Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

of the existing ‘balance of power.’ The Europeans had rather opted for using
Algiers as a ‘pawn’ against the commercial interests of their rivals while
waiting for more appropriate conditions for colonization. Considering the
network of never-ending plots and intrigues the Christian consuls—along with
Jew bankers—knitted against each other and subtly communicated to the Deys
of Algiers, it was evident that, in one way or another, the latter were
manipulated for various ends. 89
Moreover, by pointing out the probable hindrance of the Barbary States
for American commerce and their usefulness for Great Britain, Lord Sheffield
was in fact unveiling the true approach of Britain to Algiers: that of a weapon
that could be used efficiently against the rebellious Americans. For Britain,
more than just on the battlefield, the war against the United States was also
commercial. By refusing to agree to a commerce protection clause, the British
meant to asphyxiate American trade; an alternative which could perhaps
reverse the general situation in their favor. 90
A close look at Great Britain’s
policies during the crucial year of 1783 shows that the British were reluctant to
recognize the independence of their American colonies. And since they could
not prevent it, then they could at least deny the Americans access to British
markets, and even hinder their attempts to reach non-British markets. As for the
first, they could do it of right by refusing to include commerce agreements in
89 The judge from the account of the French historian Henri de Grammont Histoire d’Alger (1886),
which according to the Algerian historian Lemnouar Merouche stands out today as an unequalled work
on Ottoman Algeria, El-Djenina was infected by consuls’ intrigues. British intrigues (pp. 331, 340,
345, 348, 397), French intrigues (pp. 118-19, 243, 297), and Jews’ intrigues (pp. 236, 341, 350, 363)
are few examples.
90 USRDC, 6:790, Laurens to Thomson, March 28, 1784.
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