Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

For sure, there were a number of alternatives which provided politicians with
enough room to decide about the next move should a limited use of force fails
to attain the objectives in view. The Americans were confident as to the
“faithful execution of the treaty” and its future respect by Algiers because they
could “rely on the credit already acquired by [American] arms;” 154 but should
they not meet the objective immediately, other alternatives were already
visible. According to Monroe, the United States was rapidly rising in
population and so was its importance as a commercial and maritime nation;
therefore, it will have “more power to inflict the punishment on them
[Algerines] which for the present may be spared. 155 In like manner, Madison
suggested deployment of a force enough to protect Mediterranean commerce.
Should that not meet the desired objectives, squadrons would be reinforced:
It merits consideration whether the squadron might not proceed in such
force only as would overmatch that of Algiers and suffice for a
blockade; diminishing thus the stake exposed, without an entire
disappointment as to the original objects. The reinforcing squadron or
squadrons might follow as soon as better estimates of the prospect
should justify it. 156
It was evident that the Americans projected a limited use of force and over a
short period of time only; the objective was the conclusion of a new treaty
according to terms they had fixed. Should that treaty could be obtained by a
mere show of force, like a blockade or show of the flag for example, further
undertakings would be unnecessary: “it is the duty of the government to
154 WJMPPP, 5:378, To the Peace Commissioners to Algiers, April 10, 1815.
155 Ibid.
156 LWJM 2:611, to Monroe, July 14, 1815.
378