Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

precisely the best landing place for troops which was no more than the bay of
Sidi Fredj where, some two decades later, France would land its troops in
force. 95
More, in 1800, Malta changed hands to Great Britain with whom
Algiers was bound by a treaty of peace but the latter continued to consider
Malta as an enemy state. Continued attacks on Maltese shipping and
enslavement of prisoners caused further deterioration of Algiers’ relations with
Great Britain. 96
Furthermore, more than just a defensive weapon against enemy
aggressions—as it was conceived by the founders of Algiers—corsairing had
become an economic necessity for their successors. A relatively important
source of revenue for Algiers, 97 in addition to taxes imposed on the native
population, corsairing contributed to the wealth and power of the ruling
Turkish elite, particularly the Ri’yas. 98 One of the two pillars of the Algerian
state, next to the Janissaries, the Ri’yas had always contested for power and
obtained it. Indeed, the founders of Algiers were issued from the class of
corsairs; even two of them, Khayreddin Barbarossa and El-Euldj Ali climbed
Nettement, Histoire de la conquête d’Alger, écrite sur des documents inédits et authentiques, new
edition (Paris: Jacques Lecoffre, 1867), p. 126.
95 Grammont, Histoire d’Alger, pp. 371-72; Panzac, Corsaires Barbaresques, p. 230.
96 Probably Algiers did not recognize British sovereignty over Malta because the latter continued to fly
a separate flag until 1814. Only then did the Congress of Vienna legalize Britain’s hold over it. D. K.
Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Study from the Eighteenth Century, 2 nd edition
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 287; also, Edgar Erskine Hume, “A Proposed Alliance
Between the Order of Malta and the United States, 1794: Suggestions Made to James Monroe as
American Minister in Paris,” William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine, 2nd Ser., 16:
2 (Apr., 1936), p. 230.
97 Western writers have always argued that corsairing was the sole source of revenue for Algiers.
Revisionist studies, however, have shown that prizes and ransom constituted less than 15% of revenues
and absorbed about the same percentage of the active population. For an example see Fontenay, “La
course dans l’économie portuaire, ” pp. 1327-42.
98 For aspects of ‘turkishness’ of the ruling elite of Algiers see Shuval, “The Ottoman Algerian Elite,’
pp. 323-44.
147