News Letter 1941 Jul-Dec - Air Force Historical Studies Office

THE BIG BABY SOLOED
B,19 Test Flights Under Way
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The Flight
\ Arter weeks of delay
aased by dU'f'iculty in
erfecting the brake Etystem,
all the multitude of detailled
preparations for this
~
long-aw~ited f~ight at last
were complete. The new runway,
4,000 feet of concrete
built especially for this
moment, was finished and
waiting. The day was clear
and a rising sea breeze gave
evidence that by noon a
brisk wind, most favorable
for a take-off, would be
blowing.
Word had circulated by
grapeVine, telephone and
personal contact that this
day, June 27, 1941, was to
be the day. A final check
was completed and the airplane was searched
thoroughly for evidence of subversive activities,-stowaways
seeking a brief moment of
fame, and any previously undiscovered defects
or maladjustments.
Everything was reported in order. The
Douglas Company, manufacturers of the huge
ship, secured the final, complete approval
of the Army inspectors. The crew was read~
The chief pilot, Major Stanley Umst~ad, and
his crew were sure that they were now at the
end of What had long since come to be considered
an endless vigil.
Li eut. Co L dalles G. fay lo r
on this page describes the
fi-rst night of the B-19, the
wor~d/s lar g e s t: bOllber, and
gives a history of its deve~opllent
as he persona~~y sees
it. Tfhi~e Chief of the .Hrcraft
Branch of the Naterie~
Division, at fright lie~d,
Co~one~ Tay~or p~ayed an illportant
ro~e in the work
which ~ed to the huge JrllY
~ir forces bOllbers of ,oday -
in the deve~opllent Of which
the United States has ~ed the
world. the B-19, ~atest record-breaking
product of the
ArllY Air 10rces, was his particu~ar
"baby," since he was
head of the board of officers
which gave final consideration
to and apProva~ of its
construe ti on.
At 11:30 a.m., the crew got aboard. Major
Howard Bunker climbed into the co-pilot's
seat. At their places were the other members
of the crew - Jack Grant, flight engineer;
Herle Steel, hydraulic engineer;
kwul Escallier, electrical engineer, all
of the Douglas Company; Mark Koogler, civlltan
employee from Wright Field, who actedas
erE'Wchief, and the writer as Army observers.
EqUipment was checked and tons of air mail
taken aboard.
Quickly the engines were started. Major
Umstead taxied to the far end of the runwa~
pausing but a moment. The minute hand crept
upward as it neared 12:00, the 8ppo1.nted
hour. The brakes were set and the engines
checked individually.
Here She ComesI
At 12:02 the engines were opened wide
(Continued on Page 20) .
-3-
The History
In the late 1920's it was
becoming apparent that unless
new and more suitable designs
could be worked out as prototypes,
the Doubet theory regarding
employment of aerial
bombardment would prove to be
a fallacy. The eXisting
bombing airplanes were so
slow and had such little
range that many people were
convinced that their employment
in unassisted formations
against fighter aircraft was
hopeless.
To disprove this, the Materiel
Division in 1929 worked
out a new basicliesignfor
a light, fast bomber which
was produced in two formsas
the B-9 by Boeing and the
B-IO by Martin. When these two airplanes
were type tested, the results startled the
world, and everyone began to see that size
was not important in airplane design, but
that for a given horsepower a predetermined
result could be secured provided real aerodynamic
research had been completed prior
to construction.
One could secure either a small fast plane
or a large efficient weight carrier - both
having a relatively high performance if the
aerodynamic solutions were cor~ect. Everyone
began to incorporate the monoplane idea
due to its now-proven high efficiency for
any size of airplane. Large,' I:Ilgh~speed
wind tunnels became a necessity. Military
people began to set up requirements for
their national air forces, depending upon
their geography, national policy, etc.
Germany elected to build many fast, highflying
airplanes, including light bomb~~~
which sacrificed range and defense fur
speed. This was due to the closeness of
England and France, where it was thought
shor-t.-j-ange fighter craft could help their
bombers drive their way to Victory. The
G.A.F. underestimated the ability of their
airplanes to fight off attacking fighters
when both their bombers and fighters lacked
rear armament and, therefore, could not
fight a position fight as is required of
formation f'ighters. The value of a true
escort fighter airplane was not "at reRlized.
(Continued on Page 19)
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