1 Theorising Agency in International Relations In Hobbes's Wake ...

Leviathan, lies once again in focus as it showcases the natural individual in her raw, self-interested,
utility-maximising form. 12
Patrick Neal in his ‘Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory’ identifies individualism and
Instrumentalism as two of the theory’s core tenets, which he traces directly to Hobbes. By
‘individualism’ Neal (1987, 637) means that ‘antecedently defined selves’ stand prior to all ‘sociopolitical
relations and institutions’. The individual is therefore the ‘foundation or independent variable’ of
rationalist analyses (Neal 1987, 637). These individuals or ‘separate selves’, moreover, ‘are understood
to be rationally self-interested maximizers of utility’ (Neal 1987, 637-638).
‘Instrumentalism, then’, Neal (1987, 637) continues, ‘must deny that human beings are in any
inherent or intrinsic sense social beings’. Further, ‘instrumentalism seeks to understand relations in
terms of selves, not selves in terms of relations’ (Neal 1987, 637). Under these rationalist lenses, cast
upon the state of nature, Hobbes becomes, by way of his ‘natural man’ the founder of a ‘radical
individualism’ that entrenches the individual and the wide gamut of its behaviour as the legitimate
object of political analysis (Hampton 1986). David Gauthier (1977, 139) for his part captures this
individualist ontology in the following terms:
‘(…) individuals human beings not only can, but must, be understood apart from society. The
fundamental characteristics of men are not products of their social existence….man is social
because he is human, not human because he is social. In particular, self-consciousness and
language must be taken as conditions, not products, of society.’
It is noteworthy that Hobbes is once again a reference point. Thus Jean Hampton (1986, 6) for her part
writes:
12 To the extent that the Leviathan does enter into the analysis, for example in Morton Kaplan (1956,
405), it is to limit any hold it might have on the individual by concluding to the absence of any ‘extraindividual
source of obligation’ in Hobbes political treaty. Such conclusion however is premised on
Hobbes political subject and his ‘natural man’ being two different persons, rather than two facets of the
same individual moving out of the state of nature, as does Hobbes’ natural man.
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