News Letter 1941 Jul-Dec - Air Force Historical Studies Office

AIr Pewer Held. the Key
fAmmand of the Oeean Approaeltes
B;vUeat. fAl. Tho._ B. PhlWp.
Ge_.... staU~ ...
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Even if the United States had no harbor defenses
it would be impregnable to invasion. And this
still would be true if our Navy were inferior to
that of an invading power. In spite of this, a
great program of harbor-defense construction is
proposed and is partially under way. One wonders
if this program has been devised with full realization
of the ability of air power to perform many
functions of harbor-defense installations.
Harbor defenses are supported by the argument
that they will prevent invasion of the United
States. Actually, they never were intended to
prevent invasion. If the need for harbor defenses
depended upon their ability to protect the United
States from invasion, it would be very simple to
prove that no harbor defenses are necessary. Landbased
air power has made the United States impregnable
toa sea-borne invasion.
The attempted counterinvasion of Norway by the
British supplied the factual proof of the wellestablished
theory that sea-borne invasions are
impossible against land-based air power. This
particular operation took place under the most
favorable circumstances possible for the British:
The Norwegians welcomed their coming and desired
their help; the British did not have to contend
with any harbor defenses nor enemy forces when
they made their landings at Aandalsnes and Namsos --
there was nothing to oppose them until they had
marched a considerable distance into Norway where
they met advanced detachments of the German Army;
nevertheless, the invasion failed.
Prime Minister Churchill gave as explanation for
this failure -intense, continuous bombings of the
bases at Namsos and Aandalsnes which prevented the
landing in those small fishing ports of any large
reenforcements and even of artillery for the infantry
already landed. It, therefore, was necessary
to withdraw the troops or to leave them to be
destroyed by overwhelming forces. The decision to
withdraw was undoubtedly sound. The withdrawal of
these 12,000 men--less than a division--was accomplished
with very great skill and, I must add, very
lood luck;"
In other words. nothing but the "intense, continuous
bombinlS" prevented the success of the
British counter invasion of Norway. There were no
harbor-defense guns to fire against the British
nor were any German troops at the harbors to live
the slightest opposition to the landings. This
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was purely a victory of air power over a sea-borne
invasion which had no aerial support.
On the German side. the means to repel the invasion
were qui te inadequate. Germany had occupied
the airdromes at ~lo and Stavanger. ~lo is 326
miles from Namsos and 220 miles from Aandalsnes.
Stavanger is 260 miles from Aandalsnes and 420 miles
from Namsos. Thus the German air forces operating
against the British invasion bases had to operate
from considerable distances. Not only that, but
they were very limited in numbers--to the numbers
that.could be placed on four rather inadequate
airdromes--and were engaged primarily in supporting
the ground operations of the German troops who
were driving through the Norwegian valleys in an
effort to reach the British.
Another factor of great importance in favor of
the Briti~h was the short distance that the expeditionary
forces had to go to reach Norway and
the fact that their ships could approach the Norwegian
coast beyond range of German bombers closely
enough so that the final run to the coas.t could be
made in darkness and wi thout fear of bombing. Bombing
was possible only after the ships reached the
harbors.
It might be thought rash to conclude from a single
example that impregnability toa sea-borne invasion
could be considered as proved. The British effort
in Norway was a very special case, however, in
which every factor, except readiness, perhaps, favored
the invader. If the conditions under which
an invasion would have to be attempted against the
United States are visualized, it will be seen that
the problem of invading this country would be infinitely
more difficult than was the British problem
of landing troops in Norway. Leaving aside
naval interference, imagine a convoy of 40 or SO
troopships crossing the 3,000 miles of the Atlantic
Ocean toward the United States. The departure of
such an 'invading force could not be kept secre t ,
Our defending bombers would start attacking it a
thousand miles from the coast. The attacks would
grow in intensity as the convoy approached. The
invasion might not be stopped before it reached
the coast, but it would be badly damaged.
Imagine. then, this convoy attempting to come
into a harbor and remaining practically stationary
for days in narrow waters with the entire bombing
force available to the United States working on
it. The picture is incredible. The invasion