Democracy Today.indb - Universidade do Minho

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DEMOCRACY TODAY
should act as accurate as possible in accordance with the wishes of the
principal, as this is the only way the agent can continue his task. I will
argue here that this formalistic view is too limited and accordingly blind
to a core that is the same for all representational relations. The “etymology”
of the word re-presentation tells us that something/-one that is
not here is presented again through something/-one else (Ankersmit
2002, 108). The one(s) functioning as substitute or as replacement will
never be a perfect copy of the one(s) represented. Ankersmit tries to
elucidate this given by referring to the way in which a portrait represents
the one portrayed. “Portraits will differ dramatically from the
persons portrayed, yet this fact alone will not make us say that the
portrait is a distortion of reality, or a misrepresentation” (Ibid., 113).
That representation would be capable of mimicking the represented is
an illusion. The reason for this is that the one who represents cannot
‘read off’ the transparent and authentic characteristics and interests
of the represented, simply because they are not transparently given
(Saward 2010, 77). This should not be seen as a deviation. It is a functional
and creative freedom at the side of the representative to give a
particular interpretation of the identity of the represented. In the words
of Ankersmit there is an “aesthetic gap” between the represented and its
representatives. What happens in representation is that the represented
are depicted as such and such. Their (collective) identity is created,
by making something visible that was only there before implicitly.
The aesthetic gap thus creates the opportunity for the representative
to “partly determine the nature of what they represent” (Ankersmit
2002, 114). This is in contrast with the framing of representation as
a principal-agent relationship, as the focus is there explicitly on the
correct transmission of information from the principal to the agent
and on mechanisms that prevent the agent from deviating from the
preferences of the principal. Both the principal-agent and the aesthetic
model have different implications for the first legitimacy-question.
While the principal-agent view wants to constrain the freedom of the
representative as much as possible, the aesthetic view acknowledges
that the representative should possess an adequate scope for manoeuvre.
This last view lies between the elitist and the principal-agent view
and differs from both as it accentuates the role of representation as
constituting the identity of the represented.