One of the Bank’s key objectives has been to get industrial logging to contribute to poverty alleviation through the generation of state revenue. Accordingly, the Code includes provision for the redistribution of 40% of forest area tax revenues to regional and local government (25% to provinces and 15% to territoires – article 122). It also makes compulsory the direct negotiation between logging companies and communities adjacent to their operations of ‘social responsibility contracts’ (cahiers des charges) (article 89); and introduces a requirement for a forest management plan (articles 71, 99, 100), covering among other things the protection of biodiversity in production areas. It also calls for ultimate designation of at least 15% of the country’s total surface area as classified (ie protected) forest. The Forestry Code is heavily based on the reforms the World Bank imposed on Cameroon in the mid-1990s. As the example of Cameroon shows, industrial logging and the wealth it creates do not improve the quality of life of ordinary people when operating within a corrupt political context. All of the signs for the DRC are equally ominous. Thanks to the failure to implement and/or enforce its key social and environmental provisions, the Forestry Code promises to do more to hand control of the country’s forests to the industrial logging industry, than to promote those forests as a source of sustainable livelihood for the majority of the DRC’s people or as an area requiring preservation for reasons of biodiversity or climate protection. Genuine development and environmental protection are likely to be the casualties, not the beneficiaries of ‘reform’. Five years on, some of the key reforms set out in the Forestry Code remain unimplemented (for example land use planning see pp58–63). Of those aspects that have come into effect, the new forestry tax regime has yet to deliver any money whatsoever for local social projects, and measures designed to ensure that communities benefit from logging (eg community consultation and social responsibility contracts) have been implemented in a derisory manner or not at all.
CARVING UP THE CONGO 31 ©Greenpeace/Davison
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- Page 29 and 30: CARVING UP THE CONGO 23 [I]n spite
- Page 31 and 32: Sodefor’s logging titles in the D
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- Page 39 and 40: CARVING UP THE CONGO 33 INDUSTRIAL
- Page 41 and 42: CARVING UP THE CONGO 35 three years
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- Page 73 and 74: CARVING UP THE CONGO 67 operation.
- Page 75 and 76: CARVING UP THE CONGO 69 total emiss
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30<br />
CARVING UP THE CONGO<br />
UNIMPLEMENTED AND UNENFORCED,<br />
THE 2002 FORESTRY CODE WILL NOT STOP<br />
RAINFOREST PLUNDER OR CONTRIBUTE<br />
TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION<br />
Central to the World Bank’s reform strategy<br />
for the DRC is the Forestry Code which it<br />
imposed on the DRC Government. One of the<br />
Bank’s key objectives has been to get industrial<br />
logging to contribute to poverty alleviation<br />
through the generation of state revenue.<br />
Accordingly, the Code includes provision for<br />
the redistribution of 40% of forest area tax<br />
revenues to regional and local government<br />
(25% to provinces and 15% to territoires –<br />
article 122). It also makes compulsory the<br />
direct negotiation between logging companies<br />
and communities adjacent to their operations<br />
of ‘social responsibility contracts’ (cahiers des<br />
charges) (article 89); and introduces a<br />
requirement for a forest management plan<br />
(articles 71, 99, 100), covering among other<br />
things the protection of biodiversity in<br />
production areas. It also calls for ultimate<br />
designation of at least 15% of the<br />
country’s total surface area as classified<br />
(ie protected) forest.<br />
The Forestry Code is heavily based on the<br />
reforms the World Bank imposed on Cameroon<br />
in the mid-1990s. As the example of<br />
Cameroon shows, industrial logging and the<br />
wealth it creates do not improve the quality of<br />
life of ordinary people when operating within a<br />
corrupt political context. All of the signs for<br />
the DRC are equally ominous.<br />
Thanks to the failure to implement and/or<br />
enforce its key social and environmental<br />
provisions, the Forestry Code promises to do<br />
more to hand control of the country’s forests<br />
to the industrial logging industry, than to<br />
promote those forests as a source of<br />
sustainable livelihood for the majority of the<br />
DRC’s people or as an area requiring<br />
preservation for reasons of biodiversity or<br />
climate protection. Genuine development and<br />
environmental protection are likely to be the<br />
casualties, not the beneficiaries of ‘reform’.<br />
Five years on, some of the key reforms set out<br />
in the Forestry Code remain unimplemented<br />
(for example land use planning see pp58–63).<br />
Of those aspects that have come into effect,<br />
the new forestry tax regime has yet to deliver<br />
any money whatsoever for local social<br />
projects, and measures designed to ensure<br />
that communities benefit from logging<br />
(eg community consultation and social<br />
responsibility contracts) have been<br />
implemented in a derisory manner or not at all.