Islam: A Guide for Jews and Christians - Electric Scotland

180 t CHAPTER SEVEN
claimed by Christian bishops and in particular, after the erosion of
their powers and the growth of his, by the pope, the bishop of
Rome.
There are no great divergencies between Sunni and Shiite law in
practice, but two examples deserve notice. Unlike, the Sunnis, the
Shiites permit the practice of temporary marriage (muta), a sexual
union for a limited period of time, even hours, in exchange for a
fixed sum of money. The Sunnis regard this as mere prostitution;
the Shi‘ites claim, perhaps correctly, that the Prophet himself allowed
it and that it was only outlawed by the caliph Umar. Since
the Shiites do not accept the authority, political or legal, of any of
the first three caliphs, muta stands. Taqiyya, or dissembling, is a
characteristic Shiite teaching born as a reaction to living as an often
persecuted minority under Sunni sovereignty. Indeed, Muhammad
himself had lived under such circumstances, and according to
the Shiite understanding of Quran 16:106, which promises the
wrath of God will descend on those who disbelieve “except for
those who are compelled but whose hearts are firm in faith,” it is
permissible to dissemble one’s beliefs, specifically one’s Shiite beliefs,
when there is danger of losing life or property. Though generally
associated with Shiites, taqiyya was also permitted to the
Sunni Muslims of Spain, for example, when they were threatened
with death if they did not convert to Christianity.
Ijtihad
Since the lawyers of Islam were essentially rabbis and not bishops
speaking comfortably ex cathedra, they had early begun to employ
various forms of legal reasoning that have been the staples of lawyers
always and everywhere. The earliest generations of Muslim
jurisprudents had often simply rendered an “opinion” (ray) on a
matter of practice in the still ill defined field of Islamic law, and
more often than not this was sufficient to settle the matter. By the
generation of Shafii, however, things had become considerably
more complex, and the Egyptian lawyer was clearly attempting to
rationalize legal thinking when he insisted that “opinion,” which