Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

ulers of Algiers to doubt American seriousness about a peace treaty and gave
American captives false hopes. Cathcart penned clearly the consequences of
that ill-fated early contact:
by deceiving the Dey with unwarranted expectations he [Lamb]
committed the honor and dignity of his country and led the Dey and
Grandees to believe that the government of the United States was
trifling with them … a sacred adherence to, and compliance with, ought
forever to characterize the public operations of contracting powers,
especially those divided by so great a distance as the United States and
the Regency of Barbary. 129
The impact of bad communications was undoubtedly damaging to early
diplomatic contacts between Algiers and the United States and revolting for the
first captured crews. Those remained in captivity until a treaty of peace was
finally concluded in September 1795 more than eleven years after Congress
first resolved to negotiate a treaty with Algiers!
During the War of Independence, and always because of the hazards of
ocean-crossing, including the possibility of capture by British cruisers,
Congress introduced some security measures such as cipher and the forwarding
of quadruple copies of every document. 130 Yet, that was not sufficient and
delay of instructions from Congress to diplomatic representations continued to
be a serious handicap even after the cessation of hostilities. To palliate to that
handicap, Congress gave its diplomatic agents in Europe, particularly those
accredited to France (Franklin and Jefferson) and Great Britain (Adams), “full
powers and authority … to confer, treat, and negotiate” with foreign
129 Cathcart, The Captives, p. 31.
130 Barnes, Foreign Service, pp. 9-10.
200