Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

ecomes even more amazing when in the same context and just few lines later
one reads his own self-celebrating assessment: “I had no indirect views,
practised no subtleties, meddled in no intrigues, pursued no concealed
object….” 156
To wrap it up, such a plan could not materialize if it were not given
assent by Congress; Jefferson therefore referred it to Congress emphasizing a
favorable prospect for protecting American commerce in the Mediterranean by
“an exclusion of them [Barbary predators] from the sea.” Not only that; the
non-meddling and melioristic Jefferson took also on himself the burdensome
and meddling mission of civilizing the ‘Barbary barbarians’ and “chang[ing]
their habits and characters, from a predatory to an agricultural people.” 157
All
that Jefferson needed for his grandiose plan was “a frigate, and its expenses.”
Debated in Congress in July 1787, that plan was “resolved in the
affirmative.” 158 But because of inability to obtain the necessary funds from the
recalcitrant Confederation states, the proposal seemed to have passed quickly
into oblivion but not for long. As soon as the United States could have the
necessary means for executing its plan of aggression, the prospect of attacking
Algiers surfaced again. But that had to wait until the United States would grow
some teeth. For the time being, and after that show of aggression, Jefferson
resumed his commercial activities but that time he shifted to rice-sale. 159
156 Jefferson, Memoir, 1:52.
157 Ibid., 1:54.
158 SJ, 4:372, July 27, 1787.
159 Jefferson, Memoir, 2:107, To John Jay, May 4, 1787.
292