Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES
David Plotke
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS – NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH – NEW YORK, U.S.A.
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THE PROJECT FROM WHICH I DRAW THIS PAPER MAKES THREE MAIN ARGUMENTS
ABOUT CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY.
First, there is probably no such thing as the ‘minimal democracy’
that some authors recommend and others criticize vigorously. There
is just democracy.
Second, in democracies all good democratic virtues do not go easily
together. Tensions and conflicts make choices among these virtues
unavoidable in developing distinctive forms of democracy.
Third, different forms of representation relate closely to different
models of democracy in which one or more virtues gain a central place.
In making these choices, interest representation should play a basic
role in contemporary democratic politics.
This paper presents brief versions of the first two arguments. I
start with a discussion of minimal democracy. Then I consider tensions
among democratic virtues and forms of democracy. In the larger project,
I assess different forms of representation. I am interested in assessing
the advantages and problems of different kinds of representation. This
question is important per se and a good way to move further beyond
debates about whether democracy requires representation. (It does.)
DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES
David Plotke