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Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

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3. Deliberation and democracy – an example<br />

What Dahl terms enlightened understanding is close to what is meant<br />

by a robust level of deliberation in one strand of democratic theory.<br />

Deliberation is clearly a democratic virtue - it is better that citizens<br />

discuss and understand the meanings and consequences of the choices<br />

they need to make. It is also desirable that citizens understand each<br />

other more fully than is needed in pure bargaining relations, and that<br />

they try to reach a substantial agreement. Yet if we increase deliberation<br />

to very high levels, growing tensions with other basic features of<br />

democracy seem likely.<br />

Deliberation and participation compete for time and resources.<br />

One can try to erase this tension by declaring them to be versions of<br />

the same thing, but this makes little sense if one thinks about any actual<br />

political context. Deliberating about a program or an issue takes time.<br />

Participating in a sustained way in an effort to influence relevant views<br />

and decisions also takes time. And it is not the same activity, or the same<br />

kind of time. There is also a tension between the relatively more reflective<br />

stance entailed in deliberation and the more partisan stance that is usually<br />

part of participation. Unless time is unlimited, then, more deliberation<br />

<strong>do</strong>es not mean more participation, and it may well mean less.<br />

Deliberation and equality of voting have no particularly strong<br />

relation. Increasing deliberation should not cause voting equality to<br />

diminish – the likely relation is neutral.<br />

71<br />

DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES<br />

David Plotke<br />

constant at a relatively low level, above but near the threshold of democracy. Then we<br />

would consider what happens as the level of the remaining attribute was increased (e.g.,<br />

rising levels of participation). We could then make judgments about how this increase<br />

influences the other attributes.<br />

The second approach would focus on pair wise analyses of the five main attributes of<br />

democracy indicated by Dahl. We would start by examining each of the ten pairs (such<br />

as inclusion and agenda control). What happens to one of the two attributes in each<br />

set as we increase the level of the other – what happens to deliberation as participation<br />

increases, for example? Does increasing one attribute produce a positive or negative result<br />

with the other? The next step would be to see whether there are some properties of the<br />

relations that allow us to group them in a theoretically interesting way.<br />

The second route might be more rigorous, although it would risk becoming impossibly<br />

complex. The first route risks oversimplification, but the advantages in clarity and directness<br />

are large. I will not undertake either procedure here – my purpose in discussing<br />

them is to suggest the size of this relatively unexplored theoretical territory.

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