Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho
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44<br />
DEMOCRACY TODAY<br />
should act as accurate as possible in accordance with the wishes of the<br />
principal, as this is the only way the agent can continue his task. I will<br />
argue here that this formalistic view is too limited and accordingly blind<br />
to a core that is the same for all representational relations. The “etymology”<br />
of the word re-presentation tells us that something/-one that is<br />
not here is presented again through something/-one else (Ankersmit<br />
2002, 108). The one(s) functioning as substitute or as replacement will<br />
never be a perfect copy of the one(s) represented. Ankersmit tries to<br />
elucidate this given by referring to the way in which a portrait represents<br />
the one portrayed. “Portraits will differ dramatically from the<br />
persons portrayed, yet this fact alone will not make us say that the<br />
portrait is a distortion of reality, or a misrepresentation” (Ibid., 113).<br />
That representation would be capable of mimicking the represented is<br />
an illusion. The reason for this is that the one who represents cannot<br />
‘read off’ the transparent and authentic characteristics and interests<br />
of the represented, simply because they are not transparently given<br />
(Saward 2010, 77). This should not be seen as a deviation. It is a functional<br />
and creative free<strong>do</strong>m at the side of the representative to give a<br />
particular interpretation of the identity of the represented. In the words<br />
of Ankersmit there is an “aesthetic gap” between the represented and its<br />
representatives. What happens in representation is that the represented<br />
are depicted as such and such. Their (collective) identity is created,<br />
by making something visible that was only there before implicitly.<br />
The aesthetic gap thus creates the opportunity for the representative<br />
to “partly determine the nature of what they represent” (Ankersmit<br />
2002, 114). This is in contrast with the framing of representation as<br />
a principal-agent relationship, as the focus is there explicitly on the<br />
correct transmission of information from the principal to the agent<br />
and on mechanisms that prevent the agent from deviating from the<br />
preferences of the principal. Both the principal-agent and the aesthetic<br />
model have different implications for the first legitimacy-question.<br />
While the principal-agent view wants to constrain the free<strong>do</strong>m of the<br />
representative as much as possible, the aesthetic view acknowledges<br />
that the representative should possess an adequate scope for manoeuvre.<br />
This last view lies between the elitist and the principal-agent view<br />
and differs from both as it accentuates the role of representation as<br />
constituting the identity of the represented.