Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

His unguarded expressions, his hints, threats, etc. despising the French
and Spanish, signifying their defeat and in fact everything he could
possibly utter in the most vulgar language that it was with pain we see
him so unworthy of his commission and the cloth he wore. 88
What was at stake then at Algiers was more than the Dey and his Divan
could have possibly imagined. Their position was obsolete and onedimensioned:
militarily, they strove to maintain strong fortifications of the city
to avert attacks and pursued corsairing as a defensive measure; diplomatically,
they persevered in maintaining the same line of diplomatic conduct—based on
the above mentioned principles—at a time the world was rapidly changing
around them. But they did not realize that their defenses were weak and the
navy was vanishing compared to that of the western world. 89 They were also
far from realizing that a player entered on the international stage with new
concepts and views totally different from their own.
For Europeans and Americans particularly, the situation was more
complex and completely different. During that short period of negotiations,
Algiers was transformed, on the one hand, to a cluster of intrigues knitted by
the major players particularly Great Britain, France, and Spain against the
United States—and against each others—in which the Dey was played as a
simple pawn; and on the other, to an espionage ground for the American envoy
who already had as instructions a certain number of intelligence questions to
answer. Those stressed matters relating to fortifications, arsenals, port defenses,
88 EN, 3:197.
89 For a broad view about Algiers’s military and naval capacities during the 1780s see SPPD, 10:46-47,
49-50, 52-53, Report of Secretary of State Relative to Mediterranean Trade, Dec. 28, 1790.
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