1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...
1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...
1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Leviathan, lies once aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> focus as it showcases the natural <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong> her raw, self-<strong>in</strong>terested,<br />
utility-maximis<strong>in</strong>g form. 12<br />
Patrick Neal <strong>in</strong> his ‘Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory’ identifies <strong>in</strong>dividualism and<br />
<strong>In</strong>strumentalism as two of the theory’s core tenets, which he traces directly to Hobbes. By<br />
‘<strong>in</strong>dividualism’ Neal (1987, 637) means that ‘antecedently def<strong>in</strong>ed selves’ stand prior to all ‘sociopolitical<br />
relations and <strong>in</strong>stitutions’. The <strong>in</strong>dividual is therefore the ‘foundation or <strong>in</strong>dependent variable’ of<br />
rationalist analyses (Neal 1987, 637). These <strong>in</strong>dividuals or ‘separate selves’, moreover, ‘are understood<br />
to be rationally self-<strong>in</strong>terested maximizers of utility’ (Neal 1987, 637-638).<br />
‘<strong>In</strong>strumentalism, then’, Neal (1987, 637) cont<strong>in</strong>ues, ‘must deny that human be<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong> any<br />
<strong>in</strong>herent or <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic sense social be<strong>in</strong>gs’. Further, ‘<strong>in</strong>strumentalism seeks to understand relations <strong>in</strong><br />
terms of selves, not selves <strong>in</strong> terms of relations’ (Neal 1987, 637). Under these rationalist lenses, cast<br />
upon the state of nature, Hobbes becomes, by way of his ‘natural man’ the founder of a ‘radical<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividualism’ that entrenches the <strong>in</strong>dividual and the wide gamut of its behaviour as the legitimate<br />
object of political analysis (Hampton 1986). David Gauthier (1977, 139) for his part captures this<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividualist ontology <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g terms:<br />
‘(…) <strong>in</strong>dividuals human be<strong>in</strong>gs not only can, but must, be understood apart from society. The<br />
fundamental characteristics of men are not products of their social existence….man is social<br />
because he is human, not human because he is social. <strong>In</strong> particular, self-consciousness and<br />
language must be taken as conditions, not products, of society.’<br />
It is noteworthy that Hobbes is once aga<strong>in</strong> a reference po<strong>in</strong>t. Thus Jean Hampton (1986, 6) for her part<br />
writes:<br />
12 To the extent that the Leviathan does enter <strong>in</strong>to the analysis, for example <strong>in</strong> Morton Kaplan (1956,<br />
405), it is to limit any hold it might have on the <strong>in</strong>dividual by conclud<strong>in</strong>g to the absence of any ‘extra<strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
source of obligation’ <strong>in</strong> Hobbes political treaty. Such conclusion however is premised on<br />
Hobbes political subject and his ‘natural man’ be<strong>in</strong>g two different persons, rather than two facets of the<br />
same <strong>in</strong>dividual mov<strong>in</strong>g out of the state of nature, as does Hobbes’ natural man.<br />
11