Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

coastal forts, size of the navy and land forces, commerce, revenues, and
languages. 90
Lamb failed as diplomatic negotiator but he proved to be a good spy. By
furnishing the American ministers with the requested information and
estimations for a strike force, he contributed valuable data to an on-going plan
which consisted of using force against Algiers. 91 More, in terms of long-term
strategic counseling and management accounting, he proved to be more
farsighted accountant than Jefferson and Adams. Lamb came to the conclusion
that attacking Algiers would cost a lot more money than negotiating a peace
treaty, therefore he recommended making peace:
To fight these people, the first year will cost us more than half a million
pounds sterling. I have a perfect knowledge of the cost of armed vessels;
and at the distance we are from these people, and foreign ports to make
use of, it will be a heavy tax upon us, and without the least prospect of
gain… it is my opinion, that for a less sum we can make peace. 92
But he also saw that, in the case the United States would decide to use force, a
coalition with the countries that were at war with Algiers was necessary to
reduce costs. The only problem with his last option, however, is that there were
not many countries that were at war with Algiers. Lamb advised the ministers:
My advice is, if we should arm against these people, to unite ourselves
with those nations that are not at peace with Algiers; and that will lessen
our expense much on the occasion. 93
90 USDC, 1:660, From Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, October 11, 1785. For the full list of inquiries see
Appendix 4.
91 For intelligence data see USDC, 3:83, 86-88, From John Lamb to Thomas Jefferson, May 20, 1786.
For a strike force, he estimated that “five thirty-six gun frigates will be the least force and two large
tenders,” see USDC, 3:33, From John Lamb to Thomas Jefferson, March 29, 1786.
92 USDC, 3:85.
93 Ibid., 3:86.
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