Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

pro-war positions are scattered throughout his entire correspondence. That view
was also defended by Jay: “I should prefer war to tribute, and carry our
Mediterranean trade in vessels armed and manned at the public expense.” 118
In his reply, Adams could but agree with Jefferson but only in the sense
that an alternative of war “would raise the spirits and courage of our
countrymen immediately” and they “might obtain the glory of finally breaking
up these nests of banditti;” but he held to the position of not engaging into
war. 119
He estimated that Jefferson had undercalculated the cost, but most
important, that he had underestimated the force of Algiers. According to
Adams, Algiers had a formidable force and strong fortifications which would
render it “more difficult and dangerous to attempt a blockade.” Besides that, he
argued that because of expense, Congress would never consent to war, or at
least not before years to come. Therefore, he reasoned “we ought not to fight
them at all, unless we determine to fight them forever.” 120 Adams did not reject
the use of force on “grounds of principle” but rather on the basis that the
United States was not yet in a position to meet the objectives it desired. 121
d) Duplicity: The Americans had always accused the Europeans of
duplicity and for good reasons. 122 Based on the promises of good offices of the
French King according to the treaty of 1778, the American commissioners had
approached the French government on many occasions soliciting help for the
118 CPPJJ, 3:223, Jay to Thomas Jefferson, 4 December, 1786.
119 WJA, 8:411, To T. Jefferson, 31 July, 1786.
120 Ibid.
121 Sofka, “Jeffersonian Idea of National Security,” p. 534.
122 For a summary diverse European perfidies relating to that period see Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary,
pp. 58-63.
279