708-Chaudhari Technical Institute, Gandhinagar - Gujarat ...
708-Chaudhari Technical Institute, Gandhinagar - Gujarat ... 708-Chaudhari Technical Institute, Gandhinagar - Gujarat ...
TRADE POLICY OF JAPAN Export policy of Japan For many years, export promotion was a large issue in Japanese government policy. Government officials recognized that Japan needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed to generate exports to pay for those imports. After 1945, Japan had difficulty exporting enough to pay for its imports until the mid-1960s, and resulting deficits were the justification for export promotion programs and import restrictions. The belief in the need to promote exports is early strong and part of Japan's self-image as a "processing nation." A processing nation must import raw materials but is able to pay for the imports by adding value to them and exporting some of the output. Nations grow stronger economically by moving up the industrial ladder to produce products with greater value added to the basic inputs. Rather than letting markets accomplish this movement on their own, the Japanese government felt the economy should be guided in this direction through industrial policy. Japan's methods of promoting exports have taken two paths. The first was to develop world-class industries that can initially substitute for imports and then compete in international markets. The second was to provide incentives for firms to export. During the first two decades after World War II, export incentives took the form of a combination of tax relief and government assistance to build export industries. After joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1964, however, Japan had to drop its major export incentive — the total exemption of export income from taxes — to comply with IMF procedures. It did maintain into the 1970s, however, special tax treatment of costs for market development and export promotion. Once chronic trade deficits came to an end in the mid-1960s, the need for export promotion policies diminished. Virtually all export tax incentives were eliminated over the course of the 1970s. Even JETRO, whose initial function is to assist smaller firms with overseas marketing, saw its role shift toward import promotion and other activities? In the 1980s, Japan continued to use 120
industrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated industries, but direct export promotion measures were no longer part of the policy package. The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in certain industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries created a backlash in other countries, either because of their success per se or because of allegations of unfair competitive practices. Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) guidelines, nations have been reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import quotas. Quotas violate the guidelines, and raising tariffs goes against the general trend among industrial nations. Instead, they have resorted to convincing the exporting country to "voluntarily" restrain exports of the offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry out such export restraints. Among Japan's exports to the United States, steel, color television sets, and automobiles all were subject to such restraints at various times. Import policy of Japan Postwar era Japan began the postwar period with heavy import barriers. Virtually all products were subject to government quotas, many faced high tariffs, and MITI had authority over the allocation of the foreign exchange that companies needed to pay for any import. These policies were justified at the time by the weakened position of Japanese industry and the country's chronic trade deficits. The main impetus for change throughout has been international obligation that is, response to foreign, rather than domestic, and pressure. The result has been a lengthy, reluctant process of reducing barriers, which has frustrated many of Japan's trading partners. Japan has been a participant in the major rounds of tariff cutting negotiations under the GATT framework — the Kennedy Round completed in 1967, the Tokyo Round completed in 1979, and the Uruguay Round completed in 121
- Page 88 and 89: 5. INDIA’S TRADE WITH JAPAN In 20
- Page 90 and 91: 7. JAPANESE FDI IN INDIA Following
- Page 92 and 93: long-term planning has been a major
- Page 94 and 95: 10 JAPAN EXPORT PROHIBITIONS Japane
- Page 96 and 97: Overview of Japan economy Japan's E
- Page 98 and 99: competition and boosting exports th
- Page 100 and 101: is rice. Resources of raw materials
- Page 102 and 103: GDP (purchasing power parity): $4.3
- Page 104 and 105: Stock of narrow money: $6.696 trill
- Page 106 and 107: 79.67 (2011 est.) 87.78 (2010 est.)
- Page 108 and 109: Ryukyu-shotō and Daitō Islands: O
- Page 110 and 111: Business overview of Japan & Intern
- Page 112 and 113: Japan trade with other countries (2
- Page 114 and 115: the 1970s, however, extraordinary t
- Page 116 and 117: Documentation for international tra
- Page 118 and 119: Name of company in Gujarat No Compa
- Page 120 and 121: Japanese Interested In Gujarat Japa
- Page 122 and 123: Japanese Companies Turnover In Guja
- Page 124 and 125: their own, the Japanese government
- Page 126 and 127: 1990s to 2010 The stop working of t
- Page 128 and 129: Key people Products Revenue Shinzo
- Page 130 and 131: strike, demanding among other thing
- Page 132 and 133: Chart 2: Volume of world merchandis
- Page 134 and 135: Total trade between India and Japan
- Page 136 and 137: Economy The Japanese economy is one
- Page 140 and 141: 1993. As a result of these agreemen
- Page 142 and 143: Chart 6: Quarterly World exports of
- Page 144 and 145: JAPAN'S EXPORTS TO INDIA JAPAN'S IM
- Page 146 and 147: inflows from Japan increased during
- Page 148 and 149: INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHI
- Page 150 and 151: CONCLUSION The Global Country Resea
industrial policy to promote the growth of new, more sophisticated industries,<br />
but direct export promotion measures were no longer part of the policy<br />
package.<br />
The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in<br />
certain industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries<br />
created a backlash in other countries, either because of their success per se<br />
or because of allegations of unfair competitive practices. Under General<br />
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) guidelines, nations have been<br />
reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import quotas. Quotas violate the<br />
guidelines, and raising tariffs goes against the general trend among industrial<br />
nations. Instead, they have resorted to convincing the exporting country to<br />
"voluntarily" restrain exports of the offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was<br />
quite willing to carry out such export restraints. Among Japan's exports to<br />
the United States, steel, color television sets, and automobiles all were<br />
subject to such restraints at various times.<br />
Import policy of Japan<br />
Postwar era<br />
Japan began the postwar period with heavy import barriers. Virtually all<br />
products were subject to government quotas, many faced high tariffs,<br />
and MITI had authority over the allocation of the foreign exchange that<br />
companies needed to pay for any import. These policies were justified at the<br />
time by the weakened position of Japanese industry and the country's chronic<br />
trade deficits.<br />
The main impetus for change throughout has been international obligation<br />
that is, response to foreign, rather than domestic, and pressure. The result<br />
has been a lengthy, reluctant process of reducing barriers, which has<br />
frustrated many of Japan's trading partners.<br />
Japan has been a participant in the major rounds of tariff cutting negotiations<br />
under the GATT framework — the Kennedy Round completed in 1967,<br />
the Tokyo Round completed in 1979, and the Uruguay Round completed in<br />
121