Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

Algiers to an injudicious [appointment]” but Adams disagreed on the ground
that he “cannot see any advantage in it, but, on the contrary, several
disadvantages.” 38 To Jay he justified his position on the ground that it “would
cost us three or four thousand pounds to send any one.” 39
Ultimately, the
Americans decided to stop negotiations and Jefferson carried on with a plan he
started working on earlier for a joint Christian attack or blockade against
Algiers. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the delegates to Congress
imputed failure to “the unsklfulness [sic] of the Negotiator, the poverty of the
United States, and the Very unfriendly opposition given by the British there”
than to any faulty conduct on the part of Algiers. 40
The commissioners on their side, after they had authorized Lamb some
room for maneuver in negotiations, did not approve of the agreement he had
made at Algiers but they did not judge it important to inform the Dey. About
the Dey-Lamb agreement, or what Jefferson called “positive stipulation,” the
latter wrote in 1792 to John Paul Jones, a new commissioned envoy to Algiers:
“we disavow it totally, as far beyond his [Lamb’s] power,” but he added: “We
have never disavowed it formally, because it has never come to our knowledge
with any degree of certainty. 41 A letter from the American captives written
early in 1787, however, clearly contradicts Jefferson’s assertion. Indeed, the
captives informed the ministers about the proceedings, price set for their
38 WJA, 8:413, T. Jefferson to John Adams, 27 August, 1786 and ibid, 8:415, To T. Jefferson, 11
September, 1786 respectively.
39 Ibid., 8:417, To Secretary Jay, 27 October, 1786.
40 LDC, 24:240, North Carolina Delegates to Richard Caswell, April 18, 1787.
41 SPPD, 10:262, Thomas Jefferson to Admiral John Paul Jones, 1 June 1792.
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