1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...
1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...
1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...
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for every person. While there are utterances (s<strong>in</strong>ce Hobbes’ natural man seems speak) there is <strong>in</strong> fact no<br />
language, <strong>in</strong> the sense of a collective, transmittable sets of mean<strong>in</strong>g that can provide the basis of a<br />
common understand<strong>in</strong>g and thus for collective action. <strong>In</strong> the state of nature there is only sound and<br />
fury, signify<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
This mean<strong>in</strong>gless or topsy-turvism also constitutes the most robust objection to tak<strong>in</strong>g the state<br />
of nature at face value as the found<strong>in</strong>g paradigm for apprais<strong>in</strong>g the space of <strong>in</strong>ter-state relations.<br />
Tempt<strong>in</strong>g though the image may be that space is not quite populated by ‘a multitude of humpty<br />
dumpties’, and history, as amply emphasized by <strong>in</strong> English School read<strong>in</strong>gs of Hobbes, has provided<br />
sufficient evidence of successful collective action between states. <strong>In</strong> that space language and mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
still obta<strong>in</strong>; that is, despite the multiplicity of languages, the possibility, if not always the actuality, of a<br />
common understand<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>s.<br />
<strong>In</strong> this read<strong>in</strong>g, what the state of nature represents is the solipsistic world of the <strong>in</strong>fant,<br />
etymologically the pre-speak<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong>-fans). 20<br />
The <strong>in</strong>dividual that Hobbes’ natural <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
captures, then, is not even the child, but the <strong>in</strong>fant, a po<strong>in</strong>t to which I return below. An implication of<br />
that argument here is that apprehend<strong>in</strong>g the state (<strong>in</strong> realism) or the <strong>in</strong>dividual (<strong>in</strong> rational choice<br />
theory) on the model of Hobbes’s ‘natural man’ [sic] is tantamount to <strong>in</strong>fantiliz<strong>in</strong>g them, <strong>in</strong> the sense of<br />
negat<strong>in</strong>g the constitutive and central role of language <strong>in</strong> their ability to act politically.<br />
The Leviathan as The ‘Quilt<strong>in</strong>g Po<strong>in</strong>t’ Fasten<strong>in</strong>g the Social Order<br />
Hobbes’s state of nature thus features the same <strong>in</strong>herently loose relation between the signifier<br />
and signified that characterizes a Lacanian conception of language. <strong>In</strong> Lacan (1956), this constant<br />
slippage is temporarily arrested by what he terms ‘quilt<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts’ (po<strong>in</strong>ts de capiton), or (literally)<br />
upholstery buttons. These constitute key signifiers <strong>in</strong> the discourse of the ‘normal’ (non-psychotic)<br />
20 <strong>in</strong> as <strong>in</strong> prior to; fans as the present participle of fari, to speak.<br />
27